The 'third way' and social justice


Journal of Political Ideologies (2001), 6(2), 231–235

COMMUNICATION

The ‘third way’ and social justice
MARCEL WISSENBURG

Faculty of Policy Sciences, University of Nijmegen, PO Box 9108,
6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT In reaction to Steve Buckler’s and David Dolowitz’s earlier contri-
bution to this journal, I argue that New Labour’s ‘third way’ cannot be founded
on John Rawls’s theory of justice. ‘Third way’ practice contradict s Rawls’s
ideas about both redistributiv e justice and social justice in a broader sense.

Rawlsian output justice

Social democracy was the � rst to emerge out of the ideological ruins of 1989
with a new perspective on a changing world: the ‘third way’. Recently, Steve
Buckler and David Dolowitz1 argued that more can be said in defence of New
Labour’s ‘third way’ than has been said so far. With this ‘so far’, one can refer
both to writings of the British and other ‘third way’ parties’ politicians ,2 and to
those of ‘third way’s academic defenders like Miliband and Giddens.3 What all
these texts have in common is, after all, that they mix two elements where three
would be needed. ‘Third way’ advocates offer analyses of empirical data and
normative claims. What is missing is a theoretical foundation justifyin g the
passage from is to ought.

The thesis Buckler and Dolowitz defend is that John Rawls’s theory of justice
may offer such an underpinning , that in fact ‘third way’ principles and policy
already re� ect Rawls’s ideas. I shall argue instead that the ‘third way’ as we
know it � ts neither the more familiar part of Rawls’s work, the theory of the just
distributio n of the bene� ts and burdens of social co-operation (‘output justice’),
nor criteria of social justice in a broader sense. In the end, Buckler, Dolowitz and
I might very well agree that the ‘third way’ is an approximation of Rawls’s
theory. Yet for now I believe that the principles of the ‘third way’ need serious
revision before there can be any talk of an equilibrium between the philosoph y
of social justice and the practices of the ‘third way’.

One reason for Buckler and Dolowitz to believe in a convergence between
Rawls and the ‘third way’ is that the latter would re� ect Rawls’s conviction that
there is an irresolvable disagreement on the de� nition of the good.4 This brought
Rawls to the conclusion that a theory of social justice needs to be founded on

ISSN 1356-931 7 print; 1469-9613 online/01/020231–05 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080 /1356931012005387 6



MARCEL WISSENBURG

an impartial conception of the right. It is true that we � nd, for instance, Blair and
Schröder saying similar things—that governments cannot and should not pre-
scribe what kinds of lives people should lead and what kinds of things they
should value. Yet the practice of the ‘third way’ deviates considerably from the
promise, as I hope to show when I reach my fourth point.

A second indication of convergence would lie in the Rawlsian Difference
Principle, which Buckler and Dolowitz reformulate as ‘the arranging of social
and economic inequalitie s such that they are to the bene� t of all under condition s
of fair equality of opportunity ’. The test for whether inequality bene� ts all is that
the social system ‘must enhance the long-term interests of the least well off
groups in society’.5 This description certainly � ts Blair’s and Schröder’s belief
that perfect equality is not a desirable objective for the ‘third way’; we should
accept that some inequality is justi� ed.6 But the description does not � t Rawls:
Rawls’s true position on inequality is one of ‘equality unless’, not ‘inequality so
that’: ‘… there are conceptions of justice that are recognizably egalitarian, even
though certain signi� cant disparities are permitted. The two principle s of justice
fall, I assume, under this heading’.7 Buckler and Dolowitz go so far as to claim
that Rawls accepts inequality because it contributes ‘to ef� cient wealth creation
in a system where the prospects of all are potentiall y enhanced’,8 which may be
or may not be empirically true for a ‘third way’ society. However, for Rawls
ef� ciency and justice are distinct desiderata :9 a slave society where freedom is
‘potentially ’ attainable can be perfectly ef� cient but will never be just. In
addition, Rawls rejects the notion of desert or merit as a basis for the unequal
distributio n of (say) income: it betrays an inadmissible partiality to a particular
theory of the good.10

Thirdly, Buckler and Dolowitz claim that Rawls is concerned about proce-
dures not outcomes: unlike many theories of social justice, his does not call for
an equal distributio n of the bene� ts and burdens of social co-operation, or for a
distributio n mechanism that satis� es some other criterion for a just state of
affairs, an outcome. What matters for Rawls is that his two principles are
followed, ‘whatever [the] outcome happens to be’.11 The result may be equality
one day, inequality the next. Again, this re� ects Schröder’s and Blair’s idea that
equality of outcome is not intrinsicall y valuable but disregards people’s efforts.
And again, it does not re� ect Rawls. Apart from rejecting desert, Rawls does
care about outcomes: the point about the Difference Principle is that it should be
applied so as to bring the worst off as close to equality as possible. For Rawls,
there can be no justi� cation for social inequality in itself: inequality is the result
of systems and institution s that differently reward people on the basis of their
natural or social differences, differences which are (in accordance with the
is-does-not-imply-ough t rule) morally indifferent. Rawls’s commitment to out-
comes also becomes clear in his brief discussio n of Amartya Sen’s suggestio n
to replace primary social goods as a distributio n criterion by ‘basic capabilities ’,
i.e., by what individual s in their particular situations can actually do with their
primary social goods. Rawls rejects Sen’s suggestion , not because outcomes do
not matter but because Sen’s criterion is impractical.12

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THE ‘THIRD WAY’ AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Fourthly, Rawls and the ‘third way’ would converge in applying the Differ-
ence Principle to opportunities.13 Yet even if ‘opportunities ’ and ‘primary social
goods’ were interchangeable (which they are not), Rawls’s opportunitie s are not
those of Blair and Schröder. In ‘third way’ practice, opportunitie s are opportuni -
ties for self-suf� ciency given a free market society, which comes down to
creating incentives for � nding work and for becoming � exible workers able even
to take jobs they would not dream of desiring—and to creating disincentive s for
those who will not co-operate. Think of the British New Deal programmes
established to ‘cater to the needs of [disadvantaged] groups by offering them
packages of support and advice designed to ensure that they are aware of and can
take advantage of employment opportunitie s where appropriate’.14 All this
deviates from Rawls’s theory in two respects: it lacks impartiality with regard to
the individuals ’ theories of the good (forcing them to subject to the dictates of
the labour market), and it takes the present free market society for granted,
whereas Rawls sees it as one possible context for social justice among many.

Finally, Buckler and Dolowitz point out that in providing opportunities , the
‘third way’ wishes to pay special attention to ‘groups that are […] marginalized
due to arbitrary factors’.15 This could be interpreted as a re� ection of Rawls’s
principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity , but looks are deceiving. As we have
just seen, the ‘third way’ de� nes equal opportunit y not as equal opportunit y to
attain a particular position or not try at all (thus respecting the individual ’s
theory of the good and plan of life), but as an equal opportunity to attain any
position the labour market cares to offer and no other.

Social justice

Social justice is more than distributiv e output justice: it also relates to the input
side, i.e., the distributio n of access to the creation of the bene� ts and burdens
of social co-operation (hence fair equality of opportunity) , and to commutative
justice, i.e., justice among individuals .16 Although Buckler and Dolowitz do not
discuss them, it is worthwhile noting that ‘third way’ theory and practice cannot
meet standards for these aspects of social justice either.

First of all, the ‘third way’ disregards justice in the input sphere. One of the
most distinguishin g features of socialism and social democracy used to be that
they questioned the existing system or mode of production ; the ‘third way’,
however, lets supply rule. It is as if the ‘third way’ has thrown away the baby
with the bath water: in relinquishin g its resistance to market mechanisms, it has
also abandoned its objections to capitalisti c ownership relations and to the
expression of uncritical, potentiall y harmful preferences that market mechanisms
thrive on. On the one hand, employers continue to rule the labour market and
dictate which jobs are offered, which qualities are desired, and by implication
which human beings are useful; on the other, producers dictate which products
are offered and are considered desirable or valuable. The ‘third way’s’ interpret-
ation of ‘opportunities ’ in the � eld of labour relations at the very least fails to
encourage, but probably directly discourages, the development and expression of

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MARCEL WISSENBURG

plans of life and theories of the good that deviate from the ideal of the useful
drone. In this respect, the ‘third way’ silences social, political and moral critique
before it can even be expressed.

A second problem is that the ‘third way’, in the sphere of output social justice
and particularly in the � eld of labour, fails to guarantee distributiv e justice as
such. Justice is a remedial virtue, a virtue for an imperfect world of scarcity and
egoism.17 With its interpretatio n of social justice as attainable by commutative
means, the ‘third way’ offers this remedial virtue to the ideal participant in
market procedures: self-suf� cient, self-conscious , responsible individuals . Jus-
tice is meted out in the market place, and (ideally) given to those who qualify
for the criteria of the market place: those who work harder or perform better
receive more than those who do not. Obviously, without further remedial
measures this would lead to the exclusion of those who do not qualify: the lazy,
politicall y motivated defectors, and people who cannot qualify as easily. The last
category consists of all those parties for whom the redistributiv e welfare state
was invented in the � rst place. In other words, it is still up to old welfare state
institution s to deal with these sources of injustice, not the new institution s
introduced (and given political priority) by the ‘third way’.

