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This article is about the general concept. For other uses, see Belief (disambiguation).

Psychological state of holding a proposition or premise to be true

	Part of a series on
	Epistemology
	

	Category
	Index
	Outline




	
Core concepts


	Belief
	Justification
	Knowledge
	Truth


	


Distinctions


	A priori vs. A posteriori
	Analytic vs. Synthetic


	


Schools of thought


	Empiricism
	Naturalism
	Pragmatism
	Rationalism
	Relativism
	Skepticism


	


Topics and views


	Certainty
	Coherentism
	Contextualism
	Dogmatism
	Experience
	Fallibilism
	Foundationalism
	Induction
	Infallibilism
	Infinitism
	Rationality
	Reason
	Solipsism


	


Specialized domains of inquiry


	Evolutionary epistemology
	Feminist epistemology
	Formal epistemology
	Metaepistemology
	Social epistemology


	


Notable epistemologists


	René Descartes
	Sextus Empiricus
	Edmund Gettier
	David Hume
	Immanuel Kant
	W. V. O. Quine
	more...


	


Related fields


	Epistemic logic
	Philosophy of mind
	Philosophy of perception
	Philosophy of science
	Probability


		v
	t
	e





A belief is an attitude that something is the case, or that some proposition about the world is true.[1] In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false.[2] To believe something is to take it to be true; for instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the proposition "snow is white". However, holding a belief does not require active introspection. For example, few carefully consider whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, simply assuming that it will. Moreover, beliefs need not be occurrent (e.g. a person actively thinking "snow is white"), but can instead be dispositional (e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white").[2] 

There are various different ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (Jerry Fodor), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (Roderick Chisholm), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions (Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson), or as mental states that fill a particular function (Hilary Putnam).[2] Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, including eliminativists about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our folk psychological concept of belief (Paul Churchland) and formal epistemologists who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either we have a belief or we don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").[2][3]

Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?"; "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H2O part of the content of that belief)?"; "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?"; and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?".[2]


Contents


	1 Psychology
	2 Historical conceptions of belief
	3 Emotion and beliefs
	4 Formation
	4.1 Conditional inference process
	4.2 Linear models
	4.3 Information processing models and change



	5 Modification of beliefs
	6 Prediction
	7 Knowledge and epistemology
	7.1 Justified true belief
	7.2 Epistemology versus religion
	7.2.1 Belief-in
	7.2.2 Belief-that
	7.2.2.1 Economic belief
	7.2.2.2 Delusion
	7.2.2.3 Science









	8 Religion
	8.1 Forms
	8.1.1 Fundamentalism
	8.1.2 Orthodoxy
	8.1.3 Modernism/reform



	8.2 Approaches to others
	8.2.1 Exclusivism
	8.2.2 Inclusivism
	8.2.3 Pluralism
	8.2.4 Syncretism



	8.3 Adherence
	8.4 Apostasy



	9 Collective belief
	9.1 Perspectives



	10 See also
	11 Notes
	12 Further reading
	13 External links





Psychology[edit]

Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought. Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis.

The concept of belief presumes a subject (the believer) and an object of belief (the proposition). So, like other propositional attitudes, belief implies the existence of mental states and intentionality, both of which are hotly debated topics in the philosophy of mind, whose foundations and relation to brain states are still controversial.

Beliefs are sometimes divided into core beliefs (that are actively thought about) and dispositional beliefs (that may be ascribed to someone who has not thought about the issue). For example, if asked "do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas?" a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before.[4]

This has important implications for understanding the neuropsychology and neuroscience of belief. If the concept of belief is incoherent, then any attempt to find the underlying neural processes that support it will fail.

Philosopher Lynne Rudder Baker has outlined four main contemporary approaches to belief in her book Saving Belief:[5]


	Our common-sense understanding of belief is correct – Sometimes called the "mental sentence theory," in this conception, beliefs exist as coherent entities, and the way we talk about them in everyday life is a valid basis for scientific endeavor. Jerry Fodor was one of the principal defenders of this point of view.
	Our common-sense understanding of belief may not be entirely correct, but it is close enough to make some useful predictions – This view argues that we will eventually reject the idea of belief as we know it now, but that there may be a correlation between what we take to be a belief when someone says "I believe that snow is white" and how a future theory of psychology will explain this behavior. Philosopher Stephen Stich has argued for this particular understanding of belief.
	Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it – Known as eliminativism, this view (most notably proposed by Paul and Patricia Churchland) argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as the four humours theory of medicine, or the phlogiston theory of combustion. In these cases science has not provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
	Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy – The major proponents of this view, Daniel Dennett and Lynne Rudder Baker, are both eliminativists in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they do not go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett the intentional stance, belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level.


Strategic approaches make a distinction between rules, norms and beliefs as follows:


	Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines, or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the imposing entity's ability to enforce them.
	Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent upon law or regulation.
	Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior. The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e., security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and norms.[6]


Historical conceptions of belief[edit]

In the context of Ancient Greek thought, three related concepts were identified regarding the concept of belief: pistis, doxa, and dogma. Simplified, pistis refers to "trust" and "confidence," doxa refers to "opinion" and "acceptance," and dogma refers to the positions of a philosopher or of a philosophical school such as Stoicism.


Emotion and beliefs[edit]

		This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it.  (January 2020)



Research has indicated that emotion and cognition act in conjunction to produce beliefs, and more specifically emotion plays a vital role in the formation and maintenance of beliefs.[7][8][9]


Formation[edit]

  
We are influenced by many factors that ripple through our minds as our beliefs form, evolve, and may eventually change



Psychologists study belief formation and the relationship between beliefs and actions. Three models of belief formation and change have been proposed:


Conditional inference process[edit]

When people are asked to estimate the likelihood that a statement is true, they search their memory for information that has implications for the validity of this statement. Once this information has been identified, they estimate the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were true, and the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were false. If their estimates for these two probabilities differ, people average them, weighting each by the likelihood that the information is true and false. Thus, information bears directly on beliefs of another, related statement.[10]


Linear models[edit]

Unlike the previous model, this one takes into consideration the possibility of multiple factors influencing belief formation. Using regression procedures, this model predicts belief formation on the basis of several different pieces of information, with weights assigned to each piece on the basis of their relative importance.[10]


Information processing models and change[edit]

These models address the fact that the responses people have to belief-relevant information is unlikely to be predicted from the objective basis of the information that they can recall at the time their beliefs are reported. Instead, these responses reflect the number and meaning of the thoughts that people have about the message at the time that they encounter it.[10]

Some influences on people's belief formation include:


	Internalization of beliefs during childhood, which can form and shape our beliefs in different domains. Albert Einstein is often quoted as having said that "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen." Political beliefs depend most strongly on the political beliefs most common in the community where we live.[11] Most individuals believe the religion they were taught in childhood.[12]
	Charismatic leaders can form or modify beliefs (even if those beliefs fly in the face of all previous beliefs).[13] Rational individuals need to reconcile their direct reality with any said belief; therefore, if belief is not present or possible, it reflects the fact that contradictions were necessarily overcome using cognitive dissonance.
	Advertising can form or change beliefs through repetition, shock, and association with images of sex, love, beauty, and other strong positive emotions.[14] Contrary to intuition, a delay, known as the sleeper effect, instead of immediate succession may increase an advertisement's ability to persuade viewer's beliefs if a discounting cue is present.[15]
	Physical trauma, especially to the head, can radically alter a person's beliefs.[16]


However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In Anna Rowley's book, Leadership Therapy, she states "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This means that peoples' beliefs should evolve as they gain new experiences.[17]


Modification of beliefs[edit]

	
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See also: Belief revision

An extensive amount of scientific research and philosophical discussion exists around the modification of beliefs, which is commonly referred to as belief revision.
Generally speaking, the process of belief revision entails the believer weighing the set of truths and/or evidence, and the dominance of a set of truths or evidence on an alternative to a held belief can lead to revision. One process of belief revision is Bayesian updating and is often referenced for its mathematical basis and conceptual simplicity. However, such a process may not be representative for individuals whose beliefs are not easily characterized as probabilistic.

