CONCLUSIONS, KEY FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—Military and Police

Conclusion: The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability, but not the ability to operate independently. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military and external threats.

Finding 1: *Although the Iraqi Army and Special Forces have demonstrated significant progress in counterterrorism capabilities at the operational level, the Iraqi Police Service and National Police have many challenges to overcome and cannot yet meaningfully contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Iraq. The border security forces are assessed as being ineffective.*

Finding 2: *The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring greater security to Iraq's provinces varies by region and by organization within the ISF owing to many factors, including political leadership, security environment, sectarianism, and available resources.*

Finding 3: *The "clear, hold, build" strategy being implemented by Iraqi Security Forces is on the right track and shows potential, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the police forces can execute these types of operations independently.*

Finding 4: *The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.*

The Ministry of Defense

Conclusion: The Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for policy development and implementation as well as resource allocation for the Iraqi military, is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission. However, its capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military. As the MOD continues to mature, it should assume the ministerial-level functions that currently fall to the Coalition.

Finding 5: *Inefficiencies and overcentralization within the Ministry of Defense and its inability to fully execute its budget impede the combat readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces.*

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Finding 6: *The ability to contract efficiently is important to the MOD's mission to sustain the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD currently lacks effective processes to execute contracting requirements.*

Finding 7: *The MOD consistently compensates the members of the Iraqi military, but it has difficulty accounting for personnel.*

Finding 8: *The level of information sharing and cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition and distrust among duplicative intelligence organizations.*

Finding 9: *Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as having created a second, and politically motivated chain of command, effectively communicating orders directly to field commanders. Such a practice bypasses national command lines, which should flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of Iraqi Armed Forces.*

Finding 10: *The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this condition.*

The Iraqi Army and Special Forces

Conclusion: The Iraqi Army and Special Forces possess an adequate supply of willing and able manpower and a steadily improving basic training capability. The Army has a baseline supply of equipment for counterinsurgency, but much of this equipment is unavailable for operations owing to maintenance and supply chain management problems. They are making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within their ranks and are achieving some progress. Their operational effectiveness, particularly that of the Special Forces, is increasing, yet they will continue to rely on Coalition forces for key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. Despite progress, they will not be ready to independently fulfill their security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved to that end.

Finding 11: *In addition to protecting the nation against external military threats, the Iraqi Army can and should also play a role in preventing unconventional threats migrating from points outside of Iraq. The Army currently does not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counterinsurgency operations simultaneously.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Iraqi Army's size and capability should be developed as part of an Iraqi national security strategy that defines the roles and missions of the ISF to address both internal security and border security needs. The Army as well as the nation's police forces are currently emphasizing internal security; only ineffective border security forces are focused on controlling the borders. The Iraqi Army must contribute to both border and internal security. A national*

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

The Iraqi Navy

Conclusion: The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense's understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

Finding 24: *The low profile of the Iraqi Navy within the MOD, as well as the ministry's inadequate budget allocation and execution, significantly impede Iraqi naval operations and development.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Coalition advisors must assist the Iraqi Navy leadership in advocating budget priorities within the MOD. The strategic importance of the Iraqi Navy must be better articulated to the Government of Iraq, in terms both of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and of providing the security needed to ensure the efficient flow of exports. Larger issues of poor ministerial capacity and poor budget execution must also be addressed with Coalition support, as detailed more extensively in the discussion on MOD capacity (Chapter 4).*

Finding 25: *The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is small, complicated, and of vital strategic importance. Relations among the nations bordering the area of responsibility and their respective navies and coast guards are fragile at best. Furthermore, the international maritime borders with Iran and Kuwait are contested and not clearly demarcated. These issues warrant greater attention from both the MOD and the Coalition.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Absent clearly defined territorial seas, the Iraqi Navy's battle space will be further complicated. Although the Commission realizes that resolving this issue is made more difficult by long-standing animosities between these nations and may not be feasible in the near term, it is important that the profile of this issue be raised within the Government of Iraq and the country team.*

Finding 26: *The Iraqi Navy does not have a collaborative relationship with the Iraqi Coast Guard, though the two services operate in close proximity and have complementary missions. This lack of coordination has the potential to create vulnerable seams in a critical strategic environment.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition should work with the MOD, Iraqi Navy, and Coast Guard to examine the feasibility and potential advantages of merging the Navy and Coast Guard into a single service with responsibility for coastal maritime security. If unity of command cannot be attained by combining both forces under the MOD, then better cooperation and coordination has to be developed to prevent a serious gap in security.*

Finding 27: *The new Iraqi Navy has made significant progress over a very short time period, particularly in planning, but it remains heavily reliant on the Coalition for training, logistics, and maintenance support.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *An ongoing Naval Transition Team presence in Umm Qasr is essential and should be continued.*

