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==Writings==
''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' begins with the introduction: "'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, more or less, to human nature.… Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man."<ref name=":4" /> The [[science of man]], as Hume explains, is the "only solid foundation for the other sciences" and that the method for this science requires both experience and observation as the foundations of a logical argument.<ref name=":4" />{{Rp|7}} In regards to this, philosophical historian [[Frederick Copleston]] (1999) suggests that it was Hume's aim to apply to the science of man the method of experimental philosophy (the term that was current at the time to imply [[Natural philosophy]]), and that "Hume's plan is to extend to philosophy in general the methodological limitations of [[classical mechanics|Newtonian physics]]."<ref>[[Frederick Copleston|Copleston, Frederick]]. 1999 [1960]. ''[[A History of Philosophy (Copleston)|A History of Philosophy]]'' 6. Kent: [[Burns & Oates|Burns & Oats]]. {{ISBN|9780860122999}}. [https://books.google.com/books?id=BMjrs7-gk9oC Lay summary] via Google Books. pp. 405–06.</ref>

Until recently, Hume was seen as a forerunner of [[logical positivism]], a form of anti-[[metaphysics|metaphysical]] empiricism. According to the logical positivists (in summary of their [[verificationism|verification principle]]), unless a statement could be verified by experience, or else was true or false by definition (i.e. either [[tautology (logic)|tautological]] or [[contradiction|contradictory]]), then it was meaningless. Hume, on this view, was a proto-positivist, who, in his philosophical writings, attempted to demonstrate the ways in which ordinary propositions about objects, causal relations, the self, and so on, are [[logical equivalence|semantically equivalent]] to propositions about one's experiences.<ref>[[A. J. Ayer|Ayer, Alfred Jule]]. 1946 [1936]. ''[[Language, Truth, and Logic|Language, Truth and Logic]]''. London: Penguin Books. [[iarchive:AlfredAyer/page/n39/mode/2up|p. 40]].</ref>{{failed verification|date=March 2015}}

Many commentators have since rejected this understanding of Humean empiricism, stressing an [[epistemology|epistemological]] (rather than a [[semantics|semantic]]) reading of his project.<ref name="CSW" group="lower-roman">For example, see {{harvtxt|Craig|1987|loc=Ch. 2}}; {{harvtxt|Strawson|2014|p=}}; and {{harvtxt|Wright|1983}}.</ref> According to this opposing view, Hume's empiricism consisted in the idea that it is our knowledge, and not our ability to conceive, that is restricted to what can be experienced. Hume thought that we can form beliefs about that which extends beyond any possible experience, through the operation of faculties such as custom and the imagination, but he was sceptical about claims to knowledge on this basis.

===Impressions and ideas===

A central doctrine of Hume's philosophy, stated in the very first lines of the ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature|Treatise of Human Nature]]'', is that the mind consists of perceptions, or the mental objects which are present to it, and which divide into two categories: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call {{smallcaps|impressions}} and {{smallcaps|ideas}}." Hume believed that it would "not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction", which commentators have generally taken to mean the distinction between ''[[feeling]]'' and ''[[Thought|thinking]]''.<ref name=":9">Garrett, Don. 2002. ''Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. {{ISBN|9780195159592}}.</ref> Controversially, Hume, in some sense, may regard the distinction as a matter of degree, as he takes ''impressions'' to be distinguished from ideas on the basis of their force, liveliness, and vivacity{{mdash}}what [[Henry E. Allison]] (2008) calls the "FLV criterion."<ref name=":10">[[Henry E. Allison|Allison, Henry E.]] 2008. ''Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. {{ISBN|9780199532889}}.</ref> ''Ideas'' are therefore "faint" impressions. For example, experiencing the painful sensation of touching a hot pan's handle is more forceful than simply thinking about touching a hot pan. According to Hume, ''impressions'' are meant to be the original form of all our ideas. From this, Don Garrett (2002) has coined the term ''copy principle,<ref name=":9" />'' referring to Hume's doctrine that all ideas are ultimately copied from some original impression, whether it be a passion or sensation, from which they derive.<ref name=":10" />

==== Simple and complex ====
After establishing the forcefulness of impressions and ideas, these two categories are further broken down into ''simple'' and ''complex'': "simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation", whereas "the complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts".<ref name=":4">Hume, David. 1739. [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712120258/http://www.davidhume.org/texts/thn.html ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' 1]. London: John Noon. Retrieved 19 May 2020.</ref> When looking at an apple, a person experiences a variety of colour-sensations{{mdash}}what Hume notes as a complex impression. Similarly, a person experiences a variety of taste-sensations, tactile-sensations, and smell-sensations when biting into an apple, with the overall sensation{{mdash}}again, a complex impression. Thinking about an apple allows a person to form complex ideas, which are made of similar parts as the complex impressions they were developed from, but which are also less forceful. Hume believes that complex perceptions can be broken down into smaller and smaller parts until perceptions are reached that have no parts of their own, and these perceptions are thus referred to as simple.

==== Principles of association ====
Regardless of how boundless it may seem, a person's imagination is confined to the mind's ability to recombine the information it has already acquired from the body's sensory experience (the ideas that have been derived from impressions). In addition, "as our imagination takes our most basic ideas and leads us to form new ones, it is directed by three principles of association, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect":<ref>Fieser, James. 2011. "[https://www.iep.utm.edu/hume/ David Hume (1711—1776)]." ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. Retrieved 19 May 2020.</ref>

* The '''principle of resemblance''' refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent resemble one another. For example, someone looking at an illustration of a flower can conceive an idea of the physical flower because the idea of the illustrated object is associated with the physical object's idea. 
* The '''principle of contiguity''' describes the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent are near to each other in time or space, such as when the thought of a crayon in a box leads one to think of the crayon contiguous to it.
* The '''principle of cause''' '''and effect''' refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent are causally related, which explains how remembering a broken window can make someone think of a ball that had caused the window to shatter.

Hume elaborates more on the last principle, explaining that, when somebody observes that one object or event consistently produces the same object or event, that results in "an expectation that a particular event (a 'cause') will be followed by another event (an 'effect') previously and constantly associated with it".<ref name=":11">Norton, David Fate. 1999 [1993]. "[https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=GVRL&u=redm07619&id=GALE%7CCX3450000731&v=2.1&it=r&sid=GVRL&asid=628c8aaa Hume, David]." Pp. 398–403 in ''[[The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy|Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy]]'' (2nd ed.), edited by [[Robert Audi|R. Audi]]. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. Retrieved 18 May 2020. – via [[Gale (publisher)|Gale]].</ref> Hume calls this principle ''custom'', or ''habit'', saying that "custom...renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past".<ref name=":5">Hume, David. 1990 [1748]. ''[[An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]]''. New York: [[Anchor Books|Anchor]]/[[Doubleday (publisher)|Doubleday]].</ref> However, even though custom can serve as a guide in life, it still only represents an expectation. In other words:<ref>Drefcinski, Shane. (1998). "[http://people.uwplatt.edu/~drefcins/humeencyclopediaentry.html A Very Brief Summary of David Hume]." ''Dr. Shane Drefcinski''. US: [[University of Wisconsin–Platteville]].  {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170509231819/http://people.uwplatt.edu/~drefcins/humeencyclopediaentry.html|date=9 May 2017}}. Retrieved 19 May 2020.</ref> <blockquote>Experience cannot establish a necessary connection between cause and effect, because we can imagine without contradiction a case where the cause does not produce its usual effect…the reason why we mistakenly infer that there is something in the cause that necessarily produces its effect is because our past experiences have habituated us to think in this way. </blockquote>Continuing this idea, Hume argues that "only in the pure realm of ideas, logic, and mathematics, not contingent on the direct sense awareness of reality, [can] causation safely…be applied—all other sciences are reduced to probability".<ref>Hume, David. 2010 [1778]. ''[[An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]]''. In ''[[Masterplots]]'' (4th ed.). pp. 1–3<!--find direct ref-->.</ref><ref name=":5" /> He uses this scepticism to reject metaphysics and many theological views on the basis that they are not grounded in fact and observations, and are therefore beyond the reach of human understanding.

