(PDF) What is Kant’s Transcendental Reflection? success fail Aug DEC Jan 20 2019 2020 2021 4 captures 28 Jul 2020 - 20 Dec 2020 About this capture COLLECTED BY Collection: Save Page Now TIMESTAMPS Conference PaperPDF AvailableWhat is Kant’s Transcendental Reflection? January 2018 DOI: 10.5840/wcp232018751730 Conference: XXIII World Congress of Philosophy Volume: 75 Projects: Role of the Transcendental Reflection in Implementation of the Power of Judgment by Judges Philosophical foundations of C. G. Jung's analytical psychology Authors: Valentin Balanovskiy Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University Download full-text PDFRead full-text Download full-text PDF Read full-text Download citation Copy link Link copied Read full-text Download citation Copy link Link copied References (14) Abstract The concept of ‘transcendental reflection’ has been under-studied despite its crucial significance for Kant’s philosophical system. Kant’s transcendental reflection is an instrument inherent in our consciousness. Without this instrument, one would be unable to distinguish between representations/ fantasies and the reality; to have self-consciousness; to identify the functions of the human soul; to distinguish between the effects of the senses, the understanding, and reason within these functions, including identifying the a priori forms of the senses, the understanding, and reason; and to classify representations by the faculty of cognition to which they belong. This study aims to reconstruct the main features of Kant’s ideas of transcendental reflection and to define this notion through analysing the Critique of Pure Reason and the other fundamental works of Kant. Discover the world's research 19+ million members 135+ million publications 700k+ research projects Join for free Public Full-text 1 Content uploaded by Valentin Balanovskiy Author contentAll content in this area was uploaded by Valentin Balanovskiy on Jul 13, 2018 Content may be subject to copyright. Theories of knowledge and epistemology (75) Valentin Balanovskiy  Abstract: The concept of transcendental reflection’ has been under-studied despite its crucial significance for  philosophical system. Kan transcendental reflection is an instrument inherent in our consciousness. Without this instrument, one would be unable to distinguish between representations/fantasies and the reality; to have self-consciousness; to identify the functions of the human soul; to distinguish between the effects of the senses, the understanding, and reason within these functions, including identifying the a priori forms of the senses, the understanding, and reason; and to classify representations by the faculty of cognition to which they belong. This study aims to reconstruct the   transcendental reflection and to define this notion through analysing the Critique of Pure Reason and the other fundamental works of Kant. Key words: transcendental reflection, Immanuel Kant, critical philosophy, transcendental rationalism, a priori forms, functions of consciousness, self-consciousness, transcendental and formal logic Text: The issue of the nature and functions of  transcendental reflection is quite complex; moreover, it remains insufficiently explored. The main problem is that, in most cases, the information Kant gives about this concept is implicit, which leads to a certain ambiguity in understanding this phenomenon. For example, Karin de Boer writes    transcendental reflection are notoriously obscure1. Indeed, Kant did not provide much information on transcendental reflection. As a result, researchers have not paid significant attention to the issue. Apparently, Kant assigns the meta-reflective function to transcendental reflection, i.e. he uses it to construct and describe his system as a whole addressing this notion in brief notes. E.g., in the Critique of Pure Reason, the most comprehensive information on transcendental reflection is contained in the Appendix on the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental2 (B 316-349). Stefan -Walter calls it the part of the Critique of Pure Reason that is least understood by researchers3. Some useful information can be found in  What objective unity of self-consciousness is4 (B 139-140), the chapters The discipline of pure reason5 (B 736-822) and The architectonic of pure reason6 (B 860-879), and the Critique of Judgment. At the same time, the importance of transcendental reflection is beyond doubt. In this respect, one cannot but agree with Kenneth Westphal that the lack of attention to this notion suggests that we have overlooked something very important for understanding and assessing 7. However, there have been several attempts to look into the matter. For 1 Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Refl, Kant Yearbook, 2 (2010), 53. 2 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 366-383. 3 -Walter, S.,          Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (2004), 146. 4 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 250-251. 5 Ibid, 628-671. 6 Ibid, 691-701. 