There are several techniques for individuals or groups to change the beliefs of others; these methods generally fall under the umbrella of persuasion. Persuasion can take on more specific forms such as consciousness raising when considered in an activist or political context.
Belief modification may also occur as a result of the experience of outcomes. Because goals are based, in part on beliefs, the success or failure at a particular goal may contribute to modification of beliefs that supported the original goal.

Whether or not belief modification actually occurs is dependent not only on the extent of truths or evidence for the alternative belief, but also characteristics outside the specific truths or evidence. This includes, but is not limited to: the source characteristics of the message, such as credibility; social pressures; the anticipated consequences of a modification; or the ability of the individual or group to act on the modification. Therefore, individuals seeking to achieve belief modification in themselves or others need to consider all possible forms of resistance to belief revision.


Prediction[edit]

Different psychological models have tried to predict people's beliefs and some of them try to estimate the exact probabilities of beliefs. For example, Robert Wyer developed a model of subjective probabilities.[18][19] When people rate the likelihood of a certain statement (e.g., "It will rain tomorrow"), this rating can be seen as a subjective probability value. The subjective probability model posits that these subjective probabilities follow the same rules as objective probabilities. For example, the law of total probability might be applied to predict a subjective probability value. Wyer found that this model produces relatively accurate predictions for probabilities of single events and for changes in these probabilities, but that the probabilities of several beliefs linked by "and" or "or" do not follow the model as well.[18][19]


Knowledge and epistemology[edit]

Main article: Epistemology

  
A Venn diagram illustrating the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief (represented by the yellow circle). The Gettier problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge.



Epistemology is concerned with delineating the boundary between justified belief and opinion,[20] and involved generally with a theoretical philosophical study of knowledge. The primary problem in epistemology is to understand exactly what is needed in order for us to have knowledge. In a notion derived from Plato's dialogue Theaetetus, where the epistemology of Socrates (Platon) most clearly departs from that of the sophists, who at the time of Plato seem to have defined knowledge as what is here expressed as "justified true belief". The tendency to translate from belief (here: doxa – common opinion) to knowledge (here: episteme), which Plato (e.g. Socrates of the dialogue) utterly dismisses, results from failing to distinguish a dispositive belief (gr. 'doxa', not 'pistis') from knowledge (episteme) when the opinion is regarded true (here: orthé), in terms of right, and juristically so (according to the premises of the dialogue), which was the task of the rhetors to prove. Plato dismisses this possibility of an affirmative relation between belief (i.e. opinion) and knowledge even when the one who opines grounds his belief on the rule, and is able to add justification (gr. logos: reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) to it.[21]

Plato has been credited for the "justified true belief" theory of knowledge, even though Plato in the Theaetetus (dialogue) elegantly dismisses it, and even posits this argument of Socrates as a cause for his death penalty. Among American epistemologists, Gettier (1963)[22] and Goldman (1967),[23] have questioned the "justified true belief" definition, and challenged the "sophists" of their time.


Justified true belief[edit]

Justified true belief is a definition of knowledge that gained approval during the Enlightenment, "justified" standing in contrast to "revealed". There have been attempts to trace it back to Plato and his dialogues, more specifically in the Theaetetus[24] The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, an agent 
  
    
      
        S
      
    
    {\displaystyle S}
  
 knows that a proposition 
  
    
      
        P
      
    
    {\displaystyle P}
  
 is true if and only if:


	
  
    
      
        P
      
    
    {\displaystyle P}
  
 is true
	
  
    
      
        S
      
    
    {\displaystyle S}
  
 believes that 
  
    
      
        P
      
    
    {\displaystyle P}
  
 is true, and
	
  
    
      
        S
      
    
    {\displaystyle S}
  
 is justified in believing that 
  
    
      
        P
      
    
    {\displaystyle P}
  
 is true


This theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of Gettier problems, situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but where many philosophers deny that anything is known.[25] Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.[26] Bernecker and Dretske (2000) argue that "no epistemologist since Gettier has seriously and successfully defended the traditional view."[27]:3 On the other hand, Paul Boghossian argues that the justified true belief account is the "standard, widely accepted" definition of knowledge.[28]


Epistemology versus religion[edit]

Historically belief-in belonged in the realm of religious thought, belief-that instead belonged to epistemological considerations.[29]


Belief-in[edit]

To "believe in" someone or something is a distinct concept from "believing-that." There are at least these types of belief-in:[30]


	Commendatory / faith – we may make an expression of 'faith' in respect of some performance by an agent X, when without prejudice to the truth value of the factual outcome or even confidence in X otherwise, we expect that specific performance. In particular self-confidence or faith in one's self is this kind of belief.
	Existential claim – to claim belief in the existence of an entity or phenomenon in a general way with the implied need to justify its claim of existence. It is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. "He believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in Santa Claus" or "I believe in a deity" are typical examples.[31] The linguistic form is distinct from the assertion of the truth of a proposition since verification is either considered impossible or irrelevant or a counterfactual situation is assumed.


Belief-that[edit]

Economic belief[edit]

Further information: Economic ideology

Economic beliefs are beliefs which are reasonably and necessarily contrary to the tenet of rational choice or instrumental rationality.[32]

Studies of the Austrian tradition of the economic thought, in the context of analysis of the influence and subsequent degree of change resulting from existing economic knowledge and belief, has contributed the most to the subsequent holistic collective analysis.[33]


Delusion[edit]

Insofar as the truth of belief is expressed in sentential and propositional form we are using the sense of belief-that rather than belief-in. Delusion arises when the truth value of the form is clearly nil.[34][35][36]

Delusions are defined as beliefs in psychiatric diagnostic criteria[37] (for example in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Psychiatrist and historian G.E. Berrios has challenged the view that delusions are genuine beliefs and instead labels them as "empty speech acts," where affected persons are motivated to express false or bizarre belief statements due to an underlying psychological disturbance. However, the majority of mental health professionals and researchers treat delusions as if they were genuine beliefs.


Science[edit]

In scientific medical writing, the verb 'believe' can mean "actively accept as true" on the basis of external evidence (for example, a statement of the type, "we believe that x is a better treatment than y in this disease" can imply that "after examining the available evidence, we have concluded that x is...").[38]


Religion[edit]

  




Religious belief refers to attitudes towards mythological, supernatural, or spiritual aspects of a religion.[citation needed] Religious belief is distinct from religious practice and from religious behaviours – with some believers not practicing religion and some practitioners not believing religion. Religious beliefs, deriving from ideas that are exclusive to religion,[citation needed] often relate to the existence, characteristics and worship of a deity or deities, to the idea of divine intervention in the universe and in human life, or to the deontological explanations for the values and practices centered on the teachings of a spiritual leader or community. In contrast to other belief systems, religious beliefs are usually codified.[39]


Forms[edit]

A popular view holds that different religions each have identifiable and exclusive sets of beliefs or creeds, but surveys of religious belief have often found that the official doctrine and descriptions of the beliefs offered by religious authorities do not always agree with the privately held beliefs of those who identify as members of a particular religion.[40] For a broad classification of the kinds of religious belief, see below.