===Induction and causation<!--linked from 'Problem of induction'-->===
The cornerstone of Hume's epistemology is the [[problem of induction]]. This may be the area of Hume's thought where his scepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced.{{sfn| Kenyon|Craig|1985|p= ?}} The problem revolves around the plausibility of [[inductive reasoning]], that is, reasoning from the observed behaviour of objects to their behaviour when unobserved. As Hume wrote, induction concerns how things behave when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, or the records of our memory".{{sfn|Hume|1777|p= 26}} Hume argues that we tend to believe that things behave in a regular manner, meaning that patterns in the behaviour of objects seem to persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present.{{sfn|Atherton|1999|loc= [https://books.google.com/books?id=9u56iKhWQu4C&pg=PA202&dq=hume+Uniformity+of+Nature&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DVOIVKTQAon4UojxgJgL&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=hume%20Uniformity%20of%20Nature&f=false pp. 202–203]}} Hume's argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be uniform, as justification comes in only two varieties—demonstrative reasoning and probable reasoning<ref group="lower-roman">These are Hume's terms. In modern parlance, ''demonstration'' may be termed ''[[deductive reasoning]]'', while ''probability'' may be termed ''[[inductive reasoning]]''.

[[Peter Millican|Millican, Peter]]. 1996. ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20171020020313/http://www.davidhume.org/papers/millican/1996PhD.pdf Hume, Induction and Probability]''. Leeds: [[University of Leeds]]. Archived from the [http://www.davidhume.org/papers/millican/1996PhD.pdf original] on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 6 June 2014.</ref>—and both of these are inadequate. With regard to demonstrative reasoning, Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being regular.{{sfn|Hume|1777|p= 111}} Turning to probable reasoning, Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past. As this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is under question, it would be [[circular reasoning]].{{sfn|Hume|1777|p= 115}} Thus, no form of justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences.

Hume's solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human practice of making inductive inferences. He asserts that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable [''[[sic]]''] necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." In 1985, and in agreement with Hume, John D. Kenyon writes:{{sfn|Kenyon|Craig|1985|p=254}} <blockquote>Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment&nbsp;... but the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief.</blockquote>Others, such as [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], have demurred from Hume's solution,{{sfn|Harris|2004|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uBbfizzKTDoC&lpg=PA42&pg=PA42&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false p. 42]}} while some, such as Kant and [[Karl Popper]], have thought that Hume's analysis has "posed a most fundamental challenge to all human knowledge claims".{{sfn|Popkin|2014}}

The notion of [[Causality|causation]] is closely linked to the problem of induction. According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events. It is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation. At least three interpretations of Hume's theory of causation are represented in the literature:{{sfn|Read|Richman|2002|pp=13–14 and 69}}

# the [[Logical positivism|logical positivist]];
# the sceptical realist; and
# the [[Quasi-realism|quasi-realist]].

Hume acknowledged that there are events constantly unfolding, and humanity cannot guarantee that these events are caused by prior events or are independent instances. He opposed the widely accepted theory of causation that 'all events have a specific course or reason'. Therefore, Hume crafted his own theory of causation, formed through his empiricist and sceptic beliefs. He split causation into two realms: "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact."<ref name=":5" /> Relations of Ideas are ''a priori'' and represent universal bonds between ideas that mark the cornerstones of human thought. Matters of Fact are dependent on the observer and experience. They are often not universally held to be true among multiple persons. Hume was an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience".<ref name=":5" /> He goes on to say that, even with the perspective of the past, humanity cannot dictate future events because thoughts of the past are limited, compared to the possibilities for the future. Hume's separation between Matters of Fact and Relations of Ideas is often referred to as "[[Hume's fork]]."<ref name="SEP">Morris, William Edward, and Charlotte R. Brown. 2019 [2001]. "[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/ David Hume]." ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab. Retrieved 18 May 2020.</ref>

Hume explains his theory of causation and causal inference by division into three different parts. In these three branches he explains his ideas and compares and contrasts his views to his predecessors. These branches are the Critical Phase, the Constructive Phase, and Belief.<ref name="Davidhume 1748">"Davidhume.org." Texts - An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748, 1777). Web. 19 March 2017.<!--find direct ref--></ref> In the Critical Phase, Hume denies his predecessors' theories of causation. Next, he uses the Constructive Phase to resolve any doubts the reader may have had while observing the Critical Phase. "Habit or Custom" mends the gaps in reasoning that occur without the human mind even realising it. Associating ideas has become second nature to the human mind. It "makes us expect for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past".<ref name=":5" /> However, Hume says that this association cannot be trusted because the span of the human mind to comprehend the past is not necessarily applicable to the wide and distant future. This leads him to the third branch of causal inference, Belief. Belief is what drives the human mind to hold that expectancy of the future is based on past experience. Throughout his explanation of causal inference, Hume is arguing that the future is not certain to be repetition of the past and that the only way to justify induction is through uniformity.

The [[logical positivism|logical positivist]] interpretation is that Hume analyses causal propositions, such as "A causes B", in terms of regularities in perception: "A causes B" is equivalent to "Whenever A-type events happen, B-type ones follow", where "whenever" refers to all possible perceptions.<ref>For this account of Hume's views on causation cf. {{harvtxt|Ayer|1946|pp=40–42}}</ref> In his ''Treatise of Human Nature'', Hume wrote:{{sfn|Hume|1739|p=167}}

<blockquote>
Power and necessity…are…qualities of perceptions, not of objects…felt by the soul and not perceiv'd externally in bodies.
</blockquote>

This view is rejected by sceptical [[Philosophical realism|realists]], who argue that Hume thought that causation amounts to more than just the regular succession of events.<ref name="CSW" group="lower-roman" /> Hume said that, when two events are causally conjoined, a necessary connection underpins the conjunction:{{sfn|Hume|1739|p=78|ps=, original emphasis}}

<blockquote>
Shall we rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By no means…there is a ''necessary connexion'' to be taken into consideration.
</blockquote>

Angela Coventry writes that, for Hume, "there is nothing in any particular instance of cause and effect involving external objects which suggests the idea of power or necessary connection" and "we are ignorant of the powers that operate between objects".{{sfn|Coventry|2006|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gq348MmuojAC&dq=hume+coventry&q=%22effect+involving%22#v=snippet&q=%22effect%20involving%22&f=false pp. 91–92]}} However, while denying the possibility of knowing the powers between objects, Hume accepted the causal principle, writing: "I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that something could arise without a cause."{{sfn|Hume|2011|p=187}}

It has been argued that, while Hume did not think that causation is reducible to pure regularity, he was not a fully fledged realist either. [[Simon Blackburn]] calls this a [[quasi-realism|quasi-realist]] reading,{{sfn|Blackburn|1990|p= ?}} saying that "Someone talking of cause is voicing a distinct mental set: he is by no means in the same state as someone merely describing regular sequences."<ref>Quoted by {{harvtxt|Dauer|2010|p=97}}</ref> In Hume's words, "nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion".{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=78, fn 17}}

===The 'self'===
[[File:DavidHume.jpg|thumb|left|Statue of Hume by [[Alexander Stoddart]] on the [[Royal Mile]] in Edinburgh]]
Empiricist philosophers, such as Hume and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], favoured the [[bundle theory]] of [[personal identity]].{{sfn|Dicker|2002|p=15}} In this theory, "the mind itself, far from being an independent power, is simply 'a bundle of perceptions' without unity or cohesive quality".{{sfn|Maurer|2013}} The self is nothing but a bundle of experiences linked by the relations of causation and resemblance; or, more accurately, the empirically warranted idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle. According to Hume:<ref name=":4" />

{{Quote|text=For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long I am insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.|title=[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]|source=Book I.iv, section 6}}

This view is supported by, for example, positivist interpreters, who have seen Hume as suggesting that terms such as "self", "person", or "mind" refer to collections of "sense-contents".{{sfn|Ayer|1946|pp=135–136}} A modern-day version of the bundle theory of the mind has been advanced by [[Derek Parfit]] in his ''[[Reasons and Persons]]''.{{sfn|Parfit|1984|p= ?}}

However, some philosophers have criticised Hume's bundle-theory interpretation of personal identity. They argue that distinct selves can have perceptions that stand in relation to similarity and causality. Thus, perceptions must already come parcelled into distinct "bundles" before they can be associated according to the relations of similarity and causality. In other words, the mind must already possess a unity that cannot be generated, or constituted, by these relations alone. Since the bundle-theory interpretation portrays Hume as answering an [[ontology|ontological]] question, philosophers like [[Galen Strawson]] see Hume as not very concerned with such questions and have queried whether this view is really Hume's. Instead, Strawson suggests that Hume might have been answering an epistemological question about the causal origin of our concept of the self.{{sfn|Strawson|2011|p= ?}} In the Appendix to the ''Treatise'', Hume declares himself dissatisfied with his earlier account of personal identity in Book 1. Corliss Swain notes that "Commentators agree that if Hume did find some new problem" when he reviewed the section on personal identity, "he wasn't forthcoming about its nature in the Appendix."{{sfn|Swain|2008|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Qoh7_nZbBjYC&pg=PA143&dq=hume+blackwell+new+problem&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SmODVNGVG8G9UeJV&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hume%20blackwell%20new%20problem&f=false p. 142]}} One interpretation of Hume's view of the self, argued for by philosopher and psychologist [[James Giles (philosopher)|James Giles]], is that Hume is not arguing for a bundle theory, which is a form of reductionism, but rather for an eliminative view of the self. Rather than reducing the self to a bundle of perceptions, Hume rejects the idea of the self altogether. On this interpretation, Hume is proposing a "[[Personal identity#The no-self theory|no-self theory]]" and thus has much in common with [[Buddhism|Buddhist]] thought (see ''[[anattā]]'').{{sfn|Giles|1993|p= ?}} Psychologist [[Alison Gopnik]] has argued that Hume was in a position to learn about Buddhist thought during his time in France in the 1730s.{{sfn|Gopnik|2009|p= ?}}{{sfn|Garfield|2015|p=45, 107}}

===Practical reason===
''[[Practical reason]]'' relates to whether standards or principles exist that are also authoritative for all rational beings, dictating people's intentions and actions. Hume is mainly considered an anti-rationalist, denying the possibility for practical reason, although other philosophers such as [[Christine Korsgaard]], [[Jean Hampton]], and [[Elijah Millgram]] claim that Hume is not so much of an anti-rationalist as he is just a sceptic of practical reason.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Mason |first=Michelle |author-link=Michelle Mason |volume=31 |issue=2 |date=September 2005 |title=Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason |url=http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v31n2/mason/mason-v31n2.pdf |publisher=[[Hume Studies]] |access-date=2016-05-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617090548/http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v31n2/mason/mason-v31n2.pdf |archive-date=17 June 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Hume denied the existence of practical reason as a principle because he claimed reason does not have any effect on morality, since morality is capable of producing effects in people that reason alone cannot create. As Hume explains in ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' (1740):<ref name=":4" />{{Rp|457}} <blockquote>Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."</blockquote>Since practical reason is supposed to regulate our actions (in theory), Hume denied practical reason on the grounds that reason cannot directly oppose passions. As Hume puts it, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Reason is less significant than any passion because reason has no original influence, while "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence."<ref name=":4" />{{Rp|415}}

Practical reason is also concerned with the value of actions rather than the truth of propositions,<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |url= http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=practical-reason |title=Practical Reason |last=Wallace |first=Jay |year=2014 | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 April 2016}}</ref> so Hume believed that reason's shortcoming of affecting morality proved that practical reason could not be authoritative for all rational beings, since morality was essential for dictating people's intentions and actions.

===Ethics===
{{see also|is–ought problem}}
Hume's writings on ethics began in the 1740 ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature|Treatise]]'' and were refined in his ''[[An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals]]'' (1751). He understood ''feeling'', rather than ''knowing'', as that which governs ethical actions, stating that "moral decisions are grounded in moral sentiment."{{sfn|Cranston|2014|p=4}} Arguing that reason cannot be behind morality, he wrote:{{sfn|Hume|1739|p=458}}

<blockquote>
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
</blockquote>

Hume's [[Moral sense theory|''moral sentimentalism'']] was shared by his close friend [[Adam Smith]],{{sfn|Hume|2013|p=548}}{{failed verification|date=March 2015}} and the two were mutually influenced by the moral reflections of their older contemporary, [[Francis Hutcheson (philosopher)|Francis Hutcheson]].{{sfn|Taylor|1965|p= ?}} [[Peter Singer]] claims that Hume's argument that morals cannot have a rational basis alone "would have been enough to earn him a place in the history of ethics."{{sfn|Singer|2015}}

Hume also put forward the ''[[is–ought problem]]'', later known as ''Hume's Law'',{{sfn|Singer|2015}} denying the possibility of logically deriving what ''ought'' to be from what ''is''. According to the ''Treatise'' (1740), in every system of morality that Hume has read, the author begins by stating facts about the world as it ''is'' but always ends up suddenly referring to what ''ought'' to be the case. Hume demands that a reason should be given for inferring what ''ought to be'' the case, from ''what is'' the case. This is because it "seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others."{{sfn|Hume|1739|p=470}}

Hume's theory of ethics has been influential in modern-day [[Meta-ethics|meta-ethical theory]],{{sfn|Edwards|2002|loc= [https://books.google.com/books?id=0pGKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA44&dq=Hume++meta-ethics+influence&hl=en&sa=X&ei=zrmIVL_FE4iBUc-JgIAG&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Hume%20%20meta-ethics%20influence&f=false p. 44]}} helping to inspire [[emotivism]],{{sfn|Humber|2008|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dh-E6oIlCkAC&pg=PA136&dq=Hume+emotivism+influence&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9LuIVIfhIIW1UaCIg_AM&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Hume%20emotivism%20influence&f=false p. 136]}} and ethical [[expressivism]] and [[non-cognitivism]],{{sfn|Brown|2005|pp=97–100}}{{failed verification|date=March 2015}} as well as [[Allan Gibbard]]'s general theory of moral judgment and judgments of rationality.{{sfn|Angier|2012|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ndyMavMbiZMC&pg=PA114&dq=Hume++influence+gibbard&hl=en&sa=X&ei=0r-IVKLZF4PwUJbrgLAJ&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Hume%20%20influence%20gibbard&f=false p. 114]}}

===Aesthetics===
Hume's ideas about [[aesthetics]] and the [[theory of art]] are spread throughout his works, but are particularly connected with his ethical writings, and also the essays "[[Four Dissertations#Of the Standard of Taste|Of the Standard of Taste]]" and "[[Four Dissertations#Of Tragedy|Of Tragedy]]" (1757). His views are rooted in the work of [[Joseph Addison]] and Francis Hutcheson.{{sfn|Gracyk|2011|loc= ch. 1}} In the ''Treatise'' (1740), he touches on the connection between beauty & deformity and vice & virtue.{{sfn|Hume|1739|loc=Sect. VII and Sect VIII, pp. 295–304}} His later writings on the subject continue to draw parallels of beauty and deformity in art with conduct and character.{{sfn|Costelloe|2013|loc= [https://books.google.com/books?id=MH3_R04jW80C&pg=PA111&dq=hume+aesthetics&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hvGFVMcPy_5So1I&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAQ#v=snippet&q=deformity&f=false p. viii]}}

In "Standard of Taste", Hume argues that no rules can be drawn up about what is a tasteful object. However, a reliable critic of taste can be recognised as objective, sensible and unprejudiced, and extensive experience.{{sfn|Harris|2013|loc= [https://books.google.com/books?id=zWMBAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA401&dq=hume+aesthetics&hl=en&sa=X&ei=AxaGVPzBHcjsUsjwgOAP&ved=0CDsQ6AEwBTgK#v=onepage&q=hume%20aesthetics&f=false p. 401]}} "Of Tragedy" addresses the question of why humans enjoy [[tragedy|tragic drama]]. Hume was concerned with the way spectators find pleasure in the sorrow and anxiety depicted in a tragedy. He argued that this was because the spectator is aware that he is witnessing a dramatic performance. There is pleasure in realising that the terrible events that are being shown are actually fiction.{{sfn|Schmidt|2010|loc= [https://books.google.com/books?id=ZSXlNY6xIMoC&pg=PA324&dq=hume+of+tragedy&hl=en&sa=X&ei=RBqGVPnpBMb9Utelg9AP&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hume%20of%20tragedy&f=false pp. 325–326]}} Furthermore, Hume laid down rules for educating people in taste and correct conduct, and his writings in this area have been very influential on English and Anglo-Saxon aesthetics.{{sfn|Scruton|2014|p=18}}

===Free will, determinism, and responsibility===
Hume, along with [[Thomas Hobbes]], is cited as a classical compatibilist about the notions of [[free will|freedom]] and [[determinism]].{{sfn|McKenna|Coates|2015|loc=Ch. 3}}{{sfn|Russell|1995}} ''[[Compatibilism]]'' seeks to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist view that human beings are part of a deterministic universe, which is completely governed by [[physical law]]s. Hume, on this point, was influenced greatly by the scientific revolution, particularly by [[Isaac Newton|Sir Isaac Newton]].{{sfn|Wright|2010|p= ?}} Hume argued that the dispute between freedom and determinism continued over 2000 years due to ambiguous terminology. He wrote: "From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot…we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression," and that different disputants use different meanings for the same terms.{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=81}}{{sfn|Passmore|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vZRtAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&dq=hume+presume+that+there+is+some+ambiguity&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3zSMVOvlJYnyULWZhPgP&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=hume%20presume%20that%20there%20is%20some%20ambiguity&f=false p. 73]}}

Hume defines the concept of necessity as "the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together,"{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=82}} and [[liberty]] as "a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=95}} He then argues that, according to these definitions, not only are the two compatible, but liberty ''requires'' necessity. For if our actions were not necessitated in the above sense, they would "have so little in connexion with motives, inclinations and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other." But if our actions are not thus connected to the will, then our actions can never be free: they would be matters of "chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=96}} Australian philosopher [[John Passmore]] writes that confusion has arisen because "necessity" has been taken to mean "necessary connexion." Once this has been abandoned, Hume argues that "liberty and necessity will be found not to be in conflict one with another."{{sfn|Passmore|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vZRtAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&dq=hume+presume+that+there+is+some+ambiguity&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3zSMVOvlJYnyULWZhPgP&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=hume%20presume%20that%20there%20is%20some%20ambiguity&f=false p. 73]}}

Moreover, Hume goes on to argue that in order to be held [[morally responsible]], it is required that our behaviour be caused or necessitated, for, as he wrote:{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=98|ps=, original emphasis}}

<blockquote>Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some ''cause'' in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil.</blockquote>

Hume describes the link between causality and our capacity to rationally make a decision from this an inference of the mind. Human beings assess a situation based upon certain predetermined events and from that form a choice. Hume believes that this choice is made spontaneously. Hume calls this form of decision making the liberty of spontaneity.{{sfn|Mounce|Mounce|2002|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qyepEVWo0v8C&pg=PA66&dq=hume+liberty+of+spontaneity&hl=en&sa=X&ei=bjeMVOKlG4L6UJe1gNgL&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hume%20liberty%20of%20spontaneity&f=false p. 66]}}

Education writer Richard Wright considers that Hume's position rejects a famous moral puzzle attributed to French philosopher [[Jean Buridan]]. The [[Buridan's ass]] puzzle describes a donkey that is hungry. This donkey has separate bales of hay on both sides, which are of equal distances from him. The problem concerns which bale the donkey chooses. Buridan was said to believe that the donkey would die, because he has no [[autonomy]]. The donkey is incapable of forming a rational decision as there is no motive to choose one bale of hay over the other. However, human beings are different, because a human who is placed in a position where he is forced to choose one loaf of bread over another will make a decision to take one in lieu of the other. For Buridan, humans have the capacity of autonomy, and he recognises the choice that is ultimately made will be based on chance, as both loaves of bread are exactly the same. However, Wright says that Hume completely rejects this notion, arguing that a human will spontaneously act in such a situation because he is faced with impending death if he fails to do so. Such a decision is not made on the basis of chance, but rather on necessity and spontaneity, given the prior predetermined events leading up to the predicament.{{sfn|Wright|2010|p= ?}}

Hume's argument is supported by modern-day compatibilists such as [[R. E. Hobart]], a pseudonym of philosopher Dickinson S. Miller.<ref>See e.g. {{harvtxt|Hobart|1934|p=?}} and {{harvtxt|Carroll|Markosian|2010|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=f6bcZq4_4gUC&pg=PA54&dq=hume+hobart+Free+Will+as+Involving&hl=en&sa=X&ei=vjiMVJalEcjzUIu6gdgL&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=hume%20hobart%20Free%20Will%20as%20Involving&f=false p. 54, note 11]}}</ref> However, [[P. F. Strawson]] argued that the issue of whether we hold one another morally responsible does not ultimately depend on the truth or falsity of a metaphysical thesis such as determinism. This is because our so holding one another is a non-rational human sentiment that is not predicated on such theses.{{sfn|Strawson|2008|p=?}}{{sfn|Prasad|1995|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=66b8FJmZQ38C&dq=hume+strawson&q=hume+moral%2C+reactive#v=snippet&q=hume%20moral%2C%20reactive&f=false p. 348]}}

===Religion===
Philosopher [[Paul Russell (philosopher)|Paul Russell]] (2005) contends that Hume wrote "on almost every central question in the philosophy of religion," and that these writings "are among the most important and influential contributions on this topic."<ref name="plat" /> Touching on the philosophy, psychology, history, and anthropology of religious thought, Hume's 1757 dissertation, "[[Four Dissertations#The Natural History of Religion|The Natural History of Religion]]", argues that the [[monotheistic]] religions of [[Judaism]], [[Christianity]], and [[Islam]] all derive from earlier [[polytheistic]] religions. He went on to suggest that all religious belief "traces, in the end, to dread of the unknown."{{sfn|O'Connor|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ntygPAezQJUC&pg=PA7&dq=hume+religion&hl=en&sa=X&ei=1s_GU_r3KPPH7Abi94GgAg&ved=0CEUQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=hume%20religion&f=false pp. 7–8]}} Hume had also written on religious subjects in the first ''Enquiry'', as well as later in the ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]''.<ref name="plat" />