7 Westphal, K., Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, 3. instance, Martin Liedtke pays special attention to the notion of reflection in the systems developed by Kant and his predecessors8. Kenneth Westphal criticises the inadequate    transcendentalism in the analytical tradition9. Stefan - Walter examines the connection between the notion of reflection in the transcendental topic and the concept of (Vorurteil) in  logic10. Anja Jauernig11 and Karin de Boer12 scrutinise the issue  representations through examining the mechanism of transcendental reflection. Kurt Walter Zeidler13 and Rudolf Malter14 consider a range of issues pertaining to the difference between transcendental and formal logics and between transcendental and logical reflection. Nevertheless, these attempts have not been sufficient to give a full picture of transcendental reflection. Therefore, let us turn for Kant assistance. It can be easily established that, in his texts, Kant refers to the reflexive phenomena of consciousness both explicitly and implicitly. E.g., the fundamentally reflexive nature of the understanding follows implicitly from the passages where Kant calls understanding the representation of a representation15 (B 93). The first explicit definition of reflection given in The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection suggests that Kant assigns two basic meanings to this notion, namely: 1) the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts (B 316)16, and 2) the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition (ibid)17. In the first citation, Kant defines reflection as the state of mind, which serves as the basis for all findings of the Transcendental Analytic. In particular, he identifies the first action that activates our self-consciousness. Without this reflection, the original synthetic unity of apperception is impossible18 (B 131-133), since, in this state of mind, an individual is aware that they are they and everything else is not them. Indeed, according to Kant, if we were not able to distinguish between the outer world and ourselves using transcendental reflection, we would not be conscious beings, and hence we would never be able to cognise, assess, or motivate ourselves. Therefore, the first function of transcendental reflection identified explicitly in the text is that of a means to distinguish between the subject and an object of any activity. In the second citation, Kant calls reflection a means to identify the status of representations based on their source and place in consciousness. This is the second most important function of transcendental reflection       emergence of the transcendental topic  a doctrine designed to assign a place to all concepts depending on whether it is used in the realm of senses/the understanding/the unity of both, or in 8 Liedtke, M., Der Begriff der reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Univ., Phil. Fak., Diss., Hamburg, 19Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 48 (1966), 207-216. 9 Westphal, K., , Kant-Studien, 94.2 (2003), 135-171, and Westphal, K., Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 10 -Walter, S., Topik, Reflexion und Vorurteilskritik: Kants Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe im Kontext, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (2004), 146-175. 11 Jauernig, A., , in D. Garber and B. Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns, Princeton, Oxford, 2008, 41-63. 12 Boer, K., Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant's first Critique, Kant Yearbook, 2 (2010), 53-73. 13 Zeidler, K.W., Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1992. 14 Malter, R., Logische und transzendentale Reflexion. Zu Kants Bestimmung des philosophiegeschichtlichen Ortes der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Revue internationale de philosophie, 35 (1981), 284-301. 15 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 205. 16 Ibid, 366. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid, 246-247. the realm of reason, or in the unity of the senses, the understanding, and reason19 (B 234-326).         meaningful transcendental topic and Aristotle formal logical topic20 (B 324-325). Therefore, without transcendental reflection as a universal differentiation tool, one would not be able either to establish adequate correlations between representations and notions, to distinguish between representations according to their sources, or to understand  transcendental deduction of categories, without which an adequate cognition of the outer world is impossible. Thus, in the first explicit definition of reflection, Kant stresses its two most significant and general functions characteristic of the whole Critique of Pure Reason: I)  , through which the subjective conditions for concept formation are determined. Its product is the transcendental unity of self- consciousness, which makes it possible to carry out the synthesis of the manifold given in a sensual intuition (since it assigns the identity of the subject to itself) and to maintain the integrity of the subject in the process of cognition. It protects the subject from dissolving in the object of cognition and preventing the objective world from dissolving in a subjective consciousness21 (B 134). II) Reflection as a tool for differentiating between, analysing and comparing the elements of consciousness, uncovering the structure and functions of consciousness, classifying the information contained in the consciousness by the place in its structure. In this sense, transcendental reflection has a multilevel structure. With some reservations, one can also attribute to this meaning of reflection  analytic of concepts as a method adapted to the needs of critical philosophy used not for a formal study of concepts, but for the analysis of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to research the possibility of a priori concepts22 (B 90). It is necessary to emphasise that this division of reflection functions in  system is not traditional for Kant studies. Most studies focus only on the second function, since it is rather evident. Indeed, in most cases, Kant explicitly calls the processes pertaining to the second meaning reflection or transcendental reflection. Moreover, Kant scholars usually limit the scope of inquiry to the Critique of Pure Reason neglecting the fact that transcendental reflection is connected to the reflective power (faculty) of judgment and, thus, to all human activities.  