Fundamentalism[edit]

Main article: Religious fundamentalism

First self-applied as a term to the conservative doctrine outlined by anti-modernist Protestants in the United States,[41] "fundamentalism" in religious terms denotes strict adherence to an interpretation of scriptures that are generally associated with theologically conservative positions or traditional understandings of the text and are distrustful of innovative readings, new revelation, or alternative interpretations.[citation needed] Religious fundamentalism has been identified[by whom?] in the media as being associated with fanatical or zealous political movements around the world that have used a strict adherence to a particular religious doctrine as a means to establish political identity and to enforce societal norms.[citation needed]


Orthodoxy[edit]

Main article: Orthodoxy

First used in the context of Early Christianity, the term "orthodoxy" relates to religious belief that closely follows the edicts, apologies, and hermeneutics of a prevailing religious authority. In the case of Early Christianity, this authority was the communion of bishops, and is often referred to by the term "Magisterium". The term orthodox was applied[when?] almost as an epithet to a group of Jewish believers who held to pre-Enlightenment understanding of Judaism – now known as Orthodox Judaism. The Eastern Orthodox Church of Christianity and the Catholic Church each consider themselves to be the true heir to Early Christian belief and practice. The antonym of "orthodox" is "heterodox", and those adhering to orthodoxy often accuse the heterodox of apostasy, schism, or heresy.


Modernism/reform[edit]

	
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The Renaissance and later the Enlightenment in Europe exhibited varying degrees of religious tolerance and intolerance towards new and old religious ideas. The philosophes took particular exception to many of the more fantastical claims of religions and directly challenged religious authority and the prevailing beliefs associated with the established churches. In response to the liberalizing political and social movements, some religious groups attempted to integrate Enlightenment ideals of rationality, equality, and individual liberty into their belief systems, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Reform Judaism and Liberal Christianity offer two examples of such religious associations.


Approaches to others[edit]

Adherents of particular religions deal with the differing doctrines and practices espoused by other religions or by other religious denominations in a variety of ways.


Exclusivism[edit]

See also: Religious exclusivism

People with exclusivist beliefs typically explain other beliefs either as in error, or as corruptions or counterfeits of the true faith. This approach is a fairly consistent feature among smaller new religious movements that often rely on doctrine that claims a unique revelation by the founders or leaders, and considers it a matter of faith that the "correct" religion has a monopoly on truth. All three major Abrahamic monotheistic religions have passages in their holy scriptures that attest to the primacy of the scriptural testimony, and indeed monotheism itself is often[quantify] vouched[by whom?] as an innovation characterized specifically by its explicit rejection of earlier polytheistic faiths.

Some exclusivist faiths incorporate a specific element of proselytization. This is a strongly-held belief in the Christian tradition which follows the doctrine of the Great Commission, and is less emphasized by the Islamic faith where the Quranic edict "There shall be no compulsion in religion" (2:256) is often quoted as a justification for toleration of alternative beliefs. The Jewish tradition does not actively seek out converts.

Exclusivism correlates with conservative, fundamentalist, and orthodox approaches of many religions, while pluralistic and syncretist approaches either explicitly downplay or reject the exclusivist tendencies within a religion.[citation needed]


Inclusivism[edit]

People with inclusivist beliefs recognize some truth in all faith systems, highlighting agreements and minimizing differences. This attitude is sometimes associated[by whom?] with Interfaith dialogue or with the Christian Ecumenical movement, though in principle such attempts at pluralism are not necessarily inclusivist and many actors in such interactions (for example, the Roman Catholic Church) still hold to exclusivist dogma while participating in inter-religious organizations.

Explicitly inclusivist religions include many that are associated with the New Age movement, as well as modern reinterpretations of Hinduism and Buddhism. The Baháʼí Faith considers it doctrine that there is truth in all faith-systems.


Pluralism[edit]

Main article: Religious pluralism

People with pluralist beliefs make no distinction between faith systems, viewing each one as valid within a particular culture.


Syncretism[edit]

Main article: Syncretism

People with syncretic views blend the views of a variety of different religions or traditional beliefs into a unique fusion which suits their particular experiences and contexts (see eclecticism). Unitarian Universalism exemplifies a syncretic faith.


Adherence[edit]

See also: Existence of God

Typical reasons for adherence to religion include the following:


	Some see belief in a deity as necessary for moral behavior.[42]
	Some regard religious practices as serene, beautiful, and conducive to religious experiences, which in turn support religious beliefs.[43]
	Organized religions promote a sense of community among their followers, and the moral and cultural common ground of these communities makes them attractive to people with similar values.[44] Indeed, while religious beliefs and practices are usually connected, some individuals with substantially secular beliefs still participate in religious practices for cultural reasons.[45]
	Each religion asserts that it is a means by which its adherents may come into closer contact with the Divine, with Truth, and with spiritual power. They all promise to free adherents from spiritual bondage, and to bring them into spiritual freedom. It naturally follows that a religion which can free its adherents from deception, sin, and spiritual death will have significant mental-health benefits. Abraham Maslow's research after World War II showed that Holocaust survivors tended to be those who held strong religious beliefs (not necessarily temple attendance, etc.), suggesting that belief helped people cope in extreme circumstances. Humanistic psychology went on to investigate how religious or spiritual identity may have correlations with longer lifespan and better health. The study found that humans may particularly need religious ideas to serve various emotional needs such as the need to feel loved, the need to belong to homogeneous groups, the need for understandable explanations and the need for a guarantee of ultimate justice. Other factors may involve sense of purpose, sense of identity, or a sense of contact with the divine. See also Man's Search for Meaning, by Viktor Frankl, detailing his experience with the importance of religion in surviving the Holocaust. Critics assert that the very fact that religion was the primary selector for research subjects may have introduced a bias, and that the fact that all subjects were Holocaust survivors may also have had an effect. According to Larson et al. (2000), "[m]ore longitudinal research with better multidimensional measures will help further clarify the roles of these [religious] factors and whether they are beneficial or harmful."[46]


Psychologist James Alcock also summarizes a number of apparent benefits which reinforce religious belief. These include prayer appearing to account for successful resolution of problems, "a bulwark against existential anxiety and fear of annihilation," an increased sense of control, companionship with one's deity, a source of self-significance, and group identity.[47]


Apostasy[edit]

Main article: Apostasy

See also: Existence of God § Arguments against belief in God

Typical reasons for rejection of religion include:


	Some people regard certain fundamental doctrines of some religions as illogical, contrary to experience, or unsupported by sufficient evidence; such people may reject one or more religions for those reasons.[48] Even some believers may have difficulty accepting particular religious assertions or doctrines. Some people believe the body of evidence available to humans to be insufficient to justify certain religious beliefs. They may thus disagree with religious interpretations of ethics and human purpose, or with various creation myths. This reason has perhaps[original research?] been aggravated by the protestations and emphases of some fundamentalist Christians.
	Some religions include beliefs that certain groups of people are inferior or sinful and deserve contempt, persecution, or even death, and that non-believers will be punished for their unbelief in an after-life.[49] Adherents to a religion may feel antipathy to unbelievers. Numerous examples exist of people of one religion or sect using religion as an excuse to murder people with different religious beliefs. To mention just a few examples:
	the slaughter of the Huguenots by French Catholics in the sixteenth century
	Hindus and Muslims killing each other when Pakistan separated from India in 1947
	the persecution and killing of Shiite Muslims by Sunni Muslims in Iraq
	the murder of Protestants by Catholics and vice versa in Ireland (both of these examples in the late twentieth century)
	the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that continues as of 2018[update] – According to some critics of religion, such beliefs can encourage completely unnecessary conflicts and in some cases even wars. Many atheists believe that, because of this, religion is incompatible with world peace, freedom, civil rights, equality, and good government. On the other hand, most religions perceive atheism as a threat and will vigorously and even violently[citation needed] defend themselves against religious sterilization, making the attempt to remove public religious practices a source of strife.[50]