====Religious views====
Although he wrote a great deal about religion, Hume's personal views have been the subject of much debate.<ref group="lower-roman">For example, see {{harvtxt|Russell|2008}}; {{harvtxt|O'Connor|2013}}; and {{harvtxt|Norton|1993}}.</ref> Some modern critics have described Hume's religious views as [[Agnosticism|agnostic]] or have described him as a "[[Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonian skeptic]]."<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Mullen|first=Shirley|year=2003|title=David Hume and a Christian Perspective on History|journal=Fides et Historia|volume=XXXV|pages=49–60}}</ref> Contemporaries considered him to be an [[Atheism|atheist]], or at least un-Christian, enough so that the [[Church of Scotland]] seriously considered bringing charges of infidelity against him.{{sfn|Mossner|1980|p=206}} Evidence of his un-Christian beliefs can especially be found in his writings on miracles, in which he attempts to separate [[historical method]] from the narrative accounts of miracles.<ref name=":0" /> The fact that contemporaries suspected him of atheism is exemplified by a story Hume liked to tell:{{sfn|Scharfstein|1998|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iZQy2lu70bwC&pg=PA454&dq=hume++fishwives&hl=en&sa=X&ei=wi3KU6jOGMaM7AaRoIDYBQ&ved=0CFEQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=hume%20%20fishwives&f=false p. 454, footnote]}}

<blockquote>The best theologian he ever met, he used to say, was the old Edinburgh fishwife who, having recognized him as Hume the atheist, refused to pull him out of the bog into which he had fallen until he declared he was a Christian and repeated the Lord's prayer.</blockquote>

However, in works such as "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm", Hume specifically seems to support the standard religious views of his time and place.<ref name=":12">Hume, David. 1777 [1741]. "[https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/se Of Superstition and Enthusiasm]." Essay X in ''[https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/full Essays Moral, Political, and Literary (1742-1754)].'' Retrieved 19 May 2020. [https://web.archive.org/web/20180710222300/http://www.davidhume.org/texts/emp.html Archived]. Also available: [http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/hume.superstition.html Full text] and [https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/704#Hume_0059_254 Liberty Fund edition].</ref> This still meant that he could be very critical of the [[Catholic Church]], dismissing it with the standard [[Protestant]] accusations of superstition and idolatry,{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=51}}<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|70}} as well as dismissing as idolatry what his compatriots saw as uncivilised beliefs.{{sfn|Hume|1757|p=34}} He also considered extreme Protestant sects, the members of which he called "enthusiasts", to be corrupters of religion.{{sfn|Hume|1741|pp=73–76}} By contrast, in "[[Four Dissertations#The Natural History of Religion|The Natural History of Religion]]", Hume presents arguments suggesting that [[polytheism]] had much to commend it over [[monotheism]].{{sfn|Hume|1757|p=63}} Additionally, when mentioning religion as a factor in his ''History of England'', Hume uses it to show the deleterious effect it has on human progress. In his ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature|Treatise on Human Nature]]'', Hume wrote: "Generally speaking, the errors in religions are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous."<ref name=":0" />

Paul Russell (2008) writes that Hume was plainly sceptical about religious belief, although perhaps not to the extent of complete atheism.  He suggests that Hume's position is best characterised by the term "[[irreligion]],"<ref>[[Paul Russell (philosopher)|Russell, Paul]]. 2008. ''The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. {{ISBN|9780199751525}}.</ref> while philosopher David O'Connor (2013) argues that Hume's final position was "weakly [[deistic]]." For O'Connor, Hume's "position is deeply ironic. This is because, while inclining towards a weak form of [[deism]], he seriously doubts that we can ever find a sufficiently favourable balance of evidence to justify accepting any religious position." He adds that Hume "did not believe in the God of standard theism…but he did not rule out all concepts of deity," and that "ambiguity suited his purposes, and this creates difficulty in definitively pinning down his final position on religion."{{sfn|O'Connor|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ntygPAezQJUC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22but+he+did+not+rule+out+all+concepts+of+deity%22&source=bl&ots=ulLs4-GWED&sig=XcJNdJXP3jP-N0ynFZ8wroDbAUg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=CtwmVd-BKueP7AbA14CYDg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=%22but%20he%20did%20not%20rule%20out%20all%20concepts%20of%20deity%22&f=false pp.11, 19]}}

====Design argument====
One of the traditional topics of [[natural theology]] is that of the [[existence of God]], and one of the ''[[a posteriori]]'' arguments for this is the ''argument from design'' or the [[teleological argument]]. The argument is that the existence of God can be proved by the design that is obvious in the complexity of the world, which ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]'' states is "the most popular," because it is:<ref name="RE">[[#{{harvid|RE}}|RE]]</ref>{{unreliable source?|date=April 2015}}<blockquote>…the most accessible of the theistic arguments…which identifies evidences of design in nature, inferring from them a divine designer.… The fact that the universe as a whole is a coherent and efficiently functioning system likewise, in this view, indicates a divine intelligence behind it.</blockquote>In ''[[An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]]'', Hume wrote that the design argument seems to depend upon our experience, and its proponents "always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=148}} Philosopher Louise E. Loeb (2010) notes that Hume is saying that only experience and observation can be our guide to making inferences about the conjunction between events. However, according to Hume:{{sfn|Loeb|2010|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6ECxW_2tAf0C&pg=PA118&dq=companion+hume+observe+neither+God+nor+other+universes&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Z0OMVMfjJob1UvykgLAN&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=companion%20hume%20observe%20neither%20God%20nor%20other%20universes&f=false p. 118]}} <blockquote>We observe neither God nor other universes, and hence no conjunction involving them. There is no observed conjunction to ground an inference either to extended objects or to God, as unobserved causes.</blockquote>Hume also criticised the argument in his ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'' (1779). In this, he suggested that, even if the world is a more or less smoothly functioning system, this may only be a result of the "chance permutations of particles falling into a temporary or permanent self-sustaining order, which thus has the appearance of design."<ref name="RE" />{{unreliable source?|date=April 2015}}

A century later, the idea of order without design was rendered more plausible by Charles Darwin's discovery that the adaptations of the forms of life result from the [[natural selection]] of inherited characteristics.<ref name="RE" />{{unreliable source?|date=April 2015}} For philosopher James D. Madden, it is "Hume, rivaled only by Darwin, [who] has done the most to undermine in principle our confidence in arguments from design among all figures in the Western intellectual tradition."{{sfn|Madden|2005|loc= [https://books.google.com/books?id=UKSZeRnuyjAC&pg=PA150&dq=teleological+god+hume+darwin&hl=en&sa=X&ei=FvrIU4uBMYOu7AaV1oGQCw&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=teleological%20god%20hume%20darwin&f=false p. 150, emphasis removed.]}}

Finally, Hume discussed a version of the [[anthropic principle]], which is the idea that theories of the universe are constrained by the need to allow for man's existence in it as an observer. Hume has his sceptical mouthpiece Philo suggest that there may have been many worlds, produced by an incompetent designer, whom he called a "stupid mechanic". In his ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion'', Hume wrote:{{sfn|Hume|1779|p=167}}

<blockquote>Many worlds might have been botched and bungled throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out: much labour lost: many fruitless trials made: and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making.
</blockquote>