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Iraqi Police Service

Conclusion: The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

Finding 33: *The emphasis on local recruiting and assignment in the Iraqi Police Service is showing promise in establishing security at the local level; strong personnel vetting processes will remain vital.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with provincial authorities to ensure that established vetting procedures are used consistently throughout the country to combat militia, criminal, and terrorist infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service.*

Finding 34: *Police training in Iraq is improving, particularly in areas where training is led by Iraqi instructors partnered with civilian police advisors.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue transitioning the lead for training to the Iraqis wherever possible and should consider instituting a "train the trainers" program throughout the provinces to facilitate this process.*

Finding 35: *U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of the training and advisory effort.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team and the Police Training Teams should be transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals.*

Finding 36: *The number of civilian international police advisors is insufficient to the task of training the Iraqi Police Service.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition—not just the United States—should fund and recruit the requisite number of international police advisors.*

Finding 37: *Training programs to date have emphasized quantity of police trained over quality of training, thereby undermining the long-term effectiveness of the force in favor of force generation efforts.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Particularly in light of a significantly high number of personnel in the Iraqi Police Service who have not yet undergone Coalition training, the Ministry of Interior and Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should seek higher-quality police recruits and vet them more carefully as they continue to address the training backlog.*

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

The National Police

Conclusion: The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized.

Finding 44: *In its current form, the National Police is not a viable organization. Its ability to be effective is crippled by significant challenges, including public distrust, sectarianism (both real and perceived), and a lack of clarity about its identity—specifically, whether it is a military or a police force.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized under the MOI. It should become a much smaller organization under a different name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance disposal, urban search and rescue, special threat action, and other similar functions.*

The Department of Border Enforcement

Conclusion: Iraq's borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq's borders will remain porous and poorly defended.

Finding 45: *The overall capacity of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate is undermined by weak MOI capacity. Further, border security commanders have little confidence that the MOI will address their needs and concerns.*

Finding 46: *The divided responsibility for land, sea, and air ports of entry between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transportation, together with the lack of unity of effort between these ministries, undermines the effectiveness of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Government of Iraq should establish clear guidelines to facilitate unity of effort between the MOI and MOT for border security and move quickly to consolidate overall responsibility for border security under the MOI.*

Finding 47: *The MOI has not created standardized concepts of operations, operating procedures, or processes for the Ports of Entry Directorate to apply at Iraq's land ports of entry; each appears to be run according to the initiative—or lack thereof—of the local commander.*

Finding 48: *Many land ports of entry have neither the quantity nor the quality of monitoring and detection systems required for border security operations to function effectively.*

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Table 1. ISF Independent Assessment Commission Organization

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), Chairman

Ministry of Defense Syndicates

Iraqi Army
General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.), Syndicate Chair
General John Abrams, USA (Ret.)
General Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne, USA (Ret.)
Command Sergeant Major Dwight Brown, USA (Ret.)
Sergeant Major Alford McMichael, USMC (Ret.)

Iraqi Special Forces
Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA (Ret.)

Iraqi Air Force
General Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.)*

Iraqi Navy
Admiral Gregory Johnson, USN (Ret.)*

Ministry of Interior Syndicates

Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Police Service
Chief Charles Ramsey, Syndicate Chair
The Honorable Terrance Gainer
Colonel Michael Heidingsfield, USAF (Ret.)
Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland
Chief John Timoney

Other Ministry of Interior Functions
General Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.), Syndicate Chair*
Admiral Gregory Johnson, USN (Ret.)*
Lieutenant General Martin Berndt, USMC (Ret.)

* Denotes dual Commission role

Cross-Cutting Issues Syndicates

Logistics
Lieutenant General Gary McKissock, USMC (Ret.)

Intelligence/Command and Control
Lieutenant General James King, USA (Ret.)

Resources
The Honorable John Hamre

Personnel
Major General Arnold Punaro, USMC (Ret.)

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Figure 1: ISF Independent Assessment Commission Site Visits (Iraq)

1. Tal Afar
3rd Iraqi Army Division HQ

2. Mosul
Multi-National Division-North HQ
2nd Iraqi Army Division HQ

3. Kirkuk
Kirkuk Air Base (Iraqi Air Force)

4. Sulaymaniyah
Joint Iraqi Police Academy
Provincial Directorate of Police HQ

5. Habbaniyah
Habbaniyah Iraqi Police Academy
Regional Training Center - Habbaniyah
Multi-National Forces - West (MNF-W) HQ
MNF-W ISF Training Facilities
Iraqi National Maintenance Site
1st Iraqi Motor Transport Regiment

6. Zurbatiyah
Point of Entry Border Station

7. Taji
Camp Taji
Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence
Iraqi Counterinsurgency Academy
Iraqi Military Intelligence Academy
Iraqi Signal School
Regional Support Unit - Taji
Iraqi Army Services Support Training Institute
Taji National Depot
Regional Training Center - Taji
1st Brigade Combat Team
1st Cavalry Divison
Iraqi Army NCO Academy
CMATT Command
Taji Air Force Base
Saba' Al Bur
Joint Security Station-West

