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CURRENT OPERATIONS AND THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN IRAQ

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
MARCH 17, 2005

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CURRENT OPERATIONS AND THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN IRAQ

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 17, 2005.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. SAXTON. Good morning.

This morning the committee will continue its oversight of operations in Iraq by receiving testimony from three outstanding experts regarding both military operations and the ongoing political transition.

Our witnesses today are the Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, former Secretary of Defense for Policy, and former Senior Adviser for Defense and Security Sector Affairs to the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq; Dr. Steven Metz, Chairman of Regional Strategy and Planning, Research Professor of National Security Affairs; Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Welcome to the committee, gentlemen. We appreciate very much that you have agreed to be with us this morning.

As we enter the fourth year of the continuing Global War on Terrorism, it is appropriate to reflect on valuable lessons as well as to address current challenges.

Our witnesses can add to our understanding of these lessons and challenges by discussing in some depth the major issues identified by the military and its operations in Iraq, in particular multinational forces.

Iraq has identified five pillars for not only completing our mission in Iraq but for winning the overall campaign against extremism.

Generally stated, these pillars include: combat operations as an effective counterinsurgency campaign, the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, restoration and improvement of essential services, promotion of governance and the establishment of the legitimate national government.

Finally, the strategy seeks to promote economic pluralism.

The panel we have before us today has a wide variety of professional academic and political experience. We hope that their experience helps us better understand the challenges we face and how the Department of Defense (DOD), five-pillared approach is or is

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not effective in rebuilding a country devastated by 30 years of tyranny.

We have seen some recent improvements in Iraq, including yesterday's inaugural meeting of the Transitional National Assembly, as well as steady improvement from the Iraq security forces.

Today over 2,000 reconstruction projects are under way with nearly 1,000 more in the final stages of planning.

Today's infrastructure in Iraq is improving, but we still have a long way to go. The progress is being made despite a persistent insurgency and is evidence of our military efforts having a major impact.

I hope that your testimony today, gentlemen, helps us better understand what things we have done right in Iraq, and what we can more effectively address as the challenges go forward.

Gentlemen, we are pleased that you have chosen to join us here today on such short notice and look forward to your testimony.

Now let me recognize Mr. Ortiz for whatever opening statement he may wish to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My dear leader is not here with me this morning, but I am going to read the statement that he worked on last night.

"I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I want to say a few words about why today's hearing is important and how we got to where we are today.

"The ongoing conflict in Iraq is the most consuming national security issue we currently face as a Nation. Regardless of whether we agree with the decision to invade Iraq or not, our national prestige is now on the line and we must win.

"The outcome of the effort to rebuild Iraq into a viable national but pluralistic government has implications beyond Iraq itself. What happens in Iraq also affects our relations with our allies, regional stability, the broader war against terrorism and the future of democracy in the Middle East.

"On a different scale, the conflict in Iraq has profound implications for the future well-being and capability of our military forces.

"It is incumbent upon us, as a committee, to explore the various facets of this situation, not only because our success or failure in Iraq affects our national standing, but also because we, on this committee, have a constitutional duty to provide our military—and we need to understand how things in Iraq stand today. Can we win in Iraq?

"We need to know what our strategy for success is. We have been asking this of our senior defense officials and military officers for several weeks. We have yet to get an answer that satisfies me.

"We should understand how to measure our own progress in Iraq as well as that of the Iraqi security forces. We need to have a realistic sense of whether integrating the Shiite, Sunni and Kurd ethnic factions into Iraq's security forces and into the government has some reasonable prospect of success.

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"We need to understand the nature of the insurgency and its capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. We need to understand the progress in rebuilding Iraq's economy and infrastructure.

"While it is not the subject of today's hearing, we must also fully understand how the pace of operations in Iraq is affecting our own force. How is the continued high pace of operations going to affect our ability to train, equip and man the force?

"How significant an issue is detainee abuse, both within our own forces and creating ill will among the Iraqi people toward Americans?

"What does the prospect of an extended military presence in Iraq mean for our future defense budgets? What steps should we be taking now in order to avoid breaking the force and in order to ensure that our military remains prepared to meet contingencies in other regions of the world?

"To do our job right, we need answers to these questions from experts within the Administration and without.

"Mr. Chairman, fortunately, we have a distinguished panel of outside experts before us today, who I know we are going to be able to shed some light on these important matters.

"Mr. Chairman, I do now want to note that the original scope of this hearing has been to explore just the progress in training Iraqi security forces. This is a critical issue in achieving success in Iraq and eventually drawing down the American presence there.

"It is even more important in light of the testimony given earlier this week by the Government Accountability Office. This testimony highlighted problems with the reporting of the numbers of Iraqi security forces on the rolls and problems in measuring their readiness.

"I had hoped that we would be able to hear two experts, Generals Luck and Petraeus. In my opinion, the Administration should want to have these witnesses appear before us, because I believe much of what they would like would be good news. Sadly, this is not the case.

"I again want to thank our three witnesses for being here today on a short time notice."

And now I turn to my chairman, who just walked in, and to my dear leader, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Ortiz.

And welcome, Mr. Skelton, this morning. And we are glad you are here with us and I think you might want to say a few——

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. I just want to thank the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz, for the opening statement, and I am sorry I am a few moments late. I was unavoidably detained and I look forward to the very distinguished witnesses today.

And again, Mr. Ortiz, thank you.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Skelton. Gentlemen, the floor is yours. Proceed as you see fit.

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Secretary SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, do you have a preference as to the order, or we sort of thought we would start at this side and go along, if that is okay.

Mr. SAXTON. We will start with you, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, FORMER SENIOR ADVISOR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY SECTOR AFFAIRS TO THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY FOR IRAQ

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to be here.

I regret that the short notice made it impossible to prepare a written statement, but I have a few notes to talk about the issues that you have asked us to address.

And I should make clear that I am speaking as an individual and certainly not for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), or Ambassador Bremer.

I was in Iraq for six months in 2003 working for Ambassador Bremer on the CPA staff, with a principal responsibility for the Iraq military, including things ranging as far as from paying the old military to the much more important task of setting up the training and equipment program for the new army and starting working with the Iraqis on the new Ministry of Defense and national security system.

I want to begin by saying what a privilege it was to work with the dedicated and brave team of civilians and military, Americans and coalition countries and Iraqis, and especially the Iraqis who bear the principal risk in this whole effort.

Since then I have tried to follow events and talk to people and read carefully and critically, but obviously I have no special access to internal information. And I recognize, in part, because of my experience out there, the limits of what you can know in detail about a process that is as complicated and as far away as the efforts in Iraq.

As Mr. Ortiz said in his opening statement, the war will remain controversial for a long time. But the issue is not its rightness or its wrongness or even the correctness of the decisions that were made in the aftermath of the major combat operations. The issue is the future and the stakes are huge. They are huge for Iraqis, but they are also huge for the Americans.

As was said in the opening statements by both you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ortiz, the United States, not just our prestige but our security interests are vitally at stake.

And moreover, the possibility of real change in the Middle East is in some sense a function of our success or failure in Iraq.

Much has gone more difficult, much has gone badly. And the losses both in terms of killed and wounded are a terrible loss for the people involved and they are a tribute. We owe it to their sacrifice to follow through and make this a success. And that also includes being clear-eyed about what has gone right and what has gone wrong.

There has been good news in the election and in the political process that is starting. But it is far from clear that the trend line

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is yet steadily and irrevocably off. And there is certainly no magic fix and there is absolutely no quick fix.

The goal is still the right one. In Iraq, it is decent for its own people, governmentally, economically and in security terms, and it is a constructive force in the region.

Now, you outlined, Mr. Chairman, the five pillars. For some reason they have grown—like, I guess, all government programs—they have grown from four to five, since I was there. We combined security into both the efforts of the multinational force and the Iraqi security forces. But those are the basic elements of a successful strategy.

And I want to make the point that they are interrelated. Services, economic recovery and a representative and legitimate government are important in themselves but they also contribute to security, and security is necessary for them to be successful.

I want to focus on two points: One is, what is the nature of the problem we face in the insurrection? And second, what is a workable approach to the security situation?

I think the election has made it obvious that insurrection—which is a term that I have never liked particularly—is not simply or even primarily a fight against the U.S.-led occupation. No, it is probably true that most Iraqis, like most people, do not like having a foreign army around.

The core of the problem is it is a fight about the future of Iraq. The great majority of the Iraqi people want to seize the opportunity of the ouster of Saddam to build a new country. This is certainly the view of almost all Kurds and Shia and other minorities. And many Sunnis as well want to see success and want a new system.

The real issue is that this effort is being resisted by people who do not want a success. Certainly the core of the insurrection remains the old Baathist thuggery, and they are supported by much of the old Sunni elite.

The Sunnis are in an interesting and difficult position. They have two sets of concerns, one legitimate and one illegitimate.

The illegitimate sets of concerns are that the old system was dominated by Sunnis, dominated by a relatively small group of Sunni elite who did very well out of the old regime. At the core of it was the Baath Party, which I think is better thought of as like the Mafia than like a political party.

But it also included a whole structure dependent on Saddam's handouts and his power. That is the illegitimate part, with which there can be fundamentally no compromise.

The legitimate part of their concerns is that they realize that they are now a minority in a country, in which for both good and bad reasons the majority may be tempted to oppress them, in some sense to treat them more or less the way they treated the majority when they were in power.

And that is a concern that it is essential that the Iraqi political system address.

So far, the political leadership in both the Shia and Kurdish communities has recognized that obligation and is trying to reach out to the Sunni leadership. But that is essentially what the fight is about.

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The insurrection itself is composed of a lot of different groups. As I said, I believe the core of it remains the old structure of Saddam's Baath Party. But it is also supported by Sunni nationalists, some of whom are primarily Sunni nationalists, some of who are Sunni-Islamic radicals with more of a religious fanaticism and bigotry than an ethnic nationality as their organizing principle.

There are some foreign terrorists. That cannot be ignored. And it is certainly the case that even many of the indigenous terrorists take advantage of external refuges, money, places to organize and so on.

And then, something I think Americans do not focus on, but for many ordinary Iraqis, the central security issue has nothing to do with politics; it has to do with ordinary crime, particularly kidnapping, theft and a general rise in organized crime attendant on the general weakness on the security system and the police.

There are also potential security problems including the possibility of Shia extremism and the militias, which are a potential for a kind of warlordism in Iraq.

At the moment, those are not the central problems, but they are long-term problems.

In the long run the solution to these security problems has to be Iraqi, but it certainly is the case that in the short run, that is going to require a lot of support from outside, both in dealing with the immediate security problems and in training and equipping the Iraqi security forces.

Programs are now under way, both in the military, under the ministry of defense for the army and what used to be called the ICDC, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and then the national guard, which has now been folded into the military.

At least as important are the police and the criminal justice system and the Iraqi-based intelligence system.

In all of these elements—General Eaton, who was in charge of the coalition military assistance training system when I was out there, he was my deputy for the actual military training. He used to like to say that everybody wants things good, fast and cheap. And he said, "I can almost always do one of the three. I can sometimes, by great effort, do two of the three, but you would never do all three." And we have to recognize that the solution is not going to be all three.

There have been problems with getting equipment. And there are problems in some sense about the nature of the equipment which is required for the Iraqi forces.

We have paid, rightly, a great deal of attention in this country—and the committee has been a leader on the issue—for example, of body armor for American troops. That certainly has to be the American priority.

But the Iraqis, not surprisingly, say if they are supposed to go out on patrols with Americans troops with body armor and they do not have any body armor, they are not very happy about that arrangement. We have to address that kind of issue.

The fundamental problem with both the police and the army and the military units is leadership.

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We learned very early on in the training efforts that the ordinary Iraqi GI, if you will, the enlisted person—and they are all men, the enlisted man—is pretty good.

Iraq is the permanent refutation of the National Rifle Association (NRA) argument that no country with widespread private ownership of firearms was ever a dictatorship, because as far as I can see, every Iraqi family has several AK–47s.

When we tried to limit them to one, it was regarded as extremely unreasonable. And then the prohibition on machine guns was also regarded as an interference with their cultural practices.

The troops are pretty good. The problem is leadership, which is the problem in any military or police organization.

It is very hard to change a whole culture of leadership in a short time, and yet, in a sense, it absolutely has to be done.

Let me just identity a few of what I think are some of the lessons that we have learned in trying to train the Iraqi security forces.

The first is that effectiveness is key. I really do not like this numbers game. It would be much better—quite literally—it will be much better to have 2,000 competently trained police and 2,000 competently trained sort of special forces, counterintelligence people, in units than to have 10 times that many who are incapable of doing much more than guarding buildings.

And it is also important to remember that we and the Iraqis are building an Iraqi security force for the long haul. So it is essential that the Iraqi security forces be respectful of civil authority. Iraq is, after all, the country that invented the Middle Eastern military coup in the 1930's.

And it is important and part of the effort to build up a civilian Ministry of Defense, to build up a structure of oversight of national security and coordination of national security that really works.

The second lesson I draw is, you cannot rely on the old structures. Every effort to try to pull together the old structures has been a failure. And it is harsh to say it, but the system has got to be built up from the ground up and build it new.

The third is that quality counts. If you want it bad, you get it bad.

As I said, I think the biggest success in training the security forces has been the relatively small elite units and that things should be accelerated as much as they can be without losing quality, but you have to be very conscious of the fact that if you accelerate very much, you will lose quality.

It is also important that national unity be reflected in the composition of the security forces. The security forces cannot be the preserve of any political party or any ethnic group. And that requires real effort.

One of the principles that we tried to establish was that the army, at least the actual regular army, would be integrated, in ethnic terms. So there would be Kurds, Shia and Sunni in every unit, literally in every squad.

That is very hard to do, but it is very important if the national army is to be perceived as a national army and not a political instrument.

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As I said, the process has real enemies. There are efforts to infiltrate the units. This is a real danger. On the other hand, national reconciliation is also very important.

It is important that people understand that the exclusion of so-called Baathists never applied to most people who were in the Baath Party. It only applied to about 40,000 out of a party membership of well over a million.

In officer corps, the commissioned officer corps, more than 80,000 officers—we have the personnel records so we know—only about 8,000 were at senior levels in the Baath Party, and that included a lot of people who were actually in the intelligence services.

Corruption is a major problem. It is endemic in the region and it is endemic in Iraq, and it makes it very difficult if you do not get good people.

Basically, this is up to the Iraqis. There are many difficulties. It has turned out to be harder than people expected. There were plenty of mistakes.

But there are some reasons to hope. There are a lot of resources. The fact that the United States, with the support of Congress, is prepared to continue to put money into the effort is extremely important.

It is also important to have some sense of perspective. It is still true that Iraq is not a country that is in total chaos. No part of the country is entirely safe.

The insurgents can and do put off bombs in Erbil, which in other respects is as safe as Baltimore, but most of the incidents are concentrated in the relatively small part of the country.

And there are a lot of Iraqis who want this process to work.

The general public does not like the occupation, but they remain remarkably hopeful about the future of Iraq. Paradoxically enough, at least if you believe the polls, more Iraqis think Iraq is on the right track than Americans think the United States is on the right track.

I do not believe that is true, but that is what the polls say.

So there is a real prospect of this working.

Iraq is a country that has gone through hell for really the last 50 years, and they see an opportunity. And the question is: Can we work with them to build up their security forces and on the other fronts so that it is a success?

It is important for America as well as for Iraq that that succeeds.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Slocombe, thank you very much, sir. Dr. Metz.

STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN METZ, CHAIRMAN: REGIONAL STRATEGY AND PLANNING, RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Dr. METZ. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege to be able to speak today on what I really believe is the preeminent security issue of our time.

I do need to note that I am here as an analyst and a scholar who has spent a lifetime trying to understand insurgency—the past two years, the Iraq conflict. But all of my comments today are strictly my own and do not reflect official Army or DOD positions.

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As suggested in the opening statements of this hearing, the Iraq conflict is of great importance, not only because its outcome will shape the Middle East and affect U.S. interests there for years to come, but also because of the broader thing it tells us about the nature of armed conflict and American strategy in today's global security environment.

What we learn or do not learn in Iraq will determine how secure the United States is in the coming decades in many other parts of the world as well.

So this truly is, I believe, the preeminent security issue of our time.

And from that perspective, what I would like to do, in a very brief statement, is to try to place the Iraq conflict and the insurgency there in a broader strategic context. And I will do this by addressing four questions.

One question I am going to talk briefly about is: How did we get there? Second, what is the nature of this conflict? Third, what has gone well and what has gone badly? And fourth, what is the way ahead?

Let me start with the question of how we got there.

I certainly do not intend to provide a history lesson on the events that led us to involvement in counterinsurgency in Iraq. But I do want to address what I think are two common misperceptions about the emergence of the insurgency and U.S. involvement in the counterinsurgency there.

One is that the United States somehow caused this insurgency through misguided policy or strategy.

As a long-time student of insurgency, I believe that there were two contradictory dynamics in place in Iraq that meant that some sort of armed resistance was inevitable.

One of these dynamics was the fact that Iraq was coming out of decades of pathological repression. So what that meant was the Iraqis were not prepared in 2003 to operate a stable, developing and open political system without some tutelage.

The other dynamic was the fact that they were not willing to accept this fact.

These two things—neither of which the U.S. created—were in opposition to each other. And I believe that the opposition between them, the conflict between them, made some sort of armed struggle inevitable.

It is certainly true that the insurgency might have occurred earlier or later than it did. It might have been more or less widespread if we had done different things.

But I believe that the history of insurgency suggests that the factors that were in place there meant that some sort of armed conflict was inevitable.

The second misperception in terms of how we got there is one that really has almost become standard in the thinking about insurgency—in fact, this is a Scali article I was reading just a couple of days ago—and that is the idea that the United States was slow in recognizing the insurgency and responding to it.

And you know, I think the idea that people even say, that people put this idea forward, shows what extraordinarily high standards we hold our defense policy-makers and our military leaders to.

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Because if you look at the history of insurgency, going back 100 years or more, around the world, the norm for a government or regime to recognize that an organized insurgency is under way and then began to respond to it is years.

I would suspect that if someone actually did empirical research and looked at all of the insurgencies that had never existed, you would find that generally the insurgencies had been in place and doing things, including armed attacks, for one year or two years before the government finally said, "Yes, we have a problem," and dealt with it.

This pattern has really been repeated over and over again around the world.

It took the United States about 10 weeks to recognize this insurgency and at least begin to deal with it.

So I am absolutely convinced that this is by far the fastest reaction to an insurgency that has ever existed in history.

So when I see these criticisms in the literature talking about the slowness of the American reaction, it really seems to me that this is like a coach blaming a football team that has just won 35 to nothing for the one or two times that it did not score during the game. I mean, I really think that we reacted in a historically extraordinary way there.

Second question: What is the nature of the conflict?

I am absolutely convinced that the single most important characteristic in an insurgency, and one that we all need to continually remind ourselves, is that the military dimension of it is only one part and usually not the most important one.

Insurgents might sometimes defeat governments in the military realm, but it is almost always true that insurgents themselves cannot be defeated by military force alone.

In fact, insurgents intentionally shape their strategy and intentionally shape a conflict so that the military realm is not decisive.

They recognize that governments almost invariably have a significant military advantage. So what they do is they shift the conflict into other what might be called battle spaces.

The most important battle space, the essence of an insurgency, is the psychological. Insurgency is often called armed theater. And I think that is a very apt metaphor, because what we have, as in the theater, is we have two antagonists who are interacting with each other, insurgents and counterinsurgents, but they are also playing to a wider audience at the same time that they interact with each other.

Now, what all of this means is that the only successful response to insurgency is a unified, holistic counterinsurgency strategy that blends the military with law enforcement, effective intelligence, psychological operations and broad-based efforts to address the grievances that led to the conflict in the first place.

So the military is an important player in counterinsurgency, but certainly not the only one and, in most cases, not the most important. The military dimension is not the decisive one in a counterinsurgency.

The third question I would like to briefly touch on is: What has gone well and what has gone badly?

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Again, what I will do here is just give a very broad strategic overview and explore this in any way you would like later on.

To some extent, I am a biased observer here. But based on my background of examining insurgencies around the world for a number of years, I am convinced that in general the reaction of the Department of Defense and the military and their adaptation has gone fairly well in this conflict, considering that counterinsurgency preparation was not a top priority of DOD and the military for a number of years, and considering that this may be the most complex insurgency in all of history.

As we know it is almost as if there are multiple insurgencies, multiple conflicts with different strategies, different tactics, different organizations taking place in the same time and space.

Insurgencies, in general, are often what might be called adaptation contests between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Each tries to learn, adapt, change what they are doing more quickly than the other.

And this has certainly characterized the Iraq insurgency. It has been a constant learning contest. And, in fact, our military has done extraordinarily well, I believe, at this learning.

If you track the adaptations that have taken place, from the broad strategic level to the squad level, you look at all of the communications between sergeants and captains and lieutenants, the things that worked that were immediately communicated through blogs and chat rooms and things like that to other units, we have really done a very, very good job of adapting and learning on the fly.

What has not gone well in this particular conflict are those vital and even decisive components of the conflict that should not have been the responsibility of the military: some types of intelligence, economic and political development, strategic and political shaping of the environment and so forth.

You know, I think what has happened in Iraq is the military has undertaken a number of the tasks like this for which it was not perfectly suited simply because there was no other organization in the U.S. Government that was suited to do it, was effective and was there to do it.

The military took on a lot of jobs because no other agency existed which could.

To again kind of explain this point by a metaphor, what happened in Iraq is as if we entered a large-scale conventional war with a tremendously adept Air Force but no Army or Navy at all. I mean, any student of military history would say, "That is no way to fight a war."

What we did in Iraq is, we entered a counterinsurgency with an effective, talented military but without the other components of this unified governmental team that could do the other tasks.

As a nation, to phrase it differently, we were not organized and prepared for counterinsurgency across the government.

And this leads directly to the final question that I would like to address: What is the way ahead? And let me suggest two broad issues that I think are very important for us to consider under this topic.

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First, we need to decide, through rigorous study, through open debate, through hearings like this, whether we believe the conflict in Iraq is a model for the future or a unique case that will not be repeated.

And I mean, I will tell you this literally keeps me awake at night thinking about this. Because we all know the old saying that militaries often prepare to fight the last war.

And, you know, it is often said that the military, to some extent, spent a lot of the 1990's preparing to fight Desert Storm over. And there have been hundreds, thousands of cases throughout history of militaries that did a lot of changing, reorganization, training, but they were preparing to fight the last war.

There is a chance that we might repeat that with Iraq. We might transform the military to be more effective at Iraq-style conflicts. We might even reorganize other parts of the government only to find that we will not do another Iraq in the future.

But if you think of what Iraq was like, the idea that we were forced to transform a restive nation with limited United Nations (U.N.) and international support, the question we need to ask ourselves is: Is that going to be the normal pattern for the future uses of American force, or what is a unique, a *sui generis* case that will not be repeated again?

If the later is right, then we would probably be best not transforming the military and the government to deal with this type of situation.

Second and finally, if we do decide that Iraq-style operations are the way of the future, that this is what the future conflict environment will bring us and we need to transform to reorganize to deal with them, I am absolutely convinced that the key to success is developing capability outside the military for those other decisive tasks that are best suited for other agencies.

And I do not believe this is simply a matter of assigning a greater role to the State Department. I know there is been movement in that direction saying, "Well, you know, it should be the State Department in charge of counterinsurgency rather than the Department of Defense."

I think that the State Department is as ill-equipped to focus on counterinsurgency as the Department of Defense and the military are. I mean, both have absolutely vital roles, but neither is primarily focused on this type of task.

Today, the military is undertaking a number of steps to be more effective at stability and counterinsurgency operations, to confront irregular challenges. And the State Department has moved in this direction as well.

But if Iraq is a model of the future, what we need is a serious and fundamental reorganization of the government so that we have some sort of agency, some organization that really focuses on not only responding to these type of situations when we face them in the future, but more importantly, deterring and preventing them.

If we do not create an organization like this, I am afraid that what we might do is simply rearrange the existing deck chairs rather than create a really effective mechanism.

Clearly, what I am proposing here would be an immense task. And that is why I think it is a very important force to decide if Iraq

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conflicts are the model of the future, are we going to be serious about it.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Dr. Metz. Dr. Krepinevich.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before this committee today and to offer my views on this important issue.

I come at the issue from a bit of a different perspective than either of my colleagues.

The focus of my testimony is how can we tell whether or not we are winning this war. And to do that, I will speak briefly on what kind of a war is this; what is this war's center of gravity; what is our strategy for securing that center of gravity; and then how do we measure or determine or assess whether or not we are making progress and executing our strategy.

My colleagues have spoken to the issue of what kind of war is this. Obviously, we are fighting an insurgent movement.

And fighting insurgencies, as we have seen and heard, is a difficult business. It is a business we got out of, right after Vietnam, and you can see, in particular, our Army struggling to get back into that business.

Insurgencies do not play to our strong suits.

They devalue technological and logistical advantages, advantages that are among the strongest of our military, while they emphasize what some people would call the social or perhaps, Dr. Metz, the psychological element of warfare which is arguably a weakness of ours, especially given the lack of cultural expertise we have on the area.

Now, in an insurgency what would be the center of gravity?

Well, I would define the center of gravity as that asset or set of assets the loss of which will an enemy's ability or his will to continue resisting.

In a conventional war we often think of the opposing army. Destroy the opposing military, they can no longer resist, or key industrial infrastructure, or key geographic locations—how close are we to Baghdad, in the second Gulf War.

But insurgents have no field army. They have no infrastructure to defend. They occupy no territory that we can seize that will assure us a victory.

It turns out that, in my estimation, there are three centers of gravity in this war. And they all reside, in a sense, in the social dimension.

The first is the Iraqi people, the second is the American people and the third is the American soldier. Do these three groups want us to win this war? Do they want to see us achieve our objectives? Do they think this is a worthy cause?

In other words, do we have their hearts, to use the phrase?

And second, do they think we can win? Do they think we are going to win? Is the sacrifice that we are talking about actually going to end in victory as opposed a noble sacrifice that ends in defeat?

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We have to have all three centers of gravity to win this war, which is a critical asymmetric disadvantage on our part. For us to win we need to maintain or secure all three centers of gravity. For the enemy to win they just need to pry loose one.

If American soldiers, young American men and women, stop enlisting in our Army in sufficient numbers, or if they stop reenlisting, we cannot sustain this war.

If the American people decide that this war is not a worthy cause, or that our military is being poorly led and we are not on the path to victory, but this is just sort of a protracted war with no light at the end of the tunnel, they may decide to cut our losses.

If the Iraqi people do not share their government's vision of the future, the government that we are cooperating with, or if they think that they like the vision, but, you know, you cannot trust those Americans, they may not stay the course, they may conclude that we will not win this war.

So we need to capture, we need to secure all three centers of gravity. And as I said, the insurgents only need to secure one.

Further complicating the issue for us is that there are discontinuities between the various centers of gravity. The American people would like to hear, for example, that the troops are going to come home on this date or that date, but a date that is fairly soon.

The Iraqi people probably, at least the Iraqi government, may need to hear "The American troops will be here as long as it takes to win this war."

There is an inconsistency there. Whatever strategy we develop has got to account for those inconsistencies, has got to balance among them.

What is our strategy for securing these centers of gravity? Traditionally, there is a real menu of strategies for dealing with insurgencies and insurrections. The oil spot strategy: clear and hold, enclaves, search and destroy.

Imperial strategies like divide and conquer, and going all the way back to the Romans, their strategy was to create a desert and call it peace. We would refer to it as perhaps scorched earth. That does not seem to be an option for us, thankfully, in this war.

It is not clear to me that we are, at this point, based on my study of the conflict, pursuing any one of the strategies in particular. Perhaps that is a measure of the complexity of the war, as Dr. Metz was saying, but at some point you do need to agree on a strategy and pursue it.

And that is a concern I have, because if you do not have a clear strategy, then what is the linkage between what you are trying to do and the centers of gravity, and how do you measure whether or not you are making progress in the war?

This brings me to my central point which is: How do we measure progress?

In the October 2003 memo written by Secretary Rumsfeld that was leaked to the press, the Secretary said, "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the Global War on Terrorism." And as Iraq has been described as the central front of that war, one would suspect that the Secretary was concerned that we lacked metrics for knowing how well we were doing in Iraq.

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What are these metrics? How do we know whether or not we are winning or not?

With respect to metrics, they must be chosen with fear and they must be frequently revisited.

As I mentioned, metrics must be linked to strategy and the strategy must be linked to the centers of gravity.

Some of the metrics that you have heard, that I have heard, are often cited as measures of progress, such as: What is the strength of the insurgent forces? What are the number of Iraqi troops that have been trained? What are the level of U.S. casualties? What are the number of insurgent attacks?—seem to me to be either problematic metrics or perhaps, in some cases, even counterproductive.

I think in choosing metrics we have to understand some fundamental points.

The first, getting back to the social dimension of strategy, is if we know who the insurgents are and we know where they are, we win this war. Nobody is worried about whether we have enough combat power. We just need to know who these people are and where they are and we win.

The key in knowing who they are and where they are is intelligence. But it is not the intelligence of spy satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); it is human intelligence.

It is people being able to look at this group of people sitting up here, who all look pretty much alike, and be able to say, "Well, that is an insurgent and he is an insurgent and she is an insurgent." That kind of intelligence comes from the local population. It does not come from technology. It comes from the Iraqi people. Now, when will the Iraqi people provide us with that kind of intelligence?

They will do it when we have won their hearts and minds, when they finally come to the conclusion that they want us to win this war, they think we are going to win it, and when we provide them with enough security that they feel comfortable enough risking sharing that information and being safe from insurgent retribution.

So the key, in my mind, in many ways, is winning the intelligence war.

Now, as I mentioned before, the choice of metrics should quite properly take some time and considerable effort. I will offer up a few here as a way of perhaps demonstrating the link between winning the information war, the centers of gravity strategy and winning the conflict.

One metric, for example, it would be interesting to know the percentage of contacts with the enemy that are initiated by U.S. and coalition forces. That is to say, over time, when we engaged with the enemy, are we initiating the contact or are they?

Because over time, if that percentage is growing, it means we know more and more who the insurgents are and where they are, that we have the initiative. It means we are winning that intelligence war, and we are winning it because we are winning over one of the key centers of gravity, the Iraqi people.

Better still, if you are thinking about training indigenous Iraqi forces to take over this war, not how many are there, but what percentage of contacts with the enemy are initiated by Iraqi security forces.

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We would expect to see over time, if this Iraqification initiative is a success, that not only will Iraqi forces have progressively more contact with the enemy proportionately than we will, but if they are winning the cooperation of the Iraqi people, those contacts will be increasingly initiated by them and not by the enemy.

Another metric that was suggested by Major General Pete Chiarelli, who commanded the 1st Cav Division over in Baghdad until recently: What is the percentage of IEDs, improvised explosive devices, that we are either intercepting or destroying versus those that are detonated against our troops?

Again, it gets back to: Are you winning the information war? Because if we are locating them before they go off, if we find out about them before the enemy initiates an attack, again, we are winning that information war, that intelligence war, and we are winning the support of the people.

Another metric: Can we trace the market for IED emplacements? Let me give you an example.

If we could identify, for example, that last November, the going rate for getting someone to put an IED in place was $200 and now it is $600, well, that is good news for us, because it means, all other things being equal, there are fewer and fewer people who are willing to do that sort of thing.

And so the supply of would-be recruits, would-be insurgents for that particular person is drying up. To get people to do these things, you are going to have to pay them a higher premium to do it—again, an indication of how the trends are in this conflict.

What are the trends in terms of assassinations and police casualties?

If I am an Iraqi citizen and I see judges being assassinated, I see members of the new legislature being assassinated, even police, my thinking is, "If you cannot protect your own, how are you going to protect me? And in the end, how are you going to win that intelligence war, because I am not going to risk my life, if you cannot protect yourself, to give you information against the insurgents?"

Similarly, what are trends in terms of the defections among insurgents, particularly in the leadership?

Think about it. Just as we are trying to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, we are also trying to convince the insurgents, as many of them that we can, that their cause is a hallow one, their hearts, but also that they cannot win, that their cause is hopeless.

And especially if leadership starts coming over, what does that tell insurgents down in the ranks? If we start eliminating these people, not having them defect, but eliminating them, what does that tell the people in the lower ranks in terms of the insurgents' ability to shield their own?

Again, I think that would be an interesting metric to measure.

Another metric—and this is the final one I will mention—has to do with reconstruction.

It has been in the press recently that the premium, the security premium for reconstruction projects, which was down around 5 percent, I guess, when we began, in some cases, it is up around 20 or 25 percent.

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So we are digging a well, and we have 3 guys there digging a well and 30 guys there making sure that they do not get shot while they are digging it.

Over time, you would like to know what that premium is. If we are winning, that premium should be going down because more and more areas of the country should be secure.

Those people that were supposedly training by the tens of thousands should be providing security. After all, it is not the numbers that we train, as Mr. Slocombe has said; it is what they are capable of doing, what they are capable of providing.

So again, I think there are ways to measure progress in this war. It would be interesting to know what the data are. I do not think a lot of the traditional metrics that are associated with conventional war really apply here.

And as I said, I think we need to get about this business and to make sure that whatever metrics we choose, there is a clear linkage to strategy and there is a clear linkage to the three centers of gravity.

To sum up then, we are engaged in a protracted conflict against irregular forces. There are three centers of gravity. The enemy only needs to secure one. We need to secure all three.

From my perspective, at least, it is difficult to discern, at present, a clear strategy that links the winning of the intelligence war with the centers of gravity.

