Inconsistent triad - Wikipedia Inconsistent triad From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigation Jump to search This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Inconsistent triad" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (May 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) An inconsistent triad consists of three propositions of which at most two can be true. For example: Alice loves me. If Alice loves me, then she would have sent flowers. Alice has not sent flowers. If one finds oneself believing all three propositions of an inconsistent triad, then (in order to be rational) one must give up or modify at least one of those beliefs. Maybe Alice doesn't love me, or maybe she wouldn't send flowers to me if she did, or maybe she actually has sent flowers. Any inconsistent triad {A, B, C} gives rise to a trilemma {{A, B}, {B, C}, {C, A}}. Contents 1 Perception and objects 2 The problem of evil 3 See also 4 References Perception and objects[edit] The dialectical framework for the whole discussion of the problem in the philosophy of perception and the theoretical conception of perceptual experience is set out as an inconsistent triad.[1] Physical objects are mind-independent. Physical objects are the direct objects of perception. The direct objects of perception are mind-dependent. The first proposition is defended by realist, while is rejected by anti-realist or idealist. The problem of evil[edit] Main article: Problem of evil The problem of evil is often given in the form of an inconsistent triad. For example, J. L. Mackie gave the following three propositions: God is omnipotent God is omnibenevolent Evil exists Mackie argued that these propositions were inconsistent, and thus, that at least one of these propositions must be false. Either: God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and evil does not exist. God is omnipotent, but not omnibenevolent; thus, evil exists by God's will. God is omnibenevolent, but not omnipotent; thus, evil exists, but it is not within God's power to stop it (at least not instantaneously). Many responses have been made to the problem of evil, including the proposition that evil exists as a consequence of a greater good, such as free will; that evil is an illusion; and that evil is necessary for spiritual growth. See also[edit] Reductio ad absurdum Trilemma References[edit] ^ Brewer, Bill (2011-03-01). Perception and its Objects. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001/acprof-9780199260256. ISBN 9780191725470. Howard-Snyder, F., Howard-Snyder, D., & Wasserman, R. (2009). The Power of Logic (4th Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. (p. 336) ISBN 978-0-07-340737-1 Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Inconsistent_triad&oldid=921026055" Categories: Syllogistic fallacies Problem of evil Hidden categories: Articles needing additional references from May 2008 All articles needing additional references Navigation menu Personal tools Not logged in Talk Contributions Create account Log in Namespaces Article Talk Variants Views Read Edit View history More Search Navigation Main page Contents Current events Random article About Wikipedia Contact us Donate Contribute Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file Tools What links here Related changes Upload file Special pages Permanent link Page information Cite this page Wikidata item Print/export Download as PDF Printable version Languages Add links This page was last edited on 13 October 2019, at 11:46 (UTC). Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization. Privacy policy About Wikipedia Disclaimers Contact Wikipedia Mobile view Developers Statistics Cookie statement