id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_p4orf2t6hzfzhdeh5dss7ecv6q	John F. Manning	Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process	2006	12	.pdf	application/pdf	5502	413	65	When I went to law school twenty-odd years ago, legal academics said very little—and wrote even less—about statutory interpretation as such.1 No course was offered on the subject.2 And in the Federal judges properly scoured the legislative history for evidence of the background policy impulses and understandings that putatively underlay a statute's adoption.7 And when the statute's perceived purpose contradicted the rules embedded in the statutory text, federal judges felt at liberty to enforce the Indeed, when a statute is ambiguous, Justice Scalia is very much for reading it in a way that coheres with related laws. As far as adaptability is concerned, Justice Scalia has suggested that in choosing among reasonably available understandings of an ambiguous statute, courts statute itself."31 Or it is likely to note that "it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."32 That is, the Court now acts on	./cache/work_p4orf2t6hzfzhdeh5dss7ecv6q.pdf	./txt/work_p4orf2t6hzfzhdeh5dss7ecv6q.txt