I think that assuming an effective strategy exists or can be instituted, it will have to focus on these centers and in particular on winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, which I think, again, is key to winning that intelligence war to defeat the insurgents.

As Mr. Slocomobe said, "You cannot get good, fast and cheap all a once." This will take time and persistence, if you want good results. I do not think we will see them fast. And I certainly do not think we will see them cheap.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my remarks.

And I would be happy to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the Appendis on page 65.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Krepinevich. I am going to yield my time to Mr. Conaway, for starters here.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, you guys have certainly given us plenty to think about this morning. One of the things that occurs to me, in terms of are we winning or not, where does the economy, the quality of life—all we hear about are the things being blown up and our young men being killed and their young men and women being killed.

And what role do we see in terms of, is the economy getting better; are people having jobs; is there commerce going on, separate and apart from this, that might also factor into some indication that if life is getting better, then you would think that the normal citizen would look on that very favorably with respect to the insurgency.

Any sense on the economy?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would say that that is a key aspect. If you are talking about the Iraqi people being the center of gravity, an

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improved economy, an improved way of life—the prospect that you will have a better life and your children will have a better life—has got to be, I think, a key part of any strategy for winning the war.

With respect to that, again, what you want to try to do is provide security. You do not want to end up with a reconstruction program that ends up looking like "Groundhog Day," where you go in and you create infrastructure, but you do not provide the security that goes along with it, which leaves it open to sabotage by the insurgents.

So it has to go hand-in-hand with that. And again, that security is also integral to winning the minds of the Iraqi people and convincing them that it is safe to cooperate with the government.

Another factor that you have with a growing economy should be a decline in unemployment. And in fact, I think our reconstruction strategy should be as human-capital intensive as possible, sort of going back to Franklin Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps—put as many Iraqis to work as possible.

And so it is not a matter of how efficiently we can dig a ditch or how cheaply we can do it, but I think a key metric there has to be how many Iraqis we can involve. We want these people going home at night with a little bit of money in their pockets and too tired to do anything.

And what you also do in terms of the insurgents, I think, is to dry up that pool of Iraqis that can be co-opted.

There are some true believers among the insurgents. But it seems to me that there are also some who do not have money, have too much time on their hands, maybe their risk tolerance is a little bit higher than mine, and for a few hundred dollars, well, why not go out and plant an IED.

So again, I think reconstruction also plays into the market for IED fees as well.

Dr. METZ. Could I comment briefly on that?

My impression—certainly when I was there, and I think it is still true—is that there is a burgeoning retail sector. You go out on the streets, they are full of people, tshops are full of goods.

Every Iraqi seems to have bought a satellite dish and an air conditioner, which is one of the reasons why the electricity is a problem. And that is very important.

The problem is, is it beginning to be converted into real employment? Unemployment figures in countries like Iraq are extremely unreliable, inherently, but all of the evidence is that it is huge.

Most Iraqis, a high percentage of the population, still basically depend on government-provided food.

We have essentially taken over—I hope, without some of the problems—we and the Iraqi government have essentially taken over the oil-for-food program.

Electricity is essentially free. There is not very much of it, but it is free. Gasoline is for all practical purposes free, which is one reason there are such long gas lines.

One of the long-term problems that Iraq has is that it has inherited a Stalinist-style economy with very inefficient state-owned enterprises that nominally employed a lot of people to make goods that are not sellable outside the country.

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Investment would be important, and as Dr. Krepinevich says, in order to get investment, you are going to have to have security. You are also going to have to have infrastructure.

One of the real disappointments is that it has been so slow getting—we are about back to where the pre-war was in terms of electricity and local production of fuel products and so on, but it is been very hard to get above that.

Partly, it is because of security. It is a lot harder to build a better electrical system if people bomb the pylons, but part of it is not just security.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Can I add a comment, sir?

I think there is a lot of good news going on in terms of the economic reconstruction. But I would just have to warn you that when we try to understand this conflict, we need to be very careful to understand that the phrase, "quality-of-life" is to some degree cultural in its definition.

I mean, Americans tend to define it by cars, houses, kind of physical things. And what we are dealing with here is a culture where quality of life is probably defined as much by concepts like justice and pride, defined by family as it is by how much stuff you own.

So when we look at whether the quality-of-life is improving, it is not just schools, electricity, cars and things like that, but there are these other elements that are a lot harder to get your arms around.

I have had this debate with people for the past couple of years, and they go, "You know, but we have built X number of schools and the roads and things like that."

And I say, "Let's just kind of play a mind game. Let's imagine in some nightmare future, al Qaeda has taken over the United States. And they are implementing Sharia and they are reorganizing the government the way they want it. But at the same time they are fixing the roads and building schools and making the escalators and the Metro work and stuff like that. Would that be okay with you?" And of course any American says, "No, absolutely not."

So we need to understand that to some degree that is the way a lot of Iraqis see the world as well. They like the schools, they like the roads, but I do not think that is really the essence of what this is all about.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. I am going yield to Mr. Udall. But first I must say, Mr. Chairman, that this is an excellent group of witnesses. We really appreciate this. I will ask questions later. Mr. Udall.

Mr. UDALL. I want to thank my Ranking Member for yielding and acknowledge this is one of the best panels that we have had since I joined this committee. Thank you for helping shed some light on what is unfolding.

I wanted to direct a question to Dr. Krepinevich.

We traveled to Munich together recently for the security conference there. In the conversations there was a lot of talk about our European allies, how we bring them to our side in Iraq. Do you think that is an approach that would bear any fruit?

And given what you have had to say today, what would we say to our European allies about the insurgency, about how they might be helpful to us?

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Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, at its fundamental level, strategies about connecting ends and means, and we have, what I would say, ambitious objectives for Iraq, creating a democracy where really democracy has not existed.

The means are what has become in question, in particular.

We have an Army that is built for sprints, not marathons. We have a world-class sprinter as an Army. They are great fighting short wars. They do phenomenal. But we did not structure the Army to sustain it over a long period.

I think there is a concern about that particular center of gravity, that we may not be able to sustain the quality and the level of forces in the field.

One of the reasons I think we turn to coaching up the Iraqis, if you will, is the lack of allied participation.

I had a chance to have lunch with the French equivalent of the Vice Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, last year. And we were talking about the question that you raised.

And he said to me, "Do not you Americans understand?" He said, "Europe really has no troops to send." He said, "If you look at our military," being the French military, "We have troops in Haiti. We have troops in West Africa. We have troops in the Balkans, troops in Afghanistan. If our policy changed to conform to yours overnight, the number of troops we could send would be abysmally small."

He said, "The other great country in Europe that has not sent troops are the Germans, but a significant part of the German military is still conscript. And by German policy, you cannot send conscripts overseas." They really have more of a territorial army.

Other countries that have large armies would be countries like Turkey and India, which for obvious reasons, you would not want to involve their armies in Iraq.

And I think as a consequence of this, whether it is because they do not have the forces to send or they disagree with our policies or would not be wise to send a Hindu army, for example, into a Muslim country, what we have gravitated toward is the Iraqis. The Iraqis become the solution.

But I think it is correct, because I think in the final analysis, they have to win their own freedom.

But that is where we are. I do not see any silver bullet, if you will, in terms of a change either in the disposition of the policy of many of our allies or their capacity to really provide large numbers of troops.

Mr. UDALL. Doctor, if I could follow on, I have had conversations with some of the senior members on the committee on our side of the aisle—Representative Taylor, Representative Abercrombie, Representative Snyder—and we have discussed whether removing American troops sooner rather than later would take the American face off of the occupation and make it easier for the Iraqis to stand on their own.

There is another point of view that in fact the problem is not the American presence; it is the presence of the insurgency.

Would you comment on the utility of that?

And perhaps if there is time, the other two panelists might share their opinions as well.

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Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think right now the American forces probably serve two very useful purposes.

It used to be said that American forces in Europe kept the Soviets out and the Germans down, meaning keeping the Germans and the French from going back at one another.

I think, right now, if you look at where Iraq is, our forces serve to keep some of the wolves at bay. I think, certainly, if our forces were pulled out, you would see even greater efforts by the Iranians, the Syrians, the Turks to jigger and arrive at a more proper outcome.

I think our forces are a moderating influence that keeps the various major groups within Iraq from going at one another.

Remember, the path to power in Iraq has traditionally been a scrum, in which force determines who comes out on top, and then the other groups are repressed.

For the time being, I think that has been moderated by the presence of U.S. forces.

But I also think one indication of the fact that they are concerned about a precipitous U.S. withdrawal is the fact that they are maintaining their own militias. They all have their own private armies. They have a hedge against our pulling out too quickly.

So the final thing I will say is, I think over time, we may be more concerned about the American soldier or the American people, in terms of those centers of gravity with respect to long-term U.S. presence in Iraq.

And here I mean it will be interesting to give you a metric. Over time, are Iraqi forces, for example, suffering a higher percentage of casualties relative to American forces?

Because at some point, if they are not, either the American people or American soldiers will say, "Well, wait a minute. Why are we fighting this fight? It has been three years since we have started training up these forces. When are they going to start taking some of the risks for their own security?"

And I think what you can see over time perhaps is a bit of a backlash that sees the Iraqi security forces as free riders in this conflict. And so that, I think, is something that would concern me just as much as our pulling out precipitously.

Mr. UDALL. I see my time is expired.

I would just note that the British drew the lines of modern-day Iraq in 1922, and I think I have my facts right, the last British soldier left Iraq in 1955. We should be mindful of that.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, it has been 60 years since the end of World War II. We are still there.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Joe Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find your testimony so compelling and so interesting. My questions are going to be brief, because I want you to use as much of my time as you possibly can.

Do the insurgents, in your opinion, actually believe that they can win and that they can supplant the Iraqi government being established right now and that they can drive the Americans and the British and the other coalition forces out?

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Is that their goal? Do they think really that they can win, these disaffected Baathists and old Sunni elite, the outsiders, whatever their motive is for being there?

I am going to throw in a request for your opinion as to how much effect you think Iran might be having on this conflict as well, on the insurgency, either with the insurgents—which seems to me to be a little odd—or just affecting the polices of their Shiite brethren in Iraq.

So I would ask any of you to just kind of tackle this and just free associate, because this has been a great free association of strategic thinking so far this morning.

Thank you.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Can I have a try at that? The Baath—the people who are leading this insurgency are, I believe, the core of it remains mostly the old Baath leadership. A big part of their ideology is that they are survivors.

Remember, Saddam spent, what, four years in jail after one of the coups and came back?

So I think it may not be rational, but I think their maximum objective is that they will come back and take over.

I think their minimum and unfortunately substantially more realistic objective is that they will be able to create a situation in which the rest of the country will have to cut a deal with them, and they will, at a minimum, have power in the Sunni areas and in much of Baghdad and power over the security forces.

Again, I do not think those are the realistic objectives, but I think that is probably what they think.

With respect to Iran, whoever else is behind this insurrection, it is not the Iranians. They are, bizarrely enough, on our side on this particular issue. They want the Sunni insurrection suppressed, and they want to establish a viable and respected government in Iraq that will be majority Shia, because the country is a majority Shia.

I think they are playing for the long run. They want to have influence. They want to have continued impact.

They certainly want to impact the religious community. In some sense, we have talked about the political fight. In some sense it is also a fight over the leadership of the Shia sect of Islam.

I worked a lot with the people in SCIRI, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. And while they are a tough bunch of people, they are also very strongly nationalists and Iraqi.

Somebody said one of the reasons not to worry too much about the attitudes of the Iraqis who were in Iran during long periods of exiles is that they have lived there. The dislike by most Iraqis—who are almost all Arabs, except for the Kurds—for Persians knows no limits. One of the real occasional insults that they throw at politicians is that they are really Persians.

I think, in the long run, Iran has ambitions in the region, but they are long-run problems rather than short-run problems.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Can I comment on that, sir?

Dr. SCHWARZ. Please. There are a few seconds left. The yellow light is on, so fire away.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I spent a lot of time in the last year and a half trying to figure out what these guys want, what their objectives are, and it is almost impossible to discern, because it is such a

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multiparty insurgency, and because unlike most historic insurgenices, they do not have a political wing that says what they want.

You know, I do think Secretary Slocombe was right in that I suspect that those of the insurgents that think strategically, what they want is to, at some point in time in the future, be taken seriously, to be integrated into a government of national unity.

So maybe these guys are like the insurgents in South Africa that never thought they were going to march victoriously into the capital the way Castro did or the Vietnamese did, but simply to be integrated.

But I also think that there is a large what might be called astrategic component of this insurgency: people fighting for their manhood, for their pride. And they have not really, I do not think, kind of worked out a linear logic where they say, "If we do this, it is ultimately going to have that political effect."

And that is what makes this so hard, is this is not a purely rational, political, strategic insurgency the way a lot of them in the past have been.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Slocombe, I think you mentioned the three centers of gravity.

And recently I have been reading the news media about what the new Iraqi government wants to do, and that is to remove the military personnel that were under Saddam Hussein. And I think if they were to do that, 50 percent of the troops would be taken out of the military, and about 75 percent of the officers would be removed.

At one time, the American government—or our troops brought them in. Now the Iraqi government is going to push them out.

What kind of impact is this going to have on the three centers of gravity that you mentioned, you know, the Iraqi people, the American people and the military? What kind of impact if they were to follow with what they want to do—what kind of impact is that going to have?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I am not an expert on the ethnic composition of the force and what they are calling for specifically.

But it seems to me, of course, the key issue here is how it affects the ability of Iraqi security forces to begin to, in a sense, win over the hearts and minds and provide for the security of the Iraqi people; their capacity to begin to deal with the insurgency.

And so I think within the first center of gravity, the Iraqi people, it is: Does this delay reconstruction because security cannot be provided? Does this delay local elections because security cannot be provided? Does this limit my freedom? Do I incur personal risk because security is not provided?

With respect to the American population—again, the longer it takes for the Iraqis to begin to assume a greater burden for their security, one question is, of course, is this war being well-directed and well-managed, because we have been at this process now since at least 2003.

And, of course, the second is the issue of why should young—at what point—why are young American women still risking their lives on behalf of the Iraqis when the Iraqis—and this would, per-

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We will have to see whether that strategy works.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Hefley.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We talked about the Iraq people and we talked somewhat about the factions, but would you speak to that?

You know, my impression is that this is a tribal society. It is kind of an artificial country in some ways. You have the Sunnis and the Shiites and the Kurds and so forth.

How difficult is it going to be to ever get them to really work together as they a melting pot nation, so to speak?

Would you speak to that?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. It is going to be difficult, there is no question.

It is a little less artificial than some of the particulars of the border. There is one place you will notice where the border with Jordan way out in the desert makes a funny twist, a sort of dog leg, because the British did not want a particular road junction to be inside Iraq.

But I think you have to distinguish between the Kurds who definitely want independence. If the Kurds had their way, they would be an independent country straddling four existing countries.

I think most of the Kurdish leadership understands that is not going to happen, and their objective is to cut a deal with a very high degree of autonomy within the country.

But they also recognize there are some advantages to being in a stable political situation from which they have to stay in the country to get it.

The fundamental political issue in Iraq is the relative power of the central government in the regions.

The only way this is going to work is if there is sufficient devolution of power to the regions, to the provinces, which essentially means to ethnic areas, for people to accept it.

Although, one of the things that it is important to understand—you look at these maps in the newspapers or even the ones that the intelligence people produce, and it is neatly divided. These are the Kurds in the North and the Shia in the South and the Sunnis in the middle.

Then there certainly are heavily homogeneous areas, but a lot of them are very mixed up.

There are a million people in Baghdad who can speak Kurdish. Basra has a big Sunni population. Samarra, which is a city whose population is almost entirely Sunni, has one of the major Shia religious shrines, and you see lines of buses of Shia who have come to worship at the shrine.

So there are some things which hold the country together as well, and I think there is a certain sense of Iraqi nationalism.

It is not Afghanistan. It is not by any means as divided and so on.

It certainly is a tribal society, it is a clan society, it is a provincial society and so on.

It is not hopeless, but it is very hard.

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Dr. METZ. Traditionally, an attractive strategy for Iraq would be divide and conquer, especially if you wanted to get out sooner rather than later.

You would do something along the lines of what the British did, which would be to pick a group, back that group against the others, tell them that you will back them unless they threaten your interest in the region, and enable them to suppress the others.

What we are trying to do is much more noble in terms of creating a democracy. But the order of magnitude in terms of the degree of difficulty is also greater.

Democracies find their security in institutions, just as we do in our country. It is our institutions, not a power grab that we have in terms of who governs in this country. They have no experience in that.

And it seems to me that their fear of each other and the fear of lapsing back into the old ways or the traditional ways of securing power means that some way, somehow at the end of the day, if they want to make this work, they are going to have to request a long-term presence of U.S. forces.

There was a Shiite leader recently who said, "Well, of course we do not want the Americans as occupiers, but we might accept them as guests."

And, again, I think down the road if they become seriously interested in democracy, it is going to require a protracted U.S. presence before they are comfortable trusting one another because right now there is no trust or very little.

Mr. HEFLEY. And history tells us that tribal, clan-based nations have some particular political problems, that they cannot transcend them—Ireland, Scotland, perhaps the Republic of South Africa, where societies in some way similar to Iraq and even societies divided along religious, sectarian lines, like Switzerland and Belgium were able to work through that. It is not easy, but it can be done.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, than you for your testimony this morning.

Mr. Chairman, in celebration of our respective Irish roots, I am going to yield my time to Mr. Ryan down in the——

[Laughter.]

Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. I thank Mr. Reyes. I owe you a green beer.

Just a couple of questions—thank you, this has been very informative as well.

I have had the opportunity over the past few weeks to have some pretty good conversations with young men who have returned back who have been in the field and who have went on these missions in Iraq.

And from what they have told me, it seems like there is differing opinions from those folks who are going out and those soldiers who are out on these missions who are very, very frustrated, not only because they are losing their friends, but because they built a city hall and the city hall gets blown up or they build a clinic and the clinic gets blown up.

And what I am noticing is and what they have noticed—and I think what is frustrating them because they are going back—is there is a real disconnect between those soldiers that are out on

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the front lines and those people who are behind the barricades in Iraq.

And I just wondered if you could just explain or give me your thoughts on, is there a disconnect? And are we not hearing a lot of the things that maybe we should be hearing, or is that just soldiers who are in the battle for a while and just frustrated?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, again, from my perspective, that gets back to this issue of what is your strategy.

And my argument has been a key element of your strategy has got to be to win that intelligence war. To do that you have to win the hearts and minds.

If you are thinking about metrics, for example, you just pointed out, Congressman, what good does it do us to build a town hall and see it blown up a week later? That does not improve the lives of the Iraqi people.

In that respect, the amount of projects that we have ongoing or the amount of money we have spent is not really a good metric. It is the amount of projects that, actually, over the long term improve the lives of Iraqi citizens.

To do that, you have to provide security. It has got to be an enduring security. It cannot be episodic, just while the construction is taking place and then everyone is on their own.

And I do not see, again, that kind of strategy.

A traditional counterinsurgency strategy would say you have to start out where you are strong, you would have to provide security, you would have to train local indigenous forces. When they were sufficiently well trained, you could move on and expand your efforts.

There is an old military axiom, "He who seeks to be strong everywhere ends up being strong nowhere."

And I do not think we have set those kinds of priorities and I do not think we have pursued a strategy that enables that and reinforces it.

And so my fear is that, in terms of reconstruction, we could be stuck in sort of a "Groundhog Day." You know, you go in, you build it, they blow it up; you come back, you have to build it again.

We have to find a way of doing a better job of integrating reconstruction security and the military operation.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. If I may, I think first of all, the sense of frustration that a lot of the soldiers feel is very genuine.

If I can make a small movie recommendation, I think everybody on this committee, and in fact all Americans, should see this movie "Gunner Palace," which is a magnificent portrayal of what it is like to be a soldier in Iraq.

And I am sure that at the squad level, going out on raids, it is extremely frustrating to see projects that you worked on or people you have worked with get killed.

One of the things that makes insurgencies hard—and Dr. Metz talked about it—it takes very few people.

Probably the Irish Republican Army (IRA) never had more than 300 or 400 fighters. They had a lot of supporters and a lot of hangers-on and so on. But of the people that who were actually going out and putting bombs and shooting people, only a few hundred.

And so it is an extremely difficult target.

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I think the thing on the projects that is important and my metric would be: When do we get to the point where when a school is built and gets bombed, the reaction of the crowds is anger against the people who did the bombing and determination not to let it happen again as opposed to blaming the Americans for not stopping it?

One of the problems about 50 years of dictatorship is that a lot of Iraqis had become very passive and they expect other people, preferably the government—and in some sense, we are the government; for a long time we were—they blame us for things.

And I think when you begin to get that change that will be an important metric.

Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. The idea of winning the hearts and minds, I think we all agree on.

And the concern I have is the amount of, not only Iraqi police force and the people we are trying to recruit who are getting killed and the innocent civilians who are also getting killed, but when you actually think about how many people show up to a funeral of someone they love—let alone a young soldier or a family member, just in America, there is a hundred people who walk through the wake.

And it occurred to me that with all these innocent Iraqis being killed and all these Iraqi soldier being killed, amplified by the amount of family members and friends who are touched and hurt by that, it seems very difficult for us to win the hearts and minds when it seems like, whether it is true or not, that the Americans are responsible for our family members and our friends getting killed.

How do we overcome that?

Mr. SAXTON. Maybe one of you could just take a quick shot at this and then we will move on to the next person.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Congressman, one thing I continue to remind myself is that for any nation, any culture any where, the transition to democracy is a really, really difficult thing. I mean, it took us a revolution and a civil war to get where we are.

And I think we are seeing the same thing in Iraq today. Turning into a democracy is a really hard thing.

But specifically on your question there, at least from what I am seeing, is I am not seeing that frustration, the anger at losing loved ones turn into either a willingness to accept the insurgents or a civil war-type situation.

So there is a huge amount of natural anger and frustration, but in some ways, it is not being channeled in a way that I think is going to derail the transition that is underway.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. We are going to move now to Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. It has been very interesting to hear your perspective.

Recently, though, we heard from General Chiarelli. He provided a lessons brief for us, and it was really astounding.

This is a little different than the question just asked, because he talked about the progress that our forces are making and the impact they are having on the Iraqi people and kind of winning the hearts and minds are terms that he used. And he felt the elections

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are really the turning point in this war, and talked about even how the Iraqi press has published the FBI most wanted list in their papers.

So I wondered, from your perspective, if you truly think those elections were the turning point, and if there is been any real impact either on the recruitment over there or the insurgent activity.

And then the last question—because Mr. Slocombe just referenced the anger of the Iraqi people toward the insurgents—whether you have seen other things the Iraqi people do that you would have thought just a short time ago would be unimaginable.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I am basically an optimist about the war and about the prospects, for all the facts that they are real difficulties.

And I think there is no question the—I would not say the election was a turning point in the sense that it means everything is now certain to go fine, but it was a very important step.

I think it was a very important step partly because for at least the Shiite and Kurds and a large chunk of the sort of secular Sunnis. It means there is now a government that has a much greater degree of legitimacy than either the interim government or the Iraqi governing council.

And they are now going into a political process that will address some of these issues.

I do not think there is much—the insurgency is down from the peak late in the winter, but it is about the level pretty much—in terms of numbers of attacks and casualties and so on, it is about at the level it has been.

I think there has been real progress.

Again, it is important to understand that most of the attacks are in a limited part of the country. I mean, it is a big part of the country. It has a lot of the population, probably a quarter to a third of the population, but it has never been a nation—it is the reason I do not like the term insurgency. It is never been a nationwide movement.

You can drive from one end of Iraq to the other practically in a day so anybody can get anywhere they want to, to plant a bomb if they can get through the checkpoints.

But I am fundamentally hopeful that if we and the Iraqis make the right decisions this will come out a success.

Dr. METZ. General Chiarelli and I, 20 years ago anyway, taught together at West Point, and Pete is a remarkable officer.

Just four quick points: One is, a critical disadvantage of this insurgent movement is its lack of a popular cause. Insurgencies are made successful either because the government cannot provide security within the country or there is a popular movement. And right now what the insurgents lack, whether it is the Sunnis and the Baathists or the radical Islamist, is a cause that has really captured the imagination of the Iraqi people.

And that is an enormous advantage that we have in this war, and I think that is one of the reasons certainly for optimism.

Second, in terms of making progress, General Chiarelli did some remarkable things in Sadr City. I would like to know if those remarkable things are built upon the next six months or if you have a regression. I mean, to me, that would be a key indicator of whether he is correct or not.

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Third, how would you measure whether the elections have had an impact? Again, I would go back to the issue of hearts and minds. It seems as though we have won more of the Iraqi hearts.

People see perhaps a brighter future. They have more of a stake in what is going on now than they did before they cast their vote. They have representatives.

On the other hand, at the end of the day, it is the hearts and the minds.

Getting back to Congressman Ryan's question, at some point Iraqis may get angry at the insurgents for blowing up that city hall again. In their own calculations, in terms of where their minds lie in this conflict, they may also conclude, "I do not like the insurgents, but you know, I do not blame the Americans; I am mad at the insurgents. But you know, there is nothing the Americans can do about stopping these people from coming in here any time they want and doing anything they want, and I am staying out of it. I am not going to cooperate. I am not going to risk my skin trying to help the government because I do not think the government can protect me."

So I think there are some encouraging trends, but, again, I would like to see what are some of those metrics that I talked about before: Do we see a greater level of cooperation on the part of the Iraqi people for government forces, for the coalition forces, in terms of doing what they need to do to win this war?

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Can I suggest it is——

Mr. SAXTON. If you could make this real quick. We are out of time here.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I find more optimism at higher ranks, battalion brigade commander, than I do at lower ranks. Two ways of explaining that—one is, the brass is out of touch, which I do not buy; the other is they have a better overall picture of the way things are going and, therefore, tend to have a somewhat more positive perspective.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, sir. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you gentlemen being here, particularly on such short notice.

Would you, for the record—and we are leaving town tomorrow I believe, and it will be—have a spring, Easter recess for two weeks, so if you could get that back to us in a timely manner.

But for the record, would each of you put together, like, five questions or five things that we should be asking the Administration, the Department of Defense, about what is going on to help us?

We have difficulty getting information. I think it might be helpful.

Maybe we are asking the wrong questions. Maybe you could provide us with the kinds of questions you think would be helpful for us to ask——

Dr. METZ. A good start would be to ask the same questions you have asked us.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. On an ongoing basis so that we might—well, then maybe it is not the questions; maybe it is the answers that we get from the Administration.

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Dr. Krepinevich, we have used the phrase "hearts and minds" quite a bit this morning. But I assume that when we use the word "hearts" we are not talking about—our goal is not to get the Iraqi people to love Americans or America. When we are saying hearts, we want them to love what they see in a future Iraq. Is that a fair statement?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Yes, Congressman. Americans typically want everyone to love them. I think that is one of our national characteristics.

But here it is: Do they have a stake in the future of Iraq? Do they want to see the outcome that we are talking about, which for this Administration is a free and democratic Iraq, a growing economy and the withdrawal of U.S. forces or certainly the minimization of U.S. military presence in Iraq?

Dr. SNYDER. Right. And then my last question—you said one other question.

Over the last couple of years, last year and a half, there were a lot of public discussions about the level of troop strength in Iraq. We have an adequate number of troops. I think people like Senator McCain was talking about it very aggressively. That discussion has died down now to some extent.

My question is this—your opinion about that whole issue: during the most recent elections we had several of the folks from Iraq and from the Administration justifiably feel very good about what occurred during the election in terms of the security that went on, that apparently not one polling place had any kind of significant kind of threat to it.

And that came about for a variety of reasons. But one of them was, we have been told multiple times, is because leading up to it, more troops were kept in the country. There was, I think, essentially a lot of overtime going on. There was just a lot of American troop activity to where our troop strength was substantially higher, plus the amount of activity out in the streets was substantially higher.

My question is: Was that not a case study for the fact that more troops could have meant, over the last 18 months, better security, perhaps less attacks on electricity in the schools and the city halls that Congressman Ryan was talking about and all?

And then it is almost accepted as a given now that while our troop strength is at the peak, and we are gradually at some point going to start reducing them as Iraqi troops come on board, but that does not necessarily have to be a given if we had maintained that same level of troop strength and activity we had during the election period, maybe it means more electricity gets out there, more investors come in, more Iraqis feel comfortable participating in the government.

Would you comment on this whole area of American troop strength in view of what happened during the election with the security that was provided with expanded troops?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I suppose more is always better, in some sense. I have never been entirely convinced the absolute number of American or coalition, or for that matter, Iraqi troops or security forces is the key.

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I think the reason it worked so well for the election was you were able to surge. You had a large but defined number of places you had to protect.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. It turned out that the Iraqi population, or at least most of it, really wanted to vote. You have to remember that in the areas where there is a big insurgency problem, the turnout was terrible, almost nobody voted.

I think another infantry division would certainly have a positive effect, but I am not sure it would have a positive effect equivalent to the cost in terms of impact on the force and so on.

I think we need to focus much more on intelligence, on specialized capability, on getting the Iraqis into the fight.

I think it is important for other reasons to increase the size of the Army modestly for reasons which are in some ways independent of the absolute troop level in Iraq.

It is really very hard for us to sustain anything like 100,000 troops in Iraq for a long time. It is doable, but it is going to take a bigger base to do it.

Dr. METZ. To reinforce my point that the psychological is what really matters, I think more American troops there might be militarily good, but it would be psychologically very bad in terms of sending the message of, "This is your country. We are turning it over to you," or whatever.

So I think it would be a matter of the adverse psychological, and political costs would probably outweigh the military utility.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. We are going to Mr. Geoff Davis, the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with your assessment that more troops would probably be counterproductive from both the political and cultural message that would be sent. Based on my experience in the Middle East, these are not an insurgency in the classic sense at all.

Certainly from a soldier complaint standpoint, everything that I have heard at the front lines is more the typical frustration of soldiers, who were in the combat situation—no different, quite frankly, than police in some difficult areas dealing with difficult situation—in that when you are overcoming a threat, certainly on a vastly more destructive scale in the Middle East, that work will be undone, in light of the fact that we are in the midst of a war right now that has revolutionary impact in the region.

One thing that strikes me, that makes me very hopeful, is the Iraqi people keep coming back. They keep coming back to these places that are destroyed. Recruits keep coming back to participate in the process.

I tend to read Osama bin Laden's message to Zarqawi in perhaps a different context than much of the press, that is, simply to attack the United States, but maybe in a clear cultural context to back off, that his efforts in Iraq are counterproductive.

I almost wonder, as enforcement continues, we draw more of the Iraqis into the process, if it is not going to be a very positive outcome.

The hearts-and-minds argument, to me, is something I remember certainly growing up, and also in the post-Vietnam time frame, when I was at the military academy. People wanted to draw the

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conclusion immediately about Vietnam, which I believe this is not in parallel.

And what I would like your comments on, partly for public consumption as well: Do you think that this actually—the situation that we are facing in the Philippines, not in precise parallel but in many ways—tracks more closely with the Philippine insurgency of the beginning of the last century in terms of fragmented rebellion—I would not even call it classic insurgents, thugs, in many cases tribal-based—and that over the long run, there is going to be a hopeful outcome to this based on the strategy that is in place right now?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I am afraid I am not enough of an expert on the Philippines insurrection.

Maybe on St. Patrick's Day, I think it is in some ways more like Northern Ireland, that is, you have a very serious ethnic conflict. Some people on one side, who have genuine grievances, other people who are prepared to use force. And the problem is both to suppress the violence and to seek a political solution.

But I am sorry I do not know enough about the Philippinian insurrection to really make the comparison.

Dr. METZ. Just a couple of points on your comments: My own belief is that outsiders can never win hearts and minds. I mean, hearts and minds are the key, but it is got to be the Iraq security forces winning the hearts and minds.

And I think to the largest extent possible, we need to get out of the hearts and minds business because outsiders cannot do that.

I spent a lot of time thinking about what is the apt historical analogy for this one, and I am not sure that I found a good one.

One thing that concerns me, though, is that it not become like the conflict in Colombia where the insurgents kind of become an industry. They develop a vested economic stake in continuing this thing on. They get involved in, you know, drug running, trafficking, organized.

You know, if you have this marriage of the insurgents and organized crime, then I think that is where you have something that could easily percolate on for decades.

So that is just kind of the analogy that I hoped that it does not become.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. There are some very tenuous parallels between the Philippine insurrection and what we are seeing in Iraq.

There was some concern that we had not properly planned for phase four operations after the Spanish-American War.

It was an issue in the 1900 election about how many forces we were going to keep there, how soon are we going to bring them home.

Arthur MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur's father, ended up commanding the U.S. forces. They were trying to suppress the insurgency.

Three things seemed to work in our favor.

One, as I recall, was the development of the Philippine scouts, the use of indigenous forces, training them up to help.

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Second was the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, who was the charismatic insurgent leader, which really took a lot of the wind out of the insurgents' sails.

And then not long afterward—it may have been years but it was not decades—we also committed to Philippine independence, which I think also ameliorated some of the nationalistic fervor for the insurgency.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. My neighbor from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would observe that the quality and importance of the testimony is inversely related to the number of people sitting in the press gallery of hearings. So you should be very flattered by that.

This has been an outstanding panel and we have learned a lot by listening to you. Thank you.

I would like to suggest that the committee takes the metrics proposed by Mr. Krepinevich and ask the Department of Defense to answer to provide us data with those metrics. I think I counted seven of them.

Some of them would probably have to be reported in a classified session. But I think that they are very telling, and I would like to suggest that we make a request, as a committee, for the data. To the extent the data can be shared publicly, we should.