system must be considered as a whole; the fragments that are not clearly explained by Kant should be reconstructed. The author of this study attempted to reconstruct certain fragments of his PhD thesis. Some updated results and conclusions will be presented below. This study will concentrate on the second application of the notion of transcendental reflection and attempt to consider the issue in a wider context. As mentioned above, reflection as a means of differentiation is  more clearly and explicitly than reflection as a condition for the synthetic unity of apperception. Most researchers agree that, in this sense, the notion constitutes an important key to  as a whole23. To help his readers to understand the essence of the new concept, Kant distinguishes between two types of reflection  transcendental and logical ones. The difference between these types is considered in detail in Rudolf Malter24. This study will focus only on certain aspects thereof, since logical reflection is a necessary part of reflection as an all-embracing multi-level mechanism ensuring the functioning of human consciousness. Alongside transcendental reflection, Kant identifies logical reflection defined as a mere comparison, for in its case there is complete abstraction from the cognitive power to 19 Ibid, 305-371. 20 Ibid, 370-371. 21 Ibid, 247. 22 Ibid, 202. 23 Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant's first Critique, Kant Yearbook, 2 (2010), 62. 24 Malter, R., Logische und transzendentale Reflexion. Zu Kants Bestimmung des philosophiegeschichtlichen Ortes der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Revue internationale de philosophie, 35 (1981), 284-301. which the given representations belong25 (B 318). Moreover, logical reflection deals with notions and never with objects or things (Gegenstand), which is the main difference between logical and transcendental reflection. Logical reflection is governed by the principles of general (formal) logic, which has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather considers representations, whether they are originally given a priori in ourselves or only empirically, merely in respect of the laws according to which the understanding brings them into relation to one another when it thinks, and therefore it deals only with the form of the understanding26 (B 80). Thus, the purpose of logical reflection is manipulating the formal logical content of consciousness regardless of its origins or correlations in the outer world. This function is important but not exhaustive for a human being in the world depicted by Kant. In its turn, transcendental reflection is governed by the principles of transcendental logic, which  unlike general logic  has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason, but solely insofar as they are related to objects a priori27 (B 81-82). The main advantage of transcendental reflection is its connection to objects and, therefore, the reality, since transcendental reflection takes place in the realm of not only the understanding, but also the senses and reason, although Kant explicitly places transcendental reflection within the boundaries of the understanding and the senses. Indeed, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the notion primarily in the contexts that emphasise the facts that transcendental reflection belongs to the understanding and that it is used to coordinate the senses and the understanding28 (B 316). Thus, most researchers focus only on the epistemological significance of transcendental reflection. However, this does not exhaust the issue and there is a need to address the other works of Kant. In this respect, the Critique of Judgment and the Critique of Practical Reason are also important sources of information about the very essence of transcendental reflection. How can one reconstruct    explicit definition of transcendental reflection? Firstly, there is a close connection between transcendental reflection and the reflective power of judgment embracing all levels of our consciousness from the senses to reason. In effect, the functions of transcendental reflection go beyond the understanding, since the main contribution of transcendental reflection is facilitating reflective judgments. This is the only thing that ensures the adequacy of reflective judgments. However, reflective judgments are the   teleology, aesthetics, and morality. Therefore, according to Kant, transcendental reflection permeates all conscious activities. Secondly, Kant definition of understanding in general incorporates the power of judgment and reason alongside the understanding, whereas together they comprise the higher faculties of cognition29 (B 169). Thirdly system suggests a close connection between transcendental reflection and the ideal of pure reason. Based on the analysis of all Critiques, it is demonstrated that the ideal of pure reason can be described as a goal that determines the form of knowledge for each human activity, whereas transcendental reflection is a means to put the ideal of pure reason into practice i.e. to apply it to concrete disparate and multifarious empirical material30. Therefore, it is     system, transcendental reflection pertains to all content of human consciousness involved in fulfilling the functions of the soul. Therefore, transcendental reflection should have a multi-level structure. However, this creates a complication  transcendental logic is a complex discipline, which poses an obstacle to formalisation. Moreover, manipulation with 25 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 368. 26 Ibid, 196. 27 Ibid, 196-197. 28 Ibid, 366. 29 Ibid, 267. 30 Transcendental reflection and the ideal of pure reason in Kant's works, Vestnik IKBFU, 6 (2014), 7-13. reflective judgments remains an urgent issue. These circumstances, make the Critique of Judgment the most  oeuvre to interpret31. Kant demonstrates the functioning of both types of reflection through analysing the four pairs of concepts of reflection32 (B 317-324)  identity and difference, agreement and opposition, the inner and the outer, and the determinable and the determination (matter and form)33 (B 317). Kant conducts this analysis not only to criticise  idealism, but also and primarily to define transcendental reflection more precisely and accurately as compared to logical reflection, as well as to stress the advantages of meaningful consideration of objects as compared to the formal one. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that logical reflection is an ugly duckling in has an important function. It helps to analyse the relations between notions contained in consciousness for the compliance with the laws of general logic. Without this act of formal comparison (as well as without transcendental reflection), one can be confused by the reflective power of judgment. Without logical reflection, it is impossible to deal with large amounts of abstract information contained in the consciousness of the modern individual. It is worth noting that, before Kant created his system, there had been no need for transcendental reflection. Indeed, if one deals with only one function of consciousness  the epistemological function  and relies on the understanding or the senses, logical reflection proves to be sufficient, since the main task of such reflection is to analyse relations between representations for the compliance with the laws of logic. However, according to Kant, one will not suspect that they are surrounded by an illusion if one does not distinguish between their thinking, the process of cognition, and the outer world. Therefore, if one wants to cognise the reality, according to Kant, one should understand that thinking and cognizing are not the same and that there are two other functions of consciousness alongside the epistemological one. As one can see, the situation becomes increasingly complicated. Obviously, errors stemming from the confusion about the ways to use the cognitive mechanisms become possible. A correct use of the cognitive faculties requires a more delicate tool than logical reflection. Kant demonstrates that such tool  transcendental reflection  is inherent in our consciousness. According to Kant, transcendental reflection makes it possible to avoid many mistakes in the process of judgment formation. Moreover, it is well known that human knowledge consists of judgments. How does it work? Transcendental reflection makes it possible to answer a question on the nature of representations crucial for the adequate cognition before forming a judgment, namely, In which cognitive faculty do they belong together? Is it the understanding or is it the senses before which they are connected or compared?34 (B 316). This allows us to wake up from the dogmatic dream, where all judgments are accepted out of habit, or connected through inclination35 (Ibid). Transcendental reflection takes the central place in consciousness, especially when it considered in the context of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Therefore, one can suppose  remembering the primacy of practical reason over theoretical one  that transcendental reflection is rooted in reason. But in the Critique of Pure Reason there is only one indirect proof of this statement. In this place Kant underlines the deepest difference between logical and 31 These results were obtained from an expert survey undertaken by the author in 2014. For more information in English, see: http://www.kant-online.ru/en/?p=719. The survey results were published in Russian in 2014: Prioritetnye zadachi kantovedenija na blizhajshee desjatiletiePriorities of Kant Studies for the Next Decade), Kantovsiy Sbornik, 4 (2014), 116-122. 32 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 367-370. 33 Ibid, 367. 34 Ibid, 366. 