American philosopher [[Daniel Dennett]] has suggested that this mechanical explanation of teleology, although "obviously&nbsp;... an amusing philosophical fantasy", anticipated the notion of natural selection, the 'continued improvement' being like "any Darwinian selection algorithm."{{sfn|Dennett|2009|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=i1tNI9646Q4C&pg=PA620&dq=hume++anthropic+principle&hl=en&sa=X&ei=4zXKU_nGCqaw7Aa-w4GAAg&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBjgK#v=onepage&q=hume%20%20anthropic%20principle&f=false pp. 620–621]}}

====Problem of miracles====
{{main|Of Miracles}}

In his discussion of [[miracle]]s, Hume argues that we should not believe miracles have occurred and that they do not therefore provide us with any reason to think God exists.{{sfn|Bailey|O'Brien|2006|p=101}} In ''An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'' (Section 10), Hume defines a miracle as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent". Hume says we believe an event that has frequently occurred is likely to occur again, but we also take into account those instances where the event did not occur:{{sfn|Hume|1777|pp=110–111}}

<blockquote>A wise man…considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments.… A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments…and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.</blockquote>

Hume discusses the testimony of those who report miracles. He wrote that testimony might be doubted even from some great authority in case the facts themselves are not credible: "[T]he evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=113}}

Although Hume leaves open the possibility for miracles to occur and be reported, he offers various arguments against this ever having happened in history.{{sfn|Hume|1777|pp=116–131|ps=, Part II of Section X}} He points out that people often lie, and they have good reasons to lie about miracles occurring either because they believe they are doing so for the benefit of their religion or because of the fame that results. Furthermore, people by nature enjoy relating miracles they have heard without caring for their veracity and thus miracles are easily transmitted even when false. Also, Hume notes that miracles seem to occur mostly in "ignorant and barbarous nations"{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=119}} and times, and the reason they do not occur in the civilised societies is such societies are not awed by what they know to be natural events. Finally, the miracles of each religion argue against all other religions and their miracles, and so even if a proportion of all reported miracles across the world fit Hume's requirement for belief, the miracles of each religion make the other less likely.{{sfn|Bailey|O'Brien|2006|pp=105–108}}

Hume was extremely pleased with his argument against miracles in his ''Enquiry''. He states "I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=110}} Thus, Hume's argument against miracles had a more abstract basis founded upon the scrutiny, not just primarily of miracles, but of all forms of belief systems. It is a common sense notion of veracity based upon epistemological evidence, and founded on a principle of rationality, proportionality and reasonability.{{sfn|Bailey|O'Brien|2006|pp=105–108}}

The criterion for assessing Hume's belief system is based on the balance of probability whether something is more likely than not to have occurred. Since the weight of empirical experience contradicts the notion for the existence of miracles, such accounts should be treated with scepticism. Further, the myriad of accounts of miracles contradict one another, as some people who receive miracles will aim to prove the authority of Jesus, whereas others will aim to prove the authority of Muhammad or some other religious prophet or deity. These various differing accounts weaken the overall evidential power of miracles.{{sfn| Ahluwalia|2008|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-PCV11VQ8PYC&pg=PA104&dq=%22Understanding+Philosophy+of+Religion%22+hume&hl=en&sa=X&ei=6qs4Vbe4EofXPeywgbgN&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22Understanding%20Philosophy%20of%20Religion%22%20hume&f=false pp.104–106]}}{{failed verification|date=April 2015}}

Despite all this, Hume observes that belief in miracles is popular, and that "the gazing populace… receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=126}}

Critics have argued that Hume's position assumes the character of miracles and [[natural law]]s prior to any specific examination of miracle claims, thus it amounts to a subtle form of [[begging the question]]. To assume that testimony is a homogeneous reference group seems unwise- to compare private miracles with public miracles, unintellectual observers with intellectual observers and those who have little to gain and much to lose with those with much to gain and little to lose is not convincing to many. Indeed, many have argued that miracles not only do not contradict the laws of nature, but require the laws of nature to be intelligible as miraculous, and thus subverting the law of nature. For example, William Adams remarks that "there must be an ordinary course of nature before anything can be extraordinary. There must be a stream before anything can be interrupted."<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/stream/essayinanswertom00adamiala#page/14/mode/2up |title=An essay in answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on miracles |access-date=16 March 2017|publisher=London : White |year=1767 }}</ref> They have also noted that it requires an appeal to inductive inference, as none have observed every part of nature nor examined every possible miracle claim, for instance those in the future. This, in Hume's philosophy, was especially problematic.{{sfn|Levine|1989|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fC3-d89f7qoC&dq=hume+miracle+criticism&q=%22hume+with+a+glaring%22#v=snippet&q=%22hume%20with%20a%20glaring%22&f=false p. 3]}}

Little appreciated is the voluminous literature either foreshadowing Hume, in the likes of [[Thomas Sherlock]]<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/trialwitnessesr00shergoog |quote=witnesses Thomas SHerlock. |title=The Trial of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus - Internet Archive |publisher=John Eliot |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Sherlock |first1=Thomas |year=1809 }}</ref> or directly responding to and engaging with Hume- from [[William Paley]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vqcRAAAAYAAJ&q=Nairne+intitle:Evidences+inauthor:William+inauthor:Paley |title=Paley's Evidences of Christianity: With Notes and Additions - William Paley, Charles Murray Nairne - Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Paley |first1=William |last2=Nairne |first2=Charles Murray |year=1858 }}</ref> William Adams,<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/essayinanswertom00adamiala |title=An essay in answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on miracles : Adams, William, 1706-1789 : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive |access-date=16 March 2017|publisher=London : White |year=1767 }}</ref> John Douglas,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y4UNAAAAQAAJ&q=douglas+the+criterion+miracles&pg=PR1 |title=The criterion: or, Miracles examined with a view to expose the pretensions ... - John Douglas, John Douglas (bp. of Salisbury.) - Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Douglas |first1=John |last2=) |first2=John Douglas (bp. of Salisbury |year=1832 }}</ref> [[John Leland (Baptist)|John Leland]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rt9JAAAAMAAJ&q=intitle:View+intitle:Principal+intitle:Deistical+inauthor:Leland |title=A view of the principal deistical writers that have appeared in England in ... - John Leland, William Laurence Brown - Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Leland |first1=John |last2=Brown |first2=William Laurence |year=1837 }}</ref> and [[George Campbell (minister)|George Campbell]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ddsOAAAAIAAJ |title=A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles ... - George Campbell - Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Campbell |first1=George |year=1823 }}</ref> among others. Regarding the latter, it is rumoured that, having read Campbell's Dissertation, Hume remarked that "the Scotch theologue had beaten him."<ref>{{cite web|title=Campbell, George|url=http://historicalapologetics.org/campbell-george/|author=Huitt, Kyle|date=25 December 2016|website=Library of Historical Apologetics|access-date=16 May 2020}}</ref>

Hume's main argument concerning miracles is that miracles by definition are singular events that differ from the established laws of nature. Such natural laws are codified as a result of past experiences. Therefore, a miracle is a violation of all prior experience and thus incapable on this basis of reasonable belief. However, the probability that something has occurred in contradiction of all past experience should always be judged to be less than the probability that either ones senses have deceived one, or the person recounting the miraculous occurrence is lying or mistaken. Hume would say, all of which he had past experience of. For Hume, this refusal to grant credence does not guarantee correctness. He offers the example of an Indian Prince, who, having grown up in a hot country, refuses to believe that water has frozen. By Hume's lights, this refusal is not wrong and the Prince "reasoned justly;" it is presumably only when he has had extensive experience of the freezing of water that he has warrant to believe that the event could occur.{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=113}}