I read, Mr. Slocombe, your speech from February 9th of 2004 that was distributed, and I am paraphrasing the beginning, but you say, central to our success in Iraq "is better intelligence which will rely less on technical measures, though these have potential, than on improved human intelligence and painstaking professional regional expert analysis.

"Especially since the capture of Saddam, there is been important progress, particularly in securing information from ordinary Iraqis who understand both that their interests lie with the coalition and that the Iraqis who work with it and that ours is more likely to be the winning side."

In February of 2004, on a grade of A to F, how would you evaluate the human intelligence-gathering operation that was in place at the time you made the speech, and what grade would you give it today, and what should we do to improve upon where it is today?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I think it is improving, but I have to say, as I said, I have no inside information as to how the intelligence system is working in Iraq.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand—based upon your observations from the public record.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. My sense is that it is very much a question of what part of the country you are talking about.

There are large parts of the country where they do not like to have Americans around, because they do not like foreigners in general. But there is no question of what side they are on and there is a good deal—I think the problem continues to be very serious, that for a variety of reasons, some of which is intimidation.

I mean, the reason you do not get support is that people who help you get found out. The enemy has a very good counterintelligence system.

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I am not sure that it is—I do not have any reason—let me put it this way: I do not have any reason, from the public record, to think that the intelligence has improved anywhere near as much as it is going to need to.

Mr. ANDREWS. So what is our letter grade, A to F?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. C-plus.

Mr. ANDREWS. What was it a year ago?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. C.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do we need to do to make it an A, A-plus?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. It is a terrible chicken-and-an-egg problem. I think it is central.

But it is not just the hearts and minds. I will not say it, but you all know the version about if you grab a hold of something, the hearts and minds will follow.

Mr. ANDREWS. In New Jersey, we do know that saying.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Right.

Whether people think we are going to win makes a huge difference in how much cooperation you get out of people.

And I think in some ways that is the reason why it is rational to focus our efforts on the Sunni areas, to try to reach out to local leaders, but they have to be local leaders who are with the program.

I am a bit of a hardliner on this. I have never been sympathetic to the idea that it is just a question of finding local Sunni chieftains who have power in the region. Yes, you have to find them and try to work with them and persuade them you are going win, persuade——

Mr. ANDREWS. I saw some evidence just the other day of a dramatic example of the chicken-and-egg problem that really each of the three of you is talking about.

An officer who had been responsible for one of the most troubled areas came home and gave a speech, which I read, and he said that the number of attacks that they were experiencing had dropped from hundreds per week to the single digits, two or three per week, and it was directly proportional to their success in infrastructure—water, sewer, power, quality of life.

Now, understandably, they achieved a better quality of life because they reduced the number of attacks, in part, and then they reduced the number of attacks because they achieved the better quality of life.

And at some point we are going to get ahead of that curve. I hope it is very, very soon.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. It is absolutely the case that the sort of—the do-good stuff, like services and the economy and education, health, that kind of stuff, is important for security reasons as well, precisely because it is what convinces people that, A, we and, more to the point, the government is right; and, B, competent and going to win.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much to all the panel.

Mr. SAXTON. If I may just take the prerogative of the chair to pursue this point a little bit further, I guess I would just pose a question to the three of you.

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Can we be accurate here in this room—2118, I guess it is—based on the information that we have available to us, really grading our intelligence effort?

What makes me say this is that my last trip to the theater, I visited with some folks who were doing some fairly astonishing things in terms of being able to accomplish missions that we will not talk about here. And that had to be based on some pretty good intelligence.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. A lot of the intelligence is very good. One of the things I have learned in a lot of years testifying to the Congress is that if people ask you to give a letter grade, do not explain why you cannot give a letter grade and hope that people will believe it.

The reason is, you have to look not just at the individual successes, which are very real and very important.

Part of the reason that I wrote that in February was the capture of Saddam was an intelligence triumph, built exactly on this kind of painstaking look at lots of data gathered from local people.

My sense is that you have to have it generally so that the number of incidents go down and you stop more—we stop a lot—but you have to be able to stop most of them.

It is a sort of analogy to the point about the centers of gravity. We can stop 95 percent of the attacks, and we still have a problem. And that is part of the difficulty with the intelligence challenge.

But I do not in any way disagree that the intelligence people do remarkable things. It is just they have got to do a lot of remarkable things and do it consistently for you to actually get to the point where you can defeat the enemy decisively.

Mr. SAXTON. I think we would all agree that whether we have good intelligence that is gathered by our soldiers and the people who are associated with our soldiers, from the agency, et cetera, the real key to success going long-term, as Mr. Andrews, I think, alluded to, is the Iraqi—and as you alluded to—is the Iraqi people coming on board and cooperating and providing intelligence freely to us and to their own forces.

Dr. METZ. And I was going to suggest, sir, that an A or an A-plus may even be impossible in this realm, for two reasons.

One is, at the lower level at least, so many of these insurgents bands are family organized. It does not matter how hard you try, you are not going to get somebody to turn in their cousin, even if they do not like what their cousin is doing. They are going to deal with it some other way.

And the second problem is, you know, back to the big issue, ultimately what we need is not for the U.S. to be really, really good at human intelligence in Iraq, but for the new Iraqi security forces to be really, really good at it.

And the problem there is, as we know, they are badly penetrated, and they have got a really, really big counterintelligence problem themselves.

So we have a lot of problems with sharing and things like that because we cannot, at this point, fully trust them.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Ms. Davis.

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Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all of you for being here. I agree, it has been especially compelling in terms of your testimony.

Can you follow up? I think, Dr. Metz, you said that the State Department was no more better equipped to deal with this than the DOD.

And I know my first visit to Iraq with the coalition provisional government, I was concerned that all directions seemed to be coming from the Department of Defense, and expected a little bit more from the State Department.

Can you speak to that? Maybe can all of you speak to that?

How should that be coordinated differently? Is it a different animal, as you suggest, in terms of building the peace?

And I would like you to comment briefly on the fact that, in the discussions and talking about the information war, you have not really mentioned the role of women.

And particularly on my last trip—and I think that Ambassador Negroponte confirmed this as well—a lot of the information, a lot of the intelligence is coming from women.

And yet there seems to be little coordination with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts and how they are building a civil society, and the impact that that may be having on women coming forward and providing some of that information.

Dr. METZ. What I meant with State is that just as counterinsurgency is not seen by DOD as its primary focus, it becomes kind of a lesser included, we are never going to get the State Department totally focused on it because their primary job is going to continue to be diplomacy.

But I think you are exactly right, that what the solution may be is something like a permanent standing Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), CPA that can do both preconflict analysis, deterrence, and then be kind of the core of the effort if we get involved in one of these things as well.

So I think that there is a lot of thinking that needs to be done there. There is a tendency to sort of brush CPA and ORHA aside because they had some problems, but I think that as a model of integrating the different agencies, that might be fruitful to look at. And ultimately, it might not matter whether this permanent CPA reports to DOD, State or the National Security Council (NSC).

On the role of women, as a political scientist I am certainly aware that women play a crucial role in conflict resolution around the world. I mean, kind of standard Conflict Resolution 101 is to politically mobilize and energize the women in the society. That tends to help for conflict resolution.

Of course, in Iraq the problem that we continue to butt up against is the fact that you have such a vehemently male-dominated society. I do not know if that takes that option off the table, but it certainly makes it more complex than it would in a society that is organized a different way.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. On the issue of women, I believe one of the maxims we ought to apply is reinforce strength and not weakness, and that part of the base that is actually interested in this working is the women in Iraq, both because they want security for their

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families and because they realize that a continued conflict is going to produce an Islamic reaction, which is for most of them not good.

There are things that we are doing. I mean, one of the things which is interesting is that the Iraqi political system, with pressure from us, has accepted a rule that we would never accept, which requires a certain percentage——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Quota.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Yes, well, when we were setting up the governing council we had a lot of arguments about how many women should be on it, and the Iraqis pointed out that they already had a higher percentage than either the American House of Representatives or the British House of Commons.

On the State-DOD issue, if I may, I think both the Defense Department and CPA have taken some unfair hits on that.

CPA was dominated by diplomats. Bremer was obviously a career diplomat. His deputy was always a British diplomat. There were a lot more ambassadors and State Department people working on the system.

Now, I think the relationship between the CPA, which was a civilian operation, and what was then General Sanchez's 5th Corps in Command Joint Task Force (CJTF), was actually a pretty good one.

The problem was that we did not have enough civilians out in the countryside—by which, basically, I just mean outside of Baghdad—able to do the kinds of things that needed doing.

And sometimes it only took a couple of people. There was a remarkable British woman who was the CPA rep in Kirkuk, who basically—I mean, it was the strangest story, because she was your kind of classic English do-gooder lady, with the sensible shoes and straight hair and spoke perfect Arabic, as she had lived in the region all of her life.

And she fell in love with the American military; American military fell in love with her. She was in charge of the civil affairs, basically they worked for her.

If we had been able to replicate that around the country, we would have been in a lot better shape.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I just wonder whether that was based on perhaps some false assumptions on our part, as well, though, that in fact the insurgency was not rebuilding its strength and that we did not need to have people out there in the hinterlands.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Somewhat, but I do not think that was so much——

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Mr. SAXTON. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel all for coming.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, will we be coming back or will this be——

Mr. SAXTON. Yes. We will take a break here after Mr. Larsen, and we will come back for additional questions.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. LARSEN. The term "turning point" has come up, and I am less interested in turning points in Iraq and more in favor of what,

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I think, Mr. Andrews is talking about and Dr. Krepinevich is talking about—is finding metrics that we can use to measure.

Because if we are looking for the big flash in Iraq, we will be looking for a while.

And I think this is really more of a matter of working very hard and working slowly through a problem that exist every day in Iraq for our troops and for the Iraqi people.

The second thing—we were just talking about hearts and minds. We have not talked a lot about stomachs and wallets.

And again, rather than focusing on hearts and minds, General Chiarelli's strategy in Sadr City was not really about stomachs and wallets and the sweat of the sewer water, electricity, trash. It is a really problem that we are now, in my opinion, as Mr. Slocombe just said, we are now just getting back to pre-war levels electricity production.

That is a sign of a lot of things, a failure on our part, failure on, I think, the Iraqis' part to focus on investment, failure or success from some of the insurgencies to attack this infrastructure.

If we cannot take care of some of those basic things, it is going to be a lot longer before we can get to some of these other metrics that we need to look at.

Mr. Ryan's question, I want to build on that a little bit. I think he talked in terms of soldiers, Marines specifically.

I meet with some national guard folks in the 81st Brigade Combat team that come home now—most of them will be home by the end of the month—and I am going to sit down with them over the next couple of times that I am back home and ask them basic questions: What did you see? What did you learn? What are you not getting?

Can the three of you in the next three minutes, maybe a minute each, give me the two things I might hear from a national guard person's perspective about what they need while they are over there, and also what I might hear about what they need now that they are home?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I certainly would not venture to speak for them. They have gone through the experience, and you are right to get it directly from them.

And undoubtedly, there are equipment things and so on that they will want to talk about.

I think the critical thing that they need from here is support for these projects, these causes that have to get fixed.

Stomachs and wallets tend to cost money. And I think one of the problems we have had, that it is entirely self-imposed. It is got nothing to do with neo-cons or the enemy or anything like that. It is how hard it has been—it is gotten better—to get money out to the commanders.

One of our big successes was the so-called CERP program, which I think is Commander's Emergency Response Program, which put money in the hands of the local commanders and then down, at least, to brigade and I think, in some cases, below that, where the officers had the authority to go out and do local projects, hire people.

And that, I think, is one the places where you get the most leverage both in security terms and development terms.

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But I am sure that the guard people will have very concrete and specific things they are concerned about.

Dr. METZ. Yes, in terms of the specific question, it is really hard to speculate because it depends on so much where they were and what they were doing and things like that.

At least from the guard and reserve people that I talked to, the preeminent issue was always just the pace of utilization—how can we continue to have our careers and things like that if we are going to be mobilized for long periods of time on a recurring basis?

So ultimately once the dust has settled on this, what the Congress and the Department of Defense and the President may need to do is to sit down and take a really broad look at how we use reserves in our military in general.

Might we want to consider some new model where when someone signs up you tell them, "Okay, at one point in your career, you might be mobilized for three years, but you can only be mobilized"—I do not know, pick a date—"once every six years," or something, "during the course of your career," rather than as needed.

So I think that we may have to relook that. There is a lot of relooks going on, of course, concerning the concentrating high-demand specialties in the guard and reserve, you know, the civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) and stuff like that.

And I know the Army and the other services as well are recognizing that if we are going to have this continual pace of involvement in protracted conflicts, we probably need to relook that.

So I think that is an issue that is going to be, if not totally fixed, a at least partially fixed in the coming years.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Very quickly, two points: One is, stomachs and wallets are about hearts and minds. They are about convincing people that they have got a better life ahead of them.

If I were a troop coming back from Iraq, what I would like to know is: Is the sacrifice I made over there these last however many months, is that going to be sustained or is it going to be in vain?

And to me, that requires a coherent strategy if you are talking about—for example, General Chiarelli in Sadr City: Is the funding going to be there to sustain those projects that we started that started giving those people a better life? Is the security going to be provided so that they can enjoy those and they will sustain their growing support for the government?

That is what I think I would be worried about because I do not want to have sort of "Groundhog Day" in my life every year or two and keep going back to the same place and starting up all over again.

Mr. SAXTON. We are down to an official five minutes left in this vote. And we have two 5-minute votes after this one, so we should be back in 15 or 20 minutes.

And Dr. Metz, I understand that you have another obligation, sir. You will just have to use your best judgment as to how you want to proceed.

[Recess.]

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STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Okay, we have Mr. Taylor and then Mr. Cooper.

The gentleman from Mississippi—and, gentlemen, let me apologize for not being here for most of your presentation, but I have heard great things about it.

In fact, most members have liked it a lot better since I was not in the chair. So it was really, really good.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both you gentlemen for being here today.

I pose this question to both of you: Do you see a coherent United States policy in Iraq?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I think I see a policy that has a good prospect of winning.

And I think it is coherent in the sense that it does recognize the need to link what our military does, what we do to get the Iraqi security forces able to take over, and the political and economic aspects.

I think there are a lot of moving parts that do not work together nearly as well as they should.

One of those is within the control—it is frustrating because it is entirely within our control—and that is, the difficulty of getting funding out quickly to the right places to the people who are able to use it on the ground.

As I say, you know, the fact the people are shooting at you, that is a real world problem and there is a limit to what you can do about it. The fact that you have bureaucratic and accounting hang-ups in the United States that keep you from doing the job, I find very hard to deal with.

On the intelligence side I think that is the biggest operational or practical problem.

I think you were here when I said, I honestly, at this point, I do not have any special access so I cannot say what is being done. I would think that is one of the other critical factors.

But it is very much a part of a coherent policy that the non-military aspects be properly funded and properly executed with enough people out there, and enough willingness to make things happen quickly.

I hate to say this: We did not fight this war to save money, and that some of the accounting is not absolutely perfect is regrettable and should be fixed and it is right and so on, but it is not the biggest problem.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would say there is an overall policy.

It seems to me that the goal here is to help lay the foundations for a democratic Iraq.

We could argue about whether it is overly ambitious or whether it is realistic or not, but I think that is the policy. We could put it down perhaps as a big bet, but perhaps a necessary bet, given some of the trends we saw in the Middle East or have seen in the Middle East.

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Like Mr. Slocombe, I think politically, it is democracy; economically, it is reconstruction; in the military sense, it is to provide security.

As I said before, what I do not see is a coherent strategy that this is our policy, these are our objectives, these are the means that we have to bring to bear. How are they being applied in a coherent way, and an integrated way to do that?

And I guess one thing that does give me that kind of pause is, I have not been able, given the metrics or given the measures that Administration has provided, really been able to get a sense of how they all fit together and how we are able to use these to determine whether we are actually making progress toward achieving these policy goals and objectives.

Mr. TAYLOR. Last two questions if you could touch on—in January, I was told by our political officer, and I believe his name is Bob Ford, that their polls showed that a majority—and a large majority, I want to say 70 to 80 percent—of Iraqis had an unfavorable view of the American occupation.

My question is: can you win a counterinsurgency when that large a percentage of the population has an unfavorable view of you?

The second thing is, I have been reading parts of your book. Doctor, I have to confess, I have not read the whole book. I have read the counterinsurgency sections of it and find myself very much in agreement that it is more important to have a great deal of control over at least a part of the country rather than having a little bit of control over all of the country.

Is there any part of Iraq that either of you would feel safe walking the streets of other than the green zone?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. What parts, sir?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Kurdistan, for sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. That is the easy answer.

There are large parts of what you might call Shia land, say, south of Hillah, where there is a risk. The enemy puts off bombs in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah—which are the big cities in Kurdistan—periodically.

But there are large parts of the country where you would certainly feel safe even as an American, and looking like an American, walking around, you know, like the line in Casablanca there are parts of Basra I would not walk around in at night.

But there are parts of a lot of places I would not walk around in at night. But that is for ordinary crime.

And in some ways, much more relevant for an Iraqi, there are large parts of the country that are not really part of the insurgency. The insurgents come in and blow up mosque, blow up Shia shrines and so on, periodically.

But there are large parts of the country that for an Iraqi—again, with the important exception of regular crime—are not a security problem at all.

There are other parts where no one—you cannot go as an American at all safety without full-up security operations.

Mr. TAYLOR. Is there time for a brief response, Mr. Chairman?

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Two things: One is I would agree with Mr. Slocombe. If I were in Iraq I would want to be in the parts of Iraq that he is talking about.

But second, in terms of violence, I think people can tolerate random violence much better than targeted violence. The random violence of the car bombing that happens to kill innocent bystanders as opposed to the knowledge that if I cooperate with the government, someone is going to visit me tonight and I am not going to be around tomorrow.

We can tolerate random violence. What we cannot tolerate is that targeted violence that separates the people from their own government, their own police.

Second, in terms of the popular opinion, I was struck how quickly public opinion in Indonesia has shifted since the relief operations conducted by American forces were undertaken, a radical shift in terms of their views of Americans, even their views of America's role in the Global War on Terrorism.

So one thing I would like to know is: How deep are these views held by the Iraqis?

And related to that, in the final analysis, it is not their views about us, it is not whether they like us; it is whether they like where their government is taking them. Because at the end of the day we are going home. They have to live with that government.

I think that is where we really need to focus our efforts.

And as I mentioned before, you can even see some Shia politicians now saying, "Well, we cannot tolerate the Americans as occupiers. We might be able to tolerate them as guests."

So I think there is some room for maneuver there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for sticking around during the votes.

Bob Andrews said earlier, "The quality of the hearing is inversely proportional to the press gallery." You could also add: inversely proportional to the number of Republicans who are attending.

Perhaps they already know the answers. Maybe we should call this a classified hearing, then for sure there would be more people to show up.

I am curious about several things.

One, I read in the paper a couple of months ago that Al Jazeera was for sale. I have not heard anything more about it.

Second, can we really trust the Iraqi troops that we are training, or will it be like the mujahedeen, where we gave them Stingers and eventually many of those Stingers were used against us.

Third, I am increasingly worried that our military is not really being allowed to be the military and give their unvarnished military advice.

We have the continuing spectacle of our top military leaders coming before us to say things that they could not possibly agree with—for example, Army generals testifying that we need to cut the Army's budget this year during a war. I am sure they make up some money in the supplemental.

But yesterday, the top Air Force general, General Jumper, was here saying his chief worry was, "aging of the fleet, aircraft."

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I asked him what his budget does about that aging, the answer is precisely nothing, may exacerbate it. Yet he is out here telling us we need to modernize the fleet.

So you kind of wonder if we are getting good advice or straight advice. And these are fine honorable men with long careers in service, and we appreciate that. They risked their lives for the country.

But somehow when they reached the bureaucratic pinnacle, I am not sure we are hearing straight advice, for example, on things like guarding the ammunition dumps after the military portion of the war.

We read more and more in the papers about there was not just looting, but systematic looting of some of the most high-tech equipment that could make weapons of mass destruction. And we simply did not have the forces on the ground to take care of that.

That could not be in military doctrine to allow that sort of rampage to go on.

But we sit here lulled to sleep by folks who say everything is just fine, just give us a little more money for this or that. But it does not seem to me that we are achieving what we need to when, Mr. Slocombe, you said earlier—he expects us to win.

Well, I hope so. This is a third-rate country. We have the finest military in the history of the world, and we are spending on the current path at least a half a trillion dollars, maybe a trillion dollars, to accomplish the job.

Meanwhile we are bogged down, we are handicapped in dealing with other conflicts possible.

If we do not win it is—what?—a humiliation.

We have set our expectations way too low.

And still, even though this is the fifth Muslim country we have been responsible for trying to improve in the last 10 years, our language speakers are woefully deficient and our civil affairs officers are all outsourced to the guard or the reserve.

We have not modernized to deal with this threat.

You pointed out the bureaucratic difficulty.

If we cannot even get CERP funds to our commanders in the field, what sort of operation are we running here?

It is embarrassing. We are a greater national than that. We should not accept these bureaucratic snafus.

Any response either of you gentlemen would care to make, I would appreciate.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I really do not know anything about Al Jazeera being for sale.

Two points with respect to can we really trust the Iraqi troops, I guess in a way the Iraqi government that emerges out of this that will control those troops.

To me, the strategic metrics of this war that I did not get into: One, it seems to me that the Administration has to create something approximating a democracy in Iraq as a means of reversing some of the unfavorable trends that we have seen happen in the Arab world and the Islamic world; second, of course, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I think if ultimately victory is measured in this way, we certainly, as I said before, have ambitious goals, first, because this is a country that really has never enjoyed democracy, has no history

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of democracy, does not see its security in terms of its institutions the way we do in this country—our legislature, our courts and so on.

Second, if the Iranians get nuclear weapons it seems to me if I were an Iraqi, I would want to find a way to get nuclear weapons, and you have that cascading effect then.

So victory or success may have to be measured in terms of delaying perhaps the date that Iraq would have nuclear weapons.

In terms of military advice, I would say certainly, as I mentioned before, we got out of this business after Vietnam. We are struggling to get back into it now in terms of counterinsurgency. The Army, just a few months ago, released a draft doctrinal manual for counterinsurgency.

I know that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz just signed out a directive that will dramatically increase language studies, studies of particular regions and countries, which I think is a big step in the right direction.

And also, I understand from talking with Dr. Metz that the Army is also resurrecting and emphasizing its strategist program, which I think is a big move in the right direction.

So there are, I think, some positive and encouraging movements.

But as to the question of whether the testimony of our military leaders reflects what is really on their minds, I am afraid it is beyond my scope to answer.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. On the issue of trusting the Iraqi units, I think one of the real concerns is the whole security force is naturally a target for the enemy's counterintelligence penetrations and so on.

And that is a serious problem. We have had some real difficulties.

My view is that you have to approach it from the point of view of ruthlessly weeding out people who are not with the program. If they want to put long-term agents of influence in place, there is probably not a hell of a lot you can do about it.

But if you are more serious because it is a large-scale problem, it is just people who are not adjusted to the new requirements, and you have to be ruthless in weeding them out.

And one of the real tests will be whether the leadership of the new government and the new Minister of Defense—whoever it is, has not been appointed yet—will be prepared to do that.

On the civil affairs, first of all, I have to say I was immensely impressed by the skill of the civil affairs people who were assigned to these jobs and the way in which they worked with the commanders and with the combat units and were able to leverage. It is a terrific asset.

Another part of the military that I hope the committee is familiar with is the Army's FAOs, foreign area officers, which is a program which is always under pressure, but has a huge payoff when we actually need to go into a country or an area.

An investment in that kind of skills, it is a long-term investment, and that is why it is always tempting to cut it, but it is extremely important.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the gentleman yield?

Could you expand on that FAO a little bit? Talk about them.

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Secretary SLOCOMBE. To a limited degree, with my limited knowledge, the Army has a program whereby, as I understand it, officers—I think at about the rank of major, but it is people who have been in the service for some significant period of time—are able to elect to into this foreign area office or program.

They learn the relevant language—it might be Spanish, it might be Arabic, it might be Chinese, it might be Swahili, it might be Kurdish. They essentially get special training in the regional area.

A lot of them, obviously, end up as attaches. But they also end up, sometimes, as civil affairs officers, as kind of advisers for commanders who are in the area.

And it has produced a cadre of Army officers who really—I cannot imagine it is more than maybe a few thousand. I doubt if it is that many. But you have a handful of people who really understand these countries.

I think one of the requirements is you have to learn the language. It is a terrific asset.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, and then we will go back and let Mr. Cooper finish his questions.

Mr. SKELTON. Excuse me for interrupting, but there are a couple of problems with the FAO, foreign area officers.

Number one is, I think they go into that specialty too late in their career. I think you ought to grow them from at least first lieutenant on up and gradually increase their responsibilities.

Second, promotions are a kiss of death. They just do not get promoted. And I have seen some very, very able FAOs, and they know full well that they are more capable than the rank that they hold, and yet, they enjoy what they do.

And you have to admire them, because to become fluent in a language, to understand a culture of a country in which they work, that is above and beyond.

And I do not know what we can do about it legislatively, but it concerns me that you do not have more people flocking to those areas that are able.

Excuse my comments, but I just got involved in this recently, and those are my quick thoughts on it.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Could I be indulged to peddle one of my ideas that I have tried to sell for a long time?

A lot of these people, as I say, rightly end up as attaches, with I think three exceptions: Moscow, Beijing and Paris, all of our attaches are O–6s.

I think it would help the United States a lot if at least some attaches, who are actually O–6s for retirement purposes and so on, were breveted as one-stars. It would make them much more effective as attaches in the country.

I also think it is notorious that being an attache is a dead-end job. To a limited extent, then, you get dead-end people in some of the attaches, which is regrettable. But more, you get a system which lets people know that if they are on this track, they are not going to make general.

I think General Eikenberry must be one of the very, very few attaches who has ever gone on in the Army after being an attache.

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And if the Army or the other services picked just one or two people every year or so out of this cadre, it would have a huge impact on the system.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. It is my understanding that the directive signed by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz will require officers who achieve flag rank to have a second language. And there are a number of other things in that directive that will attempt to really enhance those sorts of things I think that you are talking about.

One interesting development that is ongoing in Iraq right now that I think the Army is struggling with is, in going back to the Vietnam era, they are looking at providing advisers to these Iraqi units. And again, we will not have the luxury of drawing upon a cadre of officers that have those language skills, have those cultural skills.

And at the same time, in terms of sending some of our best officers to do that, there is probably going to be reluctance, because just as in Vietnam, it will be better to serve as a battalion commander, as lieutenant colonel of a U.S. unit in Iraq, than advising the battalion commander, say, of an Iraqi unit, even though that latter mission may be a lot more important in the big scheme of things.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Cooper, do you have any follow up? Why do not you go ahead if you have a follow-up. Then we will go to Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You gave me enough time and Mr. Skelton asked my question for me about the career-limiting nature of the FAO position.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thanks, Duncan. Mr. Slocombe, I have the advantage on you here a little bit today. I have a transcript of both your presentation and the question and answer session from your February 9th presentation last year, a year ago, Iraq's national security strategy.

Although, I do not know where you gave that particular presentation but if you——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 140.]

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I cannot remember either.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If it is okay with you I would like to—not quote anything, but make reference to a couple of things in the course of that event because I think, from all of the discussion here this morning, it leads me to where I want to go, the question that I want to ask or the perspective I would like both of you to address.

I have already had the opportunity to speak personally with Andy, so I think you both could speak to it.

Along about page 13 of your presentation, one of the points that you are addressing, in your formal remarks, about the task—I am going to quote here, "Moreover, the task of creating a national security system has to go beyond simply creating competent forces, phasing out the militias, coping with immediate security threats or even dealing with long-term external requirements."

And you go on to talk in some detail about the critical part of the transfer of full authority to a sovereign government and what that means in terms of civilian leadership, significant civilian staff-

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ing, clear authority over budgets, et cetera—in other words, the establishment of a civil society and the institutions associated with it particularly policing and other kinds of things.

The reason I am concentrating on that, at this juncture, is I am also making reference to what I saw taking place or what the attempt was in Kosovo and the whole Bosnian conflict and intervention with the attempt to establish civil society in terms of people being able to be certain that they would not be robbed in the street, or somebody would not knock on the door at night; if there was some kind of altercation, that there was competent authority to go to that they could have some confidence in.

And then during the question and answer session you also got into—someone from the National War College asking you, "In practical terms, a transfer of sovereignty, what will that mean for the remaining coalition civilians and military, i.e., the Coalition Provisional Authority. And do the Iraqis and coalition folks agree on what the situation is supposed to be like after the transfer of sovereignty?"

Then you went on to talk about the polls and some of the things you have mentioned today and, again, emphasizing that civilian side of things. And I think, for Mr. Krepinevich, your centers of gravity and all that revolve around this, too, as well.

The reason I am going through all of this prelude is that my concern is that I believe that the logic of this, militarily speaking, for us, means years and years and years, if you followed through with nothing else coming into the equation—what happens in Palestine or with the Israelis or Iran. You know, even if you eliminate all that and you just assume that some kind of a bubble could be established.

As I see it, we are not even remotely prepared—and this perhaps goes back to some of the questions earlier about the budget that we are receiving. One of the things I have been asking as we go through this budget question that the chairman has to come to grips with sooner rather than later—we do not even have the National Military Strategy yet for this year. We cannot get that from the Department of Defense.

Now, I am not flunking them so much as I expect they are having a hell of a hard time trying to come up with something that they can realistically present to us to be representative of what they expect to have to come to grips with; not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but just concentrating on those two areas.

If we are going to continue to have the reserve and guard do this, particularly when it comes to civil affairs and so on, I know that for a fact that virtually the entire guard and reserve in Hawaii has been called up. We do not have anybody left in Hawaii.

Per capita, I think we have probably got the most in the country. I mean, it just does not exist anymore. The guard does not exist anymore.

How is it possible for us to reconcile the configuration of today's armed services with the budget that is associated with it, and the realistic expectation that either or both of you could lay out for us now as to the time frame within which it is likely all these things will have to take place?

I cannot see the reconciliation right now.

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And the reason I am asking this question is so I do not give you any false construct here.

Because I am one that thinks that we have to remove people sooner rather than later, because I think going on the idea simply that, well, we have to work this out over a period of time, is not an answer; it is a way to avoid coming to grips with the import of the question or the proposition I have put before you.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Well, those are certainly real concerns. I certainly cannot speak—one of the luxuries of not being in the government is I do not have to defend why they have not produced things like the National Military Strategy on time.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I merely cite that in the context of what you had to deal with——

Secretary SLOCOMBE. No, I understand what you are saying.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. In the provisional authority.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. First of all, a good deal of progress was made before June 30th to build a base for a civilian Ministry of Defense. Iraq has the only civilian Ministry of Defense in the Arab world.

And it has its problems and so on, but that is actually an area where my successor, David Gompert, with very good support both from the American military and from Ambassador Bremer, made a lot of progress, and Negroponte has carried on that. And that is something the Iraqis want to have work.

But you are right. This whole business of building a civil society is an absolutely core part of success.

In terms of the time, I cannot give an estimate as to how long we are going to need to stay there for internal security reasons.

My own personal view is that if we put the resources into it over the next couple of years, I would be very surprised if we are not able to, by that time, to substantially pull down American forces so that most of the internal security mission is handled by Iraqis.

And that certainly would be the target and I think it is not an unrealistic one. But whether that will happen depends obviously on events on the ground.

And then there is the longer-term problem of whether the Iraqis will want us to leave. If the Iraqis tell us to leave tomorrow we should live.

I think we have no interest—as important as our interests are, we have no interest in staying in this country if a freely elected government says we should leave. There is no sign that they will do that.

In terms of leaving when we have gotten the job done, I think a time frame of a couple of years is probably realistic.

I agree with you that we are straining the guard and the reserve beyond, I do not know, the breaking point, but very, very badly. And we cannot, in the future, depend as heavily on the guard and reserve for certain critical skills, like civil affairs and military policemen (MPs) and so on as we have. And that is going to require some restructuring of the forces.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think, for us to achieve our objectives—which have to involve at least, aside from sustaining democracy in Iraq, also preventing a civil war that would undermine it—we are going

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to have to have what one might call a security blanket military force there, more than likely, over the long haul.

And this, in fact, may be what is happening in Afghanistan right now with what is going on with the government there—which is to say, a small U.S. military presence that gives the indigenous factions confidence that they can proceed with developing their country, developing their democracy, developing their economy, without having to worry about things disintegrating into a civil war and sort of the traditional experience of power grabbing that we have seen in that part of the world.

But that is going to take time. And I think it would be a mistake to withdraw our forces before we have that kind of understanding, and certainly should work hard to develop it, but also before Iraqi forces are really trained, organized, equipped and capable of providing for the security of their own country.

Parenthetically, in terms of the national military strategy, this year I think, from what I have seen in the Pentagon, there is the prospect of perhaps the most fundamental defense review in my memory, given the parameters that have been set forth by Secretary Rumsfeld, in terms of moving beyond the focus on traditional kinds of challenges to our security to look at a range of these irregular challenges—catastrophic attacks on our homeland—and also those challenges that are on the horizon.

In a sense, since the last major defense review, we have seen our country attacked, we have fought two major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are fighting two insurgencies, we are fighting a Global War on Terrorism.

There is an enormous opportunity. And one would expect, as I guess you do, Congressman, that there would be an enormous shift in terms of our military strategy as a consequence.

But I suspect those things take time. And as Mr. Slocombe said, fortunately I am not in the position of having to defend how much time they are taking to do it.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Could I just add one thing on the timing issue?