	Some people may be unable to accept the values that a specific religion promotes and will therefore not join that religion. They may also be unable to accept the proposition that those who do not believe will go to hell or be damned, especially if said nonbelievers are close to the person.
	The maintenance of life and the achievement of self-esteem require of a person the fullest exercise of reason[citation needed]—but morality (people are taught[by whom?]) rests on and requires faith.[51][page needed]


Collective belief[edit]

See also: Ideology and World view

A world view comprises a set of mutually supportive beliefs. The beliefs of any such system can be religious, philosophical, political, ideological, or a combination of these. Philosopher Jonathan Glover says that beliefs are always part of a belief system, and that tenanted belief systems are difficult for the tenants to completely revise or reject.[52][53][need quotation to verify] This insight has relevance for inquisitors, missionaries, agitprop groups and thought-police.


Perspectives[edit]

A collective belief is referred to when people speak of what "we" believe when this is not simply elliptical for what "we all" believe.[54]

Sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all "social facts", "inhered in" social groups as opposed to individual persons. Jonathan Dancy states that "Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure".[55]

Philosopher Margaret Gilbert (1942- ) has offered a related account in terms of the joint commitment of a number of persons as a body to accept a certain belief. According to this account, individuals who together collectively believe something need not personally believe it individually. Gilbert's work on the topic has stimulated a developing literature among philosophers.[citation needed] One question that has arisen is whether and how philosophical accounts of belief in general need to be sensitive to the possibility of collective belief.


  
Philosopher Jonathan Glover warns that belief systems are like whole boats in the water; it is extremely difficult to alter them all at once (for example, it may be too stressful, or people may maintain their biases without realizing it).[52]



Jonathan Glover (1941- ) believes that he and other philosophers ought to play some role in starting dialogues between people with deeply-held, opposing beliefs, especially if there is risk of violence. Glover also believes that philosophy can offer insights about beliefs that would be relevant to such dialogue.

Glover suggests that beliefs have to be considered holistically, and that no belief exists in isolation in the mind of the believer. Each belief always implicates and relates to other beliefs.[52] Glover provides the example of a patient with an illness who returns to a doctor, but the doctor says that the prescribed medicine is not working. At that point, the patient has a great deal of flexibility in choosing what beliefs to keep or reject: the patient could believe that the doctor is incompetent, that the doctor's assistants made a mistake, that the patient's own body is unique in some unexpected way, that Western medicine is ineffective, or even that Western science is entirely unable to discover truths about ailments.[52]

Glover maintains that any person can continue to hold any belief if they would really like to[52] (for example, with help from ad hoc hypotheses). One belief can be held fixed, and other beliefs will be altered around it. Glover warns that some beliefs may not be entirely explicitly believed (for example, some people may not realize they have racist belief-systems adopted from their environment as a child). Glover believes that people tend to first realize that beliefs can change, and may be contingent on their upbringing, around age 12 or 15.[52]

Glover emphasizes that beliefs are difficult to change. He says that one may try to rebuild one's beliefs on more secure foundations (axioms), like building a new house, but warns that this may not be possible. Glover offers the example of René Descartes, saying: "[Descartes] starts off with the characteristic beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman; he then junks the lot, he rebuilds the system, and somehow it looks a lot like the beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman." To Glover, belief systems are not like houses but are instead like boats. As Glover puts it: "Maybe the whole thing needs rebuilding, but inevitably at any point you have to keep enough of it intact to keep floating."[52]

Glover's final message is that if people talk about their beliefs, they may find more deep, relevant, philosophical ways in which they disagree (e.g., less obvious beliefs, or more-deeply-held beliefs). Glover thinks that people often manage to find agreements and consensus through philosophy. He says that at the very least, if people do not convert each other, they will hold their own beliefs more openmindedly and will be less likely to go to war over conflicting beliefs.[52][56]

The British philosopher Stephen Law (1960-) has described some belief systems (including belief in homeopathy, psychic powers, and alien abduction) as "claptrap" and says that such belief-systems can "draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap [...] if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again".[57]


See also[edit]


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Notes[edit]


	^ Primmer, Justin (2018), "Belief",  in Primmer, Justin (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, retrieved 19 September 2008

	^ a b c d e 
"Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 22 June 2020.

	^ 
"Formal Representations of Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 22 June 2020.

	^ 
Bell, V.; Halligan, P.W.; Ellis, H.D. (2006). "A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief".  In Halligan, Peter W.; Aylward, Mansel (eds.). The Power of Belief: Psychological Influence on Illness, Disability, and Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-853010-7.

	^ 
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-07320-0.

	^ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army (2012). Information Operations. Joint Publication 3–13. Joint Doctrine Support Division, Suffolk, VA. p. 22.

	^ 
Frijda, Nico H (2010). Emotions and Beliefs. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780511659904.

	^ 
Mercer, Jonathan (January 2010). "Emotional Beliefs". International Organization. 65: 1–31. doi:10.1017/S0020818309990221.

	^ 
Harlé, Katia M.; Shenoy, Pradeep; Paulus, Martin P. (19 September 2013). "The influence of emotions on cognitive control: feelings and beliefs—where do they meet?". Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. 7: 508. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00508. ISSN 1662-5161. PMC 3776943. PMID 24065901.

	^ a b c Wyer, R.S., & Albarracin, D. (2005). Belief formation, organization, and change: Cognitive and motivational influences. In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P. Zanna, The Handbook of Attitudes (273–322). New York: Psychology Press.

	^ 
Gelman, Andrew; Park, David; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Cortina, Jeronimo (2008). Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-13927-2.

	^ 
Argyle, Michael (1997). The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience. London: Routledge. p. 25. ISBN 978-0-415-12330-3. Religion, in most cultures, is ascribed, not chosen.

	^ 
Hoffer, Eric (2002). The True Believer. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. ISBN 978-0-06-050591-2.

	^ 
Kilbourne, Jane; Pipher, Mary (2000). Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel. Free Press. ISBN 978-0-684-86600-0.

	^ see Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004

	^ 
Rothschild, Babette (2000). The Body Remembers: The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-70327-6.

	^ 
Rowley, Anna (2007). Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 69. ISBN 978-1-4039-8403-6.

	^ a b 
Wyer, R.S. (1970). "Quantitative prediction of belief and opinion change: A further test of a subjective probability model". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 16 (4): 559–570. doi:10.1037/h0030064.

	^ a b 
Wyer, R.S.; Goldberg, L. (1970). "A probabilistic analysis of the relationships among beliefs and attitudes". Psychological Review. 77 (2): 100–120. doi:10.1037/h0028769.

	^ Oxford Dictionaries – definition published by OUP [Retrieved 2015-08-09]

	^ http://www.friesian.com/knowledg.htm – 2007, 2008 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D.

	^ 
Gettier, E.L. (1963). "Is justified true belief knowledge?" (PDF). Analysis. 23 (6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121. JSTOR 3326922.

	^ 
Goldman, A.I. (1967). "A causal theory of knowing". The Journal of Philosophy. 64 (12): 357–372. doi:10.2307/2024268. JSTOR 2024268. S2CID 53049561.

	^ The received view holds it that Plato's theory presents knowledge as remembering eternal truths and justification reawakens memory, see 
Fine, G. (2003). "Introduction". Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 5–7. ISBN 978-0-19-924558-1.

	^ 
Chisholm, Roderick (1982). "Knowledge as Justified True Belief". The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-0-8166-1103-4.

	^ 
Nozick, Robert. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674664485. OCLC 7283862.

	^ 
Bernecker, Sven; Dretske, Fred (2000). Knowledge. Readings in contemporary epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-19-875261-5.

	^ 
Paul Boghossian (2007), Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, ISBN 978-0-19-923041-9, Chapter 2, p. 15.

	^ 
Price, H.H. (1965). "Belief 'In' and Belief 'That'". Religious Studies. 1 (1): 5–27. doi:10.1017/S0034412500002304.

	^ 
MacIntosh, J.J. (1994). "Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams". Religious Studies. 30 (4): 487–503. doi:10.1017/S0034412500023131.

	^ 
Macintosh, Jack. "Belief-in". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. p. 86. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7.

	^ Peter Taylor-Gooby – Economic Beliefs and Social Policy Behaviour Economic and Social Research Council (Economic Beliefs and behaviour research programme) [Retrieved 2015-08-09]

	^ 
R. Arena & A. Festré (1 January 2006). Knowledge, Beliefs and Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing 2006, 288 pages. ISBN 978-1-84720-153-9. Retrieved 9 August 2015.

	^ 
L. Bortolotti (2010). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. OUP Oxford 2010, 299 pages, International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry. ISBN 978-0-19-920616-2.

	^ Tarski's Truth Definitions, LOTH Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

	^ Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences" Alfred Tarski Dover 1995/41, Ch. I, § 2 Expressions containing variables—sentential and designatory functions and Ch. II On the Sentential Calculus in its entirety

	^ Delusions in the DSM 5 A blog by Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett

	^ 
Huth, Edward J (1987). Medical Style & Format: An International Manual for Authors, Editors, and Publishers. ISI Press. p. 264. ISBN 978-0-89495-063-6.

	^ 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2007). Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. University of California Press. p. 53. ISBN 978-0-520-25181-6.

	^ 
Braithwaite, R.B. (1975). An empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief. Norwood Editions (Norwood, Pa.). ISBN 978-0-88305-955-5.

	^ 
"The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth". 27 November 2012. Archived from the original on 3 December 2012. Retrieved 28 November 2012.

	^ Compare: 
"Roy Moore: 'We Have No Morality Without an Acknowledgment of God'". Christianity Today. 7 March 2005. Retrieved 19 May 2006.

	^ 
Miller, David Ian (15 February 2005). "Finding My Religion: Steve Georgiou on his faith and mentor, minimalist poet Robert Lax". SFGate. Retrieved 19 May 2006.

	^ 
Repa, J. Theodore (18 October 1998). "Building Community: The Marriage of Religion and Education". Archived from the original on 7 September 2006. Retrieved 19 May 2006.

	^ Note for example the concept of a cultural Christian.

	^ 
Larson, David B.; Susan S. Larson; Harold G. Koenig (October 2000). "Research Findings on Religious Commitment and Mental Health". Psychiatric Times. 17 (10). Retrieved 19 May 2006.

	^ 
Alcock, James (2018). "The God Engine". Skeptical Inquirer. 42 (5): 32–38.

	^ For example: 
Russell, Bertrand (1927). "Why I am Not a Christian". Archived from the original on 19 November 2006. Retrieved 19 May 2006.

	^ For example, some Muslims believe that women are inferior to men. Some Christians share this belief. At the time of the American Civil War of 1861–1865, many Southerners used passages from the Bible to justify race-based slavery. Certain campaigners have used the Christian religion as a reason to persecute and to deny the rights of homosexuals, on the basis that the Christian biblical God disapproves of homosexuality, and by implication of homosexuals. Compare http://www.godhatesfags.com

	^ Beauchamp, Philip (pseudonym of Jeremy Bentham) Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind, 1822, R. Carlile, London, at page 76: "Of all human antipathies, that which the believer in a God bears to the unbeliever is the fullest, the most unqualified, and the most universal"

	^ 
Waldau, Paul (2001). The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (American Academy of Religion Books). Oxford University Press, US. ISBN 978-0-19-514571-7.

	^ a b c d e f g h "Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011

	^ 
Elizabeth A. Minton, Lynn R. Khale (2014). Belief Systems, Religion, and Behavioral Economics. New York: Business Expert Press LLC. ISBN 978-1-60649-704-3.

	^ 

Dancy, Jonathan (2014). A Companion to Epistemology. Just the Facts101 (2 ed.). Content Technologies Inc. (published 2016). ISBN 9781478400028. Retrieved 30 April 2019. A collective belief is referred to when people speak of what 'we' believe when this is not simply elliptical for what 'we all' believe.

	^ 

Dancy, Jonathan (2014). A Companion to Epistemology. Just the Facts101 (2 ed.). Content Technologies Inc. (published 2016). ISBN 9781478400028. Retrieved 30 April 2019. Sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all 'social facts', 'inhered in' social groups as opposed to individual persons. Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure.

	^  'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' , JonathanGlover.co.uk

	^ New Scientist (magazine), 11 June 2011 A field guide to bullshit | New Scientist - "Intellectual black holes are belief systems that draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap. Belief in homeopathy, psychic powers, alien abductions – these are examples of intellectual black holes. As you approach them, you need to be on your guard because if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again."





Further reading[edit]

	Robert Audi. "Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe", Noûs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 419–434. 
OCLC 481484099
	Coleman III, T., Jong, J., & van Mulukom, V. (2018). Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs?. Contemporary Pragmatism, 15(3), 279–283. doi:10.1163/18758185-01503001
	Elisa Järnefelt, Created by Some Being: Theoretical and Empirical Exploration of Adults' Automatic and Reflective Beliefs about the Origin of Natural Phenomena. Diss. University of Helsinki, 2013. 
ISBN 978-952-10-9416-3.
	Fred Leavitt, "Dancing with Absurdity: Your Most Cherished Beliefs (and All Your Others) are Probably Wrong. Peter Lang, 2015.
	J. Leicester, "What beliefs are made from". Sharjah, UAE: Bentham Science Publishers, 2016.


External links[edit]

		Wikimedia Commons has media related to Belief.