Thirdly, the ‘third way’ embraces the market without warranting commutative
justice. Ideally, following Aristotle, the market is a place where free and
(therefore) equally powerful individuals meet and voluntarily exchange goods
(or anything else). In real life in modern society, supply and demand are seldom
equally powerful, and therefore seldom in equal negotiatin g positions . In purely
formal terms, a market is just when both parties receive what in their individua l
eyes is the equivalent of what they gave. Given unequal starting positions , the
more powerful party is by de� nition capable of dictating what is on offer on the
market, and of raising the price of its product.

A � nal reason to question the possibilit y of reconciling the ‘third way’ with
social justice is that by refusing to create a completely free market, ‘third way’
politics contradicts its own commitment to moral pluralism and to a reduction of
state interference in civil society. This objection relates in particular to the
privatisatio n of public services practised in ‘third way’ countries: it is usually the
institution providing the service that is privatised, not the product itself. Citizens
are still legally obliged to insure themselves against illness, unemployment, old
age, and so on—nowadays, they just have to get it elsewhere than at a
government agency, and they can (usually) choose between (hopefully) compet-
ing social security providers or job mediators. Citizens may not be legally
obliged to use electricity, water and gas, garbage disposal, telephone, television,
radio and public transport, yet in practice most of these early twentieth-centur y
luxuries have become unavoidable basic needs for virtually every twenty-� rst
century European. As long as there is demand for a product, supplyin g it can be
pro� table; as long as there is no alternative to the product, the market for it is
safe.

Obviously, obliging citizens to consume services, or not enabling them to
consume alternatives, matches with the ‘third way’ intention of keeping the

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welfare state alive at lower costs (in public spending, though not necessarily
from the point of view of the individua l citizen’s wallet). But it does not match
with the idea of a free market, nor with the intention of offering ‘opportunities ’
(in the broad sense), of moving away from a paternalisti c prescription of the
terms of a good life towards an impartial respect for the existence of a plurality
of life-styles and theories of the good. Thus, there appear to be limits to the
degree to which the ‘third way’ is willing to grant responsibilit y to individuals .
What is more, the ‘third way’s’ privatisatio n strategy does not result in a
reduction of government interference in civil society. By obliging citizens to
consume certain services, they also take on a duty to see to it that these services
are provided at affordable prices. Hence, they still have to control and regulate
the market for public services.

The ‘third way’ unlocked a potential source of support for the welfare state
never thought of before, at a moment when it was needed more than ever before.
As an alternative to the increasing oppositio n between the public and private
spheres, between state and free enterprise, it proved that there could be business
and pro� t in supplyin g public services. But everything has a price. Rather than
obliterating the worst of socialism and replacing it by the best of liberalism , it
seems that as far as social justice is concerned, the ‘third way’ has replaced the
best part of socialism , distributiv e justice, by the worst part of liberalism , the
survival of the � ttest.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Michael Freeden and two anonymous referees of this
journal, to Kees van Kersbergen, Grahame Lock, and Anna van der Vleuten at
the Faculty of Policy Sciences, and to members of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, for their most helpful comments.

Notes and references
1. S. Buckler and D. Dolowitz, ‘Theorizing the third way: New Labour and social justice’, Journal of

Political Ideologies, 5/3 (2000), pp. 301–320.
2. A. Blair and G. Schröder, Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte (www.labour.org.uk , 1999).
3. A. Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); A. Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
4. Buckler and Dolowitz, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 305.
5. Buckler and Dolowitz, ibid., p. 307.
6. Blair and Schröder, op. cit., Ref. 2.
7. J. B. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 538.
8. Buckler and Dolowitz, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 309.
9. Rawls, op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 9.

10. Rawls, ibid., p. 103.
11. Buckler and Dolowitz, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 308.
12. J. B. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 13.
13. Buckler and Dolowitz, op. cit., Ref. 1, pp. 309, 311.
14. Buckler and Dolowitz, ibid., p. 313.
15. Buckler and Dolowitz, ibid., pp. 310–311.
16. Cf. Rawls, op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 108.
17. M. Wissenburg, Imperfection and Impartiality (London: UCL Press, 1999).

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