8. Arab Jabour
Patrol Base Whiskey One

9. Numaniyah
Numaniyah Iraqi National Police Academy23

10. Basra
Multi-National Divison-Southeast
10th Iraqi Army Division
U.S. Regional Embassy Office
Department of Border Enforcement - J-7
Iraqi Chief of Police

11. Umm Qasr
Umm Qasr Naval Base

12. Offshore Oil Terminals
al-Basra Oil Terminal
Khor al Amaya Oil Terminal

13. Tallil
8th Iraqi Army Division
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division
Iraqi Army Commanders for Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces

14. Trebil
Point of Entry Border Station

15. Al Walid
Point of Entry Border Station

Digitized by Google
Original from PENN STATE

Figure 2: ISF Independent Assessment Commission Site Visits (Baghdad)



1. International Zone
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih
Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq HQ
Tactical Training Command
NATO Training Mission
Iraqi National Defense University
Iraqi National Command Center
Baghdad Operations Center
Iraqi Office of the Commander-in-Chief
Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement

2. U.S. Embassy Annex

3. Iraqi Ministry of Defense

4. Iraqi Ministry of Interior

5. Baghdad Police College
Baghdad Provincial Directorate of Police HQ
Provincial Directorate of Police
Karkh Directorate Police Headquarters

6. Haifa Street Joint Security Station

7. Iraqi National Police Headquarters

8. Rustimiyah
Iraqi Military Academy - Rustimiyah
Iraqi Joint Staff College

9. Al Madai'in JSS (Al Karradah District)

10. Baghdad International Airport
Camp Dublin
- National Police Emergency Response Unit
- Iraqi Center for Dignitary Protection Training
Al Muthanna Air Base
- Iraqi Air Force
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Command

11. Camp Victory
Multi-National Corps - Iraq HQ
Multi-National Force - Iraq
Iraqi Assistance Group
Iraqi Ground Forces Command
6th Iraqi Army Division
Command Operations Post Cleary
Multi-National Division-Center HQ

12. Command Outpost Attack (West Rashid)

Digitized by Google
Original from PENN STATE

CHAPTER 1: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN IRAQ

To put the Commission's assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces in an appropriate context, it is important to understand the internal and external threats facing Iraq and its people, as well as the requirements that those threats impose on the Iraqi Security Forces. The societal forces defining the security environment in Iraq today are enormously diverse, complex, and violent, and they directly affect the stability of the broader Middle East. The conflicts in Iraq today flow from differences over religion, from historical divides, and from disputes in Iraqi society that were unleashed following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They also reflect the broader power dynamics of the region. The Iraqi Security Forces are attempting to develop and operate in the midst of an extraordinarily complex environment—an environment that significantly challenges far more mature international security forces as well.

Iraq's modern history is the story of different groups and tribes merged into a single nation-state by European powers. After the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, the Franco-British plan to unite Mesopotamia was executed through the imposition of rulers and drawing of maps in European capitals—without the censuses of or consultation with the local interested parties. In carving modern Iraq out of the former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, a largely Kurdish north was combined with a largely Sunni Arab center and a largely Shi'a south (See Figure 3). This consolidation papered over existing problems and created new ones.

Figure 3: Religious / Ethnic Areas in Iraq (as of April 07)



Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

the situation in Iraq, but the perils these surrounding countries face are in no way as great as the dangers currently confronting Iraqis themselves.

Against that history and set of regional dynamics, the most significant threats currently facing Iraq are generally agreed to be al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Sunni insurgent groups, Shi'a militias, and the largely negative involvement of neighboring countries in Iraq's internal affairs—especially Iranian support of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Al Qaeda in Iraq was credited with only 15 percent of the insurgent attacks in Iraq at the beginning of 2007, but its attacks were typically the most destructive, sensational, and destabilizing.[3] According to the Department of Defense, al Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for approximately 90 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq and the kidnapping of more than 250 foreign workers. Abu

Figure 4: State of Al Qaeda - Iraq



Source: MNF-I

[3] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida," CSIS working draft, July 16, 2007, p. 7; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070716_sunni_insurgents.pdf.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Figure 5: Anbar Attacks



or those seen as cooperating with them, as well as Shi'a Iraqis and militia members.[9] Their goal is to restore Sunni rule in Iraq. The main Sunni insurgent groups currently operating in the country are the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance, and the Mujahideen Army in Iraq. These groups are believed to be responsible for roughly 70 percent of attacks.[10] Most Sunni insurgent groups are made up of former soldiers and Sunni Arab civilians led by former Iraqi military officers. They have been concentrated in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province, as well as several majority Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, including Amiriya, Adhamiya, Fadhil, Jihad, Amal, and Doura.[11] The recent U.S. and Iraqi troop surge has focused on these violent areas, forcing many insurgents to retreat from their traditional home bases into outlying provinces such as Diyala, which has seen a major spike in insurgent activity since the beginning of the surge.[12] These groups are also increasingly active in the northern, majority-Kurdish provinces and around the multi-ethnic and contested cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.