I think that success in Iraq, whatever you think about the war, success in Iraq is so important that the pace at which we pull down our military presence should be driven by the results, not by a schedule, for a whole lot of reasons.

I mean, I suppose there will be political pressures to do sort of what the Italians are going to do, to announce a token withdrawal as a sign of success. And you probably could do it without too much harm.

But that is the wrong way to think about the problem, I think. It is that we ought to set ourselves the kind of metrics that Andrew Krepinevich talks about. And then as those metrics are met, we can pull down our presence.

And I think it is probably right, assuming it is acceptable for the Iraqis, that it may well be that a very small U.S. presence in the long run may make sense from everybody's point of view. But that is a complicated question, and we are, unfortunately, way, way down the road from having to answer that question.

But my point is that the pace of the pulldown ought to be geared to results, not a timetable.

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Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I agree with that. My problem is, is every time I get to that point—I am not disagreeing with anything that is said here—all of a sudden a fuzz sets in, a kind of fog sets in.

But even you said, "if we put the resources." I am trying to figure out exactly what resources do we put to try to get to some of these metrics. I am not arguing with any of that.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. No, I understand that, I understand that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And how do we translate that?

Let me tell you why: There is a practical side of this. It is not just for academic purposes or debate scoring points, is that we have to translate that somehow into a budget, an authorization and so on.

And we are required to do this, I mean, both by inclination and constitutional duty, and I cannot see that clearly yet.

For example, let me give you example. I just fought an election in which I had come into it just a month before—the latest filing in the country, it is July before the election in Hawaii, it is the latest filing—and I spent half a million bucks, or close to it, having to raise the money—fighting on the proposition simply because I said, if we do not discuss a draft in this country, we are not, realistically, as a country coming to grips with the sacrifice that the military is making right now, that we are not making any sacrifices in this country on behalf of that, that the only sacrifice we made, so far as I can tell, except for the military itself, including the guard and reserve, since 9/11 has been postpone the Super Bowl for a week in 2001.

After that, it has been some inconveniences—some inconveniences. You got to take your shoes off in an airport or something of that nature. And after all, the reason you are doing that is to keep yourself from being killed. So I do not even know if you can count that as an inconvenience.

The mere fact that I raised that issue, I of course then had to defend, "Abercrombie wants to draft your kids and get them all killed and all the rest of it."

And this goes to the point of Andy's question about the three centers of gravity, including the people there.

If you have a nation that will not even consider whether, if we are in a war on terror and we are having to make sacrifices in order to confront and combat effectively whatever—having been attacked on the mainland—coming from Hawaii, I can say on the mainland of the United States and so on—and we will not even take up the question of whether 98 percent of us get to watch it on television, and that our sacrifice constitutes reading in the paper or having television talk about fallen heroes, so that we get to vicariously indulge ourselves in an ongoing human interest story about separation of spouses and kids and all the rest of it for the guard.

If we are doing it at a distance, then I am very concerned that what we are going to end up doing here—and this is what I do not want to do.

I do not want to participate in what amounts to a kind of pageant of indifference or a—I do not want to say a farce, because it is not a farce, but a kind of play-acting or let's pretend, where we act here in the Congress as if we are really going to do something

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solid about meeting our obligations in this context that you have established, but what we are really doing is letting a few people make all of the sacrifices, including getting killed and wounded, and the rest of us stand around, budget after budget, year after year, as this drifts into a kind of subdued chaos.

Now, I am kind of revealing what is in my soul here. Believe me, I am not unusual on this committee. Everybody takes their job seriously on this committee, and we want to do the right thing.

And it is not so much I am pleading with you guys, "Give us an answer to our problem," but what I am saying is, we have to have more than a phrase like, "if we put in all the right resources," or, "if we are able to do this."

We got to figure out how exactly are we supposed to do this. Should we have a draft?

Should we draft people who can speak languages? Should we make a concerted effort?

I mean, those are the kinds of things we have to figure out.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. You might start by not firing because they are gay.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, something as stupid as that. You know, we are still dealing with dumb stuff like that.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I mean, I have tried to outline some of the things that I think need doing—and I know we are way over time.

I think one of the——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, I know we are over time. But believe me, the chairman has to come to grips with this and provide the leadership on this, along with Mr. Skelton, and you do not see him getting up and leaving. Because I think this is in his mind. He wants to do the right thing.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I think the issue of how a democratic society shares sacrifice for a whole lot of things, but security being one of them, is one of the toughest issues.

I happen to think a draft is not even part of the answer. But I think the problem we are going to have in getting enough people to want to serve in the military and also getting enough people, enough civilians, to want to go out and do the parts of these jobs that ought to be done by civilians, is a major problem.

I mean one of the things that I was struck by, when I was out there, was how many civilians had volunteered to go out and did not have, in hardly any case, most of the benefits that the military had.

And it is all very well to say the military should be stuck with these responsibilities. But if we do not organize the government so that the civilian agencies—whether it is in state or whether it is someplace else, including in the intelligence community—we do not organize the system so we can get some of those burdens off the military, we are not going to achieve the job, and we are certainly not going to have shared sacrifice.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. My only addition to what was just said is, as a American citizen I think I want an answer to the question that Congressman Taylor posed, which is: What are our goals, what is our policy? I think we have gotten that so far.

What I also would like to have is a clear understanding of what is it going to take in terms of resources. How many lives are we

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going to have to put at risk? How many dollars are we going to have to spend?

And then some understanding of how they are going to be applied, you know, how are these means going to be applied to achieve the ends that we seek, which is strategy. What is the strategy for how we are going to archive these ends?

And how does it integrate the kinds of things that Mr. Slocombe was talking about, the political, the economic, the social, the security?

And then finally give me some metrics. Give me some way that I can judge whether or not progress is being made.

And I think that those are basic questions when you undertake any enterprise like war and those are the ones that, I think, when you get down to the strategy and the metrics, that a number of us are struggling with, and I think that is the basis for a good exchange between the committee and the Administration.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You have been very kind, Mr. Chairman.

And both of you have been more than kind in indulging me, and my ruminations on this.

But in the end then, what I am concluding from all of this is that we are in great danger of doing something that I think that your book made clear to me, as I reviewed it.

We are in great danger of substituting military activity for political policy, or the military activity becomes the political policy, and that we begin to set up a series of metrics in which our political decisions are based on, and made on the basis of what our military activity is.

And if that happens, I think it will have the reverse effect of what you are suggesting we need to do.

I wish I had a pat answer on all of that, but that is what I want to avoid. I do not want to have military activity itself become its own rationale for, and in fact, the basis of political decision-making.

Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate your indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is important to have these extended discussions. I think it is good.

You know, the gentleman brought up the idea of disparate sacrifice.

But that is always been the case.

I think from my reading of Teddy Roosevelt's life, one reason he wanted to become a Rough Rider and go out and lean forward in a military role was, as I recall, his dad, in the Civil War, I think, hired a surrogate to take his place in the Army.

And that was something you could do if you had enough bucks in those days. So we have always had this disparate burden-bearing, if you will.

But I am reminded also when were in—and I was over in Iraq with my friend Mr. Abercrombie. We had a great trip over there. This trip after that, when we were over in Fallujah, General Kelly—who now heads up liaison here on the Hill, but a great guy who was a deputy commander of the 1st Marine Division in Fallujah—while he was deputy commander, his son, Robert, was a rifleman, I believe a PFC, in ground operations in the city.

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So you had in the same family the deputy division commander and arguably one of the lowest ranking rifleman going door-to-door in these very difficult, very dangerous operations.

In fact, General Kelly, Christmas day, was at Bethesda Hospital talking to the wounded Marines. And he asked one of them where he got the bullet holes in his leg. And the guy replied, "Well, as a matter of fact, General, I was with your son." And words to the effect of, "He made it in the building and I did not." And that set the general back a little.

But I give that illustration because there is a—even though the burden sharing is not an even thing across the board—and that is one thing the draft does. If you do not have 150 waivers and exceptions, a draft can do that.

The fact that you have the American people produce these folks that go out and go to very and very inconvenient places, and live very inconvenient lives, and put themselves in dangerous positions to serve this country is the strength of the country.

And interestingly, I would say to my colleague, they do it, even though they look next door and they see the neighbor who is not bearing the burden. And they understand that. They accept that and they go anyway.

And I do not know if there is a way that we can—we certainly cannot legislate the American spirit or the incentive or the initiative that moves people to join the military.

And that takes me to a question that you touch on, which is a question that you say—in one of your statements you say that ultimately, the American service men could vote with their feet, that is, could refuse to sign up, because this is a voluntary military we have here.

You have looked at the latest statistics, the last couple of months, for recruitment. There has been a little downswing, I think, in the Army recruitment, in the national guard, and a slight failure to meet goals, I believe, in the Marine Corps in the last couple of months.

What do you think? Could you comment on that?

Do you think that is the fact that we have settled into this long, very violent and very difficult operation, and people are taking a look at that every day on their TV screens and deciding that there is other things they want to do?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I do think, Mr. Chairman, as I have said in my testimony, the American soldier in this war, unlike the Vietnam War, is a center of gravity.

In the Vietnam War, if we needed more troops, we just increased the draft call. We cannot do that this time around.

So consequently, the American soldier does get a vote, and the vote is with his or her feet.

It is about the hearts and minds, I think, to a certain extent, of the American soldier. The heart in the sense of: Is this sacrifice I am making for my country a worthy sacrifice? And is that sacrifice honored by the American people?

And I think right now we are very fortunate that, not only do enough young men and women feel that sacrifice is a worthy one, but that they are honored by their countrymen for having made that.

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At some point, though, you begin to look at the balance-tipping for several reasons: One is, "Is this my second tour in Iraq? My third tour? Am I looking forward to a fourth tour in Iraq?"

The volunteer military is a family military, not a single military. And there are enormous family considerations. I can tell you, as someone who served for 21 years, they weigh heavily on any good soldier.

And then there is winning the minds. Do soldiers feel like they are being well led? It may be a worthy cause, but are we being well led?

Is there a prospect for victory? Because, again, people who are willing to make the sacrifice for a noble cause may not be willing to make that sacrifice for what they believe to be is a hopeless cause or an ill-led cause.

And I think we have to be very much attuned to that.

And I do think that some of these factors, obviously, the hardship of the duty, as you mentioned, the frequency of the duty, the personal risk that these people undertake, and probably other things, are leading to some of these little red flags beginning to pop up.

And you see it in terms of the shrinking pool of delayed entries, in terms of service in the Army; you see it in the need for dramatically increased retention bonuses.

And General Myers, who coined the phrase, "the hollow Army," once said to me that he thought that once you started down the slope, in terms of recruitment and retention problems, it had kind of a snowball effect, that it gathered momentum, and if you did not catch it early, there was doing to be hell to pay trying to push that snowball back up the hill.

And of course we saw that in the early 1980's.

So I share your concern. And I do think that in this war one of the limits on our ability to apply force, even though we would like to have more troops in Iraq, is clearly a sense that we cannot overstress that force.

And so, in a real sense, the burden for these deployments has been shifted from the American people, who risked having their sons and daughters taken off to war, to the senior Army leadership, because they know there is no draft call to increase, that if they break that force, it is going to be their responsibility to put it back together again.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. It is obviously hard to tell why people enlist, why they do not enlist.

One of the things I was struck by in looking at this issue of the draft is that basically now the military recruits from people—boys, men—who graduate from high school and do not go straight to college. I mean, there are obviously exceptions, but to a good first order approximation that is where the recruitment is.

And to fill the quota, we have to recruit for the military something like 20 or 25 percent of that cohort, which is a huge share.

The draft is not the answer, partly because it would become so random because you need so few people. Even if you prohibited voluntary enlistments in all the services, you would take only about 10 percent of the cohort.

So it would become a highly random thing, which in some ways would lead to all the other problems, which would be terrible aside.

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But I think somehow we have to find a way to make military service attractive outside this rather narrow band of people who—men who graduate from high school and do not go straight to college. There are a variety of ways to think about doing that.

I think, in the long run, the problem that Andrew Krepinevich identifies is much more a problem of retention, and of the guard and reserve rather than initial enlistments.

And that, I think, is a problem—obviously the draft does not solve that at all. And how you—how the strain that we are putting on the military, and especially on the guard and reserve of repeated deployments, repeated separations from their family that I think is—it does not seem to be showing up too badly yet, but it is one of those things that, as you say, can take a while to have an effect and then becomes very hard to reverse.

The CHAIRMAN. The Ranking Member never did get his question in, did you?

Mr. SKELTON. No, but I have about 54 of them I could ask right now.

The CHAIRMAN. And, gentlemen, thank you for taking so much time with us. We appreciate that and it is a good conversation.

I hope we are not making it so when we call you next time, the phone is going to ring off the hook once you look at your caller ID and see it is Armed Services Committee calling.

The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. SKELTON. So while we have them, let's ask a few.

Dr. Krepinevich, you said there are three centers of gravity: the American people, the Iraqi people and the American soldier.

I am worried about the latter. And I appreciate the discussion that you had that was initiated by Neil Abercrombie with his line of questioning.

Since I have been in Congress, which is a little over 28 years, not counting the deployments in Colombia or the strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan, I have counted 11 instances when American military have been in harm's way all the way from small to major instances. And just as sure as God made little green apples, it is going to happen in the future.

And if we were guaranteed there would be no conflicts over the next 15 years, my worry would be less.

But I fear that, using your phrase, the overstress of the force—the chairman mentioned it, I mentioned it in previous hearings about the strain that is on the military: I think it is deadly serious.

And you have not lived until you have had a national guard spouse accost you and saying, "I will tell you one thing, Congressman, when my husband gets home, he is getting out of the national guard. And not only that, everybody in his unit is too."

Well, of course, that is not going to happen. But that is a mindset that is out there.

Of course, when they come home, they are honored, thank goodness. Most of them receive plaudits from the home communities. At least they are in rural Missouri.

And my guess is, very few will follow through with that prediction by that wife.

But I worry about the stretch and the strain in the third center of gravity continuing, as strong as it has been.

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And it is not just the guard and reserve.

I was down in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Mr. Chairman, the other day, and they had a briefing on a number of issues, including the recruitment and retention.

And it is interesting to hear their recruiting general tell me that the real reason that African-American recruitment has gone way down and the Hispanic recruitment has gone way down is because of mama. The mother is saying, "Son, daughter, not a good idea." And those have plummeted in the last several months, which places additional strain upon other young folks, and the pool is shrinking.

I had a conversation with Mr. Slocombe a few minutes ago. You are less worried, I understand, about the active duty. Because they know that is part of the job. When they sign up, they know they are going to be deployed, whether it is aboard a ship or an airplane or on the ground.

That is not necessarily so with the guard and reserve. And at some point there is going to be a breaking point. And this just worries me to death, come a serious confrontation, whether it be in the Taiwan Strait and all of the problems that would arise or some unforsaken place that we just cannot dream of this moment, and we do not have the forces to do it. And what forces we have are stretched and broken.

I am terribly worried about this. And I do not know where we go. I do not see a light at the end of the tunnel on this at all. Am I wrong, gentlemen?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I think the problem is that it is a long-term problem. And we need a military that is deployable and flexible and effective and big and all of that. And the questions is: How are we going to do it?

And as you know, I think all of these deployments have been justified. And you cannot operate on the principle where we cannot use the military to do things that are important for the country, because it will make retention hard. That is going to get the cart before the horse.

But I think it is a serious problem. And one of the things that I think we have, as a country, to think about is how we—I mean, some of it is technical. You can reduce the burden on the guard and reserve by having more of the active force cover some of the functions that we thought we could rely on the reserves for. That is more or less mechanical.

But in gross terms, I think it is a serious long-term problem. And one of the real questions is: Are there not ways to expand the range of kinds of people who will find a military career attractive?

The cohort is going to get smaller, just the demographics. The number of people is going to get smaller.

Presumably more people are going to go to college. God willing, the economy will continue to improve. That is one of the reasons recruitment gets hard.

And as long as we have to recruit from such a narrow range of the country, A, we do not have the shared sacrifice and, B, the numbers just begin to get very, very difficult.

That is somewhat different from the retention problem.

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And by the way, I worry about the retention problem in the active force, as people have to make a decision. Are they going to stay in and make it a career, as opposed to something they do in their 20's, when they get married and they begin to have kids, and they want a more stable life. I think it is an issue there as well.

Mr. SKELTON. It is anecdotal, but based upon the statistics that we have had in the past, only 37 percent of West Pointers stick it out for 20 years. And it is anecdotal that a disproportionate number of them now, today, are getting out after their mandatory five years. Of course, I do not have any figures on that, but that comes swirling in.

Andrew, do you have any comments?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Yes, I think the glass may be partially full.

Obviously, we did not structure our Army to fight this kind of war. We structured our Army after Vietnam for short wars. You had the Weinberger and Powell doctrine, exit strategies, and I think it is showing up here. We have an enemy that is forcing us to run a marathon, not a 100-yard dash.

The Army is tackling that. It is going to be very interesting to see if this modularity initiative gives us more in the way of deployable combat power, re-rolling the force, standing down some artillery units, creating units that are more relevant for this kind of warfare.

There is a very interesting Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study that is coming out on that shortly, a very comprehensive look at the problem. There may be, as Mr. Slocombe says, a better way to structure the mix between and the roles and missions of the guard and reserve.

You can call the reserve up, a guard unit, for 12 months, but you do not get 12 months of service in Iraq. They have to spend a couple months training up, a couple months demobilizing at the end, so you only get a fraction of the time that you really have them called up for, in terms of their deployment.

Another thing that is going to be very interesting to see, with respect to this Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) defense review, is whether or not we begin to use Iraq as a planning template.

And I do not think we can. I do not think we can scale this force up to a much larger level, absent a national emergency, than we already have.

And yet, you look at Iran, which is not the most stable government, that has three times the population of Iraq; Pakistan, far less stable, eight times the population of Iraq.

We are not going to have a military that is eight times the size of the one we have now. We are going to have to think about different solutions, if not for those reasons, for the fact that the personnel budget is eating the procurement budget from the inside out, and we are at the point where we need to recapitalize the force.

In my mind, we are going to have to look more to rely on allies than we have in the past, but perhaps a different set of allies than we have in the past, because the problems are different and the location of the threat is different.

But also—and this is something that seems to be a major initiative within the Army and within the Administration—is to train in-

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digenous forces, somewhat similar to the effort that we had in the 1960's, to train indigenous forces to help provide for stability within their own country.

Iraq is a rather unique case, because there was no government, there was no military at the beginning of this insurgency. But that is also going to be a challenge, as you have rightly noted, in terms of training these officers, that would be capable of going overseas, understanding the culture, understanding the military institutions they are asked to work with, in order to make them more capable and more professional of accomplishing that kind of mission, so we do not have to send our forces over there to do it, or at least not in the kinds of numbers that we see in Iraq.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I have 53 additional questions, but in light of the time and the fact that you have been here so long—and we really appreciate not only your time, but your expert testimony and advice.

I will yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I think Mr. Taylor had a closing question or comment, so, Gene, why don't you wrap it up?

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. I cannot pronounce your last name so I am going to call you Andrew, if you do not mind.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. That works.

Mr. TAYLOR. I read with great interest that you thought one of the measurements should be the number of times we initiate the fighting rather than the insurgents. Interestingly enough—I am drawing a blank, Colin Powell's right-hand man, bald head, Navy SEAL——

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Rich Armitage.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Rich Armitage had also made that same observation last time I spoke with him.

Do our significant activity reports record who does that or would a Member of Congress actually have to go back and look at every account and say who started what?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. There are a number of organizations that have been gathering data on what has been going on in Iraq. For example, Joint Forces Command is responsible for lessons learned and so they gather certain data on operations.

Mr. TAYLOR. The reason I ask is, I asked General Casey, in January, if we tracked that—actually, who initiates the attack? He said we did not. And I found that strange. So do you know otherwise?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. My understanding is that the State Department was tracking that in some way, shape or form. That is my understanding.

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Slocombe, do you recall?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I had a conversation with Ambassador Armitage at one point and we were talking about this particular metric. And my impression was that he had data on that. I do not know that for a fact.

Mr. TAYLOR. My impression was——

Secretary SLOCOMBE. General Casey is an expert on what he does and does not have, but when I was out there that was actually—of the metrics, that was one of the ones that was regularly

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briefed. There would be a chart that would show a number of incidents, number that were initiated by coalition forces——

Mr. TAYLOR. Where do you think that metric is now? Do you think we initiate most of the shooting? Or do you think the insurgents do?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. I have no idea.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I do not have access to the data.

Of course, what you would be interested in, Congressman, is the trend. In other words, if it is 60 percent today, was it 20 percent 4 months ago or was it 90 percent? And that is what you would be looking at is the trend.

Secretary SLOCOMBE. All metrics also have problems. You do not want to reward—once you begin keeping track of that, people will make sure that when they go out on a patrol they shoot at somebody, and then it is an initiated contact. But the basic point is right.

And my recollection is it was tracked. They may have stopped doing it because they decided it was not a meaningful—although it was in principle meaningful, actually getting the numbers in a meaningful way was not getting anywhere.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, thank both of you, gentlemen, for sticking around for so long.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, thank you and thanks for having some good endurance today.

And I think our conversation was very enlightening, very instructive, and we really appreciate you folks devoting as much time as you have to this very critical national issue.

Thanks a lot.

[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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APPENDIX

MARCH 17, 2005

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 17, 2005

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Are We Winning In Iraq?

TESTIMONY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Andrew F. Krepinevich

Executive Director
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

March 17, 2005

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Are We Winning in Iraq?

"Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror."

Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary
October 2003

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views with you on this important issue. My testimony briefly addresses the following questions:

- What is the character of the war in Iraq?
- What are the war's centers of gravity?
- How does one wage a counterinsurgency?
- How can we measure success?

I. The Character of the Conflict

"Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic."

T.E. Lawrence ("of Arabia")

In Iraq we are confronted with enemies waging insurgency warfare. An insurgency is a protracted, multi-phased struggle, whose objective is to overthrow the existing order. Insurgencies traditionally comprise three phases: first, insurgent agitation and proselytization among the mass populace—the phase of contention; second, overt violence, guerrilla operations, and the establishment of sanctuaries—the equilibrium phase; and third, open warfare between insurgent and government forces designed to topple the existing regime—the counteroffensive phase.

Specifically, Phase I revolves around founding a political movement and creating cadres by recruiting elements of the population. Phase I operations are characterized by efforts to expand the cadres and by acts of terror, such as murder, assassination and sabotage against the regime in power. In Iraq, these movements are ready-made, the product of the US-led military operation to depose Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist Party. Remnants of that party, which is dominated by Sunni Muslim Arabs, form one insurgent group. Another potential insurgent group centers on Iraq's Shi'ite Muslims, who comprise the majority of the country's population.[1] Foreign

[1] It should be noted that, even within the ethnic groups themselves, Iraqi insurgent movements are far from unified.

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insurgents—typically referred to as terrorists—constitute yet a third group, although they themselves appear to be an agglomeration of independent radical Islamist elements.[2]

In Phase II operations, the insurgents expand their base of support through attacks on government facilities and leaders. Hit-and-run guerrilla assaults against vulnerable regime forces (e.g., convoys) become common. Efforts are made to gain control over certain elements of the population, such as in remote areas where the regime's power is weak or in areas where the regime's forces find it difficult to operate (e.g., urban areas). Guerrilla units are drawn from this expanding base of support. The link between the population and the insurgents is critical. Unless they maintain their access to the population, the insurgents cannot extend their control. Success in Phases I and II enables Phase III operations.

In Phase III the regime finds itself confronting main-force insurgent formations that are willing and able to take on the government's forces in open warfare. However, activities consistent with Phase I and II operations continue as well. The insurgent's goal at this point is to create the impression of irresistible momentum that will eviscerate the morale of the regime's forces and trigger a massive popular uprising, leading to regime collapse.

In Iraq, US and other coalition forces, along with indigenous Iraqi forces, are fighting against insurgent movements whose operations are characteristic of Phase I and Phase II operations.

II. The Centers of Gravity

The Population: The War's Center of Gravity

In war, the center (or centers) of gravity can be defined as that asset, or set of assets, the loss of which will destroy an enemy's ability or willingness to continue its resistance.[3] In conventional warfare, the enemy's military forces are often seen as its center of gravity. At other times the enemy's center of gravity has been depicted as its seat of power, its capital city, its alliance structure, or its economic infrastructure. This is not the case in insurgency warfare, where the population is the center of gravity. In the current war in Iraq, however, there are three centers of gravity, which are described below.

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[2] The Iraqi Kurds form a fourth group. At present, however, they have not taken up arms in any significant numbers against the occupying coalition forces. One radical Islamic insurgent movement with origins in the Kurdish region of Iraq, *Ansar al-Islam fi Kurdistan* (Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan), has a membership whose composition is believed to be dominated by Kurds.

[3] Clausewitz described the center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." Antulio Echevarria II notes that a literal translation of Clausewitz's views reveals the author focuses his discussion on tracing "the full weight of the enemy's force to as few centers of gravity as possible, when feasible, to one; and, at the same time, to reduce the blow against these centers to as few major actions as possible, when feasible, to one . . . . Reducing the enemy's force to once center of gravity depends, first, upon the [enemy's] political connectivity [or unity] itself . . . and, second, upon the situation in the theater of war itself, and which of the various enemy armies appears there." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 485-486, 595-596; Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 19th ed. (Regensberg, Germany: Pustet, 1991), pp. 1009-10. Cited in Antulio Echevarria II, "Center of Gravity: Recommendations for Joint Doctrine," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 35, pp. 13-14.

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The Iraqi People

For both sides, the path to controlling the country is to control the people. As Mao Zedong noted, "The people are like water and the army is like fish."[4] The insurgents' ability to *control* the population, whether through their willing cooperation or as the result of insurgent threats, acts of terror and intimidation, or the physical occupation of their community, is crucial to their success.

Access and, if possible, control over the population enables insurgents to deny critical intelligence to counterinsurgent forces. This is key. After all, if the counterinsurgent forces know who and where the insurgents are during the early phases of the insurgency, they have more than enough military capability to engage and defeat them. Access also provides the insurgents with an opportunity to gain critical intelligence concerning the plans and whereabouts of counterinsurgent forces, to recruit new members to their cause, and to obtain (or appropriate) food, medicine and other supplies.

Correspondingly, the inability of the government in Baghdad to exercise control over its population dilutes its strength, denies it replacements for the armed forces, makes taxes difficult or impossible to collect, and dries up sources of badly needed intelligence. Thus if the insurgents can gain control over the population through fear, popular appeal, or more likely a mixture of both, they stand a good chance of winning, although it may take a protracted period of time before the correlation of forces shifts in their favor.

It is important to note that, owing to the absence of personal security, the vast majority of the population typically remains uncommitted, providing support only when coerced, or when a clear winner emerges. As T.E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia") noted, "rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic." The reason for this passivity among the population is that, so long as their security is at risk, individuals that take sides in an insurgency expose themselves to retribution. In Iraq, this is particularly true for those who oppose the insurgency. The inability of coalition and hastily trained indigenous Iraqi security forces to provide security for the population makes any efforts on their part to provide active support to the Iraqi government or coalition forces a highly risky proposition.

Insurgent control of the population explains why an insurgent movement can expand as a whole even while heavy casualties are inflicted on its guerrilla units. The insurgents simply continue to draw upon the country's manpower pool to replenish their losses. Moreover, unlike the government, the insurgents have no need to secure the nation's infrastructure or provide security to the population. Hence the insurgents are often able to meter their casualties to fit the circumstances of the moment. Consequently, the population's security should be the top priority of the coalition forces, thereby denying access to the "sea" which the insurgent "fish" need to survive.

Defeating the insurgency is made both easier and more difficult by Iraq's heterogeneous demographic makeup, which cuts across nationalities and religion. While the country is

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[4] Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), *Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle* (Bombay, India: n.p. 1948.), p. 48.

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dominated by Muslims, it is also divided between the two predominant Muslim sects, the Sunni and Shi'ia, with the latter comprising roughly 60 percent of Iraq's population. It is made easier in the sense that the counterinsurgent forces can pursue a "divide and conquer" strategy that pits one group against another. It is made more difficult in that pre-empting the cause that animates one insurgent movement may not address the driving forces behind the others.

The American People

There is an important distinction to be made between insurgent movements that are being countered principally by indigenous government forces, and those that primarily confront the forces of an external power. The latter, of course, is the situation in Iraq. Up to the present, US and coalition forces have shouldered most of the burden. This can be exploited to the insurgents' advantage, if they can drain the will of the United States people to the point where Washington abandons an infant regime before it is capable of standing on its own and defending itself. In a democracy such as the United States, this could occur if popular support for the war erodes.

This is an important point, since the insurgents cannot hope to defeat US military forces in open battle (i.e., by moving to Phase III of the insurgency). American forces cannot be militarily forced out of Iraq. Consequently, the insurgents must pursue an indirect approach. Even though they are far weaker than the forces opposing them, they are relying on the active cooperation or passive acceptance of the vast majority of the indigenous population to sustain themselves. By so doing, they intend, over time, to convince the American public and its leaders that the war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure. Thus the conflict revolves around winning the hearts and minds of both the Iraqi people and those of the American people as well.

The American Soldier

The United States is waging war in Iraq with a volunteer military. In this sense, the American soldier (and marine) has a "vote" in this conflict. If, at some point, the Americans who are doing the fighting in this war become convinced that it is no longer a worthy cause, or that it is a hopeless cause, they may become unwilling to risk their lives to achieve the United States' war objectives. If that happens, the troops may "vote with their feet;" i.e., they may cease to enlist or reenlist in sufficient numbers to sustain the level of combat strength in Iraq necessary to win the war.

A Key Asymmetry

In assessing the centers of gravity, one sees a key asymmetry favoring the insurgents. *For them to win, they need secure only **one** of the three centers of gravity, while the US and its allies must secure **all three**.*

Moreover, the three centers are not identical in terms of what animates their perceptions of progress in the war. For example, high US casualty rates may have little effect on the Iraqi people; however, they could erode support among the American people for the war, and could lead to recruiting and retention problems in the Army and Marine Corps. Thus despite progress being made in terms of winning over the Iraqi people, both the American public and the

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American soldier may become disillusioned with the war if they feel that the Iraqis are not providing sufficient support.[5]

Similarly, US troops may come to believe that their tours in "hot spots" such as Iraq are too frequent to warrant their continued service (or their joining the Service). If that occurs, it may become too difficult to maintain the required forces in the field to deal with the insurgency, even if the Iraqi and American people support the war.

III. Defeating an Insurgency

"I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. ***In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it.*** *We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it . . . ."* (Emphasis added)

President John Kennedy
September 1963

While the United States does not confront a unified, coherent enemy in Iraq, insurgent elements seem to be pursuing traditional insurgent strategies and tactics.[6] The insurgents are clearly too weak to challenge coalition forces openly, and consequently appear to be targeting both the Iraqi population and public opinion in the coalition states.[7] On the other hand, the counterinsurgent forces suffer from a discrimination problem—they cannot easily distinguish insurgents from the general population. Defeating them requires time, both to provide counterinsurgent forces with an understanding of the environment in which the insurgent forces are operating, and to win the hearts and minds of the population, which will produce the human intelligence needed to distinguish the enemy from noncombatants. Again, the population emerges as a center of gravity.

The key to defeating an insurgency is to attack it at the source of its strength: the population. If the counterinsurgent forces can deny the insurgents access to the people, the insurgents become like fish out of water, denied sources of manpower and information. The insurgents' problem is further compounded if the people feel secure enough from retribution to provide counterinsurgent forces with intelligence on insurgent movements and the identities of cadre members. The prospects for gaining such intelligence are further advanced if the

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[5] The problem here is somewhat similar to the public finance "free rider" principle in which those that benefit do not shoulder their fair share of the burden. During the Vietnam War, for example, US officials often evinced concern that the deployment of additional US combat forces would produce "subtraction by addition;" i.e., that the South Vietnamese would find it increasingly easy to "let [Uncle] Sam do it," husband their own resources, and minimize their military contribution.

[6] The insurgent movements do, however, seem unified in desiring the end of US presence and influence in their country.

[7] For example, although the linkage between the perpetrators and insurgent forces is far from clear, Spain appears to have been coerced into withdrawing its forces from Iraq in large part as a consequence of a terrorist train bombing in Madrid. The point here is that Spanish troops were not evicted from Iraq by insurgent forces; rather, they were withdrawn because the Spanish electorate, in the wake of the Madrid bombings, voted in a government committed to ending Spain's participation in the conflict.

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counterinsurgent forces have won the people's "hearts," by offering them the prospect of a better way of life if the insurgents are defeated, in addition to having won their "minds" by convincing the people that the insurgents will be defeated and that the government can provide the personal security necessary to convince individuals to provide the intelligence needed to identify who the insurgents are, and where they are located.

Should counterinsurgent forces instead focus their principal efforts on destroying insurgent forces, as is more typical of conventional warfare, and accord population security a low priority, they will play into the insurgents' hands. Insurgent casualties suffered under these circumstances will rarely prove decisive. So long as the insurgents maintain access to the population, they can rarely be compelled to fight. Thus they can meter their casualties to keep them at tolerable levels, and replenish their losses by recruiting from the population. It is only when the insurgents become truly isolated from the population that the real attrition of their forces can take place.

In establishing security for the population, priority in intelligence efforts should focus first and foremost on the insurgent infrastructure, not insurgent forces. By rooting out the insurgent cadres that live among the people, insurgent forces lose their eyes and ears, and coercing the population becomes much more difficult. Moreover, the local inhabitants are likely to feel more secure if the principal threat to their security lies outside their town than if it exists within. At present, the Iraqi insurgents are principally operating inside urban areas. Getting them out and keeping them out will require a protracted investment in providing security and enabling reconstruction. In this respect, the arrangements reached with insurgents in Fallujah and Najaf, respectively, that allowed insurgent forces to operate in those cities, as opposed to government security forces, was a significant setback for the United States' counterinsurgency campaign.

It bears repeating that security for the people is the *sine qua non* for winning their hearts and minds. Once a sufficient level of security is established, civic action, public works and other forms of reconstruction can proceed within acceptable levels of risk.[8] Local elections can be held, and those who assume office need not fear for their lives. Local security forces can be established to protect their community's stake in a future that promises economic gain and access to the political power.[9] Indeed, the political, economic and social elements of the counterinsurgency campaign must be well integrated with the military dimension. There must be a unity of effort and a unity of command. For example, civic action, or reconstruction, in the

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[8] Actions of this type are designed to pre-empt the insurgents' cause by demonstrating to the people that their lives will be better if the counterinsurgents prevail, and that the people will ultimately decide their own fate, first through local elections, and then, as more areas of the country become secure, regional and national elections. This takes considerable time to bring about, and are one reason why defeating an insurgent movement tend to be a protracted enterprise.

[9] These paramilitary forces should be drawn from the inhabitants of the area, and trained in counterinsurgency operations such as small-unit patrolling, night operations, and ambush. As with progress in various forms of civic action, this training process takes considerable time, far more than the time allotted for by coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the United States has understandably tried to replace US troops with Iraqi security forces, the fact is that training indigenous security forces takes time. Hence Washington's dilemma: it needs to reduce its troop strength to reduce the strain on its forces and to provide security with an Iraqi Face; yet that security can only be provided by well-trained forces, which will take considerable time to accomplish.

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absence of security merely increases the potential resources available to insurgent forces, or provides easy targets for insurgent acts of sabotage.[10]

Developing a secure environment in which reconstruction can take place takes time. The reason for this is that the population's support is conditional on the government's ability to demonstrate convincingly that it has both the means and the will to persevere. This critical factor has been lacking in the United States' strategy for dealing with the insurgents. Despite professions that America will "stay the course" in Iraq, the population has, in fact, been subjected to a series of course changes by the US Government that provide a very weak foundation upon which to win the hearts and minds of the people.

Measuring Success

What metrics does one use in measuring whether or not we are making progress in defeating the insurgency? How ought we to think about metrics we choose?

First, metrics must focus on trends in the war, not snapshots at a particular moment. Insurgencies are by nature protracted affairs, and success can be gauged only over time. Second, in selecting metrics, one must consider their possible second-order or "hidden" effects. Consider, for example, a metric that sees enemy casualties as a way of whittling down insurgent strength. This metric, if pursued indiscriminately, may increase noncombatant casualties, and alienate the population. Ultimately, this could find the insurgents more than offsetting their losses as a consequence of enhanced recruiting opportunities with the disenchanted population. Third, metrics should be reviewed on a frequent basis to insure they have proven (or remain) valid. Finally, metrics should not be viewed in isolation. They must always be linked back to the war's centers of gravity.

The Iraqi people are likely the principal center of gravity. If progress is being made in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, it is likely—though not assured—that the support of the American People and American Soldier will be sustained, at least over the near- to mid-term future.[11] This leads to three key questions:

- "Hearts"—Do the Iraqi people share the same objectives as their government and the coalition forces?

- "Minds"—Do the Iraqi people believe that these objectives are likely to be achieved—i.e., that the insurgent groups will, in the end, be defeated?

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[10] Note that this does not imply perfect security. A town or village can weather an occasional insurgent attack, even if some loss of life is involved, far better than they can endure a string of assassinations that demonstrate the insurgents are living among them. The former implies a relatively high degree of security, while in the latter case security is effectively non-existent.

[11] It must be noted that some conflict exists among the centers of gravity—the three centers are not identical in terms of what animates their perceptions of the war. Thus, for example, aggressive US military operations undertaken to enhance the Iraqi peoples' security may help secure that center of gravity, while at the same time—if substantial US casualties are incurred—risk undermining the centers of gravity comprising the American People and American Soldier.

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- Security—If provided with a secure environment, are the Iraqi people willing to take an active role in defeating the insurgency?

In short, if we win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, and provide them with security against retribution by the insurgents, they will provide much of the critical human intelligence regarding who the insurgents are, and where they are located. With that knowledge, the counterinsurgent forces will have a decisive advantage in the war.

Strategic Metrics

Given the Bush Administration's objectives, it appears there are two metrics at the strategic level of the conflict, which address overall war aims. One is whether our operations in Iraq are enabling a shift toward more democratic regimes in the Arab/Islamic world. The second is whether we will experience, as a consequence of this war, a shift away from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Campaign Metrics

What metrics might be useful in gauging progress in the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq? Here I will present and briefly comment upon several popular (and somewhat problematic) metrics, as well as several other metrics that appear promising.

Insurgent Force Levels
Enemy troop strength is often used to gauge the military balance in both conventional and insurgency warfare. In the case of Iraq, it does not appear that attempting to count the enemy would be a particularly useful measure of his strength or our progress in the war. Historically, it has often been exceedingly difficult to obtain an accurate assessment of insurgent force levels.[12] Unlike the counterinsurgent forces, many insurgents are not "full-time" participants in the conflict. Some "insurgents" engage in hostile activities not because they are "true believers" (e.g., are devoted to the Ba'athist, radical Islamist, etc. cause), but because they are coerced into participating, or co-opted (e.g., those Iraqis who will plant an IED for a fee.)

Number of Assassinations (e.g., religious leaders, senior government officials)
The fewer the number of assassinations, the better the government is seen as able to protect its own officials. From the population's perspective, if the government cannot protect its own, it is difficult to see how it can protect individual citizens from insurgent coercion and retribution.[13]

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[12] One also must be careful that this metric does not lead to a "body-count" approach to the war, as occurred in Vietnam. Traditionally, the surest way to reduce insurgent strength is to win the hearts and minds of the population, and deny the insurgents access to them by providing security. Once access is denied, the insurgents' recruiting source dries up—his forces are attrited indirectly, and in a manner much more likely to be sustained than the direct approach that puts primary emphasis on killing insurgents.

[13] Of course, as with many metrics, one must be careful in interpreting them. If, for example, the government were so thoroughly infiltrated by insurgents, it may no longer be necessary to target government officials. Or, if the insurgents believe US popular support for the war is weakening, they may intentionally shift their focus to the centers of gravity that are the American people and the American soldier.

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Insurgent Leader Casualties and Defections

Similarly, if the insurgents cannot protect their own leadership from being killed or captured, they are likely both losing the intelligence war, which is key to defeating an insurgency, and demonstrating their inability to protect their infrastructure from government penetration. This will likely discourage recruitment, as prospective recruits will infer that an insurgent movement that cannot shield the identity and location of its leaders can hardly be expected to do so for those lower in the chain of command.

Correspondingly, if insurgents are defecting in increasing numbers, or (better still) as a growing percentage of the overall insurgent force, this would indicate that we are winning the hearts and minds of the "true believers;" i.e., they are coming to believe that their cause is no longer worth fighting for, or that it is a hopeless cause.

Success in this area is a clear indication that the counterinsurgent forces are winning the intelligence battle. Since winning that battle will very likely mean that individual citizens are stepping forward to provide information, it also means that the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people are being won over—and that a critical center of gravity is being secured.

Combat Intensity

It is tempting to measure the number of combat incidents as a sign of insurgent strength, and the lack thereof as a sign of their weakness. This must be done with care, however, as a lack of insurgent activity does not necessarily mean success for the counterinsurgent forces. One suspects the combat incidents around Fallujah in the summer of 2004 were quite low. Yet this was hardly a measure of the counterinsurgent forces' success. Rather, it was a clear signal of their impotence.

Conversely, a large number of insurgent attacks may reflect their weakness, and not their strength. Such a rash of attacks could be stimulated by insurgent fears that they are losing the war and must do something dramatic to reverse the unfavorable (from their point of view) trends.

Nevertheless, it is worth tracking insurgent activity, not so much to get a sense of whether progress is being made in defeating them, but rather to get a sense of their priorities and trends in their behavior. For example, combat incidents could provide insights on trends in the scale of enemy attacks (e.g., small group, sizeable force, large-scale units), their targeting priorities (What are they targeting: civilians? US forces? convoys? infrastructure?), and their level of success (Were casualties produced? Facilities destroyed?). These data may also tell us how effective counterinsurgent forces are in certain elements of their strategy, or signal a shift in their strategy. For example, if the data show that the insurgents are moving away from attacks on government officials, or if these attacks are experiencing a far lower success rate, then counterinsurgent efforts to protect key government officials may be paying off.

US Casualties

To the extent that US casualties are linked to a decline in support for the war among American soldiers in particular and the US public in general, they are an important metric. However, it is not clear that this is the case, at least not given the current casualty rate, which is far below that

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suffered during the Vietnam War. Furthermore, unlike in the Vietnam era, no US citizen risks becoming a casualty in Iraq unless they volunteer for military service. To be sure, the American public might, at some point, become horrified by the level of US casualties. Still, this might just as easily lead to a redoubling of the American people's determination to see the war through to a victorious conclusion, as to stimulate demands for a US troop withdrawal.

As noted above, a more important issue for the two American centers of gravity may be the "free rider problem." If it is perceived that the Iraqis do not want to fight for their own freedom against undemocratic insurgent movements, US soldiers (and the American people) may become increasingly reluctant to make sacrifices on behalf of what is perceived to be indifferent beneficiaries.

Winning the Intelligence War: The Link to the "Hearts and Minds"

It bears repeating that winning the intelligence war is critical to defeating an insurgency. Coalition forces have overwhelming combat capability. If they know who the insurgents are, and where they are, victory is assured. It is crucial that ways are identified to measure progress in this area. Consider, then, the following metrics:

Percentage of Contacts with the Enemy initiated by US and Coalition Forces. The focus is ***not*** on the number of offensive operations that coalition forces launch relative to the insurgents; rather, it is the number of contacts that are initiated by coalition forces relative to the enemy. The metric is used to find out how we are progressing in the intelligence war, which is a surrogate for getting a handle on the population's disposition. The thinking here is that a positive trend in this metric is an indication not only that the initiative is passing from the insurgents to the counterinsurgent forces, but also that a key link in this effort is the willingness of the population to provide "actionable" intelligence. When the Iraqi people support US war aims, believe the US will prevail, and believe they are secure from retribution by the insurgents, they are much more likely to provide information as to where IEDs might be planted, or when an insurgent ambush is planned, or who among them might be cooperating with the insurgents. Along these lines, among the most useful metrics would be the following:

Percentage of IEDs Intercepted/Destroyed vs. those Detonated. Again, this may be a useful surrogate for measuring whether or not the government and its coalition allies are making progress in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. To capture this trend, IED intercept figures would have to be broken down by type. For example, IEDs might be intercepted due to government/military surveillance or by tips from the civilian population, or by shoddy emplacement by the insurgents, or other factors. The key here is to track the level and effectiveness of civilian involvement in dealing with this form of insurgent attack.

Percentage of Contacts with the Enemy Initiated by Coalition Forces relative to Contacts Initiated by Iraqi units. Since ultimately this war must be won by the Iraqi people themselves, and since the United States should avoid creating a "free rider" problem with respect to indigenous Iraqi forces, measuring the percentage of contacts with the enemy initiated by coalition forces relative to contacts initiated by indigenous Iraqi units (e.g., National Guard units; police forces) might be useful. Simply put: What percentage of contacts with the enemy involve

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indigenous Iraqi forces? Of these contacts, what percentage are initiated by Iraqis, and what percentage by the insurgents?

"Actionable" Intelligence Provided by the Local Population. Correspondingly, it might be useful to measure the percentage of contacts with the enemy that stem from "actionable" intelligence provided by the local population. The higher the percentage, the greater the likelihood that the locals both share our objectives and feel secure enough to volunteer information. The goal here, of course, is to determine whether two key objectives are being met. First, are the Iraqi forces taking on an increasing share of the burden in the war against the insurgents? Second, what kind of cooperation are they receiving from the people in the form of actionable intelligence? If the trends are positive, it offers considerable encouragement.

"Market Metrics"

There is some evidence that the insurgent movement comprises not only those that are unremittingly hostile to the idea of a free and democratic Iraq and to the United States, but also those who are unemployed or part of the criminal element released from Iraqi jails shortly before the beginning of the Second Gulf War. "True believers" in the insurgent cause should not need any special incentive to undertake violent action against the Iraqi Government or coalition forces. However, there are clear indications that the insurgents are offering payments to Iraqis to plant IEDs, and declaring bounties for the killing of certain categories of individuals (e.g., Iraqi governmental officials, US soldiers, etc.). To the degree this is occurring, it indicates that the insurgency is struggling to expand its ranks, and must buy support. Given this, it would be helpful to keep track of the "market" in this aspect of the struggle. What are the insurgents offering to those who will plant an IED? Detonate one? Commit suicide in a car bomb attack? What kind of bounty are they placing on the lives of their enemies, and how does that price change over time?

The assumption behind these "market" metrics is that the higher the price the insurgents are paying people to engage in these actions, the fewer people there are who are willing to do them. Reduced supply is driving up the cost. The lower supply may be indicators of US success in meeting other objectives, such as economic growth (which, by reducing unemployment, may reduce the number of individuals willing to "work" for the insurgents), a greater sense of security (making it more difficult for insurgents to gain access to people for the purpose of "employing" them to attack the counterinsurgent forces), or a stronger sense of popular commitment to the new Iraq regime (leaving fewer people vulnerable to being co-opted by the insurgents to perform these tasks).

Of course, the price could drop at the same time there is a dramatic increase in attacks. This would be far more worrisome. Here it seems likely the price would drop because Iraqis are attracted to the insurgent movement in ever-increasing numbers. Should that become the case, the increased supply of "true believers"—those who act out of conviction—would reduce the need to hire individuals to conduct these attacks for money. In economic terms, the demand

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would be reduced relative to the supply of individuals available and, hence, the price would drop.[14]

V. Conclusion

We are, at present, engaged in a protracted conflict with an enemy waging a transnational, theologically based insurgent movement. While the conflict is global, the central front is, at present, clearly in Iraq, where we are confronted by several insurgent groups, principal among them those seeking a Ba'athist restoration and those fighting under the banner of radical Islam.

This war is marked by a severe asymmetry. The centers of gravity in this war are the Iraqi people, the American public, and the American soldier—all three must be secured to achieve our objective. The enemy, however, need only secure *one* of these three to emerge victorious.

It is difficult to discern a coherent US strategy for defeating the insurgency, or to accept that adequate metrics have been identified to gauge whether or not progress is being made. Those metrics that are most often cited, such as level of enemy attacks, US casualties, and numbers of Iraqi security forces trained, are likely to prove of relatively low utility in determining if we are winning the war. Assuming an effective strategy can be devised, it will almost certainly focus on the "hearts and minds" of the three centers of gravity and, by extension, winning the intelligence war.

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[14] In terms of measuring the success of ongoing operations to defeat the insurgents, one might examine yet another "market" force. In this case, we might trace the trend in the cost of certain key insurgent weapons. For example, what is the price of an AK-47 on the black market? A ton of explosives? On the other hand, given Iraqi culture (most people own their own weapons) and the fact that, under Saddam Hussein, the country boasted numerous ammunition dumps, the ability to restrict the supply of weapons or explosives may be very limited, at least until the latter stages of the insurgency when the government's ability to control what goes on inside its borders becomes stronger. This is not to say the government should not, for example, attempt to secure its ammunition supplies. Rather, it is a recognition that, in failing to do so immediately after the end of major combat operations, US and coalition forces enabled the market to be flooded. This combined with the relatively low rate of munition expenditures by the insurgent, means that there is very likely a generous supply of munitions available. One also notes the success insurgents have had in seizing equipment and munitions provided to Iraqi police forces that have had their command posts or police stations overrun in attacks.

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

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 21st CENTURY: RECONCEPTUALIZING THREAT AND RESPONSE

Steven Metz
Raymond Millen

November 2004

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The authors would like to thank Stephen Biddle, John Nagl, and Robert Cassidy for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this monograph. All remaining shortcomings are, of course, despite their best efforts.

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FOREWORD

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has developed a national security strategy designed to eliminate the conditions that spawn asymmetric threats. An important part of that is helping build stable, legitimate governments in nations which allowed or supported terrorism and other forms of asymmetric aggression. This has led the United States to renewed involvement in counterinsurgency.

The United States, particularly the Army, has a long history of counterinsurgency support. During the past decade, though, this has not been an area of focus for the American military. To renew its capability at counterinsurgency, the military is assessing 21st century insurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and revising its strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine.

This monograph is designed to contribute to this process. In it, Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen argue that 20th century strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine should not be applied to 21st century insurgency without further refinement. They contend that there are two major variants of insurgency which they label "national" and "liberation." Most existing strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine are derived from American experience with national insurgencies, but these need to be adapted when confronting liberation insurgencies.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this special report as part of the ongoing refinement of the Army's understanding of the threat posed by insurgency in the 21st century security environment.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

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SUMMARY

Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed.

The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. But insurgency remains challenging for the United States because two of its dominant characteristics--protractedness and ambiguity--mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest.

Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime's military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic capabilities; and, encouraging and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.

A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency must be different in some important ways. Specifically, it should include the rapid stabilization of the state or area using the appropriately sized force (but larger is usually better); a shift to minimum U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible; rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces; shifting the perception of the insurgency from a liberation one to a national one; encouraging sustained reform by the partner regime; and cauterization--the strengthening of states surrounding the state facing an insurgency.

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Sustained capability enhancement is crucial, even when the United States is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes leader development, wargaming, concept development, research and analysis, professional education, and focused training. Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness of regional states and other regional security organizations to provide counterinsurgency support, improved homeland security, and methods for early warning of insurgency, preventative actions, and the creation of early-stage support packages.

The United States must make clear whether its approach to counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring the response and method to the threat. A strategy of victory which seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very long shot, hence a strategy of containment is the more logical one.

Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. Specifically, the U.S. military and other government agencies should develop an effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and deresource insurgents. To make this work requires an independent strategic assessment organization composed of experienced government officials, military officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional experts to assess a counterinsurgency operation and allow senior leaders to make adjustments.

When involved in backing an existing government, the U.S. force package would be designed primarily for training, advice, and support. It should be interagency from the inception. In most cases, the only combat forces would be those needed for force and facility protection, more rarely for strike missions in particularly challenging environments. Modularity should increasingly allow the Army to tailor, deploy, and sustain such packages.

Sustaining the commitment is an important part of force packaging. Successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a decade or more. Consideration must be given to rotation procedures for deployed forces. To some extent, contractors can relieve this

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pressure, particularly since many of the training, advice, and support functions in counterinsurgency do not have to be performed by uniformed military. But as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the use of contractors brings a range of other problems associated with training, control, discipline, and protection.

Given the likelihood of continued involvement in counter-insurgency support, the Army will need to consider increasing the number of units that have particular utility in this environment, such as Intelligence and Engineers. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, both of which also have high utility in counterinsurgency support, need refocusing and restructuring. As a minimum, a larger proportion of these units should be in the active component. And, both need greater autonomy to be effective in a counterinsurgency environment rather than being assigned to the commander of a maneuver unit. In general, though, the Army should not develop specialized units to "fight" counterinsurgency.

Leader development and training for counterinsurgency must emphasize ethical considerations and force discipline, cultural sensitivity, and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. Most importantly, leader development must focus on inculcating the Army with the ability to innovate and adapt. Organizationally, the U.S. military should develop matrix and networked organizations. Professional education and training must be increasingly interagency and multinational.

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 21st CENTURY: RECONCEPTUALIZING THREAT AND RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. At times insurgency forms "background noise" to competition or conflict between great powers. At other times, it is strategically significant, undercutting regional stability, drawing outsiders into direct conflict, and spawning humanitarian disasters. From a systemic perspective, the lower the chances of direct armed conflict between great powers and the greater the tendency of major powers to sponsor insurgency as a form of surrogate conflict, the greater the strategic significance of insurgency. When war between great powers is likely, insurgency may simmer on but becomes strategic background noise.

Today the world has entered another period when sustained, large-scale conventional war between states is unlikely, at least in the near term. But mounting global discontent arising from globalization; the failure of economic development to keep pace with expectations; the collapse of traditional political, economic, and social orders; widespread anger and resentment; environmental decay; population pressure; the presence of weak regimes; the growth of transnational organized crime; and the widespread availability of arms are making insurgency common and strategically significant. This significance is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer.

Counterinsurgency support has been part of American strategy since the 1960s, but today insurgency is mutating, thus forcing an intense reevaluation of U.S. strategy and operational concepts. To simply extrapolate the ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts from several decades ago and apply them to 21st century insurgency is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed for the U.S. military and other components of the government to confront the new variants of this old challenge and to distinguish insurgency's enduring characteristics from those undergoing change.

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DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise. Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization—all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor. Insurgents may attempt to seize power and replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency) or they may have more limited aims such as separation, autonomy, or alteration of a particular policy. They avoid battlespaces where they are weakest—often the conventional military sphere—and focus on those where they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the psychological and the political. Insurgents try to postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain themselves, expand their support, and hope that, over time, the power balance changes in their favor.

In a broad sense, insurgencies take two forms.[1] In what can be called "national" insurgencies, the primary antagonists are the insurgents and a national government which has at least some degree of legitimacy and support. The distinctions between the insurgents and the regime are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, race, religion), or some other political factor. The government may have external supporters, but the conflict is clearly between the insurgents and an endogenous regime. National insurgencies are triangular in that they involve not only the two antagonists—the insurgents and counterinsurgents—but also a range of other actors who can shift the relationship between the antagonists by supporting one or the other. The most important of these other actors are the populace of the country but may also include external states, organizations, and groups. The insurgents and counterinsurgents pursue strategies which, in a sense, mirror image the other as they attempt to weaken the other party and simultaneously win over neutrals or those who are not committed to one side or the other.

The second important form are "liberation" insurgencies. These pit insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as outside occupiers (even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture. The goal of the insurgents is to "liberate" their nation

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from alien occupation. Examples include the insurgency in Rhodesia, the one against the white minority government in South Africa, the Palestinian insurgency, Vietnam after 1965, the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation, Chechnya, the current Taleban/al Qaeda insurgency in Afghanistan, and the Iraq insurgency.

The distinction between a national and a liberation insurgency is not always rigid and clear. A single insurgency can contain elements of both, and shift emphasis during its lifespan. The Chinese communist insurgency, for instance, began as a national insurgency, shifted to a combination of liberation and national during the Japanese occupation, and then shifted back to a national one. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese insurgency in South Vietnam grew out of a liberation one, became more national in focus before extensive American involvement in the conflict, again emphasized the liberation element from 1965 to the early 1970s, and then shifted back again.

Liberation insurgencies are difficult to counter. The approach that usually works against national insurgents—demonstrating that the government can address the root causes of the conflict through reform—does not work nearly as well since the occupiers are inherently and insurmountably distinct from the insurgents and their supporters. Their outsider status cannot be overcome by even the most skilled information campaign. What motivates the insurgents is not the lack of jobs, schools, or the right to vote, but resentment at occupation, interference, and rule by outsiders or those perceived as outsiders. Reform is not the key to a solution as it normally is in national insurgencies.[2] For this reason, skilled insurgents prefer to have their movement seen as a liberation one rather than a national one, thus making the mobilization of support and internal unity within the insurgency easier.

Insurgencies vary across time and regions but most follow a common life cycle. During the period of organization and coalescence, insurgent movements tend to be weak, disorganized, and often inchoate. Survival is the overwhelming priority. In the earliest stage, there may be diverse, competing insurgent movements within a nation. If so, establishing a reputation—"brand identity"—is important, leading some of the proto-insurgencies to undertake bold, even foolhardy actions.[3] Other insurgents may opt for the underground approach and remain hidden as long as possible

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while organizing, recruiting, training, learning their craft, and accumulating resources. Each method of mobilization—by publicity-generating action or by building an underground organization—has proven successful, particularly if the regime fails to recognize the seriousness of the threat at an early stage.

At some point every insurgency must open direct operations against the regime in order to succeed. This can take the form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, assassination of officials, sabotage, and other types of irregular or asymmetric violence. At the same time, the insurgents must continue to improve their skills, learn their craft, accumulate resources, and mobilize support. They may do this by cultivating external alliances, smuggling, robbery, narcotrafficking, kidnapping, black marketing, money laundering, counterfeiting, merchandise pirating, illegal use of charities, racketeering, and extortion. They may buy arms, obtaining them from ideological allies, or capture them from government forces. Most—but not all—insurgents also seek to augment their legitimacy, mobilize greater public support and, in some cases, expand their international acceptance.

Insurgents have a variety of methods to do this, including propaganda, information warfare designed to popularize the perception that they are seekers of justice forced into violence by the unwillingness of the regime to give them a voice in the political system, actions which demonstrate that they offer a better alternative than the regime, and simple boldness and courage—"armed propaganda"—designed to demonstrate the incompetence and brutality of the regime. In any case, insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment by defiance, particularly among young males with the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and lack of purpose. Insurgency can provide a sense of adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends its political objectives.

Thus the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young men in a society, the more fruitful ground for insurgent organizers to work. The job of mobilizing support and acquiring resources is even easier for insurgents in a liberation conflict since they can draw on the inherent dislike people have of domination by "outsiders." As Khair al-Din Hasib, the "father" of pan-Arab nationalism, stated, "Whenever, wherever there is occupation, there will be resistance."[4]

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An insurgency continues so long as both sides either feel that they will ultimately prevail, or believe the costs of stopping the conflict will be greater than the costs of persisting. Often insurgencies drag on so long that entire generations emerge that have known nothing but conflict, so their fear of peace—which is an unknown, and thus anxiety-causing—surpasses their fear of conflict. An insurgency may end when one side (or, less often, both) decides that no matter how long they continue, they cannot prevail, or that the costs of ending the conflict are less than the costs of continuation. In other words, it is less an assessment of a preferred future that drives insurgents or insurgent supporters than an assessment of who will prevail—the insurgents or the regime. The normal practice is for large segments of the population to "bandwagon" by throwing their support to the side they believe will win. Ultimately the denouement may be a negotiated settlement, or the conflict may simply peter out as the insurgents melt back into the population or go into exile. Less often, insurgencies end with decisive victory, either when the insurgents seize power or attain some other objective, or the regime eradicates all the insurgents and prevents recruitment of new ones.

During the past century, most insurgencies failed. The majority were crushed before they developed a critical mass of skill and support, or were simply incapable of attaining such a critical mass. Successful insurgencies were those with effective force protection and counterintelligence capabilities able to prevent the counterinsurgents, whether a regime or outside occupiers, from pushing the conflict to decision in the military realm until the power balance shifted in their favor. They did this either by making the political and psychological realms decisive (since it was much easier for them to attain parity with the counterinsurgents in this sphere), or by postponing decisive military encounters until they weakened the government through guerrilla, political, and psychological operations.

Starting an insurgency is easy. A dozen or so dedicated radicals with access to munitions and explosives can do it. Building an effective insurgency, though, is difficult. History suggests that it requires a specific set of conditions. The importance of these is determined, in part, by the effectiveness of the regime. When facing a determined regime with an understanding of counterinsurgency and the resources to undertake it, all of these conditions must be present for any degree of success by the insurgents. When facing a weak, disorganized, corrupt, divided, repressive, or ineffective

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regime, insurgents can overcome the absence of one or even several of the conditions.

Preconditions.

The most basic precondition for insurgency is frustration and the belief that this cannot be ameliorated through the existing political system. This may be widespread among a population or limited to a radical elite which then has to convince the more passive population of the need for violent change. A conspiratorial history and culture are also important. In such societies, insurgents can utilize or take over existing patterns of underground activity, webs of secret societies, or widespread criminal activity. A society already accustomed to conspiratorial activity is a naturally fertile ground for insurgency.

Effective Strategy.

The strategy of an insurgent movement is built on three simultaneous and interlinked components: 1) force protection (via dispersion, sanctuary, the use complex terrain, effective counterintelligence, etc.); 2) actions to erode the will, strength and legitimacy of the regime (via violence and political-psychological programs); and, 3) augmentation of resources and support. There are, though, multiple ways to undertake these actions; insurgent strategies vary over time and across regions. Often insurgents have been able to seize and hold the strategic initiative due to inherently greater flexibility and absence of ethical or legal constraints. They are also unburdened with the need to run a government and maintain security and exercise authority throughout the country, and less constrained by law and normal ethical considerations. Every successful insurgency is dominated by a feeling that the end justifies the means.

Effective Ideology.

National insurgencies in particular depend on ideology to unify, inspire, explain why the existing system is unjust or illegitimate, and rationalize the use of violence to alter or overthrow the existing system. (Because liberation insurgencies have the "organic" mobilizing factor

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of alien occupation, they depend less on artificial mechanisms such as ideology). A coherent ideology explains existing discontent and anger and offers a remedy. It builds on preconceptions, propensities, grievances, resentments, hopes, desires, beliefs, cultural variables, historical factors, and social norms. An effective insurgent ideology, in other words, must "fit" a given society. In the 20th century, the combination of Marxism and nationalism particularly was powerful. The nationalistic angle made the ideology broad and unifying; Marxism focused anger and resentment on the regime, and explained why the insurgents could expect ultimate success even when the odds against them appeared long.

Effective Leadership.

Leading an insurgency is difficult. Insurgent leaders must convince people to undertake extraordinary danger and hardship for extended periods of time with a very small chance of a positive outcome. Successful insurgent leaders are those who can unify diverse groups and organizations and impose their will under situations of high stress. Psychologically, effective insurgent leaders are so dedicated to their cause that they will persevere even though the odds are against them. They become obsessive "true believers" of nearly mythical status, driven by vision, often building a cult of leadership. Similarly, they tend to believe so strongly in their cause that they become completely ruthless, willing to do anything necessary to protect their movement and weaken the counterinsurgents. Insurgent leadership is not a business for the faint of heart, but for the utterly committed and obsessive.

Resources.

In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies, particularly access to arms, munitions, and explosives; 4) sanctuary (internal or internal+external); and, 5) intelligence. The amount needed varies from insurgency to insurgency. Some, for instance, need mass support, others do not. Some only need public passivity. Insurgent resources can be provided, seized, or created. The first can come from outside sponsors, domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of

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the counterinsurgents (e.g., the government may provide sanctuary by being unaware of the presence of the insurgents). Funding, equipment, and supplies are the resources most often seized, but in some insurgencies, particularly those in Africa, manpower is seized through violence as insurgents undertake forcible recruitment (impressment). Just as in nature an organism seeks to obtain food with the minimum energy expenditure, most insurgencies would prefer to be provided resources, but will seize or create them if none are provided or, in some cases, if provided resources come with too many strings attached.

20th-CENTURY INSURGENCY

21st-century insurgency is clearly a descendent of a similar phenomenon that blossomed in the "golden age of insurgency" in the second half of the 20th century. At that time, many states in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and even on the periphery of Europe were ruled by weak, corrupt regimes; unpopular dictators; new, fragile governments; or colonial occupiers. Socialist radicalism and nationalism inspired revolutionaries around the world and provided an ethical justification for political violence. Increases in literacy and improvements in communication helped to mobilize the disenfranchised and the repressed. The Soviet Union, unable to undertake direct expansion, adopted an indirect strategy in which it supported insurgency to weaken the West. Later China and Cuba followed suit. Toward the end of the 20th century, indirect aggression via state support to insurgency was used in Mozambique, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Western Sahara, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kashmir, and elsewhere.

Most importantly, insurgency flowered in the 20th century because of the invention of a powerful and effective insurgent-based strategy: Maoist "People's War." People's War began when a highly motivated cadre mobilized a support base among the rural peasantry using nationalism and local grievances (often including corruption, repression, excessive taxation, and issues associated with land ownership). This was particularly powerful when it could take the form of a liberation insurgency. The Chinese insurgents, for instance, gained strength when they painted their movement as an anti-Japanese one (even though they did little actual fighting with

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the Japanese). The same was true of the Viet Minh. What happened in these cases—and may happen in Iraq—was that the insurgents built their movements on liberation grounds but were able to segue into purely national insurgencies after the occupiers left.

People's War called for a period of underground political organization followed by guerrilla war.[5] The ultimate objective was seizure of power and creation of a communist state. While the insurgents were prepared for a long struggle involving occasional military setbacks, they sought to launch increasingly larger military operations. In the "pure" form of Maoist People's War, the final phase was conventional maneuver warfare after the regime was weakened by prolonged guerrilla operations. Many of the great successes of the Maoist approach (such as China itself and Vietnam) came through conventional military victory.

Throughout the course of People's War, psychological operations and political mobilization paralleled military actions. In fact, violence was viewed as "armed propaganda" designed for maximum psychological effect such as demonstrating the weakness or incompetence of the regime or provoking it into excessive reactions which eroded its support. Military actions which had maximum direct effect on the insurgents often alienated the public (as well as the international community). Violence also deterred government supporters and inspired potential insurgent supporters. The Algerian National Liberation Front, Viet Minh and Viet Cong, for instance, focused assassinations and terrorism on unpopular local officials and landowners. Often the regimes were blamed when their use of force hurt innocents while insurgents often were not—one of the core asymmetries of insurgency is an asymmetry of expectations concerning behavior. Thus one of the key decisions for counterinsurgents was deciding whether the political cost of armed strikes against the insurgents was worth paying.

