HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Conclusion

The lack of accurate information about the state of Iraqi society and infrastructure led to overly optimistic projections.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously said that "plans are nothing; planning is everything." The original U.S. plan for establishing an Iraqi government could not be implemented after the bureaucratic and administrative structures collapsed and looting destroyed government ministries. Further, the lack of accurate information about the state of Iraqi society and infrastructure led to overly optimistic projections. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was substantial evidence, however, that looting was typical in immediate postwar environments. It would have been useful if coalition planners had anticipated such an outcome and devised a contingency plan. Even if this plan had proven imperfect, the process of planning would have better prepared the coalition for establishing governing structures. The coalition's efforts to establish democratic governing structures in Iraq were marked by ad hoc approaches, reversals, course corrections, and playing catch-up. In the future, the United States will be involved in assisting other nations establish or strengthen democratic governance. Success will be more likely if we are able to "operationalize" what we learned in Iraq.

Of Related Interest

An online edition of this report can be found at our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues related to Iraq and postconflict governance.

Recent Institute reports include:

- *The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Identified* (Special Report, April 2005)
- *The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified* (Special Report, April 2005)
- *Iraq's Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country's Future* (Special Report, February 2005)
- *Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy* (Special Report, May 2004)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include:

- *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction,* by Colonel Garland H. Williams (2005)
- *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force,* by Robert M. Perito (2004)

For book sales and order information, call (800) 868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or (703) 661-1590, or fax (703) 661-1501.

United States Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
www.usip.org

Digitized by Google
Original from UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HARCH/GRAD
JZ
5574
.U55
564
no.139

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary

- In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
- Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
- Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
- Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
- Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency plan-

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Special Report 139 May 2005

Contents

Introduction 2
Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3
Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3
Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5
Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7
Lessons Identified 9
Conclusion 12

Digitized by Google

Original from
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN