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The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public 

School Classroom 

JEROEN TEMPERMAN, ed., 2012 

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands 

Studies in Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights Series, volume 11 

426 pp.  

Review by Myriam Hunter-Henin (UCL, Laws) 

 

 

At the heart of this edited collection lies one affair: the Lautsi case and one 

symbol: the crucifix. In sixteen different chapters, the book offers multiple analysis of 

the challenge raised against the mandatory presence of crucifixes in Italian state 

schools. From a variety of perspectives, the chapters all address the fundamental 

underlying question of the place of religion in public education. Testimony to the 

complex questions left open by the European Court of Human Rights in its two 

dramatically opposite decisions
1
 and to the rich and in-depth analysis of the 

contributors’ chapters, the book offers a fascinating read.  

The contributors, lawyers for most, come from a diversity of sub-disciplines 

and jurisdictions, ranging from legal theory, human rights, constitutional law; 

comparative law, law & religion and legal philosophy. They are spread across the UK, 

the Netherlands, Romania; Belgium, Canada, Italy, Hungary and the US. The book 

will be of interest to a large audience: public lawyers, human rights experts, 

educationalists, philosophers; sociologists, political scientists, scholars of religion.  

The book gives a balanced assessment of the Grand Chamber decision in 

which the obligatory presence of crucifixes on Italian state school wall classrooms 

was held not to infringe convention rights. Seven chapters against nine approve this 

final outcome but interestingly the reliance placed by the Grand Chamber on the 

                                                 
1
 ECtHR 3 November 2009 [Second Section Chamber]; ECtHR 18 March [Grand Chamber], 2011 

Lautsi and Others v. Italy, App. 30814/06. 



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concept of margin of appreciation to support its conclusion is met with far greater 

caution.
2
 

A few of the authors support the judicial restraint that the concept of the 

margin of appreciation carries. Jean-Marc Piret (chapter 3) thus underlines that the 

European Court of Human Rights does not have the standing of a Constitutional Court 

for Europe.
3
 “What is important here is the question: who is competent?”

4
. This 

tension between the universality and the national/local enforcement of human rights is 

a recurring theme, studied in other worthwhile chapters such as Silvio Ferrari’s 

(chapter 1). Both Silvio Ferrari (Chapter 1) and Brett G. Scharffs (Chapter 2) in 

different ways emphasize the importance of dialogue. The Grand Chamber’s outcome 

in that sense may be praised for allowing the dialogue to continue. By contrast, others 

regret the lack of audacity of the Court: Roland Pierik (Chapter 8); Carla M. Zoethout, 

(Chapter 16).  

Unsurprisingly, the question of the “who” is intimately linked to the 

substantive question of meaning. What does the symbol of the crucifix mean and is 

this meaning enough to amount to a violation under the Convention? Again, the 

answer to the question will depend largely on how the question is phrased. If the 

question focuses on the particular audience (children of impressionable age in 

hierarchical relationships) the answer is likely to be that the crucifix will have a 

coercive impact (Alison Mawhinney, Chapter 4). The same conclusion will follow if 

one focuses on the particular position of the crucifix as the emblem of the majority 

                                                 
2 According to Lorenzo Zucca, the concept is mentioned 27 times in the whole decision and 8 times in 
the 20 paragraphs summarizing the court’s assessment. L. Zucca, “Lautsi: A Commentary on a decision 

by the ECtHR Grand Chamber”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2013 vol. 11, n.1, pp 218-

229. on the concept of margin of appreciation itself in Lautsi, see Giulio Itzcovich, “One, None and 

One Hundred Thousands Margins of Appreciations: The Lautsi case”, Human Rights Law Review 

2012 vol. 12, n. 4. 
3
 See also Joseph Weiler. For example JHH Weiler, Lautsi: A Reply, International Journal of 

Constitutional Law 2012, vol. 10, n. 4, pp. 230-233. 
4
 Chapter 3, p.75 (italics added). 



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religion (Stijn Smet, Chapter 5) or as a sign imposed by the power of the State (Jeoren 

Temperman, Chapter 6). But as very convincingly argued by Malcolm Evans 

(Chapter 13), the rights involved ensure that public education be delivered in a 

manner respectful of diversity. The convention does not require that an appearance of 

strict neutrality be enforced but demands that the educational experience is – in its 

substance – compliant with the plurality of convictions.  

Should one argue for the opposite position, public schools and by extension, 

possibly, the public sphere should then need to be stripped of all religious symbols. 

Conceptually a strict version of neutrality would follow. The collection reflects this 

debate about neutrality, intrinsic to the case. Some chapters support a strict version of 

the notion (chapter 8). Others offer middle ground solutions where preference for 

majority religion and neutrality become compatible (Wouter de Ben; Liviu and 

Gabriel Andreescu; Hana van Ooijen, in Chapters 7, 9 and 11 respectively).  

The Italian context – certainly – may easily welcome a strict version of 

neutrality (Carlo Panara, chapter 12) and arguments can be made in favour of such 

move for the sake of multiculturalism (as illustrated interestingly by the Canadian 

context by Richard Moon, Chapter 10). However, transferred to a European context, 

one may query whether the European Court is to decide for a particular form of 

Church/State arrangement across Europe
5
 - which leads us back to the question of the 

“who”. 

This overlap between the questions is reflected in the book. The concept of 

neutrality, highlighted as the overarching theme of part III of the book is actually one 

of the recurring themes in many chapters. One may also wonder in what way chapters 

4 to 12 are really less specifically about Lautsi than the last four, put together under 

                                                 
5
 See Ian Leigh and Rex Ahdar, “Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How 

God Never Really Went Away”, (2012) 75(6) Modern Law Review 1064–1098. 



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the title of “Lautsi-specific comments”. The comparative perspective developed in 

part IV is interesting but limited. A chapter comparing the concept of secularism in 

France and Italy would have shed further light on the case as would have a detailed 

analysis of the German position. But these minor queries about the overall structure 

and scope of the book take none of the value of the collection away.  

As the dialogue on the place of religion in the public sphere continues, this 

particular collection, edited by Jeroen Temperman, will offer a rich and fascinating 

contribution to the debate. 

Myriam Hunter-Henin* 

 

 

*Dr Myriam Hunter-Henin, Senior Lecturer in Law, University College 

London, Faculty of Laws