DOC
94.F 76/1 : I r 1/9/991

UNITED STATES-IRAQI RELATIONS

HSSE
DOC
94. F 76/1: I r 1/9/991

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 21, 1991

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-452 ⇆ WASHINGTON : 1991

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

PURDUE U. LIBRARY
AUG 02 1991
U.S. DEPOSITORY

1017-A
91-517-F
Digitized by Google
43-452 = 91 = 1
Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, *Chairman*

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
BILL ORTON, Utah

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
BEN BLAZ, Guam
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN J. BRADY, JR., *Chief of Staff*
KRISTINE WILLIE, *Staff Assistant*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, *Chairman*

TOM LANTOS, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, *Subcommittee Staff Director*
RUSSELL J. WILSON, *Minority Staff Consultant*
CHRISTOPHER KOJM, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*
KATHERINE A. WILKENS, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*
DAVID WEINER, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

	Page
Hon. April C. Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq	2

APPENDIXES

1. Supplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the Department of State, and responses thereto	63
2. Supplemental questions submitted by Hon. Dan Burton to the Department of State and responses thereto	67
3. Biography of Hon. April C. Glaspie	68

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

UNITED STATES-IRAQI RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1991

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m. in room 2237 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets in open session today to hear testimony from the Honorable April C. Glaspie, United States Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq.

Ambassador Glaspie has had a long and distinguished career in the United States Foreign Service. She has performed with distinction throughout her career and has received many awards.

She has served in several different posts in the Middle East, as well as in Washington and in New York at the United Nations.

Late in the summer of 1988, Ambassador Glaspie arrived in Iraq to serve as Ambassador. She served in Iraq until July 31, 1990, when she left to return to the United States.

Since the August 2nd Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, she has not returned to her post. Relations between the United States and Iraq were severed in January, 1991, by Iraq.

The purpose of today's hearing is to review United States-Iraqi relations during a critical period, especially from early 1990, to the hectic events of July of last year.

Madam Ambassador, we are pleased to have you with us today. Perhaps, you would like to make some opening comments before we turn to the Members for questions?

I am advised Mr. Gilman would like to make a statement.

Mr. Gilman?

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN GILMAN

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Glaspie, it is with the utmost respect and admiration that I welcome you to this afternoon's meeting.

For many months, one of the central questions concerning the origins of the Persian Gulf crisis was whether our Embassy in Baghdad had adequately conveyed U.S. concerns about potential Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. During this period many detractors of U.S. policy in the Gulf alleged that you had not been "tough enough" with Saddam Hussein.

Never were so many so wrong.

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Today it is clear that you represented our government with great distinction and professionalism. Rather than appeasing Saddam Hussein, as some have alleged, you told Saddam that Iraq's grievances with Kuwait would have to be resolved peacefully, that the United States would not countenance Iraqi threats, intimidation, or aggression, and that the United States had vital national interests in Kuwait.

In short, you did everything that the situation at that time called for. The fact that Saddam Hussein was bent on aggression—or that he continued to underestimate our resolve—cannot fairly be attributed to your diplomacy.

Now, as post-war U.S. diplomacy concentrates on building a framework for peace in the Middle East, the need for American diplomats with expertise in Arab affairs, such as yourself, will be greater than ever before.

I sincerely hope that our government will give you an opportunity to contribute to this process in a manner that is commensurate with your talents and experience.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the testimony of Ambassador Glaspie.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.

Any other statements from Members?

If not, we will proceed.

Ambassador Glaspie, would you like to make some comments?

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR APRIL C. GLASPIE, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

Ambassador GLASPIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Congressman Gilman. I hadn't prepared an opening statement.

It was explained to me that I am not a policymaker, and only policymakers make opening statements. However, I am prepared to be immodest and if you would wish I could very quickly set a framework for our conversation. Let me remind the Members of the situation as we saw it from our Embassy in Baghdad in 1990.

The year began in many ways in February for us in Baghdad, with the sudden series of speeches in about three to five days by the President of Iraq, viciously attacking the United States, and providing a new logic by which the Iraqi Government would announce and analyze foreign policy, henceforth.

The basic principle he said being that the Soviet Union had withdrawn from the Middle East in a phrase he kept repeating, had withdrawn to Moscow to lick its self-inflicted wounds, leaving the United States as the sole superpower—as best I can, repeating his words, the sole superpower in the area, and this was very dangerous for the area he thought.

The United States would be in a position, for example, to exercise an effect on the price of oil, which would not be healthy for those countries who wished a higher price rather than a lower price.

He spoke with concern about the presence of our fleet in the Gulf, where, of course, it has been since the late 1940s. He spoke very bitterly.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

We protested. We protested, we didn't understand why he would speak in this way. He gave us no satisfaction.

On April 1st, he made his famous speech announcing that if attacked by Israel, Iraq would incinerate half that country. This caused a major crisis. It was the second summer in a row in Baghdad that we had had this kind of crisis.

We worked very hard, and I think very usefully from the point of view of Israel, Iraq, and the United States, to defuse those tensions in 1989, and we were doing the same thing in 1990, when suddenly Saddam Hussein changed the frequency again. And on the 17th of July, in the evening made a speech. The speech was followed by the publication of a letter that he had written or his foreign minister had written two days before to the Arab League, and which had not previously been publicized, and had not previously been made available, certainly to the American Government.

The speech was a virtual announcement—it was a threat against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates without naming those two countries. If they did not begin to produce according to their OPEC quota, then Iraq intended to do something about it.

The letter named Kuwait, made much more adjectival threats and spoke of a number of programs, the chief among them being a Marshall plan which Iraq wanted founded immediately to pay for its reconstruction and development after the war.

As I said, this television event occurred in the evening of the 17th. Once again, for the third time in 1990, began a period of very vigorous diplomacy, indeed.

On the 18th, we took public and private steps. The State Department warned publicly that if any country, Iraq specifically, thought we had changed our policy, they were very wrong. We would continue to defend the right of navigation in the Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz.

We would continue to ensure the free flow of oil through the straits, and above all—and she stressed this, we continued to be strongly committed to the individual and collective self defense of our friends in the Gulf. This is, as you all know, on this distinguished committee, a very strong statement.

At about an hour later the Iraqi Ambassador was convoked, he was given these points in writing and he was given additional points, which I would like to read to the committee so there is no question about the subsequent policy of the United States in the following week.

He was told we would continue to defend our allies in the Gulf. And I think this is important, that we would support the sovereignty and integrity of the Gulf States. We would not take positions on the equities of bilateral Kuwait-Iraqi disputes, but we would insist that disputes be settled peacefully, not by threats or intimidation, or, of course, by aggression.

As soon as I received a cable containing these points, I, of course, delivered them myself to the highest available Iraqi official in Baghdad.

Arab Chiefs of State, and, of course, we were consulting energetically with them, become very active. Telephone calls were made by, I would guess, seven or eight heads of state within 24 hours.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

The result of all this was, we thought, positive. Diplomacy on our part was—the Iraqis deployed troops to the border.

Our Arab friends spoke publicly, and counseled us privately, that this issue was an Arab issue. Our involvement would be very risky, we would be likely to provoke Saddam Hussein, having the effect opposite to what we intended.

However, when those troops were deployed we felt we must act. And over the advice of our friends in the Arab world, but at the request of the Government of the United Arab Emirates, the only government in the area which took our approach, we started the 24th Joint Military Operation in the Gulf.

At midnight that night, I was convoked, and protests were made. I was asked if it was also true that our fleet had redeployed.

I hope I looked suitably enigmatic, because I didn't know whether it was really deployed or not, but I thought it wouldn't do any harm if the Iraqis thought it had.

Later in the morning, when the foreign ministry officially opened, I went back with Ms. Tutweiler's statement, typed, and handed it to the Deputy Minister, and asked if it hadn't already arrived at the presidency, it be taken there immediately.

About an hour later, of course, I was called to see the President. I was there for two hours, but I think he was on the phone to President Mubarak for certainly half an hour of that.

I suppose I was with him for an hour and a half. I am sure many of you will want to come back to this meeting, but let me summarize by saying the central focus was what was to be done, and, I, of course, repeated in every way I could the instructions which I have just read to you, and he agreed that he would not pursue his disputes with Kuwait in any violent way. He would proceed to work through negotiations and in the framework for negotiations that President Mubarak and King Fahd worked so hard to produce for him.

Now, it is always possible to misunderstand. I feel quite sure I did not misunderstand what I was told, but the fact is three days later, I was told exactly the same thing by the foreign minister and the day after that, not only were these reassurances reiterated to me by the President's son-in-law, who is a minister, the Minister of Military Industrialization. He actually said to me, I know that you are running to Washington on consultations and that our President wants you to, and that your President has agreed, and I know that you will probably be coming right back to Baghdad, and may I ask you while you are there to spring our furnaces for us.

I told him, of course, so long as Iraqi troops were on the Kuwaiti border, I wouldn't dream of even raising an issue like that here, and it was foolish of him to think that I was. I bring this up only to show the deception was very deep.

The minister was saying, of course, we are not going to invade, it is a "business as usual," will you help us with export control problems that we have, because of you will be back in a few days. That was on the 29th. As you know the Jiddah Conference then began.

On August the 1st, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, who is responsible for the Kuwait dossier, announced in the evening that the next session of the talk would begin very soon in Baghdad. Perhaps, four or five hours later the Iraqis invaded.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

So, miscalculations by Saddam Hussein about American resolve, miscalculations Arab Government's resolve, decisions on his part which had precisely the opposite effect that he intended, and the most striking one, of course, is that by invading Kuwait he galvanized Arab Governments into doing something that Arab Governments have never or certainly only rarely done in the past, and had been totally opposed to up until that moment, and that is they were prepared—in fact, eager to have Western troops pass through their country, and even set up their bases.

So it is a very sad story and the President of Iraq has brought a tremendous tragedy, of course, on his own people, as well as on the Kuwaiti people, and on all the Coalition partners who so sadly lost their sons and daughters in this dreadful business.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador.

We will begin under the five-minute rule.

The Chairman Mr. Fascell and follow with the ranking Member Mr. Broomfield.

Chairman Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LONG DELAY IN GLASPIE'S APPEARING AS A WITNESS

First of all, let me congratulate you and the Administration.

We finally got to this point we had a meeting of minds with regard to this witness.

It is no fault of hers, but I am delighted that the hearing is being held, that the issue can be clarified, and that the Ambassador be given an opportunity to say what she has been saying on the record.

Madam Ambassador, you are a career service officer.

You started when?

Ambassador GLASPIE. 1966.

Mr. FASCELL. And you have had many posts, as the introductory remarks indicated.

While I wish to avoid asking this question, it is a fair and necessary one.

I am sure there is a sensible and reasonable answer and some day we will hear it. I don't know why you are testifying now.

It makes—and I am not a suspicious person, but I do have a question as to why a career service officer would be taken advantage of, in my mind, by being kept locked up in the halls of the State Department, or some place else, for all these months, while all these questions were floating around in the air, bouncing on only her head, and nobody else's.

I don't think that is fair. I don't think it is right. And none of this should redound to the discredit of your service, which has been long and distinguished in the United States Diplomatic Service.

So all I can say, is that I am pleased that at long last you have the opportunity to tell the American people what it is that you need to say.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you care to respond?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I certainly was locked up. I was working very hard.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

The State Department tends to lock us up, you know, and now we are chained to a Wang and not a typewriter. I think this is—what I want to say is perhaps more political than even diplomatic here, Mr. Chairman.

I believe, certainly diplomatically speaking, that when there is a very serious task before the nation, it is critical to concentrate on that task, and not to have diversions of any kind.

I could have agreed with you if I had ever believed there was ever going to be an attempt to avoid a conversation with the Congress on the subject of how we got into this mess, but that was never the intention.

The President clearly wanted to focus, as did this Secretary, on the work that had to be done, the coalition that had to be built. The aims that had to be established, and it seems to me the overweening necessity to ensure our troops in the field understood there was 100-percent support for them back here.

I do believe that it is critical that we all appear before you, and here we are, the war is over. And I hope that I will be able to answer any questions, hopefully, for you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Broomfield.

DID SADDAM HUSSEIN ALTER THE RECORDS OF INTERVIEWS?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I would like to thank Ambassador Glaspie for being here.

I have to say that I think it is very relevant to our understanding of the events in the Persian Gulf, to learn more about why there was a delay in setting the record straight on your meeting with Saddam Hussein.

I understand from reading our testimony yesterday that the interview that Diane Sawyer had with Saddam Hussein had been heavily edited so much it was hardly recognizable before it was actually aired.

Was it typical of Saddam Hussein and his people to alter the record of interviews that they edit things to their own satisfaction?

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IGNORANCE OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD

Ambassador GLASPIE. One of the reasons I believe that Saddam Hussein miscalculated so seriously in August is his ignorance of the outside world.

I think that one of the ways that politicians can inform themselves is to be open to—informed at least, hopefully, distinguished journalists when they pass through. Saddam Hussein had given up that opportunity, and I believe until 1990, his previous encounter with a Western Journalist was with British television program, "Panorama," in 1981.

So as part of our major effort to educate we worked very hard throughout 1989, to get journalist in to see him and struck out completely. He saw nobody.

When we heard that Diane Sawyer was interested in seeing him, we thought this might be the breakthrough.

We understood why he didn't want to see print journalists, but we thought perhaps he could be persuaded to take his story, such

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

as it was, to the American people and everybody would learn about Saddam through television.

So we worked very hard to get her interview, and she was the breakthrough interview. She made American journalism proud.

She did a great deal of homework, obviously, and she spent the whole day with him. Baghdad television then showed a transcript which was described as a complete transcript. And, of course, it was heavily cut and rather inexpertly so, such as portions Senator Cranston mentioned showing dead Kurds in Iraq were cut out. That was absolutely typical of the way the Iraqi Ministry of Information dealt with all the journalists and everybody else who was unlucky enough to be a victim of one of their transcript writing or video editing exercises.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE FACT THAT SADDAM SENT A MILITARY PLANE ON A MISSION, CONTRAVENING AGREEMENTS WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF

Mr. BROOMFIELD. One other question has troubled me, and that occurred a couple of days ago, when Saddam Hussein sent an airman up with one of his remaining military planes on a suicide mission. Now he knew that his generals had reached an agreement with General Schwarzkopf, and that we would certainly respond by to shooting the plane down.

Now, I wonder if you could tell us, is Saddam Hussein a slow learner, or how do you account for his arrogance in view of what his country has suffered in the last few weeks?

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IDENTIFICATION WITH IRAQ

Ambassador GLASPIE. Congressman Broomfield, I am quite convinced that he is the only person that I have every encountered who has come to believe he truly embodies the country. There was a French King who took this view, allegedly.

This is an Iraqi monarch who definitely takes that view. So long as Saddam Hussein survives, so does the soul of Iraq, and Iraq can be rebuilt because of the genius of its leader.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you very much.

RECORD OF U.S. STATEMENTS BETWEEN JULY 17 AND JULY 31, 1990

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Ambassador, I have been reviewing some of the statements made by U.S. officials between July the 17th and July 31st, of 1990, and I would like to go over them with you.

Ms. Tutweiler said after the July 17th speech, and you quoted this a moment ago, "we would certainly, under any circumstances, defend our vital interests."

She also said we were strongly committed to the individual and economic self defense of our friends in the Gulf.

The next day, Mr. Boucher refused to say when the United States would provide military help to its friends in case of attack. Mr. Cheney was quoted as saying, the United States commitment was to come to Kuwaiti defense if it is attacked.

On July 24th, Ms. Tutweiler said, "we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no special defense or security commitments," end of quote.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. To be fair, Mr. Chairman, that was in response to a question, I believe.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am sure that is correct, but her statement was we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments, end of quote.

Mr. Kelly reiterated Mrs. Tutweiler's statement of the 24th, and testified on July 30 only that "if forces were used we would be extremely concerned."

Now, this record is not a record of unambiguous clarity with respect to American positions. It is a record that confused me, confused this subcommittee, confused much of the Washington press. And it is not unreasonable for me to think that it might have confused Saddam Hussein as well.

It is not a record of clear, precise, unambiguous statements of the American position in the Gulf.

SADDAM HUSSEIN FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. POSITION INCLUDED THE USE OF FORCE IN THE EVENT OF AN IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am glad to reassure you, Saddam Hussein had no question in his mind, I am quite convinced of that. As the week went by and my Arab colleagues, who were the Arab colleagues and the other active diplomats on this, of course, were in and out of the foreign ministry, and were in constant contact with their own chiefs of state who were coming in and out all the time. There was no question about that.

The issue was, he didn't seem to understand the self-destructive folly of proceeding with any kind of aggression whatsoever.

Mr. HAMILTON. You believe that Saddam Hussein clearly understood, without any shadow of a doubt, that if he went into Kuwait the United States was going to oppose him vigorously and strongly with all of its military power?

Ambassador GLASPIE. With all of its military, power, no, I wouldn't suggest he thought we were going to nuke Baghdad, but I am absolutely sure he knew we would fight.

I think it dawned on him as a possibility on the 25th or the 24th when he heard that announcement. I have—

AMBIGUITY OF SECRETARY KELLY'S TESTIMONY OF JULY 30

Mr. HAMILTON. Why would not Secretary Kelly tell us that then in the testimony on July 30th when he was asked about our commitment, why would not he have said, clearly and unambiguously we are going to fight if you go across that line?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, I think you asked if we had a defense treaty. The suggestion would be in my mind that we had some kind of secret—secret arrangement with the Kuwaitis, or with the GCC and, of course, we did not.

Mr. HAMILTON. My question to Mr. Kelly related to our commitment, to our policy. Mr. Kelly responded with respect to the treaty commitment. He was correct with regard to his statement that there was no treaty. There has not been any treaty with Kuwait, so far as I know.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

But, of course, it was not as clear for Mr. Kelly, as you are suggesting, I think, that the policy was in the mind of Saddam Hussein.

Let me ask—I will tell you the question. "If Iraq, for example, charges across the border into Kuwait, for whatever reason, what would be our position with regard to the use of U.S. forces?" That was my question.

This is Mr. Kelly's response. "That, Mr. Chairman, is hypothetical or a contingency, the kind of which I can't get into.

Suffice it to say we would be extremely concerned. But I cannot get into the realm of "what if answers."

Now, this is a day or two before the invasion. Our Assistant Secretary is testifying before this Congress that we would be extremely concerned, when, in fact, you are suggesting the policy was that we would fight if Saddam Hussein went across the border, and that Saddam Hussein had no doubt about our position as you said a moment ago.

SADDAM HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. MIGHT FIGHT

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, I am suggesting that Saddam Hussein believed starting on the afternoon of the 24th, before I saw him, but certainly when I saw him was the first time, I had the impression from anybody from the Iraqi Government that it had occurred to him that we at least might fight, and I would speculate, because that is all I can do, I can't look into his mind, that he believed that we probably would fight and would fight hard.

The tragedy is, because of the sycophants around him who were trying to prove that they had produced high-tech weaponry which could actually compete with ours, I think it is quite possible that he truly believed he could beat us.

May I remind you, sir, after six weeks of pummelling by the U.S. Air Force, he still permitted this war to go ahead and it wasn't until the second day of the ground war, when he had no army left, that he finally understood that he couldn't beat us. So is a man that had a series of very, very profound miscalculations in his—

THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE MESSAGE GLASPIE RELAYED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand. Did you ever tell Saddam Hussein, Mr. President, if you go across that line into Kuwait, we are going to fight?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, I did not. Absolutely not.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yet you think he believed that?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I certainly do. I told him we would defend our vital interests.

He complained to me for one hour about fleet movements and American neo-imperialism and militarism.

He knew perfectly well what we were talking about. And it would have been absolutely wrong for me, without consulting with the President to inform anybody of a change in our policy.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Our policy was that we would defend our vital interest. Saddam Hussein who is a man who lived by the sword, believed we were going to do it by the sword.

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Ambassador, I don't hold you responsible for the statements I cited. I know you as an Ambassador in that famous interview where acting according to instructions, I want to come back to that at a later time.

No American Ambassador is going to say to a foreign leader that we are not going to defend our vital interests. The question is what is the vital interest. There must be no doubt.

Ambassador GLASPIE. We defined—

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you define it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I said sovereignty and integrity of our friends in the Gulf. That is certainly Kuwait.

AMBIGUITY OF U.S. STATEMENTS

Mr. HAMILTON. It is one thing to say you are concerned about that. That is what Mr. Kelly said.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Ms. Tutweiler said publicly, and I said privately, and I am sure Mr. Kelly recalled it when he testified, we were strongly committed to the collective self defense of the Gulf and their individual self defense, and we said that very carefully because we weren't sure there was going to be a GCC defense and, in fact, there was not.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me quote the words of Ms. Tutweiler. "We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait."

Ambassador GLASPIE. That is absolutely correct. We don't need—

Mr. HAMILTON. The kind of message you are conveying to Saddam Hussein, and your conviction that Saddam Hussein knew that the United States would fight if Iraq invaded Kuwait, is the thing that I am curious about. The record shows that State Department officials are saying that there is no special defense treaty or special commitment. They are saying simply that we would be extremely concerned.

Now that language does convey just the opposite. It conveys, look we have no treaty commitment.

We have no treaty obligation, we have no special commitment. We are deeply concerned.

That is a very different signal than saying "you walk across that line we are going to fight."

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, you cited two members of the Administration who were asked direct questions, one by your, the other by a member of the press corps at the State Department, whether we had any kind of special arrangement or treaty arrangement with Kuwait. Obviously, the answer had to be no.

I am sorry they had to say it on the record, but it seems to me they were forced to do so. What else could I say.

I am saying to you, Mr. Chairman, I spent an hour and a half with a man who railed at me, and a lot of that is in the transcript that the Ministry of Information—of course, they left that in, he is railing at the American Ambassador, it is accurate.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

He went on, and on, and on. You can't hurt us. He knew perfectly well what we were talking about.

As I said to you, that is the way his mind works. If somebody is going to protect their vital interest, in his view they are going to do it with the fleet, or with the Air Force or with the American Army. And he felt secure, secure in the belief that no Arab Government would ever allow us to use their land for that purpose.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you never said to him, "Mr. President, if you go across the line with your forces into Kuwait, we will fight?"

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely not. I did not need to say that.

If I felt I needed to say that, I would have asked the President after the meeting for permission to say that. I had no doubt in my mind that he knew that we meant business.

And certainly it is up to the President, not up to me to decide how to execute the policy.

ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF GLASPIE'S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. HAMILTON. The transcript that was released, you have indicated is deception and fabrication, and incomplete. It is difficult for us in the committee to judge that because we haven't seen the whole transcript.

We would like to see it, and I understand there may be reasons we cannot. But I do recall that the statement—the State Department—and I cannot recall the person, characterized that transcript when it was released, or shortly thereafter, as essentially correct.

I am quoting now, "essentially correct."

Why would the Department of State characterize that transcript as essentially correct, when it was filled, as you suggest, with deception and fabrication?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I have no idea. I don't know to whom you are referring or whether the person to who you are referring.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is this the first time you have heard that phrase?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is reported in the press this morning and I think reported previously.

Ambassador GLASPIE. It may well be someone who had never seen it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why would they say it was essentially correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I read—

Mr. HAMILTON. That is a direct quote from the State Department not the newspapers.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Congressman, I have no knowledge, I have never heard it before.

Mr. HAMILTON. I wonder if you could report to us on that statement, who made it and why?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I will convey that request. Perhaps, the—I am guessing, perhaps the context was that what—what was actually released by the Ministry of Information is essentially correct.

I would quarrel with that, but a lot of it is accurate. There are major gaps, a few sentences here and there are rewritten. In some cases, to pretend the gaps aren't there and in other cases for purposes of deception.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Somebody—I did read, and I think in the Don Oberdorfer article someone said it was about 80 percent correct. I could buy that.

There is 80 percent of some sentences present, and a good 20 percent of the serious material of it is certainly absent.

Mr. HAMILTON. If I understand the thrust of your testimony, it is that the transcript really gives a very distorted view?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is a distorted view of your recollection of that conversation?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. To the point where it really creates a very false impression of the conversation, is that correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Precisely, what I would expect from the Iraqi Ministry of Information, which is not a Ministry of Information, but a ministry for the enhancement of the image of the President of Iraq.

Mr. HAMILTON. That raises a question in my mind, why the State Department called it "essentially correct" and why it did not move to correct that impression that was widely created in this city and in the world, that the conversation you had with Saddam Hussien was one which suggested that you were trying to be very polite, if not appease the President.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I have tried to answer that in my response to the Chairman, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand.

Mr. Gilman?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE DONE ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT?

Ambassador Glaspie, knowing what we know today about Saddam Hussein's failure to understand as you said, American's determination to protect our vital interests in the Gulf, and their is proclivity towards violence, is there anything we could have done in the months before August 2nd, to persuade him not to attack Kuwait?

Ambassador GLASPIE. In the months before August 2nd, we were afraid he was going to attack Israel, Mr. Congressman.

He was talking, we thought in terms which suggested not simply defense, which is what he said, but also the possibility of preemption. You recall, the missile launchers that we heard much more about later on, were moved to Western Iraq and pointed in the general direction of Israel sometime in the summer.

There was really nobody who had, at least that I was aware of, thought or believed that the Iraqis were thinking about Kuwait.

Now, I think that one of the main reasons that he moved on Kuwait was the reason which didn't develop in his own mind until the summer. That is he began to realize that the coffers were not only empty, but the price of oil was low, and there was literally no more credit after all these years of heavy borrowing during the war, and these two years or at least a year and a half of overspending on both guns and butter, lead to no credit being left in the world, except the U.S., and we weren't going to let him have any.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

So we couldn't and shouldn't have prevented him from going bankrupt. In that sense I don't think there was anything we could have done. That was the new factor that entered into his calculations, which I think swung his attention to Kuwait.

Mr. GILMAN. So then in your mind there was very little we could have done to prevent him from heading toward Kuwait, because his mind had been made up pretty strongly prior to August 2nd.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I am sure Members of this committee will find it perfectly extraordinary that I can say yes to that question, but I can. I am not suggesting that the policy succeeded because, obviously, it didn't. We had to go to war.

But what we could have done to prevent it. First let me recall what a previous boss of mine said. He said, there are some things in the world the United States just can't help, and Iraq this is one of them. How could we have prevented him?

Either by diplomacy or by war. I tried to explain before he invaded Kuwait, that we couldn't forge a blocking coalition, we just couldn't do it. The Arabs wouldn't let us use their land. They didn't agree on the approach we should take.

The idea of sanctions, for example, would have made us feel morally good—I would have felt great. As I said in the statement the other day, but nobody would have followed us.

So if there was something that we could have done I admit I haven't thought of it, and I have given it a great deal of thought.

Our best chance was to tell him, draw a line in the sand. We did, and he walked over it into defeat for himself and his country.

PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. GILMAN. Do you feel you told him as forcefully as possible that we would use every bit of our influence and force to prevent him from moving against any other nation in the Gulf?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I certainly can't say, Congressman Gilman, that I said we would use everything in our arsenal, so to speak, I wouldn't do that. I used precisely the words I gave you. I am absolutely confident that he understood what I was saying.

Mr. GILMAN. Those instructions were to you, we would defend our vital interests in the Gulf?

Ambassador GLASPIE. We would support the sovereignty and integrity of the Gulf countries.

We would maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf and movement of oil through the Gulf.

It is an inclusive list.

Mr. GILMAN. Did he ask you for any explanation of that list?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Not at all. He felt this was our neo-imperialist agenda, and I would like to add one point that I think is absolutely critical.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES

Throughout this period, he remained as convinced as he had been for the previous 20 years the United States was irredeemably hostile to Saddam Hussein Government. He, over and over, accused us of trying to subvert his government.

43-452 - 91 - 2

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

It is very hard to persuade somebody of anything if they think you are irredeemably hostile. He may have felt he was going to fight us anyway. That is a possible hypothesis that we were going to force a fight on him—that is a red light on for me?

Mr. HAMILTON. You don't need to worry about that light, but I am glad you call attention to it.

AMBASSADOR GLASPIE'S RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES

Mr. GILMAN. Ambassador Glaspie, when were you recalled to the States?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I received a cable on the 28th.

Mr. GILMAN. Of August?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Of July.

We decided—we had decided that it would be absolutely necessary, given the extraordinary activities and remarks of Saddam Hussein over the previous months, to have a high-level policy review. It was deemed correct. I certainly agreed that I should be there.

However, that was the 28th. I asked for permission to stay a couple of days longer just to be sure they went to Jidda and got the negotiations begun. As soon as it was clear that the negotiations were to begin in Jidda, as he promised they would, I left.

Mr. GILMAN. When did you leave?

Ambassador GLASPIE. On the 30th.

Mr. GILMAN. And the invasion began August 2?

Ambassador GLASPIE. That's right.

GLASPIE'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY REGARDING IRAQ AFTER HER RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES

Mr. GILMAN. Were you involved in policy with regard to Iraq when you got back to the State Department?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, day and night. We never slept.

Mr. GILMAN. And all the way through you were consulted with regard to Iraq?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Lantos?

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LONG RECORD OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S FLAWED JUDGMENT REGARDING IRAQ

I welcome the distinguished Ambassador. Let me commend you for your composure and dignity under very difficult circumstances.

I must say, I am appalled by the frighteningly flawed judgment you displayed even in retrospect. I have now heard you use the terms "absolutely sure, absolutely confident" on numbers of occasions during the course of the last half-hour. It seems to me that this may be one of the problems: not just you, but the whole State Department Middle East Bureau may have had to contend with for about a decade.

Our distinguished Chairman went back to July 17th; allow me to go back a decade. Postmortems are never fun. They are certainly

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

not fun just to be able to say, "I told you so," but they may have some value if we learn from postmortems.

I pulled together a series of statements I put in the Congressional Record beginning June 9, 1981, when I pointed to the growing menace of Iraq's irresponsible dictatorship moving inexorably toward its nuclear arsenal, in its aggression against its Moslem neighbor.

It has repeatedly threatened the annihilation of Israel. The Israeli Air Force, with a limited strike, has obstructed the weapons of mass destruction. This related to the taking of the nuclear reactor in Osirak ten years ago. The State Department thought it was a horrible move. Had they not done so, our forces would have been facing a nuclear-equipped Iraq.

A few years later with a number of colleagues, I called for economic sanctions against Iraq. I introduced legislation the same as Mr. Pell in the Senate did. The State Department killed it after the House and Senate passed it. They called it premature.

Despite the incontrovertible evidence of the use of poison gas, the State Department said that sanctions were premature. I said I wished they were "premature," et cetera.

Then comes Mr. Kelly, April 29, 1990, I stated: "With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I detect an Alice-in-Wonderland quality about your testimony. I will tell you why. You recite accurately a chamber of horrors. The Department of State calls Saddam Hussein's outrageous and preposterous comments—I quote—'inflammatory, irresponsible, and outrageous.' You talk about Iraq using poison gas against its own people, diplomats encouraging murder plots in the United States, and the government importing nuclear trigger devices from here and other places. We have now the big gun episode that is lied about as are all other episodes. The human rights annual report description is a nightmare. Then you express the hope, which boggles my mind, that somehow this will change and Iraq under Saddam Hussein will turn in the direction of being a responsible and civilized and peace-loving member of the international community."

On July 27, five days before the invasion, the Iraqi bully and new Hitler, "Mr. Speaker, we have witnessed a new low under President Saddam Hussein. This week in the OPEC meeting he amassed 20,000 Iraq soldiers, a small portion of the 1-million-strong Army, on the border of Kuwait and threatened them."

During all this time there is the persistent theme by the State Department that this man can be dealt with. The Chairman's questions were excellent. I sat next to him when he asked those questions of Mr. Kelly. You, he, even now, tell us that you were sure Saddam Hussein knew that we would move militarily.

Let me tell you, very few people were sure that we would move militarily on this committee or in this country. For you to say in retrospect that Saddam Hussein absolutely knew that we would move in a military way is simply absurd.

I think you need to have a very high dose of humility in retrospect, given the pattern of appalling judgments made by you and your associates. I have been a strong supporter of the policies since the 2nd of August, but it has been a disaster for a decade prior to that.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Would you like to comment?

GLASPIE'S CONFIDENCE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE

Ambassador GLASPIE. There are a number of issues. First, I think you will find people in my bureau extremely modest about predicting things that will go on in the Middle East. What I said I was absolutely confident about was a judgment. Certainly it is a judgment; not about a policy, about the ability of the man sitting in front of me, whom I had been watching for two years—that he had come to a conclusion.

I am absolutely confident he came to a conclusion. He told me he came to the conclusion in an indirect way. He said it straight out, indirectly.

Mr. LANTOS. How can you say this?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Because he railed against what he believed we were threatening. He railed against American militarism, neoimperialism; he said, get your threats out of the Gulf. How dare you to sell Patriots to Israel?

None of your business, I said. But it was a whole series of comments that made it perfectly clear that that is what he was, A, concerned about, and B—and I did not say, I was sure. I said, I believe he probably decided on that day or the day before for the first time that we really would fight if we had to.

SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ WOULD HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE

Now, let me go back quickly to pick out one of the issues that you raised. I don't want to read anything into your comments that you did not mean to say, Mr. Lantos, but if we are going to talk about sanctions as a way to proceed with diplomacy, there is certainly a place for them, a place for them when you hope at least the sanctions will make the culprit change his ways.

If you do not believe that—and you clearly believe that Saddam Hussein was irredeemable; that was the point of your comments—then why put yourself in the position where you will have to leave the country, where it is clear that it will be impossible to have access to that government anymore? By staying there, it is my opinion—which I am quite sure you will disagree with—

Mr. LANTOS. Don't be so quite sure.

Ambassador GLASPIE. It is my opinion that we got the gassing of the Kurds stopped immediately by being able to talk to them directly over and over again; and I might say, having some visiting congressmen to help us show the Iraqis that it was not just the Administration that didn't want gassing of Kurds. We were able to get that stopped.

There are a number of things that I don't think were minor that we achieved by staying there; some of them were important human rights issues.