So for Hume, either the miraculous event will become a recurrent event or else it will never be rational to believe it occurred. The connection to religious belief is left unexplained throughout, except for the close of his discussion where Hume notes the reliance of Christianity upon testimony of miraculous occurrences. He makes an ironic remark that anyone who "is moved by faith to assent" to revealed testimony "is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=131|ps=, emphasis removed}}{{sfn|MacKie|1982|p=29}} Hume writes that "All the testimony whichever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=113}}

===As a historian of England===
[[File:David Hume 2.jpg|thumb| David Hume by [[Allan Ramsay (artist)|Allan Ramsay]], 1766]]
From 1754 to 1762 Hume published ''[[The History of England (Hume)|The History of England]]'', a six-volume work, that extends (according to its subtitle) "From the [[Julius Caesar's invasions of Britain|Invasion of Julius Caesar]] to the [[Glorious Revolution|Revolution in 1688]]." Inspired by [[Voltaire]]'s sense of the breadth of history, Hume widened the focus of the field away from merely kings, parliaments, and armies, to literature and science as well. He argued that the quest for liberty was the highest standard for judging the past, and concluded that after considerable fluctuation, England at the time of his writing had achieved "the most entire system of liberty that was ever known amongst mankind".<ref>Hume's History of England, vol, 6, p. 531 cited in {{harvtxt|Kenyon|1984|p=42}}</ref> It "must be regarded as an event of cultural importance. In its own day, moreover, it was an innovation, soaring high above its very few predecessors."{{sfn|Jessop|2015}} Hume's ''History of England'' made him famous as a historian before he was ever considered a serious philosopher. In this work, Hume uses history to tell the story of the rise of England and what led to its greatness and the disastrous effects that religion has had on its progress. For Hume, the history of England's rise may give a template for others who would also like to rise to its current greatness.<ref name=":0" />

Hume's ''The History of England'' was profoundly impacted by his Scottish background. The science of sociology, which is rooted in Scottish thinking of the eighteenth century, had never before been applied to British philosophical history. Because of his Scottish background, Hume was able to bring an outsider's lens to English history that the insulated English whigs lacked.<ref name=":7" />{{Rp|122}}

Hume's coverage of the political upheavals of the 17th century relied in large part on the [[Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon|Earl of Clarendon]]'s ''History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England'' (1646–69). Generally, Hume took a moderate [[royalist]] position and considered revolution unnecessary to achieve necessary reform. Hume was considered a Tory historian, and emphasised religious differences more than constitutional issues. Laird Okie explains that "Hume preached the virtues of political moderation, but&nbsp;... it was moderation with an anti-Whig, pro-royalist coloring."{{sfn|Okie|1985|p=16}} For "Hume shared the&nbsp;... Tory belief that the [[House of Stuart|Stuarts]] were no more high-handed than their Tudor predecessors".{{sfn|Okie|1985|p=25}} "Even though Hume wrote with an anti-Whig animus, it is, paradoxically, correct to regard the ''History'' as an establishment work, one which implicitly endorsed the ruling oligarchy".{{sfn|Okie|1985|p=27}}
Historians have debated whether Hume posited a universal unchanging human nature, or allowed for evolution and development.{{sfn|Wertz|1975|p=?}}

The debate between Tory and the Whig historians can be seen in the initial reception to Hume's ''History of England''. The whig-dominated world of 1754 overwhelmingly disapproved of Hume's take on English history. In later editions of the book, Hume worked to "soften or expunge many villainous whig strokes which had crept into it."<ref name=":7" />{{Rp|121}}

Hume did not consider himself a pure Tory. Before 1745, he was more akin to an "independent whig." In 1748, he described himself as "a whig, though a very skeptical one." This description of himself as in between whiggism and toryism, helps one understand that his ''History of England'' should be read as his attempt to work out his own philosophy of history.<ref name=":7" />{{Rp|122}}

Robert Roth argues that Hume's histories display his biases against [[Presbyterianism|Presbyterian]]s and [[Puritan]]s. Roth says his anti-Whig pro-monarchy position diminished the influence of his work, and that his emphasis on politics and religion led to a neglect of social and economic history.{{sfn|Roth|1991|p=?}}

Hume was an early cultural [[history of science|historian of science]]. His short biographies of leading scientists explored the process of scientific change. He developed new ways of seeing scientists in the context of their times by looking at how they interacted with society and each other. He covers over forty scientists, with special attention paid to [[Francis Bacon]], [[Robert Boyle]], and [[Isaac Newton]]. Hume particularly praised [[William Harvey]], writing about his treatise of the circulation of the blood: "Harvey is entitled to the glory of having made, by reasoning alone, without any mixture of accident, a capital discovery in one of the most important branches of science."{{sfn|Wertz|1993|p=?}}

The ''History'' became a best-seller and made Hume a wealthy man who no longer had to take up salaried work for others.{{sfn|Morris|Brown|2011|loc=[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/hume/#LifWor Chapter Life and Works]}} It was influential for nearly a century, despite competition from imitations by [[Tobias Smollett|Smollett]] (1757), [[Oliver Goldsmith|Goldsmith]] (1771) and others. By 1894, there were at least 50 editions as well as abridgements for students, and illustrated pocket editions, probably produced specifically for women.{{sfn|Phillipson|2012|p=131}}

===Political theory===
{{Conservatism sidebar}}
{{Utilitarianism}}
Hume's writings have been described as largely seminal to conservative theory, and he is considered a founding father of [[conservatism]].<ref name="Muller"/> Many of his ideas, such as [[limited government]], [[private property]] when there is [[scarcity]], and [[constitutionalism]], are first principles of conservative political parties around the world.<ref>{{cite web|title=Declaration of Principals, 1983|url=https://www.idu.org/about/principles-statutes/|year=1983|work=International Democrat Union|access-date=23 September 2020}}</ref>{{sfn|Dees|2010|p=403}} [[Thomas Jefferson]] banned the ''History'' from [[University of Virginia]], feeling that it had "spread universal toryism over the land."<ref>So quoted in {{harvtxt|Livingston|1965}}</ref> By comparison, [[Samuel Johnson]] thought Hume to be "a Tory by chance [...] for he has no principle. If he is anything, he is a [[Hobbism|Hobbist]]."{{sfn|Hume|1888|loc=note 13 to letter LXXXIV}} A major concern of Hume's political philosophy is the importance of the rule of law. He also stresses throughout his political essays the importance of moderation in politics, public spirit, and regard to the community.{{sfn|Forbes|1985|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=PX86AAAAIAAJ&dq=politics+moderation+hume&q=politics+moderation+hume+detested#v=snippet&q=politics%20moderation%20hume%20detested&f=false p. 150]}}

Throughout the period of the American Revolution, Hume had varying views. For instance, in 1768 he encouraged total revolt on the part of the Americans. In 1775, he became certain that a revolution would take place and said that he believed in the American principle and wished the British government would let them be. Hume's influence on some of the Founders can be seen in [[Benjamin Franklin]]'s suggestion at the [[Constitutional Convention (United States)|Philadelphia Convention of 1787]] that no high office in any branch of government should receive a salary, which is a suggestion Hume had made in his emendation of [[James Harrington (author)|James Harrington]]'s ''[[The Commonwealth of Oceana|Oceana]]''.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Werner|first=John|year=1972|title=David Hume and America|journal=Journal of the History of Ideas|volume=33|issue=3|pages=439–456|doi=10.2307/2709045|jstor=2709045}}</ref>

