id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cord-255514-wvjw8h4m	Ma, Yong	Tax evasion, audits with memory, and portfolio choice	2020-10-19		.txt	text/plain	6504	420	68	Assuming that tax audits and jumps in the risky asset both follow self-exciting Hawkes processes, we provide a semi-analytical solution to this problem for an agent with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. Considering audit memory, we investigate how an agent makes decisions about consumption, investment, and tax evasion in a financial market allowing for jump contagion. In this section, to demonstrate more clearly the implications of audits with memory for the power-utility agent's tax evasion, consumption and investment decisions, we consider the Poisson jump-diffusion model (16) for the risky asset price; accordingly our analysis is based on the results in Corollary 3.4. First, compared to the benchmark, the high (low) risk-averse agent tends to conceal more (less) of their risky investment when tax audits have memory property. These results indicate that audit memory reduces evasion more (less) efficiently by reducing the tax and increasing the fine for the high (low) risk-averse agent.	./cache/cord-255514-wvjw8h4m.txt	./txt/cord-255514-wvjw8h4m.txt