id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_2hllexfjwnfnjgz2xxs3j2i7ri	David M. Konisky	Compliance Bias and Environmental (In)Justice	2013	14	.pdf	application/pdf	10036	719	47	demographics influence compliance bias or the failure to detect noncompliant firms. community mobilization and agency decision-making authority shape bureaucrats' incentives to report noncompliance. delineates the political costs and benefits of state regulatory officers implementing the U.S. Clean Air Act. Using detection-controlled estimation, we find that while certain communities are vulnerable to compliance bias, such bias is mitigated in the presence of either politically mobilized communities or decentralized enforcement authority Observed correlations between community demographics and regulatory outputs may reflect a firm's communities are better equipped to generate compliance costs for firms and political costs for bureaucrats, and the decision-making authority of the state regulatory officers largely responsible for implementing (DCE) to model the effects of demographic characteristics on both individual firm and regulatory officer firms in minority (or poor) communities as noncompliant when these communities are politically mobilized. political mobilization can alter not only firms' compliance decisions, but also regulatory officers' detection	./cache/work_2hllexfjwnfnjgz2xxs3j2i7ri.pdf	./txt/work_2hllexfjwnfnjgz2xxs3j2i7ri.txt