35 Ibid. 36 (B 319). Hence, if both types of reflection belong to different faculties, and, surely, none of these faculties are the senses, consequently, logical reflection belongs to the understanding and transcendental reflection belongs to reason or, less likely, the power of judgment. The basis for transcendental reflection is a universal property of human beings, namely, activeness, since, according to Kant, the faculty of arbitrariness (or the self-motivation ability) is a fundamental characteristic of human consciousness and thus of reason. Nevertheless, certain doubts about the absoluteness of activeness for all faculties of the soul can arise if we consider the nature of the senses. It is an interesting issue, since Kant constantly emphasises certain passivity of the senses, which are permanently influenced by things in themselves; he also stresses that objects are given to us through the senses37 (B 74-75, 129, etc.). In fact, the senses are also active, although to a lesser degree than the understanding or reason. Finally, let us answer the question: w     Transcendental reflection is a complex differentiation tool that is inherent in our consciousness. It functions at three different levels: meta-level, transcendental level, and the level of formal logic. The first level is characterised by transcendental meta-reflection, which makes it possible to: a) identify the fundamental functions of the soul (axiological, epistemological, and practical ones); b) distinguish between the effect of the senses, the understanding, and reason in the framework of these functions, including identifying a priori forms of the senses, the understanding, and reason. The second level is characterised by transcendental reflection, which makes it possible to: a) determine the contribution of the senses, the understanding, and reason to constituting concepts; b) classify representations according to the faculty of cognition to which they belong; c) identify to what extent representations and concepts correspond to the reality (objects) using transcendental logic. The third level is represented by logical reflection making it possible to compare representations and concepts and ensure the compliance with the laws of general logic regardless of the content of cognition. The second and the third levels are described by Kant more explicitly than the first. An effective process of cognition requires all types of reflection applied within a systemic unity. The first two types of reflection should be used at the early stages of cognition and data processing in judgments, whereas the third type should be used when dealing with ready knowledge analysed for the compliance with the laws of formal logic.  transcendental reflection has long outlived its creator. It contributed to the theory of judgment meeting the  phenomenology in the development of the crucial notion of phenomenological reflection38. However, some authors focusing on reflective phenomena seem to     legacy. E.g., Patricia M. King and Karen Strohm Kitchener wrote a book entitled Developing Reflective Judgment, where they construct a model of cognitive development that describes how people justify their beliefs when they are faced with complex or vexing problems39 and argue that real problems cannot be solved by formal logic alone without true reflective thinking40.  concept of transcendental reflection. However, the book contains no mention of either Kant or Husserl. It means that there is a strong need for the notion of reflection, which proved to be useful in philosophy and psychology, therefore, Kant's system retains a high heuristic potential. 36 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1929, 278. In this place I have to refer to the Critique, because in this concrete case it is more adequate the German original text, then modern Cambridge Edition. 37 Ibid, 193-194, 226. 38 Loidolt, S., Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders, in S.  Hartimo, T. Miettinen (eds.), Phenomenology and the Transcendental, Routledge, New Yourk, 2014, 198-210. 39 King, P.M., Strohm Kitchener, K., Developing Reflective Judgment, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1994, 5. 40 Ibid, 6. References Balanovskiy, V., Prioritetnye zadachi kantovedenija na blizhajshee desjatiletie (Priorities of Kant Studies for the Next Decade), Kantovskij Sbornik, 4 (2014), 116-122. Balanovskiy, V., Transcendental reflection and the ideal of pure reason in Kant's works, Vestnik IKBFU, 6 (2014), 7-13. Boer, K., Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant's first Critique, Kant Yearbook, 2 (2010), 53-73 -Walter, S., Topik, Reflexion und Vorurteilskritik: Kants Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe im Kontext, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (2004), 146- 175. Jauernig, A.,            Leibniz, in D. Garber and B. Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns, Princeton, Oxford, 2008, 41-63. Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1929. King, P.M., Strohm Kitchener, K., Developing Reflective Judgment, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1994. Liedtke, M., Der Begriff der Reflexion bei Kant, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 48 (1966), 207-216. Liedtke, M., Der Begriff der reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Univ., Phil. Fak., Diss., Hamburg, 1964. Loidolt, S., Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders, in S.   Hartimo, T. Miettinen (eds.), Phenomenology and the Transcendental, Routledge, New York, 2014, 190-217.       