---

[9] Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Rudolfo, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas," Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Special Report, July 2007, p. 9.

[10] Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents." p. 7.

[11] Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, p. 29.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

increasingly strained, as more than 50 percent of all foreign fighters—and especially would-be suicide bombers—appear to be coming from Saudi Arabia.[24]

Means and Methods of Violence

Thanks to the legacy of the Ba'athist regime, insurgents and militias in Iraq are extremely well-armed. During his rule, Saddam Hussein purchased an enormous arsenal of conventional weapons, including huge stockpiles of artillery, tanks, mines, mortars, explosives, and ammunition of all types.[25] As Coalition forces advanced into Iraq in spring 2003, Ba'athist security forces melted away, leaving large, unguarded depots and armories that were quickly looted. Insurgents and militia members may also be buying on a black market weapons originally intended for the Iraqi Security Forces.[26]

Figure 6: Iraq – External Influences



[24] Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq and Foreign Volunteers," CSIS working draft, updated November 2005; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051117_iraqforeignvol.pdf. See also Sam Dagher, "Anti-Saudi Tide Rises in Iraq," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 9, 2007; Helene Cooper et al., "U.S. Officials Voice Frustration with Saudis, Citing Role in Iraq," *New York Times*, July 27, 2007.

[25] Although a large portion of Iraq's arsenal was destroyed in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, there still remained packed depots throughout Iraq.

[26] Government Accountability Office, *DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO-07-711, July 31, 2007.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Figure 7: Ethno-Sectarian Violence: Baghdad Security Districts



Source: MNF-I

Iraqi society is being convulsed by sectarianism that if not swiftly and significantly curtailed could contribute to a rapid deterioration of Iraq, with "grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences."[31] Iraq's overall security environment is very complex. Elements of terror, ethnic violence, insurgency, meddling by external actors, and criminal activity all combine to define, in varying degrees, the nature of the threats. The Commission assesses that despite all that remain to be done, the single most important event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's direction and security is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence and hatred. Sustained progress within the Iraqi Security Forces depends on such a political agreement.

[31] National Intelligence Council, "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead," Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate: January 2007, p. 8.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

CHAPTER 2: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

This report assesses each element of the Iraqi Security Forces in terms of its military readiness to contribute to the security of Iraq. Though many of the challenges facing the ISF are common across the military and police forces, each force has unique characteristics, potential strengths, and evident weaknesses. This chapter provides the Commission's perspective on the overall ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to conduct four critical missions: maintaining the territorial sovereignty of Iraq, denying safe haven to terrorists, providing greater security in the provinces, and ending sectarianism to promote national reconciliation.

Although the ISF have made significant progress in many areas, the Commission finds that they are not yet able to execute these missions independently. Without continued combat support, combat service support, and assistance from Coalition Military Transition Teams, it is unlikely that the ISF will achieve, in the near term, the proficiency and readiness needed to provide security for Iraq.

Figure 8: Glide Path: Iraqi Security Forces



* Manning level of combat battalions raised to 120% owing to Operation Fardh al-Qanoon lessons learned (FMS funded).

Source: MNF-I

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

predicted to Commissioners that the Army would be 60 percent capable of independently protecting Iraq from external threats by 2012 and entirely independent in this regard by 2018. He also insisted that the Iraqi Army will be able to accept more responsibility for direct combat against internal threats in 2008.

Figure 9: Casualties in Iraq by Month and Year



Source: MNF-I

The Iraqi Special Forces are a success story. The most capable units within the Iraqi military, they have trained extensively with U.S. Special Forces and developed a strong set of junior officers and a noncommissioned officer corps. Special operations involving both Coalition and Iraqi Special Forces are led by Iraqi commanders; their brigade provides 70 percent of the forces for these operations. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces still rely extensively on Coalition forces for fire and counterfire, close air support, fixed-wing and rotary wing mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The Iraqi Air Force and Navy are still too underdeveloped to contribute significantly to maintaining Iraq's territorial sovereignty. The Iraqi Air Force is organized for counterinsurgency operations and is flying operational missions over Baghdad and key critical infrastructure sites to provide Iraqi and Coalition forces with actionable intelligence, but these contributions represent a fraction of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability needed to combat the threats facing Iraq. Despite plans to triple its personnel by the end of 2007, the Air Force remains very small and is unlikely to be able to control Iraqi air space without outside assistance before 2010. Its ability to conduct aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions is improving, however, and with the planned acquisition of additional C-130 cargo aircraft for transport, UH-II helicopters for mobility and medical evacuation, and Russian Mi-17 helicopters for counterinsurgency operations, the Iraqi Air Force will grow more capable over time.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

essentially has a separate regional government and its own security forces. The remaining four provinces under provincial Iraqi control are in the southern part of Iraq. Despite the transition to this status, security in the four southern provinces is deteriorating because of a rise in intra-Shi'a violence. Increasing violence is particularly notable in Basra, Diyala, and Dhi Qar.[39] Unlike Diyala and Dhi Qar, Basra has not yet been transferred to provincial Iraqi control, but this transfer is expected to occur in the near future.

Figure 10: Governor and MNC-I Assessments and Projections for Provinces (1-31 Jul 2007)



Source: MNF-I

Already Transitioned | Ready For Transition | Partially Ready For Transition | Not Ready For Transition

Note: Provinces transfer security responsibility 30-45 days after being assessed ready

As of 9 AUG 2007

Although the central government cannot yet control security inside the country, Iraq's ground forces, particularly its Special Forces, have demonstrated strong counterterrorism capability. Iraqi Special Forces, which have conducted many counterterrorism operations with and without Coalition forces, have achieved significant operational success in 2007.

[39] See Anthony H. Cordesman, "Success or Failure? Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence and US Strategy: Developments through June 2007," CSIS working draft, updated July 9, 2007; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070709_iraqinsurgupdate.pdf.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Conclusion: The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military and external threats.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

advisors, 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries, and six U.S. military personnel, led by a Senior Executive Service–level U.K. civil servant. Most of the U.S. civilian advisors are contractors from private companies; as of July 2007, only two were U.S. civil servants. The Joint Headquarters Transition Team is led by an Australian general officer and a staff of 50 Coalition military personnel and contractors. All three organizations—the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, the MOD Transition Team, and the Joint Headquarters Transition Team—report to Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq.

The Coalition transition teams working with the Iraqi MOD have separate but related missions, each with specific challenges. The MOD Transition Team is charged both with mentoring the Iraqi MOD civilian leadership as it carries out the ministry's mission and functions and with helping the ministry build its institutional capacity. The MOD Transition Team is also working to build a professional core of civil servants within the MOD. The Joint Headquarters Transition Team supports the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in its efforts to build and implement a command and control capability to train, sustain, and develop the Iraqi Joint Force's ability to address threats as directed by the Government of Iraq. The Joint Headquarters is based on a NATO standard staffing model.

During its assessment, the Commission held numerous meetings with Coalition advisors and Iraqi MOD officials, including two with the Iraqi Minister of Defense. The Commission found that the MOD has made significant strides since 2004 and is one of the more effective ministries in the Government of Iraq. As mentioned, the MOD still faces challenges in budgeting functions, contracting, personnel, intelligence, command and control, and logistics.[53]

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Definition of Success

Success is:

If they can recruit themselves, train themselves, sustain themselves, equip themselves, pay themselves, trust each other and acquire their future force requirements, then they are truly mission ready.

Budgeting

Finding: *Inefficiencies and overcentralization within the Ministry of Defense and its inability to fully execute its budget impede the combat readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces.*

The MOD has a functioning financial management system, complete with budgets that are tied to a requirements process at broad levels. MOD officials characterized their budget as having three primary dimensions: activating the armed forces and deepening their capabilities,

[53] In a survey conducted of senior Coalition commanders in Iraq, the majority told the Commission that progress being made by the MOD in the essential combat functions of command and control, intelligence, mobility, logistics, and fire support is unsatisfactory. Logistics is the greatest near term priority.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

the MOD informed Commissioners that they are planning to field a new software system within the next 6 to 10 months, but before that can happen the software needs to be translated into Arabic, soldiers will need to gain the skills to operate it, and solutions are needed to the problems of connectivity that the regular electricity shortages will inevitably cause. In light of these challenges, fielding a workable logistics information technology system in support of the Iraqi Armed Forces is very unlikely in the near term.

There has been progress in providing the infrastructure required to logistically support the Iraqi armed forces. The comprehensive plan is centered around the Taji National Depot, which, when completed, will provide the national hub for training, supply support, and intermediate maintenance. Construction of warehouses, small arms and ammunition storage, and generator facilities are under way. Much work remains before this plan will be realized, however. The Commission was informed that the end point of the phased timeline is early 2008, but funding and construction delays will most likely push actual completion to between 2010 and 2012. Only $55 million has been funded, just one-tenth of the total required.

Another challenge for the MOD is logistics force structure design. The Iraqi Army remains heavily dependent on contracted support to satisfy day-to-day requirements, and it appears that contracted logistics support (CLS) in some form will be necessary for two to three years. The MOD has developed a detailed plan that will, when in place, adequately provide all required support. This plan is well understood by all key stakeholders, and the structure will provide not only ministerial oversight but also operating components down to the tactical level. Manning the logistics force structure will be a major undertaking, as the Iraqi Army has concentrated on its combat units and has only recently begun the process of manning and training logistics organizations. The Commission was informed that arriving at the final force structure design will likely take two to four years.

The final element needed for logistics development at the MOD level is critical: leadership. At present, there is little logistics expertise at the national level, and both uniformed and civilian leaders require one-on-one mentoring. At the operational and tactical level, transition teams are embedded with operational units. These teams provide technical support and mentoring to the battalion, brigade, and division headquarters and appear to be working very well.

Conclusion: The Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for policy development and implementation as well as resource allocation for the Iraqi military, is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission. However, its capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military. As the MOD continues to mature, it should assume the ministerial-level functions that currently fall to the Coalition.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

becoming difficult to distinguish, the CPA and MOD decided to merge the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi Intervention Force into the Iraqi Army.

The Iraqi Army, in all its various forms, has been an all-volunteer force since the fall of the Ba'athist regime and is the core of Prime Minister Maliki's "Objective Counterinsurgency Force" (for its growth since 2004, see Figure 11). It is composed of:

- Nine light infantry divisions (with one more division in development and two more planned)
- One mechanized infantry division
- Associated support/combat support units
- Nine motorized transportation regiments
- Four logistics battalions
- Two support battalions
- Five regional support units
- Eighty garrison support units[73]

Figure 11: Iraqi Army Size and Capability Growth



Source: MNSTC-I

[73] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 37, and June 2007, pp. 40–41 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Figure 14: Iraqi Army Division Disposition (2007)



Source: MNF-I

Challenges for the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces

During its assessment, the Commission held discussions with more than 50 American officials and 50 Iraqi officials directly involved in the development of the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces, including meetings with a large number of Military Transition Teams and partnered Multi-National Corps–Iraq forces. The Commission also visited more than 30 Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces facilities throughout Iraq, including Army bases, training centers, logistics and maintenance centers, and units at the division, brigade, and battalion levels.

The Commission believes that the Iraqi ground forces have made considerable progress, particularly in the past two years. However, the Iraqi Army and Special Forces face significant challenges in several mission and functional areas, including border protection, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, leadership, personnel, equipment, and logistics and maintenance.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

built tracked vehicles, 69 BTR-80 Russian-built six-wheel vehicles, 353 Polish DZIK four-wheel-drive vehicles, 291 Textron T-6 Badgers, 2,647 AM General Humvees, 600 Land Rover armored jeeps, and 60 small armored vehicles. Shortages of equipment include modern armor, heavy firepower, tactical mobility, air support, and proper medical capabilities. Orders have been placed for delivery by the end of 2007 of 110 BMPs and 29 Cascavels, 29 BTR-80s, 247 DZIKs, 149 Badgers, and 952 Humvees (for a July 2007 snapshot of Iraqi Army unit equipment levels, see Figure 15).

Iraqi units are regularly subjected to direct and indirect fire throughout the country. In almost all cases, Coalition forces must supply the counterfire, close air and artillery support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needed to target the enemy. The Iraqi Army is also significantly supported by Coalition airlift to quickly transport and surge forces to the fight.

As the Commission has stated, the Iraqi Army should continue to focus on its mission of internal defense while beginning to transform itself into a force capable of dealing with the longer-term challenge of external threats. Tactically advantageous to both missions are armor, artillery, and mobility (especially rotary airlift and aircraft capable of providing close air support). Acquiring and implementing these platforms, however, should not distract from the current counterinsurgency mission.

As a first step, existing platforms such as the T-72 tanks donated by NATO to the 9th Mechanized Division should be strategically arrayed around the country to leverage their psychological effect. Entering these platforms into the fight would send a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of the Iraqi people, including neighboring states supporting terrorism and insurgents. Outward, visible indications of strength in the form of heavy armor—displayed in the capital and elsewhere—would demonstrate that the Iraqi Army has been reborn with the strength necessary to protect the nation and its people.

Figure 15: Iraqi Army Equipment by Unit



Source: MNF-I

DIV = Iraqi Army Division
MTR = Iraqi Army Motor Transport Regiment

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

bureaucratic incentives. The Coalition should work with the MOD and Iraqi Army to simplify processes wherever possible and adjust them to an Iraqi standard, which may be more effective in the near term if not necessarily as efficient as we would like.

Conclusion: The Iraqi Army and Special Forces possess an adequate supply of willing and able manpower and a steadily improving basic training capability. The Army has a baseline supply of equipment for counterinsurgency, but much of this equipment is unavailable for operations owing to maintenance and supply chain management problems. They are making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within their ranks and are achieving some progress. Their operational effectiveness, particularly that of the Special Forces, is increasing, yet they will continue to rely on Coalition forces for key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. Despite progress, they will not be ready to independently fulfill their security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved to that end.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

it is designed to support, and it has almost no lethal capability. The procurement process has begun to acquire low-tech, fixed wing close air support aircraft. When that capability is added to those above, a balanced air force will emerge capable of fully supporting the military's counterinsurgency mission. At that point, Coalition air forces may begin a prudent drawdown.