The travel ban was lifted for everybody, Mr. Lantos. The Stark compensation—I was going to say it again, "quite sure"—it would not have been paid if we had not been there to dun them constantly.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Mr. LANTOS. How long did it take for the Stark payments to come through?

Ambassador GLASPIE. It was an electronic transfer.

Mr. LANTOS. No. How many months, how many years after the episode? It was not an electronic transfer. The subcommittee was outraged at the delay at getting compensation.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I am sorry—

Mr. LANTOS. When did the episode take place?

Ambassador GLASPIE. November 9th?

Mr. LANTOS. May of 1987. When did the parents and the wives of the sailors killed receive the compensation?

Ambassador GLASPIE. May 1990.

Mr. LANTOS. Three years later? I don't think that was a stellar performance.

Ambassador GLASPIE. We got it. We got an average of $800,000 for those widows and orphans.

I believe, Mr. Lantos, that if we had a sanction regime, we would not have been there to have those discussions. I believe that. I may be wrong.

Mr. LANTOS. I am glad to hear you say that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Goodling?

CONGRESS WAS TO BLAME FOR THE CONFUSION OF U.S. POLICY

Mr. GOODLING. I guess, if I were not so angry, I would find this whole thing hilarious. It is amazing, Madam Ambassador.

I watched you, live, yesterday. I appreciated your efforts so much that I even tuned in this morning and watched you a second time with the Senate. My arm is not long enough, so I cannot reach over or around to pat myself on the back.

If Saddam Hussein had any idea of where we stood in the United States, it had to come from 535 Members of Congress of the United States, not the Administration or anybody else. Congress micro-manages all the time. Saddam had no idea whether to believe us or you, because he did not know who to believe on this committee or in the Congress of the United States.

So I was kind of surprised that you were kind of grilled vigorously about, whether we would say positively that we would use force "if you cross the line."

We had day-and-night debates in the Congress, saying that the President of the United States cannot say that, the Ambassador cannot say that. Now we are saying, in retrospect, I guess we should not have told the President of the United States not to say that.

And finally, we had a vote to determine whether he could or could not say anything.

The debate in the Congress and on this committee was so divided that I don't know who would have said who would come under sanctions or not. Eventually we have to take it out on somebody.

That debate had to be the most misleading debate to anyone like Saddam Hussein. To anybody who was sensibly thinking the issue through, it would have been confusing, but to someone like Saddam Hussein, we had to have had him totally confused. And it was the

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Congress of the United States, in my estimation, that had him totally confused as to what we would or would not do.

I can only say, thank you for being. I am glad you stayed as long as you could. You were dealing with the impossible. Eventually, we had to show him we meant business. Even when we were moving the fleets with the troops, Congress was saying, we should not be doing that.

I am sorry that you are getting this kind of questioning, but I have to believe that, if anything confused Saddam Hussein, it was the Congress of the United States.

Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Johnston?

GLASPIE TOLD SADDAM HUSSEIN ON JULY 25 THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might point out, Madam Ambassador, this committee did vote out a sanctions resolution back in April.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, I knew about it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The first question: You mentioned a previous boss of yours who said the United States could not do everything. Was that Mr. Kissinger?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, sir. It was Mr. Schulze.

Mr. JOHNSTON. For some reason, I kept the infamous transcript mailed to us by the Ambassador to Iraq. Maybe we can glean the 80 percent that was correct. There is a consistency between your testimony and the transcript and the views of the State Department, particularly when it comes to sanctions.

If I could read this and ask you if this is a correct transcript of what you said to Mr. Hussein on July 25—I think that was your last meeting with him.

Allow me to comment on two points"—this is you talking to him. "You spoke of friendship, and I believe our President has stressed in his letters to you, including the letter he sent to you on the occasion of your National Day"—

He interrupts, "He was generous, and we appreciate and respect his expressions."

Now back to you, "As you know, he expected the U.S. Administration to absolutely and constantly reject the proposed economic sanctions." Is that not correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That was a correct statement?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Your answer earlier was that you felt sanctions would have stopped a discussion between our administration and their administration.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir. What it meant was that I believe, had sanctions been imposed—now, I was talking with Congressman Lantos, and we were talking about 1988, the first time around.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We are talking about a period of time five or seven days before the invasion in which this Congress, and Mr. Berman particularly, was approached four times by the State De-

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

partment to lay off of sanctions; and yet we knew his history up to that time.

On July 25, what was the rationale to tell Saddam Hussein that the Administration was constantly against sanctions?

Ambassador GLASPIE. That, of course, is the general United States Administration position on sanctions, which I am sure you know, Congressman Johnston.

I would like to clarify what I said before in response to Congressman Lantos.

SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN 1988

In the fall of 1988, when the Iraqis were, without any question, gassing Kurdish citizens in the north, I believe that the kind of sanctions regime that was being discussed in the Congress would have resulted in the withdrawal of our diplomatic mission ultimately from Baghdad. My point was, by staying there, we could undertake diplomatic activity.

It is very difficult, as we all know, to undertake diplomatic activity if you are not present and you do not have access to the host government. I think that is an important clarification.

U.S. POSITION ON IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER DISPUTES

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me read another part of your transcript, accurate or inaccurate. I absolutely trust in your observation, your comments to Saddam Hussein.

"I admire your extraordinary effort to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that. We are of the opinion that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country, but what we hold no opinion about are the inter-Arab disputes, such as your border disagreement with Kuwait.

"I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 1960s. The instruction we had at that time was that we should not have anything to do with this issue, and this issue was not connected with U.S. concerns."

Ambassador GLASPIE. The context here is, this issue is precisely where you put the border posts. The issue in the late 1960s and again in 1990 was whether or not the bilateral border commission would meet on the border and physically put posts in the ground. That is what we were talking about.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mrs. Meyers?

Mrs. MEYERS Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS

It has been inferred, and I think it is probably accurate that our relationship with Iraq during the 1980s was difficult because of our relationship with Iran. I would like to say, however, to make a point that I made yesterday in committee, Mr. Chairman, and that is that I think there is an inference that after Congress discussed levying some kind of sanctions, taking away agricultural credits from Iraq, that the Administration somehow ignored us or did not do it.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

I believe it was just one day later than Congress talked about agricultural credits that the Administration ceased doing all business with Iraq, said not only would we not extend agricultural credits to them, we would no longer buy their oil. Which is, of course, much more important in the scheme of things, because we were sending them $10 million a day in oil. That is what they were buying their weapons with.

Ambassador GLASPIE. And not from us, I would like to point out, Congresswoman Meyers.

Mrs. MEYERS Yes. I think it is important we make that point, that the Administration was really not dragging their feet on sanctions, and a day later than Congress moved, they moved in, not just on agricultural credits, but on everything.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ IN THE 1980'S

Do you think that our policy toward Iraq should have been markedly different in the 1980s? I know that is a speculative question, but I think the inference is being made here that somehow we made a long-time error in judgment about Saddam Hussein.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Iraq in the 1970s, the oil boom was on, became almost a rogue elephant in the area. There were departments of dirty tricks. It was a very dangerous country, very destabilizing and very worrisome.

In the 1980s, of course, Iran and Iraq went to war. I remember a distinguished American diplomat, Harold Saunders, saying to me that his nightmare was that the Ayatollah Khomeini would lead Iranians across the desert to Lebanon. The export of revolution appeared very possible.

It was tremendously important, of course, to make sure the State of Iraq did not disappear or fall under an Islamic government of the kind that Khomeini was running in Iran.

In August 1988 that war ended. Saddam Hussein was there. He was cash poor, but in charge of a very rich, very important strategic country. We could have tried to isolate him, because he had been dangerous. We would have failed.

As I have tried to explain, nobody, but nobody would have followed us into any campaign to isolate Saddam Hussein. I don't need to list the countries which did a very thriving business with him in 1989 and 1990. We did not, because we refused to provide the credits and because, of course, we had munitions control lists, chemical precursor lists, and other controls. Other countries did not enforce their controls very well.

But we came to the conclusion that it was important, especially since we could not see any alternative, to try to work with him, to work very, very cautiously—a carrot-and-stick approach, as it was characterized by the Iraqi Foreign Minister. They understood very well what we were doing.

Mrs. MEYERS Was the basic decision to try to work with Saddam Hussein to try to use the carrot and the stick, as you say, to try to bring him into the family of nations? Was that the view during the 1980s? Did we ever realize that we might be trying to deal with someone here that we could not change?

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. During the 1980s, really, Congresswoman, it was just war, war, war. That was the issue. There was really no other issue which came near causing the instability in the area, which, of course, that war caused. As long as the war was on, there really did not seem to be much else to talk about.

It was not that we were working with him. We did not even have relations with him; we had an interests section. It was not until November 1984 that we even put a flag over our little shack in Baghdad that we called home. There was not a close relationship at all, except in our mutual concern about strategy.

The only time, of course, there was a complete meeting of the minds was on Resolution 598, the effort to actually end the war. Of course, I was not there, but I have never had the impression from those four or five American diplomats who were posted there that there was across-the-board dialogue with the Iraqi Government. Had we wanted it, they were apparently not interested.

STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS TO GLASPIE BEFORE AUGUST 2

Mrs. MEYERS How recently, prior to August 2, had you had instructions from the State Department as to what to say to convey our real intentions to Saddam Hussein?

Ambassador GLASPIE. The two major sets of instructions were July 18 and July 28.

Mrs. MEYERS And those were to indicate that in every way we would protect our interests?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely. Under any circumstances.

In the Middle East when we talk about our interests in an oil-producing state, that means oil. Of course, we also said we would defend our friends. So we were not only going to defend our own national interests, which are oil and freedom of navigation in the Gulf and through the straits, but the rights of our friends to defend themselves. We would defend and support the sovereignty and integrity of our friends in the Gulf.

Mrs. MEYERS Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Owens.

Mr. OWENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. OWENS' ADMIRATION OF AMBASSADOR GLASPIE

Madame Ambassador, this member believes you were hung out to dry by a Secretary whom otherwise I have very little conflict with. I want to state, first of all, my strong admiration for your activities as Ambassador.

Two years ago I had the opportunity as you will remember of visiting with you for two days and attending over a period of two days some very intense meetings with you and all of the upper officials of the Iraqi government, except Saddam Hussein, himself. I remember very well a meeting with Vice President Taha Ramadan lasting two or three hours, in which I upbraided him about the gassing of the Kurds and a panoply of other issues. He in turn railed back and you will remember that twice you interrupted him and corrected him on policy in a very firm, tough approach. I was exceedingly impressed at your ability, pearl handled pistol and all.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Two of them.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Mr. OWENS. Two of them. There is a story circulating that you asked Mr. Saddam Hussein to remove his pistol while you were inhis office. I don't know if he did, but figuratively you disarmed him by correcting him on policy. Your representation in the Middle East prior to the August 2 invasion was impeccable. Nobody was more highly rated. I want that on the record.

AMBASSADOR GLASPIE'S ACTIVITIES SINCE RETURNING TO THE UNITED STATES

Now I want to ask you a series of questions about what has happened since your return to the United States in August and ask you if you know if they are factual. I would like to know on the record the following: Why have you not been allowed to appear before this time? Who made the decision not to allow you to appear? What instructions are you now under? We only have five minutes. As the Chairman earlier indicated, that light refers to the Members' time and not to yours in responding.

Who made the decision that you were not to speak out on policy and not even to defend yourself against the charged deception? Have you met with the President and how often with the Secretary of State since that time? Have you had regular access to cable traffic on Iraq and the situation in the region?

Don't you find lastly it extraordinary that when we had a crisis, an invasion, the decision to deploy 500,000 Americans, an all-out war, and yet you as still the ambassador to Iraq, serving at the center of the storm, were not involved at all in articulating policy? That is seven questions. It probably sets a record for the House.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I can answer quickly. Except for the middle one. Yes, of course I had access to all the cable traffic and everything else. I have been trying to write papers analyzing what is going on and what they might do about it for the last seven months that I have had access to everything not just State Department but the Department of Defense and other agencies.

Why I was not articulating policy, it is very simple, the President has been articulating policy with the assistance of cabinet secretaries.

The President has in fact routinely been briefing members of this House as well as the media. When the President and the Secretary of State take this on, then certainly nobody else in the department need do it. It would be inappropriate for us to do it.

In fact, I feel quite sure that as issues were evolving so quickly it would have been most unwise for any of us to try to do it. We were not sitting at breakfast with the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the President and the Secretary. So I don't find anything peculiar about that Congressman Owens.

How often have I been called to meet the President? Three times. I might say in all three occasions it was a very thorough policy review. The President is one of those few people in Washington who has a tremendous repository of knowledge about the Middle East.

I enjoyed those three meetings if I may put it that way. They were very profound exchanges of views and efforts to search for the

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

way to go forward. It was frankly flattering to be asked by the President.

Why was I not speaking out previously? Wasn't that the same question, the first and last questions struck me as the same. Who made that decision? It was the Secretary of State. It is his job to run his department as he wishes to. If he wishes to be the spokesman for it, with one designated spokeswoman, it seems to me that is his business, Congressman.

What was the last about instructions?

Mr. OWENS. What instructions are you under now in terms of your testimony?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I am to offer myself to answer any questions that you may put that I can answer. Of course, there are many questions I cannot answer. But from the standpoint of Embassy Baghdad, I can answer many questions.

WHY WAS GLASPIE UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS FOR 7 MONTHS

Mr. OWENS. Can you say why it has been seven months? I have been unable to reach you by telephone.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I was grateful.

Mr. OWENS. I was frankly concerned about your physical safety.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Under house arrest? No, as I mentioned earlier it was clearly the view of the Administration that we should be talking, 100 percent, I think it was before you came in, Congressman Owens, that we should be focusing 100 percent on pursuing our aims which were building a coalition, developing those aims, supporting in every way our troops in the field.

There was a very strong feeling in the department of late as well as everywhere else in the government and Congress that our troops must know the nation is fully behind them. This was not the time to be talking about anything but the task at hand.

Happily the war was over quickly and successfully and really almost right after that I was asked to come up, as you can imagine. I didn't have to be dragged. I was happy to come up. But that seems to me merely fair and reasonable way to run a business.

Mr. OWENS. You have again proven that you are a loyal, strong supporter of the State Department's policy.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. I have been out for a few minutes. I would like to defer to Mr. Lagomarsino.

GLASPIE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Ambassador there is the impression among some in this town and some in Congress I guess and certainly those who write to me in opposition to our policy that you had some kind of a buddy-buddy relationship with Saddam Hussein, you representing the United States Government. I would be interested in knowing, how long were you in Kuwait as Ambassador in Iraq.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Two years.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. How many times did you meet with Saddam Hussein during that time.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. Once.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. That was the time you just described?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. I accompanied visitors I think three times. On those occasions I think I said, "Good afternoon" and , "Goodbye" to Saddam Hussein.

We did not develop an intimate relationship.

IRAQI STATEMENTS ABOUT THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES BEFORE AUG. 2

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. In your meeting with Saddam Hussein or other Iraqi officials prior to the invasion or just prior to the invasion obviously they were talking about Kuwait. Were they talking about the United Arab Emirates or was that just by inference?

Ambassador GLASPIE. They were. There was a period of two to three weeks when Saudi Arabia and Iraq were working together to prepare for what was supposed to be the big event of 25th of July. The other big event was an OPEC meeting. The Saudis and Iraqis were very keen that the two OPEC countries which were regularly overproducing beyond their quota not only stop overproducing but promise not to ask for a larger quota three months down the road and in general fall in line with the notion of higher oil prices.

One of the reasons we were surprised when Saddam invaded was that not only was he going to try to get the money he had been trying to extort from the Arabs but how he had already got himself a higher oil price at the July 25 OPEC meeting.

So the U.A.E. was the other over producing country. That is why the U.S. was picked out.

IRAQI STATEMENTS REGARDING SAUDI ARABIA AND TURKEY

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Was anything said to you about Saudi Arabia. Did you hear his ministers mention Saudi Arabia with regard to over production?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, sir, not over production.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Or Turkey?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No.

MUBARAK'S VIEWS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I and others met with President Mubarak in December. That is after we had substantial troops in the area and they were building up and so on, right before the United Nations vote on the use of force. President Mubarak made the statement that Saddam Hussein did not realize what he was up against and no one would give him bad news, for obvious rather deadly reasons.

He also mentioned something I thought was very interesting. He repeated this story that Saddam Hussein had lied to him about his intentions to invade. He said he would not and he did. He also said that the Kuwaitis had offered him everything that he had demanded except a different border.

Is that your impression, too?

Ambassador GLASPIE. That was not my impression. I have never seen a full, entirely credible account of that famous meeting in Jidda. Clearly there was no conclusion to the negotiation since it was announced by both sides that they were going in the next few days to reconvene in Baghdad.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

I understand that the Kuwaitis had hung tough on a number of financial requests that were made to them in Jidda.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VIEWS OF INTERNAL DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. When Saddam Hussein was criticizing you and our government for our activities in the Gulf, the fleet and so on and you were telling them we were going to defend their vital interests, did he refer at all to anything like internal divisions in this county or the role of Congress or anything of that kind? He certainly did later after the troops were in.