The legacy of religious civil war in 18th-century Scotland, combined with the relatively recent memory of the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite risings, had fostered in Hume a distaste for enthusiasm and factionalism. These appeared to him to threaten the fragile and nascent political and social stability of a country that was deeply politically and religiously divided.{{sfn|Wiley|2012|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Q94tuawjdYUC&pg=PA211&dq=hume+enthusiasm&hl=en&sa=X&ei=r6vjU73yDKbD7AaP54GYAQ&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=hume%20enthusiasm&f=false p. 211]}}{{failed verification|date=August 2015}} Hume thought that society is best governed by a general and impartial system of laws; he is less concerned about the form of government that administers these laws, so long as it does so fairly. However, he also clarified that a republic must produce laws, while "monarchy, when absolute, contains even something repugnant to law."{{sfn|Hume|1741|p=119}}

Hume expressed suspicion of attempts to reform society in ways that departed from long-established custom, and he counselled peoples not to resist their governments except in cases of the most egregious tyranny.{{sfn|Hume|1739|p=550}} However, he resisted aligning himself with either of Britain's two political parties, the [[Whigs (British political party)|Whigs]] and the [[Tory|Tories]]:<ref>So quoted in {{harvtxt|Mossner|1980|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7HXJAqqNl4QC&q=whig#v=snippet&q=whig&f=false p. 311]}}, original emphasis.</ref>

<blockquote>My views of ''things'' are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of ''persons'' to Tory prejudices.</blockquote>

Canadian philosopher Neil McArthur writes that Hume believed that we should try to balance our demands for liberty with the need for strong authority, without sacrificing either. McArthur characterises Hume as a "precautionary conservative,"<ref name=":13">McArthur, Neil. 2007. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=LLq-4rxR5ncC David Hume's Political Theory: Law, Commerce, and the Constitution of Government]''. Toronto: [[University of Toronto Press]]. {{ISBN|9780802093356}}.</ref>{{Rp|124}} whose actions would have been "determined by prudential concerns about the consequences of change, which often demand we ignore our own principles about what is ideal or even legitimate."<ref name=":13" />{{failed verification|date=October 2015}} Hume supported the [[freedom of the press|liberty of the press]], and was sympathetic to democracy, when suitably constrained. American historian [[Douglass Adair]] has argued that Hume was a major inspiration for [[James Madison]]'s writings, and the essay "[[Federalist No. 10]]" in particular.{{sfn|Adair|1957|p=?}}

Hume offered his view on the best type of society in an essay titled "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth", which lays out what he thought was the best form of government. He hoped that, "in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world". He defended a strict [[separation of powers]], [[decentralization|decentralisation]], extending the [[Suffrage|franchise]] to anyone who held property of value and limiting the power of the clergy. The system of the [[military of Switzerland|Swiss militia]] was proposed as the best form of protection. Elections were to take place on an annual basis and representatives were to be unpaid.{{sfn|Hume|1987}} Political philosophers [[Leo Strauss]] and [[Joseph Cropsey]], writing of Hume's thoughts about "the wise statesman", note that he "will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age." Also, if he wishes to improve a constitution, his innovations will take account of the "ancient fabric", in order not to disturb society.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E7mScxst9UoC&q=%22limits+of+human+foresight%22 |title=Strauss, L. and Cropsey, J., ''History of Political Philosophy'', University of Chicago Press, 2012, p. 556 |date=2012-06-15 |access-date=16 March 2017|isbn=9780226924717 |last1=Strauss |first1=Leo |last2=Cropsey |first2=Joseph }}</ref>

In the political analysis of philosopher [[George Holland Sabine]], the scepticism of Hume extended to the doctrine of [[consent of the governed|government by consent]]. He notes that "allegiance is a habit enforced by education and consequently as much a part of human nature as any other motive."<ref>[[George Holland Sabine|Sabine, George H.]] 1973 [1937]. ''[[A History of Political Theory]]''. US: [[Dryden Press]]. p. 603.</ref>

In the 1770s, Hume was critical of British policies toward the American colonies and advocated for American independence. He wrote in 1771 that "our union with America…in the nature of things, cannot long subsist."<ref name=wsj11042017/>

===Contributions to economic thought===
[[File:David_Hume_and_Adam_Smith_statues,_Edinburgh.jpg|thumb|Statues of David Hume and [[Adam Smith]] by David Watson Stevenson on the [[Scottish National Portrait Gallery]] in Edinburgh]]
Hume expressed his economic views in his ''Political Discourses'', which were incorporated in ''Essays and Treatises'' as Part II of ''Essays, Moral and Political''.<ref name=":1" /> To what extent he was influenced by Adam Smith is difficult to stress; however, both of them had similar principles supported from historical events.<ref name=":1" /> At the same time Hume did not demonstrate concrete system of economic theory which could be observed in Smith's ''[[The Wealth of Nations|Wealth of Nations]]''. However, he introduced several new ideas around which the "classical economics" of the 18th century was built.<ref name=":1" /> Through his discussions on politics, Hume developed many ideas that are prevalent in the field of economics. This includes ideas on [[private property]], inflation, and [[international trade|foreign trade]].<ref>Robbins, Lionel ''A History of Economic Thought: The LSE Lectures'' edited by Medema and Samuels. Ch 11 and 12</ref> Referring to his essay "[[Of the Balance of Trade]]", economist [[Paul Krugman]] (2012) has remarked that "David Hume created what I consider the first true economic model."<ref>{{cite web|last=Krugman|first=Paul|title=How We Know The Earth Is Old|url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com//2012/11/20/how-we-know-the-earth-is-old/|work=The New York Times|access-date=21 November 2012|date=2012-11-20}}</ref>

In contrast to [[John Locke|Locke]], Hume believes that private property is not a natural right. Hume argues it is justified, because resources are limited. Private property would be an unjustified, "idle ceremonial," if all goods were unlimited and available freely.<ref>Richards, H. [https://books.google.com/books?id=9Kw5vLbYq-4C&pg=PA322&dq=hume+idle+ceremonial&hl=en&sa=X&ei=plOMVOCrMozuaMjCgqgD&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=hume%20idle%20ceremonial&f=false ''Understanding the Global Economy''], Peace Education Books, 2004, p. 322.</ref> Hume also believed in an unequal distribution of property, because perfect equality would destroy the ideas of thrift and industry. Perfect equality would thus lead to impoverishment.<ref>Hume, David. 1751. ''[[An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals]]''.</ref><ref>Stewart, J. B. 2014. [https://books.google.com/books?id=MTYABAAAQBAJ&pg=PA164&dq=hume+private+property&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hlKMVLXeHtfwaLf1gagD&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=hume%20private%20property&f=false ''Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy'']. Princeton: [[Princeton University Press]]. pp. 163–64.</ref>

David Hume anticipated modern [[monetarism]]. First, Hume contributed to the theory of [[Quantity theory of money|quantity]] and of interest rate. Hume has been credited with being the first to prove that, on an abstract level, there is no quantifiable amount of nominal money that a country needs to thrive. He understood that there was a difference between [[Real versus nominal value (economics)|''nominal'' and ''real'' money]].

Second, Hume has a theory of causation which fits in with the [[Chicago school of economics|Chicago-school]] "[[black box]]" approach. According to Hume, cause and effect are related only through correlation. Hume shared the belief with modern monetarists that changes in the supply of money can affect consumption and investment.

Lastly, Hume was a vocal advocate of a stable [[private sector]], though also having some non-monetarist aspects to his economic philosophy. Having a stated preference for rising prices, for instance, Hume considered [[government debt]] to be a sort of substitute for actual money, referring to such debt as "a kind of paper credit." He also believed in heavy [[tax]]ation, believing that it increases effort. Hume's economic approach evidently resembles his other philosophies, in that he does not choose one side indefinitely, but sees gray in the situation<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mayer|first=Thomas|year=1980|title=David Hume and Monetarism|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=95|issue=1|pages=89–101|doi=10.2307/1885350|jstor=1885350}}</ref>

Return to David Hume.



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