Current deficiencies in the Iraqi Air Force include the lack of fixed wing close air coverage to fully support the counterinsurgency capability of ground forces, a command and control program that is still largely in its infancy, and the lack of a demonstrable ability to operate jointly with other services. The Iraqi Air Force must develop operating techniques compatible with those of the ground forces that it is intended to support. Traditional independence and cultural habits among its personnel of thinking primarily of their own family or tribe may contribute to the challenge of fostering its seamless integration into joint operations. The Commission discerned some faint progress in this area, but a considerable distance remains to be traveled.

Recommendation: *Given its good progress to date, the new Iraqi Air Force should stay its present course of developing a counterinsurgency air force with a view toward establishing quality operations and maintenance capability for integration into the joint fight. As these skills are refined, reliance on Coalition support can diminish.*

Conclusion: The Iraqi Air Force's relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate during this formative period.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

The Naval Transition Team commander identified several problem areas for the Iraqis undertaking the transition. For example, the Iraqis are having trouble with the command and control portion of the road map, which eventually calls for strategic command from the Joint Headquarters in Baghdad, operational control from the naval headquarters at Umm Qasr, and tactical command from commanders on vessels in the Northern Arabian Gulf. Naval Transition Team officials characterized leadership as variable, though they consider the operational commander in Umm Qasr to be highly competent. Training is progressing well (including a good program in visit, board, search, and seizure operations), and in general the Iraqi Navy is making progress in acquiring new ships. At the tactical level, the Naval Transition Team commander cited good spirit and morale and improved base security.

The issues of poor maintenance and a weak supply chain surfaced repeatedly as major impediments to the Iraqi Navy's development. In particular, a tendency toward fixing breakdowns rather than performing preventive maintenance is a significant problem, as is the difficulty of getting funding released that can be devoted expressly to maintenance and other support operations. In fact, the Naval Transition Team Commander informed the Commission that maintenance is one of the Iraqi Navy's pressing problems, In addition, lack of access to sufficient fuel stocks and reliance on generators are problematic.[141] These issues also strongly indicate the need for continued Coalition assistance.

Recommendation: *An ongoing Naval Transition Team presence in Umm Qasr is essential and should be continued.*

It is vital that the Iraqi Navy retain the support of its Coalition partners, both to sustain current progress and to address new priorities. Among the Naval Transition Team's future priorities are creating an Umm Qasr naval base action plan with an operational focus (building command and control, improving communications, formalizing a planning process), developing consistent and competent leadership, and, ultimately, effecting the transition. The most difficult choice will likely be regarding the extent to which Naval Transition Team should step back and allow the Iraqis to take on greater responsibility, balancing their need to learn to take risks against the need to complete the transition. The central tension may be between attempting to achieve Coalition standards and encouraging the Iraqi Navy to find Iraqi solutions to its problems.[142] In the very near term, the focus may have to be placed more on the integration of Coalition forces with Iraqi naval forces than on transition.[143]

Conclusion: The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense's understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

[141] *Ibid.*
[142] *Ibid.*
[143] Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

300,000 as of July 2007 and are composed primarily of the Iraqi Police Service, National Police, and border enforcement forces (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: MOI Force Growth



Source: MNSTC-I

Data includes all MOI Forces (IPS, National Police, FPS and DBE)

Challenges for the Ministry of Interior

During its assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Commission met with officials at the departments of Defense and State involved in efforts to further develop the Ministry of Interior. The Commission also met with the Honorable Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida'ie, Iraq's Ambassador to the United States, who had served in 2004 as Minister of Interior. While in Iraq, the Commission held discussions with numerous Iraqi and American officials working for and with the MOI. In addition to meeting with senior officials working at the MOI level, the Commission also visited many Iraqi Police Service, National Police, and Department of Border Enforcement sites to gain a field-level perspective on the ministry.

It is clear from the Commission's extensive interviews and site visits that despite painstaking work, especially during the past year, the Ministry of Interior remains a highly sectarian organization that is partially effective at best and is in danger of losing ground in some administrative areas. If it is to continue to make progress, the MOI must deal more successfully with

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

140,000 people serving in the Facilities Protection Service, in December 2006 the Prime Minister directed that all FPS personnel be consolidated and come under the supervision of the MOI. Despite this new policy mandating consolidation, most ministries are resisting the change. Some ministries are reluctant to relinquish control of their FPS forces, and the Ministry of Finance has not transferred funding to the MOI to administer oversight of the Facilities Protection Service.

Until FPS personnel can be vetted, trained, and equipped under a central, national set of standards, the threat of sectarian violence delivered at the hands of FPS personnel will remain.

