id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_v4joxbkhfre45oumobnsyyp7tu	Dan Bernhardt	Nearsighted Justice	2003	36	.pdf	application/pdf	13564	876	59	2. Discourage both good entrepreneurs and bad from taking actions that raise bankruptcy probabilities. Lemma 1: If the court chooses to discourage the high default probability action by a good entrepreneur, then it optimally liquidates a good firm that enters bankruptcy with probability γ(g) = γ∗(g) . If, instead, the court chooses not to discourage the high default action by a good entrepreneur, then discourage a good entrepreneur from taking the high default action, the court must occasionally probability, the court will encourage a good entrepreneur to take the low default (no theft) action. Lemma 2: If the court chooses to discourage bad entrepreneurs from taking the high default probability action, then it always liquidates bad firms that enter bankruptcy. the bad entrepreneur will reject the renegotiation offer, go to court, and be liquidated with probability one.	./cache/work_v4joxbkhfre45oumobnsyyp7tu.pdf	./txt/work_v4joxbkhfre45oumobnsyyp7tu.txt