		Wikiquote has quotations related to: Belief


		Wikiversity has learning resources about Knowing How You Know


		Wikiversity has learning resources about Seeking True Beliefs


	 The dictionary definition of belief at Wiktionary
	 The dictionary definition of belief system at Wiktionary
	
Schwitzgebel, Eric. "Belief".  In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
	
"The Aim of Belief". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


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	Baháʼí


	Druze
	Ali-Illahism
	Mandaeism
	Rastafarianism







	Dharmic	
	Hinduism	
	Vaishnavism
	Sri Vaishnavism
	Brahma Sampradaya
	Nimbarka Sampradaya
	Pushtimarg
	Mahanubhava
	Ramanandi
	Varkari


	Shaivism
	Siddhantism
	Kashmir
	Kapalika
	Kaumaram
	Lingayatism
	Nath
	Balinese


	Shaktism
	Smartism
	Śrauta
	Sant Mat
	Neo-Hinduism




	Buddhism	
	Theravada
	Mahayana
	Chan/Zen/Thiền
	Amidism
	Nichiren


	Vajrayana
	Tibetan


	Neo-Buddhism




	Others	
	Ayyavazhi
	Jainism
	Digambara
	Śvētāmbara


	Ravidassia
	Sikhism
	Khalsa
	Sects









	Mazdans	
	Zoroastrianism
	Yazidism
	Yarsanism




	Indo-European	
	Armenian
	Baltic
	Celtic
	Druidry


	Germanic
	Hellenism
	Italo-Roman
	Romanian
	Slavic
	Ossetian
	Kalash




	Uralic	
	Estonian
	Finnish
	Hungarian
	Mari
	Mordvin
	Sámi
	Udmurt




	Altaic	
	Turko-Mongolic
	Tengrism
	Burkhanism
	Vattisen Yaly


	Tungusic
	Manchu
	Evenki






	Chinese	
	Confucianism
	Taoism
	Folk Taoism
	Yao Taoism


	Nuo
	Salvationist
	Xiantiandao
	Yiguandao


	Luoism




	Tibeto-Burmese	
	Bon
	Burmese
	Benzhuism
	Bimoism
	Bathouism
	Bongthingism
	Donyi-Polo
	Heraka
	Kiratism
	Qiang
	Sanamahism




	Korean	
	Korean shamanism
	Cheondoism
	Jeungsanism




	Japanese	
	Shinto
	Shugendō
	Tenrikyo
	Ryukyuan




	Tai and Miao	
	Ahom
	Hmongism
	Mo
	Satsana Phi




	Austroasiatic	
	Vietnamese
	Caodaism
	Đạo Mẫu
	Hoahaoism


	Sarnaism




	Austronesian	
	Batak Parmalim
	Dayak
	Kaharingan
	Momolianism


	Javanese Kejawèn
	Karo Pemena
	Malaysian
	Philippine Dayawism
	Tagalog


	Polynesian
	Hawaiian
	Māori


	Sumbese Marapu
	Sundanese Wiwitan




	African	
	Traditional	
	Akan
	Akamba
	Baluba
	Bantu
	Kongo
	Zulu


	Berber
	Guanche church


	Bushongo
	Dinka
	Dogon
	Efik
	Fon and Ewe
	Ik
	Lotuko
	Lozi
	Lugbara
	Maasai
	Mbuti
	Odinani
	San
	Serer
	Tumbuka
	Urhobo
	Waaqeffanna
	Yoruba
	Ifá






	Diasporic	
	Candomblé
	Bantu
	Jejé
	Ketu


	Comfa
	Convince
	Espiritismo
	Kumina
	Obeah
	Palo
	Quimbanda
	Santería
	Tambor de Mina
	Trinidad Orisha
	Umbanda
	Vodou
	Voodoo
	Winti







	Native
American	
	Abenaki
	Anishinaabe
	Blackfoot
	Californian
	Miwok
	Ohlone
	Pomo


	Cherokee
	Chilote
	Choctaw
	Creek
	Guarani
	Haida
	Ho-Chunk
	Hopi
	Iroquois
	Seneca
	Wyandot
	Longhouse Religion


	Jivaroan
	Kwakwakaʼwakw
	Lakota
	Lenape
	Mapuche
	Mesoamerican
	Aztec
	Maya
	Purépecha


	Midewiwin
	Muisca
	Native American Church
	Navajo
	Nuu-chah-nulth
	Pawnee
	Tsimshian
	Ute
	Zuni




	Other ethnic	
	Aboriginal Australian
	Caucasian
	Abkhaz
	Circassian


	Inuit
	Papuan
	Siberian




	Recent	
	Adi Dharm/Brahmoism
	Anthroposophy
	Discordianism
	Eckankar
	Falun Gong
	Fourth Way
	Goddess
	Japanese
	Jediism
	Modekngei
	Neopaganism
	Reconstructionism
	Wicca
	list


	Neoshamanism
	New Acropolis
	New Age
	New Thought
	Rajneesh
	Satanism
	Spiritualism
	Subud
	Tensegrity
	Thelema
	Theosophy
	Neo-Theosophy
	Agni Yoga


	Transcendental Meditation
	UFO religion
	Raëlism
	Scientology


	Unitarian Universalism
	White Brotherhood




	Note: 1 The main source: 
Eliade, Mircea, ed. (1987). The Encyclopedia of Religion. 1–16. New York: MacMillan.







	
	Historical religions

	
	Prehistoric
	Paleolithic


	Harappan
	Dravidian
	Egyptian
	Atenism


	Mesopotamian
	Sumerian
	Babylonian


	Semitic
	Canaanite
	Yahwism


	Arabian
	Somali
	Hurrian
	Urartu
	Etruscan
	Basque
	Georgian
	Vainakh
	Proto-Indo-European
	Proto-Indo-Iranian
	Vedic
	Mazdaism
	Hittite
	Armenian
	Paleo-Balkan
	Albanian
	Illyrian
	Thracian
	Dacian


	Greek
	Mysteries
	Orphism
	Gnosticism
	Hermeticism
	Greco-Buddhism


	Roman
	Imperial cult
	Gallo-Roman
	Mithraism


	Manichaeism
	Mazdakism


	Scythian
	Germanic
	Anglo-Saxon
	Continental
	Frankish
	Norse


	Celtic
	Baltic
	Slavic
	Finnish
	Hungarian
	Ainu
	Melanesian
	Micronesian
	Nauruan


	Cook Islands
	Rapa Nui
	Tongan
	Inca
	Olmec
	Zapotec
	Fuegian
	Selk'nam


	Guanche
	Jamaican Maroon







	
	Topics

	
	Aspects	
	Apostasy / Disaffiliation
	Behaviour
	Beliefs
	Clergy
	Conversion
	Deities
	Entheogens
	Ethnic religion
	Denomination
	Faith
	Fire
	Folk religion
	God
	Meditation
	Monasticism
	monk
	nun


	Mysticism
	Mythology
	Nature
	Ordination
	Orthodoxy
	Orthopraxy
	Prayer
	Prophecy
	Religious experience
	Ritual
	liturgy
	sacrifice


	Spirituality
	Supernatural
	Symbols
	Truth
	Water
	Worship




	Theism	
	Animism
	Deism
	Dualism
	Henotheism
	Monotheism
	Nontheism
	Panentheism
	Pantheism
	Polytheism
	Transtheism




	Religious
studies	
	Anthropology
	Cognitive science
	Comparative
	Development
	Evolutionary origin
	Evolutionary psychology
	History
	Philosophy
	Neurotheology
	Psychology
	Sociology
	Theology
	Theories
	Women




	Religion 
and society
	
	Agriculture
	Business
	Clergy
	monasticism
	ordination


	Conversion
	evangelism
	missionary
	proselytism


	Disability
	Education
	Fanaticism
	Freedom
	pluralism
	syncretism
	toleration
	universalism


	Fundamentalism
	Growth
	Happiness
	Homosexuality
	Minorities
	National church
	National religiosity levels
	Religiocentrism
	Populations
	Schism
	Science
	State
	Theocracy
	Vegetarianism
	Video games
	Violence
	persecution
	terrorism
	war


	Wealth




	Secularism 
and irreligion
	
	Antireligion
	Deism
	Agnosticism
	Atheism
	Criticism
	LaVeyan Satanism
	Deconstruction
	Humanistic Judaism
	Irreligion by country
	Objectivism
	Secular humanism
	Secular theology
	Secularization
	Separation of church and state
	Unaffiliated