Ambassador GLASPIE. He may have. He was thinking about it. The foreign minister often spoke about it. The key passage I think in my conversation with him on that day was, and this is in the transcript, the business about the 10,000 deaths. You Americans could not stomach heavy casualties.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. He did say that.

Ambassador GLASPIE. He did. This was his idea of Vietnam. He believe that the Vietnamese were not a worthy opponent and if the Vietnamese could create political waves in the United States he was certainly as smart as they were. That was the sense I got.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I certainly would not join those who apparently are criticizing you for not saying we would go to war. The President himself could not do that without at least talking to Congress about it. There was plenty of division in Congress right up until the vote that we had.

Mr. ENGLE. [Presiding.] Thank you.

STRENGTH OF IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have a vote on. I have one quick question. Let's move from the postmortem. I would like to hear you express your views as to the strength of the opposition groups in Iraq today and how you see the potential for their success in overthrowing Saddam Hussein or at least his regime?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well,in the North you can certainly talk about opposition groups. The Kurds have been organized in various military parties for a number of years. Mas'ud Barzani is certainly the militarily commander and has taken command in the field.

There are a number of parties that I am sure you are aware of, the Kurdish Democratic party, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

The south is an entirely different thing. This appears to have originated as entirely spontaneous uprisings in these various towns and the city of Basra. What organization is taking place there right now coming from the Iranian side of the border is very difficult to detect.

Historically whenever the borders have been open for any reason whatsoever, and clearly they are open for a very unusual reason now, Iranian organizers have come over or they have sent Iraqi Shi'ite agents of a radical Islamic view to do their organizing.

I don't know how many are there. We have to assume that some are. I have no intelligence that they are there but I think it is reasonable to assume that they are. Our own view of course is that we

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

hope the Iraqi people have a chance to organize their own participatory democracy. We feel strongly that Iraq must remain as a territorial entity in that area.

POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE OVERTHROWN

Mr. GALLEGLY. What is your assessment of the opposition, individually or collectively causing the personal demise of Saddam Hussein?

Ambassador GLASPIE. It is a very difficult call to make. Our own analysts are being extremely careful, and I don't blame them. It is possible that the fighting in the south will go on and on. It is going on or it was going on this morning.

Although the Army has of course armor down there and heaven knows what else, they have not been able to stamp it out. It keeps popping up.

The north is a very different issue. Of course there have been long periods in the history of modern Iraq when the north was not in any way under the sway of Baghdad. But if the central government cannot control the north and if they lose Mosul and Kirkuk then I think the central government's days must be numbered. If he hangs on then I think the importance of holding on to sanctions becomes critical because the economic pinch, I think, would begin to be very important.

On that point, I would like to emphasize that the President's view is very strong that we want nothing that we do to contribute to the tragic suffering of the Iraqi people.

We will be working with the ICRC and UN to see what we can do to send food and medicine to alleviate their suffering.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madame Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLE. We are going to have to take a break. I wonder if we could break for about 10 minutes and come back.

[Recess.]

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will resume its sitting. Mr. Leach.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MISCALCULATION OF U.S. ACTIONS

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

It strikes me that when we review all of this that we put a lot of attention on the fact that maybe we misjudged Saddam Hussein. But part of it was his misjudgment about the United States. Yesterday you used the adjective "stupid" applying to his judgment. My own sense is Saddam Hussein concluded based on his references about the Iran episode in particular that perhaps we were coercible. The reason I say that is that it strikes me that as we look at the Bush Administration's record which basically is one of warning through action, that is through a maneuver with a very small Gulf state as well as with statements that we would not tolerate aggressive action, that he must have concluded that we did not mean particularly what we meant.

I wonder if you would like to elaborate about the historical background in terms of how you assess Saddam and whether you think

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

the whole Iran episode was part of his calculations about the United States.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I think that Saddam burst onto the political scene as a young man. He attempted to be a man literally who undertook the assassination of the President of Iraq and then had to flee the country and spent some years in exile studying.

I have been told that the thing that interested him, I am sure among many things, but the thing that interested him very much was how you get in to power if you are somebody from a small village with no connections and how you hold on to that power.

It is said that he studied, for example, the life of Stalin, not of course because he was a Communist, he was rabidly anti-Communist, but of course the typical interest that one has, on how could a country boy move up through the party and then somehow get hold of the military and civilian intelligence organs so as to get that power for himself. I think that tasks that he set for himself was almost all consuming for most of his career.

INFLUENCE OF THE 1979 IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS ON SADDAM'S THINKING

Mr. LEACH. The question I am interested in is how he looked at the United States. Did the Iran episode have a formative influence?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Certainly it had a traumatic effect on the Iraqi government. They thought they understood what our policy was. It certainly was hostile to Iraq. It was absolutely traumatic. It was one of the few issues with grassroots resonance in the country.

4:30 p.m.

Mr. LEACH. The reason I am raising this, is because I don't think you understand, because it is a little oblique. It strikes me as we look back at the Iran episode, that the United States seemed to be coerced by the hostage-taking. The reason I raise this again is the Bush policy was fairly consistent, was fairly principal. One could argue whether we should impose sanctions or not in a firmer way.

The fact from the Iraqi perspective was that they were looking at America which seemed a little bit flabby in her foreign policy. Again, the reason I raise this is not to suggest that the decision-making by Saddam Hussein was influenced by Jimmy Carter, I think that would be a little ridiculous, but simply to say that those who think that an episode of one meeting of an American Ambassador with the Head of State, which is determinative kind of decision-making around which the Head of State then made a decision to invade another country stretches credulity.

It strikes me our record in that part of the world, stretching back more than a decade, was not one of as great firmness as the Bush Administration has subsequently reversed. And I just raise this as strongly as I can, because it may be April and March in this committee, but up is not down in foreign policy. And the fact of the matter is the people that would latch on to a single meeting between the United States Ambassador and Head of State and then suggest somehow that we are responsible for precipitating a conflict, or those critics in the Middle East who think we in effect attempted to seduce him in so we could have a ground presence in the region, and there are those that argue that I think are profoundly misled.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

That was the reason for suggesting that line of inquiry. I don't know if you want to respond just briefly on that. My time has expired.

Ambassador GLASPIE. You are absolutely right. The Iraqi presence from time to time did recall, for the edification of its readers, the Iran hostage episode.

Mr. LEACH. Certainly the aspect of taking hostages and thinking our policy would be held hostage implies that was a great influence.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Saddam Hussein is someone who likes to learn from history.

Mr. LEACH. All I would say is at the risk of greatest presumption that somehow sometimes people in politics seem to assert accountabilities, I think it is exaggerated. That doesn't mean the exact opposite is the case either that the other party is responsible, either, but I would certainly personally believe that the United States Government's handling of the Iran hostage episode had more to do with Saddam's decision to invade Iraq than any conceivable meeting of the United States diplomat at any period of time.

Ambassador GLASPIE. And the second serious miscalculation taking his own hostages.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Engel?

U.S. APPEASEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Madam Ambassador. Let me say, firstly, that I have been a strong supporter of the President's policy since August 2nd, having voted on January 12th to allow the President to take any means necessary to force Iraq out of Kuwait, but there are a few things that really boggle my mind.

Earlier on you said in your testimony that you believe Saddam Hussein was convinced we were hostile to him and we were trying to subvert his government, and that nothing essentially—I think that was the thrust of what you said that nothing we would do or could do would make him believe otherwise.

Mr. Lantos and some of the other Members have pointed out that many in Congress were arguing for months and indeed years, that Saddam was not going to change and we should have taken a firmer policy with him. In fact the bill that came out of this committee on August the 1st, the day before he invaded was a sanctions bill and the State Department had called the sponsor of that bill on that day many, many times trying to get him to modify it and withdraw it and everything else.

It would seem to me—how do you reconcile this? If no matter what we did would convince him that we were his friends then why did we seemingly try to appease him for so long?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I would like to take you back to the origin of the policy, which, of course, is the origin of this short historical period from August 1988, to the end of the Gulf War. As I said before, he was there, powerful country in a strategic spot. We could try to work with him.

We could try to moderate his views of the area. It didn't mean that we accepted the views as some of our friends in the region

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

who said he was a changed man and was already a moderate simply because he wanted to form an Arab Cooperation Council and wanted to sign non-aggression pacts with all of his neighbors. I don't think many of his neighbors believed he was not aggressive.

That wasn't it at tall. The point is he was there. I don't mean to be oversimplistic, and I hope that you won't think I am, but I believe there were two general categories of policy action before us at that point. We could have tried to teach him a lesson, in general to isolate him, give up the opportunity of access to decision-makers in the government, if not to him, but certainly to decision-makers in the government, to ameliorate his policies or to soften his policies abroad, and perhaps in a way that Americans feel important, to do something for the—especially minority Iraqi communities who were living there. We chose to do that.

Appeasement—the tone of my two years of dialogue with the Iraqis was not seen by them as appeasement. I uttered words like inflammatory and abysmal and unacceptable more times in those two years than I hope I ever have to do again. The substance of what we were talking about was certainly not appeasement. We had an agenda and we told him about it. Human rights was very high. I spent, I would say the majority of my conversations in Iraq were on human rights issues of one kind or another. I mentioned the STARK, which was very important to our government and to the 37 families involved.

Am I responding at all to your concerns?

Mr. ENGEL. Yes, but it seems to me, how could we have hoped to moderate his views if in fact he was convinced that we were hostile to him and there was nothing we could do to change that?

Ambassador GLASPIE. We weren't convinced there was nothing we could do to change it. We were convinced on the contrary we should try, cautiously. We should not open the gates of the bank to him. There was very few things we should do, but we should not give up, apply sanctions, tell him unless he behaves we won't talk to him again and go home, which is the effect of a sanctions policy.

I have never understood a sanctions policy which will not make the victims of it change their policy. He was—he has lots of money from oil revenue. If we decided we won't sell him grommets, he was going to get them somewhere else. He wanted to buy military equipment, of course, from us that we didn't allow him to do.

SANCTIONS AGAINST SYRIA BUT NOT AGAINST IRAQ

Mr. ENGEL. Well, you see it just seems to some of us if that is the attitude that we take that an individual sanctions policy won't work, then why has Syria, our worst ally on a list of countries that exports terrorism had lots of sanctions. Many of us saw no difference between Iraq and Syria leading up to the invasion.

Ambassador GLASPIE. The difference, of course, was the criteria for the terrorism. The Syrians are supporting particular terrorists. The Iraqis had thrown them out. They went to Syria directly. Abu Nidal got on a bicycle and drove across the border and sat down. Poor Ambassador Eagleton, who had spent 4 years, I think, getting him out of Iraq, was then assigned to Syria, and there he was again. I showed him, on the way to the airport—there's Abu

43-452 - 91 - 3

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Nidal's house. He almost resigned on the spot, but they got him out of Syria.

EXTENT TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES WAS INFLUENCED BY ADVICE FROM ARAB STATES

Mr. ENGEL. We didn't think Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait? I am told Israeli intelligence said that he would. Egyptians said he wouldn't. To what extent was our policy toward Iraq influenced during this period of time from what other Arab countries were telling us.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Not at all. As I tried to explain, Arab countries were saying to us and in public they did not believe the United States should get involved at all. They thought this was an Arab issue. That advice from us would be provocative to him and the worst thing we could do was flex our muscles.

WHY WEREN'T AMERICAN CITIZENS ADVISED TO LEAVE KUWAIT?

Mr. ENGEL. There was certainly a chance that Saddam Hussein was going to invade Kuwait, even if we were getting conflicting signals. Why would we not then get our American citizens out of Kuwait prior to the possibility of the invasion?

Why did we not evacuate our people in both Kuwait and Iraq?

Ambassador GLASPIE. For the American Ambassador in Kuwait to determine that American citizens should leave—and, of course, he cannot order American citizens to leave, as you know, is of course a major decision. What the Ambassador did was keep the American colony, which was huge, in Kuwait well-informed about the embassy's concerns. He had a warning system which worked. In Baghdad we had a tiny American community and I could practically call them all in a half-hour, so it wasn't that kind of problem in Baghdad.

Also in Kuwait there was a very active series of newspapers and you know, there really was news. You assume after all, that American citizens who are working for a major oil company in Kuwait are people who know what they have come into. But the warning system in Kuwait, it was tested and activated and the Ambassador was using his best judgment. Now, you know, Washington, which is responsible for providing intelligence, did not come to the conclusion that Iraq was going to invade.

We made a mistake, Congressman, and there were other mistakes that flowed from it. Had we had the smoking gun, we would have been able to persuade the Arabs and the Soviets and our western allies to form a coalition before the invasion, but we didn't. And that was an intelligence failure, because the smoking gun, so to speak, the evidence that he was going to do it was a decision that he had made clearly in his mind.

We do have some evidence that he didn't even inform his military commanders of it until a very few hours before the move.

CIA CONCLUDED ON JULY 25 THAT IRAQ WOULD INVADE KUWAIT

Mr. ENGEL. We are told that January—sorry, July 25th, the CIA had come to the strong conclusion that he was going to invade.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. Congressman, you know I can't discuss intelligence issues.

Mr. ENGEL. One final thing, Mr. Chairman.

POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE OVERTHROWN

Mr. Gallegly asked a question about what now. I am wondering with your assessment having been there for two years, what do you feel are the chances of someone within the Baath party or Saddam's inner circle toppling him? I feel very incomplete. We had a tremendous victory, but somehow this man was sitting there in Baghdad.

Ambassador GLASPIE. If that were to happen, and it could be a very grim figure, indeed. It could be, for example, this man who is so well-known in Kurdistan and who was exported to do the same evil deeds in Kuwait and was appointed Minister of Interior recently, so there would be no question about what would happen to the Shi'a if they didn't stop their insurrection.

It could indeed be somebody like that. I think the silver lining there, Congressman, would be that it would definitely be an interim government. I do not believe somebody who lacks Saddam Hussein's organizational abilities, which he certainly has, unfortunately, would hang on.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I do think the most likely thing is a military commander.

Mr. HAMILTON. Second bells have rung.

Mr. Faleomavaega, do you want to begin your questions? The Chair would be glad to have you do it.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If there is no problem.

Mr. HAMILTON. No problem at all. We recognize the gentleman from American Samoa. The Chair will vacate here in order to vote and I will get back as quickly as we can. You may proceed.

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA'S COMMENTS

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to, first of all, compliment you, Madam Ambassador, and to personally welcome you before the subcommittee and before this committee, and I want to compliment your sincerity and the forthrightness of your responses to the questions not only before this subcommittee, but certainly most of us who had the opportunity of witnessing your responses before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I also want to state for the record that I agree entirely with Chairman Fascell's observations, concerning the way that you were treated, and in my humble opinion you were treated quite shabbily by your superiors and to note also for the record that you certainly have a very distinguished career.

I just returned yesterday from the Persian Gulf and to affirm that from your colleagues and those who are still there, sharing with you also the fact that it was not a very pleasant experience for me, to say the least; reminiscing also of my own personal experiences in Vietnam, but very proud of the fact that shortly our nation's military capability, without question, is second to none, the best in the world. But cautioning that observation, I would say that

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

hopefully was a humbling responsibility for our nation when we realize awesome capability and the capacity to kill other human beings. I know this is not the intent of our country, nor is it ever our policy. It is a very interesting situation, the fact that while we were able to resolve one problem, we are now faced with two or three more problems in this very intensive area of the world.

We accomplished our military mission, and one thing I find quite amusing is that over this entire period we have never had so many overnight experts on the Middle East issue, and I just want to say I am certainly no expert on this very sensitive issue that has never been able to be resolved.

So here again we are now groping for solutions to issues that were considered supposedly politically and diplomatically impossible to resolve. And it just saddens me that it is somewhat of a sad commentary of a poorly structured foreign policy in Vietnam, and with Noriega, where our men and women who returned from that terrible conflict were treated without honor and dignity by our own citizens.

I make this observation: The Persian Gulf war is not a redemption of Vietnam, but a constant reminder that half-baked wars have always gotten us into trouble. And perhaps in my humble observations, the serious question now is that perhaps we have not gone far enough in putting Saddam in his rightful place, because the problem still exists.

POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ACCESS TO KGB INTELLIGENCE DURING THE WAR

I have a couple of questions. Hopefully, if you could help me, as you have partially responded by saying the two-year period you served as Ambassador to Iraq that you actually had not had that many direct communications with Saddam Hussein. But I was under the impression that you, more than any other public official, the person of the President, Ambassador and representative of our country, would know more than anyone concerning the leader of this country.

Madam Ambassador, is it true that Saddam Hussein, to a great extent, had access to KGB or intelligence information before, during and after all that has happened in the Persian Gulf war? Could this have been an incentive for him to feel encouraged that the kind of information he was given made him comfortable to think that he was able to overcome, potentially, militarily any sense of our response militarily to the actions that he had taken by invading Kuwait?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Congressman, I honestly don't know the answer to your question about the intelligence he had at his disposal.

I think that probably one of the most misleading factors that he had presented to him was that I believe the people around him are sycophants and wanted to show him that they had made great technological strides.

