Justice for women! Social Justice Research, VoL 7, No. 2, 1994 J u s t i c e for Women.* Percy B. Lehning I A RESPONSE TO EDWARD E. SAMPSON T h e main points of Sampson's critique against Lehning (1990) are summarized by Sampson in the following way: By failing to deal with the postmodern challenge to the Enlightenment-liberalist conception of neutrality and by thoroughly ignoring the feminist understanding in which neutrality actually conceals a masculinist bias, Lehning's analysis is seriously undermined with respect to its possibility for understanding, let alone for accom- plishing justice. (Sampson, 1994, Abstract) My response is based on these points o f critique. Feminism and Postmodernism T h e precise character of the relationship between feminist theory and postmodernism is a subject for debate. Postmodernism may have a great deal to offer to feminism but "almost all [feminist theorists] also agree that t h e r e are some serious problems with the relationship between the two" (Hirschmann, 1992, p. 300). A n y number o f anthologies on this subject support this claim (see, for instance, Benhabib and Cornell, 1987). The question is: Can feminism b e c o m e postmodernist and claim to develop a theory in the interest o f w o m e n ' s emancipation? Benhabib remarks, after an analysis o f Flax's Thinking Fragments (1990) [a book used by Sampson to support his own claims]: "The postmodern position(s) thought through to their conclusions m a y eliminate not only the specificity of feminist theory but place in ques- tion the very emancipatory ideals o f the women's movement altogether" 1Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University, Postbox 1738, 3000 D R Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 155 0885-7466/94/0600-0155507.00/0 O 1994 Plenum Publishing Corporation 156 L e h n i n g (Benhabib, 1992, p. 213). Hartsock (1990) even remarks that "postmod- ernism represents a dangerous approach for any marginalized group to a d o p t " (p. 16). F o r Hirschmann (1992) there cannot b e a feminist post- modernism, only a postmodern feminism that can borrow from certain in- sights o f p o s t m o d e r n theories. It can help feminist political theorists to develop their arguments on sexual difference and the need to attend to context and particularity (p. 318). In conclusion, notwithstanding these different opinions, there is evi- dently no d o u b t in Sampson's mind a b o u t the character the relationship b e t w e e n feminism and postmodernism should have. In that regard it is striking to note that he makes no reference whatsoever to this d e b a t e be- tween feminist theorists on this question. L i b e r a l i s m and Difference The feminist-difference issue is, according to Sampson, a problem in my work. O n the problem of representing differences, Gould (1993) has written: It h a s b e c o m e a c o m m o n p l a c e in political t h e o r y t o criticize liberalism f o r its a b - s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d a b s t r a c t individualism, in w h i c h d i f f e r e n c e s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e o f political o p i n i o n a r e i g n o r e d o r o v e r r i d d e n a n d assigned to t h e p r i v a t e s p h e r e . . . . . B u t t h e n e g l e c t o f d i f f e r e n c e in liberalism s h o u l d n o t b e e x a g g e r a t e d . (p. 1) O n e should add that it has, nowadays, become fashionable to write o f ear- lier traditions as insufficiently attentive to difference and too much preoc- cupied with ideals o f equality that require us to be, o r become, the same. As Phillips (1993) has summarized: F e m i n i s t w r i t i n g in t h e 1980s o f t e n r e g a r d e d t h e i r o w n p r e v i o u s i n c a r n a t i o n s in t h i s light, a n d a r g u e d t h a t a n exclusive e m p h a s i s o n sexual e q u a l i t y was r e q u i r i n g w o m e n t o r e p l i c a t e m a l e m o d e l s o f d e m o c r a c y o r e m p l o y m e n t o r j u s t i c e o r rights. L i b e r - alism t u r n e d o u t t o a f a v o u r i t e t a r g e t o f attack, a n d b o t h f e m i n i s t a n d socialist h a v e r e g a r d e d it as a t r a d i t i o n t h a t e r a s e s d i f f e r e n c e - - n o t in reality, o f c o u r s e , b u t in t h o u g h t . L i b e r a l political t h e o r y is said t o a s s e r t a n e s s e n t i a l s a m e n e s s o f c o n - dition t h a t overrides the differences between us, appealing to a natural equality in rights o r the possession o f reason that will stop these differences from counting. (p. 2) It is possible, however, with only a minor change of emphasis to view lib- eralism as f o u n d e d on the very pertinence o f difference as Phillips herself has noted. I n s t e a d o f d e s c r i b i n g it as overriding d i f f e r e n c e , we m i g h t equally well see liberalism as p u r s u i n g a n e s s e n t i