Social bodies and social justice


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Article:

Lewis, S and Thomson, M orcid.org/0000-0002-1570-2481 (2019) Social bodies and social
justice. International Journal of Law in Context, 15 (3). pp. 344-361. ISSN 1744-5523 

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552319000053

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Social Bodies & Social Justice 

Sam Lewis and Michael Thomson* 

Abstract:  

This article identifies, and engages with, the social bodies emerging by virtue of the biosocial 

turn in the life sciences and the contemporaneous advent of embodied approaches to social 

justice. Across diverse domains, then, bodies are increasingly understood as shaped by and 

dependent upon their environments. To explore this potentially important and productive 

Iﾗﾐ┗WヴｪWﾐIWが ┘W Hヴｷﾐｪ M;ヴデｴ; FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ ┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ｷﾐデﾗ Iﾗﾐ┗Wヴゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ 
developmental neuroscience and environmental epigenetics. We foreground significant 

intersecting concerns and argue that vulnerability theory is strengthened by engaging with a 

richer understanding of embodiment that attends to these new biosocial knowledge claims. 

This engagement can enhance the political traction of this and other embodied theories. 

These can, in turn, provide important alternatives to the neoliberal lens through which 

neuroscience and epigenetics have hitherto been translated into policy and practice. 

Exploring this new terrain, we nevertheless acknowledge the limitations and dangers posed 

by current biopolitical governance practices. 

 

Introduction 

The relationship between our bodily place in the world and social justice has long preoccupied 

feminist, critical race, and disability theorists.1 It has also provoked and shaped particular 

fields of study, such as epidemiology and public health.2 More recently, and the focus of this 

article, this relationship has become a more pervasive concern across the humanities, social 

and life sciences. In the humanities and social sciences, for example, the body features 

prominently in an increasing number of approaches to social justice. From the discourses of 

precariousness (Butler 2005) and vulnerability (Fineman 2010, 2014, 2015, 2017) to the 

                                            

 
*The authors would like to thank Joshua Warburton for research assistance and Catherine Cruse-Drew, 

CｴヴｷゲデﾗヮｴWヴ DｷWデ┣が M;ヴデｴ; FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐが JWﾐﾐｷaWヴ HWﾐSヴ┞が Iゲ;HWﾉ K;ヴヮｷﾐが K;ヴWﾐ OげCﾗﾐﾐWﾉﾉが Aﾐｷデ; “デ┌ｴﾏﾆｴWが MｷデIｴWﾉﾉ 
Tヴ;┗ｷゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾃﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉげゲ ヴW┗ｷW┘Wヴゲ aﾗヴ デｴWｷヴ ｪWnerous and thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. 
WW ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾉｷﾆW デﾗ デｴ;ﾐﾆ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ;デ デｴW けV┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ┘ﾗヴﾆゲｴﾗヮ ｴWﾉS ;デ デｴW “Iｴﾗﾗﾉ ﾗa 
Law, University of Leeds, 17-18 June 2016.   
1 While feminist and critical race scholars (for example, Donna Haraway (2004) and Dorothy Roberts (2010)) 

have done much to explore this terrain, it is perhaps disability scholars who have most acutely illustrated the 

social justice implications of the relationship between the body and the social context it is conceived within 

and moves through. This is reflected in the social model of disability which has shaped both disability studies 

and international civil society discourse (see, Oliver (1981, 1983, 2013)). 
2  The social justice concerns in these disciplines are most apparent in the work since the early 1980s that has 

focused on the social determinants of health (for example, Marmott (2005) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2011)). 



Page | 2 
 

capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2011, Sen 1980), social flesh (Beasley and Bacchi 2007), and 

depletion (Goldblatt and Rai, 2017) the body has been positioned as a site for understanding 

and responding to our common humanity. Within such models the embedded fleshiness of 

the human condition is foregrounded with the hope of leveraging a more responsive state 

(Fineman, 2010); one that recognises not only common rights and state obligations but also 

our specificity and ethical individualism (Sen, 1980).  

As these approaches to social justice have gained ground in the humanities and social 

sciences, there has been a contemporaneous turn to the social in the life sciences. Here, what 

were once imagined as immutable facts of existence - hardwired biological codes, systems, 

and processes - have lost their indifference to the social world. In particular, bodies have 

become porous to and shaped by environments of abuse and disadvantage. Neuroscience 

and epigenetics have been at the forefront of this profound shift in scientific thinking. As 

Maurizio Meloni writes, our ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW Hヴ;ｷﾐ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ヴWｷﾏ;ｪｷﾐWS aヴﾗﾏ ;ﾐ けｷゲﾗﾉ;デWS 

S;デ; ヮヴﾗIWゲゲﾗヴ デﾗ デｴW ┌ﾉデヴ;ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾏ┌ﾉデｷヮﾉ┞ IﾗﾐﾐWIデWS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Hヴ;ｷﾐげ (Meloni, 2014). At the 

same time, epigenetics に the investigation of changes in gene expression that are not driven 

by alterations to the underlying DNA sequence - has delivered us to a post-genetic world 

┘ｴWヴW ｪWﾐWゲ ;ヴW ﾐﾗ ﾉﾗﾐｪWヴ け;Hゲﾗﾉ┌デWﾉ┞ ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐげ H┌デ ;ヴW けIﾗﾐデW┝デ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ SWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ふ;ﾐS 

Wﾉ┌ゲｷ┗Wぶ WﾐデｷデｷWゲ デｴ;デ IﾗﾗヮWヴ;デW W┝デWﾐゲｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴ ; ﾉ;ヴｪW ┗;ヴｷWデ┞ ﾗa ヮﾗゲデｪWﾐﾗﾏｷIげ 

environmental and social factors (Meloni 2014, 601). Importantly, both epigenetics and 

neuroscience have been identified as offering new ways to understand and address 

inequalities and disadvantage (Loi, Del Savio and Stupka 2013, Hair et al 2015).  

Longstanding interest in the relationship between the body and the social is therefore being 

articulated in new ways at multiple disciplinary locations. Across these contexts social bodies 

are emerging that may be implicated in overlapping social justice concerns. Discussion across 

these disciplines has the potential to strengthen intersecting agendas that seek to understand 

and address inequalities that become embedded in, or understood through, the body. In this 

article we argue that bringing the social bodies invoked within embodied approaches to social 

justice ;ﾐS デｴW ﾐW┘ けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ HｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲげ ふPｷIﾆWヴゲｪｷﾉﾉが ヲヰヱヴぶ into conversation has the potential to 

invest social justice projects with new urgency, and greater political purchase, as we 

understand in new ways how opportunities and life chances may be limited by adversity and 



Page | 3 
 

deprivation. This recognises the political and legal tヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW けｴ;ヴSげ ゲIｷWﾐIWゲ ;ﾐS デｴ┌ゲ デｴW 

potential leverage afforded by デｴｷゲ けﾐW┘ ﾏﾗﾉWcular landsc;ヮWげ ふPｷIﾆWヴゲｪｷﾉﾉ Wデ ;ﾉが ヲヰヱンぶく 

To develop this argument we focus on M;ヴデｴ; FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ ┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ゲ けthe 

ヮヴｷﾏ;ﾉ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐげ (2017, 142). FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ vulnerability theory is built on the twin pillars 

of our bodily place in the world and our embeddedness in social and institutional 

relationships. These foundations mirror the analytical focus of the new social biologies and 

FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ attention to institutional structures makes it particularly relevant for the analysis 

and development of law and policy. Arguing for greater attention to what it means to talk of 

embodiment at this point in the development of the life sciences, we illustrate how these 

knowledge claims strengthen vulnerability theoryげゲ significant potential as an analytical 

framework and deliberative space for the formation of socially just law and policy.  Further, 

while developments in the life sciences have quickly become associated with stigmatising and 

punitive social policies, we posit vulnerability theory as a means of wresting these scientific 

models from neoliberal frameworks, enabling the science to be used to scaffold more 

progressive agendas. We contend that through this, vulnerability theory helps to reveal and 

Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW デｴW ﾐ;ヴヴﾗ┘ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ デｴ;デ ｷﾐｴ;Hｷデゲ に and limits - contemporary 

science and policy. 

The article begins by articulating FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ theory of universal vulnerability. We then set out 

the fundamental propositions of neuroscience and epigenetics, focusing on how 

intergenerational processes have become an important locus for these two fields and the 

point at which they meet. Having acknowledged the social bodies that populate these 

projects, we address how scientific claims from these fields have been mobilised in policy. 

The final section returns to vulnerability theory and demonstrates how the けﾐW┘ HｷﾗゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 

デWヴヴ;ｷﾐげ ふMWﾉﾗﾐｷ ヲヰヱヴが ヵΓヵぶ may provide further weight to a vulnerability analysis of 

government interventions and help to formulate alternative policy that is potentially both 

more effective and just. 

 

Vulnerability theory 

The last two decades have seen the emergence of a new humanist discourse that centres 

embodiment - entwining ethics and ontology - to challenge and re-align existing ethical and 



Page | 4 
 

political models of responsibility (Murphy 2011, 577). While our argument has relevance 

across this rich and diverse field of embodied approaches, here we focus on the analytical 

framework that Martha Fineman has built upon the ontological fact of our embodied 

vulnerability. In this sWIデｷﾗﾐ ┘W ゲWデ ﾗ┌デ FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ analytical proposition which deploys 

embodied vulnerability to articulate a けﾏﾗヴW ｷﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷ┗W ;ﾐS ヴW;ﾉｷゲデｷI ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ゲ┌HﾃWIデ に one that 

makes it clear that injury and injustice does inevitably arise when the state remains 

┌ﾐヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷ┗W デﾗ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS SWヮWﾐSWﾐI┞げ ふヲヰヱΑが ヱヴΓぶく 

For Fineman, embodied vulnerability is the defining human condition: it is part of our shared 

humanity that we all age and may be struck down by illness and natural or man-made disaster. 

While embodied vulnerability is universal it is also particular, reflecting our different forms of 

embodiment and our positioning within webs of economic and institutional relationships. 