You recall that we had a kind of moon missile which was announced with great fanfare as the first Arab missile which turned out to be, I think, four scuds with a rope around them.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

This kind of thing I am sure was presented to him constantly, together with the analysis that having dealt with "American technology," in the Iranian inventory they could deal with it again directly when it was employed by us. It sounds very naive, but I do think that might have been part of the thinking.

POSSIBLE ISRAELI ADVANCE WARNING OF THE INVASION

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Ambassador, is it true approximately two weeks before the invasion through the Israeli intelligence that we were warned Iraq was going to invade, and yet we paid no attention to these warnings? Is there any truth to these allegations?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I have no idea, sir. This wouldn't be something that wouldn't swim into my camp. I am not sure of any warning.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How was our own intelligence in not recognizing when you have a hundred thousand troops on the border of Kuwait, that there were no symptoms saying this guy is really serious—

Ambassador GLASPIE. When you say intelligence you are talking about my brain power. I agree with you, it was pretty low level. As far as intelligence information was concerned, we had all we needed. As I said to the Senate Committee, we didn't need any help from unmentionable machines. It was all there. We could see it and we could hear it. We made the work—we drew the wrong conclusions from it. It was a different kind of intelligence. It was lacking.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So we just had absolutely no information whatsoever to the fact that this man was going to invade Kuwait. He did not in any way know for sure.

Ambassador GLASPIE. If we had that kind of evidence, what we would have tried to have done in the most energetic manner conceivable would have been to create the coalition that we were only able to create after he actually did it.

The Arabs did not believe he was going to invade and they didn't want us to do much to try to help. They felt the only way to prevent—to draw him into the negotiations that everybody wanted him to begin seriously, was to set up an Arab negotiating framework and invite him to it.

He went—clearly part of the deception.

U.S. MISJUDGMENT OF IRAQI INTENTIONS

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you suppose the proposition that perhaps we had misjudged his actions?

Ambassador GLASPIE. We clearly came to the wrong conclusion, Congressman. As I mentioned before, we thought that since, first, he was getting what he said he wanted or seemed to be about to get what he said he wanted, both in terms of oil prices an Arab "Marshall Plan," and formal cancellation of his war debts to the Arab countries, these appeared to be his short-term aims.

Second, there was a mindset in the area—now here I don't mean to cast dispersions. I don't think we held it, but I think the Arabs held it that if he did anything further to bully and intimidate, per-

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

haps as a background to the negotiations, that they hoped he was going to begin, it would be yet another in a long series of incursions that Iraq had made since 1963, or even '61 since Kuwaiti independence. There had been a number of incursions, some very flagrant ones.

In 1973 a well-known one, for instance, and I think as I mentioned yesterday, a less well known one about a year before August 2nd. So it was true that Arabs talked about this as a possibility, but after the 25th, King Fahd and President Mubarek felt they had a commitment that would not be broken.

SYRIAN PURCHASE OF SCUD MISSILES FROM NORTH KOREA

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One more question. One very serious concern that I was given—at least this is something I am sure everyone is aware of; Syria has recently purchased several scud missiles from North Korea. Now Syria and Iran are not the most destabilizing forces now in the Persian Gulf. Where do we go from here?

Ambassador GLASPIE. It is very tempting for me to answer that question, Congressman. I would like to offer my views, but I am not the person to ask. I am assured the Secretary of State will be appearing before this committee right after the Easter break. I think he is the one.

ASSIGNMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS TO POSTS ABROAD

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Your expertise is in the Middle East, is it not?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It strikes me funny that I met with one of the Foreign Service agents who is Chinese and who is affluent in Mandean, and he is assigned to the Middle East.

Ambassador GLASPIE. It is his choice.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It blows my mind. Here is someone who specializes in Asian Pacific issues and who can make a contribution to our country—has he gone through five years in training and appreciating Middle Eastern—

Ambassador GLASPIE. He is a very fine Foreign Service officer. I think he will make a real contribution wherever he is.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is not the point.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I know.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is like if I were to go to the university, if I want to understand more about the Middle East, would I be studying Arabic, I mean Chinese, if I—I just am a little confused on how you move personnel within the State Department when they are not—they don't have the necessary tools to work—and this is not in any disparaging remark against this gentleman for whom I have the highest respect.

Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

April, you and I go back a long way together. I think we met for the first time almost 17 years ago to the week in Cairo during the course of my very first trip abroad as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and you were assigned to me as my control officer.

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. I didn't do very well controlling you, either, Congressman.

GLASPIE'S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. SOLARZ. I have watched your career with considerable interest over the years, and even though I had little to do with your advancement, I must say I took a certain amount of pride in it, because I was tremendously impressed with you at the time, and I always thought you were one of the best and brightest in the Foreign Service, and in a way, it was precisely for these reasons that I was so dismayed when I read the transcript that Iraq released of your meeting with Saddam Hussein, particularly when the State Department, by refusing or failing to issue any denials as to its veracity appeared to lend the kind of implicit legitimacy to that account.

I hope you understand, if I fulfill my institutional responsibilities by asking you some questions about it. First of all, I would like to know, did they make a videotape of that meeting?

Ambassador GLASPIE. They may well have, but the camera was hidden.

Mr. SOLARZ. You didn't see one?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. Who is your note-taker for the meeting?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Since I had been invited to come back for the Foreign Ministry, which I assumed was a resumed session, I didn't have a note-taker with me. We had a small Embassy, everybody was real busy.

Mr. SOLARZ. The cable you subsequently sent back, you wrote, or dictated from your memory of the meeting?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I did.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did you take notes during the course of it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. As you know, we are perhaps immodest to believe after 25 years of training, we can remember—in my case, I was lucky, because it was broken by the President Mubarak telephone call, so I had plenty of time to take notes during the meeting.

Mr. SOLARZ. On July 25th, when the meeting took place, had you been apprized of the fact they had deployed 100,000 troops along the Kuwaiti border?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I don't recall, frankly, Congressman, what our count was at that time, but it was certainly a high count, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. But you knew they had deployed forces?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Oh, yes, of course.

WHY DIDN'T THE STATE DEPARTMENT DENY THE VERACITY OF THE IRAQI TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING?

Mr. SOLARZ. After you returned to Washington, and following the release by Iraq of their version of this discussion, were you explicitly instructed by the Department to say nothing about it, to neither confirm nor deny, as it were, the veracity of their version of the discussion?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I don't believe I was explicitly instructed not to say anything. It was explained that a decision had been

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

made. It would be unwise for the Department, of which obviously I am a member, to argue about it in public at that time.

A point-by-point rebuttal would focus our national energies where we should not be focusing them, that the time for that would come later.

Mr. SOLARZ. You felt it was the view of the Department it would be best for you to say nothing about it.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Indeed, as the Department indeed itself said.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACCESS TO GLASPIE'S CABLE ABOUT THE MEETING

Mr. SOLARZ. Would you object now to having that cable turned over to the Foreign Affairs Committee on a classified basis, if necessary, so we could take a look at it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir, I would, for what I think is an absolutely compelling reason. I said yesterday, and I will say again today, in my 25 years in diplomacy, I have not been personally aware of a case where any government, no matter what the temptation, has issued such a transcript, other than Saddam Hussein's government, and the reason, of course, is credibility and the ability of a government to obtain confidential information, if you will, discreetly.

Once you start issuing memoranda of conversations with Chiefs of State, I think it damages the confidentiality of a very, very important process, so personally, no. Professionally, emphatically yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am pleased to hear you personally have no objection to the cable being given to us. I have to say professionally, I fundamentally disagree with your judgment. For one thing, this committee is frequently given access to cables involving discussions between Ambassadors and foreign leaders, including Heads of State.

And secondly, to the extent there is a legitimate concern about confidentiality that could presumably be protected if the cable were provided on a classified basis. We see all sorts of communications that come back from our Embassies abroad, including conversations with leaders. It would hardly be unprecedented if that cable were turned over to this committee, and I hope the chairman will at some point consider the possibility of using a subpoena to obtain the cable in the event it is not possible to get through more friendly means.

I don't think this should be an adversarial proceeding. We have just emerged from one of the greatest triumphs in our history, and those who participated in organizing it certainly deserve a lot of credit.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE DENIED THE ACCURACY OF THE IRAQI TRANSCRIPT

Let me move on. You said the reason for not issuing a denial about the veracity of their transcript at the time was because we had to concentrate on building the coalition. We didn't want to focus attention on what had happened previously when there were more important tasks at hand.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

I have to tell you, Madam Ambassador, that explanation is inherently implausible, and I find it inherently implausible, because in fact, the Iraqi version of the discussion was compromising our capacity to muster support for the President's policy here at home. It contributed to the view that we were somehow or another responsible for what had happened by giving Saddam the impression that he could get away with what he had done.

And, consequently, in terms of mustering and maintaining American support for a policy of firmness in the Gulf, I don't understand why it wouldn't have made sense for the Department or for you to have issued a statement that this is fundamentally misleading, a classic exercise in disinformation, and possibly through the selective use of statements you had made to him, making it clear that the Iraqi version was, in fact, distorted.

That would have contributed to American support, and therefore, to the effort to pull together a coalition. So, could you perhaps respond to that, because on the face of it, it just does seem inherently implausible.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I have provided to you the logic and the conclusion that the Department employed, Mr. Solarz, I can't make any other response.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS INCAPABLE OF BEARING HIGH CASUALTY FIGURES

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you, then, very briefly about some of the other statements in this transcript. One of the most troublesome comments, or lack of comments, in the Iraqi version, and I hope you will take advantage of this opportunity to clear it up if it can be cleared up, was Saddam's statement in which he says at the beginning, "But you know, you did not protect your friends during the war with Iran."

Then he goes on to say, "I say this because of the nature of geography and the nature of American society, which makes it impossible for the United States to bear tens of thousands of casualties in one battle."

At a time when a man has mobilized 100,000 troops along the border of a friendly state, this is a very, very serious statement, and according to the Iraqi version of the transcript, there doesn't seem to be any instance in which you attempted to rebut this assertion or say to Saddam that you represented a country which values human life, but which has paid the price in the past for defending its vital interest and the freedom of its friends and would be prepared to do so in the future.

I guess my question to you, is did he in fact make this statement, and did you in fact at some appropriate time attempt to indicate to him the error of his ways?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, he made it. It is a statement often made in Baghdad. It had been made to me on more than one occasion, and in the Foreign Ministry. I had always in the past responded to it in various different ways, of course. It had also appeared in the Iraqi-controlled press. It was a very common misapprehension about us.

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

It is one of the points I did not respond to when I was speaking to Saddam Hussein. He made a long list of points—many of which were in that transcript. I was, I would say, about one-quarter down the list of responses when he left the room, went to speak to the President of Egypt, and came back and, in effect, said we are not going to do it, it is all over.

I responded then, as I recall, to a couple of particularly egregious comments that he had made, I didn't want to leave without saying a word about them, in particular the Tutweiler statement; I responded to that. Is there any question about that?

He said, "Basically, I want you to leave." That is, Congressman, one of several points I certainly had wanted to discuss with him. It is also one of the reasons I saw the Foreign Minister. I wanted to respond to all the issues that I had not responded to with the President.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did you see the Foreign Minister?

Ambassador GLASPIE. On the 28th.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did you respond to that precise point when you met with the Foreign Minister?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I responded to the point. Whether or not I referred to the 10,000, I don't know. I certainly responded to the point assuming a softness in the American character, which I was hearing over and over again, including from the President, and which I thought had been influenced in part by complete misreading of the contemporary history of the United States.

GLASPIE'S COMMENTS ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA EDITORIAL

Mr. SOLARZ. It also says here in this Iraqi transcript that you said that you mentioned the program broadcasted on VOA. It was unfortunate, and we have offered formal apologies concerning this matter.

Now, I have this editorial before me, "No More Secret Police." I have to say, for the life of me, I don't see a single word or sentence in here that is unfortunate. This is a statement of the most fundamental American values. It deplores the existence of secret police and regimes which depend on their brutality to remain in power.

It says secret police are also entrenched in other countries, not just in the Soviet Union and East Germany, such as China, North Korea, Syria, Cuba, and Albania. Rulers of these countries hold power by force and fear, not by consent of the governed.

As East Europeans demonstrated in 1989, the tide of history is against such rulers.

Ambassador GLASPIE. There was—

Mr. SOLARZ. It concludes: "The 1990's should belong not to the dictators and secret police but to the people." Can you tell me what, if anything, was unfortunate about that editorial?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely, the editorial, except for those last lines you just read, was entirely appropriate, and as you described. It was written for a broadcast on the Eastern European Service of the Voice of America, and was so used, and I am sure quite effectively.

The lines at the end were added for the Arabic broadcast. I don't know if it was also broadcast later in Spanish, Albanian, and Chi-

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

nese, but the fact is that it does give rise to the possibility of misinterpretation that we are calling on the people of those countries to overthrow their governments.

Whatever views the United States Government may have of other governments in the world, it does not emphatically engage in subverting the regimes. I think we have a very fundamental difference, and I am surprised at you, Congressman. I think we have a very fundamental difference on this.

I certainly think it gives rise to serious misinterpretation, and if you are holding State Department cables in your hand, you will have seen the words that were cabled to me from Washington, and they were very carefully phrased.

Mr. SOLARZ. Were you told to apologize for this, or instructed to apologize for it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. The words in the cable that you are reading.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am glad that is cleared up, because if that is the case, I certainly have absolutely no quarrel with you.

Ambassador GLASPIE. You should, Congressman, because if I hadn't been told, I would have asked to have been told. I was trying to create some kind of influence for the United States of America in this very dangerous country so that we could influence it and moderate it, and the major impediment to that was their belief that for 20 years, we have been trying to subvert the regime.

This was a serious handicap in the job that the President had given me to do.

Mr. SOLARZ. This was not an editorial about Iraq, it was an editorial about oppressive regimes in general. We perhaps have an honest difference of opinion here. But I have to say that the sentence, "The 1990s should belong not to the dictators and secret police, but to the people," expresses exactly the sentiments of the American people.

I would like to believe it expresses the sentiments of the Administration. I think we should be and should have been utterly unapologetic about it. If they were offended by it, the answer I think should have been, get rid of your secret police and let your people run the country, not the Mukhabarat.

GLASPIE'S COMMENTS ON DIANE SAWYER'S INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Let me ask you finally about one other comment in the Iraqi transcript, and I hope you can clear it up. You said, according to the transcript: "I saw the Diane Sawyer program in which there were some unfair points. This is the way the media works in America, even when it affects American politicians." You go on to say if the President could control the media, his job would be easier.

A little bit earlier, you said Diane Sawyer made America proud in that interview, so perhaps you can tell us now if this is an accurate representation of what you said, and if it is, what did Diane Sawyer do that, in your view, was unfair, and what did you mean in telling a President of the country that doesn't have freedom of the press, in fact which executes journalists of foreign countries,

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

that this is the way the media works in America, even when it affects American politicians?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I would be delighted to answer that question. I think you weren't here when I mentioned we worked all through 1989 to get journalists in to see Saddam Hussein. Since diplomats couldn't see him, many of us hoped that by having journalists see him, he would begin to learn more than we knew about the outside world and the concerns, and the basis of the concerns about Iraq that were held in the outside world.

The initial encounter he had was a shock to him. He was hardly used to being cross-questioned by anybody, much less by a journalist. I wanted to say two things to him, having the opportunity to be in his presence.

First, I wanted to get over to him that we regard editing of videotapes which are labeled as complete, as cheap and unjust, and we had noticed that he had authorized—presumably he authorizes everything in the country, exactly that, as far as the videotapes are concerned which were being produced by the Ministry of Information.

I did it, and I think he took the point by my saying that the President of the United States—and I think I said Mrs. Thatcher, are constantly under the gun, if you will, of tough cross-questioning by journalists. This is the way we do it. If you want to get your story over the airways to the American people through the American journalists, you have to put up with that.

That was the point of my comments. As far as Diane Sawyer is concerned, I will say again, I did not in any way discuss Diane Sawyer's videotape. I was talking about the Iraqi Ministry of Information's videotape of the Diane Sawyer interview, which cut out all the footage, if that is the right word, which Diane Sawyer herself used.

In other words, the controversial parts.

Mr. SOLARZ. You are referring when you said it was unfair, to their coverage of Diane Sawyer's interview and not to Diane Sawyer's interview itself.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Not just Diane Sawyer's interview, but all the videotapes they were putting out by then.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED THESE POINTS EARLIER

Mr. SOLARZ. Assuming it is true that the Iraqi version of your meeting is as fundamentally flawed as we have been told it is, I think the State Department did a very serious disservice to the President's own efforts to counter this exercise in disinformation and also a fundamental disservice to Ambassador Glaspie, because I think these kinds of points, if they had been cleared up earlier, and presumably they could have been cleared up without breaching diplomatic confidentiality, would certainly have avoided a situation in which, as you know, a distinguished career Foreign Service officer was permitted for several months to have her reputation significantly impaired and impugned by virtue of an unrebutted transcript, which if accepted at face value, did not put her in the most favorable light.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

I am glad you had a chance to clarify this. I hope and trust we can finally lay the whole matter to rest by obtaining a copy of the cable and making it clear there is such a fundamental contrast between the way they described it and what you say actually happened.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey?

AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome you, Ms. Glaspie. I am not really on the subcommittee, I am on the overall committee, and I am thankful to have the opportunity to talk with you at all. It has been a long wait. I realize what you have been through the last two days particularly, and have immense respect for you personally and professionally.

As I understand it, you surely must know as much about Iraq and most aspects of the Middle East of any American, and people like you are very valuable, and I wish we had more like you and gave them better recognition and career opportunities than we do.

And I would like to prey on you a little bit to try to give me some fairly forthright intellectual analyses as to nothing recriminatory in the history, but some of the prospects presently and for the future.

Obviously, nothing you have said or would say today probably would imply or hint or substantively go to any significant criticism of the State Department, but obviously, we have had a tremendous and massive military victory. There is no doubt about that.

We have had relatively few casualties, as tragic as they were, only one Marine killed in combat in my District, another Marine lost, and we are on this military pride right now, but I am asking you as a diplomat, not just over here as a State Department representative, have we been diplomatically and politically successful?

Obviously, Saddam Hussein has been chastened, but not destroyed. Thankfully, his nuclear and chemical stockpiles are about gone, or will be. As I said, there are several hundred U.S. casualties, but 80,000 to 100,000 Iraqi casualties, military and civilian.

We have destroyed water lines and there are problems of nutrition and disease in that country. I think most significantly, are we out of this war yet? In all candor, wouldn't we have to say no, there is a three-way civil war going, at least in which we are taking an active role by invoking military force against various military alternatives that Saddam Hussein would have.

We have 450,000-plus troops there. We had the Secretary of Defense yesterday say that there is going to be ongoing rotation back in Kuwait. Kuwait has been ravaged. Even those who find the environmental disaster more or less acceptable, or worthy of the price, will admit it is the biggest man-made ecological disaster in world history.

The technical people tell us it is going to take two to four years to turn those off. I guess yesterday, the Governor of Kuwait resigned. People on the ground in Kuwait, unless we do something to help more than we are probably have no medical stability or sense of euphoria or happiness.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Do some of these variables I mentioned represent diplomatic and political success? Where do we go from here? Can we fine-tune Iraq so much that we can have Saddam Hussein out and not have a Shiite fundamentalist regime expanding into a better part of that country?

One last question—I don't want to belabor this too much, what could we have done to avoid all this?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Gosh. Well—

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I don't think I exaggerated on some of the aftermath of the war.

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, you didn't

I wish I had a teaspoon of sugar. There is a lot of serious questions that you have raised. I must say, those are exactly the questions you will want to put to the Secretary. He is the one.

KUWAIT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

But I can't resist making a couple of comments. Certainly, on Kuwait, where I lived, and where I still have my friends who have called me over the last seven months just to keep in touch. I feel I am in touch with what is going on in Kuwait in a general way.

I won't underestimate the Kuwaitis resilience. They are an extraordinarily tough people, with a historic legacy and democratic government.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You say not an extraordinarily tough—

Ambassador GLASPIE. They are an extraordinarily tough and resilient—

DEMOCRACY IN KUWAIT

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Did you say historic legacy of democratic government?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, I did.

I am glad you were listening.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. My understanding is the Emir abolished the assembly back in 1962. I understand it, it is a monarchy, strictly controlled and depressed—how can you call that—

Ambassador GLASPIE. I said historic legacy of democracy. You are talking about a parliament. I am not in anyway denying what you are saying.

What I want to say is something different. I want to say when you lived there at the palace, which is on the water, and which I gather is blown up by the Iraqis, now the Emir—not the Emir now, the previous one sat in counsel, once a week and anybody could come and speak to him. That is a kind of democracy. It is homegrown.

You have it in your constituency, people can come and speak to you. I think this is real; Congressman, I do. I think this is real. I am not playing games here.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I don't think you are, but I think you are on the verge of a substantive and semantic mistake that makes me think of—the only thing I can think of on a national scale, is poor President Ford talking about Poland being a democracy back in the campaign against Carter—wait a minute, you, obviously, know a

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

lot about the international diplomacy, but I don't think you know much about the domestic.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. The Emir runs a more or less benevolent monarchy. I find it mind-boggling.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I started by saying don't sell the Kuwaitis short. As you pointed out, they are in a very difficult ecological and logistical position right now.

I believe that they will develop some kind of participatory democracy. I didn't say they had one I said—I was going to say, I believe they will develop some kind of participatory democracy, and they have something on which to draw. They have some traditions which are foreign to us, but which are not foreign to them.

U.S. POLICY IN POST-WAR IRAQ

On Iraq, I don't think that we should be trying to do something, which I think you implied is impossible to fine tune.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I don't think it is impossible.

Ambassador GLASPIE. To try to fine tune.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Exceedingly difficult to pull off, don't you think?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely, I think it is impossible to pull off. I think we should stick to basic principles.

One of them is the human rights principle that as the President said, we don't want these planes up in the air dropping God knows what on Kurds, Kurdish civilians, or Arab civilians. There are a series of statements the President has made on that and that is certainly a basic issue.

A second basic issue is that other people should keep out of Iraq, and the President has talked about that, as well.

Beyond that, I don't think I would want to comment beyond what I had said earlier when I was asked for my opinion, and my opinion is what might happen is a military move of some kind. It would seem to me the most likely thing to happen.

I would like to close with what I hope is far more than a pious hope, and that is whatever the immediate aftermath of this may be on Iraqi politics, I sincerely hope the Iraqi people, who are quite capable of it, will have the opportunity to participate in some kind of democratic structure.

ASAD'S INTENTIONS

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. As a professional diplomat in the Mideast, how do you feel about Asad coming out and Asad's present or future intentions?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Congressman, I really am going to decline to comment on Syrian politics. The Secretary will be here very soon, and he has just—

INDEFINITE TROOP COMMITMENT IN SOUTHERN IRAQ

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. In essence, do you endorse an ongoing and indefinite troop commitment in Southern Iraq and the occasional military forays, which directly or indirectly, as you know, have the aspect of benefiting the particular groups, which I know there is a good argument for?

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

But is this—would you recommend any improvement of slight marginally new answers to improve this policy?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I really must decline to give the President advice through the—

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I am asking for advice for the Congress for the Foreign Affairs Committee as we help shape the policy of this country and hopefully participate in a democratic way.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I think that is not for me to give. I would just remark I think that the President has said, everybody is coming home.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You would agree that we have two countries substantially impaired with other problems going on right now?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Of course. Very serious problems.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much.

SUBCOMMITTEE REQUESTS FOR CABLES AND TRANSCRIPTS

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Ambassador, I know it is not your position, but I want to make sure the record is clear.

This subcommittee, of course, would like to have the transcript, the total transcript of your conversation with President Saddam Hussein, and you understand our request.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I will convey that request.

Mr. HAMILTON. I appreciate that is not your decision to make.

We would also like to review the cables going back through 1990 and 1989, so I make that request, as well, and would appreciate it if you would convey that.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I will do so.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is also likely when I finish my questions here that we will even have additional questions, which we will want to submit in writing to the Department.

SAUDI-IRAQI RELATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1989

Now, what I would like to do now is to go back through a series of incidents that occurred beginning in November, 1989; and my only purpose is to try to understand what happened and what we did as a result of that incident to get the record straight.

I want to start with a period in November of 1989 when we in the Congress were considering a tank sale to Saudi Arabia. And in November 7, 1989, one of the Members of this subcommittee asked about the threat of Saudi Arabia, and the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Edward Gnehm, now our Ambassador, as you know, to Kuwait, testified: "I don't think it is appropriate to focus on Iraq as the principal threat because in truth, at the present time, Saudi-Iraqi relationships are good."

That is the end of his quote.

Ambassador GLASPIE. They just signed a nonaggression pact, if I have my dates correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. Right.

And Secretary Kelly replied later in November of that year when he was asked about the state of Saudi-Iraqi relationship, "There is no doubt that the countries are on very good terms now. They have frequent visits with one another, cooperate on a number

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

of fronts. So given the current relationship, it is hard for me to see Iraq as a threat to Saudi Arabia," end of quote.

Now, was there any doubt in your mind at that time about the Iraqi-Saudi relationship, or do these statements fully express your view of that relationship at that time?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, there are levels and levels. Certainly I would have made those statements myself.

Mr. HAMILTON. You what?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I would have made such statements myself. That is what both governments professed, both of them.

They had chosen to sign a nonaggression pact, and a security pact on the same day. But I would also have said, although no Arab diplomat said it to me, that the record of Iraq in the peninsula in the 1970s, and given the strategic concerns in Saudi Arabia when the Arab Cooperation Council was formed, I doubt that it is possible to legislate, so to speak, complete trust overnight with a nonaggression pact.

But those two statements are absolutely accurate.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you did not see Iraq at that time as a threat to Saudi Arabia, or to the region?

Ambassador GLASPIE. At that time?

Mr. HAMILTON. At that time. We are talking about 1989 here.

Ambassador GLASPIE. No.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am not trying to trap you with any of these questions. I just want to get the record clear with respect to this.

VOICE OF AMERICA EDITORIAL POLICY

Now, I understand while I was out of the room, Mr. Solarz went into this Voice of America editorial.

Ambassador GLASPIE. He did.

Mr. HAMILTON. And I had only a couple of questions about that.

After that incident, were new procedures for advanced State Department clearance put in place for all editorials dealing with Iraq?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Hamilton, I think I know the answer to that question, but I am going to decline to answer. That really is a question that I think has to go to the State Department.

I was in Baghdad.

Mr. HAMILTON. I see.

You do know the answer to it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I think I do, but I don't want to be wrong, so respectfully—

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we will submit that in writing, and then the department can respond to it.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, please.[1]

STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON IRAQ

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, I want to move on to February 21, 1990. That day the State Department Human Rights Report on Iraq came out, and it called the Iraqi record abysmal. You probably recall that.

---

[1]See appendix 1.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. We wrote it in my embassy, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Okay.
What was the reaction in Baghdad?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Oh, very hurt feelings, I would say.
Mr. HAMILTON. Were you called to the Foreign Ministry?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I don't remember if I was specifically called to the Foreign Ministry or whether I was going anyway. But certainly within one or two days of the issuance of the report, I was told that in a rather informal way, actually, that it was unfair and so on and so on.

I said I would be delighted to give them an extra copy.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did they log a protest with us?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Not a formal protest to me. I don't recall if Ambassador Mashat did hear it. He may have, but not in Baghdad.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you know what response we made to their criticisms of the report?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I made no response. I said our views stand as written, and I said, in fact, they were written in my embassy, so I certainly am not going to debate them.

U.S. RESPONSE TO IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE

Mr. HAMILTON. When chemical weapons were used, and now I am jumping a little backwards. I think they were used by the Iraqis if—

Ambassador GLASPIE. September 1988.
Mr. HAMILTON. September 1988; is that correct?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Did we lodge a protest at that time?
Ambassador GLASPIE. We not only lodged a protest—
Mr. HAMILTON. Were you Ambassador at that point?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Okay.

Ambassador GLASPIE. We not only lodged a protest, as I think I mentioned earlier in my testimony but our ability to detect that event ushered in an extremely energetic period of about a month or even six weeks, I don't recall, of diplomacy and also activity.

You remember that was the period where we had, I don't know how many tens of thousands people marching past the embassy and so on.

Mr. HAMILTON. And how did they respond to that protest? What did they say to you; we did it, or did they deny they did it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. They denied they did it initially. However, the President in Iraq then indicated in a series of televised remarks, as I recall, that they did thereby pull out the rug from those who had already planned another campaign.

And as you know, I had only been in Iraq for about two months then, Mr. Chairman. But it was quite a week because the Defense Minister in an effort—I mean, it was very illustrative moment for those of us new to Iraq.

The Defense Minister, in an effort to difuse western criticisms, made the following public statement. This is an effort to diffuse criticism. He said for every insect, there is insecticide.

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Now I am going to shift the time on you again, and I want to go to February 24, 1990. Saddam Hussein gave a speech in Amman, Jordan; you are familiar with that, very tough speech. He called on Arab investors to pull money out of the United States, and invest in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union instead.

He protested the U.S. for the new wave of Jewish immigration to Israel. He denounced our naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and then he said, and I quote him, "America is repeatedly saying its armed forces will remain in the region. This makes us wonder what was the real U.S. attitude toward ending the Iran-Iraq war, whether it really wanted it to end," period, end of quote.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, four days after that, the State Department testifies before this subcommittee, and says this, quote: "It is clear that Iraq seeks improved relations with the United States. Trade will be a key factor in that relationship. This is not an easy relationship, but it is an important one in which we have made significant progress in recent years," end of quote.

Then I asked Secretary Kelly on that same day, February 28, 1990, about the speech of February the 24th, and Secretary Kelly said, and I quote him: "I must say that the tone of my conversations with Iraq was quite constructive and did not include strong criticisms of that type. I have asked the government of Iraq if they would care to explain these recent statements to us. We do not yet have a response," end of quote.

Now, we then in this subcommittee read the speech of Saddam Hussein on February the 24, and we believed it to be a major attack on the United States.

And yet, the testimony of the department is that significant progress is being made in recent years, and that it is—and this is the sentence that really puzzles me: It is clear that Iraq seeks improved relations with the United States, four days after a ballistic attack against us.

Now, how do we—how do I understand that? I mean, I am trying to understand what is happening out there. And I get that kind of testimony after that kind of a speech, and I don't understand it.

Ambassador GLASPIE. The chronological event between Mr. Kelly's visit on the 12th of February, I believe, with Saddam Hussein, in which Saddam Hussein registered very clearly his desire for improved relations, as he had in the past, and the February 24th speech, which came in the middle was the editorial, as you know, Mr. Chairman.

In other words, he thought that he was being attacked. He thought that John Kelly had come and, I must say John Kelly, I remember very well, said to Saddam Hussein, that we are prepared to have good relations with you. He didn't go any further than that.

And then he made clear, as I recall, that we had an agenda, and if there was going to be good relations, there were things that we wanted from them.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

President Saddam had responded that he did, indeed, want a better relationship than he had had with us.

Neither side pretended that our relationship was good. But it had been abysmal, as you recall.

The speech on February 17, which occurred in Amman—in Baghdad was then followed by the speech you are talking about in Amman on the 24th.

It was almost immediately about the speech that he changed his tune. It was actually before the 24th. The Amman Summit of the ACC was on February the 24th. The Foreign Ministers had met about four days before in Baghdad. And he gave a review of his speech in Baghdad.

This is the second time we had heard it. But we didn't, neither Mr. Kelly nor I and you knew about the FOA editorial.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me ask you, after that speech, was it your impression that Iraq was trying to improve relationships with the United States?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I certainly did not think so.

And I was very puzzled. The Arab Ambassadors had a meeting, I remember, after that speech, the day of that speech in Baghdad, and then came to see me and asked me if I could solve the mystery.

And then they told me they thought it was the VOA editorial. Of course, this was a serious change of tune from the Iraqi—I mean, the President of Iraq had said exactly the opposite a week before.

So, of course, I was puzzled. I wanted to get to the bottom of it so that I could make some kind of recommendation to the department.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you thought it was a major speech, I presume.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Of course I did.

Mr. HAMILTON. And were worried by the tone of it, not just the tone, but the language or words of it.

Ambassador GLASPIE. So did the other Arab chiefs of state.

U.S. REACTION TO SADDAM'S THREATS IN APRIL 1990

Mr. HAMILTON. Then I want to go to 1990 on April the 2nd and that was the occasion when Saddam Hussein at a military ceremony announced that Iraq had developed chemical weapons and he said, and I quote him, "By God, we will make the fire eat up half of Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq," end of quote. I am sure you remember that.

What did you then do after you heard that speech?

Ambassador GLASPIE. What I did, Mr. Chairman, was to say out loud to myself, thank God we have a diplomatic presence here, because it would appear that there is a diplomatic crisis in the offing.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you protested the speech?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Oh, yes, of course.

Mr. HAMILTON. To whom? The Foreign Minister?

Ambassador GLASPIE. To the Foreign Ministry, whoever I could see. I don't remember. I believe it was to Nizar Hamdun, who was the Deputy Foreign Minister.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

And, of course, there was an immediate public reaction here, and I believe Ambassador Mashat was called in on the same day, as I recall.

Mr. HAMILTON. And how did the Iraqis respond to you; do you recall, when you protested?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I think they just—I am trying to remember. I don't believe there was any response at all initially other than to repeat a kind of—set of background points.

And the litany is known to you; the belief, the one basic point, of the Iraqi belief that the repetition of the 1981 attack could occur at any time.

And they really were, obviously, concerned about it. It happened once; it could happen again.

This, of course, was the excuse that was ultimately given to us, and as you know very well, we told them that we didn't find that acceptable.

VISIT OF SENATORS TO IRAQ IN APRIL 1990

Mr. HAMILTON. Now I want to direct your attention to April 12 of that year, and you had a group of U.S. Senators in Baghdad. I am not going to ask you about some of the quotes that were made. I will overlook that.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. But during the CODEL, Saddam Hussein reportedly backed off his statement that he would attack Israel by saying he meant only that he would respond if attacked first.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that your recollection of the conversation?

Ambassador GLASPIE. It is my recollection of the American media's understanding. In fact, on February the 24th, we read his speech as saying, as the key sentence beginning with "if". So we didn't hear a difference.

Mr. HAMILTON. You interpreted that as if he was backing off his threat?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I am sorry, on April the 1st, I mean.

Mr. HAMILTON. The question was, did you interpret that—

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, no. We didn't. I mean, this is not enough. It is unacceptable and inflammatory to be talking about burning up half of Israel no matter what the context of it is.

It is unacceptable, and we said so, and so did Senator Dole in his letter, which was published, as you recall.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE IN APRIL 1990

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Now I want to go to April the 26th, 1990, and I am focusing on events here.

Ambassador GLASPIE. My birthday.

I was trying to remember what happened.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, this was the State Department testimony again on U.S.-Iraqi relationships. I, just for our record want to lay it out here. It takes place with the State Department's human rights statement, abysmal human rights in Iraq; Saddam Hussein's

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

February speech, highly critical of the United States; a murder attempt in February instigated by the Iraqi mission in New York; the execution in march of the journalists, Bezhaft; Iraq's efforts in March to smuggle nuclear capacitors, the triggering devices, out of the United States; the stationing in March of missile launchers in western Iraq; and the April 2nd statement that I referred to a moment ago against Israel.

All of those events right in this period of time.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And the testimony before this subcommittee is this: Mr. Kelly quoted as saying: "Our policy toward Iraq has been to attempt to develop gradually a mutually beneficial relationship in order to strengthen positive trends in Iraq's foreign and domestic policies," end of quote.

In response to a question on the evidence of change in Iraq he says, quote: "One swallow does not make a spring. Nevertheless, we believe there is at least the possibility of improvement, and we want to try to encourage that improvement," end of quote.

And another quote—all of these are out of context, but I think they give an accurate flavor of the testimony we received, quote: "The best way to improve Iraqi behavior was to try to engage with Iraq," end of quote.

And then another quote: "We believe there is still a possibility for positive alterations in Iraqi behavior. We do not believe the imposition of economic sanctions now would leave that possibility open," period, end of quote.

Now those are the quotations, the testimony that caused Mr. Lantos to say, as you all recall earlier in his statement, that there was an Alice in Wonderland quality about the testimony of the State Department at that point.

Now, what strikes me, of course, is that you have all of this evidence of increasingly ominous behavior by Iraq, but no change in policy. And the statements before this subcommittee that do not in any way suggest the severity of Saddam Hussein's conduct.

And so my question here is, why? I mean, why didn't we get a sense of what Saddam Hussein was doing? And from these outrageous speeches and actions, we got the reaction from the State Department that we had to gradually develop this mutually beneficial relationship.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, we didn't have any ongoing government-to-government programs at that time, except for our health center, which I am sure you are not going to suggest we should have closed.

The tone of our exchange had gone to, I think I can use the word "confrontational" months before that, certainly by the middle of February.

I think I must fail to convey my very profound belief that the more dangerous the situation, the tougher the situation, the more important it is to stay in there, try to maintain and improve, if possible, access to the host government decisionmakers, and do what can be done; and our reach always exceeds our grasp in those issues because in the Mideast, they are usually issues of peace and war.

To ameliorate the tension, it has to be done—

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

WHY WASN'T INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORSENING IRAQI ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS CONVEYED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE?

Mr. HAMILTON. May I ask you, during this period of time now, we are talking about the winter and the spring of 1990 was it your feeling that Iraqi attitudes and actions were becoming increasingly worse from our point of view?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Of course, and I thought that they were based on a genuine Iraqi fear, paranoia, if you will.

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure.

Why wasn't that conveyed to us in testimony? That may not be a fair question to you because you were in Baghdad. But that simply was not conveyed to us.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, you know, you are telling me that Mr. Kelly was speaking about his meeting on the 12th, that was before any of these events.

It was the last moment when we saw what we hoped would be a Saddam Hussein who was genuinely interested in finding concrete, tangible actions to take which would encourage us to believe that we could develop some real—I don't want to say trust, but sufficient confidence on which to establish a useful dialog.

But the point is, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that as the situation became tense, and it was very tense when Senator Dole and his group arrived, it was important that we were there, that he was willing to see us.

Now, in the past he wouldn't have been willing to see us. He wouldn't have been willing to listen. Western diplomacy was beginning to make some in-roads in our ability to talk to Iraqi policymakers. And that is important.

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not mean to suggest, of course, by my question that I favored breaking off diplomatic relations with Iraq. I agree with your statement. It was important. That is one of the very essential features of diplomacy to sense that kind of a change and to convey it.

What bothers me if I understand your reactions here, is that while you were analyzing this as a period, as you said a moment ago, of great tension and increasingly worse relations between the two countries, the testimony here in Washington did not convey that sense at all.

I don't hold you responsible for that.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I don't want to distance myself from the testimony. There was one sentence that I didn't recall. But the other points that you read seemed to me in the limited context of short assertive sentences to be true, and not at all to be contradictory to the concern that obviously the whole world felt as these comments about binary chemical weapons were repeated and repeated.

U.S. RESPONSE TO SADDAM'S STATEMENTS AT THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me continue. I want to push on with a few questions on some other events.

On May 28th and 30th of 1990 there was an Arab League Summit that was held in Baghdad at the instigation of Iraq.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

The summit communique included a number of references that were very critical of the United States and of U.S. policy, including the statement holding the United States, quote, "primarily responsible," end of quote, for the situation in the region.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, did you protest that speech? What happened as a result of that speech? Do you recall? What did you do?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, there are quite a few things that happened. There was a communique, I think is what you were exerpting there. There was an alleged secret conflict of the chiefs of state, which I knew nothing about at the time, and I don't even know existed. It is said now that it happened and that the Emir of Kuwait was threatened. This we didn't know about, and I don't know if that it happened.

The communique, of course, was in the normal course of diplomatic discourse I told the Foreign Ministry exactly how objectionable we felt.

Of course, the Iraqis would have pointed out, that this was not simply their view. It was the view of all the chiefs of state.

Well, our other friends, of course, said you should have seen the first draft as they also call it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did our policy change in any way toward Iraq in response to the summit communique and the outcome of the Baghdad Summit?

Did we shift our policy at all?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, our policy towards Iraq was never more than a cautioning ford when we thought the Iraqis deserved a positive quid pro quo from us.

There was no program by that time to discontinue. We were existing solely on the basis of a diplomatic dialog. That was it.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Ambassador GLASPIE. So, you know, I think we were not using any carrots. We didn't have any in our pocket. I spent every day going down and swinging at them with the same kind of adjectives that they were using in their communiques.

U.S. POLICYMAKERS' INATTENTION TO IRAQ BEFORE THE INVASION

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me convey to you my impression. You don't need to respond to this at all if you don't want to.

As I look at this record I get the impression that no one in the high levels of policymaking in the State Department was paying very much attention to Iraq until probably about the end of July of 1990.

What I am saying to you is, I get the very clear impression that during the six or eight months prior to August the 2nd, Iraq's policy changed, and it changed in a very negative way towards the United States.

But U.S. policy did not change. Warning bells went off, but nobody in Washington was listening.

And the question I have on my mind is why policy didn't change during this time, and that is probably not a question to put to you, but I want you to understand why I, and I think some of the other Members of the subcommittee, feel as we do.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. May I just say very quickly, Mr. Chairman, that the relationship that we had by March or April was a very flimsy one. The flavor became more and more sour.

When you say "our policy didn't change," I would simply like to reiterate that our policy was to be there, to see if we could not influence the Iraqis in a positive way, and that is what we continued to do.

The idea, Mr. Chairman, that a speech about incinerating half of Israel, which caused weeks of great concern and high tension in the area, didn't have the primary attention of the Secretary of State and the President of the United States seems to me Alice in Wonderland.

It really does. I wasn't here, but I feel absolutely confident that the highest levels of the American Government was as concerned as everybody else in the world when we learned that missiles had been moved to Western Iraq and pointed at Israel.

So with the greatest due respect, Mr. Chairman, I really must ask that you reconsider the notion that in the summer and spring of any time after April the 1, that the events in the Middle East and Iraq's belligerent attitude did not have high level attention.

I really reject the notion that our policy didn't change. Our policy, if I may say for the third time, was simply to be there, to do what we could. We originally were thinking in terms of carrots and sticks.

We had not carrots on the table and and none in our pocket. We were using sticks. And we were helpful, Mr. Chairman. We helped to reduce the tension between Israel and Iraq as I believe the Israelis said.

Mr. HAMILTON. While you are telling me that our policy was to be there, Mr. Kelly is telling me our policy toward Iraq has been to attempt to develop gradually mutually beneficial relationships.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely. I couldn't have put it better. Indeed, that is just what I said. When we could, we drew out some positive trends, and we did get a few things along the way, Mr. Chairman. I want to say that again.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why didn't Mr. Kelly convey to us this sense of deterioration in the relationship?

Ambassador GLASPIE. When was this? I am sorry.

Mr. HAMILTON. April 26th, and then again in July.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, I mean, honestly, Mr. Chairman, this is right after this extraordinary speech of Saddam's of April the 1st, publicized first on April the 2nd. I mean, I don't know anything about this exchange between you and Mr. Kelly, but it seems to me, perfectly fair to assume that the tension in the Middle East would be well known in this committee, and, of course, that is presumably why you were asking him these questions.

But I think the sentence you just read absolutely encapsulates what we were trying to do. If it was impossible at a certain period to pull out any positive threads from this relationship, then the best we could do was to be there and make sure that we did what we could to lower the tension, and hope that we would be able to influence Iraq in the future along positive lines.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

And as I say, there were a few things that we were able to get along the way. You know, it was in January, sir, that the travel ban of some areas was lifted. And it was lifted for all Iraqis.

U.S. REACTION TO IRAQI THREATS AGAINST KUWAIT IN JULY 1990

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. Now I want to go to July the 15th, and at that point, the foreign minister, Mr. Aziz is writing a threatening letter to the Arab League accusing Kuwait and the U.A. of direct aggression by exceeding their oil production quotas.

And then on July the 17th, Saddam accused the Gulf Arab States of stabbing Iraq in the back with a poison dagger by overproducing oil. At that time he said that something effective had to be done.

Did that speech come as a big surprise to you or had you picked up earlier than that, signals that this tough line toward Kuwait was emerging?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, it was a very public emergence, and ironically, the tough line above was being taken by the Saudis and the Iraqis in tandem. There were a series of meetings and highly publicized messages among the OPEC countries in preparation for the July 25th OPEC meeting. There was a meeting of a group of Arab OPEC members in Jena prior to the 15th.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you meet with Aziz after the speeches I referred to?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I met with him on July the 28th.

Mr. HAMILTON. So that was after his speech and after Saddam's speech on July 17th?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. But as I pointed out, starting on the 18th, with the exception of only an intervening Friday, which of course is the day that the Iraqi foreign ministries closed, I was there every day and three times on the 25th.

Mr. HAMILTON. This was during a period which you were seeking daily clarification and explanations?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that right?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, it is, sir.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INNER CIRCLE OF ADVISORS

Mr. HAMILTON. We have often heard here that the foreign minister was isolated from Saddam Hussein. He was not really on the inner circle. What is your impression of that?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I am always fascinated by people who pontificate about the inner workings of the Iraqi Government. I can say that after two years, I have no good idea about who Saddam Hussein's close advisors are. And Mr. Chairman, it is not for lack of trying, I can tell you.

But I do not know. I believe, and I am speculating, not informing you, that Saddam Hussein recognized that he had very, very few people to whom he could turn, loyal bodies who had experience and knowledge of the West. And I think he had two of his three deputy prime ministers as perhaps two of only four or five such people. One of those, of course, is Aziz.

Mr. HAMILTON. No, you met with Nizar Hamduum on the 25th; am I correct about that?

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. Twice.

Mr. HAMILTON. You met with him twice on that day. Did you at that time have instructions regarding clarification on that July 16th letter to the Arab League and the July 17th Saddam speech?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I had those instructions on the 18th of July, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Had no instructions.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I had them on the 18th of July. They were immediately sent to not just me, but all of my colleagues in the area.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was there any subsequent instructions after July 18th and before this July—

Ambassador GLASPIE. There was no need for any further formal instructions, sir. What we did have was the equivalent of additional instructions in the State Department's public statement on the 24th.

And it was those remarks by Ms. Tutwiler that caused me to be summoned at midnight. Then some hours later, I received the text from Washington, and that was the occasion of my unannounced arrival at the foreign ministry later in the morning to deliver those in writing.

GLASPIE'S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN ON JULY 25

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. And you went to the Presidency to see Saddam on the 25th; is that correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I was taken to the Presidency; I didn't have the slightest idea who I would see. There are a number of people whose offices are in the Presidency. I was put into Presidency care and nobody knew that I was going, except the Italian ambassador. I said, please come and get me.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you met with Saddam at that point?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, yes indeed. He was there.

IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT USE FORCE

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, during that meeting, did he say specifically he would not use force toward Kuwait?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And that was not a conditional statement of any kind, it was just a flat, clear, plain statement: We will not invade Kuwait; is that correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. The Iraqis are prone to what are called looney legalisms. Saddam Hussein told me he would not use violence to settle his disputes.

I believe that the way the transcript was issued with those comments at the end of it from Saddam Hussein were intended to make the point that you are inferring, that what he told me was as long as the Kuwaitis do the right thing, we won't invade. That is not the case at all.

As President Mubarak announced or was told him, and as I read in the open letter that King Fahd has, and that the Saudi Embassy here has published from King Fahd to President Saddam Hussein.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, it was very clear.

Ambassador GLASPIE. No question about it.

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Mr. HAMILTON. No conditionality?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Certainly not. And as I said, repeated to me by two different Ministers on the 28th and the 29th.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was one of those Ministers Hassan Kamal?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, indeed, on the 29th.

Mr. HAMILTON. And he says to you flatly, "We are not going to use the troops"?

Ambassador GLASPIE. As I told you, he asked me to come in, and said, "Don't worry about the troops, we have already told you that we want to talk to you about a commercial issue."

GLASPIE DIDN'T EXPECT THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD INVADE

Mr. HAMILTON. Okay. I wanted to check on a quote that was attributed to you in The New York Times in a September article. According to this paper you said, "Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait," end of quote.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Or any of it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Okay. That is the point I want to make.

Ambassador GLASPIE. I probably didn't say it, Mr. Chairman, but that is what I meant, and it will serve my right for—

Mr. HAMILTON. What, the phrase that you didn't expect they were going to take any part of it?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, I did not, sir. But I would like to add something to that. I hope I have explained to the committee very clearly why I didn't think that they were going to take all of it, and in summary, because they were already getting what they wanted. Why do it? But it is a completely different point which I was discussing in the New York Times. I think it is important, that since Iraq, for some years, had tried to make its point, by brief incursions, I thought that early on in this crisis a number of Arab states thought that that is what they were looking at, the beginning of another brief incursion.

I don't know how many brief incursions the Iraqis have made into Kuwait; I don't think the American Government knows, but there have been many of them over the last 30 years.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, at what point did you think Iraq was going to invade Kuwait? When did you first think that?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, if I had thought Iraq was going to invade Kuwait, I would have asked the President to cancel my instructions and allow me to stay at post. I knew Iraq was going to invade Kuwait when I saw pictures on the BBC in London on the morning of the 2nd, as I was packing to come home.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, until the actual invasion, it was your view that they would not invade Kuwait?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you left Baghdad for London on what date, do you know?

Ambassador GLASPIE. The 30th of July.

Mr. HAMILTON. Were you leaving at that time for a policy review?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. You were coming to Washington or to London?

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Ambassador GLASPIE. To Washington.

Mr. HAMILTON. And had we concluded at that point that no invasion would occur?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely, sir. That is why we were going to—now, let me be careful here. We thought that the immediate crisis was over. This man having told practically everybody on the map that it was. And the accounts relating that it was in his interests that it be over since he was going to get what he wanted, and if he invaded, to our logic, he would be committing a kind of suicide.

So, we thought the immediate crisis was over. I simply don't want to imply that we thought everything was going to be hunky-dory, that the negotiations with Kuwait were going to be swift and easy.

Of course, we didn't. But we did not think he was going to invade Kuwait.

GLASPIE'S VIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand. You were quoted, I think, yesterday as saying that you thought Saddam Hussein was stupid.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Suicidal, I mean. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. But when did you reach the conclusion he was stupid?

Ambassador GLASPIE. When he invaded Kuwait, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. At the time that you spoke to him, did you think he was stupid?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, I thought he was ignorant.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thought he was what?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Ignorant.

Mr. HAMILTON. About what?

Ambassador GLASPIE. About the United States, about our values, about our power.

ATTEMPTS TO EXPOSE SADDAM TO WESTERN VALUES AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Mr. HAMILTON. But during your tour then, and as you got to know this man, you felt he was out of touch, out of reach.

Did you feel that way about him?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. And this is what I had been told before I went to Iraq. And that is why I directed my staff to assist me in trying to do two things, keeping two goals before us. That we should constantly think of ways in which we can expose to him and to other senior decisionmakers all those things about us, our values, our policies, and the intricacies of our constitutional structures, relationship between the Congress and the media and government and the Supreme Court, all of which are totally misunderstood by Iraqi decision-makers.

And I mentioned the one obvious way seemed to try to get journalists in to see him. The other thing that we set ourselves to do was to see if we could find any way to get in to see him. And we couldn't.

I would just like to add one other comment, if I may, because it was such a major focus of our Embassy. We wanted to try to break

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

through this iron curtain that Saddam had put around the people of Iraq. Foreigners couldn't go to an Iraqi house, and vice versa, and anybody who was unwise enough to talk to us would, of course, be interrogated by the police, and so on.

So, we did set up a cultural, people-to-people program. And I like to think that that is what we did leave behind. In two years, we touched a lot of people, hundreds and hundreds of people. And that is what we need, sir, I think, in Iraq.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you didn't think Saddam Hussein was stupid when you talked with him, but you thought he was ignorant of the United States and not in touch with a lot of reality, I guess.

Ambassador GLASPIE. And then advised, sycophantically advised.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey, I think, has a few questions.

CLARIFICATION OF KUWAITI DEMOCRACY

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you so much, I will be very brief.

First of all, I would just like to note that when I asked you to comment and advise as to present status and concerns of future prospects in Kuwait, particularly Iraq, you very graciously deferred to the Secretary of State.

I understand that. I do hope we have the opportunity for your counsel in these very major developments at some time in the near future, if we could work that out with you and the Secretary. And I probably went on and on about our differences in substance and semantics on the democratic aspects of Kuwait, but I guess we could say it is a relatively benevolent or more or less aggressive monarchy with some democratic aspects.

Could that get us clearer?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, Mr. McCloskey, it is the only country that I have had the pleasure of serving in, other than this one and the United Kingdom, which had a parliament. I used to go to it twice a week, and you wouldn't have allowed the free-wheeling conversation that they allowed.

Unfortunately, there is no parliament now.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. There is also a question about rights of parliament and powers of parliament. Saddam Hussein took Kuwait in six hours; is that not correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. However long it took to drive through.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Pretty stark and pretty simple. And I guess about that time, you were somewhere between London and Washington?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. In transit?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I was in London and was ordered to stay there for two or three days.

POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ WOULD INVADE SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Did you think at that time that Saddam Hussein would go into Saudi Arabia?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I had—well, I couldn't decide. In my mind it was when I came back here and was able to look at the information that we had that I understood why the President—

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. When you looked at that information, it must have been at least on the 3rd or something like that. Did you advise the President or his secretary then on—

Ambassador GLASPIE. I didn't get back until the 8th

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, somewhere, communications being what they are, did you advise the President as to likely Iraqi intention on Saudi Arabia?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, sir. I mean I was isolated from information where I was.

GLASPIE'S ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT REGARDING DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Then you could not advise at all, by implications of what you are saying, as to whether or not to deploy the troops?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No. But as soon as I got back I offered my advice.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Could I ask what that was?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, I am asking, I guess you are saying you decline to answer.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well,—could you ask me precisely the question again, what issue it was that you were—

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, I mean, did you have an opinion or did you advise the President and/or the Secretary on deploying troops to Saudi Arabia?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, I did not. Those decisions—no, I did not.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You did not—

Ambassador GLASPIE. I did not advise the President, no.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. How about the Secretary?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Or the Secretary, no.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, in effect you are not in a position, for all your activity—

Ambassador GLASPIE. I wouldn't expect to be, sir. I mean they would ask my advise on matters having to do directly with Iraq. This would be a major political military question which I would not expect to be asked to advise on.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Did you think it was wise—was your immediate reaction that it was a wise thing at the time to deploy troops?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. You have been very generous.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Burton.

GLASPIE'S RESPONSE TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA EDITORIAL

Mr. BURTON. Yes. Thank you very much.

I know you are very tired, and I have been gone and come back and we won't keep you but just for a moment. You have been very patient. There was a question that was asked earlier about whether you told Saddam Hussein that the VOA editorial in February of 1990, which mentioned Iraq around countries with the secret police, and whether you reassure him by stating that a formal apol-

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

ogy was presented? As I understand it, you answered in the affirmative and said that that VOA broadcast was cleared only for Eastern Europe; is that correct?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, sir. None of that is correct. All those details were between me and the foreign ministry in late February. What happened with Saddam Hussein was that he referred to it in his rather long opening remarks to me, and in passing later on in the conversation I referred to it and reminded him, since he seemed to think that we were done with it. I reminded him that the foreign minister had already received a letter from us on that subject.

I wanted to be sure that the foreign minister had told him of the exchange between us. That is why I raised it.

Mr. BURTON. Did you object to that, or did you apologize for that VOA editorial?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I wrote a letter on instructions from the department using the words which were carefully crafted in the department, and were along the lines of, you probably have the text in front of you, the editorial which could have given rise to misinterpretation. Yes, I did indeed but that was months before.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Solarz, according to my staff assistant, indicated that you told him this editorial was cleared for Eastern Europe?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No. I discussed that point with the foreign ministry in February; I did not discuss that with Saddam Hussein.

It was a passing remark in a Saddam Hussein conversation. I might have. I mean if it occurred to me to say so, I might have, but there is not reason to say so and I didn't say so.

Mr. BURTON. You did not say it was cleared only for Eastern Europe?

Ambassador GLASPIE. No, but it is true, it was cleared for broadcast in Eastern Europe. Your remark is correct.

Mr. BURTON. It was cleared only for broadcast in Eastern Europe?

Ambassador GLASPIE. That is correct. And then the last lines were then added, it was translated to Arabic and broadcasted with the additional language, but uncleared for broadcast in Arabic or with the additional language.

Mr. BURTON. Well, we contacted the VOA and they said that it was not limited to Eastern Europe only.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, good. But it was written, I was informed, for a Eastern European audience. Certainly when you read the text of it, that is where it is directed. But the point about the clearance of the editorial is that basically the editorial was used twice.

It was used, and then a final short paragraph was added. That amended version was not recleared in the State Department.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I won't prolong this. I had submitted earlier some questions for the record and the Chairman very graciously said that you would answer those questions.

Ambassador GLASPIE. With pleasure.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

IN HINDSIGHT, WHAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY

Mr. HAMILTON. Just finally, Madame Ambassador, as you look back over your experience there, what would you have done differently in light of the subsequent events with respect to your own conduct and with respect to U.S. policy?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I have of course been over this in my mind many times. I have discussed it with people whose knowledge of Iraq is greater than mine and whose views I respect.

The fact, and it was a fact, that we overestimated Saddam Hussein's instinct for self preservation, for whatever reasons. I think that was internally consistent, and our mistake. You know, this is what I would change if I could, but with the data available to me at that time I do not believe that I would have come to different conclusion no matter how hard I thought about it.

We did not realize he would be so foolish as to ignore our repeated and crystal clear warnings. So with the data available to us, I fear that I could only have come to the wrong conclusion.

I don't take comfort that everybody else that I was working with in Baghdad, including Arab ambassadors came to that same wrong conclusion.

Mr. HAMILTON. So looking back you really see no mistakes?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I think it was morally right in August 1988 to try to see if we could bring him along. We never bought the idea, as I think you know, Mr. Chairman, that was promulgated in the area that this is a changed man.

We can work with him. That is not the attitude with which we began this experiment in August 1988. We hoped he might be a changed man. We hoped very much he might be a changed man, and if he wasn't, we hoped that we could change him.

Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to be clear. As you look back, you see no mistakes?

Ambassador GLASPIE. I can only speak to the approach that we took. If you want to go hour by hour and day by day, I am sure we made many mistakes. I am talking about, it seems to me a fair question if I may say, the approach that we took.

Mr. HAMILTON. The policy?

Ambassador GLASPIE. The policy approach that we took, not the day by day execution. I am sure I made many mistakes. But the approach I think was right, and we failed. We didn't make it work.

Mr. HAMILTON. And by the word approach, you really mean the policy?

Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. The general overall policy, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we have had you here a very, very long time. I apologize to you for that. You have been patient with us in responding to our questions, and after a good many weeks and months in which we sought the opportunity to have you, we are very pleased that you could come.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

Ambassador GLASPIE. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Digitized by Google

Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

APPENDIX 1

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO:

HEARING ON U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS, MARCH 21, 1991

I. UNITED STATES POLICY AND POLICY PROCESS:

QUESTION:

1. Until the summer of 1990 when it became clear that Saddam was lying to you and to other leaders about his intentions in Kuwait, did Iraq keep the policy commitments and other assurances they made to the United States?

- What commitments did they make?
- Did they honor the commitment not to use chemical weapons after they used them in September 1988?
- How careful were the Iraqis in honoring their other commitments, for example, the commitment not to support international terrorism following the 1983 U.S. decision to remove Iraq from the list of countries supporting international terrorism?

ANSWER:

The Iraqi government honored its commitment not to use chemical weapons following September 1988. Iraq also met its financial obligations to the United States, as payments for CCC and Ex-Im guarantees were submitted on schedule up to the August 2 invasion of Kuwait. No payments have been received since that time.

Regarding international terrorism, Iraq was actually removed from the list of states supporting terrorism in 1982, following steps to rein in Abu Nidal and cut past terrorist links. Iraq expelled the Abu Nidal Organization in 1983 and sought to establish a new image as a state opposed to terrorism. Between 1982 and the summer of 1990, the only known terrorist acts linked to Iraq were the murders of three Iraqi political exiles in 1988. However, Iraq provided sanctuary for members of certain Palestinian terrorist groups during that period.

QUESTION:

2. What role did you play in policymaking?

- Did you personally participate in any interagency meetings regarding Iraq while you served as Ambassador?
- What did you know about the April 16, 1990 interagency Deputies Committee meeting chaired by Mr. Gates to review policy toward Iraq?
  - Was that the first such review since you arrived in Baghdad?
- Would the review of policy that you were meant to be returning to Washington for in early August have been the first formal review in which you took part since you took your post in 1988?

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

– Did you see your role more as an executor of policy or as a policymaker?

– During your tour did you ever ask for a policy change or review, and, if so, when and for what reasons?

– Do you feel that you were adequately consulted on all decisions regarding United States policy toward Iraq?

ANSWER:

As is customary for a U.S. Ambassador, my role in policy-making consisted of providing analytical reporting on developments in Iraq, including statements and actions by the Iraqi leadership, and, as appropriate, making recommendations to the Secretary on pending policy decisions. My role was more executor of policy – in accordance with instructions from Washington – than policy-maker.

I did not take part in Washington interagency meetings regarding Iraq; I was at my post. Consequently, I had no knowledge of an April 16, 1990 Deputies Committee meeting on Iraq, nor do I know if that was the first such meeting since my arrival in Baghdad. The review for which I returned in early August would have been the first such review in which I took part since taking my post in 1988. As Ambassador, I did not request a policy change or review, although I did request to brief senior Department and Administration officials on my July 25 meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After my return I met on several occasions with the Secretary and the President.

QUESTION:

3. In your remarks yesterday you said frequently that one of your principal tasks was to try to keep the lines of communication open to Baghdad.

– Precisely what do you mean by that?

– In a society as closed as Iraq was, how do you keep lines of communication open and how do you know you are doing so?

– In a situation where one man, with a narrow and skewed vision, runs the entire show, lines of communications hardly exist: how would you define lines of communication?

– Most senior Iraqi officials, I am told, have no or sporadic lines of communications to the top – how do they keep open lines of communication?

ANSWER:

By "lines of communication," I mean our capability to exchange official messages directly with a responsible level of the government of Iraq. At a minimum, such communication would enable both us and the Iraqis to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. At best, it would make possible a genuine improvement of mutual understanding and enhance U.S. influence.

The aggregation of power in the hands of one man does indeed limit the number of useful channels of communication which are available. We sought to make U.S. views known to Saddam by maintaining contact with his advisors, including (former) Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and senior members of his staff.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad sought to maintain contact with as many Iraqi government officials as possible, at a variety of levels. In addition, the U.S. Cultural Center, sponsored by the U.S. Information Service, offered cultural programs to private individuals and provided daily summaries of U.S. media reporting to a long list of official and non-official Iraqis. We also attempted to broaden government-to-government cooperation, e.g. by encouraging contact between FAA and DEA and their Iraqi counterparts.

QUESTION:

4. In mid-August, the British and Soviet Ambassadors who, like yourself, were out of Baghdad on August 2nd, returned to Baghdad. You did not.

- Why not?

- What was the recommendation of your Bureau on this point?

- In testimony before the Subcommittee on September 18, Assistant Secretary of State Kelley informed us that the decision not to send you back to Iraq was made by the President. Is this accurate?

- At a time when other Ambassadors were returning to Iraq, what was the reasoning for this decision to have you remain in Washington?

- Between August 1990 and January 1991, when our Embassy was closed, was the President ever asked to reconsider this decision?

ANSWER:

My departure from post was authorized by Washington. It is correct that the decision not to send me back was made by the President. As the White House spokesman said on September 13, the President did not wish to send the Iraqi government a signal of "business as usual". He decided the day after the invasion that I would not return.

II. U.S. POLICY - NOVEMBER 1989 TO JULY 1990:

QUESTION:

1. On February 15, 1990 there was a Voice of America editorial which spoke of the downfall of Ceausescu and called for democracy in several countries, including Iraq.

- After this incident, were new procedures for advance State Department clearance put in place for all editorials dealing with Iraq?

  - Why was this done?

  - Was this policy change just for editorials about Iraq? If so, why only Iraq?

ANSWER:

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

As Ambassador, I had no direct role in any such developments. However, I understand that procedures for inter-agency coordination of VOA editorials dealing with Iraq were reviewed at that time. Since VOA editorials reflect the official views of the U.S. government, such coordination is appropriate to ensure that the editorials are consistent with U.S. interests and policy objectives in the countries which receive the VOA transmission.

III. EVENTS LEADING TO THE AUGUST 2ND INVASION:

QUESTION:

1. What was the content of the message sent by President George Bush to President Saddam Hussein just before the invasion, after officials in Washington received a report from you on your meeting with Saddam Hussein on July 25?

- Did that message say the United States wanted better relations with Baghdad?

- Did that message express the President's concern about Saddam's threat to use force?

- What did the message from the President specifically say we would do if Iraq invaded Kuwait?

ANSWER:

It would be inappropriate for me, as Ambassador, to comment on the substance of Presidential communication beyond my remarks to the Committee on March 21.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Purdue University Libraries
3 2754 074 680 368

APPENDIX 2

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO

QUESTION:

1. Is it in our interest to be so sensitive to the paranoias and conspiracy theories of Arab dictators?

– Shouldn't we start being more blunt with them?

ANSWER:

In dealings with foreign government officials, U.S. diplomats must strive to articulate U.S. policy in a straightforward manner which will be clearly understood.

QUESTION:

2. Did you have anything to do with killing a July 25 V.O.A. editorial that warned against any aggression against Kuwait?

– Why was that editorial killed?

ANSWER:

I had no knowledge of any such editorial.

QUESTION:

3. Did you tell Saddam that the V.O.A. editorial in February of 1990 (which mentioned Iraq among countries with a secret police) was "sad?" Did you reassure him by stating that "a formal apology was presented?"

ANSWER:

As I stated in my March 21 appearance before the subcommittee, I reminded Saddam Hussein of my earlier statement to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the USG was not dedicated to the overthrow of certain foreign governments.

QUESTION:

4. Did you tell Saddam that "I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media." And did you condemn A.B.C. news for being "cheap and unjust" to Saddam?

ANSWER:

As I stated in my March 21 appearance before the subcommittee, I urged the Iraqi President to make himself available to representatives of the U.S. media. I told him that selective editing – including the Iraqi Ministry of Information's editing of the Diane Sawyer interview for local broadcast – was cheap and unjust.

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY

APPENDIX 3

APRIL CATHERINE GLASPIE

Position for which considered: Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq

Present Position: Director, Office of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon

Office Address: Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Born: April 26, 1942, Vancouver, Canada

Legal Residence: Solana Beach, California

Marital Status: Single

Home Address: 2704 P. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Education
B.A. 1963, Mills College
M.A. 1965, Johns Hopkins University

Language Ability: French (3+/4, tested), Arabic (4/4, tested)

Experience:

Government

1966	Joined Foreign Service
1966	Political Officer, American Embassy, Amman, Jordan
1967-69	Political Officer, American Embassy, Kuwait, Kuwait
1969-71	Consular Officer, American Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden
1971	Operations Center, Department
1972-73	Language Training, American Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
1973-77	Political Officer, American Embassy, Cairo, Egypt
1977-78	Staff Assistant, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department
1978-80	Political Officer, American Embassy, London, England
1980-81	Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York
1981-83	Director, Language Institute, American Embassy, Tunis, Tunisia
1983-85	Political Officer/Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Damascus, Syria
1985-present	Director, Office of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Department

Awards
Director General's Award for Reporting (Cairo)
Superior Honor Award (Cairo, Damascus)
Meritorious Award (Kuwait)

Memberships
American Foreign Service Association

August 1987

43-452 (72)

Digitized by Google
Original from PURDUE UNIVERSITY