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Find sources: "Justification" epistemology – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (March 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Part of a series on Epistemology Category Index Outline Core concepts Belief Justification Knowledge Truth Distinctions A priori vs. A posteriori Analytic vs. Synthetic Schools of thought Empiricism Naturalism Pragmatism Rationalism Relativism Skepticism Topics and views Certainty Coherentism Contextualism Dogmatism Experience Fallibilism Foundationalism Induction Infallibilism Infinitism Rationality Reason Solipsism Specialized domains of inquiry Evolutionary epistemology Feminist epistemology Formal epistemology Metaepistemology Social epistemology Notable epistemologists René Descartes Sextus Empiricus Edmund Gettier David Hume Immanuel Kant W. V. O. Quine more... Related fields Epistemic logic Philosophy of mind Philosophy of perception Philosophy of science Probability v t e Justification (also called epistemic justification) is a concept in epistemology used to describe beliefs that one has good reason for holding.[1] Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of warrant (a proper justification for holding a belief), knowledge, rationality, and probability, among others. Loosely speaking, justification is the reason that someone holds a rationally admissible belief (although the term is also sometimes applied to other propositional attitudes such as doubt). Debates surrounding epistemic justification often involve the structure of justification, including whether there are foundational justified beliefs or whether mere coherence is sufficient for a system of beliefs to qualify as justified. Another major subject of debate is the sources of justification, which might include perceptual experience (the evidence of the senses), reason, and authoritative testimony, among others. Contents 1 Justification and knowledge 2 Conceptions of justification 3 Theories of justification 4 Criticism of theories of justification 5 See also 6 References 7 External links 7.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7.2 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Justification and knowledge[edit] "Justification" involves the reasons why someone holds a belief that one should hold based on one's current evidence.[1] Justification is a property of beliefs insofar as they are held blamelessly. In other words, a justified belief is a belief that a person is entitled to hold. According to Edmund Gettier, many figures in the history of philosophy have treated "justified true belief" as constituting knowledge. It is particularly associated with a theory discussed in Plato's dialogues Meno and Theaetetus. While in fact Plato seems to disavow justified true belief as constituting knowledge at the end of Theaetetus, the claim that Plato unquestioningly accepted this view of knowledge stuck.[1] The subject of justification has played a major role in the value of knowledge as "justified true belief".[citation needed] Some contemporary epistemologists, such as Jonathan Kvanvig assert that justification isn't necessary in getting to the truth and avoiding errors. Kvanvig attempts to show that knowledge is no more valuable than true belief, and in the process dismissed the necessity of justification due to justification not being connected to the truth.[citation needed] Conceptions of justification[edit] William P. Alston identifies two conceptions of justification.[2]:15–16 One conception is "deontological" justification, which holds that justification evaluates the obligation and responsibility of a person having only true beliefs. This conception implies, for instance, that a person who has made his best effort but is incapable of concluding the correct belief from his evidence is still justified. The deontological conception of justification corresponds to epistemic internalism. Another conception is "truth-conducive" justification, which holds that justification is based on having sufficient evidence or reasons that entails that the belief is at least likely to be true. The truth-conductive conception of justification corresponds to epistemic externalism. Theories of justification[edit] There are several different views as to what entails justification, mostly focusing on the question "How sure do we need to be that our beliefs correspond to the actual world?" Different theories of justification require different conditions before a belief can be considered justified. Theories of justification generally include other aspects of epistemology, such as knowledge. Notable theories of justification include: Foundationalism – Basic beliefs justify other, non-basic beliefs. Epistemic coherentism – Beliefs are justified if they cohere with other beliefs a person holds, each belief is justified if it coheres with the overall system of beliefs. Infinitism – Beliefs are justified by infinite chains of reasons. Foundherentism – A combination of foundationalism and epistemic coherentism, proposed by Susan Haack Internalism – The believer must be able to justify a belief through internal knowledge. Externalism – Outside sources of knowledge can be used to justify a belief. Reformed epistemology – Beliefs are warranted by proper cognitive function, proposed by Alvin Plantinga. Epistemic skepticism – A variety of viewpoints questioning the possibility of knowledge Evidentialism – Beliefs depend solely on the evidence for them. Reliabilism - A belief is justified if it is the result of a reliable process. Criticism of theories of justification[edit] Robert Fogelin claims to detect a suspicious resemblance between the theories of justification and Agrippa's five modes leading to the suspension of belief. He concludes that the modern proponents have made no significant progress in responding to the ancient modes of Pyrrhonian skepticism.[3] William P. Alston criticizes the very idea of a theory of justification. He claims: "There isn't any unique, epistemically crucial property of beliefs picked out by 'justified'. Epistemologists who suppose the contrary have been chasing a will-of-the-wisp. What has really been happening is this. Different epistemologists have been emphasizing, concentrating on, "pushing" different epistemic desiderata, different features of belief that are positively valuable from the standpoint of the aims of cognition."