a l s a m e n e s s o f c o n d i t i o n in o r d e r to underwrite t h e v e r y r e a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n u s . . . . [Liberalism] is d r i v e n precisely b y w h a t it s e e m s as t h e p o w e r a n d t h e t e n s i o n s o f d i f f e r e n c e . N o t i o n s o f diversity a n d d i f f e r e n c e t h e n ap- Justice for Women 157 pear central to liberalism from its inception and to liberal democracy throughout its formation. (p. 3) I, o f course, do n o t claim t h a t these ideas have b e e n realized in practice. T h e p o i n t is t h a t t h e r e is, c o n t r a r y to Sampsons's suggestions, n o t h i n g " p h a l l o c e n t r i c " in this liberal d e m o c r a t i c framework. O n t h e contrary, I a g r e e with M e n d u s (1992) w h o in an essay on feminism a n d d e m o c r a c y has suggested t h a t difference is the rationale for democracy. T o m a k e this p o i n t clear it is necessary to m a k e a distinction b e t w e e n two levels o f d e m o - cratic interest: the principle o f inclusion and the principle o f equality. A t t h e first level, difference should be ignored. Differences o f class, race, a n d g e n d e r should n o t m a t t e r w h e n deciding on citizenship. A t the s e c o n d level t h e s e differences should be recognized, b u t n o t eliminated. For whereas traditional democratic theory tends to construe difference as an ob- stacle to the attainment of a truly democratic state, feminist theory should alert us to the possibility that difference is rather what necessitates the pursuit of democracy. (Mendus, 1992, p. 216) In conclusion, Sampson in m u c h too e a g e r to reach the conclusion t h a t liberal political t h e o r y a n d liberal democracy are u n a b l e to deal in a n a d e q u a t e way with differences. He, in fact, would have a h a r d time con- vincingly arguing so. J u s t i c e a n d D i f f e r e n c e T h e feminist-difference issue t h a t is claimed to be a p r o b l e m in m y w o r k a l s o - - a c c o r d i n g to S a m p s o n - - p e r m e a t e s my ideas on justice. Is this i n d e e d the case? In regard to "diversity a n d d e m o c r a c y " and the p r o b l e m o f repre- senting differences, G o u l d (1993) has r e m a r k e d t h a t an alternative theo- retical f r a m e w o r k in which differences would be a d e q u a t e l y recognized a n d effectively t a k e n into a c c o u n t in the public domain, remains u n d e v e l o p e d a n d problematic (p. 2) Taking differences seriously in the social a n d po- litical d o m a i n m e a n s taking rights seriously. It involves a c o n c e p t i o n o f rights a n d justice t h a t are n o t difference-blind in its principles o f e q u a l rights m a n d a t i n g a sameness o f t r e a t m e n t , b u t it involves principles t h a t build a recognition o f difference a n d the protection o f the rights o f differ- e n c e into its basic conception. Rawls's (1993) t h e o r y is an example o f a t h e o r y t h a t tries to do j u s t this, as I argued in L e h n i n g (1990). This t h e o r y acknowledges d i f f e r e n c e as a concern for justice. D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n is built into the basic r e q u i r e m e n t o f j u s t t r e a t m e n t . Justice as equal f r e e d o m should n o t entail only t h e nega- 158 Lehnlng tive liberties a n d e q u a l political fights b u t also e q u a l rights t o t h e c o n d i t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t , positive f r e e d o m , z T h e c r i t i q u e t h a t I d e v e l o p e d with r e g a r d to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n o f p r i m a r y g o o d s h a d to d o with t h e fact t h a t justice r e q u i r e s n o t t h e s a m e c o n d i t i o n s f o r e a c h o t h e r , b u t e q u i v a l e n t c o n d i t i o n s d e t e r m i n e d b y basic capabilities. B e c a u s e justice entails a r e c o g n i t i o n a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f rel e- v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s , I a r g u e d t h a t we sh o u l d r e p l a c e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n o f p r i m a r y g o o d s b y Sen's c o n c e p t i o n o f basic capabilities. W e w o u l d t h e n b e m o r e able to c a p t u r e t h e realization o f positive f r e e d o m a n d d i f f e r e n c e s w o u l d b e b e t t e r recognized. In conclusion, S a m p s o n h as n o t shown at all t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e t h a t is d e v e l o p e d in L e h n i n g (1990) is i n d i f f e r e n t to differences; t h e y a r e n o t o v e r r i d d e n o r s t o p p e d f r o m counting. C a p a b i l i t i e s and Difference S a m p s o n (1994) is so obsessed with trying to m a k e his p o i n t a b o u t t h e feminist c h a l l e n g e to all c o n c e p t i