The People's War strategy also directed insurgents to develop "liberated areas" that they could administer more justly than government-controlled regions. This too was a means of psychological warfare and propaganda designed to win over the "undecideds" to the rebel side. In fact, that was the essence of People's War and the core of its triangularity: the conflict was an armed and political-psychological competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the "undecideds."

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Often outside supporters played an important role in People's War, providing sanctuary, training, equipment, funding, and supplies. In fact, 20th-century insurgency was a form of proxy conflict caused by the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers. Because direct confrontation between the West and East risked escalation to the thermonuclear level, proxy conflict was considered a safe option.[6] By the 1980s, the United States—recognizing that insurgency often required "fighting fire with fire"—began promoting insurgency against pro-Soviet regimes in places such as Nicaragua and Angola.

Despite its long history with insurgency and other forms of irregular war, the United States was organizationally, doctrinally, conceptually, and psychologically unprepared for People's War when it first confronted it in Vietnam. The Army, at least at the senior level, placed little stress on the mundane but vital aspects of counterinsurgency, such as training the South Vietnamese security forces, village pacification, local self-defense, and rooting out insurgent political cadres, at least at the higher level. Perhaps more importantly, even though a number of experts in the United States developed an astute understanding of the Vietnamese communist strategy and organization, Washington never forced the South Vietnamese regime to undergo fundamental reform and thus it never solidified its legitimacy.[7] Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler reflected the thinking of President Lyndon Johnson and his top advisors when he said, "The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military."[8]

By the time the United States did develop an organization to synchronize the military, political, and psychological dimensions of the struggle—the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program—it was too late.[9] The United States never supported CORDS to a degree comparable to the major military operations, the North Vietnamese military was thoroughly entrenched in the south, the South Vietnamese regime was widely perceived as corrupt and illegitimate, and the American public alienated. Even though the Viet Cong were militarily crushed in the 1968 Tet Offensive and saw their political underground decimated by the Phoenix Program (which came later), the shift of power away from the regime was irreversible and carried on by the other element of the insurgent alliance—the North Vietnamese Army.[10]

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When the United States again confronted insurgency in the 1980s, it drew on the Vietnam experience to develop a "carrot-and-stick" strategy which simultaneously promoted democratization, economic development, dialogue, and defense. In addition, Washington limited where it became involved. Recognizing that counterinsurgency support was a very long-term proposition and that support by the American people and their elected leaders would have to be sustained, the United States limited its involvement in counterinsurgency to areas of high national interest, especially Central America and the Caribbean.

In addition, indirect means rather than the large-scale application of American military force was the preferred method. The 1987 *National Security Strategy*, for instance, specified that indirect military power, particularly security assistance, was the primary tool of counterinsurgency. The 1988 *National Security Strategy* was even more explicit, emphasizing that U.S. engagement "must be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome and important U.S. national security interests."[11]

This understanding of insurgency was eventually codified with the 1990 release of Army and Air Force doctrine in FM 100-20/AFM 3-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*. Success in low-intensity conflict, according to this manual, followed adherence to five "imperatives": political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance. The pivotal concept was *legitimacy*. This assumed the people of a country will decide whether the government or the insurgents can offer them the "best deal" in terms of goods and services and then support that side. Following this line of thought, U.S. activity in counterinsurgency was based on the concept of internal defense and development (IDAD) under which the host government "identifies the genuine grievances of its people and takes political, economic, and social actions to redress them." But while FM 100-20, like the national security strategy, noted that the U.S. military role in counterinsurgency would "normally center on security assistance program administration," it did not rule out direct tactical involvement of U.S. forces.

Simultaneously, other governments around the world also came to grips with Maoist-style insurgency and developed effective strategies, doctrine, and forces to counter it. Some utilized the American approach, combining carrot-and-stick. Others, such as the

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Guatemalans and Peruvians, implemented a "mailed fist" strategy which also proved effective (albeit brutal). By the end of the 20th century, counterinsurgency thinking had caught up with insurgency, and the tide had turned. Insurgency's "golden age" was over—at least for a brief period.

MUTATING INSURGENCY

While many governments have discovered ways to counter Maoist People's War, the factors that motivate insurgents—the perception of repression, anger, frustration, and an inability to ameliorate these through legitimate political means—persist.[12] As a result, insurgency is mutating. Some things, though, have not changed. Insurgency remains complex, grinding, dirty, and violent, mired in multiple levels of ambiguity and dragged out for an extended period of time. But there are key changes or discontinuities with effects that are not yet fully understood:

The Meaning of Sanctuary.

There are fewer geographically remote areas outside government control where insurgencies can gestate, so the initial stages of development tend to take place "hidden in plain sight" in cities and other developed areas. The ability of governments, particularly those affiliated with the United States, to find and destroy targets from a distance has made embedding and dispersal the preferred forms of protection for insurgents rather than isolation. The ongoing global trend toward urbanization means this will continue—future insurgencies will tend to form and develop in cities rather than rural areas.[13] While this is necessary for self-protection, dispersion will make it difficult for insurgent movements to concentrate enough power to seize control of a state. Maoist People's War was effective because it was able to weaken the regime psychologically and politically, then launch decisive military blows. Modern insurgents may never develop enough military power to undertake conventional operations and thus have to rely on terrorism and psychological and political means. This has a lower chance of success than the Maoist approach. Widely dispersed, networked insurgencies are difficult to eradicate, but also less likely to gain victory than the more concentrated insurgencies of the 20th century.

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Diversification of Support.

While insurgent movements continue to seek external support and many find it important, they can no longer rely on it to the extent that Cold War insurgents could, in large part because of the ability of the United States to pressure external supporters. Insurgents therefore must devote extensive effort to fundraising or income generation. This increasingly leads them into coalition with organized crime, or to become criminal organizations themselves. While this is, in a sense, a distraction, it diminishes the need for external sponsors and even the mass public. To a much greater extent, contemporary insurgents only need the passivity of the public rather than its active support.

Extended Connections.

Interconnectedness and information technology have facilitated the linkage of various insurgent movements and allied organizations, including criminal enterprises across regions and around the world. Coalitions and partnerships that would have been impossible during the Cold War are becoming the norm. The best example is the transnational Islamist insurgency which includes a dizzying array of subcomponents.

Asymmetric Power Projection.

Insurgents have developed the capability for strategic power projection (terrorism), strategic intelligence, and the building of wide-ranging regional and global linkages without the need for a patron like the Soviet Union or Cuba. Eventually this may allow them to deter states with a less-than-vital interest from providing counterinsurgency support.

Shifting Rallying Cries.

The content of insurgent ideology has shifted. While there are a few lingering Marxist insurgencies, an ideology based on transnational, radical Islam is clearly on the ascent. In some ways it poses greater challenges than Marxism. For instance, clerics play a

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central role in political mobilization but are considered protected and hence unacceptable targets. Because of its transcendentalism, radical Islam can inspire suicide terrorists—a phenomenon uncommon in secular insurgencies. But radical Islam is also a less forward looking and inclusive ideology than Marxism; its appeal outside its historical cultural realm is limited. In the broadest sense, the ideologies which underlie 21st century insurgencies decry the injustice of globalization. Because the United States is seen as the engineer of the existing world order, many insurgent ideologies define the United States and its partner regimes as the enemy.

Transparency.

Flowing from information technology, globalization, and the international movement of people, transparency has changed the nature of psychological warfare, making it easier to transmit information (including rumors and lies) and to build linkages, but harder to sustain perceptions or themes that do not closely match existing predispositions. In an environment with multiple and instantaneous sources of information, perceptions can be shaped but not controlled.

The mutation of insurgency is likely to continue. This may take several directions. For instance, insurgencies may become increasingly networked, with no centralized command and no common strategy, only a unifying objective. This would make them even less effective in terms of seizing power or attaining other political goals, but more survivable in the face of effective counterinsurgent actions. Insurgencies also may develop connections, even alliances with legitimate political organizations which share their resentment of the U.S.-dominated global economic and political system. It is conceivable that insurgent movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America could find political allies or sympathetic affiliates in North America, Western Europe, and the Pacific Rim. This would accord them a degree of legitimacy which would greatly complicate the task of counterinsurgency. Insurgencies may follow the path of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia* [FARC]) and evolve into purely criminal organizations with only the thinnest veneer of politics. Or, more ominously, they may acquire weapons of mass destruction and thus develop an increased deterrent or compellence capability.

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CURRENT SITUATION

The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. What takes place within states is of intense concern to those outside, particularly retain, to the United States in its role as engineer of global and regional order. Interconnectedness between states, their permeability, the globalization of economies, the transparency arising from information technology, and the intermixing of people around the world give every conflict regional and global repercussions. "In an increasingly interconnected world," states the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, "regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity."[14] In Colombia, for instance, "the link between terrorist and extremist groups . . . challenge[s] the security of the state" while in Africa, "civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones."[15] Internal conflicts create refugee flows which destabilize neighboring states. They often spawn organized crime as rebels turn to smuggling to raise capital and acquire weaponry. As the images of internal war are broadcast or emailed around the world, awareness rises and, with it, demands for action or intervention—the days are gone when millions could die in civil wars with barely a whisper to the outside. And internal conflicts and the weak states or ungoverned areas they create often serve as breeding grounds for terrorism so the connection between internal conflict and American security is direct.

Insurgency is challenging for the United States because two of its dominant characteristics—protractedness and ambiguity—mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Rapid decisive operations are seldom, if ever, strategically decisive; long-term involvement with extensive interagency activity and partner cooperation is the norm. Since the military battlespace is not decisive, ultimate success requires that the U.S. military play a supporting role to other government agencies and, more importantly, to the partner governments and their security forces. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Even when the military is effective at the security component of counterinsurgency, other government agencies are less effective at political, economic, psychological, and intelligence challenges.

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Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest. Because insurgency is a holistic threat, counterinsurgency must be integrated and holistic.

The strategic and doctrinal framework with which the United States must face 21st century insurgencies does provide a foundation. But there are serious gaps. Some key strategic documents overlook insurgency all together. For instance, the 2004 *National Military Strategy* states, "While the Armed Forces' foremost task is to fight and win wars, the character of conflict has changed, necessitating capabilities to defeat a wide range of adversaries—from state to nonstate actors."[16] While not using the word "insurgency," it refers to "illegal armed groups that menace stability and security."[17] But its strategic principles are agility, decisiveness, and integration which "support simultaneous operations, the application of overmatching power and the fusion of U.S. military power with other instruments of power."[18] This perspective is not integrated fully with characteristics that history has shown to be most effective in counterinsurgency including perseverance, restrained use of force, and emphasis on intelligence, law enforcement, and political action. Moreover, the section of the strategy which deals with deterring aggression does not mention sponsorship or support of insurgency as a form of aggression.[19] The strategy does mention stability operations but views them purely as a follow-on to major combat operations. In aggregate, the 2004 *National Military Strategy* applies the conceptual foundation and methodology developed for conventional combat to irregular warfare rather than developing a new or separate approach.

While Joint and Service doctrine does deal with insurgency, it tends to overlook the ongoing mutations, treating 20th-century Maoist People's war as a universal model for insurgency. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, for instance, incorporates counterinsurgency under nation assistance which includes security assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civil assistance.[20] Foreign internal defense (FID) is the most salient concept. It is defined as "the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency." This "has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government."[21] Initially developed

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from the U.S. experience in Vietnam, FID is designed to "free and protect a nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society."[22] Economic, social, informational, and political needs are the focus of U.S. effort. However, military assistance is usually necessary to provide security.

While foreign internal defense continues to seek improvements in a partner state's internal defense and development, it is no longer aimed purely at countering insurgency. FID programs may also address other, interrelated sources of instability such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and ethnic rivalries.[23] The military's role in FID can be categorized as indirect support such as security assistance, combined exercises, and exchanges; direct support such as civil-military operations, military training to host nation forces, logistics support, and intelligence and communications sharing; and combat operations.

Recent Army doctrine incorporates counterinsurgency into stability operations and support operations. The emphasis tends to be less on the direct interests of the United States in countering insurgency—that insurgency can be used as proxy aggression or that it can spawn terrorism—than on the indirect adverse effects of such conflict. For instance, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 states, "Many modern conflicts do not directly affect the interests of the United States. Others, however, affect U.S. humanitarian interests, access to markets and materials, the safety of our citizens, and the stability necessary to sustain democratic government. These threats to U.S. national interests may require stability operations or support operations in response."[24]

Army doctrine also is based on FID. The core logic is triangular: the insurgents and the counterinsurgents are simultaneously at war with one another and competing for public support. FM 3-07 states:

> Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support. The winner will be the party that better forms the issues, mobilizes groups and forces around them, and develops programs that solve problems of relative deprivation. This requires political, social, and economic development. Security operations by military and police forces, combined with effective and legitimate administration of justice, provide the necessary secure environment in which development can occur.[25]

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According to the doctrine, the primary role of the Army in counterinsurgency is managing security assistance programs.[26] While U.S. forces generally do not engage in combat, they may conduct strike operations if required.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq led the Army's leaders to recognize the need for new counterinsurgency doctrine. An interim field manual was published in October 2004, with other versions intended to follow.[27] While this was an ambitious undertaking, it did not grapple with new forms of 21st-century insurgency, instead treating 20th-century insurgency patterned after Maoist People's War as a universal model. For instance, the new doctrine defined insurgency as an "organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government" which would exclude the conflict in Iraq prior to national elections, or the post-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.[28] It treats the Maoist-style objective of forming an alternative state and the organization of a Maoist-style insurgency—leadership, combatants, cadre, and mass base—as a universal form.[29] Given this perspective, the recommendations for counterinsurgency are those designed against a Maoist-style insurgency and largely reflect the lessons of Vietnam. Using a national insurgency as the sole model, the doctrine gives no consideration to the special requirements of a liberation insurgency.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Until recently, the United States became involved in counter-insurgency to support a regime whose overthrow would threaten important or vital national interests. A range of criteria were used to decide whether intervention was warranted:

- The nature of the regime facing the challenge (the United States is less likely to commit to the defense of a repressive regime than during the Cold War);
- The nature of the insurgents (the United States is more likely to assist regimes threatened by insurgents linked to al Qaeda or its affiliates);
- The economic or geostrategic significance of the state facing an insurgency (the United States is more likely to become involved in counterinsurgency in the Americas than in Africa,

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and in economically important areas than those of little economic value);

- The traditional relationship of the threatened state with the United States (it is important for the United States to remain a steadfast security partner) ;
- The human cost of the insurgency (the United States is somewhat more likely to intervene in a conflict that involves humanitarian disasters or genocide than ones that do not).

Historically, the decision to intervene usually was made when a pro-American regime faced an active insurgency that it could not handle on its own. In the post-September 11, 2001, strategic environment, a second mechanism for American involvement in counterinsurgency has emerged: an insurgency that arises out of a stabilization and transformation operation such as ENDURING FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM. Since such stabilization and transformation operations are likely to remain an important element of American national security strategy for the duration of the global war on terrorism, the U.S. military is likely to be used in counterinsurgency support into the foreseeable future.

When the United States supports a beleaguered partner, there are existing political and security structures but America's leverage may be limited. A regime that faces a serious insurgency threat often has major political, economic, and social shortcomings. Because an insurgency was able to coalesce and develop indicates that the regime is unable or unwilling to recognize this fully. The problem for the United States is finding an effective way to encourage or, if necessary, force the partner to undertake needed reforms at the same time that its security capabilities are improved. All too often a partner will conclude that, if they are important enough to attract Washington's commitment to help them, American policymakers will not let them fall and thus will overlook continued repression, corruption, or other shortcomings.

In addition, American assistance makes partner regimes feel more secure which can, in their eyes, diminish the urgency of change. This complicates counterinsurgency support and makes it difficult to retain the backing of the American people and other nations. For instance, El Salvador undertook serious reform in the 1980s only when the U.S. Congress threatened to cut off support if significant

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improvements were not made in the protection of human rights, civil-military relations, good governance, and military effectiveness. Ironically, the greater the U.S. interest in protecting a partner regime, the less leverage Washington has.

The second mode of counterinsurgency support—one associated with intervention in a failed state or as a follow-on to a stabilization and transformation operation—can be even more challenging because existing security and political structures are weak or nonexistent, and because it is much easier for the insurgents to cast their struggle as one of liberation. This is not news: American strategists fully recognize that a national insurgency is easier to counter than a liberation one. The problem is that the United States sometimes must assume a dominant role when there is no effective local partner (as in Vietnam in 1966, Afghanistan, and Iraq). The dilemma is that this allows the insurgency to become seen as liberation. It is difficult to shift back to a national conflict. Even when the United States helps establish a local government and security forces (as in Vietnam by the early 1970s and Iraq at the present time), the new regime may be perceived as an American proxy. It can be difficult to mobilize backing for counterinsurgency under these conditions, even when the future offered by the United States and its local partners is, in objective terms, significantly more attractive than that proposed by the insurgents. The natural human tendency is to rally to fellow citizens, even those with whom the public is not inherently comfortable such as the former Ba'athists in Iraq, against outsiders.

Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level necessary to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime's military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic capabilities; and encouraging and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. In most cases, this will include a coordinated reform program across the military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic spheres. The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.

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While this makes perfect sense for a national insurgency, one size does not fit all. A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency must be different in some important ways. This includes:

- Rapid stabilization of the state or area using the force required. Normally, larger is better since perception and presence are integral components of stabilization. Preferably, the stabilization force should be a multinational and integrated interagency organization operating with a United Nations mandate. The U.S. contingent should not be the largest if other effective multinational partners are available.
- A shift to a minimum U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible.
- Rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces.
- Shifting the perception of the insurgency from one of liberation to a national one. This will include augmenting the legitimacy of the local government and security forces by distancing them from the United States. *The more the local government and security forces are seen as proxies or subordinates of the United States, the more difficult it will be for them to establish legitimacy.* This process will entail having the local government and military forces take the lead in projects and operations whenever possible (even if they might approach them differently than the United States).
- Over the long term, adjusting the actions of the local regime by encouraging sustained reform.
- Cauterization—the strengthening of states surrounding the state facing an insurgency. In this way, the strategic damage can be contained should the insurgency escalate or become uncontrollable.

Some elements of U.S. strategy will be relevant to both national and liberation insurgencies. For instance, sustained capability enhancement is crucial even during those times when the United States is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes leader development, wargaming, concept development, research and analysis, professional education, and focused training. This will be particularly difficult to sustain in the interregnums between

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counterinsurgency operations, but is vital. The tradition within the U.S. military has been to develop an impressive understanding of and skills at counterinsurgency when engaged in such an operation, and then to let the expertise atrophy afterwards, thus forcing a blank slate relearning process when the Nation is again committed to counterinsurgency support ("reinventing the wheel" in other words). This is not an effective or efficient pattern.

Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness of regional states and other regional security organizations to provide counterinsurgency support. This is easier said than done. Because counterinsurgency tends to be a dirty business and because the emergence of an active insurgency is seen as a taint on a regime, security organizations in regions where insurgencies occur have tended to shy away from collective responses. They are more than willing to work on cooperative ventures for peace operations, but not counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency support traditionally has come from outside a region. Breaking down this prejudice and building effective regional counterinsurgency systems would be useful. Along similar lines, synchronization of counterinsurgency thinking among key American partners like the NATO states, Australia, and India would augment U.S. capabilities.

Since insurgents have developed a strategic strike capability via terrorism, improved homeland security also must be seen as part of capability enhancement for counterinsurgency support. When assessing the wisdom of engagement in counterinsurgency support, American political leaders must consider the domestic social repercussions and whether the involvement might spawn terrorism aimed at the United States. This possibility must not deter the United States from actions in the national interest, but is a consideration. It means that the Department of Homeland Security should be consulted and integrated into counterinsurgency strategic planning.

The United States, along with global and regional partners, needs better methods for early warning of insurgency, preventative actions, and the creation of early-stage support packages. One of the ironies and problems with insurgency is that the regime facing one often does not recognize it or denies it until the insurgency has had time to coalesce and develop. This is understandable—to admit that a serious insurgency challenge exists is to admit that national policies

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and means of governance have been flawed—but it nonetheless means that the insurgents are given a head start. The insurgents, in other words, always begin a conflict with the strategic initiative. The threat will be difficult to remedy until challenged regimes stop denying their problems. Moreover, the United States would have to commit resources before a conflict explodes. This will be difficult but the payoff would be immense—preventing an insurgency or nipping one in the bud is always easier than turning the tide on one that has taken root.

Third, the issue of when and how to engage in counterinsurgency support will remain an open one in U.S. strategy. Specifically, the question of whether this should be an "all or nothing" proposition is vital. Should there be a counterinsurgency corollary to the "Powell Doctrine" which states that the United States will only engage in counterinsurgency support when the interests at stake are high enough that we are willing to sustain the effort to the end and to use decisive force, even if that requires a decade or more and a significant commitment of money and personnel? Or is a modest amount of counterinsurgency support to a beleaguered friend better than none at all? In reality, this is probably not an either/or choice. The United States has and will continue to become involved in both "major" counterinsurgencies where the stakes are high and sustained, high level engagement is justified as well as "minor" ones where it is not. The key is to understand the distinction and not let what should be a minor case segue into a major commitment.

The United States must make clear whether its approach to counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring the response and method to the threat. Traditional thinking is that victory, defined as the eradication of the insurgency as a political and military force and the amelioration of the factors that allowed it to emerge in the first place, is the appropriate goal. This is captured in Joint and Army doctrine. But given the extent of America's global commitment and the time and resources it takes to attain ultimate victory in counterinsurgency, a strategy of containment merits consideration. This would be similar to the contemporary Israeli approach. The Israelis know they cannot win the "hearts and minds" of the Palestinians. They know they cannot ameliorate the root cause of the insurgency since that is the existence of Israel itself. They therefore have built a strategy designed to keep the insurgents ineffective for as long as it takes.

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A strategy of containment might distinguish between different types of insurgents and only commit the United States to countering an insurgency likely to support international terrorism or aggression, or one attempting to overthrow a truly democratic regime. Such a strategy would return to a minimum U.S. presence once an acceptable level of stability was attained. Americans might initially protest that such a strategy of containment is antithetical to the current broader tenets of U.S. national security strategy, but it is certainly within our tradition. We have, for instance, chosen to manage the problem of Haiti for the past century, preferring to reintervene as required rather than engineer the sort of wide scale social, political, and economic transformation that it would take to prevent instability from reemerging. It is conceivable that in far away places like Iraq and Afghanistan, we could adopt a strategy of intervention and stabilization when necessary without an attempt to transform the societies or a commitment to protracted counterinsurgency.

Which strategy makes more sense? As Clausewitz reminds us, "The first, the supreme, and the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make" is to understand "the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." A strategy of victory which seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very long shot. No matter how much effort, money, and blood the United States pours in, it will be unable to change the image of an outsider imposing a solution. Even if the United States focuses on creating a friendly regime, that regime will be unlikely to attain legitimacy and support (except by turning on the United States). In such insurgencies, a strategy of containment is the more logical one.

One additional strategic factor merits consideration: some strategic thinkers contend that the United States is now facing the first insurgency of a global scale—created by the interlinkage of multiple national insurgencies—led by a network motivated by radical Islam.[30] The Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an insurgency: protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, dispersal, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization designed to protect the insurgents and eventually

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alter the balance of power in their favor; avoidance by insurgents of battlespaces where they are weak and a focus on those where they can compete, particularly the psychological and the political. The insurgents are fighting a total war with limited resources; the counterinsurgents are self-restrained by ethics and a desire to control costs. This belief suggests that the appropriate American response is to build a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency which reflects the differences between national and liberation insurgencies.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

One of the core dynamics in insurgency and counterinsurgency is the "learning contest." Insurgents tend to be highly adaptable and flexible, at least at the tactical and operational levels. To match them, counterinsurgents must also be adaptable and quick to learn. Adaptability can be maximized by an institutional culture which stresses it and gives maximum autonomy to lower level leaders; by refining methods for the collection, dissemination, and implementation of lessons learned; and by adopting what the U.S. Marine Corps calls a "matrix organization" of functionally organized teams from across the U.S. Government and, for military units themselves, a networked structure with central coordination but local autonomy.[31]

Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. One useful approach would be to adopt an interagency, effects-based method of counterinsurgency planning focused on the following key activities:

- *Fracturing* the insurgent movement through military, psychological, and political means, to include direct strikes, dividing one part against another, offering amnesties, draining the pool of alienated, disillusioned, angry young males by providing alternatives, and so forth. Relationships within insurgent movements are not necessarily harmonious. Cabals within the insurgency often vie for leadership or dominance. Identifying these rifts and exploiting them may prove to be a coup for the counterinsurgency strategy;

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- *Delegitimizing* the insurgent movement in the eyes of the local population and any international constituency it might have;
- *Demoralizing* the insurgent movement by creating and sustaining the perception that long-term trends are adverse and by making the lives of insurgents unpleasant and dangerous through military pressure and psychological operations;
- *Delinking* the insurgent movement from its internal and external support by understanding and destroying the political, logistics, and financial connections; and,
- *Deresourcing* the insurgent movement both by curtailing funding streams and causing it to waste existing resources.

Each of these effects would require specific metrics. In combination, these would allow counterinsurgent commanders to assess success or failure and make adjustments. Since the essence of insurgency is psychological, metrics in this realm, while difficult to develop and assess, are more accurate than body counts, insurgent operations undertaken, development projects begun (or finished), and similar measures. They might include things such as the percentage of local residents who feel secure enough to go out at night, express a pro government political position, or work for the government, or the percentage of people with favorable attitudes toward the government versus toward the insurgents. In addition, metrics should focus heavily on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the partner government and security forces.

The notion of recognizing and reacting to failure is an important one. As John Nagl points out, one of the things that allowed the British army to innovate and adapt during its counterinsurgency operations in Malaya in the 1950s (and thus attain success) was its willingness at all levels to admit failure.[32] To make this work requires an independent strategic assessment organization. Those whose careers are contingent on the success of a campaign can never evaluate it with brutal objectivity. Yet counterinsurgency demands brutal honesty. Making an organization or even its higher headquarters responsible for self-evaluation is to risk the kind of fantasy assessments, delusional optimism, and inflated reporting seen in Vietnam. The auditors should include experienced government officials, military officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional

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experts. The organization should be nonpartisan, interagency and, if possible, multinational.

Another way of thinking about structuring an operation (and one that is compatible with the effects-based approach) is to use *preemption/prevention* as a guideline. Certain adverse things can happen during the course of an insurgency: 1) the emergence of a serious insurgency in the first place; 2) the development of military capabilities by the insurgents which pose a threat to the regime; 3) the expansion of public support for the insurgents to the point that the legitimacy of the regime is challenged; 4) the creation of linkages between the insurgency and organized crime, or the entry into organized crime by the insurgency itself; 5) development of the ability to sustain a level of chronic instability by the insurgents; 6) a widespread perception that ultimately the insurgents will prevail; and, 7) the coalescence of a coherent insurgent political organization.

An effective counterinsurgency plan would be one explicitly designed to preempt and prevent these adverse trends. Each activity would blend both defensive and offensive actions. Each would require a range of resources and actions; each could be evaluated by separate metrics (again measured and evaluated by a small, responsible strategic assessment organization which focuses on actionable information rather than bureaucratic procedures.)

Counterinsurgent planners should always remember that timing matters. As with health care, a small effort early is more effective than a major one later on. While it is difficult to discern, insurgencies do have a point of "critical mass" where they become much more formidable opponents. If the United States is able to help a threatened partner augment its military, psychological, and political capability rapidly and early, it may be able to prevent the insurgents from attaining critical mass. In general, U.S. intervention for counterinsurgency support is most likely to succeed at an acceptable cost before an insurgency reaches critical mass (however hard that may be to identify). U.S. involvement after an insurgency as reached the "point of no return" where it cannot be defeated at a reasonable cost is likely to be ineffective. If an insurgency reaches this point, the United States should pursue disengagement even given the strategic and political costs.

The military component of a counterinsurgency campaign must seize the initiative as quickly as possible. There are multiple ways of doing this. When an insurgent movement elects to make

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a major stand in the military battlespace and depends on internal sanctuary, conventional sweeps and offensives play an important role. But history suggests that "fighting fire with fire"—emulating insurgent tactics—is also important. The counterinsurgents, for instance, can develop combined guerrilla forces comprised of U.S. or other outside Special Forces and host nation personnel. Creating a second front for the insurgents severely weakens their ability to wage an effective insurgency since the allied guerrillas launch raids on their logistical bases and headquarters as well as interdicting lines of communication. The French and British used allied guerrillas to great effect in Indochina and Malaya respectively. Even though the program began late in the Indochina war (1953), French guerrillas tied down a number of Vietminh battalions by raiding bases, striking at headquarters units, and interdicting lines of communication.[33] They even operated in China, much to the consternation of the Chinese. The British in Malaya also raised guerrilla forces operating in the same manner. Moreover, the British raised guerrilla units comprised of former insurgents to bolster the counterinsurgent effort. Similarly, American Special Forces also formed guerrilla units during Vietnam. Logically, allied guerrilla operations force the insurgents to devote critical resources and manpower to defensive measures. Given that insurgent capabilities are weak to begin with, such an allied capability can quash an insurgency early on.

In a national insurgency with its triangular configuration, the war of ideas plays a critical role. Hence information operations cannot be conducted in an ad hoc manner. The insurgents always have an initial advantage in this regard, and only a sophisticated information operations campaign will wrest the initiative from them. The host nation government must control this process fully; the United States will never have a sophisticated enough understanding of key cultural and historical elements to run a program on its own. The American role is to provide support. In a liberation insurgency, the United States is at a distinct disadvantage in the information campaign. Almost no U.S. actions or information themes are likely to change the core dynamic of the conflict: that Americans are seen as outsiders and the insurgents as insiders. This does not mean that the United States should abandon the information campaign, but American strategists and leaders must be aware of its limitations and not expect to "win" the "war of ideas" on their own.

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ORGANIZATIONAL AND FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The history of counterinsurgency shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements of national power effectively. This is considered one of the reasons for British success in Malaya and for the lack of French and American success in Indochina.[34] History also suggests that intelligence and, equally important, counterintelligence, is central to success in counterinsurgency. Insurgencies pose particular intelligence challenges, so intelligence must be all-source, focused, and disseminated to the various organizations involved in the counterinsurgency effort. The seamless integration of law enforcement and military action is equally important. Police capability has always been vital to destroy insurgent political undergrounds but is becoming even more so as insurgency mutates. Today effective, preferably multinational law enforcement support is vital to limit insurgent access to resources whether through direct criminal activity or ties to global organized crime.

One of the most important elements in counterinsurgency support is selecting the right person to lead it. In most cases, insurgency warfare necessitates a law enforcement response, so a security czar, preferably a former police commissioner, should exercise unified command. This appointment accomplishes two objectives. First, it signifies the primacy of a political solution vice a parochial military solution. Second, it appoints a credentialed official with experience in domestic security issues and able to integrate rapidly all agencies towards a unified counterinsurgency campaign. Equally important, the leader of counterinsurgency support must be a skilled strategist, able to integrate elements of power and take a long-term perspective. His staff must be more than military, including police, experts on economic and political development, psychologists, cultural anthropologists, and mass communications specialists.

Because insurgency is an "armed theater" where the antagonists are playing to an audience at the same time they interact with each other, it is sometimes suggested that a specific organization is needed to control information activities. This many not be the most effective solution. A better idea is to create an organizational culture

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where every component of the government is aware of the centrality of information, the need to tailor images and messages, and the importance of developing strategies, operations, and tactical plans based on desired psychological and political effects.

The package for counterinsurgency support provided by the United States will depend on whether the operation entails supporting a threatened partner state or is a component of post-intervention stabilization and transformation. When involved in backing an existing government, the U.S. force package would be predominately designed for training, advice, and support. In most cases, the only combat forces would be those needed for force and facility protection, more rarely for strike missions in particularly challenging environments. Modularity should increasingly allow the Army to tailor, deploy, and sustain such packages. It would be a mistake, though, to think strictly in terms of Army or even military force packages. When the United States undertakes counterinsurgency support, it should build an interagency force package from the beginning.

The relationship of the U.S. force and the supported government is always a major consideration. Intelligence sharing particularly is complicated since the United States will often have no way of assessing whether the supported government counterintelligence procedures are adequate. For actionable intelligence, it is more effective to rely on police forces to gather intelligence through investigations, interviews, and interrogations with the inhabitants than to rely solely on technical means. In a counterinsurgency, human intelligence is often more timely and accurate, yet the military, particularly an outside military offering counterinsurgency support, faces tremendous obstacles in building and sustaining the personal relationships which fuel human intelligence.

Sustaining the commitment is an important part of force packaging. Successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a decade or more. Consideration must be given to rotation procedures for deployed forces. This strikes directly against one of the primary conundrums in counterinsurgency: history has shown over and over that short-term deployments are ineffective in counterinsurgency since units and individuals are not able to develop adequate situational awareness and local knowledge, yet in the contemporary U.S. military, it is difficult to sustain long-term deployments in

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hardship locations. To some extent, contractors can relieve this pressure, particularly since many of the training, advice, and support functions in counterinsurgency do not have to be performed by uniformed military.

As Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the use of contractors brings a range of other problems associated with training, control, discipline, and protection. In a politically charged environment, missteps by contractors can be just as damaging as mistakes by uniformed military.

While a large U.S. military presence may be needed during the early part of a counterinsurgency campaign following intervention and or the stabilization of a failed state, over the long term, a small military footprint, supporting a larger law enforcement effort is an effective solution that crushes the insurgency without giving the insurgency a nationalist rally cry against an occupying power. In general, the smallest effective U.S. military presence is the best.