[2]:22 See also[edit] Dream argument Münchhausen trilemma References[edit] ^ a b c "Epistemic Justification". Internet Enyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 6 July 2020. ^ a b William. P. Alston, Beyond "Justification": dimensions of epistemic evaluation, Cornell University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-8014-4291-5 ^ Robert J. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1994, ISBN 978-0-19-508987-5 External links[edit] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[edit] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemology, 2. What is Justification? Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy[edit] Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemic Justification Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemic Entitlement Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemic Consequentialism Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Coherentism in Epistemology Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Contextualism in Epistemology v t e Epistemology Epistemologists Thomas Aquinas Augustine of Hippo William Alston Robert Audi A. J. Ayer George Berkeley Laurence BonJour Keith DeRose René Descartes John Dewey Fred Dretske Edmund Gettier Alvin Goldman Nelson Goodman Paul Grice Anil Gupta Susan Haack David Hume Immanuel Kant Søren Kierkegaard Peter Klein Saul Kripke Hilary Kornblith David Lewis John Locke G. E. Moore John McDowell Robert Nozick Alvin Plantinga Plato Duncan Pritchard James Pryor Hilary Putnam W. V. O. Quine Thomas Reid Bertrand Russell Gilbert Ryle Wilfrid Sellars Susanna Siegel Ernest Sosa P. F. Strawson Baruch Spinoza Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Nicholas Wolterstorff Vienna Circle more... Theories Coherentism Constructivism Contextualism Empiricism Evolutionary epistemology Fallibilism Feminist epistemology Fideism Foundationalism Holism Infinitism Innatism Naïve realism Naturalized epistemology Phenomenalism Positivism Rationalism Reductionism Reliabilism Representational realism Skepticism Transcendental idealism Concepts A priori knowledge A posteriori knowledge Analysis Analytic–synthetic distinction Belief Common sense Descriptive knowledge Exploratory thought Gettier problem Induction Internalism and externalism Justification Knowledge Objectivity Privileged access Problem of induction Problem of other minds Perception Procedural knowledge Proposition Regress argument Simplicity Speculative reason Truth more... Related articles Outline of epistemology Faith and rationality Formal epistemology Meta-epistemology Philosophy of perception Philosophy of science Social epistemology Category Task Force Stubs Discussion v t e Positivism Perspectives Antihumanism Empiricism Rationalism Scientism Declinations Legal positivism Logical positivism / analytic philosophy Positivist school Postpositivism Sociological positivism Machian positivism (empirio-criticism) Rankean historical positivism Polish positivism Russian Machism Principal concepts Consilience Demarcation Evidence Induction Justification Pseudoscience Critique of metaphysics Unity of science Verificationism Antitheses Antipositivism Confirmation holism Critical theory Falsifiability Geisteswissenschaft Hermeneutics Historicism Historism Human science Humanities Methodological dualism Problem of induction Reflectivism Related paradigm shifts in the history of science Non-Euclidean geometry (1830s) Uncertainty principle (1927) Related topics Behavioralism Post-behavioralism Critical rationalism Criticism of science Epistemology anarchism idealism nihilism pluralism realism Holism Instrumentalism Modernism Naturalism in literature Nomothetic–idiographic distinction Objectivity in science Operationalism Phenomenalism Philosophy of science Deductive-nomological model Ramsey sentence Sense-data theory Qualitative research Relationship between religion and science Sociology Social science Philosophy Structural functionalism Structuralism Structuration theory Positivist-related debate Method Methodenstreit (1890s) Werturteilsstreit (1909–1959) Positivismusstreit (1960s) Fourth Great Debate in international relations (1980s) Science wars (1990s) Contributions The Course in Positive Philosophy (1830) A General View of Positivism (1848) Critical History of Philosophy (1869) Idealism and Positivism (1879–1884) The Analysis of Sensations (1886) The Logic of Modern Physics (1927) Language, Truth, and Logic (1936) The Two Cultures (1959) The Universe in a Nutshell (2001) Proponents Richard Avenarius A. J. Ayer Alexander Bogdanov Auguste Comte Eugen Dühring Émile Durkheim Ernst Laas Ernst Mach Berlin Circle Vienna Circle Criticism Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909) History and Class Consciousness (1923) The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934) The Poverty of Historicism (1936) World Hypotheses (1942) Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951) Truth and Method (1960) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) Conjectures and Refutations (1963) One-Dimensional Man (1964) Knowledge and Human Interests (1968) The Poverty of Theory (1978) The Scientific Image (1980) The Rhetoric of Economics (1986) Critics Theodor W. Adorno Gaston Bachelard Mario Bunge Wilhelm Dilthey Paul Feyerabend Hans-Georg Gadamer Thomas Kuhn György Lukács Karl Popper Willard Van Orman Quine Max Weber Concepts in contention Knowledge Objectivity Phronesis Truth Verstehen Category Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Justification_(epistemology)&oldid=996430123" Categories: Metatheory Justification Epistemological theories Hidden categories: Articles with short description Short description is different from Wikidata Articles needing additional references from March 2016 All articles needing additional references All articles with unsourced statements Articles with unsourced statements from July 2020 Articles containing German-language text Navigation menu Personal tools Not logged in Talk Contributions Create account Log in Namespaces Article Talk Variants Views Read Edit View history More Search Navigation Main page Contents Current events Random article About Wikipedia Contact us Donate Contribute Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file Tools What links here Related changes Upload file Special pages Permanent link Page information Cite this page Wikidata item Print/export Download as PDF Printable version In other projects Wikimedia Commons Languages العربية Deutsch Eesti Español فارسی Français Hrvatski Italiano Қазақша Português Sicilianu Slovenčina کوردی Suomi Tagalog Edit links This page was last edited on 26 December 2020, at 15:41 (UTC). 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