	Overviews
and lists
	
	Index
	Outline
	Timeline
	Abrahamic prophets
	Deification
	Deities
	Founders
	Mass gatherings
	New religious movements
	Organizations
	Religions and spiritual traditions
	Scholars










	
	 Category
	 Portal







	
	v
	t
	e


Philosophy of religion

	Concepts in religion	
	Afterlife
	Euthyphro dilemma
	Faith
	Intelligent design
	Miracle
	Problem of evil
	Religious belief
	Soul
	Spirit
	Theodicy
	Theological veto




	Conceptions of God	
	
	Aristotelian view
	Brahman
	Demiurge
	Divine simplicity
	Egoism
	Holy Spirit
	Misotheism
	Pandeism
	Personal god
	Process theology
	Supreme Being
	Unmoved mover




	God in	
	Abrahamic religions
	Buddhism
	Christianity
	Hinduism
	Islam
	Jainism
	Judaism
	Mormonism
	Sikhism
	Baháʼí Faith
	Wicca







	Existence of God	
	For	
	Beauty
	Christological
	Consciousness
	Cosmological
	Kalam
	Contingency


	Degree
	Desire
	Experience
	Fine-tuning of the universe
	Love
	Miracles
	Morality
	Necessary existent
	Ontological
	Pascal's wager
	Proper basis
	Reason
	Teleological
	Natural law
	Watchmaker analogy


	Transcendental




	Against	
	747 gambit
	Atheist's Wager
	Evil
	Free will
	Hell
	Inconsistent revelations
	Nonbelief
	Noncognitivism
	Occam's razor
	Omnipotence
	Poor design
	Russell's teapot







	Theology	
	Acosmism
	Agnosticism
	Animism
	Antireligion
	Atheism
	Creationism
	Dharmism
	Deism
	Demonology
	Divine command theory
	Dualism
	Esotericism
	Exclusivism
	Existentialism
	Christian
	Agnostic
	Atheistic


	Feminist theology
	Thealogy
	Womanist theology


	Fideism
	Fundamentalism
	Gnosticism
	Henotheism
	Humanism
	Religious
	Secular
	Christian


	Inclusivism
	Theories about religions
	Monism
	Monotheism
	Mysticism
	Naturalism
	Metaphysical
	Religious
	Humanistic


	New Age
	Nondualism
	Nontheism
	Pandeism
	Panentheism
	Pantheism
	Perennialism
	Polytheism
	Possibilianism
	Process theology
	Religious skepticism
	Spiritualism
	Shamanism
	Taoic
	Theism
	Transcendentalism
	more...




	Religious language	
	Eschatological verification
	Language game
	Logical positivism
	Apophatic theology
	Verificationism




	Problem of evil	
	Augustinian theodicy
	Best of all possible worlds
	Euthyphro dilemma
	Inconsistent triad
	Irenaean theodicy
	Natural evil
	Theodicy




	Philosophers
of religion

(by date active)	
	Ancient and
medieval	
	Anselm of Canterbury
	Augustine of Hippo
	Avicenna
	Averroes
	Boethius
	Erasmus
	Gaunilo of Marmoutiers
	Pico della Mirandola
	Heraclitus
	King James VI and I
	Marcion of Sinope
	Thomas Aquinas
	Maimonides




	Early modern	
	Augustin Calmet
	René Descartes
	Blaise Pascal
	Baruch Spinoza
	Nicolas Malebranche
	Gottfried W Leibniz
	William Wollaston
	Thomas Chubb
	David Hume
	Baron d'Holbach
	Immanuel Kant
	Johann G Herder




	1800
1850	
	Friedrich Schleiermacher
	Karl C F Krause
	Georg W F Hegel


	William Whewell
	Ludwig Feuerbach
	Søren Kierkegaard
	Karl Marx
	Albrecht Ritschl
	Afrikan Spir




	1880
1900	
	Ernst Haeckel
	W K Clifford
	Friedrich Nietzsche
	Harald Høffding
	William James


	Vladimir Solovyov
	Ernst Troeltsch
	Rudolf Otto
	Lev Shestov
	Sergei Bulgakov
	Pavel Florensky
	Ernst Cassirer
	Joseph Maréchal




	1920
postwar	
	George Santayana
	Bertrand Russell
	Martin Buber
	René Guénon
	Paul Tillich
	Karl Barth
	Emil Brunner
	Rudolf Bultmann
	Gabriel Marcel
	Reinhold Niebuhr


	Charles Hartshorne
	Mircea Eliade
	Frithjof Schuon
	J L Mackie
	Walter Kaufmann
	Martin Lings
	Peter Geach
	George I Mavrodes
	William Alston
	Antony Flew




	1970
1990
2010	
	William L Rowe
	Dewi Z Phillips
	Alvin Plantinga
	Anthony Kenny
	Nicholas Wolterstorff
	Richard Swinburne
	Robert Merrihew Adams
	Ravi Zacharias
	Peter van Inwagen
	Daniel Dennett
	Loyal Rue
	Jean-Luc Marion
	William Lane Craig
	Ali Akbar Rashad


	Alexander Pruss







	Related topics	
	Criticism of religion
	Desacralization of knowledge
	Ethics in religion
	Exegesis
	History of religion
	Religion
	Religious language
	Religious philosophy
	Relationship between religion and science
	Faith and rationality
	more...




	
	 Portal
	 Category







	
	v
	t
	e


Worldview

	
	Related terms

	
	Basic beliefs/Beliefs
	Collective consciousness/Collective unconscious
	Conceptual system
	Context
	Conventions
	Cultural movement
	Epic poetry/National epics
	Facts and factoids
	Framing
	Ideology
	Life stance
	Lifestyle
	Memes/Memeplex
	Mental model
	Metanarrative
	Mindset
	Norms
	Paradigm
	Philosophical theory
	Point of view
	Presuppositions
	Reality tunnel
	Received view
	Schemata
	School of thought
	Set
	Social reality
	Theory of everything
	Umwelt
	Value system







	
	Aspects

	
	Biases	
	Academic
	Attentional
	Attitude polarization
	Belief
	Cognitive (list)
	Collective narcissism
	Confirmation
	Congruence
	Cryptomnesia
	Cultural
	Ethnocentrism
	Filter bubble
	Homophily
	In-group favoritism
	Magical thinking
	Media
	Observer-expectancy
	Observational error
	Selective exposure
	Selective perception
	Self-deception
	Self-fulfilling prophecy (Clever Hans effect, placebo effect, wishful thinking)
	Status quo
	Stereotyping




	Change and
maintenance	
	Activism
	Argument
	Argumentum ad populum
	Attitude change
	Censorship
	Charisma
	Circular reporting
	Cognitive dissonance
	Critical thinking
	Crowd manipulation
	Cultural dissonance
	Deprogramming
	Echo chamber
	Education (religious, values)
	Euphemism
	Excommunication
	Fearmongering
	Historical revisionism
	Ideological repression
	Indoctrination
	Media manipulation
	Media regulation
	Mind control
	Missionaries
	Moral entrepreneurship
	Persuasion
	Polite fiction
	Political engineering
	Propaganda
	Propaganda model
	Proselytism
	Psychological manipulation
	Psychological warfare
	Religious conversion (forced)
	Religious persecution
	Religious uniformity
	Revolutions
	Rhetoric
	Self-censorship
	Social change
	Social control
	Social engineering
	Social influence
	Social progress
	Suppression of dissent
	Systemic bias
	Woozle effect




	Culture	
	Anthropology (cultural, social)
	Calendars
	Ceremonies
	Coronations
	Cross-cultural psychology
	Cultural psychology
	Doctrine
	Employment/Serfdom/Slavery
	Families
	Funerals/Burial
	Games
	Holidays
	Hygiene (ritual)
	Identity (philosophy) (cultural)
	Institutions
	Liminality
	Liturgy
	Marriage
	Myth and ritual
	Oaths
	Pilgrimages
	Play
	Rites of passage (secular)
	Rituals
	Social class/Social status/Caste
	Symbols
	Symbolic boundaries
	Worship




	Groupthink	
	Abilene paradox
	Bandwagon effect
	Collectives
	Collective behavior (animal)
	Collective effervescence
	Collective intelligence
	Conformity
	Consensus theory
	Crowd psychology
	Cults
	Culture-bound syndromes
	Deindividuation
	Democracy
	Emergence
	Emotional contagion
	Entitativity
	False-consensus effect
	Folie à deux
	Group action
	Group dynamics
	Group emotion
	Group polarization
	Groupshift
	Herd behavior
	Holism
	Hysterical contagion
	Information cascade
	Invisible hand
	Lynching
	Majoritarianism/Ochlocracy
	Mass action
	Mass hysteria
	Mass psychogenic illness
	Milieu control
	Mobbing
	Moral panic
	Organizations
	Peer pressure
	Pluralistic ignorance
	Political correctness
	Pseudoconsensus
	Scapegoating
	Self-organization
	Social action
	Social behavior
	Social emotions
	Social exclusion
	Social facilitation (animal)
	Social group
	Social proof
	Social psychology
	Sociology
	Spontaneous order
	Status quo
	Stigmergy
	Swarm behaviour
	System justification
	Viral phenomena




	Knowledge	
	Axioms (tacit assumptions)
	Conceptual framework
	Epistemology (outline)
	Evidence (anecdotal, scientific)
	Explanations
	Faith (fideism)
	Gnosis
	Intuition
	Meaning-making
	Memory
	Metaknowledge
	Methodology
	Observation
	Observational learning
	Perception
	Reasoning (fallacious, logic)
	Revelation
	Testimony
	Tradition (folklore)
	Truth (consensus theory, criteria)
	World disclosure




	Metaphysics	
	Ætiology
	Afterlife
	Anima mundi
	Being
	Causality
	Concepts
	Consciousness (mind–body problem)
	Cosmogony
	Cosmology (religious)
	Creation myth
	Deities (existence)
	Destiny
	Eschatology
	Everything/Nothing
	Evolution
	Existence
	Fiction/Non-fiction
	Free will
	Future
	History
	Ideas
	Idios kosmos
	Illusions
	Incarnation
	Information
	Intelligence
	Magic
	Matter
	Miracles
	Mythology (comparative)
	National mythoi
	Nature (philosophical)
	Ontology
	Origin myths (political myths)
	Otherworlds (axes mundi)
	Problem of evil
	Physics (natural philosophy)
	Reality
	Souls
	Spirit
	Supernature
	Teleology
	Theology
	Time
	Unobservables




	Value	
	Æsthetics
	Almsgiving/Charity
	Altruism
	Autonomy
	Beauty
	Codes of conduct
	Comedy
	Common good
	Conscience
	Consent
	Creativity
	Disgust
	Duty
	Economics
	Ecstasy (emotional, religious)
	Elegance
	Emotions (æsthetic)
	Entertainment
	Eroticism
	Ethics
	Étiquette
	Family values
	Food and drink prohibitions (unclean animals)
	Golden Rule
	Guilt/Culpability
	Happiness
	Harmony
	Honour
	Human rights
	Judgement
	Justice
	Laws (jurisprudence, religious)
	Liberty (political freedom)
	Love
	Magnificence
	Maxims
	Meaning of life
	Morality (public)
	Obligations
	Peace
	Piety
	Praxeology
	Principles
	Punishment
	Qualities
	Repentance
	Reverence
	Rights
	Sexuality (ethics)
	Sin
	Social stigma
	Stewardship
	Styles
	Sublime, The
	Suffering
	Sympathy
	Taboo
	Taste
	Theodicy
	Trust
	Unspoken rules
	Virtues and Vices
	Works of art
	Wrongdoing










	
	Examples

	
	Attitudes	
	Optimism
	Pessimism
	Reclusion
	Weltschmerz




	Economic and
political ideologies	
	Authoritarianism
	Anarchism
	Capitalism
	Christian democracy
	Collectivism
	Colonialism
	Communalism
	Communism
	Communitarianism
	Conservatism
	Constitutionalism
	Distributism
	Environmentalism
	Extremism
	Fanaticism
	Fascism
	Feminism
	Fundamentalism
	Globalism
	Green politics
	Imperialism
	Individualism
	Industrialism
	Intellectualism
	Islamism
	Liberalism
	Libertarianism
	Masculism
	Militarism
	Monarchism
	Nationalism
	Pacifism
	Progressivism
	Radicalism
	Reformism
	Republicanism
	Sentientism
	Social democracy
	Socialism
	Utilitarianism
	Veganism




	Religions	
	African traditional religions
	Baháʼí
	Buddhism
	Cao Dai
	Cheondoism
	Chinese traditional religions
	Christianity
	Ethnic religions
	Hòa Hảo
	Hinduism
	Islam
	Jainism
	Judaism
	Korean shamanism
	Neo-Paganism
	Rastafarianism
	Secular/Nonreligious/Agnostic/Atheist
	Shinto
	Sikhism
	Spiritism
	Taoism
	Tenrikyo
	Tenriism
	Unitarian Universalism
	Zoroastrianism




	Schools of
philosophy	
	Agriculturalism
	Aristotelianism
	Atomism
	Averroism
	Cartesianism
	Cārvāka
	Collectivism
	Confucianism/New Confucianism
	Critical theory
	Cynicism
	Cyrenaics
	Determinism
	Dualism
	Eleatics
	Empiricism
	Eretrian school
	Epicureanism
	Existentialism
	Foundationalism
	Hedonism
	Hegelianism
	Hermeneutics
	Historicism/New Historicism
	Holism
	Humanism/Renaissance humanism
	Illuminationism
	ʿIlm al-Kalām
	Idealism
	Individualism
	Ionian
	Kantianism/Neo-Kantianism
	Kokugaku
	Legalism
	Logicians
	Materialism
	Mohism
	Megarian school
	Modernism/Postmodernism
	Monism
	Natural Law
	Naturalism (Chinese)
	Naturalism (western)
	Nihilism
	Peripatetic
	Phenomenology
	Platonism/Neoplatonism
	Pluralism
	Positivism
	Pragmatism
	Presocratic
	Pyrrhonism
	Pythagoreanism/Neopythagoreanism
	Rationalism
	Reductionism
	Scholasticism/Neo-Scholasticism
	Sentientism
	Social constructionism
	Sophism
	Spinozism
	Stoicism
	Structuralism/Post-structuralism
	Thomism
	Transcendentalism
	Utilitarianism
	Yangism



























Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Belief&oldid=996647270#Religion"


		Categories: 	Belief
	Epistemology
	Truth
	Psychological attitude
	Propositional attitudes
	Religious belief and doctrine


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		 This page was last edited on 27 December 2020, at 21:35 (UTC).
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