T. M. Scanlon - Wikipedia T. M. Scanlon From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigation Jump to search American philosopher This biography of a living person relies too much on references to primary sources. Please help by adding secondary or tertiary sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. (February 2011) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) T. M. Scanlon T. M. Scanlon at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics in 2018. Born Thomas Michael Scanlon (1940-06-28) June 28, 1940 (age 80) Nationality American Alma mater Princeton University Harvard University Era 21st-century philosophy Region Western philosophy School Analytic philosophy Institutions Princeton University Harvard University Main interests Contractualism Influences John Rawls Immanuel Kant Jean-Jacques Rousseau Saul Kripke Influenced Thomas Nagel Derek Parfit Christine Korsgaard Pamela Hieronymi Thomas Michael "Tim" Scanlon (/ˈskænlən/; born 1940), usually cited as T. M. Scanlon, is an American philosopher. At the time of his retirement in 2016, he was the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity[1] in Harvard University's Department of Philosophy, where he had taught since 1984.[2][3] He was elected to the American Philosophical Society in 2018.[4] Contents 1 Life and career 2 Philosophical work 2.1 Contractualism 3 In popular culture 4 Selected works 4.1 Books 4.2 Chapters in books 4.3 Articles 5 References 6 Sources 7 External links Life and career[edit] Born June 28, 1940, Scanlon grew up in Indianapolis, Indiana; obtained his undergraduate degree from Princeton University in 1962; earned his PhD in philosophy from Harvard under Burton Dreben; studied for a year at Oxford University on a Fulbright Scholarship; and returned to Princeton University, where he taught from 1966 until 1984.[2] He was made a MacArthur Fellow in 1993.[5] His teaching in the department has included courses on theories of justice, equality, and recent ethical theory. His book, What We Owe to Each Other, was published by Harvard University Press in 1998; a collection of papers on political theory, The Difficulty of Tolerance, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003. Scanlon is the father-in-law of philosopher and African-American studies scholar Tommie Shelby. Philosophical work[edit] His dissertation and some of his first papers were in mathematical logic, where his main concern was in proof theory, but he turned to ethics and political philosophy, where he developed a version of contractualism in the line of John Rawls, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Scanlon has also published important work on freedom of speech, equality, tolerance, foundations of contract law, human rights, conceptions of welfare, theories of justice, as well as on foundational questions in moral theory. Contractualism[edit] This article is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (July 2019) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Contractualism is a constructivist attempt at providing a unified account of the subject matter of a central part of morality which Scanlon calls "what we owe to each other". The normative domain of what we owe to each other is meant to encompass those duties to other people which we bear in virtue of their standing as rational creatures. A broader conception of morality includes whatever else we may owe to specific people, such as the special obligations we bear in relations with friends and family, or whatever else morality may require of us, such as the way in which we treat ourselves or nature. Scanlon believes that what we owe to each other, or what we could loosely call "the morality of right and wrong", is distinct from this broader conception of morality in that contractualism provides a unified account of its content.[6] In Scanlon's contractualism, judgements about right and wrong, unlike empirical judgements, are not theoretical claims about the nature of the spatiotemporal world but rather practical claims about what we have reason to do.[7] Further, they are a particularly important class of practical claims in that the judgement that an action is wrong is taken to provide reasons to not do that action which are most often considered to be decisive against competing reasons.[8] Following this point, Scanlon takes questions about the reason-giving force of moral judgements to be prior to questions about the subject matter of the morality of right and wrong.[9] More explicitly, he thinks that if we provide an account of the extraordinary reason-giving force of moral judgements then this account could largely form the basis for a characterisation of the subject matter of what we owe to each other. Scanlon grounds the reason-giving force of judgements about right and wrong in "the positive value of a way of living with others".[10] A way of living with others which is typified by an ideal of mutual recognition between rational agents, where mutual recognition demands that moral agents acknowledge the value of human life and respond to this value in the right ways. On the question of how ought we to value human, or rational, life, Scanlon argues that different valuable things require different ways of valuing. In contrast to teleological accounts of value, often to take something to be of value is not only to see reason to bring about a maximal amount of that thing.[11] This is especially true when considering the value of human life. When we value human life, he writes, we do not see this as a reason to create as much human life as we can. Rather, we tend to see reason to respect other human beings, to protect them from death and other forms of harm and, in general, to want their lives to go well. More important for Scanlon, to value rational life is to recognize the features which distinguish rational life from other valuable things, specifically, the ability of rational creatures to assess reasons and judgements, and to govern their lives in accordance with these assessments. Scanlon asserts that the proper response to the recognition of these distinctive features is to treat rational creatures in terms of principles which they could not reasonably reject.[12] From this point, Scanlon's account of the value of rational life provides a focus around which his account of the reason-giving force of moral judgements dovetails quite neatly with a characterization of the method of reasoning which we use to arrive at judgements of right and wrong, a method, moreover, which seems to be phenomenologically plausible. The reason-giving force of moral judgements is grounded in an ideal of mutual recognition which requires treating others in accordance with principles that they could not reasonably reject. Because mutual recognition requires that these other people are also appropriately motivated, this entails Scanlon's formulation of wrongness: "An act is wrong if and only if any principle that permitted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected by people moved to find principles for the general regulation of behaviour that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject".[13] An act is right, quite simply, if a principle permitting it could not reasonably be rejected in terms of this contractualist formulation. Regarding how moral principles are derived from the contractualist formulation, when considering whether a principle can be rejected we must take into account the consequences, in general, of its being accepted, not only the consequences of the particular actions that it allows.[14] Because we cannot be sure about who will be affected by a principle, and how they will be affected, we must draw on our experience of life and consider the "generic reasons" which individuals are likely to have, as a result of their general circumstances, to reject a principle.[15] In order to determine whether a principle is reasonably rejectable, we must impartially weigh these generic reasons against each other,[16] and exercising our judgement, draw a conclusion about what the weight of reasons support.[17] Given the motivation of finding principles for the general regulation of society that no-one could reasonably reject, if the weight of reasons support a certain conclusion then it would be unreasonable to reject that conclusion.[18] Importantly, principles can only be rejected by individuals; aggregation of reasons across individuals is not allowed.[19] So if the generic reasons of an individual carry more weight than any other individual's generic reasons, then his generic reasons are (for the most part) decisive in determining principles. The generic reasons which are open to consideration under the contractualist formulation are any reasons which we judge as relevant to reasonable rejectability. This requires that we exercise our judgement in determining whether such reasons would be suitable grounds for mutual recognition.[20] Therefore, that a principle would negatively affect a person's well-being is not the only kind of reason which may be brought against a principle. Other considerations, such as how a burden would be imposed by a principle, can serve as reasonable grounds for rejection. While contractualism only provides an account of that central part of morality which deals with what we owe to each other, Scanlon writes that this part of morality is related to the broader realm of morality in complex ways. There is pressure for the morality of what we owe to each other to acknowledge the values included in the broader realm of morality insofar as principles which don't make room for these values could be reasonably rejected. In turn, these values must accommodate the dictates of what we owe to each other to the extent that they involve relations with others, who have separate moral standing.[21] In popular culture[edit] Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other is referenced several times in the American television series The Good Place, serving as the initial text used to instruct the protagonist Eleanor, who has apparently ended up in Heaven by mistake.[22][23] The phrase "What We Owe to Each Other" is used as the title of the sixth episode of the first season, and that episode features a summary of Scanlon's ideas, as does the season two finale. Scanlon's ideas play a prominent role in the series finale, in which Eleanor finally finishes reading Scanlon's book and uses the principles of contractualism to explain a crucial decision that she makes. Selected works[edit] Books[edit] Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674950894. Scanlon, T. M. (2003). The difficulty of tolerance: essays in political philosophy. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780511615153. Scanlon, T. M. (2008). Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674043145. Scanlon, T. M. (2014). Being realistic about reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199678488. Scanlon, T. M. (2018). Why does inequality matter?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198812692. Chapters in books[edit] Scanlon, T. M. (1977), "Due process", in Pennock, J. Roland; Chapman, John W. (eds.), Due process, Nomos Series no. 18, New York: New York University Press, pp. 93–125, ISBN 9780814765692.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Preview. Scanlon, Thomas M. (1977), "Liberty, contract, and contribution", in Dworkin, Gerald; Bermant, Gordon; Brown, Peter G. (eds.), Markets and morals, Washington New York: Hemisphere Pub. Corp. Distributed solely by Halsted Press, pp. 43–67, ISBN 9780470991695.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, Thomas M. (1979), "Human rights as a neutral concern", in Brown, Peter; McLean, Douglas (eds.), Human rights and U.S. foreign policy: principles and applications, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, pp. 83–92, ISBN 9780669028072.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, Thomas M. (1981), "Ethics and the control of research", in Gaylin, Willard; Macklin, Ruth; Powledge, Tabitha M. (eds.), Violence and the politics of research, New York: Plenum Press, pp. 225–256, ISBN 9780306407895.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (1982), "Contractualism and utilitarianism", in Sen, Amartya; Williams, Bernard (eds.), Utilitarianism and beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 103–128, ISBN 9780511611964.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (1988), "The significance of choice", in Sen, Amartya; McMurrin, Sterling M. (eds.), The Tanner lectures on human values VIII, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, pp. 149–216, ISBN 9780874803020.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Pdf. Scanlon, T. M. (1991), "The moral basis of interpersonal comparisons", in Elster, Jon; Roemer, John E. (eds.), Interpersonal comparisons of well-being, Cambridge England New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 17–44, ISBN 9780521457224.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (1997). The diversity of objections to inequality. The Lindley Lecture, 1996. Lawrence, Kansas: Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas. Pdf. Reprinted as: Scanlon, T. M. (2000), "The diversity of objections to inequality", in Clayton, Matthew; Williams, Andrew (eds.), The ideal of equality, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Macmillan Press St. Martin's Press, pp. 41–59, ISBN 9780333686980.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Also available as: Scanlon, T. M. (1996). "La varietà delle obiezioni alla disegualianza". Filosofia e Questioni Pubbliche (Philosophy and Public Issues) (in Italian). Roma Luiss Management. 2 (2): 3–19.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (1999), "Punishment and the rule of law", in Koh, Harold Hongju; Slye, Ronald (eds.), Deliberative democracy and human rights, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, pp. 257–271, ISBN 9780300081671.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2001), "Promises and contracts", in Benson, Peter (ed.), The theory of contract law: new essays, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law Series, Cambridge England New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 86–117, ISBN 9780521041324.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2002), "Reasons and passions", in Buss, Sarah; Overton, Lee (eds.), Contours of agency: essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 165–188, ISBN 9780262025133.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2004), "Reasons: a puzzling duality?", in Wallace, R. Jay; Pettit, Philip; Scheffler, Samuel; Smith, Michael (eds.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 231–246, OCLC 648260069.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2006), "Justice, responsibility, and the demands of equality", in Sypnowich, Christine (ed.), The egalitarian conscience: essays in honour of G.A. Cohen, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 70–87, ISBN 9780199281688.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2009), "Rights and interests", in Kanbur, Ravi; Basu, Kaushik (eds.), Arguments for a better world: essays in honor of Amartya Sen | Volume I: Ethics, welfare, and measurement, Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 68–79, ISBN 9780199239115.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2011), "How I am not a Kantian", in Parfit, Derek; Scheffler, Samuel (eds.), On what matters (volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 116–139, ISBN 9781283160179.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2012), "The appeal and limits of constructivism", in Lenman, James; Shemmer, Yonatan (eds.), Constructivism in practical philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 226–242, ISBN 9780191631191.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2013), "Interpreting blame", in Coates, D. Justin; Tognazzini, Neal A. (eds.), Blame: its nature and norms, Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 84–100, ISBN 9780199860821.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Articles[edit] Scanlon, Thomas (Winter 1972). "A theory of freedom of expression". Philosophy & Public Affairs. Wiley. 1 (2): 204–226. JSTOR 2264971.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, Thomas (Summer 1975). "Thomson on privacy". Philosophy & Public Affairs. Wiley. 4 (4): 315–322. JSTOR 2265076.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (November 1975). "Preference and urgency". The Journal of Philosophy. 72 (19): 655–669. doi:10.2307/2024630. JSTOR 2024630.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, Thomas (Autumn 1976). "Nozick on rights, liberty, and property". Philosophy & Public Affairs. Wiley. 6 (2): 3–25. JSTOR 2265059.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (1977). "Due process". Nomos. 18: 93–125. JSTOR 24219202.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (May 1977). "Rights, goals, and fairness". Erkenntnis. 11 (1): 81–95. doi:10.1007/BF00169845. JSTOR 20010534. S2CID 189888868.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (October 1986). "Equality of resources and equality of welfare: a forced marriage?" (PDF). Ethics. 97 (1): 111–118. doi:10.1086/292820. JSTOR 2381409. S2CID 170236973.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Pdf. Scanlon, Thomas (Summer 1990). "Promises and practices". Philosophy & Public Affairs. Wiley. 19 (3): 199–226. JSTOR 2265394.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (Spring 1992). "The aims and authority of moral theory". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 12 (1): 1–23. doi:10.1093/ojls/12.1.1. JSTOR 764567.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (June 1995). "Moral theory: understanding and disagreement: Reviewed work: The Viability of Moral Theory by Allan Gibbard, Alasdair MacIntyre". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 55 (2): 343–356. doi:10.2307/2108551. JSTOR 2108551.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, Thomas (Spring 1997). "The status of well-being". Michigan Quarterly Review. University of Michigan. XXXVI (2): 290–310. hdl:2027/spo.act2080.0036.210.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also Tanner lecture pdf. Scanlon, T. M. (July 2000). "Intention and permissibility: T. M. Scanlon". Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume. 74 (1): 301–317. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00073.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Pdf. See also: Dancy, Jonathan (July 2000). "Intention and permissibility: Jonathan Dancy". Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume. 74 (1): 319–338. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00074.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (2003). "Individualism, equality, and rights". University of Miami Law Review. University of Miami School of Law. 58 (1): 359–368.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Pdf. Scanlon, T. M. (January 2003). "Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard: Précis of What We Owe to Each Other". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 66 (1): 176–189. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00249.x. JSTOR 20140523.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Gauthier, David (January 2003). "Are we moral debtors?: Reviewed work: What We Owe to Each Other by T. M. Scanlon". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 66 (1): 162–168. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00250.x. JSTOR 20140521.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Gibbard, Allan (January 2003). "Reasons to reject allowing: Reviewed work: What We Owe to Each Other by T. M. Scanlon" (PDF). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 66 (1): 169–175. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00251.x. JSTOR 20140522.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (November 2003). "Metaphysics and morals". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 77 (2): 7–22. doi:10.2307/3219738. JSTOR 3219738.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (December 2003). "Replies". Ratio. 16 (4): 424–439. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00231.x.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: O'Neill, Onora (December 2003). "Constructivism vs. contractualism". Ratio. 16 (4): 319–331. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00226.x.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Wolff, Jonathan (December 2003). "Scanlon on well-being". Ratio. 16 (4): 332–345. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00227.x.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Raz, Joseph (December 2003). "Numbers, with and without contractualism". Ratio. 16 (4): 346–367. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00228.x.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Parfit, Derek (December 2003). "Justifiability to each person". Ratio. 16 (4): 368–390. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00229.x.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Timmons, Mark (December 2003). "The limits of moral constructivism". Ratio. 16 (4): 391–423. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00230.x.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (May 2011). "Why not base free speech on autonomy or democracy?". Virginia Law Review. The Virginia Law Review Association via JSTOR. 97 (3): 541–548. JSTOR 41261520.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Pdf. Scanlon, T. M. (October 2011). "Forum: libertarianism and liberty". Boston Review. Boston Critic, Inc.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (June 2012). "Provocation: everyone is a philosopher!". Harvard Law Review Forum. The Harvard Law Review Association. 125: 228–235.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (Spring 2013). "Responsibility and the value of choice". Think. 12 (33): 9–16. doi:10.1017/S1477175612000280.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, Thomas M. (June 2013). "Giving desert its due". Philosophical Explorations. 16 (2): 101–116. doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.787437. S2CID 96470140.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) Scanlon, T. M. (June 2015). "Kamm on the disvalue of death". Journal of Medical Ethics. 41 (6): 490. doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102037. PMID 25005111. S2CID 38143185.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) See also: Kamm, Frances (June 2015). "Summary of Bioethical Prescriptions". Journal of Medical Ethics. 41 (6): 488–489. doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102018. PMID 24797609. S2CID 33549534.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link) References[edit] ^ "The Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity is among the oldest endowed chairs at Harvard University, having been first established in 1789. Past holders of the chair include Josiah Royce, Gerge Herbert Palmer, William Ernest Hocking, and Roderick Firth." [1] ^ a b "Thomas M. Scanlon". ^ "Celebration of the Philosophy and Teaching of T.M. Scanlon". ^ "Election of New Members at the 2018 Spring Meeting | American Philosophical Society". ^ "Thomas M. Scanlon - MacArthur Foundation". www.macfound.org. Retrieved 2018-10-06. ^ Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 6–7 ^ Scanlon 2 ^ Scanlon 1 ^ Scanlon 3 ^ Scanlon 162 ^ Scanlon 78–100 ^ Scanlon 105–106 ^ Scanlon 4 ^ Scanlon 203–204 ^ Scanlon 204–205 ^ Scanlon 195 ^ Scanlon 218 ^ Scanlon 192 ^ Scanlon 229–230 ^ Scanlon 194 ^ Scanlon 174 ^ Nussbaum, Emily. "Dystopia in 'The Good Place'". The New Yorker. Retrieved 5 February 2018. ^ Lim, Woojin. "Asking Philosopher T. M. Scanlon 'What We Owe to Each Other'". The Harvard Crimson. Retrieved 11 October 2019. Sources[edit] Interviews with Scanlon 'The Kingdom of Ends on the Cheap' in Alex Voorhoeve Conversations on Ethics. Oxford University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-921537-9 "Ethics of Blame" An Interview with T. M. Scanlon by Yascha Mounk, 2012-07-07. Interview with Fifteen Minutes Magazine, The Harvard Crimson. Asking Philosopher T. M. Scanlon ‘What We Owe to Each Other’ External links[edit] The Department of Philosophy at Harvard Contractualism at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ashford E, Mulgan T v t e Social and political philosophy Ancient philosophers Aristotle Chanakya Cicero Confucius Han Fei Lactantius Laozi Mencius Mozi Origen Plato Polybius Shang Socrates Sun Tzu Tertullian Thucydides Valluvar Xenophon Xunzi Medieval philosophers Alpharabius Augustine Averroes Baldus Bartolus Bruni Dante Gelasius al-Ghazali Giles Hostiensis Ibn Khaldun John of Paris John of Salisbury Latini Maimonides Marsilius Nizam al-Mulk Photios Thomas Aquinas Wang William of Ockham Early modern philosophers Beza Bodin Bossuet Botero Buchanan Calvin Cumberland Duplessis-Mornay Erasmus Filmer Grotius Guicciardini Harrington Hayashi Hobbes Hotman Huang Leibniz Locke Luther Machiavelli Malebranche Mariana Milton Montaigne More Müntzer Naudé Pufendorf Rohan Sansovino Sidney Spinoza Suárez 18th–19th-century philosophers Bakunin Bentham Bonald Bosanquet Burke Comte Constant Emerson Engels Fichte Fourier Franklin Godwin Hamann Hegel Herder Hume Jefferson Justi Kant political philosophy Kierkegaard Le Bon Le Play Madison Maistre Marx Mazzini Mill Montesquieu Möser Nietzsche Novalis Paine Renan Rousseau Royce Sade Schiller Smith Spencer Stirner Taine Thoreau Tocqueville Vico Vivekananda Voltaire 20th–21st-century philosophers Adorno Ambedkar Arendt Aurobindo Aron Azurmendi Badiou Baudrillard Bauman Benoist Berlin Bernstein Butler Camus Chomsky De Beauvoir Debord Du Bois Durkheim Dworkin Foucault Gandhi Gauthier Gehlen Gentile Gramsci Habermas Hayek Heidegger Irigaray Kautsky Kirk Kropotkin Laclau Lenin Luxemburg Mao Mansfield Marcuse Maritain Michels Mises Mou Mouffe Negri Niebuhr Nozick Nursî Oakeshott Ortega Pareto Pettit Plamenatz Polanyi Popper Qutb Radhakrishnan Rand Rawls Rothbard Russell Santayana Sartre Scanlon Schmitt Searle Shariati Simmel Simonović Skinner Sombart Sorel Spann Spirito Strauss Sun Taylor Walzer Weber Žižek Social theories Anarchism Authoritarianism Collectivism Communism Communitarianism Conflict theories Confucianism Consensus theory Conservatism Contractualism Cosmopolitanism Culturalism Fascism Feminist political theory Gandhism Individualism Islam Islamism Legalism Liberalism Libertarianism Mohism National liberalism Republicanism Social constructionism Social constructivism Social Darwinism Social determinism Socialism Utilitarianism Concepts Civil disobedience Democracy Four occupations Justice Law Mandate of Heaven Peace Property Revolution Rights Social contract Society War more... Related articles Jurisprudence Philosophy and economics Philosophy of education Philosophy of history Philosophy of love Philosophy of sex Philosophy of social science Political ethics Social epistemology Category Authority control BIBSYS: 90379583 BNF: cb134861072 (data) CANTIC: a11838140 GND: 128382937 ISNI: 0000 0001 0882 2592 LCCN: n80132323 MGP: 173966 NKC: jn20020721232 NLK: KAC200810499 NTA: 06849064X PLWABN: 9810679323605606 SELIBR: 89988 SNAC: w63r8gqk SUDOC: 035634030 VIAF: 27218932 WorldCat Identities: lccn-n80132323 Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=T._M._Scanlon&oldid=996186467" Categories: 1940 births Living people 20th-century American philosophers 21st-century American philosophers Analytic philosophers American philosophy academics American political philosophers Moral philosophers Harvard University alumni Princeton University alumni Princeton University faculty Harvard University faculty Proof theorists Philosophers from Indiana Philosophers of ethics and morality Writers from Indianapolis Members of the American Philosophical Society Presidents of the American Philosophical Association MacArthur Fellows Hidden categories: Articles with short description Short description matches Wikidata Articles lacking reliable references from February 2011 All articles lacking reliable references BLP articles lacking sources from February 2011 Articles with hCards Wikipedia articles with style issues from July 2019 All articles with style issues CS1 maint: ref=harv CS1 Italian-language sources (it) Wikipedia articles with BIBSYS identifiers Wikipedia articles with BNF identifiers Wikipedia articles with CANTIC identifiers Wikipedia articles with GND identifiers Wikipedia articles with ISNI identifiers Wikipedia articles with LCCN identifiers Wikipedia articles with MGP identifiers Wikipedia articles with NKC identifiers Wikipedia articles with NLK identifiers Wikipedia articles with NTA identifiers Wikipedia articles with PLWABN identifiers Wikipedia articles with SELIBR identifiers Wikipedia articles with SNAC-ID identifiers Wikipedia articles with SUDOC identifiers Wikipedia articles with VIAF identifiers Wikipedia articles with WORLDCATID identifiers Navigation menu Personal tools Not logged in Talk Contributions Create account Log in Namespaces Article Talk Variants Views Read Edit View history More Search Navigation Main page Contents Current events Random article About Wikipedia Contact us Donate Contribute Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file Tools What links here Related changes Upload file Special pages Permanent link Page information Cite this page Wikidata item Print/export Download as PDF Printable version In other projects Wikimedia Commons Languages Deutsch فارسی مصرى Русский Svenska 中文 Edit links This page was last edited on 25 December 2020, at 01:02 (UTC). 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