Zu Kants Bestimmung des philosophiegeschichtlichen Ortes der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Revue internationale de philosophie, 35 (1981), 284-301. Westphal, K.,         Response to Skepticism, Kant-Studien, 94.2 (2003), 135-171. Westphal, K., Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. Zeidler, K.W., Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1992. Dr. Valentin Balanovskiy Russia, Kaliningrad Email: v.v.balanovskiy@gmail.com Citations (0) References (14) ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication. Kant's critique of the Leibnizian philosophy: Contra the Leibnizians, but pro Leibniz Chapter Jul 2008 Anja Jauernig View Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism Article Dec 2004 Kenneth R. Westphal This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but (unqualified) realism regarding physical objects. Westphal attends to neglected topics - Kant's analyses of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold, the 'lifelessness of matter', fallibilism, the semantics of cognitive reference, four externalist aspects of Kant's views, and the importance of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations for the Critique of Pure Reason - that illuminate Kant's enterprise in new and valuable ways. His book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant's theoretical philosophy. View Show abstract Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique Chapter May 2010 Karin Boer View The Critique of Pure Reason Book Jan 1999 Kant I. View Topik, Reflexion und Vorurteilskritik: Kants Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe im Kontext Article Jan 2004 Arch Gesch Philosoph STEFAN HESSBRüGGEN-WALTER View Der Begriff der Reflexion bei Kant Article Jan 1966 Arch Gesch Philosoph MAX LIEDTKE View Epistemic Reflection and Cognitive Reference in Kants Transcendental Response to Skepticism Article Jan 2003 Kenneth R. Westphal View Der Begriff der reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Article Max. Liedtke Bibliography: p. 166-168. Vita. Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Hamburg, 1964. View Show abstract The Critique of Pure Reason / I. Kant. Article Jan 1952 Immanuel Kant Traducción de: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kritik der Urteilskraft View Show abstract Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1992. Dr. Valentin Balanovskiy Russia K W Zeidler Zeidler, K.W., Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1992. Dr. Valentin Balanovskiy Russia, Kaliningrad Email: v.v.balanovskiy@gmail.com Show more Advertisement Recommendations Discover more Project Philosophical foundations of C. G. Jung's analytical psychology Valentin Balanovskiy View project Project Russian Philosophical and Psychological Thought of the End of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries and Analytical Psychology of C.G. Jung: Influence, Reception, Criticism Valentin Balanovskiy Ideas, as well as a personality of C.G. Jung are still the subject of great interest among professional community and a wide range of readers in Russia and foreign countries. However, there are not so many fundamental works, which explicate philosophical foundations of analytical psychology. At that the majority of such researches (which are still very rare) deal only with ideas of the narrow range of philosophers, whose influence admits Jung himself. More often in such works are mentioned only two names – I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer. Regarding an influence of Russian philosophical and psychological thought on the analytical psychology, it would be truth to say that in this area was made almost nothing. Hence, a reconstruction of historical-philosophical context and systemic philosophical conceptualization of Jung’s discoveries are strongly far from its finish. This research project is aimed to fulfill designated above lacuna in a studying of the philosophical foundations of analytical psychology. I plan to make a stress on a studying of different links between Russian philosophical and historical-philosophical thought and analytical psychology. These links are not limited to only perceiving and creative development of Jung’s ideas, as we can see by the example B.P. Vysheslavtsev (his ethics of transfigured Eros). These links spread much further and predominantly appear in the influence of monodualism of N. Grot, transcendentalism of E. Medtner, conception of destruction of S. Spielrein, and (according to E.V. Chernosvitov) on the forming of theoretical basis of Jung’s concept and the method of analytical psychology. Implementation of the project will allows integrating Jung’s heritage in more wide historical-philosophical context that will help to increase essentially a scope of the use of analytical psychology, which has a strong, but still insufficient explored, heuristic potential. The project also will give necessary material for an adequate estimation of Russian thinkers’ (Grot, Medtner, Spielrein, Vysheslavtsev) contribution to the development of Russian and foreign philosophy and psychology. To resolve this task it is particularly planned to introduce in scientific discourse the archive sources, which regard the issue of Vysheslavtsev’s and Jung’s mutual influence. ... [more] View project Project Role of the Transcendental Reflection in Implementation of the Power of Judgment by Judges Valentin Balanovskiy Elina Plotnikova