Thus Fineman brings together our embodied vulnerability and our social embeddedness to 

argue that vulnerability is けboth universal and particular; it is experienced uniquely by each of 

usげ (2010, 269). FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ approach is therefore distinct from the stigmatising vulnerability 

of social policy, which characterises individuals and groups who, by virtue of their 

circumstances, are more susceptible to harm than others. Fineman regards the ascription of 

┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ゲﾗﾏW ヮWﾗヮﾉW ;ﾐS ﾐﾗデ ﾗデｴWヴゲ ;ゲ けﾏｷゲﾉW;Sｷﾐｪげ ;ﾐS けｷﾐ;II┌ヴ;デWげく It is also 

pernicious, as grouping ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ｷﾐデﾗ け┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;HﾉW ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ ; ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ 

of shared characteristics may overstate their likeness while understating their likeness to 

members of the majority population, precipitating their stigmatization (Fineman 2013: 16).  

Fヴﾗﾏ デｴｷゲ けSWゲIヴｷヮデｷ┗W ﾗヴ WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉげ ゲデ;ヴデｷﾐｪ ヮﾗｷﾐデが develops a theoretical framework for 

deliberating けthe just allocation of responsibility for individual and societal wellbeingげ (2017, 

141). The universal vulnerable subject who sits at the heart of the theory is an alternative to 

the unencumbered liberal subject of contemporary law and policyぎ け;ﾐ ｷﾉﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 

ｷﾐ┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW ﾏ;SW ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW H┞ ;ﾐ ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ SｷゲデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲげ 

(Karpin 2018, 1118). Acknowledging universal vulnerability - and the universal vulnerable 

subject it implies に the focus becomes resilience and the duty of the state is to provide us with 

the assets or tools to be resilient when our vulnerability is made manifest. 

This political and ethical project can therefore be understood as one that aims to secure a 

more responsive state (Fineman 2010); one obligated to address the differences in resilience 

that differentials in socio-economic, educational, environmental and other factors can create. 



Page | 5 
 

For Fineman, the state is けthe legitimate governing entity and is tasked with a responsibility 

to establish and monitor social institutions and relationships that facilitate the acquisition of 

ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヴWゲｷﾉｷWﾐIWげ ふヲヰヱΑが ヱンヴぶく This is essential as our position within this 

IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆ ﾗa ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ けヮヴﾗaﾗ┌ﾐSﾉ┞ ;aaWIデ ﾗ┌ヴ SWゲデｷﾐｷWゲ ;ﾐS aﾗヴデ┌ﾐWゲ, structuring 

ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ﾗヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS IヴW;デｷﾐｪ ﾗヴ ｷﾏヮWSｷﾐｪ ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデｷWゲげ ふヲヰヱΑが ヱヴヵぶく For Fineman then, a 

state けis responsive when it acts to monitor and adjust institutions and relationships when 

デｴW┞ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ; ﾃ┌ゲデ ﾏ;ﾐﾐWヴげ (Fineman 2017, 4). We return to the question of an 

appropriately responsive state in the final section of this article. 

O┌ヴ けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ;ﾐS WﾏHWSSWSげ ふFｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐ ヲヰヱヵが ヲヰΓヱぶ ヮﾉ;IW ｷﾐ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉS デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ 

the foundations for this humanist ethic (Murphy 2011, 578). In this, as we shall articulate, 

there are clear similarities with the preoccupations of the new social biologies as environment 

shapes health outcomes, resilience, and opportunities. For Fineman, however, embodied 

vulnerability is something of a term of art, a けヮヴovocation to express an alternative way of 

ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ﾉ;┘げ ふK;ヴヮｷﾐ ヲヰヱΒが ヱヱヲヰぶく Her primary concern is our embeddedness; that is, our 

place in relation to the informal and formal structures and institutions of social life that enable 

┌ゲ デﾗ HW ヴWゲｷﾉｷWﾐデぎ けA vulnerability approach is primarily focused on exploring the differences 

and dependencies that arise from the fact that we are embedded within society and its 

ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ふヲヰヱヴが ンヱΒぶ and ensuring that the state is responsive to those differences.  

Our work here is not directed at detracデｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ デ┘ｷﾐ ヮｷﾉﾉ;ヴs ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴ けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ;ﾐS 

WﾏHWSSWSげ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ふヲヰヱヵが ヲΓヱ). Rather, our project is to return to the foundational 

concern with embodiment, recuperating it as something more than a means to get to the 

structural preoccupations of the theory. In this we seek recognition of embodied differences 

as more than just the けHﾗSｷﾉ┞ SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲ デｴ;デ ;ヴW ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ 

;デ ;ﾐ┞ ｪｷ┗Wﾐ デｷﾏWげ and variations due to the inevitable corporeal changes that occur as we 

けﾏ;デ┌ヴW ;ﾐS ｪヴﾗ┘が ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ ;ｪW ;ﾐS SWIﾉｷﾐWげ ふヲヰヱΑぎ ヱヴヴぶ, which Fineman terms the 

けｴﾗヴｷ┣ﾗﾐデ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ┗WヴデｷI;ﾉ SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐIWげ ふヱヴΒぶく Here we seek a rebalancing, an 

understanding that our embodiment and our social embeddedness are intertwined in ways 

that potentially impacts intergenerationally. We demonstrate that vulnerability theorists 

need to take embodiment seriously and engage with emergent evidence of the somatic 

effects of social and environmental embeddedness.  



Page | 6 
 

Our argument, then, is that as FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa universal vulnerability is directed at 

securing a more responsive state に SWaｷﾐｷﾐｪ け; ヴﾗH┌ゲデ ゲWﾐゲW ﾗa ゲデ;デW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ aﾗヴ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 

ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲげ ふヲヰヱΑが ヱヴンぶ - the life sciences are articulating a body that may 

very directly animate this project.  As Jörg Niewöhner observes:  

It is almost ironic that the deeper biologists delve into the human body and the more 

fine-grained and molecularised their analysis becomes, the less they are able to ignore 

the many ties that link the individual body and its molecules to the spatio-temporal 

IﾗﾐデW┝デゲ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷデ S┘Wﾉﾉゲく TｴW WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ WﾏHWSSWS HﾗS┞ ｷゲ ; HﾗS┞ ぐ ﾗヮWﾐ デﾗ デｴW 

world (2011, 290). 

The new social bodies of the life sciences may therefore help to compel the state obligations 

that vulnerability theory mandates as we understand the body as porous to the social world 

in which it is embedded. This porosity can biologically entrench inequalities and disadvantage, 

limiting our resilience and that of future generations. Thus we wish to marshal this very 

overlap: fusing the recognition of our bodily place in the world that underpins embodied 

approaches to social justice and the knowledge claims of the new social biologies. Both attend 

デﾗ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ﾃ┌ゲデｷIW ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴ けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ;ﾐS socially emHWSSWSげ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW 

(Fineman 2017, 149).  

Having introduced vulnerability theory, the next section outlines the social bodies emerging 

within the biosocial landscape, focusing on developmental neuroscience and environmental 

epigenetics and, in particular, where these overlap with neuro-epigenetics. We approach the 

life sciences acknowledging that while bodies are けproduced through networks that fold and 

cut across science and other fieldsげ (Roberts, 2002, 21) biomedicine is a particularly privileged 

site at which bodies are constituted and experienced. Further, as Bruno Latour argues (1987), 

propositions are not simply claims or statements: they also articulate the body into new sets 

of arrangements or relations. These can be very concrete and structural arrangements, for 

example with the institutions of the state as illustrated below. But they also have more diffuse 

and potentially profound effects. Biological facts are けtechnophenomenaげ that constitute one 

part of our individual and shared reality but also shape けｴﾗ┘ デｴW ゲWﾉa ｷゲ ﾏ;SW さヴW;ﾉざげ (Lock and 

Nguyen, 2010, 109, 284). In the context of neuroscience we see this in the emergence of new 

brain-H;ゲWS ｷSWﾐデｷデｷWゲ ふけIWヴWHヴ;ﾉ ゲ┌HﾃWIデゲげ (Ortega 2009)) within medicine and policy, as well 

as in the support groups that embrace neuroscientific language to better articulate and 



Page | 7 
 

legitimise understandings and experiences ﾗa Sｷ;ｪﾐﾗゲｷゲ ふけﾐW┌ヴﾗIｴWﾏｷI;ﾉ ゲWﾉ┗Wゲげ (Rose 2005)). 

At the same time, claims from neuroscience and epigenetics are also easily embedded in the 

responsibilising discourses of neo-liberalism. Indeed, plasticity and the (unrealistic) belief that 

sufficient work on the self can improve the epigenome to the benefit of current and future 

generations, can deflect attention from profound structural inequalities, resonating with 

L;┌ヴWﾐ BWヴﾉ;ﾐデげゲ けIヴ┌Wﾉ ﾗヮデｷﾏｷゲﾏげ ふヲヰヱヱぶく Further, plasticity and the focus on transforming the 

ゲWﾉa ヴWｷﾐaﾗヴIWゲ デｴW W┝ｷゲデｷﾐｪ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾗヴSWヴ ;ﾐS ﾏ;ﾆWゲ けﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ┘;┞ゲ ﾗa HWｷﾐｪげ 

(Gillies et al., 2016, 233), particularly around obligations to optimise the self and parenting. 

While our engagement with these rich understandings of embodiment is necessarily limited 

here, the naturalisation of contextual and contingent understandings of the body makes 

engagement with socio-political embodiment all the more pressing (Fox and Thomson 2017; 

Dietz 2018). 