o n s o f neutrality, t h a t his critique t ak es a s t r a n g e t u r n , n o t to say a malign o n e, w h e n we c o m e to t h e p o i n t o f "basic capabilities." H e claims h e first b e c a m e aw are t h a t t h e feminist-dif- f e r e n c e issue was a p r o b l e m in my w o r k w h e n I listed the fundamental kinds of diversity that mark the human being, including dif- ferences based on metabolic rates, physical conditions, longevity, health, body size, temperament, and so forth, but excluding (by omission) sex. Lehning uses these differences to illustrate why state neutrality is so important to ensure just allocations (p. 150) . . . . Now, while Lehning's list accurately describes some of the various ways in which people differ from one another; and while Lehning is correct to note that these are the very differences that can enter significantly into just allocations, by omitting sexual differences from the list, he avoids confronting the feminist challenge to all conceptions o f neutraliO, and so can be lulled into sustaining a belief in state neutrality [emphasis added]. (p. 150) T h i s is really a n a b s u r d p o i n t o f critique. T h e implication is t h a t I, o n p u r - pose, o m i t t e d sexual d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e list to avoid t h e feminist chal- lenge. L e t us g e t t h e r e c o r d straight. I h a v e a r g u e d in L e h n i n g (1990) t h a t S en criticizes Rawls's a p p r o a c h o f p r i m a r y g o o d s b e c a u s e Rawls d o e s n o t c o p e in a n effective way w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l diversity o f h u m a n beings. T h e availability o f an a d e q u a t e r a n g e o f optio n s derives its v al u e f r o m t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n it 2See also Gould (1988). She proposes principles of justice that builds a recognition of difference and the protection of the fights of difference into its basic conception. She recognizes that Rawls also incorporates an acknowledgment of difference as a concern of justice, e.g., in his difference principle. She notes, however, that this acknowledgment is not as comprehensive as the one she herself proposes. Justice for Women 159 makes to the equal freedom o f each person to lead a good life o f his own choice. As I wrote: "In this perspective the recognition o f the fundamental diversity of human beings has very deep consequences" (p. 307). I went on quoting Sen (1988) which I shall do again: A theory of freedom has come to grips with the enormous heterogeneity o f human beings in terms of personal, social and natural characteristics. T h e crucial issue in identifying the n a t u r e of 'freedom of choice' relates to the question: Choice of what? (p. 278) Anyone who wants to argue that sexual differences are not included in this conception of freedom and choice, places himself outside the range of a reasonable debate on the implications of the idea o f basic capabilities. (And, for that matter, on the implications o f political neutrality.) But my saying so may not be convincing enough. I quote Sen (1990) himself when he discusses his conception of basic capabilities: "Variations related to sex, age, genetic endowments, and many other features give us unequal powers to build freedom in our lives even when we have the same bundle o f goods" (p. 121). Evidently it is necessary to point out to some that, in fact, in Sen's approach, where abilities to take action, and not resources, are the primary goods, we can take account o f the fact that individuals have varying needs for resources, in accordance with their social and physical circumstances, the special obstacle~ they face, and so forth. It is from that perspective that Sen discusses, for instance, the empirical issues involved in the variable conversions o f primary goods (and resources) into capabilities (and free- d o m ) with respect to Indian women. Okin (1989) has argued convincingly in Justice, Gender, and the Family that, for a number o f reasons, the division o f labor that prevails b e t w e e n the sexes is a matter o f social injustice. It often leads to economic, psy- chological, or even physical vulnerability o f women and children. It con- tributes to women's inequality o f opportunity and actual inequality o f p o w e r and influence in society at large. I must admit that I really cannot see that only a postmodern feminist point of view can lead to this insight. Even less is it clear to me why the concept o f "basic capabilities" would not b e a way to deal with these problems. It is, then, from this perspective, the perspective o f "functioning and capability" that one should understand Serfs and, one should add, Nussbaum's development ethic. ( F o r an insight- ful analysis of Nussbaum's and Sen's development ethic, see Crocker, 1992.) It is from this perspective that the contributions to, for instance Human Capabilities: Women, Men and Equality (Nussbaum and Glover, 1993) are written. (See also Nussbaum, 1992; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993.) In conclusion, there is no reason whatsoever n o t to include sexual differences in the list o f ways in which people differ, and certainly n o t from 160 Lehning the perspective o f justice that has been defended in Lehning (1990). 