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en-wikipedia-org-4719		Fact–value distinction - Wikipedia			.html	text/html	2158	227	65	The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume (1711–1776). The fact–value distinction is closely related to the naturalistic fallacy, a topic debated in ethical and moral philosophy. Others, such as Ruth Anna Putnam, argue that even the most "scientific" of disciplines are affected by the "values" of those who research and practice the vocation.[6][7] Nevertheless, the difference between the naturalistic fallacy and the fact–value distinction is derived from the manner in which modern social science has used the fact–value distinction, and not the strict naturalistic fallacy to articulate new fields of study and create academic disciplines. Hanson among others, talk of theory-ladenness, and reject an absolutist fact–value distinction by contending that our senses are imbued with prior conceptualizations, making it impossible to have any observation that is totally value-free, which is how Hume and the later positivists conceived of facts. C. Smart, "Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction", Philosophy 74, 1999.	./cache/en-wikipedia-org-4719.html	./txt/en-wikipedia-org-4719.txt