 

The life-sciences & the new social body 

In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, neuroscience and epigenetics have been part of 

;ﾐ けWヮｷゲデWﾏｷI デヴ;ﾐゲaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉｷaW-ゲIｷWﾐIWゲげ ふMWﾉﾗﾐｷ ヲヰヱヴが ヵΓΑぶ ┘ｴWヴW デhere is growing 

acceptance that humans are shaped by both biological and social forces. In these fields, and 

elsewhere, we see デｴW けﾏﾗﾉWI┌ﾉ;ヴｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Hｷﾗｪヴ;ヮｴ┞げ ふNｷW┘öhner 2011), where early 

disadvantage can shape the brainげs early development and in our postgenomic world the 

けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ﾉｷaW ﾗa ;ﾐ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲﾏ IﾗﾏWゲ デﾗ HW ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デWS ｷﾐ ヮｴWﾐﾗデ┞ヮｷI W┝ヮressionげ (Pickersgill 2014, 

481). In other words, the socially unjust distribution of resources, precarity and resilience can 

have immediate somatic affects that are then (potentially) experienced for generations. In 

this section we introduce neuroscience and epigenetics. However, the aim is not to provide 

an account of these fields. Both terms encompass a wide range of specialisms and sub-

specialisms at different stages of emergence that are often contested and sometimes in 

conflict. Rather, the aim is to introduce foundational propositions, acknowledging the limits 

of current knowledge, before proceeding to discuss the translation of neuroscience into 

public policy. Whilst we appreciate that all knowledge production is social, we recognise that 

some knowledge is more social than others, and are acutely aware of the almost endemic 

けHヴ;ｷﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ-Iﾉ;ｷﾏ ゲ┞ﾐSヴﾗﾏWげ ふMﾗヴゲW ヲヰヰヶぶ ;ﾐS けデヴ;ﾐゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ aW┗Wヴげ ふ‘ﾗゲW ;ﾐS AHｷ-Rached, 

2014) that surrounds these fields. 



Page | 8 
 

a) Neuroscience 

Since the 1990s the brain has become the focus for unprecedented research funding and 

attention. A series ﾗa ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾗﾉﾉ;Hﾗヴ;デｷ┗W けHｷｪ ゲIｷWﾐIWげ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデゲ ｴ;┗W 

ゲﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗ ﾏ;ヮ ;ﾐS ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ﾗ┌ヴ ﾐW┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWﾉ┗Wゲく B┞ デｴW ゲデ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴｷゲ IWﾐデ┌ヴ┞ デｴWヴW W┝ｷゲデWS け; 

デヴ┌ﾉ┞ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW aﾗヴ ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐIW ヴWゲW;ヴIｴげ, and by the beginning of the current 

decade けneuroscience acquired the characteristics of expertiseげ (Rose and Abi-Rached 2014, 

6). Rose and Abi-‘;IｴWS Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴ aﾗ┌ヴ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲ ;ﾉﾗﾐｪ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐIW けHWI;ﾏW 

Wﾐデ;ﾐｪﾉWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ﾉｷ┗ｷﾐｪげぎ ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗヮｴ;ヴﾏ;Iﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が Hヴ;ｷﾐ ｷﾏaging, 

neuroplasticity and genomics (Rose and Abi-Rached 2014, 6). Whilst we focus on the latter 

two に reflecting our subsequent concern with governing through children and families - it is 

worth briefly noting that the birth of neuropharmacology and its almost exponential 

development since the 1960s enabled a neuromolecular vision of the brain to emerge. All 

mental states, events and processes became articulated at the molecular level. Shortly 

thereafter, brain imaging technologies were deployed to make visible - and thus more 

intelligible - pathological and normal mental states and processes. Mediagenic visual 

representations, whilst shaped by the technologies and human choices that generated them, 

were taken to be unmediated snapshots of the truth and were ; けﾆW┞ WﾉWﾏWﾐデ ┌ﾐSWヴヮｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪ 

デｴW ｪヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐIW ｷﾐ デｴW W┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ┘ﾗヴﾉSげ ふ‘ﾗゲW ;ﾐS AHｷ-Rached 2014, 10) 

including the public policy we will address. Yet it is the advent of the plastic brain that perhaps 

best demonstrates how knowledge of the brain has been recalibrated and come to permeate 

popular, policy and legal cultures.  

For almost a century, the prevailing wisdom was that the adult brain is transmutable and 

aｷ┝WSく Tｴｷゲ けｴ;ヴS┘ｷヴWSげ Hヴ;ｷﾐ ┘;ゲ ｷﾐI;ヮ;HﾉW ﾗa ヴWゲデﾗヴｷﾐｪ ﾐW┌ヴﾗﾐゲ ﾗヴ ﾐW┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾐWデ┘ﾗrks lost or 

damaged through illness or injury (Lowenstein and Parent 1999: 1126). Understandings of 

brain plasticity emerged from experiments on the rehabilitation of humans following brain 

injury and stroke.  These demonstrated that the damaged brain could remap itself and this 

could be accelerated by rehabilitation practices informed by neurobiology. Such experiments 

transformed our understanding of the brain from a けゲWﾉa-Iﾗﾐデ;ｷﾐWSが SWIﾗﾐデW┝デ┌;ﾉｷ┣WS Wﾐデｷデ┞げ 

(Papadopoulos 2011, 432) デﾗ デｴW Hヴ;ｷﾐ け;ゲ ヮﾉ;ゲデｷIが ﾏ┌デ;HﾉWが ﾗヮWﾐ デﾗ デヴ;ﾐゲaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐぐ 

デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴﾗ┌デ ﾉｷaW ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐヮ┌デゲげ ふ‘ﾗゲW ;ﾐS AHｷ-Rached 2014, 6). Plasticity was 

matched by the discovery of neurogenesis, the growth of new nerve cells in the brain. 



Page | 9 
 

Research by Elizabeth Gould and colleagues (1999), challenged the belief that neuron 

development only occurs early in life, and suggested that it may be stimulated or prevented 

by social and environmental factors (Rose and Abi-Rached 2014: 12). This links neuroscience 

and epigenetics: as Dimitris Papadopoulos ┘ヴｷデWゲ けぷヮへﾉ;ゲデｷIｷデ┞ ;ヮヮW;ヴゲ ┘ｴWﾐ WヮｷｪWﾐWデｷIゲ ｷゲ ;デ 

work: the worldly making and remaking of the totality of an organism in the process of its 

SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ (2011, 433). 

b) Environmental epigenetics 

Epigenetics denotes the potentialﾉ┞ ｴWヴｷデ;HﾉW ;ﾉデWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ けｷﾐ ｪWﾐW W┝ヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ﾗII┌ヴ ｷﾐ 

デｴW ;HゲWﾐIW ﾗa Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ デﾗ デｴW DNA ゲWケ┌WﾐIW ｷデゲWﾉaげ ふDﾗﾉｷﾐﾗ┞ ;ﾐS JｷヴデﾉWが ヲヰヰΒぶく Cヴ┌SWﾉ┞が 

epigenetics concerns the mechanisms that switch genes on and off, or otherwise regulate 

gene expression. TheゲW Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ I;ﾐ HW Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWS ;ゲ けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヮﾉ;ゲデｷIｷデ┞げが ; ﾏW;ﾐゲ 

by which the static or fixed genome can respond more flexibly to a dynamic environment 

(Meloni 2014, 602). Within the diverse field of epigenetics, environmental epigenetics focuses 

on the impact of environmental factors on the epigenome, and therefore their impact on 

physiology に including brain form and function.  In focusing on environmental impact, 

environmental epigenetics has its genealogical roots in the normative, scientific and 

theoretical foundations of epidemiology, although this is now pursued at the scale of the 

molecular (Pickersgill et al., 2013, 430).  

Several key studies underpin much epigenetic commentary and are taken to provide proof of 

principle. These studies track changes in methylation that result from nutritional or 

environmental factors, with chronic stress a concept that drives the field and provides a focus 

for experimental design (Niewöhner, 2011, 281).3 Methylation enables the activation and 

deactivation of genes and their associated proteins. If the genome is now best described as a 

け┗;ゲデ ヴW;Iデｷ┗W ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげ ふKWﾉﾉWヴ ヲヰヱヲぶが デｴWﾐ ﾏWデｴ┞ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴｷゲが けヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ 

of specific proteins in response to the constantly changing signals it receives from its 

Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾉﾉWヴ ヲヰヱヴが ヲヴヲΑぶく TｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa ﾏWデｴ┞ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ ヮｴWﾐﾗデ┞ヮｷI W┝ヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐ I;ﾐ 

be seen clearly in nature. With honey bees, for example, feeding genetically identical larvae 

                                            

 
3 While four mechanisms of epigenetic control have been identified, most of the environmental epigenetic 
studies focus on DNA methylation, see Romani et al 2015. 



Page | 10 
 

differently produces different adult phenotypes as larvae fed on royal jelly become fertile 

queens, whilst those fed less nutritious food become sterile workers (Kucharski et al. 2008).  

In this context, recourse is frequently made to key epidemiological observations, for example 

changes resulting from periods of famine. Studies of the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944-5 

during German occupation, and the experience of malnutrition in Overkalix in Northern 

Sweden, are taken to establish a connection between malnutrition in utero and early life, and 

subsequent metabolic disorders. These disorders persist for up to six decades, include the 

second generation, and are transmitted via the epigenome (Painter Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヰΒぶく MIGﾗ┘;ﾐげゲ 

(2009) study of the level of methylation in post-mortem hippocampal tissue from two groups 

ﾗa ゲ┌ｷIｷSW ┗ｷIデｷﾏゲが ﾗﾐW ﾗa ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;S ; ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ;H┌ゲWが ｷゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾐﾗデ;HﾉWく MIGﾗ┘;ﾐげゲ 

work found a different methylation pattern in the abused group compared to the non-abused 

group. This has been interpreted as evidence of trauma becoming part of the genetic 

けﾏWﾏﾗヴ┞げが ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏ;┞ デｴWﾐ ふヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ぶ HW デヴ;ﾐゲﾏｷデデWS ｷﾐデWヴ-generationally (Meloni 2014, 

602). 

In terms of laboratory science, the work of Michael Meaney, Moshe Szyf and colleagues on 

how variations in maternal behaviour of rats created epigenetic alterations in affected pups 

is central (Meaney 2001). These and similar studies are taken to show that early life 

experiences (most often associated with maternal behaviour) can affect neural development, 

shape maternal behaviour in offspring, and hence affect gene expression in a third 

generation. Significantly, interpretation of the evidence moves seamlessly from animal 

experiments to lessons for human behaviour where we must now attend to けshaping and 

reshaping our plastic brainsげ (Rose and Abi-Rached 2014, 12). 