Recommendation: *The Coalition should support consolidation of the Facilities Protection Service by encouraging the establishment of national implementing orders. As consolidation proceeds, the Coalition should assist the MOI to ensure that the Facilities Protection Service personnel can be properly vetted, trained, and equipped.*

Conclusion: The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Challenges for the Iraqi Police Service

Though 2006 was to be "the Year of the Police," it is widely viewed as having been less than successful.[160] At the same time, it is clear that in the past year, the Iraqi Police Service has made some progress. The police in the Kurdish region are relatively solid and are providing basic security in the three Kurdish provinces. Not only are they policing their own neighborhoods, they also have opened the police training center in Sulaymaniyah to police recruits from across the country, and the region has accepted internally displaced persons from other parts of Iraq with relatively few ensuing security problems. In Habbaniyah in Anbar province, efforts to recruit police locally are thriving, and the training being conducted at the Habbaniyah regional training center is encouraging. Finally, while the sectarian influences on the police are far greater in ethnic and religiously mixed areas like Baghdad, even there the joint security stations have demonstrated that the police can begin to establish a more meaningful neighborhood presence if Coalition forces provide mentoring and oversight (for a snapshot of the transition plan for Joint Security Stations, see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Joint Security Station Evolution



Source: MNF-I

[160] Perito, "Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police and Facilities Protection Service."

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

policing is possible. Given this challenge, the Iraqi policing strategy will likely need to follow an evolutionary process, much like the police experience in Northern Ireland.

At the height of The Troubles, the police in certain parts of Belfast were restricted to responding to calls from the public and conducting limited patrols. As many as 16 British Army soldiers were required to support just two police officers on patrol, when under normal conditions these police would patrol alone. Over time, as the security situation began to improve, police officers conducted patrols in groups of two armored vehicles with three officers in each. Later, police could patrol in armored SUVs, and today police officers are starting to patrol on bicycles in what used to be the most dangerous neighborhoods. This transformation did not happen quickly; the British Army only recently ended its support to police activities in Northern Ireland after 38 years of military operations. Reductions in the military presence supporting police activities in Northern Ireland were linked to increased security on the ground, which in turn was the result of increasing political stability over time.

Recommendation: *The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to develop a detailed strategic plan to transition primary responsibility for internal security in Iraq from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service.*

Working closely with the ministries of Interior and Defense, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should help the Government of Iraq develop a detailed plan to shift primacy for Iraq's internal security from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service. This plan should outline core policing principles as well as milestones for the evolution of the policing process. One core principle should be the requirement that an Iraqi police officer is always the face of a patrol for the public, and is in charge of the patrol, regardless of the size of the military escort. Another core principle should be that the military provides a secure platform to enable police to execute their primary function of upholding the rule of law until that secure platform is no longer necessary. This kind of strategic plan would include benchmarks to assess the evolution of policing away from the Army and toward the Iraqi Police Service. Such benchmarks might include the ability to replace Army units with police personnel without loss of control over an area, or the ability to rely on military capabilities only for specialized functions such as helicopter support. Whatever the milestones, a central concept in the policing plan needs to be the establishment of civil policing as the standard. Even if for many years this civil police force can function only with substantial military support, as was the case in Northern Ireland, the concept of a civil police force responsible for public security must be instituted from the outset as a societal norm.

Conclusion: The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

how the National Guard can be used in the United States, but it is not clear whether the National Police in its current form can execute this kind of mission effectively (for its operational readiness, see Figure 19).

Figure 19: MOI National Police Forces' Operational Readiness



Source: MNF-I

Note: This chart displays National Police Units' operational readiness, not numbers of units that have been assigned lead responsibilities in their AOR.

The National Police achieved 100 percent of its authorized equipment levels at the end of 2006. National Police personnel are outfitted with small arms, medium machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and body armor. National Police units have light, medium, and heavy pickup trucks, as well as sport utility vehicles. In recognition of the need for heavier equipment, given National Police involvement in counterinsurgency operations, plans have been made to up-armor more than 1,300 of the SUVs and trucks.[168] The 1st Mechanized National Police Brigade has approximately 60 M-1117 armored security vehicles, 50 Ukrainian armored personnel carriers derived from the Soviet BTR-80, and 115 South African–made Reva armored personnel carriers. In the future, the National Police aspires to have rotary wing aircraft, cargo planes, more armored vehicles, mortars, mine detectors, and unmanned aerial vehicles, but it is not clear when or whether this equipment will be acquired.

[168] Walter Pincus, "US to Armor Plate Iraqi Police Vehicles," *Washington Post*, December 16, 2006.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

ensure that all former National Police members seeking to transfer to the Iraqi Army or Iraqi Police Service are sufficiently vetted prior to being accepted into either of those organizations.

Conclusion: The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

the implementation of an isolated new policy. It is a pervasive problem that will require real change within the Department of Border Enforcement and increased capacity—and, more importantly, will—in the MOI to exert central government authority over Iraqi border security.

> *Conclusion:* Iraq's borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq's borders will remain porous and poorly defended.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE