id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_jnvlionbffdazk7lmfrma7e3ze	Laura Valentini	Canine Justice: An Associative Account	2013	34	.pdf	application/pdf	10198	657	58	In a nutshell, I argue that if one believes that (i) certain nonhuman animals are objects of moral concern and that (ii) justice applies to fellow First, the paper illustrates how a relational approach to morality may apply to nonhuman animals, specifically in connection with the duties we owe them on grounds defends a pluralist perspective on the moral status of non-human animals, with a particular emphasis In sections 1 and 2, I explain the two basic premises of my argument: (i) nonhuman animals are objects of moral concern, and (ii) social justice is owed to fellow extensibility of duties of justice to non-human animals implies for the associative 1. Non-human Animals as Objects of Basic Moral Concern only an associative account of justice, but also the view that non-human animals who ignore their duties towards non-human animals in general, and dogs in (1981) Animal Rights and Human Morality.	./cache/work_jnvlionbffdazk7lmfrma7e3ze.pdf	./txt/work_jnvlionbffdazk7lmfrma7e3ze.txt