In the processes of translation, デｴW aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW WヮｷｪWﾐWデｷI ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗﾐ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ Hヴ;ｷﾐゲ 

becomes gendered. Here women can be framed as the けfirst environment for children, 

potentially activating and augmenting a range of moral discourses and subjecting them to 

ふｷﾐIヴW;ゲWSぶ ゲIヴ┌デｷﾐ┞げ ふPｷIﾆWヴゲｪｷﾉﾉ Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヱンが ヴンΑぶく YWデ デｴｷゲ I;ﾐ HW デヴ;IﾆWS H;Iﾆ┘;ヴSゲ デﾗ 

MW;ﾐW┞げゲ ヴ;デゲ ;ゲ デｴW けヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷI ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏげ ふBWIﾆ ;ﾐS Niewöhner 2006) of the laboratory 

funnels us towards this particular experiment, which at this point and subsequently is 

freighted with common-sense and gendered understandings of parenting and responsibility. 

Returning to our earlier statement regarding the importance of attending to the processes of 

socio-political embodiment, and before considering how this is extended when science is 



Page | 11 
 

translated into policy, it is worth briefly detailing how Meaney, Szyf and colleagues started 

their work on northern hooded rats, choosing these animals because of their identifiable 

けﾏ;デWヴﾐ;ﾉげ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴゲ ﾗa け;ヴIｴWS-H;Iﾆ ﾐ┌ヴゲｷﾐｪげ ;ﾐS けﾉｷIﾆｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ｪヴﾗﾗﾏｷﾐｪげ (Weaver et al 

2004)く “┌Iｴ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ ｷゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;HﾉW ;デ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ﾉW┗Wﾉゲ ﾗa ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷデ┞ ゲﾗ デｴ;デ ; けﾉWゲゲ ﾏ;デWヴﾐ;ﾉげ 

group can be identified within any population. The experiments focused on the impact of 

these two types of behaviour on the methylation status of the stress relevant receptor in the 

ｴｷヮヮﾗI;ﾏヮ;ﾉ デｷゲゲ┌W ふPｷIﾆWヴゲｪｷﾉﾉ ヲヰヱンが ヴンヲぶく P┌ヮゲ デｴ;デ ｴ;S けﾉﾗ┘ ﾐ┌ヴゲｷﾐｪげ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲ ｴ;S 

significantly higher rates of methylation, taken to indicate a higher susceptibility to stress. As 

WﾉゲW┘ｴWヴW ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉｷaW ゲIｷWﾐIWゲが けin epigenetics biomedical knowledge and the social structures 

of parenting, gender and family life mix in a range of waysげ (Pickersgill 2013, 437). 

The epigenetic landscape remains defined by both hype and scepticism, with claims of 

intergenerational stability and transmission of epi-mutations proving particularly 

contentious. Environmental epigenetics に including neuro-epigenetics に is a field in the 

making. While some in the social sciences draw parallels between environmental epigenetics 

and the socio-biologies of the past that were shaped by race, gender and class prejudices 

(Gillies et al 2017), others express varying degrees of acceptance (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013,  

Meloni 2014). While we have significant reservations about the scientific processes, claims, 

and their impact on policy-making, we share Meloniげゲ view that epigenetic work in 

neuroscience and epidemiology in the last decade has けundermined any residual dualism of 

ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ;ﾐS ﾐ┌ヴデ┌ヴWが けHｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉげ ;ﾐS けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ I;┌ゲWゲ ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲげ ふMWﾉﾗﾐｷ ヲヰヱヴが 

601). This necessitates grappling with the implications for social justice at the level of theory, 

policy and practice.  

We would, however, make two further points about the science. First, the new claims bolster 

work that has long linked social, economic, and environmental disadvantage to poor health 

and other outcomes. Environmental epigenetics has its genealogical origins in epidemiology, 

work on the social determinants of health, and the developmental origins of health and 

disease.  It addresses hypotheses accepted as legitimate within these fields but now at a 

molecular level. Second, even as we accept the degree to which the science is contested, 

these claims have a strategic value, able to underpin arguments for basic rights, welfare, and 

redistribution. These claims do not need to languish within the gendered and punitive policy 

discourse they are currently associated with. At the same time, we acknowledge the concerns 



Page | 12 
 

of Gillies et al (2016, 228) who argue that the context within which these sciences have 

emerged is so politically loaded that it ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ ; けゲﾗﾏW┘ｴ;デ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲﾗSSWﾐ H;ゲW ┌ヮﾗﾐ 

which to pitch a big cross-SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐ;ヴ┞ デWﾐデげ. Nevertheless, we believe that it is worth exploring 

whether デｴW けSWWヮﾉ┞ ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲｷ┗W ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ﾗa デｴW ゲIｷWﾐIW ふFｷデ┣ｪWヴ;ﾉS Wデ ;ﾉく ヲヰヱヴぶ, when 

wrested from a neoliberal frame, can disrupt the narrow and gendered understanding of the 

けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ デｴ;デ ｷゲ ﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲWS ｷﾐ Hﾗデｴ the science and policy to deliver positive outcomes for social 

justice.  

Returning to vulnerability theory, neuroscientific and epigenetic claims can underscore the 

ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐIW ﾗa ;デデWﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ ﾗ┌ヴ けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ;ﾐS WﾏHWSSWSげ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWが ;ﾐS デｴW 

indivisibility of these elements. Thus there is merit in meaningfully exploring common ground. 

Whether this is provoked by a belief in the scientific validity of current claims or merely 

recognition of their strategic potential, scientific evidence can けヮヴﾗﾏヮデ ; ﾏﾗヴW SWIｷゲｷ┗W 

ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWげ ふK;ヴヮin 2018, 116) in law and policy. As K;ヴWﾐ OげCﾗﾐﾐWﾉﾉ writes, when the brain is 

けconceptualised as an orｪ;ﾐ ﾗa ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ;ﾐS IﾗﾐデW┝デげ - rather than a singular 

computational device - けsocial inequality is less easily overlookedげ ふOげCﾗﾐﾐWﾉﾉが ヲヰヱヶが Γヵぶく 

Similarly, the けWヮｷｪWﾐWデｷI HﾗS┞げ ｪｷ┗Wゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪｷWゲ デﾗ ;ﾏWﾉｷﾗヴ;デW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ 

ﾐW┘ ｷﾏヮWデ┌ゲが HWaﾗヴW デｴW┞ けｪWデ ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ゲﾆｷﾐげ ;ﾐS ｴ;ヴﾏ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ;ﾐS a┌デ┌ヴW ｪWﾐWヴations 

(Meloni, 2015). More pointedly, and as Isabel Karpin argues, the ability to translate concerns 

;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ｴ;ヴﾏ ｷﾐデﾗ ; けヮｴ┞ゲｷI;ﾉ ヴWｪｷゲデWヴげ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ デｴW ゲﾗヴデ ﾗa けW┗ｷSWﾐデｷ;ヴ┞ デヴ;ｷﾉ 

デｴ;デ ｷゲ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ ;ヮヮW;ﾉｷﾐｪ デﾗ ﾉ;┘げ ふヲヰヱΒが ヱヱンンぶく Tｴｷゲ increases the likelihood of leveraging 

a more responsive state. While we promote engagement with the science, we do so 

acknowledging the biopolitical context within which this argument sits and we finish with an 

additional note of caution with regard to the science and this project. 

  

The new social body of science and its life outside the laboratory 

In the twenty-first century the body that is emerging from neuroscience and epigenetics is 

embedded within and shaped by its milieu. This body is further shaped by its passage into 

public, legal and political spheres. Here, actors with divergent motivations employ it to do 

different work in different contexts. In the public domain, the social body of neuroscience in 

particular has had notable reach. Its penetration into public consciousness and policy is due 

to various factors that have already been acknowledged, particularly the translation of 



Page | 13 
 

neuroscientific claims into visual, mediagenic formats. Further, neuroscience has combined 

with a burgeoning desire for self-improvement, alongside a growing ethic of personal 

responsibility for biological wellbeing, to produce a conception of the brain/body as open to 

けゲWﾉa-a;ゲｴｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪげ ふ‘ﾗゲW ;ﾐS AHｷ-Rached 2013: 199-224). In this context, conceptions of our 

corporeality pay little heed to the impact of structural factors such as poverty, deprivation 

and discrimination, emphasising personal responsibility for wellbeing and self-improvement. 

Thus デｴW┞ SWヮｷIデ ; HﾗS┞ デｴ;デ けｷゲ ﾗヮWﾐ aﾗヴ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデが ﾏ;ﾉﾉW;Hﾉe and 

ヮﾉ;ゲデｷIが ;ﾐS aﾗヴ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘W ｴ;┗W ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ﾐ┌ヴデ┌ヴW ;ﾐS ﾗヮデｷﾏｷ┣Wげ ふ‘ﾗゲW ;ﾐS AHｷ-Rached 

2013: 223). This represents a particular understanding of the social body which is clearly 

entangled with the contemporary responsibilising discourses of neo-liberalism: as Dimitri 

Papadopolous observes, every けWヮﾗIｴ ｴ;ゲ ｷデゲ Hヴ;ｷﾐげ ふ2011, 433). 

More relevant for our purposes, however, is a growing acceptance of brain-based 

explanations for human behaviour. This is evident in the legal domain where there is, for 

example, increased recourse to neuroscience in criminal trials (Catley and Claydon 2015). 

Recognition of the relationship between brain development and behaviour has the potential 

to enhance social justice through law and policy. In the youth justice field, for example, 

American research has demonstrated the diminished cognitive capacity of juveniles 

compared to adults, which may increase the risk of poor decision-making at times of stress, 

and has relevance for legal and social policies which infer adult capacity on children and young 

people (Cohen et al. 2016). Mitigating evidence of the immaturity of the juvenile brain could 

;aaﾗヴS ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪ ﾗaaWﾐSWヴゲ ｷﾐ Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐS ;ﾐS W;ﾉWゲ ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWS け;S┌ﾉデWヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa 

youth justice practice (Walsh 2011). Notably, protection would be afforded if the age of 

criminal responsibility, which is currently ten years, was raised. This was proposed by the 

Royal Society in a report on Neuroscience and the Law, which stated けデｴ;デ Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ｷﾐ 

important neural circuits ┌ﾐSWヴヮｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌W ┌ﾐデｷﾉ ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ ヲヰ ┞W;ヴゲ ﾗa ;ｪWげ デﾗ 

challenge the current age of criminal liability (Royal Society 2010: 13). 