Given the likelihood of continued involvement in counter-insurgency support, the Army will need to increase the number of units such as Intelligence and Engineers that have particular utility in this environment. As the Army continues transformation, it is likely that other types of units can be redesigned into these. Special Forces also have immense utility in counterinsurgency but should focus less on training of partner militaries. This is a vital task but can be done more efficiently by other, more numerous units, perhaps Reserve Component or contractors. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, both of which also have high utility in counterinsurgency support, need refocusing and restructuring. At a minimum, a larger proportion of these units should be in the Active Component. And both need greater autonomy to be effective in a counterinsurgency environment rather than being assigned to the commander of a maneuver unit.

Counterinsurgency related to stabilization and transformation operations can pose even greater force development challenges than support to a functioning government. A stabilization operation can require the significant deployment of forces for extended periods. One idea under consideration within the Department of Defense (DoD), for instance, is that the United States should have the capacity to deploy a force of up to 200,000 for up to 5 years and train a local military of up to 100,000 within 6 months.[35] This U.S. force

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may include large numbers of combat units and Military Police, in addition to the other specialized units. The challenge, then, is one of sustaining the commitment and developing a rotation base.

In general, though, the Army should not develop specialized units to "fight" counterinsurgency. As U.S. doctrine and strategy indicate, the primary role of the United States in counterinsurgency is strengthening and supporting partners. U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency combat should always be seen as an emergency expedient, undertaken only when absolutely necessary for the shortest period of time possible. Given this, it would not be an effective use of resources to create specialized units for counterinsurgency combat. If direct combat is required for some finite period of time, the tactical activities would be close enough to those already resident in the force that the training of existing units can be modified to make them effective.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

One can debate whether insurgents are otherwise ethical people forced to do evil things by desperation and weakness, or whether evil people are inherently drawn to insurgency. Clearly, though, this type of conflict is characterized by depravations of the most terrible type. Insurgents often make deliberate use of ethical asymmetry, undertaking actions that the regime cannot or will not. Or they draw the counterinsurgents into abuses only to use this as psychological ammunition. Regime after regime fighting determined insurgents has found that the most effective methods, sometimes the only effective methods, violate human and civil rights. Beleaguered governments must often choose between sinking to the ethical level of the insurgents or defeat. While some regimes can undertake this—witness the brutal counterinsurgency campaigns in places like Chechnya, Guatemala, and Peru—at other times, it can lead to the downfall of a government which is responsive to domestic or international pressure, whether the French Fourth Republic fighting Algerian insurgents or Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian regime undertaking counterinsurgency in Kosovo. Because of this, leader development and training for counterinsurgency must emphasize ethical considerations and force discipline. While these are certainly integral to all forms of

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leader development and training, in the counterinsurgency context, where insurgents are completely intermixed with noncombatants, intelligence is heavily human, crime and warfare intermingle, every action has immense psychological and political implications. This not only adds additional stress on soldiers and leaders, but also confronts them with a different array of challenges.

To successfully adopt matrix and networked organizations at the tactical and operational levels, leader development must focus on good decisionmaking, confidence, and creativity among lower ranking leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned. Leader development and training must include increased cultural sensitivity and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. It must focus on inculcating the Army with the ability to innovate and adapt. Every insurgency is so different that overarching concepts and doctrine must be tailored to specific situations and cultures. That can only be done by an innovative and adaptable force. Empowering and entrusting junior leaders to find durable solutions in their unique environments is the only effective way to combat dynamic insurgents. As John Nagl points out, the ability to innovate and adapt was one of the primary reasons the British were more successful at counterinsurgency in Malaya than the American Army was in Vietnam. This same truth still holds: the future belongs to the adaptable. The Army's experience in Iraq during 2003-04 suggests that it does have significant capability for innovation and adaptation, particularly at the junior levels.[36] Most of this has taken place through informal methods of communication and networking rather than through formal procedures. Extensive work is needed to further analyze this and develop methods to see that it applies at the operational and strategic levels as well as the tactical.

Given the nature of counterinsurgency, professional education and training increasingly must be interagency and multinational. The interagency aspect is particularly important. Unless the Army learns with and trains with other agencies (to include ethical training), it cannot operate seamlessly in the high pressure, violent, ambiguous world of counterinsurgency. Leaders at all levels must understand and trust the capabilities of other agencies; otherwise they will never venture from the approved military solution.

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THE WAY AHEAD

Little time has passed between the end of the last insurgency era and the beginning of the current one. That is both a blessing and a curse. Many senior Army leaders and retired officers working as DoD civilians or contractors have counterinsurgency expertise and experience. The problem is that the type of insurgency that these experts best understand—Maoist People's War—is not the same as the 21st century insurgency we have seen so far. Many ideas and concepts central to their understanding of counterinsurgency such as, for instance, the notion that victory comes from winning the "hearts and minds" of "the people" is actually specific to one particular variant of insurgency and counterinsurgency. How should the strategy and operational methods used for national insurgency differ from those applied in liberation insurgency? One of the key challenges today, then, is distinguishing the universal themes and concepts from the context specific ones, and jettisoning those which no longer apply. This process has only begun.

In the realm of strategy, the United States must build regional structures to identify incipient insurgencies, deter or prevent them, and develop regional support systems when they do break out. The idea that the United States will be responsible for counterinsurgency support around the world is not sustainable. Other nations have experience, capability, and the incentive to prevent insurgency from destabilizing their regions. The United States should inspire them to act on this.

The notion of a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency to confront the global insurgency also needs further development. As the Service most experienced in the analysis of insurgency, the Army should play a leading role in this. But the U.S. military, and particularly the Army, were so disillusioned by Vietnam that it has since kept insurgency and counterinsurgency at arm's length. When it could not be avoided, it was folded into, even hidden, in other concepts such as low intensity conflict, Foreign Internal Defense, and now stability operations and support operations. Given the centrality of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the contemporary strategic environment, the Army must transcend this hesitancy and accord these forms of conflict the priority they merit in strategy, operational thinking, doctrine, concept development, and force development.

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Given the importance of the psychological and political battlespaces in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the Army must integrate psychological concepts and analysis in its strategic and operational planning. This kind of integration will require adding trained psychologists and cultural experts at many planning levels (as well as in the professional military education and wargaming systems). The Army also needs better concepts and, eventually, doctrine to understand the linkage of insurgency and organized crime. This would certainly need to be Joint doctrine and may need to be interagency.

To instigate such changes, the Army can be an advocate and locomotive in the Joint and interagency arenas. The interagency dimension is crucial: the U.S. Army may become the most proficient army in the world at counterinsurgency, but if the rest of the government does not develop equal capabilities, the United States will not be effective. And the Army can use its powerful educational, wargaming, and concept development capabilities to generate needed changes within the Army. It will require both of these devices to meet (and transcend) the challenges of the new insurgency era.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ARMY

- Revise the understanding of insurgency which serves as a basis for U.S. strategy and doctrine to include the distinction between national and liberation movements.
- Develop, refine, and wargame appropriate strategy and doctrine for each type.
- Institutionalize methods for unified interagency approaches to counterinsurgency support.
- Act as the advocate for holistic capability enhancement across the government.
- Develop and exercise interagency techniques to build effective security and intelligence forces rapidly in a failed or occupied state.
- Develop an effects-based method of counterinsurgency planning; test this through robust experimentation, analysis, and wargaming.

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- Develop a small, independent strategic assessment agency to evaluate U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency support.
- Continue refining and implementing plans to increase Army units with particular utility in counterinsurgency such as Intelligence and Engineers, and to reconfigure and, if necessary, augment Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units.
- Undertake strategic capacity-building by coordination with regional security organizations and states.
- Integrate the Department of Homeland Security into strategic planning for counterinsurgency support.
- Refine leader development and training to include emphasis on understanding and responding to 21st century insurgency.

ENDNOTES

1. These are not mutually exclusive, and an insurgency can take on dimensions of both, or shift from one to the other over its course.

2. The British success at quelling the Malayan insurgency of the 1950s and 1960s sometimes is held to offer a model of successful counterinsurgency in a liberation framework, but its applicability is limited. The Malayan insurgency was limited to the Chinese minority of that territory and never spread to the Malay majority. If it had, the British strategy, which was based on precise, limited uses of military force and a stress on police actions and political and economic reforms, would have had less utility. In addition, one of the major factors which made the counterinsurgency campaign successful and prevented the insurgency from spreading to the ethnic Malay population was a promise by Britain that it would withdraw once the situation was stabilized. In other words, the British had to surrender their role as occupier to defeat the insurgents. For discussions of this conflict, see Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966; Robert W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972; Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dog: Malaya 1948-1960*, London: Fontana, 1973; Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960*, London: Cassell, 1966; and John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

3. The foco strategy developed by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro placed great stress on this. See Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

4. Quoted in Ahmed Janabi, "Of Homeland, Identity and Occupation," *Aljazeera.net*, September 9, 2004, published at *http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/239DF360-3640-457C-BA99-5FD497547598.htm*.

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5. Underground political organization did not stop once armed conflict began but continued through the duration of the campaign in areas controlled by the government.

6. Martin van Creveld argued that this tendency for nuclear weapons to obviate large scale conventional warfare would continue, thus making low-intensity conflict the dominant form around the world. See Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991.

7. For example, Andrew Molnar, *et. al., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office of the American University, 1965, reprinted, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001, provided an amazingly accurate description of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese strategy. A good description of Dau Tranh can be found at *http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-14725.html*.

8. Quoted in Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, New York: William Morrow, 1994, p. 724.

9. On CORDS, see Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986, pp. 118-121. Ambassador Komer was director of the CORDS program.

10. The classic early work on the organization and strategy of the Viet Cong is Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965. Also important is Pike's classic *PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam*, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986. On Tet, see Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. On the Phoenix Program, see Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, New York: Harpercollins, 1990; and Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey : The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

11. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1988, p. 34.

12. Probably the only traditional Maoist insurgency that has a chance of outright victory is the one in Nepal. See Thomas A. Marks, *Insurgency in Nepal*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.

13. 20th century urban-focused insurgent strategies such as the one associated with Carlos Marighella were not nearly as successful as the rural approach developed by Mao.

14. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002, p. 9.

15. *Ibid*, pp. 10, 11.

16. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, pp. 2-3.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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20. Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, June 1995, p. III-9.

21. *Ibid.*, p. III-10.

22. Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, April 2004, p. I-1.

23. Joint Publication 3-07, p. III-3.

24. Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, February 2003, p. 1-8.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

26. *Ibid*, p. 3-6.

27. Keith J. Costa, "Army Crafting Field Manual For Counterinsurgency Operations," *Inside The Pentagon*, August 26, 2004, p. 1. The interim doctrine is Field Manual Interim (FMI), 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, October 2004.

28. FMI 3-07.22, p. 1-1.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002, pp. 205-207 and ff.

31. See *Small Wars: 21st Century* (draft), Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2004, pp. 13-14.

32. John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, p. 192.

33. Bernard Fall, *Street Without Joy*, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1964, pp. 268-271, 274.

34. See Geoffrey D. T. Shaw, "Policemen versus Soldiers, the Debate Leading to MAAG Objections and Washington Rejections of the Core of British Counter-Insurgency Advice," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 12, No, 2, Summer 2001, pp. 51-78.

35. Thomas E. Ricks, "Shift From Traditional War Seen At Pentagon," *Washington Post*, September 3, 2004, p. 1.

36. Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

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Federal Times
August 15, 2005
Pg. 1

IG: DoD's Last-Minute Spending Broke Rules

Pentagon says fixes are on the way

By Chris Gosier

A new Defense Department audit reports that hundreds of millions of dollars worth of procurements made in the rush of last year's fourth quarter were rife with problems, including lack of planning and improper use of funds.

The July 29 audit report by the inspector general's office shows that 74 out of 75 selected purchases through the General Services Administration schedules at the end of fiscal 2004 "were either hastily planned or improperly funded."

It also found that the department rendered as much as $2 billion of procurement money unavailable by improperly "parking" it in a General Services Administration fund intended for information technology purchases. Until recently, the illegal practice was widespread — agencies would put unobligated money into the GSA IT Fund as a way to preserve the life of the money beyond the year for which it was appropriated. But GSA and other agencies have been trying to crack down on this practice.

The report, signed by Deputy IG for Auditing Francis Reardon, is the latest to criticize the way agencies use each other's contracts and procurement services. These interagency deals add up to tens of billions of dollars annually — agencies spent more than $32 billion in 2004 just on GSA's federal supply schedule contracts. The Government Accountability Office in January added interagency contracting to its list of government programs that it says are at a high risk of mismanagement, fraud and abuse.

In its report, the IG's office called upon Defense Department managers to provide more oversight to these procurements and to better clarify the roles and responsibilities of Defense and other agencies it does business with, among other steps.

Congress is also chiming in on the matter.

The Senate's version of the pending 2006 Defense authorization bill calls for the Defense IG to team up with inspectors general at other agencies that Defense does business with. This has already occurred between DoD and GSA.

"These contracts have created a chaotic marketplace in which federal agencies are being offered similar products under a wide array of contracts, without any easy way of comparing between the products," the legislation says. "At the same time, the Department of Defense does not have an adequate system to track such basic information as who is using these contracts, what they are buying, and how much they are paying.

"In too many cases, when one agency uses a contract entered by another agency, it appears that neither agency takes responsibility for making sure that procurement rules are followed and good management sense is applied," it says.

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The Defense Department and GSA have been tackling the problem in various ways in the last few years.

GSA for more than a year has been educating its own and other agencies' procurement staffs on proper contracting practices as part of its high-profile "Get It Right" campaign. Meanwhile, its inspector general's office has been busily churning out oversight audits of the agency's contracting activities to gauge the effort's success.

The contracting problems at GSA appeared to have started in the late 1990s, said GSA's assistant inspector general for auditing, Eugene Waszily.

"There was this tremendous demand for computer support services" and other services such as Web-based programming and local area networks, which GSA rightfully rushed to fill, he said. "The principal focus was to grow the business and keep the customers satisfied. In all that, I think they did an outstanding job."

But, he added, that "in some cases, they tread over the rules," fueling current misperceptions, for example, about whether it's allowable to park money in the information technology fund for later use, he said.

A series of audits in the last two years has shown great improvement, he said.

"It's sort of like turning an aircraft carrier around," he said.

Defense, meanwhile, issued a policy last October urging caution for those using GSA schedules. The memo spelled out several quality control steps for Defense agencies to use when making procurements through GSA.

The memo worked so well that it discouraged some contracting officials from using the GSA schedules at all, prompting a follow-up memo clarifying that non-Defense contracts should be used when it's in the department's best interest.

Deidre Lee, the Pentagon's director of acquisition and procurement policy at the time, emphasized the point in public remarks in June, saying the schedules were "great tools" that need to be used properly.

Defense is by far the biggest customer of governmentwide contracts, including those run by the Treasury and Interior departments, the National Institutes of Health and GSA.

The 75 purchases worth $406 million examined by Defense auditors were made primarily in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2004. The Defense IG and Waszily agreed that's when the problem of agencies parking money in revolving procurement funds, such as GSA's IT Fund, is particularly acute, since it's the end of the budget year.

"They are looking around because they know the money is lost to them if they don't use it," Waszily said.

In its audit, the Defense IG called for contracting officers to evaluate all purchases made using non-Defense contracts and create a system to track appropriated funds to ensure their proper use, among other measures.

Lee agreed in part with the recommendations but wrote in the department's response to the report that

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the Oct. 29 memorandum hasn't been given enough time to show results.

"Since the new policy has been in effect for only six months and there is insufficient experience with its implementation across the department, a change to the policy is not warranted at this time," she wrote.

What the IG found

The audit found that in 68 cases, the department failed to examine all alternatives before deciding to make its buys through GSA. Nearly all of the procurements, 74, were made without adequate interagency agreements spelling out the terms and conditions of the purchases. Thirty-eight of the acquisitions were funded improperly.

The IG found that Pentagon purchasers violated the Constitution, as well as statutes and regulations, by using funds for different purposes and in different years than those intended by Congress when it appropriated the money.

For instance, the Air National Guard paid $327,000 into GSA's information technology fund to pay for combat banner targets that are used by fighter pilots in aerial gunnery practice.

"Aside from GSA having very little, if any, experience in acquiring combat banner targets, the whole idea was inappropriate for using the IT Fund," the audit says.

Of 50 purchases through the IT fund, eight were for non-IT items, including building construction, furniture or the development of marketing tools.

The report also cited the misuse of funds to pay for vehicle barriers and thermal imaging equipment.

The Defense IG this month started a second audit of the department's dealings with GSA's client support centers, in accordance with the 2005 Defense Authorization Act.

Any disciplinary action resulting from the report would be taken by the Defense units that were audited, an IG spokesman said.

"Generally, many of the abuses are the result of employees who either misunderstood procurement regulations and guidelines or choose to disregard them," the Defense IG said in a statement.

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Atlanta Journal-Constitution
August 16, 2005
Pg. 5

New Navy Ship Fast, Lean And Mean

Sea Fighter packs powerful punch with minimal crew

By Bob Keefe

Off San Diego -- Lt. Cmdr. Brandon Bryan took a bearing on the coast of Mexico in the distance.

Then, with a satisfied look, he announced proudly, "We've just reached 50 knots."

For a fast bass boat or any car on the road, 50 knots -- about 57 mph -- would be unimpressive. But the vessel Bryan commands is nearly the length of a football field. It can carry more firepower than a battleship, a dozen or more teams of elite Navy SEALs or a squadron of unmanned helicopters.

With its catamaran-style hull and sloping bow, the Navy's new experimental Sea Fighter looks more like a heavily armored passenger ferry than a conventional warship. But as Bryan and his 25-member crew demonstrated recently to a group of reporters and dignitaries, the Sea Fighter is anything but simple or poky.

"This is the wave of the future," said Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), who as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee spearheaded funding for the $80 million ship, built by San Diego-based Titan Corp. "This is fast, has 100 times the firepower of a battleship with a fraction of the crew."

The Sea Fighter is the first of a new class of Navy ships designed to move quickly in shallow waters with a minimal crew. Dubbed littoral combat ships, or LCS, they are part of a modernization program intended to help the Navy fight in ways that hulking battleships and giant aircraft carriers can't.

"It has the speed and spirit of a PT boat and the firepower of a battleship," said Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), another proponent of the program.

The new ships are supposed to be ideal for patrolling coastlines, dropping mines or sensors, delivering assault teams and intercepting -- or outrunning -- small terrorist boats. At the same time, they're designed to carry enough missiles and other weapons to bombard a good-sized city or support battlefield troops hundreds of miles inland.

Navy leaders have indicated that they would like 60 or more of the shallow-draft ships in service in the next few years. The U.S. Coast Guard also is considering adding them to its fleet.

"Personally, I'd like to see 100 of these ships," Hunter said.

But even though it just hit the water, the Sea Fighter could soon be made obsolete by competitors.

Last year, the Pentagon selected Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics to build the first two battle-ready LCS ships. The first, called the USS Freedom, is being built by Lockheed Martin in Wisconsin and is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in 2007. Delivery of the second, General Dynamics' trimaran-

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design ship, is expected in 2008.

The vessels are eventually expected to cost about $250 million each -- substantially more than the Sea Fighter, but still only about one-fourth of the cost of a typical Navy destroyer. If the Navy likes what it gets from both or either of the contractors, the LCS program could eventually cost as much as $15 billion for 60 ships.

Until then, however, the Navy, Coast Guard and other armed services plan to experiment and train on the Sea Fighter.

The key to the new ship's design is flexibility. Traditional ships were built with specific purposes in mind -- battleships to lob shells or missiles, transport ships to ferry troops. The Sea Fighter carries the Navy designation FSF -- "Fast Sea Frame" -- meaning the Navy or Coast Guard can retrofit it for various purposes.

Off-the-shelf commercial computer components and other equipment reduce costs and make the ships more adaptable. They're supposed to be big and tough enough to withstand rough seas, like bigger ships, but also light enough to operate in water as shallow as 12 feet.

"It's lighter, it's cheaper, it's more flexible" than anything before it, said Rear Adm. Jay Cohen, commander of the Office of Naval Research, which oversaw the Sea Fighter design.

On its main deck, the Sea Fighter can carry more than 500 cruise missiles, two helicopters and other armaments. But it is the ship's speed that is most impressive to many in the Navy. Powering the vessel are two 8,000-horsepower diesel engines and two 30,000-horsepower gas turbines. That lets it go faster and farther than any other Navy vessel of its size.

Because of its speed, Navy designers had to consider some unique problems. When the Sea Fighter operates at top speed, for example, crew members typically can't be on the outside deck because they might be blown overboard.

From the helm, skipper Bryan said that commanding the Sea Fighter is unlike anything he's experienced before. "It's a real kick," he said.

What amazed him most in the early sea trials, Bryan said, was how well the 262-foot vessel handled at nearly 60 mph.

"I was surprised really at how smooth it was," he said. "I didn't expect that."

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*** WALTER B. SLOCOMBE**
Iraq's National Security Strategy
February 9. 2004

Mr. Hamre: I'm delighted that so many of you are here. I said to Walt, the last time we had a crowd like this was Bill Gates, and they share nothing in common, outside of maybe height. But other than that, I can't think there's much that unifies them. But a great turnout, and I knew there would be. Such an important opportunity.

First of all, Ambassador [Surtrutsky], thank you for coming. We're delighted you're here. Ambassador Chan, thank you. We're delighted you could join us today. We're very pleased you could be with us.

We welcome back to CSIS Walt Slocombe, a friend and a very familiar figure. His training for the dangerous and difficult assignment in Iraq was actually started here by negotiating the divorce agreement between CSIS and Georgetown University about 20 years ago. We knew he was a great divorce lawyer. The question was was he any good as a marriage lawyer? Since that was his assignment in Iraq, to create something new.

I remember when I first heard that Walt was going to go to Baghdad to help form up the security side of the new government I was both terribly surprised and completely flabbergasted, and then grateful, to think that a man of this talent was willing to interrupt his personal life -- which he has a right to recover after having served eight long years in the previous Administration. He had a right to get back to his true love which is tax law. It's true. Walt is the strangest person I've ever met. [Laughter] He's got, in his law office he's got the models of the ICBMs. Remember those famous ICBMs in the Cold War we all had where it showed all the big Russians ones and all the little American ones? Well Walt had a set of those in his law office, right next to his law tax books. And at his Pentagon office he had his Tax Code. I thought this is really quite fascinating.

He really did have the right to take time off after having served so well in DoD the last eight years, and yet when the country called he stood up and went to Iraq. I was very pleased and grateful to have had a number of opportunities to meet with him when I was there in June and early July, a long with Sheba Crocker and Rick Martin. He really was enormously helpful in shaping our thinking. We're just grateful for everything he's done.

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IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - 2/9/04

Walt, it's a real privilege to welcome you back to CSIS. It's a real privilege to welcome you as a true public servant who has done more for his country than anybody else I know. I'm grateful to call you my friend and to welcome you here and to listen to you today. Thank you very much.

Walt Slocombe:

Mr. Slocombe: Thanks very much, John. I guess it's a sign of my commitment to CSIS that one of the few non-Iraq related things I did was Jennifer MacBee and I are working on a chapter in a book for CSIS which I edited from my desk in the palace as the mortars came in.

The point about the divorce lawyer is interesting. I used to do a lot of bankruptcy law, and in many ways bankruptcy law has some interesting analogies for Iraq. But maybe as we move toward a political settlement we should think about the possibility of anti-nuptial agreements sometimes as a way of dealing of problems.

Can I begin on a serious note? A great friend of CSIS and a man who, whatever one's views of his particular substantive views was a great patriot and a great military leader, Tom Moore, passed away over the weekend, or at least his obituary was in the paper over the weekend. I think it's appropriate at a CSIS event -- I had the privilege of serving with Admiral Moore when I was on the NSC staff and he was kind to me as a very very junior member of the staff. I think it's appropriate to record his passing.

What I want to talk about today is not whether the war was a good idea or a bad idea or whether the diplomacy was -- Let me begin -- At the risk of sounding like a preacher, there are in fact a lot of empty seats, and the people who are sitting at the back, if they'll just be a little aggressive.

Also, whatever the distinguished people who were supposed to sit in the reserve seats haven't shown up -- [Laughter] -- and they must have been very distinguished indeed, judging by how distinguished the audience that is here. So there are plenty of seats and while I don't want to talk too long, nobody should be asked to actually stand up while I talk.

The war is likely to remain controversial for a long time, but the practical issue that we face, we the United States, our coalition partners, most importantly of course the Iraqis, the region and the national community is how to meet the challenges that lie before us in converting the opportunities that the war created into the reality of a secure, stable, Iraq.

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IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - 2/9/04

The stakes are very high, most of all for the Iraqi people but also for the United States and the rest of the world. Success will mean that Iraq offers a decent government and a life for its own population, a system of ordered government that respects both majority rule and minority rights, and that offers individual Iraqis both personal security and personal liberty in a nation and a region that has seen far too little of both.

Conversely, failure means a risk of civil war and other authoritarian regime with the potential to destabilize the region and to acquire weapons of mass destruction and in general a huge setback to the interests of the nations of the coalition, the region, the world, and the hopes for peace in that region.

To succeed, the Iraqis with the support of the coalition and such other members of the international community as choose to help must accomplish four different but related tasks: to provide adequate essential basic services; to build the economy; to help set up a government that is both representative and legitimate; and to establish the level of security necessary for those other goals to be achievable.

I yield to no one in making the point that the first three goals -- services, economy and government -- are critical not only for their own sake but they're critical as measures of security.

It's interesting, there was a recent poll. Iraqis in major cities were asked what's the most important thing that would help you feel more secure? And they said if the economy was better. So there is a close relationship between security and these other goals. But since security is a necessary though far from sufficient condition for success since it's mostly what I worked on when I was out there, it's what I'll concentrate on today.

Observing only that progress on the other goals is being made and that that progress contributes to security because it gives the Iraqi people a stake in stability and confidence that future lies with democracy, prosperity and order, and not with the enemies of those goals, and that cooperation will produce results.

It's important to begin by pointing out that the security situation in Iraq is a lot less desperate than most media reports imply. Iraq even inside the Sunni Triangle, much less outside it, is not a nation in chaos. Of course no part of the country is entirely safe as we saw from the terrible suicide bombings in Kurdistan recently. But in much of the country incidents are quite rare. And even in the cities and in the Sunni Triangle,

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streets and stores are full of people; basic services are improving; schools, universities and hospitals are open; crime is down; employment is up; currency is stable, actually it's appreciating against the dollar like most currencies. That may be a comment on the quality of the economic leadership in the two countries, but that's a different issue. A civil society is beginning to function; the statistical risks to ordinary Iraqis for political violence are almost certainly far less than from traffic accidents. For most Iraqis, most ordinary Iraqis who are not involved in politics or the security services, the security issue is that of ordinary crime, not politically motivated violence.

All that said, the security situation is obviously far from what it needs to be for success and much remains to be done.

Casualties to American and coalition military forces and civilian workers understandably generate the greatest concern outside Iraq, but from the point of view of the prospects for success, the critical vulnerability is not attacks on foreigners but on Iraqis who cooperate with the coalition and are working to build Iraq.

One of the things which is most remarkable and most heartening is the number of Iraqis who at very considerable personal risk are prepared to work in the security services, to work in the government, to work in the political process.

Meeting the security challenge is compounded by the multiple threats. Broadly, all the threat groups share the common goal of making the place too dangerous for outsiders and too fearful for Iraqis and too costly for the coalition to stay, and all take advantage of porous borders and foreign financial and physical havens. In all, if they succeed, would certainly establish regimes that would not respect basic human rights, individual or collective, or pursue a peaceful foreign policy.

Moreover, and this is underlined by the interesting story in the New York Times today, these disparate groups are often prepared to cooperate tactically and sometimes to masquerade as one another. One can make a logical judgmental about who's responsible for something. It's a little bit like the joke about this is the Middle East. You can never be sure that because something obviously looks like it was done by one group, it was in fact done by that group as opposed to another group in an effort to discredit or to foment trouble.

But for all these similarities, the threat groups differ in composition, motivation and tactics, and therefore in the responses that will be effective against them.

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IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - 2/9/04

The most numerous and militarily significant group is the surviving, unreconciled core of Saddam's support. This is extended families, almost all Sunni, who did very well under the old regime and who dream of somehow regaining power by mounting attacks that they hope will intimidate Iraqis and exhaust coalition and American resolve. The military calls them by the clumsy name former regime loyalists. And sometimes when we were talking about American politics I would describe myself as a former regime loyalist. I prefer, and in fact it's not bad in another one, these groups are best characterized by the names that they've chosen for one of their front organizations, that is the Party of the Return.

The capture of Saddam has further damaged the reputation and cohesiveness of the old Ba'ath party leadership but there remain elements that imagine they could somehow regain influence and even full control.

This group, which is likely to number no more than a few thousand out of a population of something like 28 million, and a former Ba'ath party membership of well over a million is responsible for most of the military-style attacks. The actual operations sponsored by these elements, however, are often conducted not by the hard core Ba'athist bitter enders themselves who need to survive personally to succeed, but by hired thugs and dukes.

The Returnists have no overarching value but power, but they are quite prepared to espouse in name at least the causes of Iraqi nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, or Sunni sectionalism and to work with other groups with whom they have essentially no ideological affinity.

The second element are the various Iraq-based Islamic terrorist groups, notably Ansar al Islaam which has renamed itself Ansar al Suna, mostly, as the name suggests, with some element of a radical Sunni Islamic agenda. Their support base is potentially broader than the Returnists because they have more appeal to the general Sunni community which is understandably apprehensive about its future. But they certainly do not represent the bulk of Iraqi people or even of Sunni communities.

These Sunni elites and their clients have no great loyalty to Saddam and his Ba'athist clique, but they do suffer the loss of past privilege and the prospect of an Iraq in which the minorities and indeed the Shia majority have real power.

With their strong Islamic radical foundation, these groups are in a better position to recruit suicide bombers but they lack

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the organizational base of the Ba'ath party or its vast hidden resources of funds and weaponry.

Then there are external terrorist groups, al Qaida being the leading one, that potentially find Iraq a congenial environment. Even more than the indigenous Sunni radicals, these groups are able to organize spectacular suicide bombings and are also particularly inclined to strike at Shia targets.

Finally, and as I say, far more important than most outsiders realize, is Iraq faces an acute problem of ordinary greed-based criminality. And moreover, some of the disorder is the result of various elements of score settling after generations of problems or discontent at practical difficulties -- riots over electricity, blackouts, or low incomes. Exacerbated by a culture of dependence and an over-developed sense of entitlement that is quick to blame the current authorities for any practical problems.

In the longer run there's also a threat to a just Iraqi state from hyper-nationalists or hyper-religious groups possibly with significant outside support who reject the basic notion of a state that accommodates the diversity of ethnic, religious and cultural groups that constitute the population of Iraq.

Corresponding to the complexity of the challenge there are many mutually supporting elements to the response. Central to all is better intelligence which will rely less on technical measures, though those have potential, than on improved human intelligence and painstaking professional regional expert analysis. Especially since the capture of Saddam there's been important progress particularly in securing information from ordinary Iraqis who understand both that their interests lie with the coalition and the Iraqis who work with it and that ours is more likely to be the winning side.

U.S. and other coalition intelligence efforts have been adjusted and refined to increase our ability to understand the threats, both strategically and tactically, and the development of indigenous Iraqi capabilities for intelligence will become increasingly important. However the enemy groups remain extremely difficult intelligence targets with extraordinarily effective counter-intelligence systems.

Second, once adequate intelligence is at hand robust coalition military operations can strike effectively to preempt and disrupt the opposition forces.

The responsibility for security operations will increasingly devolve on the Iraqis, but effective coalition military

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operations will remain critical.

Coalition military forces were never as passive as sometimes portrayed but backed by better intelligence and increasing experience they have in recent months undertaken even more aggressive and better focused operations. The ongoing rotation will involve significant realignment of the forces to emphasize mobility and precision and to take advantage of lessons learned since April, even as the total force level declines modestly.

The risk of aggressive military action is of course that such action is not informed by precise intelligence and results in unnecessary civilian casualties, it's both militarily ineffective and politically and psychologically very counter-productive.

Central to the security effort and indeed to much else in the transition is Iraqis assuming an increasing share of the burden of providing for their own security. To that end a range of security forces are being developed. A key element in this is the creative initiative of the American military leadership to establish an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the ICDC, to work closely with coalition military forces. These people are locally recruited and live and work in their communities. They receive a few weeks of initial training and then operate as an integral part of U.S. and other coalition military units bringing special skills of familiarity with the country and the communities in which they operate.

There are now about 20,000 on the ICDC roles and the goal is to roughly double that. They will be in operations with coalition forces within the next few months.

I should note that these target numbers, like those that follow, are obviously subject to some adjustment as conditions and experience dictate.

I also should note that although I was honored to have had the privilege -- I should have said this at the beginning. I was honored to have the privilege to serve as part of CPA, I have now left government service, and although I'm an unpaid consultant to CPA and OSD, my remarks are very definitely -- especially the cracks about the economy -- are very much unofficial and my personal views.

Because of their close links to coalition units these ICDC units are not full scale, independent military forces for they depend for most of their support on the associated coalition units. In the long run they or at least selected elements will receive more equipment and be strengthened by the training of

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working with experienced coalition units and will probably transition into some kind of reserve under the Iraq [inaudible] Ministry of Defense.

I believe the key to the long term security of Iraq is the major programs to create professional, highly trained, well-equipped police and military forces. These programs will reach full scale in the coming months. The current military is by late this year to have trained nine brigades of light infantry, a small coastal defense force, and a very small air transport unit with a total manpower of something like 35,000 to 40,000.