According to Kant all activity of the subject - theoretical, practical and aesthetic - is connected with the implementation of the power of judgment. However, at the stage of making a judgment - th eoretical, practical or aesthetic – there is a high probability of an improper blending of the contents of consciousness, which leads to errors. In theoretical activity, flaws of the power of judgment can lead to false conclusions, in practical – to making wrong decisions that can cause damage both to the subject himself and to the subjects or objects with which he interacts. This becomes especially urgent in the context of making adjudications, on which people's lives depend. In "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant gives an example of a judge with flaws of power of judgment, who knows perfectly the laws, but does not know how to apply his knowledge to specific cases. It is therefore extremely important to understand why judges make errors when they implement the power of judgment, what are these errors are and how to avoid them. In particular, a means of minimizing the risk of error due to wrongful blending of dissimilar contents of consciousness in making judgments is transcendental reflection – is a complex differentiation tool that is inherent in our consciousness. It functions at three different levels: meta-level, transcendental level, and the level of formal logic. The study of the features of the functioning of transcendental reflection in judicial practice will allow not only to better understand the cause of the errors, but also to develop recommendations for their elimination. ... [more] View project Project C. G. Jung and N. O. Lossky on the Improving of Personality and Society: Comparative Analysis, Criticism, Modeling of Possible Scenarios of Future Valentin Balanovskiy With the development of new technologies and the automation of production and management processes, with the advent of more free time, the personal qualities of the individual and his ability to co ordinate with others will play an increasingly important role. Artificial assistants, as well as the new system of distribution of economic benefits, will allow many to rid themselves of the need to independently provide basic needs. On the one hand, it is good. On the other hand, the availability of leisure and new opportunities can be a great challenge. An undeveloped, poorly motivated person in the absence of external incentives and constraints, such as the need to independently meet their needs and interact with others, and with the availability of technological means, may pose a threat to themselves and society. On the one hand, such a person without the pressure of external circumstances may simply begin to degrade. On the other hand, progress gives everyone new opportunities. Now, any person becomes a big boss with a staff of artificial assistants. Thus, from how developed and mentally healthy the individual will depend how he will use his free time and technological resource. In turn, Jung and Lossky not only point the way to improving the personality through identifying and overcoming unconscious and egoistic inclinations, but also give an answer to the question of how a transformed personality can contribute to the evolution of society. ... [more] View project Chapter Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay January 2017 Dennis Schulting This chapter introduces the themes of the book, particular in respect of Kant’s representationalism and his thesis of the “radical faculty of cognition”, which relate to Kant’s subjectivism. Kant’s subjectivism is addressed with respect to four seminal strands of current research in Kant’s theoretical philosophy: (1) the role of self-consciousness in objective cognition, (2) perceptual knowledge ... [Show full abstract] of spatial objects, (3) nonconceptualism and (4) transcendental idealism. The central claim of the book is that in all of these strands Kant is shown to be a radical subjectivist regarding the possibility of knowledge, and that only reading Kant as a thoroughgoing subjectivist, in the Critical, non-reductive sense defined, saves TD from standard charges of incoherence, inconsistency, or relativism/scepticism: (1) Kantian subjectivity, in virtue of the principle of apperception or transcendental self-consciousness, is solely constitutive of the very conception of what an object is or what objectivity means, so that objective validity must be seen as intrinsic to thought itself; (2) Kantian subjectivity, in virtue of the principle of apperception, given sensory input, is solely constitutive of the possibility of perceiving objects as determinate spaces, without however thereby reducing space as infinite given magnitude to being the product of the understanding (contra an influential reading), which ties in with the fact that (3) not all mental content or intuition, in Kant’s terms, is dependent on the understanding, leaving room for ‘merely’ subjective representation or non-apperceptive consciousness or ‘blind’ intuition of spatial objects, i.e. minimally nonconceptual content; (4) our subjective conceptuality, not just the forms of our sensible intuition, already entails idealism about objects (contra a standard reading that the argument of TD can and must be seen separately from the doctrine of idealism) but does not run afoul of the absolute-idealist critique that Kantian ‘merely’ “subjective” idealism leads to scepticism (contra Hegelian appropriations). Read more Article Varieties of Reflection in Kant's Logic April 2015 · British Journal for the History of Philosophy Melissa McBay Merritt For Kant, ‘reflection’ (Überlegung, Reflexion) is a technical term with a range of senses. I focus here on the senses of reflection that come to light in Kant's account of logic, and then bring the results to bear on the distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘transcendental’ reflection that surfaces in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although recent commentary has followed ... [Show full abstract] similar cues, I suggest that it labours under a blind spot, as it neglects Kant's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic. The foundational text of existing interpretations is a passage in Logik Jäsche that appears to attribute to Kant the view that reflection is a mental operation involved in the generation of concepts from non-conceptual materials. I argue against the received view by attending to Kant's division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic, identifying senses of reflection proper to each, and showing that none accords well with the received view. Finally, to take account of Kant's notion of transcendental reflection I show that we need to be attentive to the concerns of applied logic and how they inform the domain-relative transcendental logic that Kant presents in the first Critique. Read more Article Full-text available Кант versus Владимир Соловьёв: гносеология с рефлексией и без таковой January 2011 · Kantian Journal Valentin Balanovskiy This article seeks to compare Immanuel Kant's and Vladimir Solovyov's gnosiologies. The comparison is based on the philosophers' attitude to reflection — a basic cognitive mechanism. If, according to Kant, the acquisition of true knowledge is impossible without reflection (including transcendental reflection), Solovyov builds his theory of knowledge on entirely different grounds, therefore, he ... [Show full abstract] has to rely on God and intellectual intuition in discovering the truth. Only having established the pros and cons of both gnoseologies, we can define whose theory — Kant’s or Solovyov’s — is more suitable to describe the process of cognition by a human being — a being in possession of rather modest cognitive tools. Сравниваются гносеологии Иммануила Канта и Владимира Соловьёва. Основанием для сопоставления систем двух философов является их отношение к рефлексии — фундаментальнейшему когнитивному механизму. Если для Канта обретение достоверного знания невозможно без использования рефлексии (в том числе трансцендентальной), то Соловьёв строит свою теорию познания на совершенно иных основаниях, из-за чего вынужден полагаться в деле открытия истины на Бога и интеллектуальную интуицию. Только выяснив плюсы и минусы обеих гносеологий, можно определить, концепция какого из мыслителей в большей степени подходит для описания процесса постижения мира человеком, то есть существом, обладающим довольно скромным когнитивным инструментарием. View full-text Conference Paper Bringing representations to distinctness: German Rationalist method, the Critical Philosophy, and th... August 2018 Helen Sarah Robertson The so-called ‘amphiboly’ section of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a section that has remained relatively understudied in commentaries and literature on the Critique. In this brief appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant puts forward a charge against his German Rationalist heritage – the philosophical tradition of Leibniz, Wolf, Baumgarten – claiming for this heritage the error of an ... [Show full abstract] ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. When the precise nature of this charge is appreciated, it is possible to see that both the recognition of the error and the identifcation of its correction play a crucial role in the Critical philosophy itself. In this study, it is my aim to bring to light certain signifcant details of Kant’s case in the appendix and the crucial ways in which these play a subsequent role in the Critique itself. The study begins with an examination of the case in the appendix, focussing on what I take to be a crucial line of reasoning found in its introductory passages. Thereafter, the study divides broadly into two parts. In the frst part, I examine the line of reasoning insofar as it concerns a claimed error in the German Rationalist tradition. I show that the error is to be found in an implicit commitment in the frst stage of the German Rationalist method for philosophical cognition, the stage of bringing the representations of philosophy to distinctness, and show the line of reasoning in the appendix to constitute Kant’s Critical response to this commitment. In the later part of the study, I turn to the signifcance of the line of reasoning for the early parts of the Critique, in particular for the proofs of the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition, showing these proofs to be the culmination of Kant’s corrected Critical method for bringing the representations of philosophy to distinctness. Read more Last Updated: 09 Nov 2020 Discover the world's research Join ResearchGate to find the people and research you need to help your work. 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