In the legal context, then, the application of neuroscience has the potential to promote social 

justice. However, many writers have warned that neuroscience may be used to justify actions 

that do the very opposite, a familiar dual-use dilemma (Walsh, 2011) where the rhetoric of 

neuro-plasticity has ambivalent implicationsが けSｷ┗ｷSWS ;ゲ ｷデ ｷゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ ヴWゲﾗﾐ;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ デｴW 

neo-ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ｷﾏ;ｪｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ;ﾐS Wﾏ;ﾐIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIWゲげ ふMWﾉﾗﾐｷ 2014, 603).  Recent years have 



Page | 14 
 

seen the conflation of neuroscience with neo-liberal and neo-conservative political ideologies 

デﾗ IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷゲW けヴｷゲﾆ┞げ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉｷゲW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲが ;ﾐS justify particular 

interventions. In this regard, Broer and Pickersgill (2015) document the use of neuroscience 

within British social policy. They detail how neuroscience narratives emphasize individual 

responsibility (for self and Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ぶ ;ﾐSが けぷ┘へhile neuroscience may be leveraged by 

policymakers in ways that (potentially) reduce the target of their inデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW ゲﾗﾏ;ぐ 

they do so in order to expand the outcome of the intervention デﾗ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ┘ヴｷデ ﾉ;ヴｪWげ 

(60). Whilst such interventions may be seen as attempts to build resilience, the ascription of 

vulnerability to individuals, alongside stigmatising strategies to promote personal 

responsibility regardless of the wider context, can have the opposite effect. As we proceed to 

demonstrate, a universal understanding of vulnerability contests this approach, articulating 

state responsibility for our shared vulnerability that necessitates monitoring and shaping the 

social landscape to promote resilience.  

Our challenge, then, is to responses to our corporeality that invoke a liberal subject whose 

(unfortunate) circumstances stem from her own failure to make the right choices. This 

conception is likely to lever a particular response from the state, underpinned by an 

alternative vision of what will promote resilience に read as self-sufficiency - with potentially 

regressive effects. It is to this conception, and its role in the contemporary regulation of 

けヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ ;ﾐS a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲが デｴ;デ ┘W ﾐﾗ┘ デ┌ヴﾐく These discourses and policy initiatives 

illustrate how the social biologies have not lead to responses that acknowledge the wider 

social context and environment. Rather, ideas of the social are impoverished, as the family 

becomes the site at which dependency is framed and managed. In the final section we provide 

an alternative response framed through a vulnerability lens which mandates a different 

ethical starting point and generates different policy and practice outcomes. 

 

The biopolitics of brain-based public policy: The first three years movement and beyond 

Michel Foucault argued that public concern with childhood masturbation constituted for the 

first time the family as a site of surveillance overseen by medical science. He noted that 

けprecocious sexuality was presented from the eighteenth-century to the end of the 

nineteenth as an epidemic menace that risked compromising not only the future health of 



Page | 15 
 

;S┌ﾉデゲ H┌デ デｴW a┌デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW WﾐデｷヴW ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ;ﾐS ゲヮWIｷWゲげ ふヱΓΓヰが ヱヴヶぶく  ‘WaﾉWIデｷﾐｪ ┌ヮﾗﾐ this and 

the work of Claire Blencowe, Steve Garlick writes:  

[T]he discourses and techniques of the anti-masturbation campaigns were central to 

ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ HｷﾗヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ┗ｷ; デｴW ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けデヴ;ﾐゲ-ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷI WﾏHﾗSｷﾏWﾐデげく Tｴｷゲ 

けデヴ;ﾐゲ-ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷI HﾗS┞げ ﾉｷﾐﾆWS デｴW HﾗSｷWゲ ﾗa IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ デﾗ デｴﾗゲW ﾗa デｴW a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ 

(2014, 4). 

In rereading Foucault, Garlick recuperates the neglected place of security within his 

biopolitical framework. He argues that whilst anti-masturbation tracts were aimed ostensibly 

at banishing masturbation, in reality they were more concerned with enabling the 

ﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏゲ ﾗa ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ぎ けFヴﾗﾏ デｴｷゲ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wが ﾏ;ゲデ┌ヴH;デｷﾐｪ HﾗSｷWゲ WﾏWヴｪW 

as key sites for modern biopolitics, and as important figures in the genealogy of modern 

HﾗSｷWゲげ ふヶぶく 

The contention that the (biopolitical) security of the nation rests on the physical and moral 

health of its young therefore has a long history and regulatory force. As the purported seat of 

child development has shifted over time, encompassing habits, instinct, free will and 

psychology, so the proposed target of intervention has changed (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013: 

196). In line with late twentieth and early twenty-first century preoccupationsが デﾗS;┞げゲ ﾉﾗI┌ゲ 

of attention is the developing infant brain. This brain and the social relationships it is 

configured within has had a long gestation, however. Its origins are traceable to the early 

eighteenth-century, where growing prosperity in Europe and America meant that women 

were no longer required to engage in agricultural or domestic hard labour (Bruer 1999: 29-

3ヰぶく Aゲ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa ┘ﾗﾏWﾐ Iｴ;ﾐｪWSが ゲﾗ デｴW┞ け;ゲゲ┌ﾏWSが ﾗヴ ┘WヴW ｪｷ┗Wﾐが デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa ゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ 

tｴW a┌デ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ｷﾐa;ﾐデゲげ ふンヰぶ ;ﾐS デｴW ┗ｷW┘ SW┗WﾉﾗヮWS デｴ;デ けﾗﾐIW ｷﾐa;ﾐI┞ ｴ;S ヮ;ゲゲWSが ﾐﾗ 

future experiences could reverse or change the course the mother set for her infant in those 

W;ヴﾉ┞ ┞W;ヴゲげ ふ30). Over time, infant determinism acquired scientific status, as psychoanalysts 

including Sigmund Freud and John Bowlby, and animal researchers, identified maternal 

behaviour as an explanatory variable in child development with lifelong effects (30-31). This 

focus on maternal behaviour and responsibility ｷゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW ｪWﾐW;ﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa MW;ﾐW┞げゲ ヴ;デゲく 

Brain form and function was absent from these early accounts. It was not until the mid-1990s 

that neuroscience made real incursions into the realm of child development, when American 

and British policy makers employed a selective reading of neuroscience to argue for early 



Page | 16 
 

intervention programmes with disadvantaged families (Bruer 1999; 2011). John Bruer (1999) 

identified the rapid synaptic development and peak levels of synaptic density that occur in 

W;ヴﾉ┞ IｴｷﾉSｴﾗﾗSが ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けIヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ┘ｷﾐSﾗ┘ゲげ ｷﾐ Hヴ;ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが ;ﾐS デｴW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐIW ﾗa 

けWﾐヴｷIｴWS Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ  as the three pillars  ┌ヮﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ けデｴW ﾏ┞デｴ ﾗa デｴW aｷヴゲデ デｴヴWW ┞W;ヴゲげ 

movement was built. On this conception, the brain displays time-bounded plasticity, such that 

デｴW ┘ｷﾐSﾗ┘ゲ ﾗa ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデ┞ デｴ;デ W┝ｷゲデ ｷﾐ ｷﾐa;ﾐI┞ ;ヴW ﾉｷ;HﾉW デﾗ けゲﾉ;ﾏ ゲｴ┌デが ﾐW┗Wヴ デﾗ HW ﾗヮWﾐWS 

;ｪ;ｷﾐげ (Bruer 2011: 6). 

Whilst this narrative contradicts a cadre of research on the endurance of brain plasticity into 

adolescence and adulthood, it has maintained its purchase within the highest reaches of 

government. In 1997, for example, at a White House conference on Early Childhood 

Development and Learning, First Lady Hilary Clinton IﾗﾐデWﾐSWS デｴ;デ けIｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ W;ヴﾉｷWゲデ 

W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWゲが ぷｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪへ デｴWｷヴ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ┘ｷデｴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲげ ┘ｷﾉﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐW Hﾗデｴ けｴﾗ┘ デｴWｷヴ 

brains are wｷヴWSげ ;ﾐS けﾗ┌ヴ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげゲ a┌デ┌ヴWげ. She also linked individual brain development to 

the healthy parenting of future generations and the overall security of society, suggesting that 

W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWゲ S┌ヴｷﾐｪ けデｴW aｷヴゲデ デｴヴWW ┞W;ヴゲげ ﾗa ﾉｷaW けI;ﾐ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐW ┘ｴWデｴWヴ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ｪヴﾗ┘ ┌ヮ 

to be peaceful or violent citizens, focused or undisciplined workers, attentive or detached 

ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲ デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲげ (Clinton 1997). As Garlick notes (2014, 6), early responses to the 

ﾏ;ゲデ┌ヴH;デｷﾐｪ IｴｷﾉSが ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ デｴW ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けデヴ;ﾐゲ-ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷI WﾏHﾗSｷﾏWﾐデげが ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW 

a genealogical context for modern bodies and biopolitical interventions. 