A critical feature of the army that is being created is that it is truly a national army. Units are representative of the demography of the country as a whole, and units are deployed around the country without regard to the original homes of the individual soldiers and the units.

The emphasis in the training is on creating a cadre of Iraqi officers and NCOs who will then train and lead their units. As the units begin to deploy they, like the forces contributed by the 30-plus nations that have troops in Iraq, will be under operational command of and will work with coalition units but they will be under the administrative control, again like the contributions from other countries, they will be under the administrative control of Iraqi officers and they will have a full suite of equipment in their own base and support structure.

This force will form the core of a continuing independent Iraqi military. It will be overseen and managed by a civilian-led Iraqi Ministry of Defense which is in the process of being established. The Iraqi armed forces, like all armies, will be primarily oriented towards the defense of the nation against external threats but also, like all armies, it will be available to supplement police and other security units in dealing with the internal threats where necessary.

The police is the second high end part of the program. CPA over the next year or so will train some 25,000 or 30,000 new entrant policemen who will then work with international trainer mentors to complete their preparation and then go into full time service. These new professionally trained policemen will join the current force which is based largely on the old regular police but has had some new training and equipment and the target number is a total police force of something like 75,000 to 80,000 which turns out to be a reasonable relationship with total police to total population for a country like Iraq.

A critical specialized police units for investigation, forensics, community policing and so on are also being created.

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IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - 2/9/04

As in the case of the military the emphasis is on training leaders and creating a force that's appropriate in its professional standards, integrity, systems of discipline and leadership and technical skills and equipment for a democratic and diverse society, and one which is under serious security threat.

The police who will be a national force subordinate to the National Ministry of the Interior will have the primary responsibility for dealing with ordinary crime but they will also have specialized capabilities to fight violence and terrorism.

At the lower end of the spectrum of capability and therefore of cost, are site security guards with training sufficient for their limited but important role. These are the so-called Facilities Protection Corps which will number some 80,000 to 100,000, mostly subordinate to the individual ministries whose facilities they're protecting. However, the Ministry of the Interior will have overall oversight responsibility. There are also a number of specialized security forces, particularly for, well for border control and also for parts of the economy like oil production, electricity, and transportation that have complicated and extended and vulnerable infrastructures.

Essential to dealing with the criminal side of the security problem and to some degree with the political and terrorism side as well is the continuing progress on getting the Iraqi judiciary, prosecutorial and penal systems working. All these elements of the criminal justice system now come under the independent Ministry of Justice which significantly is separate from the Ministry of the Interior.

In large part creating these forces is a matter of resources. There's $5 billion in U.S. funds in the supplemental committed to these programs. Work has already, for example, begun to build bases for the new army and to buy the equipment it will need. Salaries, for the most part, come from Iraqi funds.

Realistically, however, even completing the current programs won't finish the job of establishing Iraqi security institutions. More outside support is likely to be required in the future. Some of that should come from other countries, but the United States as a nation should be prepared to continue to invest in building a free Iraq's capability for both internal and external security.

The challenges of building these institutions, however, go well beyond resources. In all these programs effectiveness requires even more than professional training and bases and equipment, fundamentally reformed and reoriented leadership. This requires not just removing those who were actively loyal to the

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old regime or operated at very high levels in it or were involved personally in abuses, but moving to a transformed ethos of discipline, integrity and leadership. Replacing the old habits in the security sector institutions which were characterized by a mixture of brutality, passivity, politicization and corruption will not be easy, but it's essential. Fortunately there are a large number of Iraqis -- some from the old institutions, some new to the field -- who accept the need for these changes. And indeed as I said, one of the most hopeful signs is the willingness of many Iraqis to run really great risks to be part of the new security institutions and to commit to operating security institutions in a whole new way.

The schedule for the creation of these forces is rapid to an unprecedented degree. For example, the police training program envisages training in about 18 months a cadre of new police officers. That is something like three or four times as many as New York City trains in an equivalent period, and New York City has the largest police training operation in the United States.

In any event, even if the schedules continue to be met the buildup efforts will still be very much underway on July 1st when sovereignty is scheduled to be transferred to a provisional government.

There will be pressures both from some Iraqis and some Americans to cut corners to meet the schedule by compromising on standards and to imagine that Iraqi units can take over difficult missions before they are really ready or indeed missions which no one ever thought they would be ready. The immediate challenges require quick action and the overall program includes some necessary short term measurers. Hoover, the long run goal of transferring the great bulk of security tasks to the Iraqis requires paying the costs and taking the time to do the job right. That is to create fully independent, properly trained, equipped and based units, particularly in the military and the police.

There are serious challenges and Iraq will need outside help for many months to come on security, but the Iraqi security forces are steadily growing in capability and responsibility. Ordinary crime rates are down as the police conduct regular patrols and develop the capability to investigate crimes and apprehend offenders. Virtually all routine guard duty is now being performed by Iraqis.

The ICDC is serving as a critical supplement to American and other coalition military forces and the initial high end professional trained battalions of the new army are coming on line. Specifically three battalions of newly trained army troops

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are now being deployed in newly rehabilitated bases in different regions of the country.

From the point of view of the long term, however, the task is not just overcoming the current violent opposition. Success requires not just dealing with the immediate crisis but establishing an effective governmental order that's both strong enough to manage the nation's security and limited enough to respect the rights of its people. And Iraq, unlike many other nations that over the past couple of decades have faced ths task of security sector reform and building a new constitutional order, will almost certainly face a continuing internal and external threat of a serious nature. I'm particularly pleased that some of our Polish friends are here today. Poland and the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe at least has the luxury of doing its transformation without people shooting at it, which is not a luxury that the Iraqis will have.

Coalition forces are likely to remain in Iraq for some years to come, but Iraq needs to move steadily to a situation where it takes care of its own security, at least its internal security, with only limited direct participation by outside forces. That's a political goal of Iraqis every bit as much as it is of the coalition. Therefore Iraq's new security institutions must be most effective and just, which is not an easy combination anywhere.

To start with, the legitimate political authority must have full control of the security organs. That was certainly not the case in the past. In Iraq the task of ensuring that the government has a monopoly of armed force is made the more difficult by demography. The Shia majority has a justifiable sense of having been mistreated and deprived of its rights not just by Saddam, but arguably ever since the Turkish conquest centuries ago. Similarly, the Kurdish communities have a strong desire to protect the de facto autonomy they've enjoyed since 1991. At the same time the Sunnis not only regret the loss of their former privileges, but they fear retribution and oppression by other groups. And the smaller but numerically not insignificant Turkamen, Yasidi, Asyrian, Shaldian and other minorities also have their fears and claims.

Partition is simply not an option. A constitutional order must be found that will accommodate these conflicting interests, and fortunately despite all the conflicts within Iraq there is no strong tradition of popularly based largescale ethnic or sectarian violence and there's a considerable group of moderates, both formally secular and religions who are willing to tolerate other faiths and other branches of Islam and to recognize the necessity of finding mechanisms whereby Iraq's diverse population

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can live peacefully together.

An issue that will assume greater and greater importance as time goes by is the handling of the various regional and party-based militia. Of these, the largest and best known are of course the Kurdish Peshmurga, but there are also the Shia-based organizations such as the Baader Corps, the Madi Army, and some of the other tribal and political groups have smaller armed forces rationalized either as for the personal security of the leadership or as ad hoc community protection.

In a state based on the rule of law there can be no permanent place for armed units that are not clearly and effectively under the control of legitimate political authority. Moreover, obviously, if some groups have such militias, others will want them and there will be a danger of the country descending into warlordism.

Accordingly, one of the key tasks in the next few months will be to find mechanisms to deal with this problem that recognize both the long term goal and the near term reality for many of these groups that continue to exist in some form or another of some kind of armed capability as an assurance against unfavorable political developments as the structure evolves.

The solution is going to require a range of measures -- pensions for bonafide retirees, absorption of parts of these militias into the regular security forces, retraining and job programs for former militia members, and stern actions against any groups that use their forces improperly during the transition period.

Again, the difficulties are real but not hopeless. I know from my own conversations with them that both Kurdish and Shia leaders realize that there needs to be real changes in the current system and accept in principle that militias, a term which they resolutely reject as failing to acknowledge the historic role of these armed forces, have to be reduced and the residue transformed into elements of the established security system, although they also want to be sure that that security system reflects their local interests and avoids past over-centralization.

The transformation will likely produce some significant regionally based security organizations and provided they can be brought within the overall control of legitimate political authority it's not necessarily a bad thing in a nation characterized previously by tremendous over-centralization of security responsibility, but there are some potential counterweights to the abuse of central authority.

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A key issue will also be defining Iraq's relationship with the United States and other coalition states in the security field. In the longer run, even after the internal security situation is adequately dealt with, Iraq will have to consider its external security requirements and their implications for its relationship with the United States, friendly regional states, and others.

A free Iraq should be a model and a beacon in the region, but for those and other reasons they will also likely have potential enemies and they will have many competing demands for available resources besides the military and other security forces. Accordingly, both Iraq and the United States and other concerned countries will need to address the issue of possible mutual security agreements in which Iraq would not be left entirely to its own resources for its own defense. Obviously this is not an issue which can be decided unilaterally, either by the Americans or the Iraqis or anybody else. It will require agreement.

Moreover, the task of creating a national security system has to go beyond simply creating competent forces, phasing out the militias, and coping with immediate security threats, or even dealing with long-term external requirements.

The critical part of the transfer of full authority to a sovereign government will be setting up a constitutional and legal framework for setting and conducting Iraq's national security policy and for maintaining and commanding its military, intelligence, police and other security forces.

As I've already mentioned, the Ministry of Defense is in the process of being created with civilian leadership, significant civilian staffing, and clear authority over budgets, personnel and policy.

The Ministry of the Interior already exists, but there will need to be a formal legal structure for it, defining its powers and its relationships to other institutions.

The security organs must be controlled by legitimate civilian government and accountable to the public and to the parliament.

Specific areas where decisions will be made, and the decisions have to be made by Iraqis although the coalition and other can provide advice and support, will include setting objectives, establishing procedures, and in particular setting the requirements for making sure that the security forces are

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free from political involvement, defensively oriented, reasonably representative of the population as a whole, financially affordable, and subject to clear standards both substantive and procedural in the use of extraordinary measures such as the use of military forces for internal security.

Moreover, in addition to dealing with the issues of respect for human rights and subordination to legal authority a reformed security system will have to end the pervasive corruption and abuses of power for personal gains that have characterized the Iraqi security institutions and much of the rest of the government in the past.

And as I said, all of this is compounded by the fact that the security organs of the new state must be effective. If the system is incapable of providing security the fact that it's a model of democracy won't do much good.

But the experience of decades of oppression has I think made all groups, and many in the perspective security organizations themselves fully conscious of the need for a whole new approach.

For all the problems, there's reason for hope. Despite all their profound differences, the overwhelming bulk of Iraqis is measured by polling data as well as by the comments of most leaders recognizing that for all their arguments over the political structure they have an opportunity which may prove fleeting to create a decent government for their nation.

They also recognize with very few exceptions that continued coalition efforts will be needed to maintain and improve security well after the formal restoration of sovereignty. Iraq has many resources -- not just oil -- a reasonably well educated professional class including the legal field. There are many things about my experience in Iraq that made me proud to be a lawyer. Including, the professional class understands the rewards that will come for a country if a decent security and legal system is in place.

My impression from my work in Iraq and my more peripheral involvement since I returned, remains that the prospect is essentially a favorable one. Much is accomplished and the essential context exists for success. The fall of Saddam has been deeply welcomed, even by most Sunnis and by virtually all the other groups, and there is genuine gratitude to the United States for liberation and widespread if grudging recognition that winning the security battle will require continued coalition effort. The capture of Saddam alive has further discredited him and his movement and reduced though hardly eliminated the fears that as in 1991 and earlier in the late '70s, the Ba'athist

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regime still somehow phoenix-like return to power.

At the same time we have to acknowledge there's also deep resentment of the occupation and impatience for Iraqis to take over full authority. The progress on all fronts is real. It's not yet irreversible and there is much more to do in the face of serious challenge.

Overall, however, this is a struggle that can and must be won. The enemy's goals are not military but political -- to intimidate Iraqis who seek change, to destroy the public's confidence in the competence of a new authorities, and the prospects of reform, and to exhaust the patience of American and other external supporters of the process.

Accordingly the key requirement is resolve, to bear the costs in money, political and military effort, and the most painful in human life necessary to overcome the forces that seek to prevent success.

One of the great privileges in my life was the opportunity to work with the American military, coalition militaries and the many brave and Iraqis who are working on this cause. The Iraqis will have to bear the main burden, but the international community has a critical contribution to make.

Thanks for your attention, and I will be glad to try to answer questions.

[Applause]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO FOLLOW

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WALTER B. SLOCOMBE
Iraq's National Security Strategy
February 9. 2004

Q&A SESSION

Ms. Flournoy: Thank you very much for laying out the complexity of the tasks, giving us an idea of what's been accomplished so far and also the substantial challenges ahead.

At this point I'd like to open it up to the floor for questions. When I call on you please state your name, your professional affiliation, and keep your question short.

Question: Mark Dobarese with Van Swick Associates.

Do you see a practical role for the United Nations in Iraq at all?

Mr. Slocombe: There's certainly a practical role. Whether the security situation is such as to make it practical for the UN to come back is a different issue and one the UN will have to resolve.

There are many things that the UN could make a contribution to do. I think there are many ways in which the UN may actually be helpful not just on this particular technical election of can you hold an election, but on some of the political negotiations and working out arrangements.

But I think the central issue is the problem is not how to distribute authority and responsibility as among different outside forces, it's how to provide legitimacy and authority and effectiveness for Iraqi units.

The problem is not to convince the Americans or the French or the UN Secretariat or the Japanese or somebody that this is a great operation, it's to convince the Iraqis.

So I don't think the issue of the UN role is central to moving forward, although I think there are some practical things. Obviously the technical and the humanitarian and health and that kind of thing. There are a lot of things the UN could do.

Understandably, they have been very badly shaken by the attack that killed [Surjodomello] and so many other UN personnel.

Question: Michael Hanlon from Brookings.

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Thank you very much for a very illuminating talk. I wanted to ask you about crime. You alluded a couple of times to rates that are going down. I know there are no reliable statistics here.

Mr. Slocombe: There aren't any reliable statistics about crime anywhere, and for sure there are no reliable statistics about crime in Baghdad.

Question: But partly for that reason perhaps you sometimes get people taking the liberty, even in the U.S. military of saying rates they think are lower than in the United States which strikes me as totally unpersuasive. I wondered if you wanted to say anything along those lines and how much of an improvement you've seen in the last couple of months just in a qualitative sense.

Mr. Slocombe: First of all I think the relevant comparison is not to New York or Washington or even to what turns out bizarrely enough to be the murder capital of the United States, Charlotte, North Carolina, but to cities like Cairo and Karachi. And you're right, I'm serious in saying no crime statistics are terribly reliable. Probably they're more reliable as to trends than as to absolute levels and in general the trend seems to be down.

Part of the crime problem is, if you remember, I guess it was in October of 2002, Saddam had a general jail delivery and for awhile about a third of the people who were being arrested were people who had been in jail a year before, so a whole criminal class was let out and the breakdown in order after the implosion of the regime obviously created opportunities for crime.

The sense is that it is getting better, but it still is a serious problem.

As I say, I think it's interesting that for most ordinary Iraqis, not for the people involved in the security and the police and that kind of stuff, not for people who are politically active, but unless you have the great misfortune to be standing in front of a police station when a bomb goes off your chances of being affected by the political violence are nil. Your chances of being robbed -- one of the vivid memories I hold, we went out to look at the university when we were putting the Iraqi guards around the university. At noon it looked like GDS, lines and lines of fancy cars of well-to-do Baghdadies who had come to pick up their kids to drive them home so they wouldn't have problems on their way home from school. It's a real problem.

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I think that's one of the reasons why the proper training of police is such a big deal.

One thing that the UN -- The UN is lousy at running armies. It actually is not bad at running police forces. I believe that the highest priority in post-conflict -- Michele has heard this speech a million times now -- the highest priority in the whole post-conflict problem is regular civil police that deal mostly with ordinary crime.

Question: Channing Chi, Ambassador of Singapore.

Walt, I know your focus in Iraq was on security --

Mr. Slocombe: I also talked too long anyway, even though --

Question: I think many of the points you made touch on politics, and your concluding point about endowing and conferring legitimacy to the Iraqi security institutions being very important is really political.

I notice in your definition of success in Iraq you did not bring up religion at all. Is the establishment of a theocracy in Iraq at the end of the day considered to be acceptable or a failure in Iraq? Because that touches on a large political question. And how does that impact on your attempts to endow legitimacy to the security institutions given the ethnic tensions?

Mr. Slocombe: I think it's important to draw a distinction between the fact, which is a fact, that the population of Iraq is overwhelmingly Muslim and the issue of a theocracy, that is a government -- At the one end, it was always a little embarrassing for us to argue that absolutely strict separation of church and state was essential when our principal coalition partner has an established church. But the constitutional formula which I believe is embodied in the draft is an acknowledgement that Iraq is an Islamic country, but also protection for, not only for various forms of Islam, but for a non-Islamic religion. There's a small but not zero Christian minority, a few hundred Jews. And I don't think even in the Shia -- Obviously there are people, there are people in the United States who I think would like a theocracy. There are obviously some people who are more significant than the number in the United States, I guess, in the Shia community who believe that you should have a theocracy sort of on the Iranian model.

Happily, Iraqis hate Persians and no rational person looking at Iraq from real close up, especially remembering that Iraq has a large Shia but Arab minority who have been badly mistreated,

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has any great enthusiasm for an Iranian model.

I think in the long run the issue of how Iran will deal with a free democratic representative diverse Iraq is an interesting challenge and one that will create some problems in the future, but so far the Iranians have been pretty good. They've said this is for the Iraqis to sort out.

I don't think there is a lot of pressure for a theocracy. Now there's another issue which is a real issue for rights particularly for women about the degree to which domestic law, what we would call domestic relations law, should be based on Islamic principles. That's a complicated question in any country. Talk about Ireland or some place like that. That is an issue which is always complicated in the country.

I also want to say I think in a fundamental sense it is not for us to say what's acceptable or what's not acceptable for the Iraqis. We certainly have strong views on some issues, and that they should expect human rights, including the rights of women is very important. But this is something which is going to have to be worked out by Iraqis.

On the whole, this is an issue where I think there are, particularly the issue of the rights of women is a tough one.

Remember, for most Iraqis, one of Saddam's worst crimes was the Iran/Iraq War which killed so many young men that there's now a huge, it must be one of the largest disproportions in the world of more women than men, which has all kinds of potentially favorable but also some potentially unfavorable -- It's one of the main reasons why you get a lot more multiple marriages, polygamist marriages than you've had historically.

Iraqi women are by no means shrinking violets and I think those issues will be pushed.

Question: Jim Matlock affiliated with the American Friends Service Committee.

Walt, the launching of this war as we now know daily is a subject of great controversy in political terms, not in terms of the service and the skill with which people have gone to pursue it and to pursue the post-war, but the political context.

What do you see as the political context in an election year when the situation is on balance sort of positive possibilities but some real challenges? If it goes not well, Bush begins to worry and Carl Rove begins to worry, is one of the greatest dangers for not having the follow-through that you advocate as

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essential to the short patience of the American public and the political, as opposed to other bases, for the White House to simply get us out as fast as they can.

Mr. Slocombe: First if all, it is no secret that I am not a Republican. Fortunately we a have a secret ballot in this country so how I vote will be --

That said, the people in the Administration were terrific to me. I was a part of the team and there was never any issue about my politics, and in fact there were a lot of other Democrats working in CPA. So what will play one way or another in the politics is appropriate for me to address.

I do think there is a danger that the debate about whether the war was a good idea or not, and I'd be happy to explain why I think it was in spite of the failure to find --

I think it's a more accurate statement to say not that the weapons of mass destruction didn't exist but that they turn out in all probability, they turn out to have been secretly destroyed before the war started.

The issue is not whether the war was a good -- The practical issue we face, as I said at the beginning, is not whether the war was a good idea, much less whether all of the Administration's arguments for it were good arguments, or whether its diplomacy was as skillful as it could have been or whether the planning for the post-war efforts was as good as it could have been. Those are interesting and important issues but they're different from the issue of what goes forward.

I think it's very important for the United States as well as for the Iraqis that we recognize that this has to be a long term commitment. Not that we're going go have 100,000 troops there forever, but this is going to be a multiyear commitment, not a matter of a few months.

I think it is important that people who have different views about the war also think very seriously -- on both sides -- about how to go forward. Politically, I'm not sure. I think we can make an argument that politically it's probably better for the Democrats if things go well in Iraq and things kind of quiet down. The democrats are unlikely to win -- well, I won't say that. [Laughter]

Short of a -- I think the problem is that we won't know whether this is a success for a time period which is long relative to the time between now and the election. And I'm not sure how -- Short of either a complete, absolute final success

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which isn't going to happen in the relevant time, or a sort of total disaster which is almost equally inconceivable. It's hard to believe there will be any clear-cut result before November.

I must say I think the reason for the desire to move more rapidly to turn over sovereignty to the Iraqis had everything to do with Iraqi impatience and very little to do with American impatience.

Question: Dan Benjamin, CSIS. Walt, welcome back.

Mr. Slocombe: Thank you all for coming. I feel like most of my friends in Washington are here, including, I really have to acknowledge Jim Matlock who I think I probably have known longer. We may differ about some views politically but we've been good friends for a long time.

Question: Let me add my voice to those saluting you for your patriotism in taking on this task.

Let me ask you, you discussed the security issue largely in dealing with external threats and with the tension with the occupation, but I wanted to ask you to look at the dynamic internally. There's an interesting article in today's Times suggesting that there will be efforts by Jihadists to incite sectarian strife. My own reading is that this has already been going on for quite a while, if you look at the bombing in Najaf. There is also anecdotal reporting that there is a religious radicalization going on within the Sunni community suggesting that the form of resentment is taking a more religious hue than a purely Ba'athist one. What are the prospects for containing this and getting a durable constitutional arrangement set up before something goes badly wrong?

Mr. Slocombe: That certainly is a danger. First of all, it's not surprising that in a society which is a profoundly Islamic society -- I mean Saddam got religion late in life but that was about it -- that one of the consequences of the collapse of the old regime is a revival of religious feeling and religious fervor. That's not unknown in other countries.

The question though is whether that's going to get translated into sectarian violence, and I agree with you that a lot of the incidents, particularly the suicide bombing attacks on Shia leaders, are almost certainly part of some extraordinarily complicated game -- the piece in the Times this morning about a deliberate plan, which incidentally one can -- One of the things that always interests me is it would be nice if the newspapers would release this document so we can read the whole thing instead of just the bits that they --

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One can read that as saying that these guys are worried, that the current tactics are not working and that they're going to have to try some extraordinarily conspiratorial measure to create trouble. So far I think it's important to remember that the Shia demands have been political demands. You can argue about whether Sistani's position is a right one, or is it a practical one, what do you do about, how do you have elections in a country with no political structure, that sort of thing, but it's not as if he was calling for kill all the Sunnis and oppress all the Kurds. It's not even as if the Kurds were saying we've got to have complete formal independence which is probably in their heart of hearts what they'd like.

I think there is real reason to believe that including Sistani there are enough leaders in the Shia community who understand that -- I have a very interesting conversation with one of the Shia representatives on the Governing Council. He said what we want in this country is a system where the majority rules, but not too much. In some sense, that's the objective. Now whether it will work is to be seen, but that's not something where we just stand back and hope it works. There are things we can do to effect it.

Ms. Flournoy: This event was originally scheduled to be concluding now, but since there are so many questions Walt has graciously agreed to stay an extra ten minutes.

Mr. Slocombe: And I'll try and be shorter in my answers.

Question: Charlie Stevenson, National War College.

What do you think in practical terms the transfer of sovereignty will mean for the remaining coalition civilians and military? And do the Iraqis and the coalition folks agree on what that situation is supposed to be like after the transfer of sovereignty?

Mr. Slocombe: One of the things which is certainly going to have to happen is there are going to have to be arrangements so that coalition military and security operations can continue with the flexibility that they need. That's an issue which is on the table and it's being worked.

The polling data is pretty clear. Most Iraqis believe that it's very important that the coalition stay as long as -- It's kind of like the President's line. As long as necessary but not a day longer. The argument is over how long is necessary and so on. But the polling data is pretty clear. Most Iraqis do not want the coalition to leave until the job is done. Now they also believe

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the coalition could do a lot better. It's not that they're all wildly enthusiastic about everything we do. But I think this problem -- which is a real one, but I think it's being worked and I think it will be satisfactorily resolved.

Also it's a relationship that's going to evolve over time. Not much is going to change on June 1st in terms of the responsibility for security but that doesn't mean that June 1st, 2005 security responsibilities won't be quite a bit different from what they are. And of course June 1st, 2004 will be very different from June 1st, 2003. You'll have Iraqi police, you already have a lot of Iraqi police, a serious beginning of an Iraq [inaudible] army.

Question: I'm Cam Haswith, United Press International. It's good to see you again.

I had actually a lot of questions more on topic, but then you said something that I think perked up all the reporters' ears which is why do you think the weapons would have been destroyed just before the war? What makes you say that? Is it faith in the intelligence that you saw?

Mr. Slocombe: No one disputes they existed because Saddam admitted they existed. The question is when were they destroyed and that is a subject which I think we do not yet know the answer. It's pretty clear they were destroyed. We may find minor quantities. But exactly how and when they were destroyed I think is still to be determined.

I don't seriously dispute that they were destroyed over exported or something, but the question is when it was done I think is an open issue.

My point was, I think Kay's statements are very balanced and fair but the naked quote, "the weapons didn't exist" could be read as they never existed, and I don't believe anybody believes that.

Question: I'm Diane Perlman, Co-Chair of the Committee on Global Violence and Security for a Division of the American Psychological Association. I'm a clinical and political psychologist. I also do collaborative divorce.

Mr. Slocombe: My mother was a clinical psychologist.

Question: Which is a different paradigm.

You mentioned the need for a whole new approach and there's escalating violence. I agree with that. I just want to say that

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just trying to eradicate, physically remove or threaten, eliminate the violence is dealing with the symptom and not the root causes. There are considerable bodies of knowledge, research and practice dealing with collective trauma, humiliation, ending cycles of violence. I've written also about psychology of terrorism and there are processes that are emerging around the world that I think will, in addition to the police and the other thing, will complement and address just grievances. Also from the field of political -- there are different political arrangements, political legitimacy. This one said it's political, but it also has a collective psychological effect. Could you --

Mr. Slocombe: I think you have to distinguish between the few thousand people who are setting off bombs and blowing up police stations and murdering religious leaders, and root causes have very little to do with that. You've got to confront that group directly.

However I completely agree that a purely security force approach is inadequate and I said that. The development of confidence in the politics of the country, the development of basic services, addressing this very difficult issue which I think is central to all Iraqi politics of the relationship between these different groups in society who are not at daggers drawn, I mean it's not that they traditionally kill each other all the time, but they also, there have been ethnic tensions and sectarian tensions in that part of the Middle East for generations and I completely agree that a very big part of the challenge, particularly for the Iraqis, is not only to deal with the material, make sure the electricity is on but also to deal with the fact that this is a diverse country and that they're going to have to learn to live together. I agree completely.

A lot is being done on that front. I talk mostly about security because that's what I'm mostly interested in.

Question: David Eisenberg, British American Security Information Council.

On the issue of weaponry, putting aside for a moment their existence or non, the fact remains as a result of the past work on them in the nuclear, biological and chemical field there now has to be a large cadre of personnel -- hundreds if not thousands -- with varying degrees of expertise. That has to in some degree represent a proliferation concern.

What steps if any, and I don't know that there are, are being taken to ensure that they don't flow out of the country and go into somebody else's employ? Similar to the same concern we've had about the FSU in other areas of the world.

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Mr. Slocombe: There are somewhat similar programs underway in Iraq to try to assure that there is employment, there are opportunities. A Ministry of Science and Technology has been set up.

You've got to kind of be a little careful that people don't come in and say I designed anthrax, give me a job at $10,000 a year in a country where $200 a month is a nice salary. But you're right, it is a real concern and one that people are working on.

You've got to be somewhat realistic. The people, we've learned a lot about what the international black market in these skills and materials is. You're not going to beat that entirely by giving people an opportunity to do peaceful research at a reasonable academic salary, but people are certainly working on the problem and trying to identify -- The ISG effort is not simply kind of chase the rabbit of what happened to the WMD, it's what was the structure, who worked on it, who was involved.

We consciously, for example, kept some of the -- The whole thing was organized on a Soviet style and there was a military industrial commission that ran the military industries. We consciously kept all those people on the payroll simply to try to minimize this problem, but it's a serious one as it is in any of these countries.

Question: Are we making transition to turn over the government too quickly?

Mr. Slocombe: We have to make sure that when the transition comes it is accepted in Iraq as a legitimate transition to a provisional government. It doesn't have to solve all the problems. That's an issue. I don't know whether we will in fact be able to do it on July 1st. On the other hand, to some degree if you don't set a deadline you tend not to -- It's not that we have to decide. It's that the Iraqis have to decide among themselves on a process.

But no, that is the key issue. The transition, unless it is accepted by Iraqis, or by most Iraqis -- by enough Iraqis to make it work as legitimate is not worth, could be counterproductive. But I also think it's useful to have a target date.

I go back to the point it was Iraqi pressure, not American, that said it should be accelerated.

Question: Thank you, I've come from Monterey, the Naval Post Graduate School. I'm Karen Gutierre.

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IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - 2/9/04

I'd like to know if you think we're learning from experiences as recently as Afghanistan in which the warlord strategy has given us great headaches. In Iraq it would seem we had the luxury of a coherent national army which no longer is our luxury. Now you're talking about militias and so on, and the security reform in Iraq is involving this massive transformation including fundamentally integrating the ICDC into the command structure of the U.S. military, as I see it, and likewise telling the Iraqi army this is going to be your Ministry of Defense, here's how you're going to fit into it. How long is that going to take us to achieve to the point where the Iraqi security is in the hands of the Iraqi forces?

Mr. Slocombe: Polls are always dangerous, but it's interesting. There was a recent poll about how much confidence Iraqis have in the police and the new army and they were at very high levels. I don't think the problem of creating a -- There will be lots of problems about getting civilians who having an argument about -- Government is wonderful. We're having an argument about who is going to pay for the cost of rehabilitating the building, but we've resolved that.

I don't think the problem of creating a Ministry of Defense is going to be a huge one. Iraq and Afghanistan are very very different countries. Iraq is not a country of warlords. It is a country with a diverse population and the militias are a problem, but they're nothing like the problem in Afghanistan.

Iraq is, my favorite story is we early on said if we're going to, with all these power outages we want to make sure that the hospitals can continue to do operations and you don't get, when the operation is in process you've got generators so the operation can continue. And the Iraqis came to us and said that's fine. Here's a list of the key hospitals. But if you're going to do this you've also got to keep the liquid oxygen plant running because if the liquid oxygen plant don't run there won't be oxygen for the operational procedures. That's probably not a problem you have very much in Afghanistan.

The countries are very very different. I think the problem of Afghanistan is that all the power has rested with these warlords or regional leaders or whatever you want to call them for centuries. For whatever else Iraq's problems are, that isn't the problem. I think there is -- One of the things that I was most and General Eaton were most strongly committed to was the idea that the Iraqi army has to be a national army. It's not easy. Not the least because very few Kurds, very few young Kurds speak Arabic. It's been effectively an autonomous place for a dozen years, so you take a 20-25 year old, they've never been in a situation where they were required to use Arabic. So the

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instruction has to be in both languages, we've got to force the officers to learn some Kurdish, we've got to make sure the Kurds learn some Arabic if they're going to stay in the Army and so forth.

But there was also a broadscale recognition that a national army's a good thing.

I agree, there is a serious problem about the ICDC as to how you're going to have, there are a lot of problems but one of them is how you avoid turning it into a situation where it becomes the base for a regional military force.

I guess we have time for two more quick ones.

Question: Walt Kreischer, Coffee News Service.

About the hard core old regimists are the most numerous of the opposition, what will it take to get them to stand down? Do we have to kill or arrest them all or is there some remedy short of that?

Mr. Slocombe: I don't think, unfortunately the United States is not free of terrorism. I don't think we're going to get to a stage where there are no terrorist incidents in Iraq for a very long time. But you can break up these organizations. I think one of the most important things, and it goes to this issue of convincing ordinary Iraqis that the future is on the side or, our side if you will, the side of change. You tend to dry up their local support. Increasingly we get information people turn in, people come u to a soldier and say you ought to look under that box and you'll find something interesting. Breaking the link.

It's a classic counter-terrorist operation. I think it's a mistake to call it an insurgency. And this goes to the psychologist's question. It is not so far, it is not so far and I don't think there's reason to believe it ever will be, a situation where you've got a vast discontented, deeply estranged population and a relatively small resistance organization that lives on that support. Much of the support is coerced, and as you begin to give people confidence as to who's going to win, give people confidence as to why they should want us to win and not the enemy, you'll begin to work away at the support. You've got to kill a lot of them. Kill them or arrest them.

Ms. Flournoy: We could be here all morning because you have succeeded in provoking so many questions. I'm sorry to those of you who didn't get a chance to ask questions, I'd encourage you to find another way to contact our speaker. I'm not sure he'll want to do that. But please join me in thanking Walt Slocombe for

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a very thought-provoking session.

(Applause)

- END -

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