3 Con- trary to what Sampson suggests, these differences where not at all omitted in Lehning (1990) "to avoid the feminist challenge." Impartiality and Difference Sampson may claim that I have missed the core o f his critique. H e may want to argue that it is not directed against the conception o f basic capabilities as such, or against justice as such, b u t its target is the concep- tion o f neutrality I use. That conception ,'actually conceals a masculinist bias," and: "the disturbing feature of the Enlightenment-liberalist project, Lehning's included, [is] its clearly masculinist bias hidden under the guise o f neutrality" (Sampson, p.148). And Much o f the feminist critique of neutrality is built upon its theory of sexual differ- ences. The feminist theory of difference argues that state neutrality is not simply and idle myth surviving from the Enlightenment, but serves to conceal the partiality that inheres in the very belief in impartiality. (p. 149) Let us first recapitulate. I wrote that the central argument favoring the liberal notion of neutrality is that it is necessary if one acknowledges that there exist a variety o f conceptions of the good life. There are many ways in which a fulfilled life can be lived, without any perceptible hier- archy among them. (Lehning, 1990, p. 188) And: The stress upon neutrality and equal respect, which denies the state any right to implement any specific conception of the good life, emphasizes the equal freedom that all persons should have to pursue their own conception of the good life. (p. 189) The public role of a neutrally recognized political conception o f jus- tice is to specify a point o f view from which all citizens can examine b e f o r e one another w h e t h e r o r not their political institutions are just. It has b e e n my contention that Rawls's conception of justice is, in fact, an example o f such a political conception of justice. This contention is based on the idea that the way Rawls has formulated his conception o f justice is f o u n d e d on the ideal o f impartial moral reason. N o w for instance Young (1990) has argued (with reference to Rawls's theory) that the ideal o f impartiality is an impossibility, and that it denies difference. (I follow here Young, 1990. On this point Sampson's argument is essentially the same as that of Young,) In fact, she claims that the ideal ~I'his o f course does not imply that the conception o f basic capabilities, as an alternative to Rawls's primary goods is immune against criticism. See for a reaction on Sen's ideas, Rawls (1993, pp. 182-186). See also Daniels (1990). Justice for Women 161 o f impartiality in moral theory expresses a logic o f identity that seeks to reduce differences to unity (p. 97). This conception o f moral reason as- sumes that in order for the agent to escape egoism, and attain objectivity, he o r she must adopt a universal point o f view that is the same for all rational agents. The ideal o f impartiality is the result of this search for a universal, objective "moral point o f view." (pp. 99-100) In sum, Young's argument is that impartial reason aims to a d o p t " a point o f view from nowhere," and therefore denies difference. I suggest, however, that impartial reason does not take a point o f view from nowhere but, on the contrary, a perspective from which allpoints o f view are taken seriously, with the purpose o f taking into account all differences. It is, o f course, the function o f Rawls's well-known device o f the "Original Position" to do just this. The "veil of ignorance" guarantees im- partiality when principles are formulated that should regulate the basic structure o f society. Hypothetical people in selecting principles o f justice are deprived o f knowledge of their own particular place in society, their class, occupation, sex, and so forth, and therefore have to consider the well- being o f everyone, from the best-off to the worst-off, on the hypothesis that they could be any one o f them. In conclusion, contrary to what Young (1990) and Sampson (1994) claim, impartiality does not do away with difference. I agree with Nussbaum (1992, p. 45) and Okin (1989, p. 101) that the exercise o f impartial moral imagination is enormously valuable for understanding the lives of, for in- stance, women, and that Rawls's theory o f justice can be a tool for feminist criticism. Neutrality and Difference Sampson claims that one o f the reasons I have made a choice in favor o f neutrality is that "If there is no neutral place to stand, we worry that there will be no way to choose among competing views, no fair way to allocate resources" (p. 147). And he continues to remark that The choices are not between neutrality o r death, chaos o r madness, but rather be- tween neutrality and the need for people to operate together, in full knowledge o f their interests and situatedness, to probe and to negotiate the terms by which they will live together imperfectly in this world of their differences. (pp. 147-148) I, for my part, certainly have not claimed that the choice is death or neu- trality. But there is more to it. The choice is not between, on the one hand, neutrality and, on the other, the need for people to c o o p e r a t e together in full knowledge of their interests and situatedness. The question is how to 162 Lehning achieve this cooperation. The upshot of my article has b e e n to show that neutrality is a plausible basis for this "negotiation" if it is to b e on the basis o f reason rather than superior force. The best we can say o f Samp- son's critique is that he has misinterpreted the ideal o f "neutrality" and "the neutral state" as developed in Lehning (1990) or has b e e n misled by the term neutrality. L e t us try, once again, to make clear the argument on which the idea of neutrality has b e e n based. The starting point for using the concept neu- trality was Rawls's idea o f political liberalism. The central aim favoring the liberal notion o f neutrality is that it is necessary if one acknowledges that there exists a variety o f conceptions o f the good life. In response to this variety, to pluralism and reasonable disagreement political liberalism for- mulates the principle that the state should be neutral with respect to this diversity o f conceptions o f the good life. Neutrality can be defined in quite different ways. As Rawls (1993) has noted: "[S]ome forms o f liberalism are neutral in the sense that they use no ideas o f the good at all except ones that are purely instrumental (neutral means, as it were) . . . . [J]ustice as fairness is not neutral in this way . . . . " (p. 191, note 22). The Rawlsian principles o f justice are sub- stantive. The principles express far more then procedural values, and so do its political conceptions o f society and person, which are represented in the original position. Justice as fairness, then, is not procedurally neutral. A different way o f defining neutrality is neutrality o f aim. In Lehning (1990) it has b e e n used in this way. There neutrality has b e e n defined in terms o f the aim o f basic institutions and public policy with respect to com- prehensive doctrines and their associated conceptions o f the good. Neu- trality o f aim (as o p p o s e d to neutrality o f procedure) "means that those institutions o f society and policies are neutral in the sense that they can be endorsed by citizens generally as within the scope o f a public concep- tion" (Rawls, 1993, p. 192). This neutrality o f aim is not to be confused with neutrality o f effects or influences. Following Rawls (1993) it should b e noted that it is s u r e l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e basic s t r u c t u r e o f a j u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e n o t to h a v e i m p o r t a n t effects a n d i n f l u e n c e s as to w h i c h c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s e n d u r e and g a i n a d h e r e n t s o v e r time; a n d it is futile t o try t o c o u n t e r a c t t h e s e effects a n d i n f l u e n c e s , o r e v e n to a s c e r t a i n f o r political p u r p o s e s h o w d e e p a n d p e r v a s i v e t h e y are. W e m u s t a c c e p t t h e facts o f c o m m o n s e n s e political sociology. (p. 193) Recapitulating, procedural neutrality should b e distinguished from neutrality o f aim; the latter should not be confused with neutrality o f effect or influence. Justice as fairness hopes to satisfy, as Rawls mentions, neu- trality o f aim in the sense that basic institutions and public policy are not to b e designed to favor any particular comprehensive doctrine. Political Justice for Women I63 liberalism abandons, however, as impracticable neutrality o f effect or in- fluence. 4 [One could add that recently Rawls (1993, p. 194) noted that the t e r m neutrality is unfortunate because some o f its connotations are highly misleading, others suggest altogether impracticable principles such as neu- trality o f effect, a idea strongly suggested by the term itself. It is a reason for avoiding the term.] A clear example o f misunderstanding the way the concept neutrality is used, is evident from the following remarks o f Sampson (1994) Tax laws, of course, do deal directly with allocation decisions a n d should thereby provide us (and Lehning) with a prime case of state neutrality. A n d yet, as we all know, there is n o way to devise tax legislation t h a t does not advantage some a n d disadvantage others. Neutrality h e r e . . , is a myth that serves some interests over others. (p. 149) 5 Sampson is quite right in stating that tax laws deal with allocation [or, as I rather would say, with (re-) distribution] decisions. The implication o f his remark is that, by making such decisions state neutrality is a mirage. Tax legislation always advantages some and disadvantages others. I will not argue that this is not what, in fact, tax law does. The ques- tion is if this is a p r o o f of the myth of the conception o f state neutrality as that conception has been used in my article. I would say it is not. L e t me elaborate. The point is not at all whether tax legislation advantages some and disadvantage others. In that sense Sampson's feminist example is be- side the point, since it actually appeals to premises about equal treatment that a neutralist would accept. The point is rather to design tax laws that advantage and disadvantage persons in a way that is in line with principles o f justice. This is what Rawls's "difference principle" is supposed to do. It is a principle that is especially relevant for the design o f tax laws. As part o f the Rawlsian conception o f political liberalism the difference principle is part o f the basic institutions o f society and policies. This principle should also b e endorsed by each citizen because it is neutral with regard to con- ceptions o f the good life that citizens are persuing. This does not mean, however, that the application o f the difference principle works out the same for everybody. The purpose o f the difference principle is to guarantee that inequalities in, for instance, income work o u t to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. It may b e the case that the difference principle requires a design of tax laws which 4It should b e emphasized that neutrality in aim does not m e a n t h a t political liberalism may n o t affirm the superiority of certain political virtues. Justice as fairness thus includes the virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, o f reasonableness a n d the sense of fairness. See Rawls (1993, p. 194). 5See also Young (1990): " T h e idea of neutrality that stands above the particular interests a n d conflicts of civil society is, however, a myth" (p. 114). 164 Lehning have as effect that some have to pay more tax and some have to pay less because the aim is reaching a situation of equal concern and respect for everybody or, to formulate it in another way, a situation o f equal basic capabilities. The burden o f taxation is to b e justly shared, b u t as with the right to equal protection which may require an unequal distribution o f po- lice over different neighborhoods, a just tax legislation may require that some have to pay more than others. In conclusion, from my part it would b e rather preposterous to drop right now the term neutrality as a rebuttal to Sampson's critique. The im- portant point to note is, however, that the use of the term neutrality, which I have tried to make more clear above, should not have b e e n interpreted to mean indifference to differences, as Sampson claims. O n the contrary, the liberal notion o f neutrality should guarantee that differences will b e taken care o f in such a way that each citizen, male or female, hetero- o r homosexual, will b e treated with equal concern and respect. Feminism and Justice Sampson is o f the opinion that the kind of constitutive sense o f per- sonhood that Sandel (1982) recommended, and that according to Sampson (1994, p. 153) is the centerpiece o f the postmodern feminist analyses, b e t t e r fits the understanding of justice then the one I have given. I am not so sure, for several reasons. L e t me mention just one. One aspect of S a n d e r s arguments, to insist that families be internally just, is misguided. The family is according to him, "beyond justice" and not an appropriate topic for a theory o f justice. Okin (1989, Chap. 2) questioned this position, especially when we notice whose interest the ideas o f love beyond justice has fre- quently served. Sandels's theory is in that sense not gender-neutral at all. A t the same time as ignoring families, theories like Sandel's assume, as Okin has noted, that meals will be cooked, houses cleaned, etc., in short the reproduction o f people will continue. It is rather a surprise to discover at the end o f Sampson's criticism of my article, that he recommends to turn to a theorist for whom the family is b e y o n d justice, b u t who nevertheless envisions---according to Samp- son the postmodern feminist view of justice. In conclusion, I have not b e e n very impressed by Sampson's critique. The question is whether there is a coherent basis for social institutions to b e constructed from the so-called feminist-postmodernist line. 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