Similar arguments have appeared elsewhere. In England and Wales a cross-party report 

entitled Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens (Allen and Duncan Smith 

2008) and the subsequent Early Intervention: The Next Steps (Allen 2011a) made the case for 

W;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ けデﾗ HヴW;ﾆ デｴW I┞IﾉW ﾗa ┌ﾐSWヴ;IｴｷW┗WﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS S┞ゲa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ Hﾉｷｪｴデゲ ゲﾗ 

ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲが a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲ ;ﾐS ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴｴﾗﾗSゲげ ふAﾉﾉWﾐ ;ﾐS D┌ﾐI;ﾐ “ﾏｷデｴ ヲヰヰΒぎ ヵぶく TｴW 

;┌デｴﾗヴゲ ゲヮﾗﾆW ﾗa ;ﾐ W┝ヮ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ け┌ﾐSWヴIﾉ;ゲゲげ ﾗヴ けS┞ゲa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ H;ゲWげ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ 

characterised by benefit dependency, educational underachievement, family breakdown, 

alcohol and drug addiction, debt, violence and crime (8-10). Whilst advocating both early 

intervention and remedial help across the early life course for children aged 0-18, the authors 

deemed the first three years of life especially important, drawing upon neuroscience to 

ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデ デｴ;デ ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ けゲI┌ﾉヮデゲげ Hヴ;ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ふaﾗヴ ｪﾗﾗS ﾗヴ ｷﾉﾉぶ S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴｷゲ ヮWヴｷﾗS 

ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴが け;aデWヴ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW H;ゲｷI ;ヴIｴｷデWIデ┌ヴW ｷゲ aﾗヴﾏWS aﾗヴ ﾉｷaWげ ふAﾉﾉWﾐ ヲヰヱヱ;ぎ ヶぶく A dominant 



Page | 17 
 

theme was the risk that けデｴW ｷﾐデWヴｪWﾐWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ デヴ;ﾐゲﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Sｷゲ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪW に the legacy that 

;ﾉﾉ デﾗﾗ ﾗaデWﾐ ｷゲ SWゲデｷﾐ┞げ - poses to society, and the associated social and financial costs (Allan 

and Duncan Smith 2008: 9). The social and economic benefits of ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW けｪﾗﾗS 

ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪげ ;ﾐS ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ childrenげゲ social and emotional development, as mediated by the 

evolving brain, were the focus of a further report entitled Early Intervention: Smart 

Investment, Massive Savings (Allen 2011b). Again, the risks posed by poor parenting were 

ﾏ;SW IﾉW;ヴぎ けthe costs of educational underachievement, drink and drug abuse, teenage 

pregnancy, vandalism and criminality, court and police costs, academic underachievement, 

lack of aspiration to work and the bills from lifetimes wasted while claiming benefitsげ ふxiv). 

This (trans-ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷIぶ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾉｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ヮﾗﾗヴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪが IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ Hヴ;ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS 

societal security resurfaced in a speech by David Cameron, in which he outlined the 

CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ aﾗヴ W┝デWﾐSｷﾐｪ デｴW Life Chances of children (Cameron 

ヲヰヱヶぶく ‘Wデ┌ヴﾐｷﾐｪ デﾗ G;ヴﾉｷIﾆげゲ attention to ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷﾐ Fﾗ┌I;┌ﾉデげゲ HｷﾗヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲが ヴ┌ﾐﾐｷﾐｪ 

throughout the speech was an appeal to security, which suggested that social and economic 

stability are intertwined. Moreover, as before, neuroscience was employed to support the 

ﾐWWS aﾗヴ W;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐぎ け[W]hen neuroscience shows us the pivotal importance of the 

first few years of life in determining the adults we become, we must think much more radically 

about improving family ﾉｷaW ;ﾐS デｴW W;ヴﾉ┞ ┞W;ヴゲげ (5). The threat posed by dysfunctional families 

デﾗ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS a┌デ┌ヴW ﾉｷaW Iｴ;ﾐIWゲが ;ﾐS デﾗ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS WIﾗnomic security more 

broadly, appeared evident.  

In line with these policy pronouncements, recent years have seen increased recourse to early 

intervention with deprived children and families. With clear echoes of the past, many 

measures aim to regulate the behaviour of parents in order to address problematic behaviour 

in children, though now they invoke narratives about brain development as justification. 

Eaaﾗヴデゲ デﾗ けヮﾗﾉｷIW ヮヴWｪﾐ;ﾐI┞げ provide an example of such brain-based early intervention (Lowe 

Wデ ;ﾉ ヲヰヱヵぎ ヱヶぶく TｴW WaaWIデゲ ﾗa SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐIWが けヮゲ┞IｴﾗゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ;ﾐS ﾏ;デWヴﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾉIﾗｴﾗﾉ 

consumption during pregnancy on the foetal brain are all cited in policy documents as reasons 

デﾗ ｷﾐデWヴ┗WﾐW ┘ｷデｴ けヴｷゲﾆ┞げ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲ (Allen 2011a). Although efforts to support women during 

ヮヴWｪﾐ;ﾐI┞ ;ヴW ┘WﾉIﾗﾏWが デｴWヴW ｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けヴｷゲﾆげ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴWゲW 

narratives. Whilst recent years have seen increased regulation of, and intrusion upon, 

pregnant women in general (Lowe 2016), Frederick (2017: 75) notes a particular focus on 



Page | 18 
 

デｴﾗゲW ┘ｴﾗが H┞ ┗ｷヴデ┌W ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞が WデｴﾐｷIｷデ┞が Sｷゲ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗヴ ゲW┝┌;ﾉｷデ┞ け;ヴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ 

SWaｷﾐWS ;ゲ さヴｷゲﾆ┞ざ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲ ┘ｴﾗ ;ヴW ｷﾐ;SWケ┌;デW aﾗヴ デｴW デ;ゲﾆ ﾗa ｷSW;ﾉ ﾏﾗデｴWヴｷﾐｪげく AﾐS ┘ｴｷﾉゲデ 

concern for the foeデ;ﾉ Hヴ;ｷﾐ ﾏ;┞ HW デｴW ゲデ;デWS ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉWが ゲﾗﾏW ゲ┌ゲヮWIデ デｴ;デ け┌ﾐSWヴﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ 

ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ;ﾉ SｷゲﾗヴSWヴ aヴﾗﾏ ヮﾗﾗヴ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ ぐ ぷ;ヴWへ ;デ デｴW 

ｴW;ヴデ ﾗa デｴWゲW ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲげ ふLﾗ┘W Wデ ;ﾉ ヲヰヱヵぎ ヲヶぶく 

Similar logics also appear to inform the recent increase in non-consensual adoption cases 

(Wastell and White 2017: 111-127). When asked in 2012 about the rise in children being taken 

ｷﾐデﾗ I;ヴWが デｴW デｴWﾐ PヴWゲｷSWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa DｷヴWIデﾗヴゲ ﾗa CｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ “Wヴ┗ｷIWゲ ;デデヴｷH┌デWS 

it (in part at ﾉW;ゲデぶ デﾗ HWデデWヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW ﾉｷﾐﾆ HWデ┘WWﾐ けﾐWｪﾉWIデa┌ﾉ ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪ ぐ ;ﾐS 

デｴW ヮｴ┞ゲｷI;ﾉ S;ﾏ;ｪW デﾗ Hヴ;ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ｷデ I;ﾐ Sﾗ ┘ｷデｴ ┗Wヴ┞ ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげ ふW;ゲデWﾉﾉ ;ﾐS 

White 2012: 410). Section 14 of the Children and Families Act 2014 requires courts to process 

I;ヴW ヮヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ け┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ SWﾉ;┞げ ;ﾐS けｷﾐ ;ﾐ┞ W┗Wﾐデ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デ┘Wﾐデ┞-six weeks beginning with 

デｴW S;┞ ﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ ｷゲゲ┌WSげが ;ﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ W┝デWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ;ヴW ヮWヴﾏｷデデWS ｷﾐ 

exceptional cases. Critics contest the scientific basis of these developments, suggesting that 

デｴW Iﾗﾐaﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa W;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS IｴｷﾉS ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐ ｴ;ゲ IヴW;デWS ; けヮWヴaWIデ ゲデﾗヴﾏげ 

(Featherstone et al. 2014: 4) that has driven the increase in applications for care orders, which 

must, on this narrative, occur quickly before the critical window of opportunity to support 

brain development closes. The concern is that this drives a policy of speedy removal, rather 

than sustained and meaningful efforts to support families to stay together.  

Current debates around Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) as a potential indicator of later 

life outcomes provide the latest policy discourse to repeat this pattern. As the ACE movement 

gains momentum globally, sIｷWﾐデｷゲデゲ IﾗﾐデWﾐS デｴ;デ ACEゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ け;H┌ゲWが ﾐWｪﾉWIデが W┝ヮﾗゲ┌ヴW デﾗ 

domestic violence, alcohol and mental health problems, and having an incarcerated family 

ﾏWﾏHWヴげ ｴ;┗W ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ﾉ;デWヴ ﾉｷaW ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏWゲ ふBWﾉﾉｷゲが IｷデWS ｷﾐ Hﾗ┌ゲW of 

Commons 2018, Q.2). However, contemporary models construct ACEs as individual and family 

factors (Bellis, cited in House of Commons 2018, Q.7) thus again articulating a narrow view of 

the social environment (White, cited in House of Commons 2018, Q.12) and targeting 

particular families for intervention. 

Parsing Garlick (2014), during the last three decades the developing infant brain has emerged 

;ゲ ; ﾆW┞ ゲｷデW aﾗヴ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ HｷﾗヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲが ;ゲ デｴW けデヴ;ﾐゲ-ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷI Hヴ;ｷﾐげ ﾉｷﾐﾆゲ デｴW ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲ 



Page | 19 
 

デﾗ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ Hヴ;ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐt and the wellbeing of the wider population. These 

developments, a form of biopolitical governing through the brain (Rose and Abi-Rached 

2014), continue a long tradition of governmental strategies to regulate children and families 

and are controversial for multiple reasons, not least the scientific basis underpinning many 

arguments (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013; Bruer 1999, 2011; Lowe et al. 2015; Wastell and White 

ヲヰヱΑぶく Nﾗデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けIヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ヮWヴｷﾗSゲげ ｷﾐ Hヴ;ｷﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ｴWﾉヮ デﾗ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデ ; ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ 

of parenthood characterised by personal responsibility, with little reflection upon the wider 

social context in which parenting takes place. Moreover, these constructions are not gender 

neutral and  particularly impact on marginalised women, whose actions are deemed to 

threaten not only the welfare of their children but also the security of wider society, as they 

incubate and parent the next generation of risky citizens.   

 

 A vulnerability theory response to the young social brain   

Policy responses to the claims of developmental neuroscience appear primarily directed at 

the family as the social environment of concern. Embedded in a neoliberal logic, these policies 

suggest that the main threat to individual and societal security is inadequate parenting 

(Gustafson 2011). Thus contemporary readings of the embedded けbrain-bodyげ (Papadopoulos 

2011) reflect notions of personal and parental responsibility for behaviour and ignore broader 

social and structural factors. Developmental ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐIW HWIﾗﾏWゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa ; けデヴ;ﾐゲ-organic 

WﾏHﾗSｷﾏWﾐデげ デｴ;デ Sヴ;┘ゲ デﾗｪWデｴWヴ W;ヴﾉ┞ IｴｷﾉSｴﾗﾗS SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが けヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲが ;ﾐS デｴW 

future (social and economic) security of the population. Further, biopolitics has always had 

political economy as its organising rationale and, as Papadopoulos observes, every 

┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗヴ Iﾗﾐaｷｪ┌ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Hヴ;ｷﾐ けｷゲ デｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ﾗa デｴW IﾗﾐﾃﾗｷﾐWS ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa I;ヮｷデ;ﾉ 

and technoscience in Western capitalist societiesげ ふ2011, 449). This translates in a number of 

ways, from the somewhat mundane policy level where packages offered by private sector 

players get bundled up in public policies around early intervention (Rose and Rose, 2016, 152), 

to the more complex mechanisms whereby our very understanding of brain physiology 

becomes inseparable from the logics of neoliberalism with significant biopolitical 

consequences for regulation of the self and families. In terms of the latter, while Jan 

Macvarish et al デ;ﾉﾆ ﾗa デｴW けヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪげ ふヲヰヱヴぎ ΑΓヵぶ ｷデ ﾏｷｪｴデ HW ﾏﾗヴW IﾗヴヴWIデ to 

デ;ﾉﾆ ﾗa けHｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲWS ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪげ ふLowe et al. 2015, 198)が ﾗヴ けﾐW┌ヴﾗヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪげ ふM;I┗;ヴｷゲｴ ヲヰヱヶぶ, 



Page | 20 
 

;ﾉHWｷデ ｷﾐ ; IﾗﾐデW┝デ ┘ｴWヴW ┘W ｴ;┗W けヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ Sｷゲｪ┌ｷゲWS ;ゲ ゲIｷWﾐIWげ ふBヴ┌Wヴ ヲヰヱヱが 12).  Yet, it is a 

particular science and a particular social body, and we contend that these policies engage an 

impoverished understanding of both デｴW ﾉｷaW ゲIｷWﾐIWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ;ﾐS WﾏHWSSWSげ 

child.  

Martyn Pickersgill argues that the complexity of contemporary developmental models directs 

┌ゲ デﾗ ヴW┗ｷゲｷデ けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷI デｴWﾗヴｷWゲ ﾗa WﾏHﾗSｷﾏWﾐデが ｴ;Hｷデ┌;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW ヴWヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 

ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞げ ふPｷIﾆWヴゲｪｷﾉﾉ Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヱンが ヴヴヰぶく In an attempt to challenge social inequality, 

the universal vulner;HﾉW ゲ┌HﾃWIデ ｷゲ aｷｪ┌ヴWS ;ゲ ｷﾐｴ;Hｷデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ けWﾏHWSSWSげ HﾗS┞く Iﾐ デｴｷゲ ゲWIデｷﾗﾐ 

we illustrate how a vulnerability theory that takes embodiment seriously can provide an 

analytical and deliberative framework to facilitate the translation of contemporary life 

science claims into more effective and more just state responses. An important part of this is 

the way in which the theory challenges the current policy default to the family as a source of 

privatised responsibility. 

To begin, it is worth repeating that Fineman identifies vulnerability as both universal and 

particular. The issue of particularity links to the state provision of resources that is responsive 

to individual circumstances and needs: 

[O]ur individual experience of vulnerability varies according to the quality and 

quantity of the resources we possess or can command. While society cannot eradicate 

our vulnerability, it can and does mediate, compensate, and lessen our vulnerability 

through programs, institutions and structures (2012, 80).  

FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ ┗ulnerability approach is therefore institutionally focused, identifying the 

responsibility of state institutions to provide assets to strengthen our resilience; that is, our 

ability to respond to what might befall us. Fineman notes that these may be assets such as 

financial capital we are able to mobilise to mitigate harm, illness and so forth, but also assets 

understood in terms of human capital or capabilities that enhanIW ﾗ┌ヴ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ けHﾗ┌ﾐIW 

b;Iﾆげ. However, the new social biologies deepen this idea of resilience as our biological 

け;ゲゲWデゲげ ;ヴW ゲｴ;ヮWS ;デ ; ﾏﾗﾉWI┌ﾉ;ヴ ﾉW┗Wﾉ and may be heritable by future generations. Thus the 

social bodies of the life sciences afford another tool in the armoury of those calling for a 

responsive state, strengthening demands by illustrating the importance of social environment 

and its impact upon the (molecular) fabric of our lives. Thus ┘W ﾏ┌ゲデ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲW デｴW けﾏ;ﾐ┞ 

ways in which the state に through law に shapes institutions from their inception to their 



Page | 21 
 

Sｷゲゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴﾗゲW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ヮヴﾗS┌IW ;ﾐS ヴWヮﾉｷI;デW ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲげ 

(2010, 274). This may shape not only personal circumstances but also the soma, with 

implications for the resilience of current and future generations. 

Bringing science and theory together in this way can challenge impoverished understandings 

ﾗa デｴW けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ ｷﾐ Hﾗデｴ ゲIｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷI┞, to contend the situation where け[t]he genetic 

determinism and reductionism of the past are replaced by a conception of early years 

ヮﾉ;ゲデｷIｷデ┞ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Hヴ;ｷﾐ ;ゲ Hｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ゲ ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪげ ふGｷﾉﾉｷWゲ Wデ ;ﾉ 

2016, 229). While Fineman recognises the family as a source of nurturing and care it is also a 

political mechanism through which responsibilities are privatised and inequalities elided. The 

family is, she argues, けa very public institution, assigned an essential public role within society. 

The family is delegated primary responsibility for dependencyげ (2013, 15). In the policies 

noted above, the broad range of environments within which we are embedded and upon 

which future development may be dependent (both in terms of the individual and potential 

future generations) is reduced to the family and, frequently, the mother. This is, of course, an 

impoverished understanding of both the scientific claims and ideas of social responsibility. 

Importantly, it also fails to account for the limited impact that individual families might make 

in the context of broader social environments of disadvantage and the fragility of families 

themselves. While the family may provide a source of shelter and resilience, it is itself a 

vulnerable structure and けゲ┌ゲIWヮデｷHﾉW デﾗ ｴ;ヴﾏ ;ﾐS Iｴ;ﾐｪWげ (11). As such, under a vulnerability 

analysis both individuals and families require the state to (equitably) provide assets that 

enable resilience and flourishing.  

In terms of the social biologies, it is clear that government cannot privatise all responsibility 

for our dependency on our environments to families, but must be responsive to environments 

of poverty, stress and degradation.  Aゲ FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐ ﾐﾗデWゲが けIﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ヴW ヮヴﾗS┌IWS ;ﾐS 

reproduced by society and its institutions. Because neither inequalities nor the systems that 

ヮヴﾗS┌IW デｴWﾏ ;ヴW ｷﾐW┗ｷデ;HﾉWが デｴW┞ I;ﾐ ;ﾉゲﾗ HW ﾗHﾃWIデゲ ﾗa ヴWaﾗヴﾏげ ふヲヰヰΒが ヵぶく In the context of 

early development, デｴｷゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ヴWケ┌ｷヴW ┌ゲ デﾗ ;デデWﾐS デﾗ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ けembodied and embeddedげ 

lives beyond the family, in the wider context of social welfare,  health provision and the 

broader physical environment. This clearly requires a more responsive state, one that is 

responsibilised to secure our neural and epigenetic futures.  This challenges much of the 

current approach, as Lowe et al argue: 



Page | 22 
 

  

[T]he mind of the child is reduced to the brain, and the brain comes to represent the 

child. It is argued that a highly reductionist and limiting construction of the child is 

produced, alongside the idea that parenting is the main factor in child devWﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデぐく 

[T]his focus ﾗﾐ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ Hヴ;ｷﾐゲぐ ﾗ┗Wヴﾉﾗﾗﾆゲ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ WﾏHﾗSｷWS ﾉｷ┗Wゲ ;ﾐS デｴｷゲ ｴ;ゲ 

implications for the design of IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ;ﾐS ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ ふヲヰヱヵが ヱΓΒぶく 

While our policy analysis has highlighted significant problems with how the science is 

responded to or mobilised, we note that the policy landscape is not without potentially 

positive examples. The New LaHﾗ┌ヴ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ “┌ヴW “デ;ヴデ ｷﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗W ｷゲ ﾗﾐW ;ﾏHｷ┗;ﾉWﾐデ 

example where the けﾉｷaW Iﾗ┌ヴゲWげ of the initiative provides an illustration of both the limitations 

and possibilities of social policy engagement with neuro-developmental claims. Introduced in 

1998, the initial aim was to establish 250 Sure Start local programmes to support parents in 

providing education and care for pre-school children in deprived areas (Bate and Foster 2017: 

4-5). Subsequently, however, local programmes were combined with existing cｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ 

ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ デﾗ IヴW;デW ﾗ┗Wヴ ンがヶヰヰ “┌ヴW “デ;ヴデ CｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ CWﾐデヴWげゲ H┞ ﾏｷS-2009 (Smith et al 2018: 4), 

representing a shift from targeted to universal provision. This shift reflected a concern that 

disadvantage was felt by families outside the first Sure Start areas and that targeted 

programmes were stigmatising (Bate and Foster 2017: 11). The move to universal provision 

can be characterised as providing a limited but important illustration of FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ conception 

of the responsive state; where institutions are monitored to ensure the fair and just 

distribution of resilience (Fineman 2017, 4) 

Views of Sure Start are mixed. Karen Clarke (2006: 699), for example, describes the scheme 

as focusing on parenting practices and the home environment rather than the wider 

ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ IﾗﾐデW┝デ ┘ｴｷIｴ けヴｷゲﾆゲ ゲﾉｷSｷﾐｪ ｷﾐデﾗ ; ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ Hﾉ;ﾏWゲ 

ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲ aﾗヴ ヮﾗﾗヴ ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏWゲげ, whilst Macvarish (2016: 87) views the automatic birth 

ヴWｪｷゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴ;IデｷIWS H┞ ﾗﾐW “┌ヴW “デ;ヴデ CWﾐデヴW ;ゲ けｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾐWデ of monitoring and 

ゲ┌ヴ┗Wｷﾉﾉ;ﾐIW デｴ;デ ゲ┌ヴヴﾗ┌ﾐSゲ ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲ ｷﾐ ヮﾗﾗヴWヴ ;ヴW;ゲげく Aﾐ┞ Iヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾏ┌ゲデが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲW 

that some schemes stretched beyond narrow constructions of the social: the development of 

Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ;ﾉﾉﾗデﾏWﾐデゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けゲ;aW ;ﾐS a┌ﾐげ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲ aﾗヴ a;デｴWヴゲ ;ﾐS IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ 

in a deprived, high-traffic area are examples of work to ameliorate poverty conducted under 

the auspices of Sure Start (Featherstone et al. 2014: 107). The assertion in a 2010 Select 



Page | 23 
 

CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ヴWヮﾗヴデ デｴ;デ けぷｷへデ ｷゲ Iﾗﾏﾏon for parents to describe the impact of their contact with 

ぷ“┌ヴW “デ;ヴデへ CｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ CWﾐデヴWゲ ;ゲ さﾉｷaW Iｴ;ﾐｪｷﾐｪざげ is also salient (Bate and Foster 2017: 13). 

In 2010 the new Tory-led Coalition Government resurrected a targeted model for Sure Start 

デｴ;デ aﾗI┌ゲWS ﾗﾐ けデｴW ﾐWWSｷWゲデ a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲげ ふIｷデWS ｷﾐ B;デW ;ﾐS FﾗゲデWヴ ヲヰヱΑぎ ヱヴぶく Tｴｷゲ ヴWデ┌ヴﾐ デﾗ ; 

aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ け┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;HﾉW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ ;ﾐS ゲｴヴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉが ;ﾉﾗngside funding cuts 

under the Coalition and subsequent Conservative Government, have precipitated a reduction 

in Sure Start provision: 1,000 centres have now closed or provide reduced services (Smith et 

al. 2018). As austerity politics have taken hold some practitioners have employed 

neuroscience to promote their professional interests and contend that early intervention is 

more cost-effective than remedial action with risky families (Gillies et al 2017: 79-80). This 

appeal to a narrow, economic rationale chimes with a neoliberal, responsibilizing agenda, 

ignoring デｴW けヴW;ﾉ-life ambiguities of culturWが Sｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ ;ﾐS SｷaaWヴWﾐIWげ ふ80) that shape our 

embodied and embedded lives.  When read together, the different chapters of the Sure Start 

story demonstrate how neuroscience may be used for progressive or regressive ends. Our 

emphasis would be on the polic┞げゲ middle years, where a responsive state expanded coverage 

distributing benefits or assets across a population, thereby developing resilience in individuals 

and families. IﾐSWWSが ｷデ ｷゲ ┘ﾗヴデｴ ﾐﾗデｷﾐｪ FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ ふヲヰヱΑぎ ヱヴΒぶ ;ヮヮヴ;ｷゲ;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ 

benefits of Head Start, the American precursor of Sure Start: 

 

ぐ sometimes privileges conferred in one system can compensate for or even cancel 

out disadvantages encountered in others. A solid, early start with regard to education, 

such as that provided by Head Start, an effective pre-school programme, may trump 

poverty as a predicator of success later in School. 

 

Fineman is, of course, correct and our argument is that the life sciences can scaffold and 

propel such arguments forward, as science has the epistemological weight to provoke a more 

decisive political response (Karpin 2018). Before concluding, however, we wish to strike a 

note of caution. We have argued that the new social biologies may enhance the political 

purchase of social justice projects that are premised on our embodied and embedded place 

in the world. Nevertheless, we must not forget that scientific knowledge is not severable from 

the contexts within which it is fabricated (Latour, 1987). More specifically, the body of the 



Page | 24 
 

social turn in the biological sciences is itself shaped by the social context within which 

knowledge of that body is generated. MW;ﾐW┞げゲ ヴ;デゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW a clear illustration, and we have 

already signalled our concerns in this regard, but we return now to these northern hood rats 

and the social structures they are interpolated and constructed within.   

In epigenetics, methylation has emerged as an identifiable and therefore measurable object. 

Nevertheless, how it becomes embedded in - and activated through - particular experimental 

hypotheses and designs is open ended. This process has been eclectic. Environmental 

epigenetics has relied on laboratory animal experiments where pregnant rats and the pups 

offer an observable world where confounding variables are limited; デｴW けヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷI 

ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏげ ﾗa ﾉ;Hﾗヴ;tory science (Beck and Niewöhner 2006). Emerging from this, and part 

of the けstabilisatｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴｷﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげが early life adversity has surfaced as an 

epistemic object. This object provides both an interpretive frame and an established concept 

anchoring ongoing research in relevant pasts (Niewöhner 2011, 288). Again we can note the 

genealogical significance of the masturbating child of the Victorian life sciences and their 

resulting parenting prescriptions. As such, scientific fact is propelled forward by the exigencies 

of the laboratory and its traction is increased as it dovetails with the longstanding biopolitical 

focus on early development in health and social policy discourses. Thus, while the bodies of 

the new social biologies are understood as embedded in and affected by their social 

environments, claims can re-inscribe or rearticulate existing inequalities while simultaneously 

obscuring and individualising their social causes and contexts (Karpin 2016, 2018) as we see 

in the current debates around ACEs. These processes take place both in the laboratory and in 

the translation of scientific findings into policy.  As Fernando Vidal argues in respect of the 

scientific focus of this article, the ideology of けbrainhoodげ に the pervasive idea that we are our 

brains に けｷﾏヮWﾉﾉWS ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷI ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ｷデ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデWS aヴﾗﾏ ｷデげ (Vidal, 

2009). While we argue for careful engagement with the science we acknowledge that others 

I;┌デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ けH;S ゲIｷWﾐIWげ (Gillies et al 2016). Nevertheless, we argue that at the very least 

a strategic mobilisation of underlying claims can support arguments that seek to provide a 

counter-narrative to the weight of discourses championing austerity and responsibilisation.  

Conclusion 

This article seeks to provoke collaboration across the humanities, social and life sciences in 

the context of an increasingly visible population of social bodies. Our starting point has been 



Page | 25 
 

the corporeal humanisms which centre the body in new models of ethical responsibility. 

Specifically, we have addressed FｷﾐWﾏ;ﾐげゲ vulnerability theory, through the lens of the けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 

デ┌ヴﾐげ ｷﾐ デｴW life sciences. Those engaging with vulnerability theory have primarily directed 

themselves towards the social and institutional structures within which bodies are 

embedded. However, acknowledging overlapping understandings of the social bodies that 

have been at the centre of our argument, we argue that we can employ investigations within 

デｴW けﾐW┘ HｷﾗゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ デWヴヴ;ｷﾐげ (Meloni 2014, 595) to more fully flesh out the embodied dimension 

of this framework. The body of environmental epigenetics, for instance, is: 

ぐ ; HﾗS┞ デｴ;デ ｷゲ ｴW;┗ｷﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮヴWｪﾐ;デWS H┞ ｷデゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ヮ;ゲデ ;ﾐS H┞ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉ 

environment within which it dwells. It is a body imprinted by evolutionary and 

transgenerational time, by early-life and a body that is highly susceptible to changes 

in its social and material environment (Niewöhner 2011, 290). 

Both vulnerability theory and epigenetics thus depart from the body associated with the 

ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ゲ┌HﾃWIデが け┘ｷデｴ ｷデゲ ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲﾆｷﾐ-bounded self and autonomy, steered through life by 

デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ﾏｷﾐS ;ﾐS Hヴ;ｷﾐげが ;ﾐ ｷSW; けWﾐｪヴ;ｷﾐWS ｷﾐ WWゲデWヴﾐ Iﾗゲﾏﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ふNiewöhner 2011, 

ヲΓヰぶく TｴW けﾏ┌ﾉデｷヮﾉ┞ IﾗﾐﾐWIデWS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Hヴ;ｷﾐげ ふMWﾉﾗﾐｷが ヲヰヱヴぶ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ デｴｷゲ けゲﾆｷﾐ-

Hﾗ┌ﾐSWS ゲWﾉaげく These richer understandings of what it is to recognise デｴW HﾗS┞ ;ゲ けWﾏHWSSWSげ 

strengthens the theory, helping to articulate what a more responsive state would look like, 

and why it matters. In the context of the scientific claims and policies we address, it is notable 

that vulnerability theory directly problematizes and challenges the default to the family and 

the privatization of responsibility this entails. 

Developments in the life sciences are being shaped not only by method and what is technically 

achievable (Fujimura 1987), but also by dominant preoccupations and pre-existent logics. 

HWﾐIWが デｴW ﾏ;デWヴﾐ;ﾉ HﾗS┞ WﾏWヴｪWゲ ;ゲ ;ﾐ けWヮｷｪWﾐWデｷI ┗WIデﾗヴげ ふ‘ｷIｴ;ヴSゲﾗﾐが 2015) and this 

extends to a regulatory focus on the child and her early years neurological development. The 

けsocialげ ｷゲ red┌IWS デﾗ けﾐ┌ヴゲｷﾐｪげ ふケ┌; ヮ;ヴWﾐデｷﾐｪぶ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉ;Hﾗヴ;デﾗヴ┞, ;ﾐS けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ｷゲ 

reduced to the family in policy (Gillies et al, 2016, 224). Vulnerability theory provides a 

framework where we are directed to consider, and expect, a more public and institutional 

grounding of responsibility. A circumspect engagement with the potentially profound shifts 

taking place in the life sciences may bolster this necessary challenge to our current politics 

while asking important questions of experimental practices in the laboratory. 



Page | 26 
 

 



Page | 27 
 

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http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/evidencebased-early-years-intervention/oral/79001.html


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