Famous battles of the nineteenth century


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FAMOUS BATTLES
OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY


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Famous Battles
of the

Nineteenth Century
DESCRIBED BY
ARCHIBAL D FOR BES, GEORGE A. HENTY
MAJOR ARTHUR GRIFFITHS, AND OTHER
WELL-KNOWN WEITERS
EDITED BY
CHARLES WELSH
Author of “A Bookseller of the Last Century,”
“The Little Wonder Shoes,”
etc., etc.
1875–1900
WITH 10 ILLUSTRATIONS
º
NEW YORK
A. WESSELS COMPANY
1910


Copyright, 1905, by
A. WEssels CoMPANY, New York
Printed April, 1905
Printed April, 1910
Composition and Electrotyping by
The Plimpton Press Boston
Printed by Braunworth & Co. New York


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PREFACE
HE Famous Battles of the Nineteenth
| Century have changed the face of nearly
every continent on the globe and have
consolidated our own great nation. Therefore
a knowledge of them, their causes and effects,
is essential to a true understanding of world-
history.
They have also called forth all that is patriotic,
and noble, and courageous, and self-sacrificing in
many of those who took part in them — in spite
of the fact that war is a manifestation of the
baser passion of human nature. True it is that
“he who ruleth his own spirit is better than he
that taketh a city,” and yet war with all its hor-
rors calls for the exercise of all that self-restraint,
and all that strength of character, and all that
obedience to the call of duty, which we every one
of us admire and which we all should emulate.
Moreover, the same courage and the same
resourcefulness which has been evoked by the
famous battles, in officer and common soldier
alike, are needed always in life, and if read in
the right spirit many lessons can be gained from
these episodes in history-making which will be
[5]


Preface
valuable in the more peaceful vocations and
avocations of life.
To present the famous battles of the nine-
teenth century in their relation to the study of
history, - to present the higher developments of
character which they have called forth, – and at
the same time to show what war is, in reality, -
and thus perhaps inculcate and foster the desire
to avoid it, — are the main objects of these vol-
umes. The stories they contain are offered as
incentives to courage and patriotism, not to ex-
cite or develop the warlike spirit. There is not
one of us who does not wish for the time when
the war drums throb no longer, and the battle
flags are furled
“In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.”
But we cannot ignore the fact that a large part
of the history of the past hundred years is the
story of its battles, and we can only hope that
the same will not have to be written of the cen-
tury in which we are now living. Unhappily,
however, the dawn of the century was shadowed
by war clouds which have since grown denser
and blacker.
The present volume brings our account of the
Famous Battles of the Nineteenth Century to an
[6]


Preface
end, with the second war of the British against
the Boers still in progress.
It covers a long period and its scenes are laid in
every quarter of the globe. We chronicle the
passing of the red man as a hostile enemy on our
own continent, and the beginnings of the devel-
opment of the United States as a World Power
by the war against Spain and other events which
occurred towards the close of the nineteenth
century.
The stirring story of the Russo-Turkish War
— and the attack on Kars, the Zulu War in
which the young Prince Imperial of France lost
his life, the thrilling and dramatic story of Gen-
eral Gordon, and the breaking of the power of
the Mahdi in the Soudan, the comparatively
easy victory of the Japs over the Chinese, and of
the Turks over the Greeks, are varied enough
in detail, though the grim theme is ever the same,
The great and commanding personalities
which figure in most of the epoch-making events
described in these volumes are well worth study,
and one purpose of the work will be accomplished
if it incites its readers to a more intimate knowl-
edge in closer detail of the lives and character
of some of the men whose acquaintance they
have made in it.
For the most part the descriptions in this vol-
ume have been written by the veteran war cor-
[7]


Preface
respondents, who contributed to the first three.
But the campaigns of the Nineties are compiled
by Mr. A. Hilliard Atteridge, from descriptions
of eye-witnesses, such as newspaper correspond-
ents, and officers and others who took part in
the battles they describe.
CHARLEs "WELSH.
August, 1904.
R
[8]


CONTENTS
§
THE RED MAN's Last Victory. Angus Evan Abbott
THE StonMING of KARs. Major Arthur Griffiths
THE BATTLE OF RoRKE's DRIFT. C. Stein
GENERAL RoBERTs IN THE AFGHAN WAR. Archibald
Forbes .
THE BoER WAR of 1881. Archibald Forbes
THE BoMBARDMENT of ALExANDRIA. Maa. Pemberton
KAssassin AND TEL-EL-KEBIR. Charles Lowe
GENERAL GoRDON AT KHARToum. Charles Lowe
THE BATTLE of PING-YANG. A. Hilliard Atteridge .
Port ARTHUR, 1894. A. Hilliard Atteridge
THE BATTLE of Domokos. A. Hilliard Atteridge
WITH KITCHENER IN THE Soudan. A. Hilliard At-
teridge . - - -
THE BATTLE of MANILA. A. Hilliard Atteridge
WITH RoosevelT on SAN JUAN HILL. A. Hilliard
Atteridge - - -
THE BATTLE of MAGERsfontFIN (1889). A. Hilliard
Atteridge - - - -
THE CAPTURE of CRONJE. A. Hilliard Atteridge
13
32
51
115
146
167
186
208
225
246
263
310
330
367
399





LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
CoL. Roosevelt AT SAN JUAN . - Frontispiece
THERE was A HAND-To-HAND STRUGGLE
SAving THE GUN's AT MAIwand (from the picture
by R. Caton Woodville, R. I.)
THE MEN STRUGGLED ON THROUGH THE HAIL of
FIRE . - - - - - -
THE BoMBARDMENT of ALEXANDRIA
CARRYING THE BASTIONs witH THE BAYoNET
FIVE MINUTEs DESPERATE AND BLOODY HAND-
TO-HAND FIGHTING . - -
GENERAL CHARLEs GoRDON
A CoRNER of THE BATTLE-FIELD, -THE STAND-
ARD-BEARER's DEATH GRIP .
65
80
128
146
184
ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY . - - -
187
206
294
310





Famous Battles
of the
Nineteenth Century
I
The Red Man's Last Victory:
The Fight of the Little Big Horn
By ANGUS EVAN ABBOTT
ROM the day in 1609 when Samuel de
F Champlain and his hardy followers burst
upon the Iroquois at Ticonderoga, and,
armed with sticks that spoke with fire and spat
out unseen death, he put these hitherto invincible
warriors to flight, to the day when the United
States was preparing to celebrate with unheard-
of splendor the centennial of its independence,
a ceaseless state of war existed between the chil-
dren of the forest and prairie and the pale-faced
usurpers. Every year had its tragedy, every
mile its white gravestone in history. And as a
fit ending to these centuries of conflict and blood-
shed came the crimson tragedy of the blotting-
out of Custer and his cavalrymen in the Bad
[13]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Lands of the Yellowstone. Many notable trag-
edies, dramatic in execution as appalling in
effect, marked the long years, but none struck
home to the hearts of the American people with
such searching directness and force as the finale
to the Indian tragedy, in which Sitting Bull,
chief of the Sioux, and General Custer, one of
America's most dashing cavalry leaders, played
the leading roles.
Surely never were such aborigines as the North
American Indian! Surely never in the history
of the world did the white man encounter' so
nearly his match as when he first plunged into
the forests of the New World. A mere handful
in numbers were these red men at the best, and
yet it can hardly be said that they were ever
subdued. In turn they met and fought the
Spaniard, then in all his glory, the Frenchman,
the Englishman — long and savage wars these
— and when Spaniard, Frenchman, and Eng-
lishman as such disappeared and the American
took their place, the Indian fought him more
fiercely than ever. When one thinks of the
white man's countless numbers and the weapons
which his ingenuity and handicraft supplied, the
marvel is that the Indian has not long since dis-
appeared from the face of the earth. But given
their numbers and weapons and all, it has been
estimated that in the wars which the white man
[14]


The Red Man's Last Victory
waged against the Indians they lost more than
ten killed to the redskin's one. Yet notwith-
standing the skill, the craftiness, the sensible
recognition of existing facts, the clever stratagem
and resistless ferocity which characterizes the
Indian nature, the level-headed way in which
he set about his wars, to kill and not be killed
his motto: notwithstanding all this, the prophecy
of the great orator Red Jacket has come true.
He said, “When I am gone and my warnings
are no longer heeded, the craft and avarice of
the white man will prevail. My heart fails me
when I think of my people so soon to be scat-
tered and forgotten.”
The feud which began on the Atlantic coast
hundreds of years before, was destined to end in
the far Northwest, away up in a corner of the
United States then almost wholly unknown to
the white man, an angle of territory bounded on
the west by the Rockies, and on the north by
what formerly was known as Rupert's Land —
British territory. The immediate cause of the
trouble which led up to the massacre of Custer
and his battalion was one which had often before
provoked active hostilities. It was the refusal
of sundry bands of Indians to settle down on the
reservations placed at the disposal of the Indians
by the United States Government. The Indians
resented the attempt to confine them to restricted
[15]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
districts. The red man of the prairie had been,
from time immemorial, a notorious nomad. On
his lean, shaggy, ungainly pony, his bow and
quiver slung across his back, his buckskin
breeches and shirt fringed with horsehair and
painted in gaudy colors, his long, greasy black
hair stuck full of the feathers of the turkey, hawk,
and eagle, he had for centuries roamed the vast
prairie at will: now fighting his hereditary foe,
and again camping for weeks at a time on the
trail of the mighty herds of buffalo in their wan-
derings over the boundless prairie.
For ages the chafings of restriction were un-
known to him, until freedom had become almost
as necessary to the savage of the plains as the air
itself. This he enjoyed, until one day the ad-
vance guard of civilization, a grizzly trapper,
dressed in leather, and carrying a flintlock under
his arm, peered out of the bushes and saw in
astonishment the great rolling prairie, the home
of the buffalo and the Sioux. The hardy pioneer
soon followed, restless, and ever pressing west-
ward; and one day, the Sioux, sitting astride his
barebacked pony, saw in amazement the long
train of white-topped wagons — the prairie
schooners — drawn by oxen, trailing westward
through the tall grass, and realized that his an-
cient fastnesses had been invaded. Immediately
there began massacres on the one hand and re-

[16]


The Red Man's Last Victory
taliation on the other. The Sioux, the Bedouins
of the prairie, were gradually driven back and
back.
During the winter of 1875–6 the authorities at
Washington, after every peaceable means had
been tried in vain, found it necessary to sanction
the use of force to compel certain refractory
bands of Indians to cease their wanderings and
outrage, to place themselves under the control
of the Indian officials, and to settle on the res-
ervations set aside for their use. These recal-
citrant savages were Sioux, than whom there
were none more warlike and cruel, and in their
raids they wandered over an area of something
like 100,000 square miles in the then territories
of Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. There
were a number of these bands of “Hostiles,”
each having a chief of its own; but as dissatisfac-
tion spread among them, all gradually centered
around two great chiefs, Sitting Bull and Crazy
Horse. Sitting Bull, at the time hostilities com-
menced, was with his band in the vicinity of the
Little Missouri River in Dakota, and Crazy
Horse and band were camped on the banks of
the Powder River in Wyoming. The region
was a wilderness: rugged, mountainous, and
deeply scarred by rapid streams and small rivers,
and, as has been told, totally unknown to the
United States soldiers. As guides to this un-
[17]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
familiar region and to scout by the way, the
command took with it Ree Indians under Bloody
Knife Chief, and Crows, led by Chief Half-Yel-
low Face. These Indians did the scouting well,
but the Rees took the earliest opportunity af-
forded them to slip away when fighting began.
The first move made against these Sioux was
on March 1, 1876. General Sheridan, a dis-
tinguished leader in the Civil War, was given
the direction of the campaign, with headquar-
ters at Chicago. General Terry held the active
command of the troops in the disaffected coun-
try. Subordinate to Terry were Generals Cus-
ter and Crook, at the head of mounted columns.
Terry ordered these leaders to move out against
the “Hostiles,” specifying the route each was to
take. Crook marched on March 1, and on
March 17 encountered Crazy Horse and his
braves, and the command was so severely handled
in the engagement that Crook fell back to his
base. Custer had been unable to make a simul-
taneous advance with Crook, owing to the
weather being so bad that it was found impos-
sible to venture into the region of heavy snows
and swollen rivers.
The news of Crook's defeat spread like wild-
fire among the Indian agencies. Couriers sped
from the camps of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull.
To every Indian encampment in that part of the
[18]


The Red Man's Last Victory
States one or more messengers came, and squat-
ting on the hardened earth of some smoky tepee,
to the listening braves told of the killing of the
paleface and the triumph of the red, and before
he had finished his tale, wigwams were struck
and loaded to the patient ponies, the squaws
strapped their papooses to their backs, and the
warriors, with faces painted in ghastly and fan-
tastical streaks, danced the war-dance, snatched
up their rifles, and, mounting their ponies, set out
to take part in reaping the harvest of scalps.
The defeat of Crook made a long war inevita-
ble. General Sheridan reinforced the troops
in the disaffected region, and remodeled his
plan of campaign. The troops were formed
into three columns instead of two; and as soon
as the weather moderated, so as to admit of
favorable progress, all set out to trap the Indians.
The three columns were commanded respectively
by Generals Terry, Crook, and Gibbon. Custer
would have led in place of Terry, had it not been
that just before the setting out of the expedition
he fell from the good graces of President Grant.
Indeed, so displeased was Grant with Custer,
that he sent definite instructions that Custer was
not to be allowed to accompany the expedition;
and it was only after a personal appeal to Grant
by Custer, and the intercession of Sheridan, that
the famous cavalry leader was allowed to take
[19]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
his place at the head of his regiment and march
away, never to return.
On May 17 the column marched from Fort
Abraham Lincoln, on the Missouri River, and
proceeding by easy stages crossed the Little
Missouri River on May 31, and camped on the
banks of the Powder, a tributary of the Yellow-
stone. The Seventh Cavalry was divided into
two columns, commanded by Major Reno and
Captain Benteen. As the Indian country had
now been reached, on June 10, General Terry
sent Major Reno with his command (six troops)
to scout up the Powder, and General Custer,
with the left wing of the Seventh, marched to the
mouth of the Tongue and there awaited Reno's
return. The major reached Custer's camp on
the 19th, and reported plenty of Indian “signs”
leading up the banks of the Rosebud. The
whole command set out at once for that stream
and pitched tents at its mouth on June 21, and
made ready for immediate active operations.
It was arranged that the Seventh United States
Cavalry, commanded in person by General
Custer, should set out on the trail Major Reno
had discovered, overtake the Indians, corner
them, and bring about a fight. This they did.
With truly Anglo-Saxon superiority the gener-
als wofully under-estimated the fighting strength
of the foe. General Custer, with his seven hun-
[20]


The Red Man's Last Victory
dred cavalrymen, believed he would be able to
cope with more savages than he was likely to
have the good fortune to meet, and his brother
generals were under the same impression. They
found out their mistake when too late.
Sitting Bull, chief of a band of Uncpapa Sioux
Indians, was at this time forty-two years old.
A great, squatty, hulking, low-browed savage,
of forbidding looks and enormous strength, and
in height as near as might be to five feet eight
inches. He had the reputation among his own
followers, as well as the warriors of other bands,
of being a Medicine-man of mark, a dealer in
omens, a conjurer of demons, a weaver of magic,
a foreteller of dire events, and a familiar of de-
parted spirits. Outside of his magic he was
known as a coward, but this defect they over-
looked in the belief that his soothsayings fully
compensated for the deficiency in his personal
valor. Their faith in his incantations was un-
bounded. In the fight of the Little Big Horn,
Sitting Bull divided his energies between getting
as far from the scene of strife as his fat legs
would carry him, and performing fanatical rites
to the confounding of the white man. The
actual leaders in the fight were Crazy Horse,
Gall, and Crow King; and in a lesser degree,
Low Dog, Big Road, Hump, Spotted Eagle,
and Little Horse, all chiefs of bands and men of
[21]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
ability and unflinching personal courage. These
superintended the movements of the “Hostiles,”
and by their personal feats of daring encouraged
their followers, while Sitting Bull looked after
the Fates.
At noon on June 22 Custer and his men set
out for the wilderness. Warnings and omens
do not seem to have been confined to the wigwam
of the red man, for on the fatal march to the .
Little Big Horn there were many that foretold
disaster to the expedition.
Captain Godfrey, who marched with the col-
umns, in his written account of the calamitous
affair, mentions many incidents which were
taken to point to disaster. He tells, for instance,
that on the evening of the first day of their march
Custer sent for his officers.
After a “talk,” Lieutenant Wallace said to
Godfrey, as they walked away from the general's
tent, “Godfrey, I believe General Custer is go-
ing to be killed.” Asked his reasons for this
belief, he simply answered: “I have never heard
Custer speak in that way before.”
A little later in the evening Captain Godfrey
came upon a camp-fire, around which sat Bloody
Knife, Half-Yellow-Face, and the interpreter
Bouyer. The half-breed asked the captain if
he had ever fought against the Sioux. Answered
in the affirmative, the interpreter gazed into the
[ 22 )


The Red Man's Last Victory
fire for a few moments before saying emphati-
cally, “I can tell you we are going to have a
big fight.”
Then again an ominous thing happened. The
general's headquarters flag was blown down and
fell to the rear, and in being replanted again fell
to the rear.
These and many other eerie happenings seem
to have sent a thrill of foreboding through the
whole command as it went on its way to the un-
explored valley of the Little Big Horn. In their
tents, when night had fallen and the fires were
out — for on this march no fire burned and
nothing was done likely to attract the eye of any
Indian who might happen to be roaming about
in the vicinity — the men sat in the dark and
told stories of scalpings and burnings at the
stake. Even the red scouts caught the prevail-
ing current of premonition and hastened to their
Medicine-man to be anointed as a charm against
the cruelty of the dreaded Sioux.
During the march up the Rosebud, Indian
“signs” were met with at every turn. Camping-
place after camping-place was found. The
grass had been closely cropped by herds of
ponies; the ashes of a hundred camp-fires lay
gray on the bare ground. On June 24 the col-
umn passed a great camping-place, the gaunt
frame of a huge sundance-lodge still standing,
[23]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and against one of the posts the scalp of a white
man fluttered in the wind.
Soon after this the Crow scouts, who had been
working energetically, returned to the camp and
reported to Custer that although they had come
across no Sioux, still, from indications discov-
ered, they felt sure that the command was in the
neighborhood of an encampment. That night
the column was divided into two, so as to raise
as little dust as possible, and made a forced
march; and on the morning of June 25, Custer,
in a personal reconnoitre, discovered the foe of
which he was in search. Although he found
himself unable to locate the actual village, he
saw great herds of ponies, saw the smoke curling
up in the air of morning, and heard the barking
of the dogs, denoting the presence of a village
behind a hill that lay in front of him. It had
been Custer's intention to remain quietly where
his command rested until night fell, when he
would advance his forces, and in the gray of
morning sweep down upon the Sioux. But this
plan miscarried. Word reached the leader that
a Sioux Indian had discovered the presence of
the United States troops and had galloped off
to warn the tribe. Custer resolved to attack
at Once.
The command set out for Sitting Bull's village
shortly before noon. It was divided into three
[24]


The Red Man's Last Victory
battalions — Major Reno commanding the ad-
vance, General Custer following with the second,
and Captain Benteen the third, the pack train
being under the charge of Lieutenant Mathey.
The whole command marched down a valley
for some distance and then separated, intending
to strike the village at different points. Custer's
battalion took to the right to cross the hills and
ride down upon the encampment, and Major
Reno branched off to the left andforded the Little
Big Horn — a stream that gives the battle its
name — at the mouth of a stream now called
Benteen's Creek. As they were separating,
Custer sent an order to Reno to “move forward
at as rapid gait as he thought prudent, and
charge the village afterwards, and the whole
outfit would support him.”
After separation the only word received from
Custer was an order signed by the adjutant, and
addressed to Captain Benteen, which read:
“Benteen, come on. Big village. Be quick.
Bring packs”; and a postscript, “Bring packs.”
About the time this message must have been
despatched, those with Reno beheld the general
and his men on top of a hill two miles or more
away, looking down upon the village, and saw
Custer take off his hat and wave it in the air, as
if either beckoning the other battalions to his
assistance or cheering his men.
[ 25 J


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
The battalion disappeared over the brow of
the hill, and after that no word or sign ever came
from Custer or anyone of his whole command.
Not a man of the hundreds that followed the
general in the charge lived to tell the tale. The
battalion was simply wiped out of existence.
In after years, some of the Indians who took part
in the massacre, laying aside their inbred taci-
turnity, consented to show a few United States
officers over the field and explain what had hap-
pened and how it had happened; but beyond
these meagre reports, and the position in which
the bodies of the soldiers were found after the
Indians had finished with their rejoicings and
the mutilations of the dead, nothing is known of
Custer's last charge. But those acquainted
with Custer and with Indian fighting are able to
picture the scene.
When Custer reached the top of the hill, in-
stead of a village of some eight hundred or one
thousand warriors, he saw beneath him a veri-
table city of wigwams spread out in the valley.
The smoke from the fires clouded the sky, great
herds of ponies cropped the grass as far as the
eye could see, thousands of painted Sioux, armed,
and astride their shaggy ponies, galloped in
circles, working themselves into a frenzy of fury
to fight the white man. Medicine-men danced
and yelled their incantations, and squaws busily
[26]


The Red Man's Last Victory
struck the tents and hurried their papooses and
swarms of dusky children out of harm's way.
When this scene of angry life met his gaze, Gen-
eral Custer, old Indian fighter that he was, must
have recognized that he was in for what seemed
likely to be his last fight. But the mistake had
been made. The time had passed for new plans
of battle. He could not turn his back on the
warriors to join his battalion with the others, for
already the painted bucks were circling round
him and firing into his ranks, and already, in all .
probability, he heard the crack of rifles to his
left, telling him that the Indians were upon Reno.
Hemmed in, retreat out of the question, and
trusting that his other battalions would hurry to
his support, he called to his men, and together
they plunged into the shrieking, shouting, seeth-
ing mass of painted and befeathered red men —
and died. -
Reno acted differently. Whether or no he car-
ried caution to an unjustifiable length is a ques-
tion that has been fiercely discussed, at least,
some of the officers who were with him being his
greatest denouncers. So bitter were the charges
made against him that a Government inquiry
was instituted, and, it is only right to say, it
exonerated him from blame.
Reno's battalion struck the Indians shortly
after crossing the Little Big Horn, and the Ree
[27 J


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
scouts at once made for the rear to be out of dan-
ger. When the Sioux Indians appeared in con-
siderable force on his front, instead of charging
the village as Custer had ordered, Reno dis-
mounted his troops to fight on foot, and taking
advantage of timber he remained stationary for
some long time in almost absolute security.
Later he ordered a retreat to the Bluffs, and
while executing this order, and in the preceding
skirmishes, Lieutenants McIntosh and Hodgson,
Dr. De Wolf, and twenty-nine men and scouts
were killed.
Soon after reaching the Bluffs Captain Ben-
teen's battalion joined Reno, placing the latter
in command of a larger force than Custer had
with him; but notwithstanding this, no active
measures were adopted, the two battalions stand-
ing nerveless and inactive, listening to heavy
firing and much ominous noise in the direction
of the village, where Custer was engaged in his
death-struggle. True, an advance was made
to a hill — the hill from which earlier in the day
Custer had been seen to wave his hat. From
the top of this elevation could be seen a great
commotion in the valley, much riding and shout-
ing and firing; but still Reno and his men were
not near enough to the spot to make out what it
was all about. The officers with field-glasses
tried their best to find out where Custer and his
[28)


The Red Man's Last Victory
battalion were, but, of course, this was impos-
sible, for by this time every man, with Custer,
had been slain.
Chief Gall afterwards said that the news of
the two columns of troops advancing against the
village struck consternation to the heart of the
Indians, but when Reno was seen to dismount
and remain stationary, they were glad, for it al-
lowed the whole Indian force to be hurled against
Custer. Him out of the way, they concentrated
against Reno. When this latter movement took
place Reno retreated again to the Bluffs, where
close to the river he picked upon a strong posi-
tion and successfully withstood a heavy fire all
the afternoon. Darkness came down, and the
troops spent an anxious night intrenching them-
selves, and wondering what had happened to
their companions with Custer, but knowing
nothing except that the general must have been
defeated.
Lying under the stars, surrounded by the
“Hostiles,” they passed a night of restlessness
and alarm. The sky was aglare with light from
the bonfires; the silence of the night pierced by
many strange cries of exultation and hate, by
shots, and the monotonous beating of the tom-
tom for the scalp-dance. At times a nervous
man would spring from his bivouac on the earth
[29]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
to shout that he heard the march of approaching
relief, and bugles rang out a welcome that was
only answered by the echoes from the hills.
When morning dawned the Sioux opened fire,
and the day which followed was one of fevered
sorties and galling waiting. On the stronghold
that day Reno's men lost eighteen killed and had
fifty-two wounded, and they spent a second
anxious night. But on the morning of June 27
General Terry raised the siege and rode into
camp. Terry, in his journey, had come across
more than a hundred dead, and that an awful
tragedy had been enacted he knew. But he did
not know the full extent of the slaughter. On
the 28th the army marched to the battlefield of
the Little Big Horn. Scattered on the slope of
the hill they found 212 dead. General Custer,
his brother — Captain T. W. Custer — Cap-
tains Keogh and Yates, Lieutenants Cook, Crit-
tenden, Reily, Calhoun, Smith, and other officers
of their men were found, each scalped and muti-
lated except Custer himself. He lay apparently
as he had fallen, the Indians refraining from
wreaking vengeance on the leader, who was well
known to Sitting Bull and others of the chiefs.
The bodies of Lieutenants Porter, Harrington,
and Sturgis, and Dr. Lord, were never found.
The killed of the entire command was two
[80]


The Red Man's Last Victory
hundred sixty-five, and the slaying of Custer and
his men was the crimson spot of the first Centen-
nial Year of the United States.
It is also rendered memorable as being the
last great victory the red man achieved over the
white.
[91]


II
The Storming of Kars
17–18 November, 1877
By MAJOR ARTHUR GRIFFITHS
K: has the reputation of being one of
the strongest fortresses in the world.
In the old Crimean days it stood a six
months' siege: gallant Fenwick Williams, an
English artillery officer, with a garrison of de-
voted Turks, made an heroic resistance in it
against superior numbers, and yielded only to
famine in the end. At the peace Kars reverted
to Turkey, who spared no pains to restore its de-
fences and make it as nearly as possible impreg-
nable. It was surrounded with new fortifica-
tions, built for the most part on the ancient sites;
they were constructed under the skilful direction
of the first military engineers, and armed with
powerful artillery. When, in 1877, Russia once
more came to blows with her traditional foe,
Kars became again the scene of furious conflict;
its possession was hotly contested, but it was
finally won by almost unexampled bravery in
the teeth of a no less stubborn defence,
The early days of the winter of 1877 were at
[32]


The Storming of Kars
hand when the Russians closed down on Kars.
The Turkish arms had but recently met with
serious reverses in Armenia; Moukhtar Pacha,
the Turkish generalissimo, had been badly
beaten in a great battle, – that of Aladjh Dagh,
— and his army, which had hitherto covered
Kars, was almost destroyed: only a wretched
remnant of panic-stricken fugitives took refuge
in the mountains about Erzeroum, where Moukh-
tar speedily followed to reorganize his shattered
forces. Another general (Hussein Pacha) was
left with a garrison of twenty-four thousand to
defend Kars. It was hoped that the great for-
tress would long hold out. It was so strongly
fortified, so well armed, so amply provisioned,
that a protracted siege seemed inevitable. The
Turks, moreover, were excellent soldiers, es-
pecially good and brave behind fortifications.
At that very moment Plevna, an improvised
fortress just south of the Danube, was still defy-
ing the most strenuous efforts of the Russians to
take it. Kars had many superior advantages
as a place of arms.
The Russians were, however, resolved to cap-
ture Kars, and soon, if they could. They
wanted it badly. Its fall would make the Rus-
sian communications safe where at present they
were insecure; from Kars they could best pro-
ceed against Erzeroum, and pave the way to
[83]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
complete mastery in Armenia. But to want a
thing is not necessarily to get it, especially in
war. Kars must be taken — granted; the point
was how to do it.
Now, there is more than one way of reducing
or getting possession of a fortress. It can be
“invested” – surrounded on all sides, that is to
say, cut off from outside relief or support, and
starved into surrender; or it may be besieged in
due form, with regular “approaches,” trenches
and saps pushed up nearer and nearer, and with
breaching batteries of heavy artillery, which
after repeated bombardments open the road to
assault; or, last of all, it may be carried by a
coup-de-main — one great vigorous blow, de-
livered without delay or hesitation, which, if
successful, settles the matter at once and out of
hand. Which was it to be with Kars?
This was the problem which confronted the
Russian generals, and which could only be
solved after anxious consideration of all the pros
and cons. Investment is a slow, often very
tedious, game; in the present case it was both
doubtful and dangerous, for the cold weather was
at hand, and the winters are so severe in Ar-
menia that the besieging troops must inevitably
endure great hardships and privations. Nor
was the process of investment certain to lead to
capture. The garrison, after holding their as-
[34]


The Storming of Kars
sailants at bay for six months or more (and they
had provisions for quite that time), after per-
petually harassing them by sortie and counter
attack, might beat them off in the end. The
same objections applied to the regular siege: the
Turks could meet the Russians with 300 guns,
heavy artillery, admirably posted, and with a
garrison sufficient to man the whole length of
their defenses. The siege might become a long
duel, in which the advantage would not neces-
sarily be with the besiegers.
There remained only the boldest, the most
hazardous, probably the most costly in human
lives, but still the most profitable if successful
— the method of immediate open assault. Kars
might perhaps be carried by storm, if only the
enterprise was undertaken on a proper scale, if
the attack was planned with judgment and at-
tempted in adequate strength. This was the
course which the Russian generals adopted.
They resolved to go in and win; to capture Kars,
or at least to make a bold attempt at capture by
sheer force and weight of arms.
To understand what follows, a brief descrip-
tion of the whole fortress, as it then stood, is in-
dispensable.
Kars was rather a series of fortified works
than a single fortress. The actual city was only
defended by a citadel, perched high above it on
[35]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
a tall, straight rock, and by an ancient wall built
by the Turks in the sixteenth century, and now
half in ruins. The strength of the place was in
its twelve detached forts, planted at points of
vantage and surrounding it entirely. These
forts may be classed in four groups, viz. – taking
them according to the points of the compass —
those to the northeast, southeast, west, and
northwest of the town.
(1) To the northeast were Forts Arab and
Karadagh, both on the high rocky ground known
as the Karadagh, or Black Mountain, built on
the bare rock, but faced with earth, which had
been carried up by hand for the purpose. These
forts had no ditches; the first was closed at the
rear by a stone barrack, the second was to have
been similarly defended, but the war broke out
before the work was completed.
(2) To the southeast of the town the country
was an open plain, and as such more easily ac-
cessible. So it was defended by two of the
strongest forts, known respectively as Fort Hafiz
and Fort Kanly: the first was a square redoubt,
or fort closed on all sides, that nearest the town
consisting of a casemated barrack of three stories;
the second consisted really of two small redoubts,
also square, supporting each other, also with
a barrack at the end. There were, besides,
Forts Souvari and Tchini, much simpler as
[36]


The Storming of Kars
fortifications, but adding to the strength of this
side.
(3) To the westward, where the ground again
rose and became mountainous (it was called the
Shorak Mountain), there were three forts, known
as Tekman, Tek Tepasse, and Laze Tepasse, all
placed on commanding points, and well armed
with batteries.
(4) And, lastly, on the Tchanak Mountain, to
the northwest, there were three more forts —
Forts Mouklis, Inglis, and Veli Pacha, the last-
named being the strongest of the three.
It must be obvious that Kars, thus defended,
was a hard nut for the Russians to crack. These
twelve forts were nearly all well placed: they
were at such distances from each other that they
could afford mutual support in case of attack,
and their rocky sites forbade all idea of under-
mining them. On the other hand, they were a
source of weakness to the town, being so near it
that its bombardment was possible by the enemy
thus permitted to come within range. They
were unprovided with magazines or storehouses;
they were short of water, all of which had to be
dragged up from the river; they had no ditches
round them, and their fronts or sides were unde-
fended by flanking fire, which, moreover, when
damaged by the enemy's batteries, could not be
quickly repaired for want of earth in the prevail-
[37]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
ing rockiness of the soil. But the crowning de-
fect in the whole system of defence was that it
was cut into two parts: one set of forts lay on the
west side of the river, the other on the east, and
the river itself, running in a deep gorge, com-
pletely separated them.
The actual condition of the defences of Kars,
the numbers of the garrison, strength of artillery,
the amount of ammunition and supplies, was
fully revealed to the Russians by spies and de-
serters; any further knowledge required was ob-
tained by careful reconnaissances. By these
means the best line of attack was arrived at, and
it was decided to make the first principal effort
against the three forts upon the plain to the
southeast of the town. The approach was
easiest in this direction, and hereabouts the
Turks kept all their depots and stores of provi-
sions. At the same time, while the chief attack
was in progress, demonstrations were to be made
at other points, mainly to distract the enemy's
attention; but these other movements were to be
pushed forward and developed into real attacks
if there was any promise of substantial advan-
tage therefrom.
Hardly second in importance to the place was
the time fixed for attack. If made during the
day, it would undoubtedly entail enormous
losses. The Turkish forts and trenches covered
[38]


The Storming of Kars
a wide extent of front; the fire they could bring
to bear, both with cannon and small arms, would
certainly be intense and deadly. It would begin
at long range — for they had excellent weapons
— and, so to speak, scorch up the ground of ap-
proach, which was altogether without cover or
shelter for troops advancing in broad daylight.
Worse than this, the precise movements of the
attacking columns would be betrayed. Many of
the Turkish forts stood on such high ground that
they could see and search out everything in the
plains below. So feints and false attacks would
be useless, and the Turkish commander, having
penetrated the real design, could concentrate in
sufficient, perhaps in overwhelming, force to
meet it at the points threatened.
A night attack was the inevitable conclusion.
The storming must be made in the dark, and yet
not in complete darkness; for that would cer-
tainly cause confusion, and probably entail
disaster. There must be light enough to direct
movements near at hand, and yet not so much
light as to betray them from a distance.
This could only be attained when the moon
was at the full; so, although a prompt attack was
decided upon, the actual date was governed by
the almanac, and the day, or rather night, fixed
was the 15th of November. It was delayed
two nights later by cloudy weather and a
[39]


The Storming of Kars
Five columns were to attack, two only to
demonstrate: the two columns of demonstration
were to appear to attack the most northern and
the eastern forts. These movements were to
be mere feints unless they made rapid and easy
impression, in which case they were to be pressed
home.
Each of the five attacking columns, except the
second, was accompanied with guns; with each
also marched detachments of engineers carrying
scaling-ladders, dynamite cartridges to blow in
gates and obstacles; gunners also accompanied
the columns to spike or dismount guns. The
Russian cavalry was distributed in three posi-
tions, to watch the various roads approaching
Kars from the north, the west, and Erzeroum.
Half-past eight was the hour appointed for
the assembly of the troops. It was a bright,
clear, frosty night, the moon was at the full, the
air bitterly cold, and very still. Nothing was
heard as the skirmishers crept smartly and still
silently forward; only a few shots were fired by
the Turkish outposts, but as there was no reply
silence again reigned. About nine P.M. the Rus-
sian guns, to draw off attention, began to salute
the Tekman fort considerably to the westward
of the line of real attack. Half an hour more,
and secrecy or stratagem was no longer pos-
sible. The murder was out; Melikoff’s men -
[41]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
“rushed” Fort Souvari without firing a shot.
Its garrison was altogether unsuspicious of the
impending danger; the Russians were over the
parapet, inside, bayoneting right and left, spik-
ing and dismounting the guns, and after a very
short fight in full possession of the place. Then
this, the second column of the attack, streamed
out to the rear of the fort, and hurried off to as-
sist in the capture of Fort Tchini, the nearest
to them, but upon the other side of the river.
This Fort Tchini was the point to be aimed at
by General Komaroff with the first attacking
column. His men had advanced at about nine
P.M. on hearing the noise of battle at Fort Sou-
vari, but met with very different fortune. He
had to cross very difficult, rocky ground, and an
interchange of shots aroused the camp that lay
under Fort Tekman, up above his left, and
brought down a host of Turks on this his left
flank. Colonel Boutchkieff, who commanded
the Russian attacking column, turned at once to
his left, and, postponing the movement on Fort
Tchini, went up against this enemy. He scaled
the heights successfully, and driving back the
Turks followed them close under the defences of
Fort Tekman. His column was only of three
battalions, but without hesitation he went in at
this strong redoubt, hoping to carry it by au-
- dacity. But he was met with a murderous fire,
[42]


The Storming of Kars
musketry from three tiers of trenches, shrap-
nel shot, stones, and hand grenades. Colonel
Boutchkieff was killed, his men were cruelly
slaughtered, and the remnant fell back to the
river, to be of no more use that night.
Fort Tchini was still untouched, and Koma-
roff drew up his reserves to form a fresh column
of attack; he had one regiment only, backed by
four-and-twenty guns, and this handful went
forward gallantly to encounter a warm reception
and eventually reap disaster. They were nearly
destroyed by direct and cross fire from the neigh-
boring forts of Tekman and Veli Pacha, but
held their ground till long after midnight, then
fell back defeated behind the river. Nor had
Prince Melikoff, coming from the Fort Souvari,
which he carried so easily, any better luck against
Tchini. He had got to the rear of it, having
crossed the river by fords and boats, and attack-
ing it on that side had taken the Turks com-
pletely by surprise. But in leading on his men
he was dangerously wounded, and they fell back
— to wait, in the first place, for Komaroff, who
never appeared, and then to recross the river.
Their retreat was greatly facilitated, however,
by the smaller attack made by Komaroff's
reserve, which had failed, as has just been
described.
So far, then, on this western side the Russians
[43]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
\
had made no sort of impression upon Kars.
But these attacks on Tekman and Tchini, al-
though unsuccessful, had been indirectly of the
utmost service, for they occupied attention, and
kept the Turkish troops employed, who would
otherwise have reinforced the defenders of the
southern and eastern forts at the point where, in
fact, the fate of Kars was being decided all this
time. It fell to the lot of the third, fourth, and
fifth columns of assault to overcome resistance
and capture the stronghold.
Count Grabbe was entrusted with the attack
of the two redoubts known as Fort Kanly, and
about ten P.M. his men got close up to them,
much harassed by the ground and the enemy's
fire. The right column approached the eastern,
or smaller redoubt, and, climbing the parapet,
effected a lodgment, although opposed by supe-
rior numbers. The left column, headed by
Count Grabbe in person, swarmed around the
western or main work, attacking it in front,
flank, and rear. Grabbe was killed at the crit-
ical moment — shot dead by two bullets — and
was succeeded by Colonel Belinsky, who later
was also killed. After an hour's fierce engage-
ment — so fierce that five hundred dead Turks
were found in this part of the redoubt next day
— the Russians effected an entrance, and drove
the garrison back, but still fighting stubbornly,

[44]


The Storming of Kars
hand to hand, till they reached the stone barrack,
which closed the rear of the fort. Here the
Turks took refuge and rallied to such good pur-
pose that Belinsky's men could get no farther.
The barrack was protected with iron gates, and
the Russians tried in vain to break them down;
then they suffered such terrible losses that they
were compelled to retire. It was at this time
that their leader, Belinsky, met his death.
A cavalry charge made by Cossacks, sent on
by Loris Melikoff, renewed the attack, and once
more compelled the Turks to take refuge in the
barrack. At the same time, General Loris Meli-
koff, finding that the assailants of Fort Kanly
had lost two leaders in succession, sent a third —
Colonel Bulmering — to take the chief command
and renew the fight. Bulmering divided his
forces into two portions, which were to turn both
flanks of the fort. The left column he com-
manded in person, and made such good progress
with it that he got to the very edge of the town.
By one A.M. the whole of the fort was in the hands
of the Russians, with the exception of the stone
barrack, which still held out obstinately. Col-
onel Bulmering now summoned it to surrender,
threatening first to batter it down with artillery,
then to destroy it with dynamite. This last was
an irresistible argument, to which the gallant
Turk in command — Daoud Pacha — at last
[45]


The Storming of Kars
to blow down the angle tower, and all with so
much spirit that the Turks were driven back
into the inner work, and from that right out of
the fort, in great disorder. They withdrew
upon Fort Arab, which was still intact, and from
this point made several courageous attempts to
retake Fort Karadagh, but altogether without
success. The Russians had got it, and held it
for good and all.
This was the unlooked-for prize of one-half of
the fifth column. The other half, moving to the
left, pursued the original purpose — that of as-
saulting Fort Hafiz. General Alkhazoff led
this attack in person, and struck at both on the
direct front and on the left flank of the fort. The
Russians went up boldly, scaling the parapet
and over into the redoubt, bayoneting all they
met, and forcing back the garrison into the bar-
rack, which, like that of Fort Kanly, closed the
throat or entrance of the fort. But this barrack
was in no condition to resist; it had been nearly
ruined by the Russian bombardment, and it
soon fell into the hands of the assailants. From
Fort Hafiz, Alkhazoff's men pressed forward
right under the walls of Kars itself.
By this time — two A.M. – the whole of the
forts on the right bank of the river were in the
hands of the Russians, for Fort Arab, north of
Fort Karadagh, was captured soon after the
[47]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Russian success at the latter had come to be
known. The barrack at Fort Kanly alone held
out, but this, as has been told, was actually
doomed. Recapitulating, Fort Souvari had been
carried early in the night; Fort Karadagh had
been seized by sudden inspiration; Forts Hafiz
and Kanly had fallen to direct attack.
But this victory did not extend beyond the
right bank of the river. On the left, or western
side, the Russians had made no decided impres-
sion. The forts on the mountainous heights
above, known as Tchanak and Shorak, still held
out: these were the Forts Tekman, Tek Tepasse,
Laze Tepasse, Mouklis, Inglis, and Veli Pacha;
and the Turkish troops which garrisoned them
numbered some fifteen thousand men, still fresh
and capable of fighting, although somewhat de-
moralized. Hussein Pacha, the Turkish com-
mander, determined, therefore, to make a last
bid for safety, if not to reverse fate, and massing
these forces on the west, struck out for the moun-
tains that ranged back towards Erzeroum. The
daylight, which broke about five A.M., betrayed
his movement, and the Russian general, Roop,
who commanded all the troops on the left bank,
set himself to intercept the Turkish march and
prevent escape. His cavalry took the fugitives
in flank, while his infantry faced and stopped
[48]


The Storming of Kars
them. The largest part of the Turks were
caught, and laid down their arms, but some got
through and hurried towards the mountains
with the Cossacks in hot pursuit. Surrender
was the order of the day, and nearly all the Turks
were overtaken and made prisoners. Only a
few of the principal officers, including Hussein
Pacha, escaped, through the fleetness and en-
durance of the horses they rode.
Early that forenoon — the 18th November —
the Russian double eagle floated from the citadel
of Kars. The whole place, with all it contained,
was in the possession of the assailants; those
who had indirectly contributed to success on the
left bank now entered the town, and joined their
comrades from the right bank, upon whom the
brunt of the business had fallen.
The result of this really audacious feat of arms
was commensurate with the unflinching courage
that had planned and carried it through. A
fortified place of the first class had been carried
in open assault, seventeen thousand prisoners
were taken, three hundred and three guns (many
of large calibre), twenty-five thousand stand of
small arms, and a vast quantity of provisions
and war material. But the cost had been heavy
to both sides in this desperate struggle: twenty-
five hundred Turks lay dead in and about the
[49]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
defences, forty-five hundred sick and wounded
filled the hospitals; and the Russians lost in killed
and wounded seventy-seven officers and twenty-
one hundred ninety-six men.
[50]


III
Rorke’s Drift
By C. STEIN
T the end of 1878 there stood upon a
A rocky terrace on the Natal side of the
Buffalo River two stone buildings with
thatched roofs, which had formed a Swedish
mission station, one of them having been used
as a church and the other having been the dwell-
ing of the missionary. These two humble edi-
fices were destined to be, on the 22d January,
1879, the scene of the most brilliant feat of arms
performed during the whole Zulu War — a de-
fence by a small determined force against the
attack of vastly superior numbers, an exploit
whose luster, relieving a period of disaster, main-
tained the prestige of British arms, and whose
success, there can be little doubt, rescued Natal
from invasion when failure would have laid the
colony open to the advance of a savage enemy.
So perfect was the conduct of the officers and
men concerned in the episode, and so well con-
ceived and executed were the measures adopted,
that even foreign military books quote the ex-
ploit as an example of the value of improvised
fortifications when they are held by brave men.
[51]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
When war was declared by Sir Bartle Frere,
the High Commissioner for South Africa, against
Cetewayo, the Zulu king, the conduct of opera-
tions was placed in the hands of Lieutenant-
General Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., as Com-
mander-in-Chief. It was determined to invade
Zululand, and all the forces available for this
purpose were moved to the frontier. They were
divided into five columns, of which three were to
advance into the enemy's country from different
points, with the intention of finally concentrating
at Ulundi, the Zulu capital, while the other two
were in the first instance to guard the frontier
against possible Zulu raids. The third column,
under the command of Colonel Glyn, C.B., the
center of the three columns of invasion, was to
assemble near Rorke’s Drift and cross the Buf-
falo River at that spot, within a mile of the old
Swedish mission station.
The river at Rorke’s Drift was, like most
African streams, an impassable torrent after
rain, but the flood quickly ran off, and a passage
could then be effected by the “drift,” or ford.
There had also been established two ponts, or
big, flat-bottomed ferry-boats, each of which
could transport an African wagon or a company
of infantry.
Colonel Glyn's column crossed the river on
the 11th of January, 1879, and from that time
[52]


Rorke's Drift
was engaged in operations in Zululand. Its line
of communications with Pietermaritzburg, the
chief city of Natal, was through Rorke's Drift to
Helpmakaar, and thence by Ladysmith and Est-
court, or by the shorter, though more difficult,
route through Greytown. Rorke's Drift, as the
actual starting point of invasion, was formed into
a depot of stores and a hospital. The deserted
mission-station buildings were utilized for this
purpose, the old church being converted into a
storehouse and the missionary's dwelling form-
ing the hospital. As a garrison for the impor-
tant post and to secure the passage across the
river, Colonel Glyn left B Company of the sec-
ond battalion of the Twenty-fourth Regiment,
under command of Lieutenant Gonville Brom-
head. With him were also Major Spalding.
who was in general charge of the line of com-
munications, Lieutenant Chard, Royal Engi-
neers, Surgeon Reynolds, Army Medical Depart-
ment, and other officers. This garrison was
eneamped near the store and hospital.
For some days after the departure of the third
column, which was also accompanied by Lord
Chelmsford and the Headquarter Staff, the
quiet routine of duty was pursued. Letters
were passed to and from the front, necessary
stores and supplies were sent on, and the men
wounded in the first engagements were received
[53]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
into the hospital. Among these last was one of
the enemy, who had been shot through the thigh
at Sirayo's kraal, and who was treated and
nursed with the same care and attention as the
Englishmen against whom he had fought. On
the 20th of January, however, a large portion of
the second column, under Colonel Durnford,
Royal Engineers, arrived at Rorke's Drift and
encamped. Their stay was brief, for they were
summoned to the fatal camp of Insandhlwana
on the morning of the 22d, Colonel Durnford
leaving a company of the Natal Native Con-
tingent, under Captain Stephenson, to strengthen
the little post. It became evident from various
circumstances that Colonel Glyn's column was
encountering a stronger resistance than had been
anticipated, and that, as the enemy were in force
within a few miles, they might make a rapid
descent upon the weakly guarded line of com-
munications. It was known that two compa-
nies of the first battalion of the Twenty-fourth
were at Helpmakaar, ten miles distant, and
Major Spalding resolved to go there at once in
order to bring them up as a reinforcement to
Lieutenant Bromhead's force. In his absence,
Lieutenant Chard became senior officer at
Rorke's Drift, and responsible for its well-being.
Although on the 22d of January there was
thus a feeling of uneasiness at the river post,
[54]


Rorke's Drift
nothing had occurred till some hours after mid-
day to cause any special alarm to its garrison.
We may believe that a general plan of action had
been considered if an attack should be made
upon it, but in the meantime all the officers and
men were engaged in their usual employments.
Lieutenant Chard was at the ponts, and Lieu-
tenant Bromhead was in his little camp hard by
the store and hospital. Shortly after three P.M.
two mounted men were seen galloping at head-
long speed towards the ferry from Zululand.
There is little difficulty in recognizing messen-
gers of disaster, the men who ride with the aven-
ger of blood close on their horses’ track, and
Chard, who met them, knew that something
terrible had happened. His worst anticipations
were more than realized when the two fugitives
— Lieutenant Adendorff, of the Native Con-
tingent, and a Natal volunteer — told their story:
the camp at Insandhlwana had been attacked
and taken by the enemy, of whom a large force
was now advancing on Rorke's Drift.
The Natal volunteer hurried on to give the
alarm at Helpmakaar; but one man was enough
for this service, and Adendorff — gallant fellow!
— said that he would remain at Rorke's Drift,
where every additional European would be a
valuable reinforcement, and cast in his lot with its
defenders. Chard atoncegave orders to the guard
[ 55]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
at the ponts to strike their tents, put all stores on
the spot into the wagon, and withdraw to the
main body of the post. Now occurred the first
incident which testified to the spirit which ani-
mated the small force on the banks of the
Buffalo. The ferryman–Daniells—and Ser-
geant Milne, of the Third Buffs (who was doing
duty with the Twenty-fourth), proposed that
they should be allowed to moor the two ponts in
the middle of the river, and offered, with the
ferry-guard of six men, to defend them against
attack — a brave thought, indeed, but it was
put aside. Chard was too good a soldier to
divide his few men in any way. He saw at once
that the commissariat stores and hospital would
require every available rifle for their defence,
and that the safety of every other place was com-
paratively a very minor consideration.
While he was giving his orders an urgent mes-
sage came from Bromhead asking him to join
him at once. To Bromhead also had come sev-
eral mounted men fleeing from Insandhlwana,
bearing the same dread intelligence which Aden-
dorff had brought to the ferry, and the trained .
officer of engineers was required to concert and
decide upon measures of defence. But when
the engineer joined the infantry subaltern he
found that the latter, aided by Assistant-Com-
missary Dunne, had already begun the neces-
[56]


Rorke's Drift
sary work, and that there was nothing to change,
if much was still left to complete. The three
officers held a hurried consultation, and prompt
use was made of all ordinary expedients of war,
while materials never before employed in forti-
fication were pressed into service. The store
and hospital were loop-holed and barricaded,
the windows and doors blocked with mattresses;
but it was necessary to connect the defence of the
two buildings by a parapet. There were no
stones at hand with which to build a wall, and if
there had been, there was no time to make use
of them; the hard, rocky soil could not be dug
and formed into ditch and breastwork; but there
was a great store of bags of mealies, or the grain
of Indian corn, which had been collected as horse
provender for the army. Assistant-Commissary
Dunne suggested that these should be used in
the fashion of sand-bags for the construction of
the required parapet. Everybody labored with
the energy of men who know that their safety
depends on their exertions. Chard and Brom-
head, Surgeon Reynolds and Dunne not merely
directed, but engaged most energetically in the
work of preparation. When the alarm was first
given it was intended to remove the worst cases
from the hospital to a place of safety, and two
wagons were prepared for the purpose; but it
was found that the attempt to move the patients
[57]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
at the slow pace of ox-teams when the Zulus were
so close at hand would only result in offering
them as easy victims to the murderous assegai.
The two wagons were therefore used as part of
the defences, and mealie bags were piled under-
neath and upon them, so that each formed a
strong post of vantage.
The ferry-guard had joined the rest of the
force at 3.30 P.M., and a few minutes later an
officer of Durnford’s Natal Native Horse, with
a hundred of his men who had been heavily en-
gaged at Insandhlwana, rode up and asked for
orders. Chard directed him to watch for the
approach of the enemy, sending out vedettes,
and when he was pressed, to fall back and assist
in the defence of the post. So far it seemed cer-
tain that when the threatened Zulu attack devel-
oped itself against the Rorke's Drift fortifica-
tions they would be found, though hurriedly de-
vised and executed, to be adequately defended
by the company of the Twenty-fourth, Captain
Stephenson's company of the Native Contingent,
and about a hundred Basutos of the Natal Na-
tive Horse. But if the gallant English officers
who had striven so hard and with so much mili-
tary genius to make their position tenable looked
forward to this amount of support, they were
destined to grievous disappointment and mortifi-
cation. At 4.15 P.M. the sound of firing was
[58]


Rorke's Drift
heard behind a hill towards the south, and told
that the vedettes of the Native Horse were en-
gaged with the enemy. Their officer returned,
reporting that the Zulus were close at hand, and
that his men would not obey orders. Chard
and his comrades had the sore trial of seeing
them all moving off towards Helpmakaar, leav-
ing the garrison to its fate. Nor was this all.
The evil example was only too soon followed.
Captain Stephenson's company of the Native
Contingent also felt their hearts fail, and, ac-
companied by their commander, also fled from
the post of duty. -
For the Native Horse there is some excuse to
be made. They had been in the saddle since
daybreak; they were the survivors of a ter-
rible defeat and massacre; they had seen a
large number of their comrades slain, and they
were demoralized by the loss of their beloved
commander, Colonel Durnford. If on this occa-
sion their valor failed them, it is to be remem-
bered that they had behaved nobly in the early
part of the day, and that in later episodes of the
war their gallantry and self-devotion were pro-
verbial. But for the Native Contingent com-
pany nothing can be said. They were fresh, and
as yet unscathed by war; they had the best ex-
ample in the calm demeanor of their English
comrades, and they had many causes of feud
[59]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and quarrel with the enemy. But, as in all
other occasions of the war where Natal Kaffirs
were employed, they gave way in time of stress,
and the greatest shame of the matter was that
their colonial European officer now shared their
misconduct.
The garrison at Rorke's Drift was now re-
duced to Bromhead's company of the Twenty-
fourth — about eighty strong — and some men
of other corps, the total number within the post
being one hundred thirty-nine, of whom thirty-
five were sick or wounded men in hospital. The
original scheme of defence had provided for a
much larger force, and Chard recognized that it
would now be impossible long to occupy effect-
ively the range of parapets and loopholes which
had been prepared. There was nothing for it
but to form an inner line of defence, to which
the garrison might fall back when the outer line
became untenable. He decided that, if neces-
sary, the hospital must be abandoned, and that
the defence must be restricted to the store and
the space in front of it, including a well-built
stone kraal or enclosure which abutted on it to
the eastward. To carry out this plan he com-
menced an inner retrenchment, forming a para-
pet of biscuit-boxes across the larger enclosure.
This was only about two boxes high when the
expected flood of attack hurled its first waves
[60)


Rorke's Drift
against the frail solitary bulwark which stood
between Natal and savage invasion.
About 4.30 P.M. five or six hundred of the
enemy appeared, sweeping round the rocky hill
to the south of the post, and advancing at the
swift pace characteristic of the Zulu warriors
against the south wall which connected the store
and hospital. But they had to deal with stern
men who were braced up for the encounter by
feelings of duty, patriotism, and the long habit
of regimental discipline and comradeship which
makes each feel assured and confident that all
are striving shoulder to shoulder, and that none
will blench from his appointed place. From
the parapet of mealie bags and from the hospital
poured forth a heavy and well-sustained fire,
which was crossed by a flanking discharge from
the store. No man wasted a shot, and the aim
was cool and deliberate.
Even Zulu valor and determination could not
face the deadly leaden hail, and the onslaught
weakened and broke within fifty yards of the
British rifles. Some of the assailants swerved
to their left, and passed round to the west of
the hospital; some sought cover where they
could, and occupied banks, ditches, bushes,
and the cooking place of the garrison. But
this first attack was only the effort of the
enemy's advanced guard. Masses of warriors
[61 )


Famous Battles of the XIXth Century
followed and flowed over the elevated south-
ward ledge of rocks overlooking the build-
ings. Every cave and crevice was quickly filled,
and from these sheltered and commanding posi-
tions they opened a heavy and continuous fire.
It was fortunate that the spoil in rifles and am-
munition taken at Insandhlwana was not yet
available for use against the English, as at Kam-
bula and later engagements, but the enemy's
firearms were still the old muskets and rifles of
which they had long been in possession. Even
so, at the short range these were sufficiently
effective, and, in the hands of better marksmen
than Zulus usually are, might have inflicted
crushing losses.
The first attack repulsed, a second desperate
effort was made by the enemy against the north-
west wall just below the hospital; but here again
the defenders were ready to meet it, and again
the assailing torrent broke and fell back. Such
of the sick and wounded in the hospitals as were
able to rouse themselves from their beds of pain
had by this time seized rifle and bayonet and
joined their comrades; but though every man
was now mustered, the total number was all too
small for the grim task before them. The mis-
fortune of the extreme hurry in the preparations
for defence was now painfully apparent. In
strengthening any position for defensive occu-
[62]


Rorke's Drift
pation one of the first measures taken by a com-
mander is to clear as large an open space as pos-
sible round the parapet or fortifications which
he proposes to hold. All ditches and hollows
should be filled up; all buildings, walls, and
heaps of refuse should be pulled down and scat-
tered; all trees, shrubs, and thick herbage should
be cut and removed; so that no attack can be
made under cover, no safe place may be found
from which deliberate fire may be delivered, or
any movement can be made by an enemy un-
seen, and therefore unanticipated. At Rorke's
Drift, not only were the buildings and parapets
overlooked and commanded to the southward
by a rocky hill full of caves and lurking-places,
but there was a garden to the north, a thick
patch of bush which was close to the parapet, a
square Kaffir house and large brick oven and
cooking trenches, besides numerous banks, walls,
and ditches, all of which offered a shelter to the
enemy, which they were not slow to profit by.
The post was encircled by a dense ring of the
foe, and from every side came the whistle of
their bullets.
Up till this time, though several men had been
wounded, no one had been struck dead. Sud-
denly a whisper passed round among the Twenty-
fourth, “Poor old King Cole is killed.” Private
Cole, who was known by this affectionate bar-
[63]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
rack-room nickname, was at the parapet when a
bullet passed through his head, and he fell doing
his duty — a noble end.
If the Zulu fire was telling, however, the steady
marksmanship of the English officers and men
was still more effective. Private Dunbar, of the
Twenty-fourth, laid low a mounted chief who
was conspicuous in directing the enemy, and
immediately afterwards shot eight warriors in as
many successive shots. Everywhere the officers
were present with words of encouragement, ex-
posing themselves fearlessly and showing that
iron coolness and self-possession which rouses
such confidence and emulation in soldiery on a
day of battle. Assistant-Commissary Dunne —
a man of great stature and physique, with a long,
flowing beard — was eontinually going along
the parapet, cheering the men and using the rifle
with deadly effect. There was a rush of Zulus
against the spot where he was, led by a huge
man, whose leopard-skin kaross marked the
chief. Dunne called out “Pot that fellow!”
and himself aimed over the parapet at another,
when his rifle dropped from his hand, and he
spun round with suddenly pallid face, shot
through the right shoulder. Surgeon Reynolds
was by his side at once, and bound up the wound.
Unable any longer to use his rifle, he handed
it to storekeeper Byrne, but continued unmoved
[64]


THERE WAS A HAND-to-HAND STRUGGLE A. 65





Rorke's Drift
to superintend the men near to him and to direct
their fire. Byrne took his place at the parapet,
and his bullets were not wasted. In a few min-
utes Corporal Scammel, Natal Native Contin-
gent, who was next to him, was shot through the
shoulder and back. He fell, and crawling to
Chard, who was fighting side by side with the
men, handed him the remainder of his cartridges.
In his agony he asked for a drink of water.
Byrne at once fetched it for him, and whilst
handing it to the suffering soldier was himself
shot through the head, and fell prone, a dead
IIla Il.
While fighting was thus going on all round
the post, a series of specially determined attacks
was made against the northern side. Here the
Zulus were able to collect under cover of the gar-
den and patch of bush, and from that shelter
were able to rush untouched close up to the para-
pet. Soon they were on one side of the barri-
cade, while the defenders held the other, and
across it there was a hand-to-hand struggle of
the bayonet against the broad-bladed bangwan,
the stabbing assegai. So close were the com-
batants that the Zulus seized the English bay-
onets, and in two instances even succeeded in
wrenching them from the rifles, though in each
case the breechloader took a stern vengeance.
The muzzles of the opposing firearms were al-
[65)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
most touching each other, and the discharge of a
musket blew the broad “dopper” hat from the
head of Corporal Schiess, of the Natal Native
Contingent. This man (a Swiss by birth), who
had been a patient in hospital, leaped on to the
parapet and bayoneted the man who fired, re-
gained his place, and shot another; then, repeat-
ing his former exploit, again leaped on the top of
the mealie bags and bayoneted a third. Early
in the fight he had been struck by a bullet in the
instep, but, though suffering acute pain, he left
not his post, and was only maddened to perform
deeds of heroic daring.
The struggle here was too severe and unequal
to be long continued. Besides the ceaseless at-
tacks of their enemy in front, the defenders of
the parapet were exposed to the fire which took
them in reverse from the high hill to the south.
Five soldiers had been thus shot dead in a short
space of time. At six P.M. the order was given
to retire behind the retrenchment of biscuit-
boxes. When the defence of the parapet was
thus removed, the dark crowd of Zulus surged
over the mealie bags to attack the hospital; but
such a heavy fire was sent from the line of the
retrenchment that nearly every man who leaped
into the enclosure perished in the effort. Again
and again they charged forward, shouting their
[66]


Rorke's Drift
war-cry “Usutul Usutu!” and ever the death-
dealing volleys smote them to the ground.
The story has now been told of the struggle
during the first hour and a half about the store-
house and large enclosure, till the moment came
when it was no longer possible to hold the whole
of the defences as they were at first organized,
and Chard was constrained to withdraw behind
the biscuit-box retrenchment which his foresight
had provided. All this time the enemy had been
making fierce and constantly reiterated attempts
to force their way into the hospital, which was at
the west end of the enclosure. Here Bromhead
personally superintended the resistance, and
here deeds of military prowess, cool presence of
mind, and glorious self-devotion were performed
to be proud of.
It has been said that the building had a
thatched roof, and the Zulus not only strove
to force an ingress, but used every expedient
to set the thatch on fire, and thus to destroy
the poor stronghold which so long mocked at
their attempts to take it. While many of the
patients whose ailments were comparatively
slight had risen from their pallets and taken an
active part in the defence, there were several
poor fellows, utterly helpless, distributed among
the different wards; and it is difficult to conceive
a situation more trying than theirs must have
[67]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
been, listening to the demoniac yells of the sav-
ages, only separated from them by a thin wall,
thirsting for their blood. At every window were
one or two comrades, firing till the rifles were
heated to scorching by the unceasing discharge.
Bullets splashed upon the walls, and the air
reeked with dense, sulphurous smoke. The
combatants may have been excited and carried
away by the mad fury of battle; but to men de-
pressed by disease, weakened and racked with
pain, truly the minutes must have been long and
terrible in their mental and physical suffering.
Shortly after five o'clock the Zulus had been able
so far to break down the entrance to the room
at the extreme end of the hospital that they were
able to charge at the opening; but Bromhead
was there, and drove them back time after time
with the bayonet. As long as the enclosure was
held, they failed in every fierce attempt. Private
Joseph Williams was firing from a small window
hard by, and on the next morning fourteen war-
riors were found dead beneath it, besides others
along his line of fire. When his ammunition
was expended, he joined his brother, Private
John Williams, and two of the patients who also
had fired their last cartridge, and with them
guarded the door with their bayonets. No
longer able to keep their opponents at a distance,
the four stood grimly resolute, waiting till the
[68]


Rorke's Drift
door was battered in and they stood face to face
with the foe.
Then followed a death struggle. The Eng-
lish bayonet crossed the broad-bladed bangwan,
the stalwart Warwickshire lads met the lithe and
muscular tribesmen of Cetewayo, and the weap-
ons glinted thirsty for blood. In the mélée poor
Joseph Williams was grappled with by two
Zulus, his hands were seized, and, dragged out
from among his comrades, he was killed before
their eyes. But now it was known that the hos-
pital must be abandoned, and as the usual path
was occupied by the enemy, a way had to be
made through the partition walls. John Wil-
liams and the two patients succeeded in making
a passage with an axe into the adjoining room,
where they were joined by Private Henry Hook.
John Williams and Hook then took it in turn to
guard the hole through which the little party had
come, with the bayonet, and keep the foe at bay,
while the others worked at cutting a further pas-
sage. In this retreat from room to room, an-
other brave soldier, Private Jenkins, met the
same fate as did Joseph Williams, and was
dragged to his death by the pursuers. The
others at last arrived at a window looking into
the enclosure towards the storehouse, and, leap-
ing from it, ran the gauntlet of the enemy's fire
till they reached their comrades behind the bis-
[69]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
cuit-box retrenchment. To the devoted bravery
and cool resource of Private John Williams and
Hook, eight patients, who had been in the several
wards which they had traversed, owed their
lives. If it had not been for the assistance of
these two gallant men, all the eight would have
perished where they lay. These, however, were
only some of the hairbreadth escapes from the
hospital, and only some of the deeds of stubborn
hardihood performed in it.
A few of the sick men were half carried, half
led, by chivalrous comrades across the enclosure
to the retrenchment, but many had to make
their own way over the space now swept by the
Zulu bullets, and that that space was clear was
due to the steady fire maintained by Chard,
which prevented the Zulus themselves from
leaving the spots where they were under cover.
Trooper Hunter, Natal Mounted Police, a very
tall young man, who had been a patient, essayed
the rush to safety, but he was hit and fell before
he reached his goal. Corporal Mayer, Natal
Native Contingent, who had been wounded in
the knee by an assegai-thrust in one of the
early engagements of the campaign, Bom-
bardier Lewis, Royal Artillery, whose leg and
thigh were swollen and disabled from a wagon
accident, and Trooper Green, Natal Police,
also a nearly helpless invalid, all got out of
[70]


Rorke's Drift
a little window looking into the enclosure.
The window was at some distance from the
ground, and each man fell in escaping from
it. All had to crawl (for none of them
could walk) through the enemy's fire, and all
passed scatheless into the retrenchment ex-
cept Green, who was struck on the thigh. In
one of the wards facing the hill on the south
side of the hospital, Privates William Jones and
Robert Jones had been posted. There were
seven patients in the ward, and these two men
defended their post till six of the seven patients
had been removed. The seventh was Sergeant
Maxfield, who, delirious with fever, resisted all
attempts to move him. Robert Jones, with rare
courage and devotion, went back a second time
to try to carry him out, but found the ward al-
ready full of Zulus, and the poor sergeant stabbed
to death on his bed.
It has been mentioned that a wounded prisoner
was being treated in the hospital. So much had
he been impressed by the kindness which he had
received, that he was anxious to assist in the de-
fence. He said “he was not afraid of the Zulus,
but he wanted a gun.” His new-born goodwill
was not, however, tested. When the ward in
which he lay was forced, Private Hook, who was
assisting the Englishmen in the next room, heard
the Zulus talking to him. The next day his
- [71]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
charred remains were found in the ashes of the
building. That communication was kept up
with the hospital at all, and that it was possible
to effect the removal of so many patients, was
due in great part to the conduct of Corporal
Allen and Private Hitch. These two soldiers
together, in defiance of danger, held a most ex-
posed position, raked in reverse by the fire from
the hill, till both were severely wounded. Their
determined bravery had its result in the safety
of their comrades. Even after they were in-
capacitated from further fighting, they never
ceased, when their wounds had been dressed, to
serve out ammunition from the reserve through-
out the rest of the combat.
When the defence of the hospital was relaxed,
it had been easy for the enemy to carry out their
plan of setting fire to the thatched roof, and now
the whole was in a blaze, the flames rising high
and casting a lurid glare over the scene of con-
flict. The last men who effected their retreat
from the building had as much to dread from
the spreading conflagration as from the Zulu
assegais. We have seen that, from the want of
interior communication, it had been necessary
for those who did escape to cut their way from
room to room. Alas! to some of the patients, it
had been impossible for the anxious leader and
his stanch, willing followers to penetrate. De-
[72]


Rorke's Drift
feated by the flames and by the numbers of their
opponents, Chard records in his official despatch,
“With the most heartfelt sorrow, I regret we
could not save these poor fellows from their ter-
rible fate.”
While in the hospital the last struggle was
going on, Chard's unfailing resource had pro-
vided another element of strength to his now re-
stricted line of defence, and had formed a place
of comparative security for the reception of his
wounded men. In the small yard by the store-
house were two large piles of mealie bags. These,
with the assistance of two or three men and
Dunne, who, severely wounded as he was, con-
tinued working with unabated energy and de-
termination, he formed into an oblong and suffi-
ciently high redoubt. In the hollow space in its
center were laid the sick and wounded, while its
crest gave a second line of fire, which swept much
of the ground that could not be seen by the oc-
cupiers of the lower parapets. As the intrepid
men were making this redoubt, their object was
quickly detected by the enemy, who poured upon
them a rain of bullets; but fortunately unhurt,
they completed their work.
The night had fallen, and the light from
the burning hospital was now of the greatest
service to the defender, as it illumined every
spot for hundreds of yards round, and gave
[73]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
every advantage to the trained riflemen of
the Twenty-fourth. The Zulu losses had been
tremendously heavy; but still they pressed
their unremitting attack. Rush after rush
was made right up to the parapets so strenu-
ously held, and their musketry fire never slack-
ened. The outer wall of the stone kraal on the
east of the store had to be abandoned, and finally
the garrison was confined to the commissariat
store, the enclosure just in front of it, the inner
wall of the kraal, and the redoubt of mealie bags.
But the steadfastness of the defenders was
never impaired. Still every man fired with the
greatest coolness. Not a shot was wasted, and
Rorke's Drift Station remained still proudly
impregnable. At 10 P.M. the hospital fire had
burnt itself out, and darkness settled over de-
fence and attack. It was not till midnight, how-
ever, that the Zulus began to lose heart, and give
to the garrison some breathing space and repose.
Desultory firing still continued from the hill to
the southward, and from the bush and garden
in front; but there were no more attacks in force,
and the stress of siege was practically over. The
dark hours were full of anxiety, and even the
stout hearts which had not quailed during the
long period of trial that was past must have had
some feeling of disquietude for the morrow, lest
wearied, reduced in numbers, and with slender
[74]


Rorke's Drift
supply of water, they should be called upon to
meet renewed efforts made by a reënforced foe.
The dawn came at last, and the eyes of all
were gladdened by seeing the rear of the Zulu
masses retiring round the shoulder of the hill
from which their first attack had been made.
The supreme tension of mind and body was
over, and if the struggle had been long and stern
the victory was for the time complete. How
bitterly it had been fought out was shown by the
piles of the enemy's dead lying around, and by
the silence of familiar voices when the roll was
called. There was yet no rest. The enemy
might take heart and return, for, though many
of their warriors had seen their last fight,
their numbers were so overwhelming, and they
must have known so well how close had been
the pressure of their attack, that they might well
think that, with renewed efforts, success was
more than possible. Patrols were sent out to
collect the arms left lying on the field. The de-
fences were strengthened, and, mindful of the
fate of the hospital, a working party was ordered
to remove the thatch from the roof of the store.
The men who were not employed otherwise were
kept manning the parapets, and all were ready
at once to snatch up their rifles and again to hold
the post which they had guarded so long. A
friendly Kaffir was sent to Helpmakaar, saying
[75]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
that they were still safe, and asking for assist-
ance. About seven A.M. a mass of the enemy was
seen on the hills to the southwest, and it seemed
as if another onslaught was threatened. They
were advancing slowly when the remains of the
third column appeared in the distance, coming
from Insandhlwana, and, as the English ap-
proached, the threatening mass retired, and
finally disappeared.
Lord Chelmsford, Colonel Glyn, and that part
of their force which, having been engaged else-
where, had not been in the Insandhlwana camp
when it was attacked and taken, had passed the
night in sad and anxious bivouac among the
dead bodies of their comrades and the débris of
a most melancholy disaster. Full of disquietude
about the fate of the post at Rorke's Drift, and
the line of communications, they had pushed
on with earliest dawn. Their advanced guard
of mounted men strained eager eyes towards
Rorke's Drift. The British flag still waved over
the storehouse, and figures in red coats could be
seen moving about the place. But smoke was
rising where the hospital had stood, and, remem-
bering that the victorious Zulus at Insandhlwana
had clad themselves in the uniforms of the dead,
there was a moment of dread uncertainty to the
officer who was leading the way. But surely
that was a faint British cheer rising from the
[76]


Rorke's Drift
post! A few hundred yards more of advance,
and it was known that here at least no mistake
had been made; here courage and determination
had not been shown in vain; and that here some-
thing had been done to restore the confidence
in British prowess which had just received so
rude a shock elsewhere.
What a sight was the spot in the bright
morning sunlight! There lay hundreds of
Zulus either dead or gasping out the last
remains of life; there was the grim and gray
old warrior lying side by side with the young
man who had come “to wash his assegai”; there
a convulsive movement of arm or leg, the rolling
of a slowly glazing eye, or the heaving of a bullet-
pierced chest showed that life was not quite ex-
tinct; and there were the defenders, wan, battle-
stained, and weary, but with the proud light of
triumph in their glance, standing by the fortifi-
cations which they had so stoutly held — fortifi-
cations so small, so frail, that it seemed mar-
velous how they had been made to serve their
purpose. The skeleton of the hospital still was
there, but its roof and woodwork had fallen in,
and in the still smoking pile men were searching
for the remains of lost comrades. And there,
in the corner of the enclosure, reverently covered
and guarded, were the bodies of the dead who
had given their lives for England and sealed
[77]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
their devotion to duty with their blood. Well
might Lord Chelmsford congratulate the de-
fenders of Rorke's Drift on the brilliant stand
that they had made, and well might the colony
of Natal look upon them as saviours from cruel
invasion.
In telling the story of the events of the 22d,
it has been said that Major Spalding left Rorke's
Drift to seek reinforcements at Helpmakaar.
There he found two companies of the Twenty-
fourth, under Major Upcher, and with them he
at once commenced to march to the river post.
On their way they met several fugitives who as-
serted that the place had fallen, and when they
arrived within three miles of their destination, a
large body of Zulus was found barring the way,
while the flames of the burning hospital could
be seen rising from the river valley. It was only
too probable that if they went on they would
merely sacrifice to no purpose the only regular
troops remaining between the frontier and Pie-
termaritzburg. Helpmakaar was the principal
store depot for the center column, full of am-
munition and supplies, and it seemed best that
its safety should, at any rate, be provided for as
far as possible. The two companies were there-
fore ordered to return, and preparations for the
defence of the stores were commenced.
According to the closest estimate, the number
[78]


Rorke's Drift
of Zulus who attacked Rorke's Drift was about
four thousand, composed of Cetewayo's Undi
and Udkloko regiments, and about four hundred
dead bodies were buried near the post after the
attack. The wounded were all carried away
from the field. The loss of the garrison was
fifteen killed and twelve wounded, of whom two
died almost immediately.
[79]


IV
Maiwand and Candahar. The
Second Afghan War
August–September, 188o
By ARCHIBALD FORBES
that the long, bitter struggle was at last on
the eve of being ended. Sir Frederick
Roberts was the master of the region around
Cabul. Sir Donald Stewart, having marched
up from Candahar and fought on the way the
brilliant battle of Ahmed Kehl, was now at Cabul
in chief command. Mr. Griffin had announced
the recognition by the Viceroy of India and the
Government of the Queen Empress, of Abdur-
rahman Khan as Ameer of Cabul. The date
of the evacuation of Cabul by the British troops
had been approximately fixed, and it seemed all
but certain that before the end of the month both
Stewart and Roberts should have re-entered
British India with their brave but war-worn
regiments. But those arrangements were sud-
denly and ominously dislocated by the tidings
which reached the British headquarters at
Sherpur by telegraph, intimating the utter defeat
I. the early days of August, 1880, it seemed
[80]


og ºgCINYAAIyw Ly SNDm:0 tahl 50N laws





Maiwand and Candahar
at Maiwand of the force commanded by General
Burrows in the region between the Helmund
and Candahar.
In the early spring of 1880 Sir Donald Stewart
had quitted Candahar with the Bengal division
of his force, leaving there the Bombay division,
to the command of which General Primrose ac-
ceded, General Phayre assuming charge of the
communications. It was known that Ayoub
Khan was making hostile operations at Herat.
Shere Ali Khan, who had been Governor of
Candahar during Sir Donald Stewart's residence
there, had been nominated hereditary ruler of
the province, with the title of “Wali,” when it
was determined to separate Candahar from
Northeastern Afghanistan. On June 21 the
Wali, who had some days earlier crossed the
Helmund and occupied Girishk with his troops,
reported that Ayoub was actually on the march
towards the Candahar frontier, and asked for
the support of a British brigade to enable him to
cope with the hostile advance. There was war-
rant for the belief that the Wali's troops were
disaffected, and that he was in no condition to
meet Ayoub’s army with any likelihood of
SUICCeSS.
After Stewart's departure the strength of
the British forces at Candahar was dangerously
low, amounting to but forty-seven hundred of all
[81)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
ranks; but it was of great importance to arrest
Ayoub's offensive movement, and a brigade
consisting of a troop of horse artillery, six com-
panies of the Sixty-sixth Regiment, two Bombay
native infantry regiments, and five hundred
native troopers — in all about twenty-three hun-
dred strong, under the command of Brigadier
Burrows — reached the left bank of the Hel-
mund on July 11. On the 13th the Wali's in-
fantry, two thousand strong, mutinied en masse,
and marched away up the right bank of the river,
taking with them a battery of smooth-bore guns
which was a present to Shere Ali Khan from the
British Government. His cavalry did not be-
have quite so badly, but in effect his army no
longer existed, and Burrows's brigade was the
only force in the field to resist the advance of
Ayoub Khan, whose regular troops were re-
ported to number four thousand cavalry and
from four thousand to five thousand infantry,
exclusive of the two thousand deserters from the
Wali, with thirty guns and an irregular force of
uncertain strength.
Burrows promptly recaptured from Wali's
infantry the battery they were carrying off, and
punished them severely in their retreat. The
mutineers had removed or destroyed the sup-
plies which the Wali had accumulated for the
use of the British brigade, and Burrows therefore
[82 )


Maiwand and Candahar
could no longer remain in the vicinity of Girishk.
It was determined to fall back upon Khushk-i-
Nakhud, a position distant thirty miles from
Girishk and forty-five from Candahar — a point
where several roads from the Helmund con-
verged, and where supplies were plentiful. At
and about Khushk-i-Nakhud the brigade re-
mained from the 16th until the morning of the
27th of July.
While waiting and watching there, a despatch
from army headquarters at Simla was com-
municated to General Burrows from Can-
dahar, authorizing him to attack Ayoub if he
considered himself strong enough to beat him,
and informing him that it was regarded of the
greatest political importance that the force from
Herat should be dispersed and prevented from
moving in the direction of Ghuzni. Spies
brought in news that Ayoub had reached Girishk
and was distributing his force along the right
bank of the Helmund between that place and
Hyderabad. Cavalry patrols failed to find the
enemy until the 21st, when a detachment was
encountered in the village of Sangbur on the
northern road about midway between the Hel-
mund and Khushk-i-Nakhud. Next day that
village was found more strongly occupied, and
on the 23d a reconnaissance in force came upon
a body of Ayoub’s horsemen in the plain below
[83]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the Garmac hills about midway between Sang-
bur and Maiwand.
Those discoveries should have afforded toler-
ably clear indications of Ayoub’s intention to
turn Burrows's position by moving along the
northern road to Maiwand and thence pressing
through the Maiwand Pass, until at Singiri
Ayoub’s army should have interposed itself be-
tween the British brigade and Candahar. Why,
in the face of the information at his disposal and
of the precautions enjoined on him to hinder
Ayoub from slipping by him towards Ghuzni
through Maiwand and up the Khakrez valley,
General Burrows should have remained so long
at Khushk-i-Nakhud, is not intelligible. He
was stirred at length on the afternoon of the 26th
by the report that two thousand of Ayoub’s cav-
alry and a large body of his Ghazis were in pos-
session of Garmad and Maiwand, and were to
be promptly followed by Ayoub himself with the
main body of his army, his reported intention
being to push on through the Maiwand Pass
and reach the Urgandab valley in rear of the
British brigade. Later in the day Colonel St.
John, the political officer, reported to General
Burrows the intelligence which had reached him
that the whole of Ayoub's army was at Sangbur,
but credence was not given to this important
information.
[84]


Maiwand and Candahar
It was on the morning of the 27th that at
length the tardy resolution was taken to march
upon Maiwand. The expectation was indulged
that the brigade would arrive at that place before
the enemy should have occupied it in force; and
that this point made good, there might occur an
opportunity to drive out of Garmac the body of
Ayoub’s cavalry in possession there. There
was a further reason why Maiwand should be
promptly occupied: the brigade had been ob-
taining its supplies from that village and there
was still a quantity of grain in its vicinity, to lose
which would be unfortunate. The brigade, now
twenty-six hundred strong, struck camp on the
morning of the 27th.
The march to Maiwand was twelve miles
long, and an earlier start than 6.30 A.M.
would have been judicious. The soldiers
marched smartly, but halts from time to time
were necessary to allow the baggage to come
up: the hostile state of the country did not
admit of anything being left behind, and the
column was encumbered by a great quantity of
stores and baggage. At Karezah, eight miles
from Khushk-i-Nakhud and four miles south-
west of Maiwand, information was brought in
that the whole of Ayoub’s army was close by on
the left front of the brigade and marching
towards Maiwand. Burrows's spies had pre-
[85]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
viously proved themselves so untrustworthy that
little heed was taken of this report, but a little
later a cavalry reconnaissance found large bodies
of horsemen moving in the direction indicated,
and inclining away towards Garmac as the
brigade advanced. A thick haze made it im-
possible to discern what force, if any, was being
covered by the hostile cavalry. About 10 A.M.
the advance guard occupied the village of Mah-
mudabad, about three miles southwest of Mai-
wand. West of Mahmudabad and close to the
village was a broad and deep ravine running
north and south. Beyond this ravine was a
wide expanse of level and partially cultivated
plain, across which, almost entirely concealed
by the haze, Ayoub’s army was marching east-
ward towards Maiwand village, which covers
the western entrance to the pass of the same
name. If General Burrows's eye could have
penetrated that haze, probably he would have
considered it prudent to take up a defenisve posi-
tion, for which Mahmudabad presented not a
few advantages. But he remained firm in the
conviction that the enemy's guns were not yet
up, notwithstanding the reports of spies to the
contrary; he believed that a favorable oppor-
tunity presented itself for taking the initiative,
and he determined to attack with all practicable
speed.
[86]


Maiwand and Candahar
Lieutenant Maclaine, of the Horse Artillery, a
gallant young officer who was soon to meet a
melancholy fate, precipitated events in a some-
what reckless fashion. With the two guns he
commanded he dashed across the ravine, gal-
loped athwart the plain, and came into action
against a body of Afghan cavalry which had just
come into view. Brigadier Nuttall, command-
ing the cavalry and horse artillery, failing to re-
call the impetuous Maclaine, sent forward in
support of him the four remaining guns of the
battery. Those approached to within eight
hundred yards of the two advanced pieces, and
Maclaine was directed to fall back upon the bat-
tery pending the arrival of the brigade, which
General Burrows was now sending forward.
It crossed the ravine near Mahmudabad, ad-
vanced over the plain about a mile in a north-
westerly direction, and then formed up. There
ensued several changes in the preliminary dis-
positions. When the engagement became warm,
about noon, the formation was as follows: The
Sixty-sixth was on the right, its right flank
thrown back to check an attempt made to turn
it by a rush of Ghazis springing out of the ravine
in the British front; on the left of the Sixty-sixth
were four companies of Jacob's Rifles (Thirtieth
Native Infantry) and a company of sappers; the
center was occupied by the horse artillery and
[87]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
smooth-bore guns, of which latter, however, two
had been moved to the right flank; on the left
of the guns were the First Grenadiers, and
on the extreme left two companies of Jacob's
Rifles formed en potence. The cavalry was
in rear, engaged in half-hearted efforts to
prevent the Afghans from taking the British
infantry in reverse. The position of the British
brigade was radically faulty, and indeed invited
disaster. Both flanks were en l'air in face of an
enemy of greatly superior strength; almost from
the first every rifle was in the fighting line, and
the sole reserve consisted of the two cavalry
corps. The baggage had followed the brigade
across the ravine, and was halted about a thou-
sand yards in rear of the right, inadequately
guarded by detachments of cavalry.
For half an hour no reply was made by the
enemy to the British shell-fire, and it is possible
that an energetic offensive movement might at
this time have resulted in success. But pres-
ently battery after battery was brought into
action by the Afghans, until half an hour after
noon the fire of thirty guns was concentrated on
the brigade. Under cover of this artillery-fire'
the Ghazis from the ravine in front charged for-
ward to within five hundred yards of the Sixty-
sixth, but the rifle-fire of the British regiment
drove them back with heavy slaughter, and they
[88)


Maiwand and Candahar
recoiled as far as the ravine, whence they main-
tained a desultory fire. The enemy's artillery-
fire was well sustained and effective: the in-
fantry found some protection from it in lying
down, but the artillery and cavalry remained
exposed and suffered severely. An artillery
duel was carried on for two hours, greatly to the
disadvantage of the brigade, which had but
twelve guns in action against thirty well-served
Afghan pieces.
The prostrate infantry had escaped serious
punishment, but by 2 P.M. the cavalry had
lost fourteen per cent. of the men in the front
line and one hundred and forty-nine horses; the
Afghan cavalry had turned both of the Brit-
ish flanks, and the brigade was all but sur-
rounded, whilst a separate attack was being
made on the baggage. Heat and want of water
were telling heavily upon the Sepoys, who were
further demoralized by the Afghan artillery-fire.
A little later the smooth-bore guns had to be
withdrawn because of the expenditure of their
ammunition. This was the signal for the gen-
eral advance of the Afghans. Their guns were
pushed forward with great boldness; their cav-
alry streamed round the British left; in the right
rear were masses of mounted and dismounted
irregulars who had seized the villagers on the
British line of retreat. Swarms of Ghazis soon
[89)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
showed themselves, threatening the center and
left; those in front of the Sixty-sixth were still
held in check by the steady volleys fired by that
regiment. At sight of the fanatic Ghazis and
cowed by the heavy artillery fire and the loss of
their officers, the two companies of Jacob's Rifles
on the left flank suddenly fell into confusion,
and broke into the ranks of the Grenadiers. .
That regiment had behaved well, but now it
caught the infection of demoralization; the whole
left collapsed, and the Sepoys in utter panic, sur-
rounded by and intermingled with the Ghazis,
rolled in a great wave upon the right. The
artillerymen and sappers made a gallant stand,
fighting the Ghazis hand-to-hand with hand-
spikes and rammers, while the guns poured
canister into the advancing Afghan masses.
Slade reluctantly limbered up and took his four
horse-guns out of action; Maclaine remained in
action until the Ghazis were at the muzzles of
his two guns, which fell into the enemy's hands.
The torrent of mingled Sepoys and Ghazis broke
in upon the Sixty-sixth, and overwhelmed that
gallant and devoted regiment. The slaughter
of the Sepoys was appalling: so utterly cowed
were they that they scarcely attempted to de-
fend themselves, and allowed themselves without
resistance to be dragged out of the ranks and
slaughtered. A cavalry charge was ordered in
[90)


Maiwand and Candahar
the direction of the captured guns, but it failed,
and the troopers retired in disorder. The in-
fantry, assailed by hordes of fierce and trium-
phant fanatics, staggered away to the right, the
Sixty-sixth alone maintaining any show of forma-
tion until the ravine was crossed, when the
broken remnants of the Sepoy regiments took
to flight towards the east, and the general's
efforts to rally them proved wholly unavailing.
The Sixty-sixth, with some of the sappers and
Grenadiers, made a gallant rally round its colors
in an enclosure near the village of Khig. There
Colonel Galbraith and several of his officers were
killed, and the little body of brave men, becom-
ing out-flanked, continued its retreat, making
stand after stand until most were slain. The
Afghans pursued for about four miles, but were
checked by a detachment of rallied cavalry, and
then desisted. The fugitive force, forming with
wounded and baggage a straggling column up-
wards of six miles long, crossed the waterless
desert sixteen miles wide to Haurs-i-Madat,
which was reached about midnight and where
water was found. From Asu Khan, where cul-
tivation began, to Kokoran, near Candahar, the
retreat was harassed by armed villagers, and the
troops had to fight more or less all the way.
Officers and men were killed, Lieutenant Mac-
laine was taken prisoner, and five of the smooth-
[91]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
bore guns had to be abandoned because of the
exhaustion of the teams. About midday of the
twenty-eighth the shattered remains of the
brigade reached Candahar. When the casual-
ties were ascertained, it became evident how
disastrous to the British arms had been the com-
bat of Maiwand. Out of a total of twenty-four
hundred and seventy-six engaged, no fewer
than nine hundred and sixty-four were killed.
The wounded numbered one hundred and sixty-
seven; three hundred and thirty-one followers
and two hundred and one horses were killed,
and seven followers and sixty-eight horses were
wounded. Since Chillianwallah the British
arms in Asia had not suffered loss so severe.
The spirit of the Candahar force suffered
materially from the Maiwand disaster, and it
was held that there was no alternative but to ac-
cept a siege within the fortified city. The can-
tonments were abandoned; the whole force was
withdrawn into Candahar, and was detailed for
duty on the city walls. The effective garrison
on the night of the 28th numbered forty-three
hundred and sixty, including the survivors of the
Maiwand misfortune. So alert were the Af-
ghans that a cavalry reconnaissance made on
the morning of the 29th found the cantonments
plundered and partly burned and the vicinity of
Candahar swarming with armed men. The
[92 )


Maiwand and Candahar
whole Afghan population, amounting to about
twelve thousand persons, was compelled to leave
the city, and then the work of placing it in a state
of defence was energetically undertaken. Build-
ings and enclosures affording cover too close to
the enceinte were razed, communication along
the walls was opened up, and gun-platforms
were constructed in the more commanding posi-
tions. The weak places as well as the gates were
faced with abattis, the defects were made good
with sandbags, and wire entanglements and
other obstacles were laid down outside the walls.
The covering parties were in daily collision with
the enemy, and occasional sharp skirmishes
occurred.
On August 8 Ayoub opened fire on the citadel
from Piquet hill, an elevation northwestward of
the city, and a few days later he brought guns
into action from the villages of Deh Khoja and
Deh Khati on the east and south. This fire had
little effect, and the return fire gave good results.
It was not easy to invest the city, since on the
west and north there was no cover for the be-
siegers; but in Deh Khoja on the east there was
ample protection for batteries, and the ground
on the southwest was very favorable. Deh Khoja
was inconveniently near the Cabul gate of the
city, and it was always full of men. So menacing
was the attitude of the Afghans that a sortie was
[93]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
resorted to against the village, which was con-
ducted with resolution but resulted in utter
failure. The attempt was made on the morning
of the 16th. The cavalry went out to hinder
reinforcements from entering the village to the
eastward. An infantry force, eight hundred
strong, commanded by that gallant soldier
Brigadier-General Brooke, moved out later cov-
ered by a heavy artillery-fire from the city walls.
The village was reached, but was so full of
enemies in occupation of the fortress-like houses
that it was found untenable. In the course of
the retirement General Brooke and Captain
Cruickshank were killed. The casualties were
very heavy: one hundred and six were killed,
and one hundred and seventeen were wounded.
The tidings of the Maiwand disaster reached
Cabul on the 29th of July by telegram from
Simla. The intention of the military authori-
ties had already been intimated that the Cabul
force should evacuate Afghanistan in two sep-
arate bodies and by two distinct routes. Sir
Donald Stewart was to march one party by the
Khyber route; the other, under Sir Frederick
Roberts, was to retire by the Kuram valley,
which Watson's division had been garrisoning
since Roberts had crossed the Shaturgardan in
September, 1879. But the Maiwand news in-
[94]


Maiwand and Candahar
terfered with those dispositions. Stewart and
Roberts concurred in the necessity of retrieving
the Maiwand disaster by the despatch of a divi-
sion from Cabul. -
Roberts promptly offered to command that
division, and as promptly the offer was ac-
cepted by Stewart. By arrangement with
the latter, Roberts telegraphed to Simla urg-
ing that a force should be despatched from
Cabul to Candahar without delay; and rec-
ognizing that the authorities might hesitate
to send on this errand troops already under
orders to return to India, he took it on himself
to guarantee that none of the soldiers would
demur provided he should be authorized to give
the assurance that after the work in the field was
over they would not be detained in garrison at
Candahar. The Viceroy's sanction came on
August 3. The constitution and equipment of
the force were entrusted to the two generals;
and in reply to questions his Excellency was in-
formed that Roberts would march on the 8th
instant, and expected to reach Candahar on the
2d of September. Sir Donald Stewart chival-
rously gave his junior full freedom to select the
troops to accompany him, and placed at his dis-
posal the entire resources of the army in trans-
port and equipment.
It cannot truly be said that it was the
[95]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
élite of the Cabul field force which constituted
the column led by Roberts on his famous
march to Candahar. Of the native infantry
regiments of his own original force which he
had mustered eleven months previously in
the Kuram valley, only two followed him to
Candahar. The second mountain-battery ad-
hered to him staunchly. Of his original white
troops the Ninth Lancers, as ever, were ready
for the march. His senior European infantry
regiment, the Sixty-seventh, would fain have
gone, but the good old corps was weak from
casualties and sickness, and the gallant Knowles
denied himself in the interests of his men. Rob-
erts's two Highland regiments had done an
infinity of marching and fighting; but both had
received strong drafts, were in fine condition,
and were not to be hindered from following the
chief whom they swore by as one man.
Sir Frederick Roberts had already represented
that it would be impolite to require the native
regiments to remain absent from India and their
homes for a longer period than two years. In
the case of many of the regiments that term was
closely approached, and the men after prolonged
absence and arduous toil needed rest, and were
longing to rejoin their families. It was not with
eager desire that the honor of marching to Can-
dahar was claimed. The enthusiasm which
[96]


Maiwand and Candahar
carried Roberts's force with exceptional rapidity
to Candahar was an aftergrowth evolved by the
enterprise itself, and came as a response to the
unfailing spirit which animated the leader him-
self. Colonel Chapman, R.A., who had served
in the same capacity with Sir Donald Stewart,
was now Roberts's chief-of-staff. The march-
ing-out strength of the column was about ten
thousand men, of whom twenty-eight hundred and
thirty-five were Europeans. Speed was an ob-
ject, and since the column might have to traverse
rough ground, no wheeled artillery or transport
accompanied it: the guns were carried on mules,
the baggage was severely cut down, the supplies
were reduced to a minimum, and the transport
animals, numbering eighty-five hundred and
ninety, consisted of mules, ponies, and donkeys.
It was known that the country could supply
flour, sheep, and forage. -
The time named for the departure of the
marching column from Sherpur was kept to the
day, thanks to assiduous organization. On
August 8 the brigades moved out a short dis-
tance into camp, and on the following morning
the long march began in earnest. The distance
from Cabul to Candahar is about three hundred
and twenty miles, and the march naturally divided
itself into three parts: — From Cabul to Ghuzni,
ninety-eight miles; from Ghuzni to Khelat-i-
[97)


Famous Battle ºf the XIXTH Century
Ghilzai, one hundred and thirty-four miles; and
from Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Candahar, eighty-eight
miles. Ghuzni was reached on the seventh
day, the daily average being fourteen miles —
excellent work for troops unseasoned to long,
continuous travel, tramping steadily in a tem-
perature of from 84° to 92° in the shade. When
possible the force moved on a broad front, the
brigades and regiments leading in rotation, and
halts were made at specified intervals. The
“rouse” sounded at 2.45 A.M., and the march
began at four; the troops were generally in camp
by 2 P.M., and the baggage was ordinarily re-
ported all up by five; but the rear-guard had
both hard work and long hours. Nowhere was
there any indication of opposition; not a single
load of baggage was left behind, comparatively
few men fell out footsore, and the troops were
steadily increasing in endurance and capacity
for rapid and continuous marching.
At Ghuzni there was no rest-day, and the
steadfast, dogged march was resumed on the
morning of the 16th. The strain of this day's
long tramp of twenty miles to Yarghatta was
severe, but the men rallied gamely, and the gen-
eral, by dint of care and expedient, was able to
keep up the high pressure. The method of
marching employed individual intelligence and
called on all for exertion in overcoming the
[98]


Maiwand and Candahar
difficulties of the march, in bearing its extraor-
dinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishment
of the paramount object. On the 20th, a dis-
tance of twenty-one miles was covered — the
longest day's march made. The effort was dis-
tressing owing to the heat and lack of shade, but
it was enforced by the absence of water. There
was no relaxation in the rate of marching, and
Khelat-i-Ghilzai was reached on the eighth day
from Ghuzni, showing a daily average of nearly
seventeen miles.
The 24th was a halt-day at Khelat-i-Ghilzai,
where Sir Frederick Roberts received a letter
from General Primrose in Candahar describing
the unfortunate sortie on the Deh Khoja village
and giving details of his situation. It was re-
solved to evacuate Khelat-i-Ghilzai and carry
forward its garrison with the column, which on
the 25th resumed its march on Candahar. On
his arrival at Tirandaz on the following day,
the general found a letter from Candahar in-
forming him that at the news of the approach
of the Cabul force Ayoub Khan had withdrawn
from his investment of Candahar, and had
shifted his camp to the village of Mazra in the
Urgandab valley, nearly due north of Candahar.
On the morning of the 27th, General Hugh
Gough was sent forward with two cavalry regi-
ments a distance of thirty-four miles to Robat,
[99].


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the main column moving on to Khel Akhund,
half-way to the earlier-named place. Gough
was accompanied by Captain Straton, the prin-
cipal signalling officer of the force, who was suc-
cessful in communicating with Candahar; and
the same afternoon Colonel St. John, Major
Leach, and Major Adam rode out to Robat,
bringing the information that Ayoub Khan was
engaged in strengthening his position in the
Urgandab valley, and apparently had the inten-
tion of risking the issue of a battle. On the
28th the whole force was concentrated at Robat;
and as it was desirable that the troops should
reach Candahar fresh and ready for prompt
action, the general wisely decided to make the
29th a rest-day and to divide the nineteen miles
from Robat to Candahar into two short marches.
The long forced march from Cabul may be re-
garded as having ended at Robat. The dis-
tance between those two extremities, three hun-
dred and three miles, had been covered in twenty
days. It is customary in a long march to allow
two rest-days in each week, but Roberts had
granted his force but a single rest-day in the
twenty days of its strenuous marching. In-
cluding this rest-day, the average daily march
was a fraction over fifteen miles. As a feat of
marching by a regular force of ten thousand men
encumbered with baggage, transport, and fol-
[100 }


Maiwand and Candahar
lowers, this achievement is unique, and could
have been accomplished only by thorough or-
ganization and steady, vigorous energy. Sir
Frederick Roberts was so fortunate as to en-
counter no opposition that might delay or hinder
his progress. For this immunity he was in-
debted mainly to the stern lessons given to the
tribesmen by Sir Donald Stewart at Ahmed-
Kehl and Urzoo while that resolute soldier was
marching from Candahar to Cabul, and in a
measure also to the good offices of the new
Ameer.
But it must be pointed out that he had
no assurance of exemption from hostile efforts
to block his path, and that he marched ever
ready to fight. It will long be remembered
how, after Roberts had started on the long,
swift march, the suspense regarding its issue
grew and swelled until the strain became in-
tense. The safety of the garrison of Candahar
was in grave hazard; the British prestige, im-
paired by the disaster of Maiwand, was trem-
bling in the balance. The days passed, and
there came no news of Roberts and of the ten
thousand men with whom the wise, daring little
chief had cut loose from any base and struck for
his goal through a region of ill-repute for fanat-
icism and bitter hostility. Not a few pessimists
held him to be marching on his ruin. But Rob-
[101)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
erts marched light; he lived on what the country
supplied; he gave the tribesmen no time to con-
centrate against him; and so, two days in ad-
vance of the time he had set himself, he reached
Candahar at the head of a force in full freshness
of vigor and burning with ardor for immediate
battle under their trusted leader.
On the morning of August 31 the force reached
Candahar. Sir Frederick Roberts, who had
been suffering from fever for some days, was
able to leave his dhooly and mount his horse in
time to meet General Primrose and his officers
to the eastward of Deh Khoja. The troops
halted and breakfasted outside the Shikarpur
gate while the general entered the city and paid
a visit to the Wali, Shere Ali Khan. On his
arrival he assumed command of the troops in
Southern Afghanistan; and he remained resting
in the city while the Cabul force was marching
to its selected camping-ground near the de-
stroyed cantonments to the northwest of Can-
dahar. A few shots were fired, but the ground
was taken up without opposition. Baker's
brigade was on the right, in rear of Piquet hill;
in the center was Macpherson's brigade, cov-
ered to its front by Karez hill; and on the left
among orchards and enclosures was Macgregor's
brigade, in rear of which was the cavalry.
Although Ayoub Khan had broken off his
[102)


Maiwand and Candahar
beleaguerment of Candahar, he had withdrawn
from that fortified city but a short distance, and
the position which he had taken up was one of
considerable strength. The Urgandab valley is
separated on the northwest from the Candahar
plain by a long, precipitous spur trending south-
west from the mountainous mass forming the
eastern boundary of the valley farther north.
Where the spur quits the main range due north
of the city, the Murcha pass affords communi-
cation between Candahar and the Urgandab
valley. The spur, its summit serrated by alter-
nate heights and depressions, is again crossed
lower down by an easy pass known as the Baba
Wali Kotal. It is continued beyond this saddle
for about a mile, still maintaining its southwest-
erly trend, never losing its precipitous character,
and steeply escarped on its eastern face; and it
finally ends in the plain after a steep descent of
several hundred feet. The section of it from
the Baba Wali Kotal to its southwestern termina-
tion is known as the Pir Paimal hill, from a vil-
lage of that name in the valley near its extremity.
Ayoub Khan had made his camp near the vil-
lage of Mazra, behind the curtain formed by
the spur just described, and about a mile higher
up in the valley than the point at which the spur
is crossed by the road over the Baba Wali Kotal.
He was thus, with that point artificially strength-
[103)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century.
ened and defended by artillery, well protected
against a direct attack from the direction of Can-
dahar, and was exposed only to the risk of a
turning movement round the extremity of the
Pir Paimal hill. Such a movement might be
made the reverse of easy. A force advancing
to attempt it must do so exposed to fire from the
commanding summit of the Pir Paimal; around
the base of that rugged elevation there were
several plain-villages and an expanse of enclosed
orchards and gardens which, strongly held, were
capable of stubborn defence. In the valley
behind the Pir Paimal hill there was the lofty
detached Kharoti hill, the fire from which would
meet in the teeth a force essaying the turning
movement; and the interval between the two
hills, through which was the access to the Mazra
camps, was obstructed by deep irrigation chan-
nels, the banks of which afforded cover for de-
fensive fire and could be swept by a cross-fire
from the hills on either flank.
Sir Frederick Roberts had perceived at a
glance that a direct attack on Ayoub’s position
by the Baba Wali Kotal must involve very heavy
loss, and he resolved on the alternative of turn-
ing the Afghan position. A reconnaissance was
made on the afternoon of the 31st by General
Gough, accompanied by Colonel Chapman.
They penetrated to within a short distance of
[104]


Maiwand and Candahar
the village of Pir Paimal, where it was ascer-
tained that the enemy were strongly entrenched
and where several guns were unmasked. A
great deal of valuable information was obtained
before the enemy began to interfere with Gough's
leisurely withdrawal. The escorting cavalry
suffered little, but the Sikh infantry covering
the retirement of the reconnaissance were hard
pressed by great masses of Afghan regulars and
irregulars.
So boldly did the enemy come on that the
third and part of the first brigade had to
come into action, and the firing did not cease
until the evening. The enemy were clearly in
the belief that the reconnaissance was an ad-
vance in force which they had been able to check,
and indeed drive in; and they were opportunely
audacious in the misapprehension that they had
gained a success. The information brought in
decided the general to attack on the following
morning; and having matured his dispositions,
he explained them personally to his commanding
officers in the early morning of September 1.
They were extremely lucid, and the plan of
attack was perfectly simple. The Baba Wali
Kotal was to be plied with a brisk cannonade
and threatened by demonstrations both of cav-
alry and of infantry, while the first and second
brigades, with the third in reserve, were to turn
[105)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the extremity of the Pir Paimal hill, force the
enemy's right in the interval between that hill
and the Kharoti eminence opposite, take in re-
verse the Baba Wali Kotal, and pressing on up
the Urgandab valley, carry Ayoub’s principal
camp at Mazra. The Bombay cavalry brigade
was to watch the roads over the Murcha and
Baba Wali Kotal, supported by infantry and
artillery belonging to General Primrose's com-
mand, part of which was also detailed for the
protection of the city, and to hold the ground
from which the Cabul brigades were to advance.
General Gough was to take the cavalry of the
Cabul column across the Urgandab, so as to
reach by a wide circuit the anticipated line of
the Afghan retreat.
Soon after 9 A.M. on the 1st September the
forty-pounder on the right of Piquet hill began
a vigorous cannonade of the Baba Wali Kotal,
which was sturdily replied to by the three field-
guns which the enemy had in battery on that
elevation. It had been early apparent that
Ayoub’s army was in great heart, and, seem-
ingly meditating an offensive operation, had
moved out so far into the plain as to occupy the
villages of Mulla Sahibdad opposite the British
right and of Gundigan on the left front of the
British left. Both villages were right in the
fair-way of Roberts's intended line of advance;
[106]


Maiwand and Candahar
they, the adjacent enclosures, and the interval
between the villages were strongly held; and
manifestly the first thing to be done was to force
the enemy back from those advanced positions.
Two batteries opened a heavy shell-fire on the
Sahibdad village, under cover of which Mac-
pherson advanced his brigade against it, the
Second Goorkhas and Ninety-second High-
landers in his first line. Simultaneously Baker
moved out to the assault of Gundigan, clearing
the gardens and orchards between him and that
village, and keeping touch as he advanced with
the first brigade.
The shell-fire compelled the Afghan occupants
of Sahibdad to lie close, and it was not until they
were near the village that Macpherson's two
leading regiments encountered much opposition.
It was carried at the bayonet-point after a very
stubborn resistance; the place was swarming
with Ghazis who threw their lives away reck-
lessly, and continued to fire on the British sol-
diers from houses and cellars after the streets
had been cleared. The Ninety-second lost sev-
eral men, but the Afghans were severely pun-
ished — it was reported that two hundred were
killed in this village alone. While a detachment
remained to clear out the village, the brigade,
under a heavy fire from the slopes and crest of
the Pir Paimal hill, moved on in the direction of
[107 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
that hill's southwestern extremity, the progress
of the troops impeded by obstacles in the shape
of dry water-cuts, orchards, and walled enclo-
sures, every yard of which was infested by ene-
mies and had to be made good by steady fighting.
While Macpherson was advancing on Sahib-
dad, Baker's brigade had been pushing on
through complicated lanes and walled enclosures
towards the village of Gundigan. The opposi-
tion here was also very resolute. The Afghans
held their ground behind loopholed walls which
had to be carried by storm, and they did not
hesitate to take the offensive by making vigorous
counter-rushes. Baker's two leading regiments
were the Seventy-second and the Second Sikhs.
The left wing of the former, supported by the
Fifth Goorkhas, the old and tried comrades of
the Seventy-second, assailed and took the village.
Its right wing fought its way through the or-
chards between it and Sahibdad, in the course
of which work it came under a severe enfilading
fire from a loopholed wall which the Sikhs on
the right were attempting to turn.
Captain Frome and several men had been
struck down, and the hot fire had staggered
the Highlanders, when their chief, Colonel
Brownlow, came up on foot. That gallant
soldier gave the word for a rush, and immediately
fell mortally wounded. After much hard fight-
[108)


Maiwand and Candahar
ing Baker's brigade got forward into more
open country, but was then exposed to the fire
of an Afghan battery near the extremity of the
Pir Paimal spur, and to the attacks of great
bodies of Ghazis, which were stoutly withstood
by the Sikhs and driven off by a bayonet attack
delivered by the Highlanders.
The two leading brigades had accomplished
the first portion of their arduous day's work.
They were now in alignment with each other;
and the task before them was to accomplish the
turning movement round the steep extremity of
the Pir Paimal ridge. Macpherson's brigade,
hugging the face of the steep elevation, brought
up the left shoulder, and having effected the
turning movement, swept up the valley and car-
ried the village of Pir Paimal by a series of
rushes. Here, however, Major White (now
Commander-in-Chief in India), commanding
the advance of the Gordons, found himself con-
fronted by great masses of the enemy, who ap-
peared determined to make a resolute stand
about their guns in position southwest of the
Baba Wali Kotal.
Reinforcements were observed hurrying up
from Ayoub’s standing camp at Mazra, and
the Afghan guns, on the Kotal had been re-
versed so that their fire should enfilade the
British advance. Discerning that in such cir-
[109]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
cumstances prompt action was imperative,
Macpherson determined to storm the position
without waiting for reinforcements. The Ninety-
second under Major White led the way, covered
by the fire of a field-battery and supported by
the Fifth Goorkhas and the Twenty-third Pio-
neers. Springing from out a watercourse at the
challenge of their leader, the Highlanders rushed
across the open front. The Afghans, sheltered
by high banks, fired steadily and well; their rifle-
men from the Pir Paimal slopes poured in a
sharp cross-fire; their guns were well served.
But the Scottish soldiers were not to be denied.
Their losses were severe, but they took the Af-
ghan guns at the point of the bayonet, and, val-
iantly supported by the Goorkhas and Pioneers,
shattered and dispersed the mass of Afghans,
reckoned to have numbered some eight thousand
men. No chance was given the enemy to rally.
They were headed off from the Pir Paimal slopes
by Macpherson. Baker hustled them out of
cover in the watercourses in the basin on the
left; and while one stream of fugitives poured
away across the river, another was rolled back-
ward into and through Ayoub’s camp at Mazra.
While Macpherson had effected his turning
movement close under the ridge, Baker's troops
on the left had to make a wider sweep before
bringing up the left shoulder and wheeling into
[110]


Maiwand and Candahar
the hollow between the Pir Paimal and the
Kharoti hill. They swept out of their path what
opposition they encountered, and moved up the
center of the hollow, where their commander
halted them until Macpherson's brigade on the
right, having accomplished its more active work,
should come up and restore the alignment.
Baker had sent Colonel Money with a half-bat-
talion away to the left to take possession of the
Kharoti hill, where he found and captured three
Afghan guns. Pressing on towards the northern
edge of the hill, Money, to his surprise, found
himself in full view of Ayoub’s camp, and in
rear of which a line of cavalry was drawn up.
Money was not strong enough to attack single-
handed, and he therefore sent to General Baker
for reinforcements, which, however, could not
be spared him, and the gallant Money had
perforce to remain looking on while the ad-
vance of Macpherson and Baker caused the
evacuation of Ayoub’s camp and the flight of
his cavalry and infantry towards the Urgandab.
But the discovery and capture of five more
Afghan cannon near Baba Wali village afforded
him some consolation for the enforced inaction.
Considerable numbers of Ayoub’s troops had
earlier pushed through the Baba Wali pass, and
had moved down towards the right front of Gen-
eral Burrows's Bombay brigade in position about
[111 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Piquet hill. Having assured himself that Bur-
rows was able to hold his own, Sir Frederick
Roberts ordered Macgregor to move the third
brigade forwards towards Pir Paimal village,
whither he himself rode. On his arrival there
he found that the first and second brigades were
already quite a mile in advance. The battle
really had already been won; but there being no
open view to the front, General Ross, who com-
manded the whole infantry division, had no
means of discerning this result; and, anticipat-
ing the likelihood that Ayoub’s camp at Mazra
would have to be taken by storm, he had halted
the brigades to replenish ammunition.
This delay gave opportunity for the entire
evacuation of the Afghan camp, which when
reached without any further opposition and en-
tered at 1 P.M. was found to be deserted. The
tents had been left standing. “All the rude
equipage of a half-barbarous army had been
hurriedly abandoned—the meat in the cooking-
pots, the bread half-kneaded in the earthen
vessels, the bazaar with its ghee pots, dried
fruits, flour, and corn.” Ayoub's great mar-
quee had been precipitately abandoned, and
the fine carpets covering its floor had been
left. But in the hurry of their flight the
Afghans had found opportunity to illustrate
their barbarism by the murder of their pris-
[112]


Maiwand and Candahar
oner, Lieutenant Maclaine, whose body was
found near Ayoub’s tent with the throat cut.
To this bloody deed Ayoub does not seem to
have been privy. The Sepoys who were pris-
oners with Maclaine testified that Ayoub fled
about eleven o'clock, leaving the prisoners in
charge of the guard with no instructions beyond
a verbal order that they were not to be killed.
It was more than an hour later when the guard
ordered the unfortunate young officer out of his
tent and took his life.
The victory was complete, and Ayoub’s army
was in full rout. Unfortunately, no cavalry was
in hand for a pursuit from the Mazra camp.
The scheme for intercepting the fugitive Afghans
by sending the cavalry brigade on a wide move-
ment across the Urgandab to strike the line of
their probable retreat towards the Khakrez val-
ley may have been ingenious in conception, but
in practice did not have the desired effect.
Ayoub Khan, however, had been decisively de-
feated. He had lost the whole of his artillery,
numbering thirty-two pieces, his camp, an im-
mense quantity of ammunition, about one thou-
sand men killed; his army was dispersed, and he
himself was a fugitive with a mere handful along
with him of the army of twelve thousand men
which he had commanded in the morning.
The battle of 1st September having brought
[113]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the Afghan war to a close, Sir Frederick Roberts
quitted Candahar on the 9th, and marched to
Quetta with part of his division. On 15th Oc-
tober at Sibi he resigned his command, and, tak-
ing sick leave to England, sailed from Bombay
on the 30th. His year of hard and successful
service in Afghanistan greatly enhanced his
reputation as a prompt, skilful, and enterprising
soldier. His subsequent career is familiar to all.
[114]


V
The Boer War of 1881
By ARCHIBALD FORBES
HE Boers of the Transvaal are descended
| from the settlers brought to the Cape
by the Dutch East India Company in
the seventeenth century. In 1814 the colony
was finally ceded to Great Britain by the King
of the Netherlands. The Boers had been in-
tolerant of the stern rule of the masters of their
own nationality, and they chafed not less under
the milder dominion of the later English gov-
ernment. The truth was, and still is, that the
Boers from the first have disliked all government,
especially when it clashed with their ideas re-
garding their rights over the natives. A dis-
turbance which occurred in 1815 led to the
“great trek,” as the emigration of the Boers
from Cape Colony was called — a movement
which resulted in their settlement in the Trans-
vaal and in the territory now known as the
Orange Free State.
Up to 1852 the British government theo-
retically extended up to the twenty-fifth degree
of latitude. But no attempt was made to
enforce this claim, and in the end even the
[115]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
shadow of suzerainty was renounced when,
on the 17th of January, 1852, the Sand River
Convention was entered into between the
British Government and the delegates of the
Transvaal Boers, by which Great Britain for-
mally renounced all rights over the country
north of the Vaal river. Originally there were
four republics in the Transvaal, but in 1860
they were united into one under the title of the
“South African Republic.”
The South African Republic did not prosper.
From the first it was impecunious, and within a
decade after its establishment it was practically
insolvent. The discovery, in 1867, of diamonds
and of gold brought into the country a rush of
strangers, whose energy and enterprise might
have altered the condition of the Transvaal but
for the lethargy and obstinate isolation of the
Boer population. Burgers, the last president
before the annexation, was a man of vigor and
talent, but the stolid and ignorant Boers declined
to be welded by him into a nation. In a war
upon which they entered with Sekukuni, a
powerful native chief, their poltroonery was
flagrant. The fighting was done for them by
the warlike native tribe of Amaswazis, who were
so disgusted with the cowardice of their white
allies that they left them in dudgeon. When
the Boers had to do their own work their hearts
[116]


The Boer War of 1881
failed them, and they fled ignominiously. Bur-
gers, with tears, strove to rally them, but in
vain, and he begged them to shoot him rather
than disgrace him. But they shrugged their
shoulders, and more than two-thirds of them
“trekked” home, leaving him hemmed in and
powerless.
The republic was encircled by native enemies
all round the Transvaal borders, all waiting for
the impending onslaught by Cetewayo, the Zulu
king, the master of a formidable army which
lay on the frontier ready to strike, and restrained
from immediate hostilities against the Boers —
who had provoked him by many encroachments
— only by his fear of the English and the per-
sonal influence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone,
the Native Secretary of Natal. On the north-
east the Amaswazis brooded in sullen discon-
tent; northward, within and beyond the frontier,
anarchy raged; and in the west the Bekhuanas
were waiting for their opportunity. Finan-
cially the republic was hopelessly insolvent.
The Boers set their faces against taxation. It
is a notorious fact that when Shepstone annexed
the Transvaal there was found in the public
treasury only twelve shillings and sixpence, part
of which was base coin. Clearly a crisis was
impending which threatened to involve South
Africa in great peril. The annexation was no
[117)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
sudden act. The Blue-books contain remon-
strance on remonstrance addressed by British
officials to the Transvaal authorities. At length
Lord Carnarvon's forbearance was exhausted.
Shepstone was sent for to England, and received
a commission of date 5th October, 1876, di-
recting him, should the emergency render such
a course necessary, to annex the Transvaal to
her Majesty's dominions. Shepstone, escorted
by twenty-five mounted policemen and a few
officials, reached Pretoria in February, 1877.
It was an open secret that he was empowered to
annex the country if he deemed it advisable, but
he expressed his readiness to refrain from that
step if certain reforms were carried out. The
Boers would have no reforms, and on April 12,
1877, Shepstone issued a proclamation formally
annexing the Transvaal to Great Britain. For
some time the Boers remained sullenly quiet.
A few of them rendered good and loyal service
with Sir Evelyn Wood during the Zulu war, but
the main body stood aloof. Sir Owen Lanyon
succeeded Shepstone as Administrator of the
Transvaal, and from the first was unpopular
with the Boers. At the close of the Zulu war
Sir Garnet Wolseley, who held the position of
High Commissioner for Southeastern Africa,
came up into the Transvaal with a considerable
strength of regular and irregular troops. During
[118)


The Boer War of 1881
his stay no actual émeute occurred, but there
were ominous demonstrations, which would
probably have come to a head but for the pres-
ence of the troops. The Boer discontent was
enhanced by the positive intimation from the
Colonial Secretary that “under no circum-
stances whatever would the Transvaal inde-
pendence be restored to the Boers,” and by Sir
Garnet's less prosaic but equally resolute utter-
ance, that “so long as the sun shone and the
Vaal river flowed to the sea the Transvaal would
remain British territory.” He finally left the
Transvaal in March, 1880, and the troops in
that territory were gradually reduced until in
November of the same year they consisted of but
thirteen companies of infantry, two troops of
mounted infantry, and four guns, distributed in
detachments in some half-dozen garrisons scat-
tered over the country.
Throughout the land there was a deceptive
peace, which lulled Lanyon into a sense of se-
curity, and to some extent deceived Wolseley.
The Boers were playing the waiting game. Mr.
Gladstone became Premier in March, 1880.
Taking it for granted that he would act on the
lines of his speeches when in Opposition, the
Boer leaders called on him to rescind the an-
nexation. The answer of the Government came
in the curt telegram: “Under no circumstances
[119)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be
relinquished.” There was consternation among
the Boers; the British inhabitants, trusting im-
plicitly in an assurance so specific, rejoiced
greatly and bought land without hesitation. In
the matter of taxation the Boers had always pre-
sented a passive resistance against the British
rule, but Lanyon's officials considered that they
might now crush this resistance by active meas-
ures. A Boer named Bezuidenhuit was levied
on, and in default of payment a seizure was
made. Bezuidenhuit and his friends forcibly
recovered the article seized, and an attempt to
arrest him was thwarted by a gathering of Boers.
At a mass meeting on the 13th of December,
1880, it was decided that the South African Re-
public should be restored; it was resolved to
fight for independence, and a triumvirate con-
sisting of Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius was
appointed to administer the Government. On
the 16th the republic was proclaimed at Heidel-
berg, which became the headquarters of the new
Government. A large body of Boers took pos-
session of that place, another went to Potchef-
strom, and a third “commando” was detailed
to another service presently to be described.
Lanyon was powerless to interfere, and he and
the English in Pretoria had to await events,
pending the expected arrival of the detachment
[120)


The Boer War of 1881
of the Ninety-fourth Regiment which had been
ordered up from Lydenburg, whence it was
known to have moved on December 5. This
ill-fated body was destined never to reach Pre-
toria. On the march Colonel Anstruther had
frequent warnings of danger, to which he paid
insufficient heed; there prevailed in the force the
rooted belief that the Boers did not intend serious
mischief. It was scarcely to be expected that
the men who had pusillanimously recoiled from
before Sekukuni's spear-armed natives would
venture to assail a body of British regular in-
fantry. But long before the end of this miser-
able war the valor and constancy of the Boers,
not less than their moderation and humanity,
had come to be acknowledged and admired. In
this, their first conflict with the “red soldiers,”
their unerring marksmanship was the chief
surprise.
The scouting duties of Colonel Anstruther's
detachment were performed with carelessness;
else, whatever might have been its fate, it would
not have been taken by surprise. About noon
on December 20th the little column, marching at
ease, was approaching Bronkhorst Spruit. The
ground traversed by the road was sparsely
wooded, sloping down from either side. Mili-
tary precautions were neglected, and the convoy
stretched to an interminable length. The band
[121]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
at the head of the column abruptly stopped play-
ing when about one hundred fifty armed
mounted Boers suddenly became visible in skir-
mishing formation on a rise on the left of the road
at a distance of a few hundred yards. Colonel
Anstruther immediately galloped back, and
ordered the leading wagon to halt and the others
to close up. A Boer advanced midway with a
flag of truce, and was met by Colonel Anstruther,
to whom he handed a letter written in English.
Its terms were at once quaint and peremptory.
“We don’t know,” it ran, “whether we are in a
state of war or not, consequently we can't allow
any movements of troops from your side, and
wish you to stop where you are. We not being
at war with the Queen nor with the people of
England, but are only recovering the independ-
ence of our country, we do not wish to take to
arms, and therefore inform you that any move-
ments of troops from your side will be taken by
us as a declaration of war.”
The messenger was to take back an answer,
which had to be given within five minutes.
Anstruther read the letter and tersely replied:
“I go to Pretoria; do as you like.” The mes-
senger departed, and the colonel, hurrying back
towards his men, ordered them to skirmish.
But it was too late. The Boers had closed in
upon the rear and flanks of the column and
[122) -


The Boer War of 1881
opened fire at point-blank range. Their fire
was deadly — every shot told; that of the troops
was scattered and ineffective. In ten minutes,
out of a total of two hundred fifty-nine, there had
been killed or wounded one hundred fifty-five
officers and men. Colonel Anstruther, himself
riddled with bullets, then ordered the “Cease
fire,” and intimated the surrender of the remains
of his force. The Boers then closed in, ordered
all arms to be laid down, and formed a cordon
round the scene of the slaughter.
When the fighting was over, Boers and sol-
diers became very friendly. The Boer com-
mander, Joubert, came forward and shook
hands with Colonel Anstruther, expressing re-
gret that he should be among the wounded. A
hospital camp was pitched close by, and leave
was given for the retention of the wagons con-
taining baggage, provisions, and hospital equip-
ment, tents for the wounded, and some unin-
jured men as hospital nurses; the remaining un-
wounded prisoners with the rest of the wagons
were removed to Heidelberg. Two men were
permitted to carry the tidings of the disaster to
Pretoria, whence without hindrance surgeons,
hospital orderlies, and ambulances were sent
out to Bronkhorst Spruit. The Boers showed
themselves most obliging, and were extremely
solicitous for the comfort of the wounded in
[123)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
camp, bringing in milk, butter, eggs, bread, and
fruit gratuitously. The statements regarding
the Boer losses in the short fight were curiously
conflicting. The Boers affirmed that they
amounted only to two killed and five wounded.
When Sir Garnet Wolseley went home he had
been succeeded, in July, as High Commissioner
for Southeastern Africa, by Colonel (after-
wards Major-General) Sir. George Pomeroy
Colley, an officer of high character. Tidings of
the outbreak in the Transvaal reached him at
Pieter Maritzburg on the 19th of December, and
were in possession of the Colonial Office in Lon-
don on the following day. Reinforcements
from India were promptly ordered to Natal, and
further instalments of troops were sent out from
England as early as possible. Considering the
weakness of the forces at Colley's immediate
disposition, he would have been wise to wait until
he had been reinforced; but he had a great con-
tempt for the Boers, and was eager to distin-
guish himself before he should be superseded
by officers of higher rank. He was warned by
Colonel Bellairs (in military command of the
Transvaal) that there were “from six thousand
to seven thousand rebels in the field, who, under
good leadership, would exhibit 'courage, dis-
cipline, and organization.” Colley hurried up
[124]


The Boer War of 1881
towards the Transvaal frontier the few com-
panies of infantry which he had in Natal.
The arrival of some drafts was very opportune
— a naval brigade was landed and sent up, as
also a squadron of dragoons and mounted in-
fantry under the command of Major Brownlow,
and the Natal Mounted Police. Colley had early
intimated his intention to enter the Transvaal
about the 20th of January, 1881, with a column
consisting of eight companies of infantry, four
guns, and a mounted squadron — a miserably
inadequate force. So far from accomplishing
this, he was able only to quit Newcastle (a border
town of Natal) on January 24, with about sixty
officers and twelve hundred men. This little
force was styled the “relief column,” as it was
intended to raise the siege of the Transvaal
towns in which were scanty British garrisons be-
leaguered by the Boers. Apart from Pretoria,
the besieged capital of the Transvaal, there were
six of those places— Potchefstrom, Rustenburg,
Marabastadt, Lydenburg, Standerton, and Wak-
kerstrom, all of which held out gallantly until the
restoration of peace.
Before advancing from Newcastle, Colley
sent an ultimatum to the Boers, ordering them,
as insurgents, to disperse. They replied, de-
claring that all they wanted was the rescinding
of the annexation and the restoration of the
/
[125)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
South African Republic under the Protectorate
of the Queen. On the 26th the British force
entrenched itself on an elevated position at
Mount Prospect, about twenty miles north of
Newcastle, in the mountainous region forming
the northern projection of Natal. The camp
was about a mile right of the road from New-
castle to Standerton, which crossed the ridge
known as Lang's Nek — about three and a half
miles further northward. In the vicinity of
Lang's Nek a considerable number of Boers
were seen. On the morning of the 28th, Colley
moved out with a strength, all told, of about
eleven hundred and sixty men.
The pass over Lang's Nek crosses the ridge
about the center of a rough semi-circle, on the
west of which is the Majuba mountain; on the
east is a long spur surmounted by a rocky crest.
In front of the proper left of this spur, several
hundred yards to the front, is an isolated conical
hill. The ground in the bottom of the enclosed
basin is low, with a gradual rise towards the face
of the spur, something in the nature of a glacis.
About nine o'clock the British force, having
moved up along a ridge out of shot, formed
into position on a rise in the bottom, with the
mounted squadron and the Fifty-eighth on the
right, the guns in the center, and the Sixtieth
[126)


The Boer War of 1881
and naval brigade on the left, the whole facing
toward the spur.
The action was begun by shelling parts of the
enemy's position, and by pushing forward a
company of the Sixtieth and the Naval Brigade,
with their rockets, which took some effect on the
Boer reserves in rear of the Nek. At ten o’clock
the Fifty-eighth advanced to the attack of the
spur, covered on its right by artillery fire and by
Brownlow's squadron. The leading troop of
mounted men swept with fine dash up the iso-
lated hill, and then charged. The hill-top was
held by a Boer piquet of considerable strength.
Brownlow shot the Boer leader with his revolver,
but his horse was shot under him; Lieutenant
Lermitte and Sergeant-Major Lunny were killed;
the supporting troop was checked — the leading
troop, fatigued and broken by the charge, and
with its leaders all down, could make no head,
and the whole squadron gave way. It was no
proper ground for cavalry, and the horsemen
should have acted as mounted infantry. Mean-
time, the Fifty-eighth had begun climbing
the steep ascent through the long entangling
grass, which retarded the men's progress. The
Boer piquet from the hill, having repulsed
Brownlow's squadron, moved down and opened
fire on the now exposed right flank and rear of
the Fifty-eighth, while the Boers on the spur
[127]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
gathered on its brow and maintained a deadly
fire from behind cover. Anxious to get to close
quarters out of this purgatory, Colonel Deane
gave the order to charge. The officers led nobly,
and the men struggled on through the hail of fire.
Colonel Deane's horse was shot, but he dashed
forward on foot until riddled with bullets ten
yards in front of the foremost man. Major
Poole and Lieutenants Inman and Elwes were
killed in supporting Colonel Deane; Major
Hingeston, and all the mounted officers of the
Fifty-eighth, were shot down or dismounted.
The stubborn soldiers of that gallant regiment
— youngsters as they were, most of them —
continued to hold their ground unflinchingly for
some time, notwithstanding the bitter fire.
Lieutenant Baillie, carrying the regimental color,
was mortally wounded, and when his comrade
Hill went to his assistance, the brave young
officer said with his last breath, “Never mind
me; save the color!” Hill, who had been carry-
ing the Queen's color, took the other also; when
he went down, Sergeant Budstock took both
colors, and carried them until the general re-
tirement, which soon had to occur. “The
Fifty-eighth,” wrote Colley, “having fallen back
leisurely without haste or confusion, re-formed
at the foot of the slope, and marched back
into position in as good order, and with as
[128 )


THE MEN STRUGGLED ON THROUGH THE HAIL of FIRE
ſº

A. 128





The Boer War of 1881
erect and soldierly a bearing, as when it marched
out.”
Spite of much British bravery, the combat of
Lang's Nek was an unquestionable and severe
defeat. But many noble deeds were performed.
Lieutenant Hill (already named) brought
wounded man after man out of action, and
worthily earned the V.C. Trooper Doogen
saved the life of Major Brownlow; Private God-
frey and Bandboy Martin remained with Major
Hingeston and Captain Lovegrove when those
officers lay wounded, enduring heavy fire in doing
so. The great brunt of the losses fell on the
Fifty-eighth. The casualties altogether amounted
to one hundred and ninety-eight, of which one
hundred and seventy-three belonged to that regi-
ment, which had to bury seventy-five officers
and men out of a total strength of four hundred
and ninety-four. Lang's Nek caused the Boers
exceptionally heavy loss. Their total casualties
from beginning to end of the war were but one
hundred and one, of which Lang's Nek accounted
for forty-one — fourteen killed and twenty-seven
wounded. The Boers behaved with humanity.
The moment that the “Cease fire” sounded
they gave permission to the English surgeons to
attend the wounded lying in front of the Boer
position, fetched water to them, and assisted in
binding up their wounds.
[129]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
\
The folly of the forward position prematurely
taken up by General Colley with an inadequate
force was made apparent by the result of the
battle of Lang's Nek. The comparative handful
of men in the Mount Prospect camp could no
longer be regarded by any stretch of imagination
as a “relief column.” That repulse had taught
the Boers their ability to arrest the further ad-
vance of the British force, and enabled them to
turn their attention to the interception of its line
of communication. The Boers, in effect, were
masters of the situation. Their patrols pene-
trated nearly to Ladysmith, and threatened
Newcastle from the Drakensberg and Utrecht
districts.
Convoys were cut off, captured, and de-
stroyed; the mail service was arrested, and
except for the telegraph service, which remained
uninterfered with, the Mount Prospect camp
was all but entirely isolated. An escort of
mounted infantry, sent out on February 7 to at-
tempt to reach Newcastle with mails, was driven
back to the camp by the fire of the Boers. Col-
ley then determined to make a more formidable
effort next day to open up communications with
Newcastle, and to clear the Boers from the road.
On the morning of the 8th he left camp with five
companies of the Sixtieth Rifles under Colonel
Ashburnham, two field and two mountain guns
[130 )


The Boer War of 1881
under Captain Greer, R.A., and a small detach-
ment of mounted men under Major Brownlow.
About five miles south of the Mount Prospect
position the Newcastle road is crossed by the
Ingogo river, which runs from west to east
through a valley. The ground north of the
river is broken and rugged; from the south bank
there is a gentle rise to the foot of a flat-topped
ridge strewn with rocks and boulders, and ir-
regularly cut by rocky depressions.
The general, leaving the two mountain guns
and a company of infantry on a commanding
crest north of the river, crossed it with the main
body, which he formed on the plain beyond, and
then moved it forward to the foot of the ridge
bounding the valley to the southward. As the
troops were ascending the rise to the ridge the
Boers showed themselves in considerable
strength, and they at once galloped forward to
dispute the ridge, and to take advantage of the
cover afforded by the intersecting valleys. Greer
brought his two guns into action, but the Boers
had already taken cover, from which they di-
rected a heavy and active fire on the guns and
skirmishers. Greer was killed early, and the
command of the guns devolved on Lieutenant
Parsons. The engagement became heavy and
general about noon, when the companies of the
Sixtieth were pushed forward against the enemy,
[131)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
whose fire from behind cover was very deadly.
The guns had to be freely exposed, and were in
action with case-shot at a range of less than five
hundred yards. The gunners suffered very
heavily, and a company of the Sixtieth, which
most gallantly advanced to cover the guns, and
met the Boer fire at close range, had many casual-
ties from the steady and accurate fire of enemies
enjoying almost perfect cover. So severe was
the fire of the Boers that the guns had soon to be
withdrawn from their exposed position, and
during the rest of the affair fired only occasion-
ally. It was apparent that they were being
gradually reinforced, and the general sent orders
to camp for three companies of the Fifty-eighth
to move out and occupy the ridges north of the
river, and for a part, if practicable, to cross the
Ingogo in support of the troops already deeply
engaged and reduced by severe losses.
About three o'clock there was a comparative
lull, although the Boers maintained a very ac-
curate fire, anyone on the British side being
almost certainly struck if at all exposing him-
self. Later in the afternoon the Boers received
considerable reinforcements, and Lieutenant
Parsons, wounded as he was, reopened with his
guns for a short time; but darkness presently
set in, and the Boers gradually withdrew to their
camp. It was Colley's conviction that the enemy
[132]


The Boer War of 1881
intended renewing the engagement next morn-
ing in overwhelming strength, and he acted
wisely in deciding to withdraw to camp under
cover of darkness. It was a gruesome night.
Torrents of rain were falling, and the darkness
was intense, except when the lightning flashes
broke the blackness of the cold and dismal night.
The ambulances sent out during the fight had
not been able to reach the actual scene of action,
since the Boers had threatened to fire on them
if they advanced while the engagement was
going on. They were not now available in the
darkness; and the wounded, whom in many
instances it had been impossible to remove from
the advanced positions, had to be searched for.
Those who were found were collected and shel-
tered for the night as well as possible with water-
proof sheets, blankets, great-coats, etc.; but
many lay as they had fallen throughout the long,
inclement night. The guns were horsed, al-
though insufficiently, by collecting all the avail-
able animals, and by withdrawing the team
from the ammunition wagon, which had to be
abandoned. When all arrangements had been
completed, the force moved off in silence, formed
in hollow square, the guns in the center, the
infantry in skirmishing order on the four sides.
The river, swollen by the rain, was deep and
rapid; and some of the first men trying to cross
[133 ] -


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
were swept down, but found foothold on a sand-
bank. The main body crossed in detachments
with locked arms. The camp was reached
about 4 A.M., on the 9th. The soldiers had
dragged the guns up the hill, the horses being
unable to pull them up the steep and slippery
road. The Fifty-eighth companies spent the
night on the northern ridges, and were not with-
drawn until the following day.
The casualties had been heavy. Among the
slain were Captain MacGregor, R.E., General
Colley's assistant secretary; Captain Greer, R.A.;
Lieutenants Garrett and O’Connell; and Mr.
Stuart, a Natal resident magistrate. A most
promising officer, Lieutenant Wilkinson of the
Sixtieth, was drowned while crossing the Ingogo,
when returning to the field with assistance for
the wounded, after having distinguished himself
throughout the engagement by his coolness and
gallantry. The total loss of this unfortunate day
amounted to one hundred and thirty-nine officers
and men. According to the statement of the
Boers, the Ingogo fight cost them eight killed
and six wounded. The Boers returned to the
scene of action on the morning of the 9th, ex-
pecting to renew the engagement. They took
away two gun limbers and the ammunition
wagon abandoned over night by Colley's people,
and then fell back behind Newcastle to join their
[134]


The Boer War of 1881
main force, reported as threatening to prevent
the advance of the reinforcements recently ar-
rived from India. Their disappearance gave
opportunity to succor the wounded and bury the
dead without molestation, and opened the road
from Mount Prospect to Newcastle, to the hos-
pital, to which latter place were promptly sent
the wounded from the British camp. The com-
munications in rear of Mount Prospect remained
open from this time forward.
Sir George Colley had sustained a second re-
verse, proportionately more bloody than had
been the first. By this time, one would imagine
it might have begun to dawn on the home
authorities that Colley, to say the least, was not
a successful commander. His experience of
actual warfare was but slender: he had served
only in the China war of 1860 and in the Ashan-
tee campaign. He was comparatively new to
South Africa, and was quite unfamiliar with
the Boer nature. Yet the authorities had as-
signed to him as second in command an officer
senior to him in army rank, who had fought
with distinction through the Crimean and Indian
Mutiny wars, and in the Ashantee and Zululand
campaigns, in high and successful commands.
Brigadier-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., was
the only officer in the latter campaign under
whom Boers served and died — served with a
[135)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
loyal devotion, died gallantly under his eye. He
knew the strange, simple, yet stubborn nature of
the Boers; he was ready to fight with them, and
equally ready to argue them out of a folly.
Wood and Colley were old and fast friends;
Wood was quite content to serve under his
junior, and had hurried out to India with a num-
ber of “special service” officers. He reached
Durban on February 12, four days after the In-
gogo reverse, Sir G. Colley's account of which
was in London on the 10th, and, notwithstanding
the unwarrantable optimism of its tone, must
have been read between the lines in Pall Mall.
Then would have been the time to avert further
futile waste of brave soldiers by instructing by
telegraph Colley and Wood to exchange their
relative positions. The arrangement would have
been perfectly regular, and Colley was the sort
of man who would loyally have accepted the
secondary position.
Picking up on his rapid journey the Indian
column from its camp on the Biggarsberg, Wood
and it (consisting of the Fifteenth Hussars, the
second battalion Sixtieth Rifles, and the Ninety-
second Highlanders) reached Newcastle on the
17th. Colley met him there, and it was re-
solved between the two officers that no further
advance should be attempted until more rein-
forcements, now on the way up, should arrive.
[136]


The Boer War of 1881
They parted on the 21st, Colley moving the
Indian column up to Mount Prospect without
molestation; Wood returning to Pieter Maritz-
burg to press on the advance of further rein-
forcements.
Sir George Colley's motive in making the
fatal advance on the Majuba mountain-top,
whatever it might have been, died with him.
His assurance had been given to Wood that no
further advance should be attempted pending
the arrival of further reinforcements. He had
engaged with the Boer Vice-President in nego-
tiations which promised favorable results. A
reconnaissance in force to the summit of the
mountain could give no more information than
a mere patrol could easily ascertain — the posi-
tion of the Boer laagers and an approximate es-
timate of the force occupying them. A Boer
piquet occasionally held the hill-top during the
day, and Colley resolved to occupy it by making
a night march. At ten o'clock on the night of
February 26 he left the Mount Prospect camp
with a force of twenty-two officers and six hun-
dred and twenty-seven men — a smaller force
than he had employed at Lang's Nek. At the
start its composition and order were as follows:
Two companies Fifty-eighth, the Naval Brigade,
three companies Ninety-second, followed by
some details; two companies of the second
[137 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Sixtieth moved out later to the piquet post close
to the foot of Inquela hill, with instructions to
occupy its summit with some detachments.
Further on, upon the narrow Nek between the
Inquela and the Majuba, Captain Robertson's
company of the Ninety-second was dropped as a
link, with orders to entrench itself. The Nek
traversed, the troops, guided by friendly Kaffirs,
had now to undertake in single file the actual
climb up the steep and rugged side of the Ma-
juba, whose top is sixty-two hundred feet above
sea-level and more than two thousand feet above
the positions of the Boer laagers. From time to
time during the tedious and toilsome ascent, a
halt was made to enable the men — heavy-laden
with rations and extra cartridges — to regain
their breath. As the troops neared the summit
the obstacles increased. The steep, grassy slopes
were succeeded by great boulders and deep
dongas, varied by sharp crags and treacherous
loose stones, over and up which the wearied and
burdened men had to drag themselves. Near
the top the ascent had to be accomplished on
hands and knees. Between four and five in the
morning of the 27th the force, much exhausted
after the heavy toil, and now only about four
hundred strong, gained the summit.
Like most of the mountains of South Africa,
the Majuba is crowned by no peak. Its top is a
[138]


The Boer War of 1881
plateau of saucer-like shape, dipping towards
the center, across which is a rocky reef about
breast-high. The circumference of the plateau
is about twelve hundred yards. When the sum-
mit was reached it was still dark, and the troops
having got mixed during the scramble up, and
being weary, lay down where they stood until
dawn. With daylight they were extended round
the edge of the plateau, with a small reserve in
the central hollow. No instructions were given
to entrench, and, indeed, the troops had no
tools for such a purpose; but the men of their
own accord attempted to obtain some cover by
throwing up defences of turf and stones. Here
and there the soldiers showed on the sky line,
and a few shots were fired, which for the mo-
ment caused great consternation in the Boer
camps in the lower ground northwest of the
Majuba.
Seeing that the mountain was in British
occupation, the expectation was natural that
an attack would presently be made on their
positions on the Nek, in which case they would
find themselves between two fires. Their first
idea, it seems, was of flight. The oxen were
inspanned, and hurried preparations were made
for retreat. But when it became evident that
the troops on the summit were in no great
strength and had neither cannon nor rockets,
[139]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and that their Nek position was unmolested, the
courage of the Boers revived. Smijt, the fight-
ing general, made a short, stirring speech, and
at his summons a number of the younger men
began to climb the mountain side under cover of
the stones and scrub. Joubert, the command-
ing general, detailed a force of the older men in
support of the storming party — picked shots
who remained below watching the edge of the
plateau, and firing at every soldier who exposed
himself. As the morning passed Boer detach-
ments attacked and hemmed in the British posi-
tion on the north, the east, and the southwest.
The defenders were not in sufficient strength
to hold the whole of the edge of the plateau, and
detachments had to be moved hither and thither
to meet and attempt to thwart the advances of
the Boers. Slowly and steadily the hostile skir-
mishers clambered upwards from cover to cover,
while the supports below protected their move-
ment with a steady and accurate fire. During
the hours from dawn to noon the British had not
suffered very heavily, notwithstanding the Boer
marksmanship. The first officer to fall was
Commander Romilly, of the Naval Brigade,
while reconnoitring with General Colley. But
the long strain of the Boers' close shooting began
to tell on the morale of the British soldiers, and
when the Boers at length reached the crest and
[140)


The Boer War of 1881
opened a deadly fire at short range the officers
had to exert themselves to the utmost in the
effort to avert disaster. The reserves stationed
in the central dip of the plateau, out of reach
until then of the enemy's fire, were ordered up
in support of the fighting line. Their want of
promptitude in obeying this order did not augur
well, and soon after reaching the front they
wavered, and then gave way. The officers did
temporarily succeed in rallying them, but the
“bolt” had a bad effect. To use the expression
of an eye-witness, “a funk became established.”
It was struggled against very gallantly by the
officers, who, sword and revolver in hand, en-
couraged the soldiers by word and by action.
A number of men, unable to confront the deadly
fire of the Boers, had huddled for cover behind
the rocky reef crossing the plateau, and no en-
treaty or upbraiding on the part of their officers
would induce them to face the enemy. What
then happened one does not care to tell in detail.
Everything connected with this disastrous en-
terprise went to naught, as if there had been a
curse on it. Whatever may have been the ob-
ject intended, the force employed was absurdly
inadequate. Instead of being homogeneous, it
consisted of separate detachments with no link
or bond of union — a disposition which noto-
riously has led to more panics than any other
[14] ]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
cause that the annals of regimental history can
furnish. Fragments of proud and distinguished
regiments fresh from victory in another continent
shared in the panic of the Majuba, seasoned
warriors behaving no better than mere recruits.
To the calm-pulsed philosopher a panic is an
academic enigma. No man who has seen it —
much less shared in it — can ever forget the in-
fectious madness of panic-stricken soldiers.
In the sad ending, with a cry of fright and
despair the remnants of the hapless force turned
and fled, regardless of the efforts of the officers
to stem the rearward rush. Sir George Colley
lay dead, shot through the head just before the
final flight. A surgeon and two hospital at-
tendants caring for the wounded at the bandag-
ing place in the dip of the plateau were shot
down, probably inadvertently. The elder Boers
promptly stopped the firing in that direction.
But there was no cessation of the fire directed
on the fugitives. On them the bullets rained
accurately and persistently. The Boers, now
disdaining cover, stood boldly on the edge of the
plateau, and, firing down upon the scared troops,
picked off the men as if shooting game. The
slaughter would have been yet heavier but for
the entrenchment which had been made by the
company of the Ninety-second, left over night
on the Nek between the Inquela and the Majuba.
[142]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
*
porary hospital was established at a farmhouse
near the foot of the mountain, and throughout
the cold and wet night the medical staff never
ceased to search for and bring in the wounded.
Sir George Colley's body was brought into camp
on March 1, and buried there with full military
honors. The other dead of the Majuba fight
rest in a cemetery on the plateau of the mountain
summit – victims of a strange and almost in-
credible folly.
Sir Evelyn Wood reached Newcastle on March
4, and assumed command. On the 6th he met
the Boer leaders, when an armistice to last for
eight days was agreed upon. The British garri-
sons in the Transvaal were revictualled for
twelve days, pending the raising of their siege on
the consummation of peace; and Sir Evelyn
Wood acknowledged the right of the Transvaal
people to complete self-government subject to
the suzerainty of the Queen. Terms of peace
were signed on March 23, 1881; and the next
day General Sir Frederick Roberts, who had
been sent out with large reinforcements to suc-
ceed Sir George Colley, reached Cape Town,
but learning of peace being signed, immediately
sailed home.
The total number of Transvaal Boers capable
of carrying arms was under eight thousand at the
beginning of hostilities. The total British force
[144]


The Boer War of 1881
in South Africa, or on the way thither, at the
close of hostilities consisted of thirteen infantry
regiments, five cavalry regiments, twenty-two
guns, three naval brigades — in all, not far
short of twenty thousand men. This total was
exclusive of the British garrisons besieged in the
Transvaal during the war. The Boer casual-
ties throughout the war, as already mentioned,
amounted to forty-three killed and fifty-eight
wounded. The British casualties were over
eight hundred killed and wounded. At Majuba
the Boers had one man killed and five men
wounded.
[145]


VI
The Bombardment of
Alexandria
By MAX PEMBERTON
O step from the boat of a yacht to the
| quay at Alexandria is to step from the
West to the fringe of the East. All
about you are porters, guides, beggars, loafers,
thieves, cut-throats, and impostors. Bales of
cotton, barrels, hampers, trollies, lumber the
wharves. The din and babble are beyond de-
scription. A hundred rogues strive and push
if thereby they may touch the hem of your gar-
ment and claim backsheesh. Pass through the
Customs, and so out to the native quarters and
to the bazaar, and the scene is scarce to be de-
scribed. Men of every Eastern nation seem
here to congregate. Turks curse Greeks;
Greeks, in their turn, curse Jews and Copts,
Hindoos, Nubians, and Albanians. The blaze
of color is dazzling, yet ever picturesque. Dirks
are sheathed in gorgeous girdles; the butts of
pistols protrude upon richly embroidered vests
and amazing tunics. Black men and white
men, brown men and yellow men, some with
1146)





The Bombardment of Alexandria
jackets, some with long, flowing robes, some al-
most naked, urge you to the deal or throw them-
selves upon your pity. Donkey boys hasten to
show you how well they understand your tongue,
in the polite and well-meant invitation to “have
a. donkey, sir.” Often you step aside to
avoid the lurch of the camel; your eyes follow
the stately swing of the Arab from the desert as
he paces some narrow alley, with head bent and
his long gun in his hand. Priests abound —
Greek priests, Coptic priests, Roman priests.
No nation seems unrepresented in this medley
of sound and strange colors; of narrow, crooked,
unpaved lanes and gorgeous modern enterprises.
If this be a description rather of the Alexan-
dria of the past than of the Alexandria of to-day,
it is better suited to my purposes. Any endeavor
to make clear the sequence of events which led
up to the bombardment and subsequent sack of
the city must include some attempt to describe
that curious coupling of West to East which has
been a feature of the place since Mehemet Ali
sought to restore its greatness, and to rear up a
new fabric upon the ashes of decay which the
Turk had left. In the year 1882 you found
many races in the seat of the Ptolemies; but a
broad line of demarcation between the two
forces was clearly laid down. While Copts and
Greeks and Hindoos and Arabs swarmed in the
[147]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
bazaars, and a first impression was one of many
peoples and many creeds, a rough division was
easy to make. Christian and Mohammedan —
between these lay the Egyptian question, so far
as this city was concerned with it.
Side by side the strongholds of the two powers
stood—one, the dirty, unpaved streets, the booths
and kennels and bazaars; the other, the great
square of Mehemet Ali, with the cafés and com-
mercial buildings, the Palais de Justice, the
churches, the theater, and the houses of the mer-
chants. Everything which tends to promote
racial hatred and national instability was here to
be discerned, when in the earlier months of the
year 1882 the dangerous problem became ripe
for partial solution. A national party strove for
so-called freedom; a Christian party strove for
more stable guarantees. Arabs hated Greeks
and Copts; Christians warred against the Arab
in turn, and went in fear of him. Year by year
the beacons of revolution were plied, until, in
the last moments of Arabi's power, the flicker
of a crisis was sufficient to light them; and these
beacons being kindled, gave the signal for the
Egyptian campaign of 1882.
I am not concerned with the defence of Arabi
Pasha, nor with the discussion of those large
claims made on his behalf at the beginning of
the Egyptian war. It is sufficient for me to re-
[148]


The Bombardment of Alexandria
member that he was War-Minister to the Khe-
dive in the earlier months of the year 1882, and
that he was the spokesman of all those turbu-
lent elements of Mohammedan dominion which
threatened at one time to make him the most
successful dictator of the latter half of the cen-
tury. Patriot possibly he was; but that pure
patriotism was not the ultimate goal of his am-
bitions all the events of that strange year made
manifest. No doubt, the antipathy to Euro-
pean influences, and general hatred of the Euro-
pean colony in Egypt, helped Arabi largely in
his demand, in the year 1881, for a general in-
crease of the army, and for a more popular and
purely Egyptian ministry. But once he found
the Khedive pliant in his hands, the step from
agitation to action was a short one. Early in
the next year we find the weak Prince Tewfik
nominated by the Powers, and Arabi setting up
practically as the dictator of the Egyptian peo-
ples. His cry that the foreigner should be
driven out of the country brought thousands to
his banner. That he had the sympathy of his
countrymen there can be no question. That it
was impossible for Britain as a Power to submit
to his authority, and to the government by arms
which he sought to set up, was equally apparent.
Thus in June of the year 1882 the English were
fighting for the Khedive against his own Minis-
[149]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
ter of War, and engaged in an undertaking
which could end only in their final expulsion
from the country or their temporary occupation
of it.
The first sparks of war were to be observed in
Alexandria in the June of the last-named year.
A sudden rioting and massacre of Christians —
principally Greeks — added to an insult to the
British Consul, sowed the seeds of that which
was to mature so quickly. For many weeks the
Mediterranean fleet, under the command of
Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, lay off the
harbors of the city as a visible token of British
determination to uphold the Khedive against
Arabi, and of the intention to protect the Chris-
tian population. Hundreds of the latter mean-
while fled from Alexandria — some to Greece,
the majority to Italy. It became dangerous
for a European to venture abroad alone even in
the earlier hours of day. Robberies were fre-
quent, and assassinations common.
Arabi himself waxed bolder every day. He
boasted that he could, with the forces at his com-
mand, hold the city against the fleets of all Europe.
He busied himself with the training of engineers;
he began at the last to strengthen the forts and
to throw up new earthworks. It was an anx-
ious moment for “Jack” when, on the night of
July 6, 1882, the searchlight was turned upon
[150)


The Bombardment of Alexandria
the fortifications near the Ras-el-Tin Palace,
and two hundred of Arabi's sappers were seen
busy with pick and shovel. The result was the
immediate demand for the cessation of all works
upon the forts, and, finally, for the temporary
surrender of them. Arabi, seeking discreetly
to temporize, neglected to furnish the necessary
guarantees — met this practically with a point-
blank refusal. The reply was the issue of an
ultimatum on the morning of July 10. Either
the forts were to be surrendered, or the city was
to be bombarded. Arabi chose bombardment,
and the ships were cleared for action.
This was the situation in the town; let us see
what was the position in the harbors before it.
Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour was then in
command of eight battleships and of eleven gun-
boats; the latter principally of the smallest class.
Nearly all these ships would be regarded as
more or less obsolete.to-day, though the flagship
Invincible carried four eighty-ton guns and
boasted a speed of 12.6 knots an hour. Of the
others, the Inflexible was the largest, this being
the biggest ship in the engagement, and one
which carried, like the flagship, four eighty-ton
guns. With her were the Sultan, the Superb,
the Alexandra, the Téméraire, the Penelope,
and the Monarch. The latter ships, built in the
years 1867 and 1868 respectively, were then
[151 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
comparatively old; but the Superb, the Inflexible,
the Téméraire, and the Alexandra represented
the then most recent naval phase. That was
the day of a belief in big guns. Europe had
watched the building of sixty-eight, eighty, and
even one hundred-ton guns, and had asked ex-
pectantly, “What of the results?” The revolt
of Arabi promised the British that which they
had speculated upon, and discussed, and weighed
up for forty years — the spectacle of their fleet
in action. When at last the crisis came —
when the ultimatum went forth, and French,
American, and Italian warships steamed from
the harbors of Alexandria, while refugees fled
from the city as from a pestilence — the excite-
ment waxed strong. As for the British Jack
Tars, they were sick with hope. For weeks they
had been saying, “To-morrow, to-morrow is the
day!” For weeks they had borne with disap-
pointment and postponement as they lay under
the shadow of the great forts, and waited for the
booming of the signal gun. But now, surely,
the hour was at hand. Small wonder if they
doubted that such a good thing could ever be.
For the fuller understanding of the engage-
ment of the famous July 11, let us take our
stand upon the flagship Invincible, anchored
outside the harbor of the city. There are
two harbors before us—an inner harbor and
[152 )


The Bombardment of Alexandria
a large outer basin defended by the break-
water. To the southeast there stands up
the great Marabout fort, forming the southern
point of the bay, whereon the city is built. To
the northeast is the Pharos fort, boasting
more than a hundred guns of all calibers, and
conspicuous for its massive tower. Roughly
speaking, you may regard the shape of the shore
of the Alexandria of to-day as that of a pair of
horns sticking out into the sea with the Pharos
Light as the north tip and the Ras-el-Tin Palace
and lighthouse as the southern tip. Southward
of this palace, and in the curve of the southern
bay, lie the famous Mex forts, and from these
to Fort Marabout the whole of the shore bristles
with guns. It was against these guns that the
British thirsted to try their luck, when on the
night of July 10 they turned in like excited chil-
dren, and almost prayed that the morrow would
find them listening to the music of the great ar-
tillery.
The Condor was the first ship to be about on
the following morning, but long before six
o'clock the whole fleet was moving and active.
At that hour the men were already stripped to
their flannel jerseys, the great guns were charged,
the decks were cleared for action. The admiral's
plan was now known to all. He had determined
upon three attacks — the Invincible, the Mon-
[153 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
arch, and the Penelope to begin work from the
harbor; the Inflexible to attack the Mex forts;
the Superb, the Sultan, and the Alexandra to
operate from outside the harbor, and to center
their fire first upon the forts by the Ras-el-Tin
Palace, and then, steaming to the northeast, to
demolish Fort Ada and the Pharos. As for the
puny gunboats, they were to lie behind the war-
ships, and to act as occasion required. That
they were permitted soon to depart from this
inglorious position the whole record makes
manifest.
Six o'clock in the morning, and the men were
at the stations. Forbiddingly and majestically,
the dark hulls of the eight ironclads stood up
above the sunlit water. Scores of merchant-
men, which had showed their heels to the har-
bors directly bombardment was threatened, now
lay securely at anchor, eager to be spectators of
so glorious a sight. On shore no unusual signs
of activity were at first apparent. There was
no ostensible signal of truce. Lieutenant Smith,
who had been sent to report upon the truth of
the story that Arabi's men were busy with arma-
ments near the Slaughter-house, returned to tell
of active work and of sappers busy.
Throughout the fleet, excitement was at its
zenith. Jack had stripped himself for the fray
with the zest that a schoolboy strips for football.
[154]


The Bombardment of Alexandria
º
Wound up by long weeks of expectation, he
scarce dared to believe that the cup was at his
lips, even though the muzzles of the eighty-ton-
ners showed grimly above his decks, and any
moment might bring the thunders of discharge.
For nearly an hour he stood at his post. Half-
past six came, and still the guns were silent; a
quarter to seven was marked, and no note of
command was heard. Ten minutes later, and
in a measure unexpectedly, the Alexandra fired
a shell at the Pharos, and the bombardment had
begun. The smoke of this shot had scarce
floated away on the breeze when the flagship
hoisted the signal “All vessels engage batteries.”
Such a signal was like the bell of a prompter
rung to raise the curtain upon a stage play. In
a moment the quiet and the expectancy had
given place to the thunder of cannon and the
heat of battle. An American officer who wit-
nessed the action from a warship in the offing
declared that a hurricane of sound seemed to
rush up over the sea. Instantly, clouds of
smoke and leaping fire began to veil the forts.
Crashing reports, the sharper noise of smaller
guns, even the singing of bullets, made the
music of the morning. While the heavy guns
were fired at long intervals, while there were
pauses when you might have said that the fleet
was resting, the rolling reports from the shore
[155]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
were never still. Fort Marabout, with its two
eighteen-ton guns and its host of smaller weap-
ons, emitted a continuing cloud of fire; the guns
by Ras-el-Tin — two of them of twelve tons —
pounded bravely at the Superb, the Sultan, and
the Alexandra. The heavy weapons of the
Pharos, joined anon to those by the Ras-el-Tin,
belched smoke and flame unceasingly. The
British attack was concentrated upon Fort Mara-
bout, the Mex forts, and the fortifications near
the palace. At this time the value of fore and
aft guns upon the big ships was illustrated hu-
morously. The mighty Inflexible, standing off
the outer harbor, thundered away with her fore
guns at Ras-el-Tin, while from her stern she
pounded Marabout. If the shooting of some
of the ships was not particularly good, that of
others was admirable. Every shot from the
Invincible either burst in the forts or struck the
parapets heavily. Clouds of dust and earth,
heavy lumps of stone rolling seawards, spoke
eloquently of the accuracy of her gunners. A
middy, named Hardy, tucked up in her main-
top, helped with signals whose value was be-
yond praise. Never did a marker at Wimbledon
follow the path of a bullet with keener eyes than
those with which Midshipman Hardy watched
the flight of the great shells. Though a hail of
shot fell all about him, and the smoke was so
[156]


The Bombardment of Alexandria
heavy over the decks that the gunners were like
men walking in the dark, the accuracy of the
lad’s judgment was unfailing. Even the ad-
miral thanked him; and as hit after hit was re-
corded, the whole crew fell to cheering with
voices that were heard by every sailor in the
fleet. “It was Eton and Harrow over again,”
said an observer. And that was true.
If this plucky lad deserves a line of special
eulogy, we must not forget that others were at
the same time displaying courage worthy of the
highest traditions of Jack in action. The story
of the Condor has been written many times. It
will bear writing again and yet again whereso-
ever the record of the British navy is laid down.
I have said that this gallant little ship, whose
only armament was two small sixty-four pound-
ers and one seven-inch Woolwich rifled gun,
had been the first to be moving on that mem-
orable day. She was also the first of the gun-
boats to get into action. Though the instruc-
tions of the admiral were that the gad-flies
should be more or less spectators, acting as the
occasion required, it was not many minutes be-
fore Lord Charles Beresford determined that
the occasion required him to try his three
small guns upon the massive fortifications of
Marabout.
The idea, bold to the last point of courage,
[157]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
was not lacking method. It was Lord Charles's
notion that the Gatling might tickle up the
gunners of Marabout, and send so many of
them to an honorable grave that the bigger
guns would find no servants. With this in his
head, he took a liberal view of the general in-
structions, and bringing the Condor to within
twelve hundred yards of the fort — the shoal
prevented him from getting nearer — he began
his merry attack. Never did a crew follow a
daring skipper more resolutely. The men of
the Condor had been near to shedding tears of
rage in the early morning when an order from
the flagship compelled them to go to the assist-
ance of the Téméraire, which had floundered
upon the shore. They had thought that they
must do the work of a mere tug, and miss such
glorious fun as was to be had in the neighbor-
hood of Arabi's guns. From that degradation
Lord Charles saved them swiftly. The rattle
of the Gatling, the crack of his larger weapons,
seemed at first like the music of a mere farce.
His shot, said observers, would be as a hail of
peas to the gunners in the great fort. That the
gunners took the same view was proved by their
action. They continued to concentrate all their
fire upon the three warships which were troub-
ling them. As for that toy-boat which menaced
[158]


The Bombardment of Alexandria
them, they regarded it as a fine stimulant to
laughter.
It is not recorded how soon these laughter-
loving gentlemen changed their opinion. Cer-
tain is it that three of their guns were disabled,
and that many of them must have paid the pen-
alty of their humor when at last they awoke to
the situation, and concentrated all their fire
upon the wasp whose sting they had felt so
sharply. Shell after shell then hissed over the
plucky little ship. One struck her heavily, but
not in a vital line. Shot seemed to rain near
her decks, and still she stuck to her work, while
other gunboats came to her assistance, and the
Bittern, the Beacon, the Decoy, and the Cygnet
were all barking merrily. Soon the fire from
Marabout began to slacken. The telling shoot-
ing from the Invincible, whose huge shells went
home every time, coupled to the merry attack
of the gunboats, finished the work. The ad-
miral signalled, “Well done, Condor.” Cheer
after cheer rang over the waters. The Inflexible
took up the cry. The fleet declared that a deed
of surpassing bravery had been done that day.
The hour of action is not the fitting hour to
meditate upon individual deeds, and the atten-
tion of Jack was soon called from the Condor to
new scenes. It was plain to him that the hours
of “Horrible Pasha” were numbered in Alexan-
[159]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
dria. Marabout was done with; the guns of the
Mex Forts were so far silenced at one o’clock
that a force was despatched to land and, if
possible, finish the business speedily. So great
was the impatience of its members to get ashore,
that Major Tullock sprang from the launch and
swam to the outworks. But the Egyptian sol-
diers made no reply: a fact for which no one has
accounted satisfactorily to this day. While our
men expected every moment to hear the hiss of
their bullets, or to see them sweeping to the
charge, not a sound was raised nor a uniform
discerned. Dexterously and quickly the two
ten-inch guns were burst and the others spiked.
A shot from the Invincible had already destroyed
the powder magazine, and half-past two had not
come when Mex was done with.
From that hour until half-past four, when the
career of “Horrible Pasha” in Alexandria was
practically closed, the account of the bombard-
ment is chiefly an account of the silencing of
Fort Ada and of the Pharos. To the Inflexible
was given the greater part of the latter task, and
right well did she acquit herself. The shells
from her eighty-ton guns thundered upon the
doomed town like a visitation from the heavens.
Earth and mortar and débris rose in blinding
clouds. The neighboring buildings suffered
heavily; even the English Consulate was threat-
[160]


The Bombardment of Alexandria
ened. Anon, a terrific explosion spoke of the
wrecking of her powder magazine. Two hun-
dred men, an authority computed, were killed
by that single discharge. The Superb, the Sul-
tan, and the Alexandra, helping the end, rained
great shot upon the rapidly succumbing forts.
When two bells in the first dog-watch was struck,
the voice of Arabi was no longer to be heard.
The admiral caused the “Cease fire” to be sig-
nalled. The bombardment of Alexandria was
a victorious fact.
We can well imagine in what spirits Jack
turned into his bunk that night. To say that
he was excited is to use a commonplace where a
commonplace will not suffice. Few in that fleet
had seen a shot fired in earnest from a great
battleship. Few had been permitted to witness
a beaten and cowed city in the first hours of its
destruction. When Jack turned in, flames were
still to be seen in the European quarters of the
town. Like beacons of the defeated, they flared
up at many points, kindled as much by the loot-
ers, whom Arabi had left as his legacy, as by the
shells which the British guns had dropped.
While they burned, and after the question,
“What of to-morrow?” Jack fell to discussing
to-day. Already it was whispered that the fleet
had lost only ten men. Two were killed upon
the Sultan, which had been hit no less than
[161 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
twenty-three times. The Alexandra, which had
fourteen shells in her, had lost one man. The
Superb and the Inflexible each mourned one
brave fellow. Of wounded there were twenty-
seven: the unfortunate Sultan nursing seven of
these, the Invincible six, the Alexandra three, the
Inflexible two, the Superb one. To the list of
dead, unhappily, there was added subsequently
the name of Lieutenant Jackson, who was struck
and mortally wounded by the same shell which
killed the carpenter of the Inflexible.
But, viewed in any light, the loss was amaz-
ingly small. Granted that the gunners of Arabi
were unworthy of the officers who led them so
gallantly, none the less did it seem miraculous
that the ships should face the fire of some hun-
dreds of guns for ten hours, and that three of
them should not have a dead man to show. The
little Condor had no casualty of any sort. The
crews of the other gunboats were without a
scratch. Jack told his mates this, and his jubi-
lation was unbounded. Nor could he forget that
rewards were ripe for plucking. The name of
Lord Charles was upon many tongues. Mid-
shipman Hardy was a hero of the night. Major
Tullock's plucky swim through the surf before
Fort Marabout, the daring of his comrades when
spiking the guns, were things to tell and tell
again. It was good to hear that Gunner Hard-
[162] -


The Bombardment of Alexandria
ing, of the Alexandra, had picked up a live shell
from his main deck and soused it in water with
the coolness of a man rinsing a rag. None knew
at that time that Arabi had withdrawn his forces
and retired upon Rosetta. “The morning gun
will be a signal for resumption,” said Jack. In
which hope he lay down at last upon a night to
be forever memorable among the nights which
he would live. -
On the morning of the 12th an early observa-
tion made it clear that the survivors of Arabi’s
force had not been altogether idle during the
night. Fort Moncrieff, whose two barbette
guns, mounted on the Moncrieff system, had
offered such a stubborn and lasting resistance to
the fire of the Alexandra, the Superb, and the
Sultan, obviously had been repaired. Else-
where, however, there was no sign either of
activity or of truce; and when this was plain, the
Inflexible and Téméraire opened fire again, their
first three shots practically laying low all that
Arabi's men had done in the night. With these
shots the whole work of the morning ended. A
white flag, displayed upon Ras-el-Tin, caused
the admiral to signal the “Cease firing” almost
with the echo of the first gun. For the rest of
the day the men lay idle, while in Alexandria
herself awful scenes of massacre and of pillage
were being prepared for. Nearly the last act of
[163 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Arabi had been to let loose his so-called Bed-
ouins — in reality cut-throats and robbers of the
finest brand. When night fell on the 12th, these
men were already busy. How many Christians
they slaughtered in the streets, what was the
sum total of their pillage, will never be known.
All that could be surmised was the story of the
leaping flames which rose up in clouds of lurid
fire from every quarter of the city. Alexandria
was burning — destroyed by those who had
boasted of their desire to become a nation and
to save their country.
Throughout the night the nameless horrors
were at their zenith. The tremendous holo-
caust lighted the devils at their work of murder
and of pillage. How many defenceless men
cried for mercy and were not answered, how
many were stabbed or ripped open and shot,
history will never tell us. We can only imagine
the scene so full of terror and of dread. No
sack of modern times is to be named with this
sack of the city of the Ptolemies. During two
days the riot, the incendiarism, and the murder
were unchecked. Lack of instruction held the
admiral's hand. For forty-eight hours he felt
it impossible to send help to the hunted Chris-
tians, whose brothers' blood was running red in
the alleys and in the squares. When, at last, a
landing was effected, and an heroic attempt was
[164]


The Bombardment of Alexandria
made to grapple with the situation, Alexandria
was no more. Empty, rocking shells marked
the spot where houses had been; smouldering
heaps of cinders stood for churches and for cafés.
In the European quarter there was hardly a
building which had not some scar to show.
The French Consulate was a heap of ruins.
In the Rue Chérif Pasha, only the Anglo-Egyp-
tian bank stood up. So great a space had been
cleared by fire around the statue of Mehemet Ali
that those most familiar with the center could
not tell where they were. Ras-el-Tin had been
looted with a fine appreciation of finish. In the
Rosetta Road the very pavements were littered
with the broken clock-cases, the remnants of
jewel-boxes, the splinters of the plunder and the
loot. An early examination of the forts — one
of the first tasks of the men — spoke of a success
for British guns beyond any which had been
looked for. Jack heard with wonder that every
engineer or gunner in the service of Arabi had
been killed. The famed Pharos fort was a heap
of ruins woful to see. The great tower had be-
come a crumbling mass of ruins; of the hundred
weapons of all sizes not one had escaped. Two
great twelve-ton guns had been so shelled that
they stood straight up on end, their muzzles
pointing to the sky. The gunners of the In-
vincible had received orders to respect a tomb
[165]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
rising up in the center of Marabout. When
the English entered the fort they found the sar-
cophagus absolutely unharmed, though shell had
fallen all around it and the environing district
was appalling. In Fort Ada there was the cus-
tomary cat yawning and prowling as though
inexpressibly bored by the whole thing.
[1661


VII
Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
By CHARLES LOWE
RABI PASHA and his rebellious ambi-
A. tion were the cause of the British cam-
paign in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir—a
word which simply means “the large village.”
Arabi was of low origin, but had risen by his
ability and force of character to be a very popu-
lar colonel in the Egyptian army of the Sultan
of Turkey's Viceroy, or Khedive, Tewfik. He
was an ardent advocate of the policy of “Egypt
for the Egyptians”; but in the championship of
this policy he forgot that, amongst other coun-
tries, England had immense interests at stake
in Egypt, not only as the holder of about four
millions sterling of Suez Canal stock, but also
as the mistress of India, to which the Canal
formed a commercial and military route.
His defeat at Alexandria, far from breaking
the power and pride of Arabi, had the effect only
of deepening his hatred of the English, and he
retired into the interior with the view of organ-
izing further opposition. He had thrown down
the gauntlet, and England could not refuse to
pick it up. As the fleet could not sail up the
[167] -


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Nile to Cairo, it was necessary to equip and
send out an army which should land in Egypt,
seek out Arabi wherever he was to be found,
and make an end, once and forever, of him and
his rebellious force. This army was entrusted
to the command of Sir Garnet (afterwards Vis-
count) Wolseley, who had already distinguished
himself in so many of “little wars” that he was
facetiously termed by the British “our only
General.”
Before leaving England he laid his hand, with
remarkable foresight, upon the map, and, point-
ing to Tel-el-Kebir, said that he would engage
and beat the army of Arabi there, about the 13th
of September; and he kept his word to the very
letter.
To accomplish this task, England at once be-
gan to bring together in Egypt an army — or
Army Corps — of about forty thousand men.
Some came from the garrisons in the Mediter-
ranean — Malta, Cyprus, and Gibraltar —
others were brought from India, and the re-
mainder sent out straight from England.
Being gathered, as it was, from so many dif-
ferent sources, this huge force could not, of
course, all land at once; but the marvel was that
its component parts reached the trysting-ground
in Egypt so soon as they did, and it was ad-
mitted on all hands that no other nation in the
[168]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Well aware of the importance of this position
for the British, the Egyptians made several at-
tempts to drive them out of it and back to
Ismailia before reinforcements could reach them;
but each time they recoiled from the enterprise
with the bitter conviction that British bullets
and sabers were things on which no one could
reasonably hope to whet his teeth and thrive.
Two main actions were fought at Kassassin —
though these formed the mere prelude, so to
speak, to the grand spectacular drama that was
presently to be enacted at Tel-el-Kebir.
The chief of these preliminary actions, fought
on the 28th of August, will always be memorable
for the grand cavalry charge which closed it.
Early in the morning General Graham had be-
come aware that the Egyptians were making
preparations to attack him from a circle of sand-
hills which formed a kind of amphitheater
around Kassassin. Graham's force was by no
means a large one, but it was impossible for the
Egyptians to make out how strong it really was,
and it is always half the battle to be able to con-
ceal your plans and numbers from the enemy.
A few days previously Arabi had sent out his
second-in-command, Mahmoud Fehmi Pasha,
a great engineer and reader of military signs, to
discover the strength and dispositions of Gra-
ham, but by a curious accident he fell into the
[170]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
hands of the English and never returned to his
own side. To this capture Arabi himself after-
wards attributed the sole blame of his not having
been able to oust the audacious English from
their advanced post at Kassassin — and the in-
cident will show how very important it must
always be in warfare to seize and detain spies.
Graham's force at Kassassin was not a large
one (under two thousand). Drury Lowe's Cav-
alry Brigade was stationed some miles to the
rear at Mehsameh, and Graham heliographed
to them to come and help him on his right flank
in the impending battle. Come they did with
right good will, for they were all burning for a
fight, but only to hear that the Egyptians, after
using their guns for some time, had apparently
retired again behind their sand-hills; so back
they went to Mehsameh and off-saddled again.
! The heat was terrific, and water from the canal
had to be poured on the heads of the English
artillerymen to enable them to stick to their guns.
Sunstrokes were numerous, but the men bore
all their sufferings with a fortitude truly heroic.
The scorching heat was probably the reason
why the Egyptians had drawn off from their
first attack on Kassassin, but towards the cool
of the evening they again began to push forward
from their sand-hills and threaten the British
position. The left of this position was well
[171]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
protected, but the right less so; and, indeed,
General Graham expressly made such a dis-
position of his force on the latter flank as might
tempt the enemy down from his sand-hills so as
to essay a turning movement, when they would
be caught in the trap which he was preparing
for them.
To this end, about 5.20 P.M., he despatched
his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Pirie, Fourth
Dragoon Guards, with a message to Drury Lowe,
in the rear, at Mehsameh, or wherever he should
be found, “to take the cavalry round by our
right, under cover of the hill, and attack the left
flank of the enemy's skirmishers.”
But when Lieutenant Pirie did at last reach
Lowe, after a long and fatiguing ride through
the arid desert sand — in the course of which his
horse fell under him from sheer exhaustion and
he had to borrow another mount from a gun-
team — he delivered his message in this altered
form, that “General Graham was only just able
to hold his own, and wished General Drury Lowe
to attack the left of the enemy's infantry skir-
mishers.” The famous cavalry charge at Bala-
clava had been due to a similar mistake in the
delivery of a verbal order, though at Kassassin,
as it turned out, the repetition of this mistake
did not result in disaster, but in victory. So far
was Graham from not being able to hold his
[172]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
own that, about two hours after despatching
Lieutenant Pirie for the cavalry, he had ordered
a counter-attack and a general advance of his
line, which had meanwhile been reinforced by a
fresh battery, for his other guns had been obliged
to retire out of action, owing to want of ammuni-
tion, it having been found impossible to drag
the battery carts through the deep and yielding
sand.
It was while Graham was engaged in this
general advance that at last Drury Lowe arrived
upon the scene with his cavalry. The sun had
now set, but a bright moon was shining, and the
flashes from the Horse Artillery and infantry
afforded some guide for the movement of the
British horsemen, which was directed towards
the evening star — the only landmarks in the
nocturnal desert. Suddenly the cavalry came in
sight of the extreme left of the Egyptians, and
was at once exposed to a heavy fire. “Shells
screamed and shrapnel bullets tore up the road
on either side.” Rushing to the front, the guns
of the Horse Artillery attached to the Cavalry
Brigade unlimbered and belched out several
rounds of shell on the Egyptian masses. Then
the front of these British guns was rapidly cleared
and Drury Lowe gave the Household Cavalry
the order to charge.
Led on by Colonel Ewart, away with a wild
[173]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
cheer went the three ponderous squadrons of
| clanking giants straight at the Egyptian bat-
talions, which in a few more moments had been
trampled and sabered into positive annihilation.
“Now we have them!” Sir Baker Russell had
cried out to the men; “trot — gallop — charge!”
Sir Baker's own horse was shot under him, but
he caught another, and was soon again in the
thick of the fray. Many were the feats of per-
sonal adventure in connection with this glorious
charge. Some of the troopers were killed, some
lost themselves in the darkness and were taken
prisoners, happy to escape the barbarous mutila-
tions that were perpetrated by the Egyptians on
the British dead and wounded.
The cavalry charge at Kassassin was a splen-
did feat of arms, but it somehow or other became
the subject of as curious a myth as that which
gathered round the sinking of the Vengeur on
the “glorious 1st of June.” At Balaclava the
Light Brigade had ridden down upon the Rus-
sian guns, and nothing would content the chron-
iclers of Kassassin but the performance of a sim-
ilar act of glory. The illustrated papers of the
day which had artists in Egypt gave stirring pic-
tures of the Life Guardsmen dashing through
the smoke of the Egyptian batteries, slashing
and thrusting at the gunners as they crouched
for shelter beneath their pieces. But this was
[174]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
pure imagination. If commanded to do so the
Life Guards would have charged into the very
“mouth of hell,” not to speak of Egyptian guns.
But what they were ordered to “go for” was the
Egyptian infantry, which was considerably in
front of its guns, and these had limbered up and
retired from action, rendering it impossible for
the victorious troopers to see and capture them
in the darkness. But the day had been won all
the same.
A few days later, on the 9th of September, an-
other attack of the Egyptians on Kassassin was
beaten off in the most brilliant manner, the Thir-
teenth Bengal Lancers, in their picturesque tur-
bans, especially distinguishing themselves; and
there were many who thought that Sir Garnet
Wolseley ought to have rushed the not far-dis-
tant entrenchments of Tel-el-Kebir there and
then. But though this might certainly have
been done, there were certain weighty reasons of
military policy against the step. For a com-
mander must not be too much of a Hotspur, but
think of ulterior aims as well as of present op-
portunities. It is the man who can bide his
time that will ultimately win.
Foiled in their repeated attempts to bar the
British advance, Arabi and his Egyptians now
finally withdrew behind the entrenched lines of
Tel-el-Kebir, there to stand on the defensive
[175]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and await attack. These formidable lines,
which ran along a ridge of rising ground, pre-
sented a front of about four miles long, and had
been constructed according to the most advanced
principles of military engineering. The Egyp-
tians are great hands at the spade, being con-
stantly employed in the throwing up of water-
dams and the like, and many thousands of will-
ing hands had been at the disposal of Arabi in
the task of raising his famous line of earthworks.
How many men of all kinds — Egyptians, Nu-
bians, Bedouins, etc. — Arabi had behind the
shelter of these parapets Sir Garnet Wolseley
did not exactly know, but concluded that the
number could not be far short of twenty-two
thousand.
On the other hand, the English commander
had now with him about seventeen thousand
officers and men, with sixty-seven guns, where-
with to crack the nut that was presented by
Arabi’s entrenchments, and these Sir Garnet re-
solved to storm at the hour when darkness was
beginning to glide into dawn — for the reasons
that at this cool hour his troops would naturally
fight much better than under the roasting rays
of the sun, that they would be less exposed to the
enemy's fire in the faint light, and that they
would also profit by the demoralization which
invariably seizes upon soldiers when set upon
[176]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
unawares. But, to make the surprise complete,
it was necessary that the very utmost care should
be taken to give no indication to the watchful
Egyptians behind the earthworks of the stealthy
approach of their British foes. When ranked
into line, the storming columns were to advance
— not to the word of command, but by the mere
guidance of the stars, like so many ships at sea.
Not a pipe was to be lit, not a whisper heard in
the ranks.
The night (September 12–13) was more than
usually dark, and it was some time before the
troops could be placed in the positions assigned
them. -
Arabi and his men fondly believed that all
this British force was sleeping the sleep of wea-
ried soldiers at Kassassin and other points be-
tween that place and the Suez Canal. As a
matter of fact, it was marshaling itself in line of
battle array on an elevation called Ninth Hill,
about five and a half miles from Arabi's lines,
from which it remained hidden by the impene-
trable curtain of night. Some of the regiments
— notably the Highlanders — had but a few
hours before hurried up to the front from Is-
mailia; though wearied by the long and strenu-
ous march, they were all eager to be led on to
the fight without further delay. Until the hour
of starting, all the men stretched themselves on
[177]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the sand to snatch what brief and hurried sleep
they could. From previous experience it was
reckoned that the actual progress over the desert,
with its darkness and other difficulties, would be
about one mile per hour — just think of that! —
so that by starting at 1.30 A.M., Sir Garnet cal-
culated to reach the enemy's works just before
the first gleam of dawn — so nicely was every-
thing planned beforehand.
“The long sojourn at Ninth Hill,” wrote Gen-
eral Hamley, “while waiting for the moment to
advance, was of a somber kind: we sat in silence
on our horses or on the sand, while comrades
moving about appeared as black figures coming
out of the darkness, unrecognizable except by
their voices. A skirmish had taken place some
days before near this spot, in which men and
horses were slain, and tokens of it were wafted
to us on the breeze.” Once there was a false
alarm on the right, and the prostrate men sprang
to their feet; but it turned out to be only a body
of British cavalry moving across the front of the
line.
At last, in the lowest undertone, word was
passed along all the line to advance, and soon
nothing was heard but the “swish-swish” of the
battalions footing it warily across the sand as if
it had been snow — silence otherwise and dark-
ness around and above, with the stars shining
[178]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
down as they had done in the time of the Pha-
raohs and the long dynasties of Egyptian kings
lying entombed in the Pyramids. Well might
the British troops have been impressed with the
suspense of the moment and the awful solemnity
of the scene. Directing poles had been pre-
viously fixed in the sand by the engineers, but
they proved of little or no use, the only effective
finger-posts being the everlasting stars, and even
these were now and then obscured by clouds.
Sometimes the mounted men of the Head-
quarters' Staff, moving up to the columns with
whispered instructions, were mistaken for prying
Bedouins; but silence and discipline were won-
derfully well preserved, and forward, ever for-
ward, moved the invisible and barely audible
masses of fighting men. Once the Highland
Brigade lay down to rest for twenty minutes,
and this was the occasion of some confusion
which was like to have ended in a calamity.
For the order thus given in the center of the
Highland line did not reach the outer flanks,
by reason of its being so cautiously passed from
mouth to mouth, till some time after, the con-
sequence being that as the flanks continued to
step out, while maintaining touch with the re-
cumbent center, those flanks lost their direction
and circled round in such a manner that the
Brigade finally halted in a crescent-shaped
- [179]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
formation, with the right and left almost con-
fronting each other; and but for the intelligence
and efforts of the officers, these opposing flanks,
mistaking each other for enemies, might have
come to actual blows.
With great difficulty the proper march-direc-
tion was restored, and on again swept — or,
rather, crept — the whole line, like thieves in the
night. Weird and ghostly was the effect of the
dim streaks, looking like shadows of moving
clouds, but which were really lines of men steal-
ing over the desert. All these men knew that
they were forbidden to fire a single shot until
within the Egyptian lines, and that these were to
be carried with a cheer and a rush at the point
of the bayonet; so that they almost held their
breath with eagerness, and plodded ever on like
phantoms of the desert — silent, resolute, and
prepared. For nearly five hours they had thus
advanced, and then they knew that the supreme
moment must now be near.
Nearer, indeed, than they fancied! For, to use
again the words of General Hamley, who was rid-
ing behind his Highlanders:“Just as the paling of
the stars showed dawn to be near, but while it was
still as dark as ever, a few scattered shots were
fired in our front, probably from some sentries, or
small pickets, outside the enemy's lines. No no-
tice was taken of this, though one of the shots
[180]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
killed a Highlander; the movement was un-
changed, and then a single bugle sounded within
the enemy's lines. These were most welcome
sounds, assuring us that we should close with
the foe before daylight, which just before seemed
very doubtful. Yet a minute or two of dead
silence elapsed after the Egyptian bugle was
blown, and then the whole extent of entrench-
ment in our front, hitherto unseen and unknown,
poured forth a stream of rifle fire. Then, for
the first time that night, I could really be said
to see my men, lighted by the flashes. The
dim phantom lines which I had been looking on
all night suddenly woke to life as our bugles
sounded the charge, and, responding with lusty,
continued cheers, and without a moment's pause
or hesitation, the ranks sprang forward in steady
array.”
It was as if the footlights of the rebel Pasha's
long-extended stage had suddenly flashed out
with blinding flame; and now the vast and sol-
emn theatre of the desert, which a moment be-
fore had been wrapped in the deepest silence
and darkness, grew luminous with lurid jets of
fire and resonant with the deafening rattle of
Egyptian musketry and the roar of guns — a
transformation scene as sudden as it was impres-
sive. Never had British soldiers been actors
on such a grandly picturesque stage. But do
[181]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
you suppose that these soldiers returned the
volleys rained on them by the Remingtons of
Arabi's men? Not a bit of it. Not a single
shot was fired; but bayonets were fixed, and
away like an avalanche dashed the redcoats on
the foe. Their distance from the blazing line
of entrenchment was deemed to be about one
hundred and fifty yards, and in the interval nearly
two hundred men went down, the Seventy-fourth
(Highland Light Infantry) on the left losing five
officers and sixty men before it got to the ditch.
This was six feet wide and four feet deep, and
beyond was a parapet ten feet high from the
bottom. The first man to mount this parapet
was private Donald Cameron, of the Cameron
Highlanders, a brave young soldier from the
braes of Athol; but he at once fell back among his
struggling comrades with a bullet through his
brain, dying the noblest of all deaths. Little
wonder that, on passing the Seventy-ninth after
the battle, General Alison exclaimed, “Well
done, the Cameron men! Scotland will be proud
of this day's work!”
It so happened that in the darkness the High-
land Brigade, which formed the left of the at-
tack, had got considerably in front of the rest of
the line, so that it was the first, so to speak, to
break its bayonet-teeth on Arabi's entrench-
ments; and the seizure of these works for the
[182]


Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir
first ten minutes to a quarter of an hour of the
fight was the history of the advance of the kilted
warriors from the North. They had not fought
better even at Fontenoy, Quebec, and Quatre
Bras; nor were their present foes to be despised,
seeing they were allowed by all to have borne
the charge with a discipline and a desperation
worthy of the best troops. “I never saw men
fight more steadily,” said Sir A. Alison. “Five
or six times we had to close on them with the
bayonet, and I saw those poor men fighting hard
when their officers were flying before us. All
this time, too, it was a goodly sight to see the
Cameron and Gordon Highlanders — mingled
together as they were in the stream of the fight,
their young officers leading in front, waving
their swords above their heads — their pipes
playing, and the men rushing on with that proud
smile on their lips which you never see in sol-
diers save in the moment of successful battle.”
When the Black Watch had reached the crest
of the works, and were being re-formed to attack
some other guns in the interior entrenchments, a
battery of the newly formed Scottish Division
of the Royal Artillery swept past them, shouting
out “Scotland forever!” as the Greys and the
Highlanders had done on the ensanguined slopes
of Waterloo. Here the Black Watch had to
mourn the death of Sergeant-Major MacNeill,
[183]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
who fell pierced by three bullets after laying low .
six of the enemy with his good claymore. The
Irish soldiers too did their fair share of the fight-
ing. The Royal Irish on the extreme right,
with a wild yell, and all the splendid valor of
their nation, went straight as a dart at their par-
ticular portion of Arabi's works, carrying them
with the bayonet, and turning the flank of his
position.
All along the line the engagement now be-
came general, the men plying butt and bayonet
upon the Egyptians, who fell in scores — in
swarms. At the bastions stormed by the High-
land Brigade the enemy lay in hundreds. On
the other hand, the total losses of the British
army at Tel-el-Kebir amounted to three hundred
and thirty-nine, of which two hundred and forty-
three occurred in the Highland Brigade, leaving
ninety-six to represent the losses of the rest of the
force.
Under the Queen's soldier-son the Guards
were in the second line as a reserve, but so
quickly and successfully had the works been
stormed that they were not required to fire a
shot. Some, however, were wounded (Father
Bellew, their Roman Catholic chaplain, and
Colonel Sterling amongst others), for Arabi's
men shot high, sometimes over the heads of the
attacking party. On the other side of the canal,
[184]


cARRYING THE BAstions with the bayonet p. 13,





VIII
General Gordon. The Tragedy
of Khartoum
January 19 – February 6, 1885
By CHARLES LOWE
ernment resolved on despatching a military
expedition, under Lord Wolseley, to relieve
and rescue General Charles Gordon — the Bay-
ard of the nineteenth century — and the Egyp-
tian garrison of Khartoum, which was besieged
by the Mahdi, or False Prophet of the Soudan,
with twenty thousand of his fiercest warriors.
After incredible exertions in ascending the
Nile and struggling with the difficulties and dan-
gers of the “cataracts,” this expedition at last
reached Korti about the end of the year, where
intelligence reached it of the pressing peril of
the gallant Gordon and his garrison. The expe-
dition was then divided into two forces — one,
under General Earle, called the River Column,
which was detached to occupy Berber, and on
the way inflict condign punishment upon the
Monassir tribe for the treacherous murder of
I. the autumn of 1884, the Gladstone Gov-
[186]


FIVE MINUTES DESPERATE AND BlooDY HAND-To-HAND FIGHTING

A. 18.7


Col
and


General Gordon at Khartoum
Colonel Stewart and his companions, whom
Gordon had previously sent down to Dongola;
and the other, known as the Desert Column,
under Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart,
to make a bold and rapid dash across the Bayuda
waste of sand and scrub with intent to establish
a foothold at Metamneh, on the Nile, whence,
with the aid of Gordon's steamers from Khar-
toum, it would ascend the river and relieve the
beleaguered garrison.
This Desert Column, composed of picked men
from all the élite regiments of the British army,
with a superb detachment of Bluejackets, yet
aggregating less than two thousand combatants,
mounted on camels, pushed across the parched
Bayuda Desert, and covered itself with glory by
vanquishing all its foes: hunger, thirst, sleepless-
ness, and, worse than all, the fanatical spearmen
of the Mahdi; at Abu-Klea (17th of January),
when marching in square fifteen hundred strong,
it was suddenly set upon, as a lighthouse rock is
assailed by raging seas, by a roaring flood of
more than five thousand death-despising sav-
ages; and after only about five minutes' desperate
and bloody hand-to-hand fighting, in the course
of which it lost the heroic Colonel Fred Burnaby
and one hundred sixty-eight officers and men
killed and wounded — being all but submerged
[187)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
in this human deluge of the desert — it at last
raised a rousing cheer in token of victory.
We have not space to tell of the further diffi-
culties of the march: the incidents of the zareba,
or extemporized fortalice, near Abu-Kru, in-
cluding the death of two war correspondents
and the fatal wounding of the commander of the
column; the final march of the fighting square
for the river; the scattering of a second onset of
Mahdist warriors with a few well-directed vol-
leys; and the final arrival of the square on the
banks of the river, the sight of whose blessed
waters was hailed by them with as much en-
thusiasm as had been the distant Euxine by the
home-returning soldiers of Xenophon after their
perilous and toilsome march through the moun-
tains of Armenia.
That night (Monday, 19th of January, 1885)
the flying column bivouacked as best it could on
the bank of the river, sleeping as it had never
slept before — all but the surgeons, who, though
tired to death, were heroically unremitting in
their attentions to the wounded.
Early next morning the men were again
paraded to return to the zareba. On the way
the village of Gubat was burned, and at about
eight o'clock, the enemy offering but little re-
sistance, the entrenched position was reached
Once more.
[188]


General Gordon at Khartoum
While the square was on the march the day
before there had been considerable fighting at
the zareba, but ultimately the Arabs had been
compelled to give way before the fierce and well-
directed fire from rifles and guns alike. Break-
fast was just ready when the flying column was
seen returning, Colonel Talbot, commanding the
Life Guards, walking as composedly in advance
through the scrub as though he were returning
from a review. On the column coming up it
was received with befitting cheers, for it had
done its work well, or “tastefully,” as was re-
marked by an Irishman of the Royal Sussex.
An hour later the whole force moved away in
columns of regiments from the zareba, taking as
much of the stores as possible, and leaving be-
hind a guard of fifty men. Five-and-twenty
wounded soldiers had to be carried on hand-
stretchers, for hundreds of camels had been lost.
The enemy dared not again to attack the force,
which reached the river village of Abu-Kru by
nightfall. The wounded were placed under
cover in the huts, and the outlying houses were
loopholed for defence, whilst the troops settled
down for the night on the ground outside.
Hitherto the Arabs had given no sign, but now
their fire was drawn by the daring Mr. Bennett
Burleigh, of the Daily Telegraph, who had rid-
den on towards a point where, with the true in-
[189]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
stinct of the war-correspondent, he had sus-
pected a possible source of interest. The troops
now advanced in square in case of a sudden rush
of spearmen, and the enemy opened a brisk fire
from loopholed walls. Occasionally the square
halted, and the men lay down whilst skirmishers
were sent out to reply to the fire of the enemy;
while Sir Charles tried his guns, though they
produced no effect on the mud walls, the shells
going as clean through them as revolver bullets
through a target of cardboard.
Presently, however, Barrow sent to say that
he could see some large flags in the rear, and
that he was certain they were on steamers, and
the ubiquitous Burleigh rode off to meet them.
Sir C. Wilson also sent Stuart-Wortley to com-
municate with them, and, to the exceeding joy
of all, they turned out to be four vessels which
Gordon had sent down from Khartoum to co-
operate with his relievers.
“The steamers,” wrote Mr. Burleigh, “were a
curious sight. Three of them were about the
size of large river-steamers, and the fourth was
even smaller than a Thames penny-boat. The
hulls of all four were of iron; the sides and the
bridge were boarded up like a London street
bill-boarding. In place of their pine boards
however, there were heavy sunt-wood timbers,
two or three inches thick, and as impervious to
[190]


General Gordon at Khartoum
rifle bullets as steel plates. In the forward part
of each vessel a raised wooden fort had been
built, the inside plated with old boiler iron.
Projecting through a port-hole, closed against
bullets by an iron plate when necessary, was a
short brass-rifled gun four inches in bore, such
as are used by the Egyptian army. On the main
deck another gun was placed. Gordon must
have lavished hours and days of hard labor to get
the material together for making these four
steamers into iron or wooden-clads so strong
that they could safely run the gauntlet of the
rebel cannon and rifle fire.”
Meanwhile Sir C. Wilson had withdrawn his
force to a village fronting the west side of Me-
tamneh — first north, then south, then west;
and no sooner had he begun this retiring move-
ment than the enemy opened on him from an
advanced battery with blind shell, though luckily
only one came into the square. “I heard the
rush of the shot through the air,” he said, “and
then a heavy thud behind me. I thought at first
it had gone into the field-hospital, but on looking
round found it had carried away the lower jaw
of one of the artillery camels, and then buried
itself in the ground. The poor brute walked on
as if nothing had happened, and carried its load
to the end of the day.”
The sudden appearance of the steamers had
[191]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
produced quite a stage effect; and the black
troops on board, hastening to disembark and
eager for the fray, were lustily cheered by Tommy
Atkins, who was not in a particularly pleasant
frame of mind at having thus been made to pass
the morning hours in imitation of the storied
king of France and his thirty thousand men.
The swarthy Soudanese, who behaved like per-
fect children in their joy at the prospect of their
being able to show a thing or two to Tommy
Atkins, came on as keen as possible, and ran
four guns into action at once. “Being sent to
their guns with orders,” said Lieutenant Douglas
Dawson, of the Coldstreams, “I stayed with
them for half an hour, while they made some
first-rate practice on the town, and though the
gun-fire drew down the bullets pretty thick, they
didn't appear to mind a bit. It seemed extraor-
dinary what good troops the master mind of
Gordon had made out of such rough material.
Never have I seen men so pleased as they were
at meeting us. Gordon's name mentioned was
like that of a god whom they worshiped. It was
even difficult for these enthusiastic allies to re-
tire, as we explained to them that we did not in-
tend for the present to attack the town.”
For, alas! that was the conclusion to which
Sir C. Wilson had now been forced by a calm
survey of all the circumstances of the situation.
[192]


General Gordon at Khartoum
Lord Cochrane, of the Second Life Guards,
pleaded very hard for leave to storm the town,
and, under cover of the smoke from the wind-
ward side, drive the Arabs into the river, but Sir
Charles did not think the result would justify
the risk. Boscawen managed the withdrawal
cleverly and well, without confusion or hurry,
and always giving the enemy a chance to attack
if they wished. Shortly before the withdrawal
began, Poé, of the Marines, received a dreadful
wound in the thigh, necessitating amputation
very high up. Ever since leaving Korti he had
worn a red coat, almost the only one in the force,
and this had made him too conspicuous to the
marksmen of the enemy. He was shot while
standing up in the open talking to his men, who
were lying down.
By the time the force had returned to Abu-
Kru its involuted line of march resembled as
nearly as possible the figure eight. The in-
tended attack of Sir C. Wilson on Metamneh
had resolved itself into a mere reconnaissance in
force; and he himself admitted that the moral
effect of this was bad, giving the enemy fresh
heart. But he was not without his substantial
reasons for what he had done. By death and
wounds the effective force at his disposal had
already been decimated, and he could therefore
ill afford to risk the further diminution of his
[193]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
combative strength, the less so as he now had
reason to fear that bodies of the Arabs were ad-
vancing against him from Khartoum as well as
Shendy – north and south. Besides, even if he
had taken Metamneh, he estimated that the
force at his disposal, after deduction of the loss
in storming, would be insufficient to hold it
against all comers. For these and other rea-
sons he decided not to press the attack. But,
after all, he had established himself on the Nile
with Gordon's steamers at his service, and that
was the main thing.
These steamers had brought down with them
Gordon's diaries up to the 14th of December (it
was now the 21st of January), together with a
note in the beleaguered hero's own handwriting,
dated 29th of December: “Khartoum — all
right; can hold out for years.” Where, then,
was the hurry? Ah, but there was another letter
from Gordon to a private friend, Watson, dated
14th of December (the date of the last entry in
his diary), in which he said he expected a crisis
within the next ten days, or about Christmas
day! And now it was nearly a month after
Christmas! Gracious heavens! was this not
enough to fill the relieving force with the keenest
apprehension, and rouse to the very utmost all
the energies of its commander P Gordon's
“Khartoum — all right” note was evidently a
[194]


General Gordon at Khartoum
blind: the real stress of his position was con-
veyed in his private letters; and thus, rightly
discerning the situation, Sir C. Wilson resolved
“to carry out the original program and go up to
Khartoum.”
At once 2 No, various circumstances seemed
to render this impossible, and, indeed, unneces-
sary. To begin with, a rumor had reached Sir
C. Wilson that a hostile force was approaching
from the south, and it therefore behooved him —
so he thought — to descend the Nile in one of
Gordon's steamers and inquire into the truth of
this report, “I would not leave the small force
in its position on the Nile without ascertaining
whether it was likely to be attacked.” More-
over, in spite of Gordon's gloomy forebodings,
Sir C. Wilson knew that, although Omdurman
— on the left bank of the White Nile over against
Khartoum — had fallen, Khartoum itself was
still holding out; while he also calculated that
the besieging pressure on the town would be re-
lieved by the large number of men detached by
the Mahdi to meet the English, and that news
of their victories would be sure to have pene-
trated into Khartoum and given fresh heart to
Gordon and his garrison.
In Wilson's opinion there was nothing to show
— and he questioned the commanders of the
steamers carefully — that the crisis at Khar-
[195]


General Gordon at Khartoum
shell screaming and crashing into mud-built
Shendy. The bolder spirits of the party had
pleaded hard with Wilson for leave to land and
storm the place outright; but again, as at Me-
tamneh, the combative impulses of these fiery
Hotspurs were repressed by the just and cau-
tious reasonings of their sagacious commander.
Thus, then, passed Thursday, the 22d. Be-
fore leaving the steamer by which he had gone
down to Shendy, Wilson ordered preparations
to be made for a start to Khartoum next day —
the 23d. But, alas! unexpected difficulties again
cropped up, rendering it impossible for the two
selected steamers to be got under weigh. For
it was found that the engines had to be over-
hauled, wood had to be collected as fuel, rations
drawn for the crews, pilots selected for the cat-
aracts; and, above all things, those crews had to
be assorted in conformity with the express in-
struction of General Gordon, who insisted
strongly on our taking actual command of the
steamers, and removing from them all Pashas,
Beys, and men of Turkish or Egyptian origin,
whom he describes as “hens.” “So the hours
slipped by,” said Sir C. Wilson, “and we failed
to make a start” (on the 23d).
Nor was it till eight o'clock on the following
morning (Saturday, the 24th) that the two
steamers at last began to churn the waters of
[197]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the Nile and head for Khartoum, amid the part-
ing cheers of the lads they left behind them.
These vessels were the Bordein and the Telaha-
wiyeh. On board the former were Sir C. Wil-
son, accompanied by Khashm-el-Mus, Captain
Gascoigne, ten men of the Royal Sussex, one
petty officer, one artificer R.N., and one hundred
ten Soudanese troops, the “hens” having all
been weeded out. The Telehawiyeh carried
Abd-el-Hamid, Captain Trafford, and ten men
of the Royal Sussex, including a signaller, Lieu-
tenant Stuart-Wortley, one artificer R.N., and
eighty Soudanese troops; but she also had in tow
a nugger laden with dhura (grain) for the fam-
ished garrison of Khartoum, and fifty additional
Soudanese soldiers.
It had been originally intended to send fifty
men of the Royal Sussex up to Khartoum, but
Sir C. Wilson did not feel justified in taking with
him an escort of more than twenty. Happy
fellows, to be thus chosen for such an honorable
and risky enterprise, and greatly envied by the
war-correspondents, who, for all their hard
pleading, were not allowed to share their peril.
Lord Wolseley had particularly wished the escort
to enter Khartoum in red coats, and these had
been sent to the front. But somehow or other
they had been lost or looted; so a call had to be
made for scarlet tunics, and a sufficient number
[198]


General Gordon at Khartoum.
were raised from the Guards or the Heavies,
though these hung rather loosely on the less
massive frames of the men of Sussex.
“Now, what was it we were going to do?”
wrote Wilson. “We were going to fight our
way up the river and into Khartoum in two
steamers of the size of penny-boats on the
Thames, which a single well-directed shell would
send to the bottom; with crews and soldiers ab-
solutely without discipline, with twenty English
soldiers, with no surgeon — not even a dresser
— and with only one interpreter, Muhammed
Ibrahim, still suffering from a flesh wound in his
side.”
The filth in the steamers was something in-
describable, the stench which rose up from the
holds overpowering, and the rats countless and
ubiquitous, no place or person being too sacred
for them. With such a motley crew, moreover,
the noise on board was sometimes deafening,
and King Kurbash had frequently to assert his
sway. The top of the deck-house or saloon in
either boat was assigned to the ten Sussex men,
with their arms and ammunition, kits and food,
who were thus in a kind of citadel which could
command the whole ship in case of a mutiny or
anything going wrong.
All kinds of botheration occurred to impede
the progress of the steamers. For they were
[199]


General Gordon at Khartoum
steamers — until, on the afternoon of the 27th, a
native on the left bank hailed the Bordein, shout-
ing out that a camel-man had just passed down
with the news that Khartoum was at last taken,
and Gordon killed. Incredible! So much so,
that “we dined together in high spirits at the
prospect of running the blockade next day and
at last meeting General Gordon after his famous
siege,”—a siege which had lasted for three hun-
dred seventeen days, or only nine days less than
that of Sebastopol.”
Starting at 6 A.M. on the 28th, the steamers
had advanced to a point whence the towers of
Khartoum could at last be descried in the far
distance — Wortley and his signaller with the
heliograph now getting ready to try and attract
Gordon's attention! — when another Shagiyeh
shouted out from the bank that Khartoum had
been taken, and Gordon had been killed two
days before.
Soon afterwards a heavy fire was opened on
*On the 9th of December Gordon had written in his diary:
“We are only short of the duration of the siege of Sebastopol
fifty-seven days, and we had no respite, like the Russians had
during the winter of 1854–55. . . . Of course, it will be looked
upon as very absurd to compare the two blockades, those of
Sebastopol and Khartoum; but, if properly weighed, one was
just as good as the other. The Russians had money—we had
none; they had skilled officers—we had none; they had no
civil population—we had forty thousand; they had their route
open and had news — we had neither.”
[201]


General Gordon at Khartoum
the confluence of the Blue and the White Niles?
Wilson, always in the optimist vein, thought
that the island might still be in the hands of Gor-
don's men, who had thus begun to co-operate
with the steamers. But, alas! no. Drawing
near to address them and ask for news, Wilson
was driven back into his turret by a shower of
hostile bullets. Mahdist riflemen those, and
no mistake. º
But might not Khartoum itself still be holding
out? Forward again, and let us see! But “no
sooner did we start upwards than we got into
such a fire as I hope never to pass through again
in a penny-steamer.” — nothing to greet the
score of English redcoats but the roar of hostile
guns, the continuous roll of musketry from either
bank, the loud-rushing noise of Krupp shells,
the grunting of a Nordenfeldt or a mitrailleuse
— such a devils’ concert and carnival of welcome
as English redcoats had not had for many a day.
No flag flying in Khartoum, and not a shot fired
on shore in aid of the steamers. Could the
most eager and optimisic of Wilsons fail at last
to read the true significance of all that?
Certainly not; seeing was now believing. “I
at once,” wrote Wilson, “gave the order to turn
and run full speed down the river. It was hope-
less to attempt a landing or to communicate with
the shore under such a fire. The sight at this
[203]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
moment was very grand: the masses of the enemy
with their fluttering banners near Khartoum;
the long rows of riflemen in the shelter-trenches
at Omdurman; the numerous groups of men on
Tuti; the bursting shells, and the water torn up
by hundreds of bullets and occasional heavier
shot—made an impression never to be forgotten.
Looking out over the stormy scene, it seemed
almost impossible that we should escape.”
The Sussex redcoats had been very steady
under all this jeu d'enfer, and done much execu-
tion among the ranks of the enemy. All on
board had very narrow escapes from bullets and
bursting of shells — Wilson's field-glass, for
example, being shattered in his hand; but, for-
tunately, the enemy's gunners were bad shots.
Some of the Soudanese soldiers did things which,
if they had been English, would have entitled
them to the Victoria Cross, and the Sussex drum-
mer picked up and threw overboard the burning
fuse of a shell which had burst overhead.
When the steamers got clear of the last guns,
after having been under fire more or less for four
hours, it was past four o'clock; and then it was,
the tension of the fight being over, that all on
board realized to the full the terrible nature of
the situation.
As for the Soudanese, they were all in the
depths of despair at the thought of the ruin in
[204]


General Gordon at Khartoum
which the fall of Khartoum must have involved
their families; and Khashm-el-Mus, their chief,
collapsed entirely.
So would Wilson, too, he said, had it not been
for the thought of how he was to get his steamers
down the cataracts again — a much more dan-
gerous business than that of bringing them up
— down to Abu-Kru with the awful news that
Khartoum had fallen, and that Gordon was un-
doubtedly dead. Sir Charles had been acting
as chief of the Intelligence Department before
the command of the Desert Column devolved
upon him by the wounding of Herbert Stewart,
and now here he was racing down the Nile on
his battered penny-steamer, the bearer of these
terrible tidings.
The steamers continued their down-stream
course until dark — the Telahawiyeh had
grounded but soon got free and followed her
consort — when they made fast to an island
south of Jebel Royan. From this place messen-
gers, in the Mahdi's uniform, were sent to ascer-
tain the fate of Gordon, and on their return they
stated that the town had fallen on the morning
of Monday, the 26th, through the treachery of
Faragh Pasha, that Gordon himself had been
killed, and the town given over to a three days'
pillage. Faragh Pasha had originally been a
black slave, whom Gordon freed and entrusted
[205]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
with the command of the Soudanese troops.
This ungrateful scoundrel, it was said, had
opened the gates and let in the roaring flood of
Mahdist murderers.
In what particular manner Gordon himself
had met his doom is still subject to some little
doubt. All the best evidence tended to prove
that he was killed at or near the palace, where
his body was subsequently seen by several wit-
nesses. The only account by a person claiming
to be an eye-witness relates: “On hearing the
noise I got my master's donkey and went with
him to the palace. We met Gordon Pasha at
the outer door. Mohamed Bey Mustafa, with
my master, Ibrahim Bey Rushdi, and about
twenty cavasses, then went with Gordon towards
the house of the Austrian Consul Hansel, near
the church, when we met some rebels in an open
place near the outer gate of the palace. Gordon
Pasha was walking in front leading the party.
The rebels fired a volley, and Gordon was killed
at once; nine of the cavasses, Ibrahim Bey
Rushdi, and Mohamed Bey Mustafa were killed;
the rest ran away.”
The massacre in the town lasted some six
hours, and about four thousand persons at least
were killed. Major Kitchener, of the Intelli-
gence Department, who made very careful
inquiries into the circumstances of the fall of
[206]


GENERAL CHARLES Gordon p. 206





General Gordon at Khartoum
Khartoum, came to the conclusion that the ac-
cusations of treachery were the outcome of mere
supposition. In his deliberate opinion the city
fell, not through the opening of the gates by
Faragh Pasha, but from sudden assault when
the garrison were too exhausted by privations to
make proper resistance. If such were the case,
the fact disposes completely of the reasoning of
those who argued that, even if Sir Charles Wilson
had been able to start at once from Metamneh in-
stead of after a delay of four days, he would not
have been in time to save Gordon by stiffening
the courage of his garrison with the presence of
his redcoats, who were but the avant-couriers of
more to come.
But “Too late! Too late! by only a couple of
days!” – such were the cruel, the crushing
words which ever rang in the ears of Wilson and
his companions as they did their downhearted
best, amid their disaffected and almost mutinous
crews, to steer their steamers down through
cataracts, sunken rocks, and sandbanks far more
treacherous than Faragh Pasha, back to Abu-
Kru with the woful burden of their tidings.
(207)


The Battle of Ping-Yang
Seoul against the Chinese, but with the object
of driving them out of the country and carrying
the war into Manchuria.
A Chinese force, the numbers of which were
enormously exaggerated by current report, had
advanced from the Yalu River to Ping-yang,
where it had been reënforced by troops sent
across the sea from Taku, and by the detach-
ment that Yeh had saved from the lost battle
near Asan. Ping-yang, a walled city of about
twenty thousand inhabitants, was a place famous
in the history of Korea. It had once been the
capital of the country in the days before Seoul
became the residence of the Court. When the
Japanese invaded Korea at the end of the six-
teenth century, they had captured Ping-yang,
but this had marked the farthest limit of their
conquests. In 1592 they had been attacked and
defeated by a mixed Chinese and Korean army
on the hilly ground about Mount Mok-tan,
“the Hill of Peonies,” just outside the northern
walls of the city.
Ping-yang stands on the right or west bank of
the Tatung River, a wide and deep stream which
makes a deep bend and almost encloses it on
three sides. The shape of the walled city is a
flattened oval, the one of the longer sides lying
along the river bank. At the north end the
ground rises sharply to Mount Mok-tan, but all
[209]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
round the country is hilly. The Chinese did
not rely for the defence of the city on its ancient
fortifications, which consisted of a high em-
battled wall, with numerous gates, each crowned
by a pagoda-like ornamental structure of painted
and gilded woodwork. They had erected a
number of square earthwork forts on and around
Mount Mok-tan, and on the lower ground be-
tween the wall and the river at the south end of
the town. There was a bridge of boats across
the river, and at the farther end of this they had
erected another group of forts, with two ad-
vanced works to watch the high road to the
south and to Seoul. Several Krupp guns, mostly
of small caliber, were mounted in these new
fortifications.
The best troops in the force assembled for the
defence of the city were thirty-five hundred
partly drilled Manchus under General Tso.
Besides these, there was another corps of fifteen
hundred men from Moukden city, six thousand
men from the province of Pe-chi-li under Gen-
eral Wei, two thousand from Port Arthur, and
about one thousand more whom General Yeh
had brought from Asan. On the strength of his
alleged success over the Japanese, Yeh was given
the chief command.
Meanwhile, the Japanese army in Korea had
been largely reënforced. At the beginning of
[210]


The Battle of Ping-Yang
the crisis a small detachment had been landed
at Fusan in the extreme south of the peninsula
to protect the Japanese trading colony in the
port. On August 6 General Nodzu arrived
there with the greater part of the Fifth Division,
and next day began to march northwards to
Seoul, which was held by Oshima's brigade.
Nodzu’s force could have reached the Korean
capital much more quickly by going by sea to
Chemulpo; but at this stage of the war, while
the Chinese fleet was still intact, it was not con-
sidered advisable to send all the transports into
the Yellow Sea. Besides, it was felt that a
march through Southern Korea would discour-
age the local adherents of the Chinese faction
and establish Japanese influence in the district.
Nodzu reached Seoul on the 19th, and took over
the supreme command of the Japanese forces.
Two other small detachments were landed at
Gensan on the east coast. One of these pushed
on to Seoul. The other marched towards Ping-
yang to coöperate from the eastward in the
coming attack on that place.
Oshima had sent two of his officers with a
small party of cavalry northwards to reconnoitre
Ping-yang. These were cut off and killed to a
man by a much stronger detachment of Chinese
sent out from the city by General Yeh, who re-
[211]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
ported the incident as a great victory over a large
force of the invaders.
By the end of August General Nodzu was
ready to begin active operations against Yeh
and the Ping-yang garrison. Two roads, or
rather tracks, run through the hilly country from
Seoul to Ping-yang, one near the sea, the other
farther inland through the town of Sak-riong.
A column of all arms under General Tachimi
had already been pushed forward to Sak-riong
by the inner road. Nodzu’s plan was that Ta-
chimi should continue his advance by this line,
while he himself with the main body marched
by the other road. A third column under Col-
onel Sato was to advance from Gensan. All
three columns were to be in the neighborhood
of Ping-yang by September 14. Nodzu would
then leave Oshima to make an attack next day
on the southern defences of Ping-yang, while he
with the main body, having crossed the Tatung
below the town, would attack the place from the
eastward, and Sato would attack from the north,
assisted by Tachimi, who was to cross the river
above the town. He hoped that he would thus
not merely get possession of Ping-yang, but also
capture the whole of Yeh’s army.
Against a better organized and better trained
force than that which held Ping-yang this com-
bined movement of several columns converging
[212]


The Battle of Ping-Yang
by widely separated roads upon the fortress
would have been a risky business. If Yeh had
been a European commander, he would have
fallen upon Sato's column before Nodzu and
Tachimi were able to give it any help. But in
adopting this plan the Japanese commander
acted on the knowledge he possessed of his op-
ponent's character, and his daring acceptance
of a theoretical risk was justified by the result.
Yeh pushed some small detachments along
the roads towards Seoul to delay the Japanese
advance, and there were consequently some un-
important skirmishes in which Oshima's brigade
played the chief part. It occupied Chung-hua
on September 10, Nodzu with the main body
turning to the left at Hwang-ju, ten miles far-
ther south, in order to cross the Tatung River
near its mouth. As Oshima's men approached
Chung-hua they found the road strewn with the
oil-paper cap-covers worn by the Chinese troops
in wet weather. The Korean peasants ex-
plained that these and other minor articles of
equipment had been thrown away by a Chinese
force, which had just retreated towards Ping-
yang after a night alarm, in which the various
regiments in camp had fired into each other in
the dark.
On the 12th Oshima's brigade came in sight
of the southern forts of Ping-yang, and during
[218]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
this and the next two days it did its best to mis-
lead the Chinese into the belief that it had the
main body behind it and was preparing to rush
the southern defences and force the crossing of
the river just below the town. Reconnaissances
were pushed close up to the enemy's works, and
there was some sharp skirmishing. The artil-
lery opened on the forts in order to draw their
fire and ascertain how they were armed, and a
party of daring volunteers swam the river under
fire and brought back five large junks from the
other side. Thus the attention of the Chinese
was riveted on the immediate neighborhood of
Ping-yang, and they knew nothing of the pas-
sage of the river near its mouth by the main body.
This was a tedious operation extending over
three days, for the river was one thousand yards
wide, its muddy banks were not easy of access,
and the number of boats available was insuffi-
cient for rapid transit.
. The small column, advancing from Sak-riong
under General Tachimi, crossed the Tatung
River some miles above Ping-yang on the 13th,
after dispersing by long-range rifle volleys a
Chinese detachment that tried to hold the op-
posite bank. On the 14th Tachimi's vanguard
came in sight of Ping-yang, but he kept his men
concealed in the hills to the north of the town.
Colonel Sato, with the Gensan column, was near
[214)


The Battle of Ping-Yang
at hand on Tachimi's right. During his ad-
vance, Sato had only encountered some small
cavalry detachments of the enemy. On the
evening of the 14th the Japanese forces were
thus close in to Ping-yang; but the Chinese sys-
tem of outposts was so hopelessly bad that they
were only aware of the presence of Oshima's
brigade, which they took to be the vanguard of
the main attack, coming as they expected from
the south.
On the night of the 14th, the eve of the battle,
the entire force available for the attack amounted
to about fourteen thousand men with forty-two
guns. But on account of the long delay in the
crossing of the Tatung River the greater part of
General Nodzu's column was so far away that it
could not hope to come into action till late on
the 15th, the day originally fixed for the attack.
On the afternoon of September 14 Nodzu sent
orders to Oshima to continue to engage the ene-
my's attention during the following day, but to
postpone the real attack till the 16th. Unfor-
tunately there were no means of communicating
this counter-order to Sato and Tachimi. Though
they were so close at hand, connection had not
been established with them either by messengers
or signalers. The commanders of the other
columns only knew that they must be not far off
to the northward. With a more enterprising
[215]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
enemy than the Chinese this want of connection
between the columns might have had fatal con-
sequences. As it was, General Oshima saw the
obvious danger of deferring the attack, and,
“in acknowledging the receipt of the order,
pointed out that, in all probability, the Gensan
and Sak-riong detachments would attack on the
15th as previously arranged, and that if this were
the case he would feel bound to give them all the
assistance he could, especially as the main col-
umn would be unable to co-operate.”
The night was fine and clear, the full moon
shining brightly in the sky. An hour before
dawn Oshima, who was eager to attack at all
hazards, had got his men ready to advance, and
at half-past four his guns renewed the bombard-
ment of the southern forts. From the hills to
the northward beyond the river could be heard
the booming of another cannonade. Tachimi
and Sato were in position, and as soon as Oshi-
ma's guns opened fire they had brought their
batteries into action, and had begun to form
their infantry for the attack. Oshima in his
turn, on hearing their fire, ordered his brigade
to advance against the Chinese forts, and so in
the gray dawn of September 15 the battle of
Ping-yang began.
As soon as the firing commenced, General Yeh
and his staff went to the gaily painted pagoda at
[216]


The Battle of Ping-Yang
the north gate. His banner, of bright crimson
cloth, twelve feet square, and bearing his name
in huge characters, hung over the outer wall.
Close by he had a large body of Manchu cavalry.
ready to charge out on the Japanese if they failed
in their attack. He had about twenty-five hun-
dred men in the works on the left bank, thirty-
six hundred in the northern defences, and about
six thousand of Li Hung Chang's drilled troops
holding the town wall and the southern defences
near the river.
Oshima's attack on the forts of the left bank
was intended to be a mere feint, but such was
the eagerness of both men and officers that they
pushed it home, and actually got possession of
some of the outworks, in the first dash made
before the sun rose. But for hours they made
no further progress. The Chinese, armed with
Mausers and well supplied with cartridges, kept
up a heavy fire, and only for the advantage that
their well-served artillery gave them they would
have been driven back. As it was, they were
barely able to hold their ground, and at one mo-
ment the outlook was so doubtful that one of the
regiments buried its colors lest they should fall
into the hands of the enemy. The only portion
of Oshima's command that obtained any de-
cided success was a detachment of two com-
panies under Major Okuyama, which crossed
[217]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the river below the town, in order to get in touch
with Nodzu and the main attack, and succeeded
in setting fire to the straw-roofed houses of the
southern suburbs of Ping-yang.
Meanwhile, Tachimi and Sato's columns had
been more successful in their attack on the north-
ern forts, five in number, three in the outer line
and two others nearer the city, the larger of the
two crowning the Mount of Peonies, famous as
the scene of Konishi’s defeat three hundred
years ago. The first fort was rushed in the twi-
light; the second, after being heavily bombarded,
was stormed at half-past seven, and the third
was taken half an hour later. Covered by their
artillery, which was well placed among the pines
on the ridges to the north of the city, the Japan-
ese now advanced against the two inner forts.
The Chinese abandoned the smaller of them,
and the Peony Fort was stormed at half-past
eight, the Japanese, to use their own expression,
swarming up three sides of the hill like ants.
The guns were then brought up to the Mount of
Peonies and opened on the city wall and the
northern gate, the infantry pouring in a heavy
rifle fire wherever the defenders attempted a
reply.
It was not till near eight o'clock that General
Nodzu had enough troops in hand to begin the
attack on the southwest end of Ping-yang. After
[218]


The Battle of Ping-Yang
a brief bombardment of the outworks he de-
ployed his infantry for the attack. They were
gallantly charged by the Manchu cavalry, who
came rushing out from one of the gates, but these
daring horsemen were received with such a fire
that few of them escaped. Of these the greater
part gained the open country, and rode away
northward to join the army on the Yalu. One
by one the outlying works were abandoned, and
the Chinese gradually concentrated their de-
fence on the high wall of the city.
The sky had become overclouded since early
morning, and about noon a storm burst over
Ping-yang. Then ensued a curious scene.
“Shortly after midday,” wrote the Standard
correspondent, “the dense fog of smoke, which
had been slowly drifting eastward, was broken
up by an almost tropical downpour. The Chi-
nese troops put up their oiled-paper umbrellas
and resolved to keep their bodies dry as well as
their powder. This seems almost too grotesque
to be true, but it is a fact. Their spacious um-
brellas, sticking above the walls of their trenches,
formed excellent targets for the Japanese sharp-
shooters. Chinese soldiers are miserable, de-
pressed creatures in the rain, and this unfor-
tunate downpour had not a little to do with the
success of the Japanese attack at this period.”
The forts on the high ground at the south of the
[219)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
city were captured, and then the Chinese hung
out white flags, and the firing ceased for awhile,
and a Chinese officer with a flag of truce came
out in front of Nodzu’s attack. To quote the
Standard correspondent, Mr. Williers, again:
“Some Japanese officers left their lines and
met him half-way. They found the Chinese
asked for a suspension of hostilities pending an
arrangement to surrender. The Japanese
pointed out that this could easily be done. The
Chinese had simply to lay down their arms, and
the Japanese would march in and take possession.
The Chinese general sent word to say that they
could not very well surrender in such rainy
weather. His men would get drenched, and
things would be generally uncomfortable. Would
they wait, say, for twelve hours? The rain
might lift by then. But the Japanese would not
listen further to the parley, and hostilities re-
commenced.”
The cavalry attempted another sortie, prob-
.ably in the hope of clearing a way for a general
retreat. There were about five hundred of
them. They rode gallantly down on Nodzu's
infantry, but were swept away almost to a man
by the Japanese rifles. On the north side of the
city the fire had ceased from the wall, and the
great gate seemed to be abandoned. But this
might be only a trick of the wily Chinese, and
[220)


The Battle of Ping-Yang
after an attempt to open the gate from the out-
side, which drew fire from some of the neighbor-
ing loopholes, a gallant soldier, a private named
Hirada, volunteered to climb the wall and re-
connoitre. His comrades watched him anx-
iously as he scrambled up the high wall beside
the pagoda-crowned gateway, from which the
dragon flag still flew. He found the parapet
deserted, got down and unbolted the gate, and
the Japanese infantry rushed in. The Chinese
had retired to some houses at a distance inside
the gate. They had fired at Hirada as he was
opening it, and they now exchanged a sharp fire
with the advancing Japanese. Beyond this
point the Japanese made no progress during the
afternoon; and as the walls and towers on the
right and left were held by the Chinese, and they
were rallying in the streets, Tachimi decided to
fall back on the Peony Mount, and hold on there
till the main attack had made further progress.
This retirement after the gate had been forced
shows that the Japanese had still a good deal of
respect for their opponents. But the next day
was to bring a surprise. ,
“When morning dawned,” writes the corre-
spondent already quoted, “Ping-yang was silent.
No reveille from the Chinese lines heralded the
day. Down by the western gate was a village
smouldering. Here and there a hut was strug-
[221 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
gling to burst into flame, for the rain had now
ceased, and the pall of smoke still hung over the
valley. The soddened turf, the fields of millet,
beans, and corn, wore the imprint of a great host
having passed over the country. The roads,
the trails through the fields, were strewn with
bright and gaudy uniforms. Flags, quaint
spears, curious old-time muskets, swords, pots,
and pans, and several curiously carved carriage
chairs were sticking in the mud. The Japanese
army awoke to this strange sight, rubbed its eyes
and wondered, then sounded the advance, and
closed upon the city. The earthworks, the re-
doubts, and the city itself were empty. The
Chinese army had disappeared. Some twelve
thousand men had stolen away in the night.
“He who fights and runs away lives to fight an-
other day.” So runs the old adage. These
are the tactics the Chinese have followed since
the beginning of the campaign. It was so at
Asan, where General Yeh stole out of the clutches
of the Japanese with one thousand troops. These
very men, after a splendid march through the
roughest and most inhospitable part of Korea,
reached Ping-yang to meet the Japanese again,
and, with the rest of the Ping-yang garrison,
succeeded in again carrying out the tactics they
followed at Asan.”
On the Japanese side six hundred and thirty-
[222]


The Battle of Ping-Yang
three men had fallen in the attack. Of these,
eight officers and one hundred and fifty-four men
were killed. Oshima's brigade suffered most
severely. Fully three-fourths of the loss fell upon
it, and the general himself was slightly wounded.
The Chinese loss cannot be so accurately stated.
It was certainly over a thousand, besides more
than six hundred prisoners. The Japanese
acknowledge that the Chinese fought bravely.
They give especial praise to the Chinese general
Tso. During the defence of the Peony Hill Fort
he was badly wounded, but tearing off a strip of
his long robe he bound up his wound and con-
tinued to encourage his men. Another bullet
struck him down dead, and on this his men gave
way. To this fall the Japanese attribute their
easy capture of the fort. A few of the prisoners
who tried to escape were beheaded, the rest were
well treated. As trophies of the fight the Japan-
ese had thirty-five Krupp guns, about five hun-
dred Mauser repeating rifles, and as many good
modern breech-loaders, quantities of older weap-
ons, flags, cartridges and money.
The collapse of the Chinese defence has been
explained by two facts. In the first place the
defences were on such an extensive scale that
not one of them were fully manned. Instead of
twelve or fourteen thousand men, the forts and
lines of Ping-yang would have needed thirty-five
[223]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
thousand. Again, the Chinese had expended all
their energy on fortifications, and made little or
no effort to clear the front of their works. Trees
were left standing in the dense pine woods on the
ridges that came close up to the works, and thus
the Japanese as they marched on the place were
screened almost entirely from view, and had a
good deal of cover from fire.
On the day of the battle Marshal Yamagata
was approaching with a new army of ten thou-
sand men that had lately landed at Chemulpo.
He took over the chief command on the morrow
of the victory. But there was no more fighting
in Korea. Ping-yang had cleared the north of
the peninsula of the Chinese. Yeh rallied his
twice-beaten army only behind the Yalu River,
the northern frontier of the country, where the
Chinese were now gathering an army for the
defence of Manchuria.
1224)


X
Port Arthur
The Chino-Japanese War (1894)
By A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
s FTER the victory of Ping-yang the Jap-
anese army, now under Marshal Yama-
gata, advanced to the Yalu, the northern
boundary of Korea, forced the passage of the
river and invaded Manchuria. On September
17 the Japanese fleet, under Admiral Ito, had
brought the Chinese northern squadron to action
and defeated it off the mouth of the Yalu. This
victory gave the Japanese the command of the
sea. They made use of it to send an army to
reduce the great naval arsenal of Port Arthur.
This second army, composed of a division under
General Yamaji and a brigade under Hasegawa,
the whole commanded by Marshal Oyama, and
numbering about twenty-five thousand men,
landed on October 24 at Hua-yuan-kon, in the
Liao-tung peninsula, and marching southwards,
captured Kin-chow on November 6, and Ta-
lien-wan on the 7th.
Kin-chow and Ta-lien-wan had been captured
by Yamaji's division. Before advancing on
[225]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Port Arthur, Marshal Oyama brought up Hase-
gawa's brigade, and gave his army, now concen-
trated at Ta-lien-wan, and in touch with the
fleet, a few days' rest, during which the doomed
fortress was carefully reconnoitred, and the
country between it and the Japanese camp was
cleared of the roving bands of Chinese braves
that infested it.
The country round Port Arthur is a mass of
rocky hills with steep sides, running up now into
isolated pointed summits, now into narrow
ridges or table lands of no great width. The
harbor lies northeast and southwest in the line of
its greatest length. The town and dockyard are
at the north end, between two hills, the more
easterly of which looks out on the sea. A rocky
promontory shelters the lower part of the harbor
from the sea. On this promontory, on the east-
ern hill near the town, at the base of this hill,
and on another hill still farther east, stand the
sea forts.
This eastern hill is the end of a sickle-shaped
range of heights, with pointed summits running
inland, and forming an outlying rampart to the
town on the north and northeast. Each hilltop
is crowned with a fort. In the following narra-
tive this range will be spoken of as the “northern
ridge.” West of the town, and completing the
line of its landward defences, is another hill,
[226]


Port Arthur — 1894
steep-sided, broad-topped, a small table land,
with a couple of summits rising above its general
level. This is the hill of I-tzu-shan (literally,
the “Chair Hill”). It is crowned with three
forts, and as its summit is the highest land near
the Port, they overlook and can take in reverse
the land forts on the inner part of the northern
ridge. The hill of I-tzu-shan is thus the key of
Port Arthur. Once in possession of a besieger,
the forts on the nearer summits of the northern
ridge would be untenable, and these being taken,
the rest must fall in succession, and the place
would be at the mercy of the besiegers.
The main road ran into the town of Port
Arthur through a gap between the I-tzu plateau
and the inland extremity of the northern ridge,
crossing an open level space used as a parade
ground by the garrison. The I-tzu forts com-
manded the gap from the left, and on the right
its approaches were covered by the guns of a
strong fort built on the summit of Sung-shu-
shan (the Pine Tree Hill), the western buttress
of the ridge. Next, running along the crest of
the sickle-shaped curve of the ridge, stood seven
forts on the long summits known as the Erh-
lung (the Two Dragons; in some Japanese narra-
tives the Urlung) and the Chihuan (the Cock's
Comb). Another fort looked out on the sea
from the east end of the ridge, and between it
[227]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and the isolated hill near the town there was
another fort on the lower ground, also forming
part of the seaward defences. The hill between
the town and the sea, Huang-chin-shan (the
Golden Hill), was crowned by a fort armed
with nineteen guns. Seven forts were built on
the promontory between the harbor and the sea
known to the Chinese as Lan-hu-wei — i.e. the
Tiger's Tail. The largest and highest placed
of these, built on Man-tou-shan (Bread Hill),
was constructed to fire across the harbor and
cover the left flank of the I-tzu plateau with its
long-ranging guns.
The forts had all been planned, constructed,
and armed under the superintendence of Euro-
pean and American engineers. Their heavy
armament consisted of breech-loading Arm-
strongs and Krupps. There were a few quick-
firers, field-pieces, and mountain guns, and
some machine-guns were used to flank the
ditches. The garrison consisted of about ten
thousand men. Japanese writers, anxious not
to minimize the success of their own army, assert
that this was an adequate garrison; but, even if
the troops and their officers had been of better
quality, ten thousand men would be dangerously
dispersed and terribly overworked in a pro-
longed defence of a fortress which was protected
not only by a system of sea forts, but also by a
- [228]


Port Arthur — 1894
line of land works extending over about seven
miles of ground. There were twenty-two forts
in all. Allowing only an average of four hun-
dred men for the defence of each of them, there
would be a reserve of only twelve hundred men
left. Thirty thousand men for the fortifications
would not have been too many. Considering
all that had been said at the outset of the war
about the “armed millions” of China, it is
curious that she could only find this handful of
men for the defense of the fortress that was her
chief naval base; while the navy itself could lend
no co-operation whatever to the land forces.
On November 20, just before the abortive
sortie of the Chinese, Marshal Oyama had as-
sembled his principal officers at his headquar-
ters — not for a council of war, but to explain
to them the arrangements he proposed to make
for the assault of the forts next day. The troops
were to form up at 2 A.M., ready to march from
their camps between Shuang-tai-kow and Tu-
cheng-tzu, so as to be in position before Port
Arthur by dawn. They were to march in three
columns: on the right General Yamaji, with
main body consisting of the bulk of the first divi-
sion; in the center General Hasegawa's brigade;
on the left a small column of all three arms,
moving between Hasegawa's troops and the sea,
and guarding the flank of the advance against a
[229]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
possible sortie from the forts on the north ridge.
At dawn the fleet would open fire on the forts
nearest the sea. The artillery of the first divi-
sion on the right would come into action against
the forts on the I-tzu plateau, taking up its posi-
tion on a ridge facing the north side of the plateau
and distant about a mile from the forts. In this
position the guns could also be brought to bear
on the gap leading to the town. On the left of
the field artillery, and a little to its rear, the
heavy guns of the siege train were to come into
action near the village of Shui-shih-ying (“the
Naval Camp”), firing first at the I-tzu plateau
and the Pine Tree Hill Fort (Sung-su-shan),
and in the second stage of the fight devoting all
their attention to the western forts on the ridge.
Hasegawa was to occupy the high ground north
of Shui-shih-ying, facing the ridge forts on which
he was to open fire.
During this bombardment General Nishi,
with the first brigade of Yamaji's division, was
to work round to the left, or southwestern flank
of the I-tzu plateau. For the greater part of
the way his march would be concealed from the
Chinese by a lower range of hills running north
and south. In fact, he would be under cover
until his troops moved over the crest of the range
opposite their objective and deployed for the
attack. All this time his movements would not
[2:30]


Port Arthur — 1894
in any way mask the fire of the Japanese bat-
teries. It was expected that by the time Nishi
was ready to advance, the guns of the I-tzu forts
would have been silenced and their garrisons
very much demoralized by the Japanese shell
fire. The forts would then be attacked by
Yamaji's two brigades, Nishi moving against
the flank and Nogi against the front of the plat-
eau, the artillery meanwhile concentrating its
fire on the ridge, especially on Sung-shu-shan
and the Erh-lung forts. As soon as the I-tzu
forts were taken, Yamaji's and Hasegawa's col-
umns would make a converging attack on the
western forts of the ridge, and, after clearing
Sung-shu-shan and Erh-lung of the Chinese,
rush down into the town. Once the land de-
fences were captured, it was expected that the
rest of the forts would surrender rather than
face the combined attack of the army and the
fleet.
The troops began to fall in for the march at
1 A.M. It was very dark; the moon was in the
first quarter, a horned crescent, high over the
Port Arthur hills, and giving very little light.
In the bivouacs coolies stood holding aloft blaz-
ing torches, and here and there in the ranks of
the regiments, and beside the gun teams, a sol-
dier held a lighted lantern of painted paper,
giving to the scene of preparation for battle
[231]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
rather the air of a holiday fête than of the stern
business of war. At last all was ready, and the
long columns tramped off in the darkness, their
movement still marked by hundreds of paper
lanterns, for surprise was no part of their plan.
By five o'clock all the troops were in position,
the guns had unlimbered, and the men were lying
down waiting for the dawn, many of them snatch-
ing a short sleep, after the wearying muster at
midnight and the march in the darkness over
the broken ground.
Oyama and his staff were in the center, with
the reserve battalions just in rear of the long line
of guns formed of Yamaji's batteries and the
siege train. About half-past six the sky began
to whiten with the dawn over the sea, and soon
the sharp outlines of the Chinese forts could be
made out, crowning the dark masses of the I-tzu
plateau on the right front and the long ridge of
the “Two Dragons” and the “Cock's Comb”
to the left. Word was sent to Yamaji to begin
the bombardment.
The first gun was fired from one of Yamaji's
field batteries. It was the signal for all the
others to open fire, and a rain of shells was soon
falling on the plateau forts. The Chinese re-
plied in a very leisurely way, and their aim was
wild and wide of the mark. The Japanese fleet
lay off the harbor mouth about six miles out to
[232]


Port Arthur — 1894
sea. It had been arranged that it should not
fire upon Port Arthur during the first stage of
the attack, lest shells flying over the hills should
reach the Japanese lines on the other side. Ito's
fine cruiser squadron had now with it a flotilla
of ten torpedo boats, but it was not necessary
for it to take any serious part in the attack.
The cannonade continued for more than an
hour. By half-past seven the forts on the I-tzu
tableland were all but silent, and the order was
sent to Nishi's infantry to advance to the attack.
There were very few correspondents with the
army, but amongst them was one of the most
experienced English war correspondents, Mr.
Frederic Villiers. His letters give a vivid im-
pression of the scenes during the advance of
Yamaji's division against the key of the Chinese
defences.
“It was not until half-past seven,” he writes,
“as far as I can remember, that the skirmishing
lines moved up. Then they swept up towards
the three forts which surmounted Table Moun-
tain. From our guns on the knoll in Suishi (i.e.
Shui-shih-ying) Valley a hail of shrapnel
crowned the heights of Table Mountain with
wreaths of smoke. Shell after shell burst in
these works. The great mountain, seemingly
asleep, slowly awakened from its heavy slumber
and began to reply in a ponderous, sleepy sort of
[238 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
way. Then on our right, where Yamaji stood,
a mountain battery began shelling; and this was
answered by two or three shells in our vicinity,
which were too far off their mark to be pleasant
for the sight-seers on the left of Yamaji's posi-
tion. Nishi's columns moved up on the right
to the first earthwork on Table Mountain, which
was the western attack. Nogi moved up from
the left, which was the eastern attack, very
slowly; so for the moment the battle formation
was at an angle of about thirty-five degrees from
the ridge of the fort. Nishi in about fifteen
minutes carried his objective, and a few minutes
after Nogi had swept up under a very galling
fire, though of short duration, and the Table
Mountain was in the hands of the Japanese.
But this was only effected with considerable loss
for the short period during the rush, the Japanese
losing thirty-five by casualties. Among those
placed hors de combat were two officers.”
The Chinese really made no stand once they
saw the long lines of the Japanese attack closing
on them. They abandoned all three forts one
after another, on an average giving up a fort
every five minutes. Some of the Japanese who
fell in the attack were not hit by shots from the
I-tzu forts, but by bursting shells fired over the
town from the fort on Golden Hill, in order to
cover the hurried retreat of the fugitives. It
[234]


Port Arthur — 1894
was afterwards ascertained that the Chinese had
about sixteen hundred men in the three forts on
the tableland and the fort on Pine Tree Hill, an
average of about four hundred in each work.
Another sixteen hundred held the Two Dragons
and the Cock Comb on the north ridge; two thou-
sand more, fugitives from Kin-chow and Ta-
lien-wan, prolonged the line of defence along the
ridge to the sea, and a reserve of twelve hundred
men, belonging to the same unfortunate force,
lay behind Pine Tree Hill, near the parade
ground.
Thus the Chinese were hopelessly out-num-
bered, the twelve hundred men who held the I-tzu
tableland being rushed by at least six thousand,
with as many more threatening their right; more-
over, shut up in a series of separate forts, small
detachments of less than five hundred had to
face the rush. Of course, if they had stuck to
their works, fired low and steadily, and brought
a cross fire of rifles and machine guns to bear on
the attack, they might very well have repulsed the
foe. But they were Chinese troops, with very
scant ideas of mutual support, and little trust
either in their officers or their weapons, so it is
no wonder they went. Although the correspond-
ent call the Japanese loss serious, the capture
of the tableland was surely cheaply bought with
only two officers and thirty-three men killed and
[235)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
wounded out of a whole division. With any real
defence the capture of the forts would have meant
the fall of some hundreds of men and officers
in the columns of assault.
For the wounded, not only those brought
down from the hill, but those also who had been
hit by the shells from the Chinese forts during
the cannonade, prompt and ample provision had
been made by the Japanese medical corps. To
quote again from Mr. Williers’ letter:
“During the fight I was watching a hamlet of
about half a dozen houses at the end of the neck
of the ravine (near the artillery position). When
the first shots were fired the Red Cross flag was
run up, and by its side was the national flag of
Japan. The doctors were already preparing for
casualties. About that time a sharp fusillade
was going on on our right flank. The only de-
cent tactics the Chinese showed in this miserable
business was an attempt at a flanking movement,
started too late on our attack upon the Table
Mountain. For the moment it was utter con-
fusion. The Chinese from the small forts on the
Port Arthur inlet were firing shell after shell at
the fort that had already been occupied, but
these missed and burst in the vicinity of the Red
Cross hamlet, and a tremendous fusillade was
going on in the valley on the right of us. Nogi,
with two regiments, was sent out to turn this
[236]


Port Arthur — 1894
flanking movement of the Chinese, and the
mountain battery which had done such execu-
tion in the taking of Table Mountain was hurried
down from the heights, thundering through the
ravine down to the valley on our right to assist
Nogi's column.
“The little Red Cross hamlet was beginning
to fill up with casualties. The men were brought
down on stretchers, dripping with their blood,
and laid on straw in front of the small gardens
of the houses. Within one of the gardens were
tables already erected, at which the doctors were
busily at work. In my considerable experience
of many armies in the field, I have not seen more
excellent work done on the actual field of battle
by surgeons. Nothing was wanting. The latest
improvements in antiseptic lint, in the sterilizing
of the instruments, were there, right on the field
of battle. The Red Cross boxes were filled with
the latest necessaries for the treatment of the
wounded. Each man who was treated had his
name checked, and a little tag with his name
and the nature of his wound tied to one of his
legs, and then he was forwarded to the field hos-
pital. And all this was done under circum-
stances the most trying for delicate surgical work.
Shells from the great Eastern Fort on Golden
Mount were bursting in our vicinity, though
why so much good ammunition was wasted no
[237]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
one could tell. Many of the stretcher bearers
had to pause from their work and seek cover be-
hind the walls of the houses, but the doctors
calmly went on. One horse, belonging to a doc-
tor, standing just outside the little garden of
which I have been speaking, had its neck broken
by a fragment of shell, and lay there weltering
in its blood, with the rest of the wounded lying
about on the street. Speaking of this Red Cross
work to Colonel Taylor, who has been specially
sent out by the British Foreign Office to report
on the Japanese system of ambulance, he told
me that what he saw in the Shui-shih Walley was
quite equal to anything he had ever witnessed
under similar conditions.”
When Nogi's brigade had cleared the northern
end of the Table Mountain of the last of the
Chinese, there was a brief lull in the engage-
ment. The fleet now began to fire long-ranging
shots at the seaward forts, and on the land Ya-
maji's batteries and the siege train concentrated
their fire on the fort on Sung-shu-shan (Pine
Tree Hill), the mountain-guns being taken up
to the top of the Table Mountain to assist in the
bombardment. These Chinese abandoned the
fort under this heavy artillery fire, after lighting
a fuse near the magazine, in order to blow the
work up. This occurred a little after eleven,
[238 )


Port Arthur — 1894
while the Japanese infantry were moving to the
attack of the north ridge.
General Hasegawa was, meanwhile, advancing
across the valley in front of these forts and the
Cock's Comb. He had only his mountain bat-
teries with him, but was assisted by the fire of
Yamaji's guns, which were now enfilading the
ridge from the first artillery position, and drop-
ping shells on to it from the captured Table
Mountain. Hasegawa's infantry crossed the
valley below the ridge in successive lines of skir-
mishers, being exposed to a heavy fire as they
traversed the open ground, and suffering a good
deal of loss. As they reached the base of the
ridge they were able to get cover under its steep
sides. Here they massed and prepared for the
assault. Above them the rocky hillsides rose
abruptly to the forts, which stand at a height of
about three hundred feet above the level of the
valley.
By ten o’clock the three battalions of the
Twenty-fourth Regiment (sturdy fighting men
from the southern island of Kiu-shiu, which
boasts that it has produced more of the heroes
of Japan than any other district) were massed at
the base of the ridge and began to climb the
slope. At first they were protected by the very
steepness of the hillside, but about half-way they
came under fire from the forts at a range of six
[239]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
hundred yards. There was a temporary check
at this point, and then the regiment went on
again. An English officer who watched this
assault of the Two Dragons and Cock's Comb
forts thus described the scene:
“We reached a hill to which the Japanese
artillery were moving, just in time to watch a
most magnificent attack by the Japanese in-
fantry from the north straight up at a fort facing
them, and under the fire of guns and rifles from
three others as well. It was a scene to remember
forever. The Japanese artillery were in a good
position now for enfilading these forts, and did
so with the nearest fort with the best effect. It
was evacuated by the Chinese at 11.10 A.M.,
and blew up immediately afterwards. The ar-
tillery then fired at the next fort, at which the
main infantry attack was directed; but the range
was long, and the shooting not quite good enough
to be effective for some time. Meanwhile the
Japanese infantry were climbing the slope, tak-
ing advantage of whatever slight cover could be
found. The ground round them was ploughed
up by the Chinese projectiles, but they never
stopped, and seemed quite unhurt. At last
they rested for a few minutes about three hun-
dred yards below the fort in a fold of the ground,
which gave time for the slower ones to come up
to the front. Then once more on. But just as
[240)


Port Arthur — 1894
they moved forward a row of land mines ex-
ploded right in front of them. They seemed to
stagger for a moment, and then rushed on. But
by this time the Chinese were beginning to suffer
from the Japanese artillery fire, and just before
the Japanese infantry reached the fort the Chi-
nese left it. This was at 11.25 A.M. That
settled all the forts which faced north.”
The fort blown up at 11.10 was Sung-shu-
shan, the Chinese having fired the magazine as
they left it. The fort captured at 11.25 was one
of the works on the Cock's Comb (Chi-huan-
shan). The Two Dragons forts and the rest of
the works on the ridge were rapidly evacuated
by the Chinese. By half-past twelve all the
land defences had been abandoned except the
great fort on Shang-chin-shan (Golden Hill),
whose batteries not only defended the harbor
mouth, but also looked towards the land over
the roofs of the town.
Before following further the story of the fight,
an incident of the attack on the north ridge must
be related here, as an illustration of the Japanese
code of military honor. One of the officers of
the Twenty-fourth Regiment, Captain Kani,
had been seriously ill for some days in hospital,
and was reduced to a state of great weakness.
Nevertheless, on the eve of the attack on Port
Arthur he insisted on resuming command of his
[241]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
company. It was one of those assigned for the
actual attack on the Two Dragons and Cock's
Comb Forts. Kani struggled on through the
night march, climbed the steep hillside under
fire with his men, but when the rush for the fort
came he fell down utterly exhausted, within a
hundred yards of the rampart, over which his
men dashed without him. He was taken to hos-
pital, but instead of taking the natural view that
he had done his best to be with his men, and had
indeed led them up to the point when the enemy's
resistance collapsed, he thought only of his fail-
ure to be with them to the last, and said he was
ashamed forever, if he survived, after remaining
behind. A week after the battle he managed to
escape from the hospital, went back to the ridge,
and on the spot where he had fallen he killed
himself with his sword. A letter was found be-
side him. “It was here,” he had written, “that
sickness compelled me to stop and leave my
men to assault the fort without me. Never can
I wipe out the disgrace while I live. To vin-
dicate my honor I die here, and leave this letter
to speak for me.” Such deeds are an inherit-
ance from the days of feudal Japan. One may
well regret that a mistaken code of honor should
thus deprive his country of the services of so
brave a soldier as Captain Kani.
By half-past twelve the hills round Port Arthur
[242.]


Port Arthur — 1894
were in possession of the Japanese army. Their
artillery was being dragged up to the summits
in order to concentrate its fire on the Golden
Hill. On all the forts on the ridge and the
plateau except one the Japanese flag was flying,
and that one exception was a mass of blackened
and smoking ruins. The way into the town lay
across the wide open space of the parade ground
below the north ridge, a space partly surrounded
by low walls; beyond, the road ran over a little
river by a narrow bridge, beyond which opened
the main street of the town. The houses, light
buildings, mostly without an upper story, were
crowded along the farther side of the stream.
High above them towered the Golden Hill, from
which the Chinese gunners were making good
practise at any Japanese that showed near the
parade ground.
Across this open space the Japanese infantry
were exchanging rifle fire with two bodies of
Chinese, who held a couple of shelter trenches
near the houses just beyond the stream and on
the slope of “Cairn Hill” north of the suburb.
The Japanese staff was anxious to do as little
injury as possible to the town and dockyard.
To have bombarded them would have been to
risk a fire that might have destroyed the very
workshops, stores and machinery they hoped to
secure for the use of their own navy. So the
[243]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
guns were leveled only against the hostile bat-
teries on the Golden Hill, and to the infantry
was assigned the task of clearing the town of the
enemy. The Second Regiment, which had not
yet been engaged, was ordered to attack across
the parade ground.
At first they made very little progress. So
heavy was the fire of the Chinese, who held the
approaches to the bridge, that it was thought
they must be armed with repeating rifles. But
gradually, notwithstanding severe loss, the in-
fantrymen worked their way close up to the
stream, advancing under some cover which they
found to left or right of the open space of the
parade, here slipping behind a low wall, there
crawling along a ditch. So the rifle fire directed
across the stream at the Chinese gradually in-
creased in intensity, as more and more men came
up. A little before three a battalion extended
across the parade ground and crossed it in alter-
nate rushes, the men kneeling to fire. As they
neared the bridge they closed into a small col-
umn and dashed across. The Chinese did not
wait for them. They fled down the lanes of the
town, throwing away their weapons. About the
same time the fire ceased from the Golden Hill,
and the fort was abandoned. Only the sea forts
on the promontory of the “Tiger's Tail” still
[244]


Port Arthur — 1894
flew the dragon flag of China, and exchanged a
slow fire at long range with the fleet.
Port Arthur, notwithstanding all its elaborate
fortifications, had been taken in less than nine
hours, and with a loss of life that, considering
the nature of the enterprise, might be described
as trifling. It was a glorious day for the Japan-
eSe a TITIS.
[245]


XI
The Greco-Turkish War, 1897
The Battle of Domokos.
By A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
N the early spring of 1897 the progress of
I the insurrection in Crete, the landing in the
island of three thousand Greek troops under
Colonel Vassos, the successes won over the
Turks, and the armed action of the international
fleet against the insurgents, had all combined to
fan to fever heat the popular excitement in
Greece. To the Sultan's order for the partial
mobilization of the Turkish army King George
had replied by concentrating the Greek army on
the frontiers of Thessaly and Epirus. The fleet
had already been prepared for war with a view
to the expedition to Crete. The calling out of
the reserves of the land army rapidly raised the
numbers of the troops on the frontier, and these
were reinforced by the bands organized by the
Ethnike Hetaireia, which were followed by the
Government to form camps of their own near
the border. This added considerably to the
danger of war.
The demonstrations in Athens had now be-
come almost daily events. Zeto o Polemos!
[246]


The Greco-Turkish War — 1897
(“Hurrah for War!”) was the popular cry. The
leaders of the agitation had persuaded them-
selves and their followers that war meant cer-
tain and easy victory over the Turk. Mace-
donia would rise in arms, Albania would pro-
claim its independence and refuse to fight for
the Sultan, the communications of the Turkish
army would be cut by the insurrection in its
rear. It would be left without supplies of food
or cartridges, and forced to retreat through a
hostile country or surrender to the Greeks in its
front. It was reported that the Turkish Gov-
ernment was so short of money that already it
could not obtain supplies for the troops it was
trying to mobilize; that those who had been got-
ten together were starved, ragged, barefoot; and
that smallpox and fever had broken out in their
camps. These reports, as we shall presently see,
had very little foundation in fact, but they served
to increase the popular enthusiasm for war.
The Turkish fleet was notoriously inefficient.
The navy had taken a leading part in the de-
position of Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1877, and Abdul
Hamid regarded it always with suspicion. He
did not like the idea of his palace and capital
being under the guns of a squadron that some
Pasha might use as the trump card in another
game of revolution. The most powerful ships
were ironclads of a type that was getting out of
[247]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
date twenty years before. On the eve of the
war, orders were given to patch them up. But,
do what they would, the Turks had to confess
that the Greek fleet with three small modern
battleships and a flotilla of torpedo craft had the
undisputed command of the sea. Vigorously
used, this fleet might be an important factor in
the war; for once hostilities began, the Turks
could make no use of transport by sea, and their
supplies and reinforcements would have to reach
their base of operations at Salonika by a single
line of railway which runs along the coast of
Roumelia in easy reach of the sea, and be de-
stroyed by the Greek fleet. Salonika itself
might not be safe from a vigorous attack.
It was further hoped by the friends of Greece
that the other small states of the Balkan penin-
sula would join in the attack on the Sultan.
Montenegro, Servia, and Bulgaria were all ex-
pected to put their armies in the field. The
Turk was not merely to be defeated in Mace-
donia; he was to be swept, bag and baggage, out
of Europe. Unhappily for the Greeks, they were
counting on insurrection to prepare the way for
their victorious advance.
If there was to be a fight across the border
against the Turk, it could not be very long de-
layed. In March the snows were melting on
the mountains, the streams were full of good
[248]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
lowed to obtain any territorial advantage even
in the event of victory.
But this waiting game could not be prolonged
indefinitely, and in the first days of April the
Ethnike Hetaireia began to use its irregular
bands on the border in a way that was sure to
provoke a Turkish declaration of war. It cer-
tainly acted with the connivance, and even the
aid, of Greek regular officers on the frontier.
How far the headquarters staff of the Royal
army was a party to these proceedings, how far
the cabinet at Athens was involved in the policy
of this powerful secret society, it is not possible
to say.
It was not until the Greeks had raided the
Turkish frontier at Karya that war was declared.
Edhem Pasha reported the news of the raid
to Constantinople. He followed up this first
message with others telling how fighting had
begun now here, now there, and he had ordered
up his reserves. In the afternoon he was in-
formed by a telegram from the capital that war
had been declared, and he was ordered to ad-
vance in force against the Greeks next morning.
He had already sent into action all the troops
who were actually at hand, and was pressing the
Greeks slowly back toward the frontier. The
firing went on far into the night, by the bright
light of the full moon. But for the official world
[250)


The Greco-Turkish War — 1897
the war began only at dawn on the Easter Sunday
morning. It was not to last long. Begun on
April 18, it ended on May 18, just thirty days
later. It might be called the Thirty Days War.
After a not very seriously contested fight for
the frontier in Thessaly, the Greeks were forced
to retire; the Turks were successful in the battles
of Pharsala, Velestino, and Volo, and after the
battle of Pharsala there had been no attempt at
a pursuit, and the Turks had lost all touch of
the Greek main army. It was ascertained,
however, that it would make another stand on
the hills about Domokos.
Finally at 6 A.M. on the 17th of May, the Turk-
ish columns began the march. The compara-
tively level ground over which the left wing
moved to battle was here and there planted with
corn — now standing high and green — but
was mostly undulating grass land, uncultivated
natural pasture. Here and there rose rocky
knolls, and there were a number of small villages.
It was an intensely hot day, and the five columns,
each formed by a brigade, moved very slowly,
the ranks opening out, and the columns length-
ening, so that when they were sighted from the
citadel of Domokos it was reported to the Crown
Prince that not five brigades, but five divisions,
were advancing against his front.
The first shots were fired on the left about ten
[251 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
o'clock. Hairi Pasha's advanced guard was ap-
proaching the village of Tsiobu, when from the
houses and enclosures of the little place there
came a rapid discharge of musketry. The vil-
lage was held only by a handful of Greek cavalry,
most of whom were dismounted on its northern
edge, but they were using their carbines to such
good effect that the cautious Turkish com-
mander overestimated their force, took them for
at least a whole rifle battalion, and began to
deploy his advanced guard in a long battle line
as if he were going to fight a serious action.
Edhem Pasha with his staff had ridden to the
top of a little knoll near the high road when
they heard the firing. With their field glasses
they were able to see that Hairi could not pos-
sibly have any large force in front of him, and
after 'impatiently watching the fusillade for a
while a galloper was sent to hurry him on, for
Neshat and the Second Division had been di-
rected not to get farther forward than the First
Division on the left, and the whole of that division
was halted. It was nearly eleven o'clock when
Hairi’s vanguard at last pushed boldly forward,
and the Greek horsemen galloped off from the
south end of the village.
Half an hour later the Greek siege guns
mounted on the heights of Domokos opened
fire on the heads of Neshat’s columns. The
[252)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and set him right. Meanwhile Neshat had to
wait for him. It was some time before the ad-
vance of the right wing was resumed.
So far there had been mere skirmishing in
the plain and a distant cannonade from the
heights. The great natural rampart of the
Domokos ridge, now wreathed in the smoke of
the Greek batteries, might well seem unassail-
able, and it was no part of Edhem's plan to
attack it in earnest on this day. The hill,
crowned by the citadel, rose fifteen hundred feet
above the plain; from the crest the hill descended
in a series of terraces, and each had its line of
shelter trenches for infantry, with here and
there the more massive earthworks of a battery.
Looking at it, Edhem realized that it was ground
that might well be held by a comparatively small
force, and as the sound of firing came heavier
and heavier from the hills to the eastward, it
occurred to him that the Crown Prince was
probably employing a considerable part of his
force to check the all-important flank movement,
and, if not hard pressed at Domokos, might still
further reinforce his right. So Neshat was
ordered to advance without waiting for Hairi's
belated co-operation.
The Turkish left wing, under Hamdi and
Memdhuk, had been making very slow progress,
on account of, first, the difficulties of the ground
[254]


The Greco-Turkish War — 1897
they had to traverse, and then the obstinate re-
sistance of the small Greek force opposed to
them, which was under the command of Colonel
Mastrapas. Hamdi very early in the day de-
cided that he could not possibly drag the greater
part of his artillery over the rugged paths of
Mount Khassiadiari. He kept with him only
his mountain battery and one of the field-bat-
teries. It fared even worse with Memdhuk,
who kept only six mountain guns, and sent all
his field-batteries back to Pharsala. About
8 A.M. Hamdi's advance guard was in action
against the outposts of the Fourth Greek regi-
ment. A few companies for a while held in
check a whole battalion of Albanian regulars.
Forced back by sheer weight of numbers, the
Greeks doggedly defended every inch of the
ground, and Hamdi had to use his artillery to
force his way forward. Memdhuk came into
action somewhat later, his opponents being a
battalion of Euzonoi. Had the Crown Prince
reinforced his right early in the day — above
all, had he sent some of his mountain batteries
to the help of Mastrapas — the result of the
fight might have been different. As it was, the
brave linesmen and rifles were very slowly, but
none the less surely, forced back. So it was not
till late in the afternoon that the heads of the
Turkish columns had reached the points as-
[255]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
signed to them in the orders for the day, and
Memdhuk was not able even to attempt the dash
for the Phurka Pass, which had been suggested
as the best use to make of the Albanian irregu-
lars attached to his division.
By three o'clock the Greek outposts had been
withdrawn from the plain in front of Domokos,
and Neshat's divisional artillery and some of
Riza's reserve batteries were in action against
the Greek guns on the terraced hillside. The
Turkish infantry began to move forward to the
attack, and the battle began in grim earnest.
In front of the first and lowest line of Greek
trenches before Domokos a long firing line of
Turkish infantry was pressing on, the Adrianople
brigade on the right, another of Neshat's brig-
ades on the left. They slowly gained ground
till they reached a little stream about six hun-
dred yards from the trenches. Then their fur-
ther progress was checked. So heavy and rapid
was the fire of the Greek infantry, that one of
the correspondents with the Turkish army re-
marks that one might well imagine that the
Greeks had suddenly exchanged their old Gras
rifles for Mauser repeaters.
Another point is worth noting, for, though it
shows a strange lack of discipline in the Greek
army, it says something for the warlike eager-
ness of the men. Hundreds of soldiers and
[256.]


The Greco-Turkish War — 1897
some of the officers of Dimopulos' reserve brig-
ade left their position behind the crest of the
ridge and crowded the hilltops to watch the fight.
It was the fiercest struggle in the whole cam-
paign. Battalion after battalion of the Adrian-
ople brigade was pushed into the firing line.
They came on gallantly, reckless of the heavy
loss they were suffering. But they, too, showed
a woful lack of battle training. In their eager-
ness, the supports fired as they moved up, heed-
less of the risk of hitting their comrades in the
firing line in front, and the ill-aimed, hurried fire
of the Mausers did comparatively little harm to
the Greeks in the trenches.
It was now late in the afternoon. The Greeks
might so far claim a victory on the main battle-
field, but about five o'clock disquieting news
reached the Crown Prince at Domokos from
Colonel Mastrapas’ flanking detachments in the
hills to the eastward. He reported that he was
being driven back by an overwhelming force of
the enemy, and he asked for reinforcements.
Colonel Dimopulos' brigade was now divided.
Part of it, with a mountain battery, was sent
away to the eastward to support Mastrapas—all
too late — and the rest of the brigade was used
to reinforce the troops holding the trenches be-
fore Domokos.
The Turks had brought all their reserve bat-
[257]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
teries into action. Altogether in the center they
had seventy-two guns and six howitzers at work
shelling the Greek position. Three Greek guns
had been dismounted, and an artillery wagon
had blown up on the slope near the citadel, send-
ing a great spurt of flame and smoke high over
the hilltops. Several of the batteries concen-
trated their fire on the nearest and lowest of the
Greek trenches. The rifle fire from the en-
trenchment gradually slackened, and at last it
was rushed by the Adrianople brigade. Out of
thirty-five hundred men, they had lost nearly
seven hundred in the advance. A little later
the village of Welisiotae, shattered by the fire of
Hairi’s divisional artillery, was evacuated by the
Greeks, but they held the hill slopes above the
place, and as the sun set, the main position was
everywhere intact.
Edhem Pasha and his staff had watched the
fight from a knoll near the Pharsala road, facing
Domokos. They prepared to bivouac for the
night near its base, but before anyone could
think of resting there was much to be done.
The Turkish marshal and his officers were not a
little anxious about the situation. There was
no news whatever from the two divisions in the
hills to the left. Arrangements for keeping up
communication with that wing by signaling had
broken down. All that was known was that in
[258] N


The Greco-Turkish War — 1897
every lull of the main battle the wind had borne
from the eastward the boom of Hamdi's moun-
tain guns. He had been fighting till nightfall,
with what result could only be guessed, but it
was thought that if he had been completely suc-
cessful he would have found some means to get
the news through to the headquarters’ staff be-
fore the close of the day. Then the frontal at-
tack on the Domokos position, though it had
been more vigorously pressed than had been
originally intended, had proved on the whole a
costly failure. The mere outworks of the posi-
tion had been taken, and the Greeks might try
to recover them in the night.
Orders were given to the troops to lose no
time in entrenching themselves on the ground
they occupied, and Hairi was directed to move
one of his brigades nearer to the main road, so
as to be in position, if necessary, to support the
Adrianople brigade which had suffered so
severely, and the men of which were exhausted
by the prolonged fight in which they had been
so hotly engaged. Soon after dark there was
the beginning of a panic in the Turkish center.
Some of the horses of Riza's reserve batteries
were being marched to the rear in order to give
them water, when the report spread that a re-
treat had been ordered, and that the artillery
was already moving off. It was with difficulty
[259]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
that a general movement back towards Pharsala
was prevented.
About eleven o’clock a tired horseman rode
in from the eastward with a despatch from
Hamdi Pasha. He informed Edhem that he
had driven back the Greeks and had bivouacked
for the night between Karatsali and Virsi, and
that Mamdhuk was in line with him farther
eastward. He was thus in a position to come
down on the Greek right or establish himself on
their right rear as soon as next day's sunrise gave
him light to advance. This news put an end to
the anxieties of the Turkish staff. The orders
for next day were quickly written. Hamdi was
to advance against the Greek right, signaling
the moment when he marched off by a salvo
from all his guns. Memdhuk was to swing
round towards the southeast and try to get be-
tween the Greeks and the 'Phurka Pass, or at
least on the flank of their line of retreat, and
within striking distance of it.
The frontal attack on Domokos was to be re-
sumed at dawn and pushed home as soon as
there were signs that Hamdi's advance over the
crest of the ridge was producing an effect on
the Greeks. The horseman who had brought
the despatch said he could not possibly find his
way back through the hills in the dark. It was
by good luck he had reached the headquarters,
[260]


The Greco-Turkish War — 1897
so difficult was the country. So Colonel Mah-
mud Bey, who had led the charge at Velestino
and had been in the saddle all day during this
battle of Domokos, took the orders and rode.
away to Pharsala, where he got a fresh horse and
then made his way to Hamdi's headquarters.
Just before sunrise the report of the guns in the
hills told Edhem that his left wing had received
its orders, and that Hamdi's division was march-
ing off.
But as the sun rose it was seen that the
Greek entrenchments were empty; the town
silent. After nightfall the evening before, the
Crown Prince had decided that with the Turks
established in force in the hills on his right the
position was no longer tenable, and he had issued
orders for a general retreat. The defenders of
the main position, who felt that they had won a
victory, received the news with astonishment,
and there was much talk of treachery at head-
quarters and of a betrayal of the last stronghold
of Thessaly to the invader as the price of peace.
Such a view of the situation was natural enough,
but the history of the fight shows how unjust it
was. On the hills of Domokos Prince Constan-
tine had made a brave stand and saved the honor
of the Greek arms. Outnumbered and outgen-
eraled as he was, he could do no more. So all
night long in the bright moonlight the Greek
[261]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
army and a crowd of fugitive countryfolk
streamed over the Phurka Pass. It was just a
month since the moonlight night that had seen
the first fight along the border range of Northern
Thessaly.
The battle of Domokos ended the war. Nakki
Pasha had advanced against Smolenski at Hal-
myros on the morning of the 17th. He found
the village held only by a Greek rearguard,
which retired after a brief engagement. Smo-
lenski had fallen back on Platanos, where he
was strongly entrenched, but in the night, be-
tween the 17th and 18th, he received orders from
the Crown Prince to conform to the general re-
treat of the army and join the main body at
Lamia. The Turks had pressed closely on the
Crown Prince's beaten army as it fell back over
the Phurka Pass. It was found to be impossible
to make a stand at Lamia, and a position was
therefore taken up on the range of Mount CEta
and in the Pass of Thermopylae. But on May
19 news arrived that an armistice had been
signed. Under the terms of the subsequent
treaty of peace Greece paid a war indemnity to
Turkey and ceded to the Sultan a strip of terri-
tory on the northern frontier that gave the Turks
command of all the passes leading into Thessaly.
[262]


XII
With Kitchener in the
Soudan, 1898
By A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
T was not to be supposed that the events
I which led to the death of General Gordon
in the Soudan would weaken the intention
of the British to crush the power of the Mahdi
on the Upper Nile. Accordingly in 1898 Sir
Herbert Kitchener with a powerful British and
Egyptian force set out to make his way to Khar-
toum and Omdurman. Every step of the way
was fiercely contested by the Mahdi and his Der-
vishes, but the onward march of Kitchener and
his forces was irresistible.
He had timed his advance so as to arrive be-
fore Omdurman when the moon was near the
full. To have bright nights was a double ad-
vantage to him. It enabled some of the march-
ing to be done in the cool moonlight, and it
minimized the danger of attacks by the enemy.
The night before the great battle was clear
and bright, and, to give additional security to
the riverside camp, the gunboats, moored close
to the Nile bank, swept its flanks and front with
the broad white beams from their electric search-
[263]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
lights. To some of the wild tribesmen in the
Dervish bivouac on the hills it must have seemed
some strange magic, this lighting up of the desert
with the giant rays of dazzling brightness. And
it is even said that some of them refused to re-
main with the Khalifa's standard, declaring
that if the invaders could thus control the sun-
light, Allah must surely be with them.
Along the front of the Sirdar's camp watchful
sentinels were on the alert, and the friendlies
had scouts out towards the Dervish bivouacs,
and a post on the slope of Jebel Surgham. These
friendly scouts had been warned to move in
couples when they approached the sentry line,
and the sentinels were told to let men running
back two and two pass in without a challenge.
They were to fire on any large body and chal-
lenge men approaching singly. During the
night deserters from the enemy caused some
alarms. Once the whole of the British second
brigade was on its feet for a few minutes. One
of the deserters who arrived was an Emir with a
few of his followers.
Shortly before midnight some of Colonel Win-
gate's spies got back from the Mahdist lines and
brought the news that the Khalifa would attack
before dawn, if not earlier in the night. It is
certain, however, that, whatever may have been
his intentions, he sent nothing more than a few
[264]


With Kitchener in the Soudam — 1898
scouts towards the Anglo-Egyptian camp during
the hours of darkness. One reason for his in-
activity was the false impression conveyed to
him of the Sirdar's plans by some friendlies from
the neighborhood of Agaiga, whom Wingate had
sent out in the evening with orders to prowl
round the Dervish camp and spread the report
that the Sirdar was going to repeat the tactics
of Ferkeh and the Atbara, marching in the dark-
ness and attacking in the gray of the morning.
Thus the Khalifa was induced to wait during the
night for the expected attack. It was only when
he found that the invaders were still camped
on the river-bank at dawn that he moved forward.
So there was a quiet night, disturbed only by
some local false alarms — a shot or two fired by
sentries at what they took to be moving foes in
their front, and one volley from a picket just
after a party of friendly scouts had rushed in,
giving the impression that the Dervishes were
coming. Curiously enough, though Dervish
scouts were undoubtedly prowling in the front
of the camp, the moving searchlights never
actually showed any of them.
A little after half-past three (when it was still
dark, and with nearly two hours to wait for the
sunrise) the bugles of the British divisions and
drum and bugle in the Egyptian camp sounded
the reveille, and the men rose and stood where
[265]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
they had slept, in battle array. Breakfasts were
hastily got ready and disposed of. Pack ani-
mals were loaded up ready to move off when the
order was given to march, for at that moment
the general idea was that the enemy would still
give battle on the hilly ground between the camp
and Omdurman, and that the Anglo-Egyptian
army would have to advance and attack him.
As soon as the dawn began to whiten the sky
away across the Nile the cavalry trotted out and
made for the hills, to see what the Dervishes
were doing. The gunboats had steam up, and
were cleared for action, ready at the word to
slip from their moorings and cover the flank of
the army as it marched on Omdurman.
By five o'clock the whole force was ready to
march, but before breaking up the line and
moving to the attack of the Dervishes the Sirdar
waited for news from his cavalry scouts. As
they pushed into the hills a number of Dervish
horsemen retired before them without showing
any fight. Major Baring's squadron of the
Egyptian cavalry had ridden over the low ridge
that forms the shoulder of Jebel Surgham.
Here he came in sight of the Khalifa's camp and
saw at once signs that showed him the enemy
would soon be on the move. He sent in his re-
port, and then the headquarters staff suspended
all further preparations for the march, and the
[266]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
The men wore the white jibba, ornamented with
divers colored patches — the Dervish uniform.
Over their heads fluttered the brightly colored
pennons of their emirs. Even before they came
in sight many in the camp had heard, like the
noise of the sea, the confused roar made by hun-
dreds of war-drums and the mingled shouts of
thousands of fanatic warriors, marching, as they
fondly dreamed, to victory, under the eye of the
Khalifa himself, for soon his black banner
showed in the midst of the advancing tide of
armed men.
Here and there the foremost Dervishes fired a
few shots at the retiring cavalry. The Lancers
rode into the left of the camp and formed up
between the British division and the river; the
Egyptian squadrons, moving rapidly across the
front of the camp, rejoined the main body of
Broadwood's cavalry away to the north of the
battle line.
The gunboats had steamed up the river and
had joined Major Elmslie's battery in the re-
newed bombardment of Omdurman. Now that
the enemy's army was in sight, they were recalled
to assist in repelling his attack. The cavalry
reports showed that the Khalifa's first line was
formed of five great masses of rifle and spear-
men. From left to right it was between two
and three miles long. In the rear of it there
[268]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
was a second line, of much less strength, escort-
ing a mass of camels and donkeys laden with
supplies. Cavalry were riding on the flanks,
and here and there in the intervals of the great
moving mass of infantry, but the Dervishes had
only brought out with them three Krupp guns
and one of the old Nordenfeldts. These were
in their right center.
Topping the ridges in front, the great moving
multitude of Dervish warriors poured out upon
the sandy plain in front of the Sirdar's line.
Some of the leading Mahdists were firing as they
marched, but the range — nearly two miles —
was far beyond the farthest limit of what the
Remington rifle could do, even with better am-
munition than the cartridges made in Omdur-
man arsenal. Shouting and drumming, the
main mass moved on without firing a shot.
Their right climbed over the Jebel Surgham
height, and from that point to the Kerreri Hills
the whole plain was filling with horse and foot,
rifles, and spears, and waving banners, while the
drum and war-horn raised a deafening din.
A staff officer spurred away from the Sirdar's
side to the British left, where Major Williams's
gunners of the Royal Artillery were waiting
ready beside their long fifteen-pounders. He
brought the order to open fire. Precisely at
6.40 the first gun aimed at the Dervish right and
[269]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
loaded with shrapnel boomed out, and the shell
burst fairly in the air, just in front of the enemy's
line, rolling over a good score of the foremost in
the attack. Then the other guns and the Egyp-
tian batteries joined in, and all along the Der-
vish front the bursting shells tore gaps in their
ranks, gaps that were filled as soon as they
were made.
Through the field-glass those who watched
the bursting shells saw that many even of the
wounded Dervishes sprang up and regained
their place in the front. A few minutes more,
and another galloper carried the order to the
Grenadier Guards to open fire with volleys from
their long-ranging Lee-Metfords at twenty-seven
hundred yards, the extreme distance for which
the rifle is sighted. The Guardsmen standing
close to the zareba hedge opened fire with vol-
leys by sections, and the other regiments of
Gatacre's division carried on the firing away to
the left. In the huge moving mass in front of
them they had a target against which even at
such a distance the volleys could hardly fail to
be effective. In the center and on the right the
Soudanese and Egyptian battalions were still
silently watching the enemy's advance, lying
down in their shelter trenches, for the range was
far too great for their Martinis.
Under the rain of bursting shells and Maxim
[270]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
in dire straits. About sixty of them had al-
ready fallen, killed or badly wounded, when
rescue arrived, the Melik and two other gun-
boats steaming up to close quarters and sending
a shower of bursting shells from their quick-
firers and a hail of bullets from their Maxims
into the Mahdist ranks. Osman withdrew his
force from the neighborhood of the river, leaving
great heaps of dead to mark the spot where he
had been caught by the gunboats. The camel
corps, marching along the Nile bank under the
protection of the flotilla, rode into the north end
of the camp and formed up behind the right
flank of MacDonald's brigade.
While this was happening, Colonel Broad-
wood, with the cavalry and the four guns of the
horse battery, had got safely away to the north-
ward, fighting all the while with a mass of Der-
vishes, part of Osman's force. The guns were
more than once brought into action; the cavalry
acted sometimes with carbine fire dismounted,
sometimes charged the overdaring Dervish horse
that ventured to press them too closely. Soon
the pressure on his force diminished as the main
body of the pursuers fell back. Then he turned,
and marching along the Nile, worked his way
back towards the main battlefield. His troopers
had behaved splendidly. They had followed
their officers as readily as if they had been en-
[273]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
gaged in a field day, instead of in a fight on diffi-
cult ground, with an overwhelming force of des-
perately daring enemies. There were many
individual deeds of heroism performed by the
Egyptian troopers in helping officers and men
who had been wounded, or whose horses had
been killed. Broadwood's fight had a useful
result on the general fortunes of the day, for at a
critical moment it had diverted at least ten thou-
sand of the Khalifa's best troops from the attack
on the camp.
Let us now turn to what was being done on
the main battlefield. When the Dervish right
and center attacks had advanced to about eight
hundred yards, their fire began to take effect
here and there in the ranks of the Sirdar's army,
the mass of riflemen on Jebel Surgham, who fired
over the heads of the advancing spearmen and
cavalry, doing the most damage. The first man
hit was Corporal Mackenzie, of the Seaforth
Highlanders, wounded in the leg by a ricochet-
ting bullet. He had the wound dressed, and
promptly returned to his place in the firing line.
The next casualty was in the Lincolns, a soldier
being shot dead as he fired his rifle. The zareba
hedge in front of the British part of the line was
never of any real use during the battle, for the
Dervishes never got near enough for it to serve
as an obstacle. It is essentially a defence for a
[274]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
bivouac at night, and on this occasion it would
have been better if it had been pulled away in
the early morning. It was so high that the men
had often to stand to fire over it, thus making
the aim less steady and exposing the soldiers
more completely, for a zareba does not stop bul-
lets. The Soudanese and Egyptian regiments
were much better off in their shelter trenches.
Shallow as they were, they afforded good cover
to a kneeling line and very complete protection
to men lying down, and both positions mean a
steadier aim for the firing line.
For five or ten minutes the Dervish fire was
heavy. There are said to have been at least ten
thousand riflemen engaged in this first on-
slaught upon the camp, and the marvel is that
they did so little damage. For the Dervish cav-
alry and spearmen there was no hope but in
getting to close quarters with the defenders of
the camp, and they pressed on recklessly, wave
upon wave, mostly to fall as they came up to the
deadly five hundred yards’ range, or to limp
back disabled by Metford or Martini bullet.
But the riflemen found some little shelter here
and there behind the undulations of the desert
ground, and lying down they kept up a sharp
fire in comparative security. Some of them
established themselves within four hundred
yards of the British zareba hedge, and at that
[275]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
range their Remingtons were effective enough.
There were some fifty or sixty casualties in the
British portion of the line alone.
But these were hardly noticed, for the atten-
tion of all in the camp was riveted on the terrible
spectacle of the Dervishes marching bravely on
through the storm of fire that blazed and roared
from the long front of the camp. The guns on
the left and the Maxims had been run out till
they formed almost a right angle with the south
side of the zareba, so as to get them to bear better
on the enemy's attack. For half an hour
through the hail of bullet and shell the Dervishes
came on. Led by their mounted Emirs, they
moved forward till they fell, and then others ap-
peared, coming on to take their places in the
front.
It was noticed that many even of their rifle-
men were so intent on pressing forward that
they never stopped to fire, but bounded onwards
among the spearmen, brandishing their Rem-
ingtons over their heads. Few got as far as four
hundred yards from the British front. The
man who fell nearest the line of the British divi-
sion was a splendidly built young Arab, who
rushed forward with his broad-bladed spear at
the charge till a bullet brought him down just
two hundred yards from the zareba. In front
of Maxwell's brigade an old white-bearded man,
[276]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
the enemy's riflemen from the hollows, whence
they still kept up a dropping fire. There was a
sense of elation at the idea that the great battle
was won and the way to Omdurman open. But
there was still a lot of hard fighting before the
Sirdar's army. The repulse of the Dervish on-
slaught proved to be only the first phase in the
struggle, and many a brave life on both sides
was yet to be sacrificed as part of the price of
victory.
By half-past eight it looked as if the battle
were over. The enemy had drawn back over the
slopes of the Kerreri Hills on one side and of
Jebel Surgham on the other. All that was to
be seen of the Dervish army was the wreckage
of the attack, the thousands of dead and
wounded strewing the desert, their jibbas whiten-
ing the ground over a space two miles long and
at least half a mile wide. The British and
Egyptian wounded were transferred from the
field hospital to the awning-covered barges on
the river. Cartridge pouches and the limber
boxes of the artillery were refilled from the re-
serve ammunition, and the order was given to
prepare the march. The Sirdar had deter-
mined to push on at once for Omdurman, about
five miles distant, so as to reach it before the de-
feated Dervishes could rally for its defence.
Passing round to the southeast of the hill, the
[279]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
more on its edges or beyond it. In this instance,
however, it is very likely that the Lancers would
have charged even if they had known from the
first the numbers and position of the Dervish
detachment. They had ridden out looking for
something to charge, and they took the first op-
portunity that offered.
Colonel Martin decided to get between the
enemy and their line of retreat landwards, so
the Lancers moved to the westward of the hol-
low and formed up in line.
Though the charge had little of “the pomp
and circumstance of war,” it was an exploit
which, so far as the hard fighting went, any
cavalry in the world might be proud of. There
is no need to discuss here the question whether
there was any real reason for the exploit to be
performed, looking at the matter from the stand-
point of the military critic. Probably the enemy
could have been turned out of their sheltering
hollow at the cost of a few shells from the artil-
lery or the gunboats, and the one British cavalry
regiment on the ground kept intact for the pur-
suit. But such reasonings after the event, even
if they are well founded, imply no discredit to
the soldier in the field, who, with only a moment
in which to decide, takes the bolder course.
And the cavalry leader is, above all others, apt,
[281]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
when he sees his enemy before him, to reason
like the poet's hero —
“There may be rules. For me, I know but one,
To dash upon my enemy and win.”
So the trumpets sounded the welcome notes
that sent the Lancers forward to their first
charge. As they neared the hollow a sputter
of rifle-fire began from its edge. A few troopers
dropped, one or two horses fell. Three hun-
dred yards from the enemy the men could see
that the scouts had made a mistake, and that
there was no mere handful of beaten Dervishes
in their front, but a dense crowd of rifle and
spearmen, full of fight, packed together in the
shelter of the rocky khor. But even if there
was any thought of a counter-order it was now
too late to stop the charge, and Colonel Martin,
riding the foremost, with his sword in its sheath,
ready to use the impetus and weight of his
charger as his best weapon, rode straight for the
center of the enemy, where the broad Soudan
spears bristled most thickly.
A minute more and the Lancers were into the
mass of the Dervish infantry, dashing through a
storm of bullets and leaping down a three-foot
drop into the hollow. And though the enemy
stood in places twenty deep, in one minute more
these gallant horsemen were through them.
[282]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
poral came out from the ranks, gave Molyneux
his stirrup leather, and brought him safely in.
Surgeon-Major Pinches, whose horse had been
shot under him, was saved by Sergeant-Major
Brennan, who, after cutting down several of his
assailants, got the Major behind him on his horse
and rode out of the press. Lieutenant Robert
Grenfell, who was leading one of the troops in
the center, was thrown by his wounded horse,
but made a desperate fight on foot. He fired
every shot in his revolver, and when last seen
alive was facing several spearmen, sword in
hand.
Several lances broke in the charge, and some
of the swords failed at a critical moment. Lieu-
tenant Wormald's sword bent as he struck at an
emir with whom he was engaged in single fight;
but he stunned him with a blow of the crooked
blade. Captain Fair's sword snapped on the
linked coat of mail of another of the enemy's
leaders, and he dashed the hilt into the face of
the Dervish. Altogether, in less than two min-
utes, twenty-two of the Lancers were killed and
more than fifty severely wounded. Of the horses,
one hundred and nineteen were killed, many
of them just struggling out of the hollow and
falling dead as the regiment rallied close to the
enemy.
It was during this rally that some of the brav-
[284]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
est deeds were done, individual officers riding
back to bring off wounded or dismounted com-
rades. Major Wyndham had lost his horse, and
was trying to mount behind Lieutenant Smith,
who had turned back to help him. He had
failed in two attempts, when he was lifted up by
Captain Kenna, who came riding back, accom-
panied by Lieutenant de Montmorency and Cor-
poral Swarbrick, all bent on saving young Gren-
fell if he still lived, and, if not, carrying off his
body. Grenfell was lying on the nearer slope of
the hollow, and a number of Dervishes were
hacking at him with their swords. Kenna and
his comrades drove them off with their pistols,
and while the corporal held two of the horses,
the two officers tried to lift Grenfell's body on to
the third. The lieutenant was quite dead, bleed-
ing from more than a dozen wounds. As they
placed the body across the saddle the horse
shied and bolted, throwing it to the ground.
The three would-be rescuers had then to retire,
keeping off the pursuing Dervishes with their
revolvers.
Hardly a man or horse in the four squadrons
had escaped without some injury, uniforms and
saddlery were cut and torn, and in every troop
horses and men were bleeding from wounds,
mostly slight, but in many cases serious, for the
brave fellows were trying to keep their places
[285]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
in the ranks, and afraid only of being ordered
to fall out. Sergeant Weysey, with the blood
running down his face, called to his troop to re-
form for another charge. Another of the
wounded Lancers, Trooper Byrne, who had re-
ceived a sword cut and a bullet, on being told
to fall out and go to the surgeon, replied, “Oh,
sir, do let me stay and have another go at them!”
Lieutenant Brinton, of the Life Guards, with
his left shoulder cut open, took his place at the
head of his troop as if he were unwounded.
Officers and men were eager to charge back
through the enemy, but Colonel Martin wisely
decided that enough had been done. Another
charge would have meant the destruction of the
regiment. He dismounted a number of troop-
ers and opened fire with carbines on the Der-
vishes, who, after firing a few shots in reply,
tried to retreat towards the hills from the hollow
which no longer protected them. As they did
so they were forced to cross the front of the
British division. The guns of the Thirty-second
Battery unlimbered and poured shrapnel into
them. The infantry gave them volley after
volley, and only a small number of them reached
the shelter of the hills.
Sixty dead Dervishes were found in the hol-
low, so that, even supposing a number of
wounded men got away from it when they re-
[286)


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
tired, their loss in the charge was comparatively
slight. Several hundred were killed as they
crossed the plain. Lieutenant Grenfell’s body
was recovered as soon as the enemy began to
retreat. It was gashed and stabbed in many
places, and one spear thrust had smashed his
watch, which had stopped at 9.40. His brother
was acting as staff officer to General Lyttelton,
and heard of his death a few minutes after.
When the battle ended he buried the body under
a tree, not far from the deadly hollow. He dug
the grave himself, assisted by four of his com-
rades.
And here, before going on to the closing epi-
sode of the battle, I may note an incident con-
nected with the Lancers' charge as related by
Mr. Williers:
“On steaming past the extreme left flank of
the Kerreri position,” he says, “we halted for a
moment to take on board another wounded
trooper, and here I saw a pathetic sight. Some
troopers of the Twenty-first Lancers, who had
remained behind to bury their heroic comrades
who had fallen in that famous dare-devil charge,
had come down to the shore for water, leading
two badly wounded chargers. One was that
of poor Lieutenant Grenfell, which had stum-
bled and thrown his rider. The poor brute was
fearfully slashed about his withers and flanks,
[287)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
which were masses of raw flesh. The other
charger was also badly hurt. They were both
able, however, to take a long drink from the
river, when they were taken up the bank and
shot. The action of the trooper — who evi-
dently owned the horse — was very pathetic.
He stood with his revolver cocked for several
moments, evidently reluctant to raise it to his
charger's head, the poor beast the while sniffing
at his hand and rubbing his nose against his
sleeve. I could see that the man was trembling
with emotion. Twice did he raise the revolver
before he could summon up nerve to pull the
fatal trigger. After it was over the poor fellow
looked intently at the inanimate body for a mo-
ment to see that he had not swerved in his aim,
and then hurried away.”
While the Lancers were desperately charging
the Dervishes on the other side of the Jebel Surg-
ham ridge, the infantry brigades, British and
Egyptian, were moving out from the ground
they had held so well, to take up the échelon
formation for the advance into Omdurman.
The leading British brigade had marched at
half-past nine, and was just topping the sandy
ridge between Surgham and the river, its four
battalions marching abreast in column. The
Sirdar and his staff were riding close to it on the
ridge, being anxious to see as soon as might be
[288)


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
what was out in front. The other brigades were
moving into the positions assigned to them for
the advance. Several of the regiments were
marching on ground that had been swept by our
fire, and frequently wounded fanatics would
spring up and fire on the men or try to close with
them. They were bayoneted or shot; but, apart
from this desultory shooting, all fire had ceased
for some time. Most of the British and Egyp-
tians felt fairly certain that the battle was over,
and that if the Dervishes were encountered again
it would be farther south, on the march between
the Surgham ridge and the suburbs of Omdur-
IIla Il.
But, screened by the hills that looked down
on the battlefield, the Khalifa was gathering his
army for a last great effort. It was well planned,
and against less thoroughly trained troops than
those who met it this onset might have ended
in a victory for Mahdism. The warriors en-
gaged in this second attack had for the most
part taken no share, or only a slight one, in the
earlier advance. The Dervishes were massed
in two huge columns, which were to make a con-
verging attack on the Egyptian right and right
Tear.
MacDonald's brigade was marching out to
take up its position nearest the hills and furthest
to the rear in the great échelon. It was for-
*
[289]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
self with sending off gallopers at the full speed
of their horses to ask the Sirdar for support.
Yakub's warriors, horse and foot mingled
together, came on as bravely as ever men charged
to death on a battlefield. Again the great tide
of jibba-clad Dervishes poured into the plain,
firing, shouting, brandishing their spears, and
beating their war-drums. There was a mo-
mentary check as the foremost ranks went down
under the Egyptian fire, and then the second
Dervish column appeared, charging from the
Kerreri Hills on MacDonald's right, led by Os-
man and Wad Helu. There is nothing more
difficult even for the best-trained troops than to
change front while actually engaged and under
a heavy fire. The soldier's attention has become
riveted on the enemy in his original front; he
feels the danger is there; and yet he finds him-
self suddenly told to cease fire, no longer to op-
pose a threatening advance, and to execute a
necessarily complex parade movement, during
the course of which he feels he is doing nothing
to defend himself. Unless drill and discipline
have become a second nature, and the men have
absolute confidence in their officers and the
officers in the men, the attempt begins in con-
fusion and ends in disaster. But MacDonald
knew he could trust his brigade even to the ex-
tent of this supreme test. He changed his order
[291]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
The Dervishes were retreating — some of
them were even running, a sight rarely seen on a
Soudan battlefield. A last desperate effort was
made by the Dervish cavalry to save the day,
but men and horses were swept down like grass
before the scythe as they came under the fire of
the right, now strengthened by two British
battalions. The Fifteenth Egyptians did not
secure the flag till every man of Yakub's body-
guard and the Emir himself had fallen beside it.
During this last struggle the Sirdar had ridden
up with his staff. An orderly took and held
aloft the black flag which Hickman had pre-
sented to the Sirdar. Instantly a shell from
one of the gunboats went hurtling close overhead.
Slatin was the first to see what it meant. “Down
with that flag,” he said, and the banner was
lowered and furled. The gunboat had not
yet realized that it was in the hands of the
Egyptians.
The long line was now on the edge of the hills,
facing westward toward the desert, where the
Emirs were striving to rally the wreck of their
army. The Sirdar ordered a general advance,
and on the victorious army went, pouring long-
range volleys into the flying foe, while the Egyp-
tian cavalry charged them on the right, and the
guns from time to time unlimbered and sent a
shower of shells into any formed body of Der-
[293 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
vishes that still held together. By quarter past
eleven it was clear that no further resistance
was possible. The line halted; the battle was
won. It only remained to secure the fruits of
victory.
Once more the order was given to form up
facing south for the march into Omdurman.
As the Sirdar's army pressed on towards the
northern suburbs of the Mahdist capital, some
thousands of the defeated Dervishes could be
seen moving by the desert towards the city.
They were no longer marching in any military
array, but plodding along in little detached
groups, with here and there a mounted man
walking his tired horse. Clearly there would be
no more show of opposition in the open, nor was
any serious resistance anticipated in the streets
and behind the walls of Omdurman.
As the gunboats came up close to the bank
near the north end of the town a crowd of the
townspeople, chiefly women, came down to the
river's edge, holding up a white flag, and pre-
senting peace-offerings of goats, chickens, cakes
and fruit. It was with some difficulty that they
were persuaded that there was no need of bring-
ing even such poor ransom to the conquerors of
the city. On the land side, too, crowds came
out with white flags to meet the advancing bat-
talions, and while they welcomed the Sirdar, it
[294]


A corner of THE BATTLEFIELD. THE standard-BEARER's
DEATH Grip A. 294


With Kitchener in the Soudam — 1898
was evident that there had been a lurking fear
that the city would be sacked after the battle, in
the old savage fashion of Arab warfare.
As the Soudanese battalions entered the sub-
urbs there was an unpleasant change from this
friendly reception. Desperate groups of Der-
vishes were holding out here and there among
the houses, making a flat parapeted roof their
post of vantage, or firing from windows and half-
open doors. There were also ghastly signs of
what the Baggara horsemen had done as they
galloped away through the suburbs from the
battlefield. Corpses lay in the deserted street,
for the most part women and young girls, slaves
of those barbarous masters whom they had
speared or cut down as they caught them escap-
ing from the houses. The Soudanese cleared
the suburb with bullet and bayonet, the gun-
boats occasionally giving effective help by
bringing their Maxims to bear on a housetop,
sweeping it with a jet of hot lead as a fireman
sweeps a roof with a stream of water. While
this desultory fighting was still going on, and
the bullets were flying in the mud-walled streets,
the Sirdar rode in at the head of his staff.
The Soudanese had got round the northeast
angle of the central walled enclosure of the city
by wading through the water of the Nile, where
it ran close to the foot of the fortifications.
[295]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
They entered by the breaches which the shells
had made in the wall on the river front, and
once inside, met with no organized resistance,
though there was some desultory skirmishing.
The Sirdar and his staff, with their escort, had
ridden down the broad street that runs from the
center of Omdurman through the northern
suburbs. Crowds of the townsfolk waited to
welcome him, some sincerely glad of the down-
fall of the Khalifa, others eager to make their
peace with the victor. As he approached the
Mahdi's tomb and the central enclosure there
were fewer of these more or less sincere con-
gratulations, and then came the experience of
being occasionally fired at from roofs and walls.
Guided by Slatin, the Sirdar entered the inner
walled city by one of the large openings on the
land side, and reached the neighborhood of the
Khalifa's half-ruined palace, while the Soudan-
ese were still clearing it of the last desperate
remnant of Abdullahi's bodyguard. The Kha-
lifa himself had ridden away only a few min-
utes before, accompanied by a few of his chiefs,
some of his wives, and a small escort. For some
time it was supposed that he was still in the
palace.
It was at this point that a most unfortunate
incident occurred. The Hon. Hubert Howard,
a son of the Earl of Carlisle, had accompanied
[296)


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
the expedition as war correspondent of the Times
and the New York Herald. He had already
seen some service in South Africa, and had there
displayed the same venturous disposition that
led him, during the battle of Omdurman, to
ride with the Twenty-first Lancers in their des-
perate charge. Out of that danger he had come
scathless. But now, when the fighting was all
but over, he was to meet his death by the fire of
his own friends. He had ridden with the staff
close up to the enclosure of the Khalifa's palace,
near the Mahdi's tomb. It was just sunset, and
the light was rapidly decreasing, but Howard,
nevertheless, told a comrade who was with him
that he would push on into the courtyard in
the hope of taking some snapshot photographs
with a hand camera which he carried. He went
in, but he had hardly done so when a shell, fired
by one of the British batteries, exploded in the
enclosure and killed him on the spot. The
battery commander had received orders to drop
a shell from time to time into the neighborhood
of the Madhi's tomb in order to break up any
rally of the Dervishes there. But he had not
been informed of the rapid progress of Maxwell's
men and the Sirdar and his staff, who had
reached the tomb much sooner than was antici-
pated. Young Howard's death was the result.
The death roll of war correspondents in the
[297)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Soudan is a longer one than for any other coun-
try, and on this day they lost, in proportion to
their small numbers, more heavily than the
combatant officers or the rank and file.
All resistance being now at an end, and it
having been definitely ascertained that the Kha-
lifa had escaped from the city, the Sirdar and
his officers paid a brief visit to the Mahdi's tomb.
The evening light coming in through the great
rent in the dome showed how the interior had
been wrecked by the bursting Lyddite shell.
The tomb itself, and the gilded railings round it,
were badly damaged; of the lamps that hung
from the roof only one remained, and the doors,
with their carved panels, had been blown open
and shattered.
Leaving Maxwell's brigade to hold the town
and keep order, the Sirdar directed the rest of
the troops to withdraw from the suburbs and
bivouac for the night in the open. Omdurman
was a pestilential place. Slatin, in his descrip-
tion of it, had in no way exaggerated the filth
and horror of its mud-walled streets.
From the mosque the Sirdar made his way to
the prison. There he found, in chains, Charles
Neufeld, the German trader who had ventured
into the Soudan in 1887, and had been a captive
ever since, wearing his heavy chains for eleven
years; so that when they were struck off he at
[298]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
first found it hard to balance himself without
the weight of them. There was also an Italian
and some Greeks, and more than a hundred
Abyssinians taken prisoners in the battle where
King Johannes was defeated and killed by the
Dervishes. Other prisoners were Egyptians
and Soudanese who had incurred the suspicion
of the Khalifa. Among these was Ibrahim
Pasha Fauzi, who had been staff officer to Gen-
eral Gordon during the siege of Khartoum. He
had been a prisoner since the fall of the city, and
had been cruelly tortured by order of the Mahdi
in order to force him to confess where he had
hidden his money during the siege. By a cu-
rious coincidence he was brought on board the
Melik to have his chains struck off by the ship's
armorer, and he was thus restored to freedom
in the presence of Gordon's nephew, who com-
manded the gunboat.
In the darkness of the gathering night the
Sirdar made his way to the bivouac. There,
stretched on the gravel of the river-bank, beside
Colonel Wingate, he dictated to the latter, by
the light of an inch of candle, the short tele-
graphic despatch that was to tell England of the
long-expected victory. It was taken down the
Nile by a gunboat to be put upon the wire at
Nasri.
In the great bivouac, guarded by only a few
[299)


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
sand eight hundred and twenty-four. It was esti-
mated that there were besides these about fifteen
thousand wounded. This would mean that in
about four hours' fighting every second man in
the Dervish army of fifty thousand men was
killed or wounded. There were thousands of
prisoners; for, when once the battle was lost, all
but the fanatic few were only too ready to make
their peace with the victors. Seven thousand
wounded were turned over to the care of the
surgeons. Thousands of prisoners were set at
liberty as soon as they had laid down their arms.
Only the emirs and some of the more truculent
of the Baggara were detained under guard.
Among the captives were some of the Khalifa's
wives. They were set free after a short inter-
rogation by the Intelligence officers. Another
prisoner was one of Slatin's former servants,
who, for conniving at his escape, had been kept
in chains for the last three years. On the eve
of the battle his chains were struck off, and he
was given a sword and buckler and forced to
march with many more equally unwilling com-
batants. He survived the dangers of the day,
and was delighted at being restored to his former
master.
Slatin had returned to the camp near Om-
durman the day after the battle and reported
that the pursuit of the Khalifa had been a failure.
[301)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
The Egyptian cavalry were in no condition for
a long pursuit. On the day of the battle they
had been in the saddle from early dawn, and
had repeatedly been hotly engaged with the
enemy. After the repulse of the final attack
they had fallen upon the retiring Dervishes, then
wheeling round they had swept past the north
of Omdurman, breaking up a large body of
Mahdist cavalry, and collecting and sending in
nearly a thousand prisoners. A little after six
o'clock, when they were preparing to bivouac
near the south end of Omdurman, Slatin Pasha
arrived with orders to Colonel Broadwood to
start at once in chase of the Khalifa.
There was no time to serve out rations or
fresh forage. The men mounted and rode off,
tired and hungry as they were. They were told
that one of the steamers would tow up a barge
full of supplies, and meet them in the morning
at some point on the river-bank. Broadwood
had about five hundred men and horses with him,
So many of the other horses were injured, or
utterly exhausted, that it was impossible to take
them out. Only the wonderful endurance of the
little Arab and Egyptian horses enabled even so
many of them to take part in the pursuit. For
about six miles they rode through the darkness,
led by a Jaalin guide. Then it was found that
they were in the midst of marshes, formed by
[302 )


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
the recent heavy rains and the overflow of the
Nile; so there was a halt till the moon rose, the
men resting, formed in a small square, for there
were armed parties of the enemy prowling in
the neighborhood.
Not far off the camel corps were also in biv-
ouac. So far, notwithstanding the exhausted
state of men and animals, there was a hope of
overtaking the fugitive Khalifa. During the
night a number of slaves and women had come
in, whom he had abandoned in his flight, or
who had given him the slip. They reported
that he had with him about a hundred men of
his own tribe, the Taaisha Baggaras. When
the moon rose the pursuit was continued, and
from time to time stragglers were overtaken who
said they had been with the Khalifa. These,
however, were now fewer and fewer, and it be-
gan to be clear that Abdullahi and his com-
panions had got a good start and were making
the most of it. Their horses and camels had
not, like the mounts of Broadwood's and Tud-
way's men, had four days of continuous and ex-
hausting work before this forced night march.
By sunrise thirty miles had been covered.
The horses were nearly dead beat, and there
was neither food for the men nor forage for their
mounts. It was, under such conditions, hope-
less to press on, so the tired men and horses
[303)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
turned towards the Nile. But the banks, cov-
ered by the flood, were for some time inaccessible.
The men had to ride for some time along the
edge of a wide belt of marshes and shallows,
two miles wide, till at last, along a point of
higher ground, they got down to the river and
received some supplies from the flotilla. Then
orders were reluctantly given to return to Khar-
toum.
Major Stuart-Wortley got his little army of
friendlies across the river during the morning,
and they took up the pursuit of the Khalifa, but
he had got such a start of them that from the
first their chance of overtaking him was not very
great. One of the steamers proceeded for some
distance up the White Nile in the hope of per-
haps coming up with the fugitives somewhere
on its banks. But the most trustworthy reports
that could be obtained from the stragglers and
the riverside folk indicated that he had not fol-
lowed the usual track of caravans near the Nile,
but had struck off into the desert, where the rain
had left large pools in the khors and hollows,
so that a small party would find water in abun-
dance for their camels and horses. But for the
recent storms the fugitives would have been
forced to follow the river-bank, and would have
had much more difficulty in getting away.
The escape of the Khalifa was the one point
[304]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
long before the victories and defeats of Mahdism
made their name famous throughout the world.
The Sirdar had crossed the Nile on Saturday,
and paid a brief visit to Khartoum, accom-
panied by his officers. The former capital of
the Soudan had shrunk to a riverside village,
surrounded by ruins. Near the Nile bank,
among the bushes, stood one of the movable
pumping-engines which Gordon had tried to
introduce as an improvement on the centuries-
old water-wheel system. His palace, where he
spent those last anxious months of his heroic
career, was a huge ruin. The roof and more
lightly built upper story were gone, but the
solidly built lower walls were standing, though
the flooring, beams, and planks had been re-
moved for the construction of newer buildings
in Omdurman, so that all the rooms, even on
the ground floor, were open to the sky. The
staircase by which Gordon had come down to
meet his murderers was also gone, but the
natives were able to point out where it stood.
The only important building that was in good
repair was the large house of the Catholic mis-
sion, to which Father Ohrwalder and his fellow
prisoners had once belonged. The house and
its courtyard had been turned into an arsenal
and storehouse by the Khalifa, and a consider-
able quantity of arms and ammunition was
[806]


With Kitchener in the Soudan — 1898
found there, including seventeen guns of various
calibres. But besides the military stores there
was a miscellaneous collection of various articles
of European manufacture, the loot of the various
garrisons that had been captured in the Soudan
and of Hicks Pasha's unfortunate army.
On the Sunday morning there was a striking
scene in Khartoum. The Sirdar and his staff,
with the officers commanding brigades and
divisions, and as many of the British officers as
could be spared from duty, were ferried across
the Nile from Shambat to the ruined city. With
them went guards of honor of several of the
British regiments, of Gordon's own corps, the
Royal Engineers, of the Royal Artillery, and of
the Eleventh Soudanese. The band of the Sou-
danese and the pipers of the Camerons and Sea-
forths were also present. The troops were
formed in a hollow square, just in front of the
ruined palace, close to the spot where Gordon
was killed. Two flagstaffs had been erected on
the palace wall, and by each stood a couple of
officers. At a signal from the Sirdar they hoisted
at one staff the Union Jack, at the other the
Khedive's flag — red with a white crescent —
while the two gunboats on the river fired a sa-
lute, the bands playing the British National
Anthem and the Khedive's March. Then fol-
lowed a brief religious service in memory of the
[807]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
hero of the spot – Charles Gordon. There
were some few among the officers who had shared
in the unsuccessful attempt to come to his rescue
thirteen years before. Three of the newspaper
correspondents, who looked on and recorded
this solemn scene, had been with the little band
that fought its way across the Bayuda Desert,
only to arrive too late. One of the four chap-
lains, the veteran Father Brindle, had marched
across the Bayuda with the Royal Irish in that
terrible campaign. Here at last they were all
at Khartoum, too late, indeed, to save Gordon,
but not too late to begin again carrying on that
work of bringing justice and security to the
people of the Soudan to which Gordon devoted
so much of his best energies.
The chaplains in turn offered prayer, then
the band played the “Dead March” in Saul,
and the pipers a wailing Highland coronach,
while the steamers on the river fired nineteen
minute guns. At the close of the service the
Sirdar called for cheers for the Queen and the
Khedive. Then the ranks were broken, and
before returning across the river to Omdurman
half an hour was given to all, officers and men,
to have an opportunity of visiting the famous
spots associated with Gordon's last days.
When the news of the battle of Omdurman
and the recapture of Khartoum reached Eng-
[808)


XIII
Admiral Dewey and the
Battle of Manila
By A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
more ominous, Admiral Dewey, who
commanded the United States squadron
in the Pacific, was directed to assemble his ships
at Hong Kong and prepare for eventualities.
He put himself into close relation with the exiled
rebel leaders, obtained from Manila very com-
plete information as to the condition of the de-
fences of the bay and the Spanish squadron; and
when at last the cables brought him news that
peace was at an end between Spain and the
United States, he sailed for Manila to fight the
first battle of the war.
Admiral George Dewey, the hero of the Ma-
nila fight, comes of an old New England family.
He was born in Vermont in 1837, graduated at
the Annapolis Naval Academy in 1854, and saw
his first war service, under Farragut, at the forc-
ing of the Mississippi mouth, and in the numer-
ous gunboat actions and attacks on forts along
A S the Cuban war crisis became more and
[310]


y
ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, U.S.N.
A. Pro





Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
armored conning-tower. The Raleigh and Con-
cord had also armored conning-towers.
On the other hand, in the Spanish fleet as-
sembled at Manila, the only ships that had even
the protection of a lightly armored under-water
deck were two small cruisers.
All our guns were modern weapons from the
Washington gun foundry, of longer range, higher
striking power, and (thanks to their flat trajec-
tory) far more accurate than the Spanish guns.
These were of various types; there were Arm-
strongs, old muzzle-loading Pallisers, Krupps,
and Hontoria guns; so that to provide a proper
variety of ammunition, and keep it sorted out
in the arsenal, must have been a troublesome
business.
Again, while the American ships were all of
recent date and in good repair, several of the
Spanish vessels were old, with worn-out engines
and boilers and leaky hulls. All this the Amer-
ican commodore knew, and, before he left Hong
Kong, he must have felt quite certain that if he
could bring the Spanish fleet to action, he could
destroy it with very little risk to his own powerful
cruisers.
By the terms of the British proclamation of
neutrality, issued on Monday, April 25, United
States war vessels were given forty-eight hours in
which to leave British ports. The proclamation
[312 )


Admiral Dewey and the Battle of Manila
and torpedoes, but, as the Subic fortifications
offered no protection, I brought my ships back
to Manila Bay. I went to Subic believing it to
be protected, but, seeing it would have taken
more than a month to make it even passably
capable of defence, I had no remedy, the Amer-
ican squadron being on its way to the Philip-
pines, but to abandon Subic and rely upon the
shelter of Cavite. The Minister of Marine
promised to send supplies, but they never came.
I knew from the first that my squadron would
be completely destroyed. I knew the Amer-
icans had men-of-war, whereas my ships were
incapable of fighting with any chance of success.
The Americans had at least one hundred and
fifty guns, modern, and all of superior pattern.
Ours were inferior in number and calibre.”
No one doubts Admiral Montojo's personal
courage and devoted sense of duty, but his very
words offer sad proof of his incompetence for
high command. It is curious that, although in-
trusted with the naval defence of the Philippines,
he knew nothing of the state of affairs at Subic
till he took his fleet there. His desperate re-
solve to fight a hopeless battle can only be ex-
plained by the effect of repeated disappointments
and troubles in his dealings with his Govern-
ment. It would have been better if he had taken
his fleet out of the bay and kept it, or a portion
[315]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
of it, at sea, eluding pursuit in the labyrinth of
reefs and islands formed by the northern Philip-
pines. He would thus have been in a position
to seriously embarrass Dewey in his operations
against Manila. Or if this course was impossible
(as some say) on account of leaky boilers and
worn-out engines, he should have done as Ad-
miral Korniloff did at Sebastopol – landed his
crews with their guns and ammunition and sunk
the ships. In this way he would have consider-
ably strengthened General Augustin's defence of
the city.
Manila Bay is about thirty miles long and
twenty-five wide at its broadest part. The
mouth of the bay is about twelve miles across,
but it is divided by the high rocky island of Cor-
regidor into two entrances — the northern, about
two miles wide, and the southern or “great en-
trance” (the Boca Grande), nearly ten miles
from shore to shore. The depth of water in both
entrances makes defence by submarine mines
very difficult even if the material had been avail-
able. Montojo had mounted a few guns in a
battery on Corregidor Island, some of them be-
ing taken from one of his ships for the purpose.
But although the material could have been ob-
tained from the electric lighthouses of the har-
bor, the steamers in port, and the arsenal and
observatory, no effort seems to have been made
[816]


Admiral Dewey and the Battle of Manila
to equip the battery with searchlights. If these
had existed they would probably have had the
effect of keeping the garrison on the qui vive
with the excitement of working them. As it
was, a very poor lookout seems to have been kept
at Corregidor.
Saturday evening was bright and clear with
some light from the moon, which was just past
its first quarter. At 8 P.M. the fleet, cleared for
action, stood in towards the Boca Grande, keep-
ing nearer the mainland side of the channel
towards Corregidor. The formation was “line
ahead.” The flagship Olympia led the way,
then came in succession the Baltimore, the Ra-
leigh, the Petrel, the Concord, the Boston, with
the despatch-boat and the two transports astern.
The whole line was more than a mile and a half
long. The engines were going slowly, all lights
were screened, and the dark hulls glided in deep
silence between the headlands. All eyes were
fixed on Corregidor, which rose like a black mass
in the dim moonlight. Every one was expecting
the flash of a hostile gun as the flagship came up
abreast of the island. But there was no sign of
life on the shore. Were the Dons asleep? or
was the Commodore's information incorrect as
to the modern guns that had been mounted to
protect the Boca Grande 2 Now the Baltimore
has passed unchallenged, now the Raleigh and
[817]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
the little Petrel. At last the Boston has the
island abeam, when suddenly a long red flash
leaps from the Fraile battery and the report of
a heavy gun booms across the sea. The shot
went whistling high in air over the Raleigh.
Bang went another gun, and this time the shot
fell short. The Raleigh, Concord, and Boston
promptly replied, sending a shower of shells
into Corregidor and Fraile, which replied until
the ships were out of range, but not a single shot
from the islands touched them. Once past
Corregidor, the engines of the squadron slowed
down till there was barely steerage way on the
ships, and as the fleet went up the bay the men
lay down to sleep beside their guns.
The course taken was northeast, up the middle
of the bay. In the gray of the Sunday morning
the fleet was off Manila about five miles from the
shore, heading directly for Sangley Point, which
bore nearly due south. It was perfectly calm,
without a breath of wind, and across the water
came the musical chime of the church bells in
the great city.
The first shots were fired a little before five
A.M. They came from three batteries of heavy
guns at the new harbor works. All the shells
flew high over the decks of the squadron. The
Concord replied with two shots, but was imme-
diately ordered to cease firing, for it would have
[318]


Admiral Dewey and the Battle of Manila
been impossible to seriously engage the batteries
at Manila without risking the destruction of the
city, and this Dewey was anxious to avoid. His
objective was Montojo's fleet, which lay ahead of
him under the guns of Cavite arsenal and of the
battery on Sangley Point.
The Spanish admiral does not appear to have
been aware of the approach of the hostile squad-
ron till he saw it steaming towards Cavite on the
Sunday morning. His ships cleared for action,
but only about half of them had steam up and
were able to get under weigh. The old wooden
Castilla had her engines broken down, and was
moored fore and aft near Sangley Point, to act
as a floating battery. Her starboard guns had
been dismounted and sent to Corregidor, but
her port guns were trained on the approaching
American squadron. The Velasco and the Don
Antonio de Ulloa were anchored near the arsenal.
They were in the hands of the dockyard staff,
undergoing repair. Montojo's flagship steamed
out towards the open water of the bay, accom-
panied by some of the smaller ships. They
formed in line of battle across the opening of
Cavite Bay, their left near Sangley Point.
All was now grim silence for a few minutes,
as Dewey's fleet — the Stars and Stripes flying
from every mast, the Olympia leading — bore
down in “line ahead” on the expectant Span-
[319]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
iards. Early as it was, the heat of the tropical
summer day was already intense, and the men
in turret and battery were stripped to the waist.
The crews stood beside their guns. The Com-
modore was on the bridge of his flagship, with
three of his officers; but Gridley, the captain of
the Olympia, was in the conning-tower, Dewey
having assigned him this station, so that in case
a shell burst on the bridge there would still be a
senior officer ready to take command.
Eight knots an hour was now the speed of the
leading ship. The range-finders in her fighting-
tops were taking the range minute by minute,
and telephoning the result to the conning-tower
and bridge. A leadsman in the bow was watch-
ing the depth, for it would be a serious matter
to touch ground. No sound was heard but the
regular throb of the powerful engines.
A roar like thunder, and then another, and a
vast fountain of water thrown skyward amid
encircling clouds of smoke, right ahead of the
Olympia—two submarine mines have been fired,
the only ones in the bay; but the Spanish en-
gineer officer who pressed down the firing-key in
Sangley battery has badly misjudged the posi-
tion of the enemy, and fired his heavy mines too
soon. Dewey thinks, no doubt, of the day,
years ago, when, as he steamed into Mobile Bay
with Farragut, he saw the Confederate mines
[320]


Admiral Dewey and the Battle of Manila
bursting like under-water volcanoes. Like Far-
ragut, he moves steadily on.
There goes the first gun from Sangley Point.
Bad ranging again on the Spanish side; that jet
of water ahead shows it has fallen short. An-
other and another, and now the guns of the Span-
ish fleet join in. They are getting the range, or
the American fleet is drifting into their zone of
fire, for now the shells are striking the water
right and left of the flagship, some of them un-
comfortably close. When is Dewey going to
open with his guns in reply? -
Now a shell bursts directly over the Olympia's
deck. No one is touched, but the men must
have some relief from their pent-up excitement.
The gunner in command at the heavy gun astern
waves his cap and calls out, “Remember the
Maine!” and the cry for vengeance is taken up
by a hundred voices.
The range was now fifty-five hundred yards,
a little over three miles. It was just nineteen
minutes to six. Dewey decided to begin his
attack. Turning to the voice tube that led to
the conning-tower, he said, “You may fire when
ready, Gridley.” The captain was only waiting
for the word. He passed the order to the for-
ward barbette for the heavy eight-inch guns to
engage the battery on Sangley Point.
The thunder of the Olympia's cannon was the
[321]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
signal to the other ships to begin. The Balti-
more and the Boston brought their heavy guns into
action, taking for their mark the Castilla and
Montojo's flagship, the Reina Cristina. The
heavier guns of the American navy still use the
old-fashioned powder, and the fleet was now
advancing through a dense cloud of white smoke.
The Spaniards redoubled their fire, and as
the Olympia led the line, heading straight for
the enemy's center, she was the mark for most
of it. The Spanish gunners shot fairly well,
and there was a good deal of luck in the way the
flagship escaped serious injury. “Their ship
and shore guns were making things hot for us,”
wrote the New York Herald correspondent, who
was beside the Commodore. “The piercing
scream of shot was varied often by the bursting
of time-fuse shells, the fragments of which would
lash the water like shrapnel, or cut our hull and
rigging. One large shell, that was coming
straight at the Olympia's forward bridge, for-
tunately fell within less than a hundredfeet away,
one fragment cutting the rigging exactly over the
heads of Lieutenants Lamberton, Rees, and
myself. Another struck the bridge gratings in
line with it. A third passed just under Dewey,
and gouged a hole in the deck.”
The range was now reduced to four thousand
yards. The water was shoaling, and the flag-
[322]


Admiral Dewey and the Battle of Manila
ship turned to starboard, and, followed by the
fleet, ran along the Spanish front, Dewey giving
the order to open fire with all the guns. The
rattle of the quick-firers mingled with the heavier
note of the big turret guns, and a storm of shells
burst upon the Spanish ships and batteries.
Opposite Sangley Point the fleet turned and
ran back again along the Spanish line, bringing
the guns on the other side of the ships to bear.
This maneuver of running up and down the line
was twice repeated. Those of the Spanish ships
that were under steam also altered their positions,
occasionally running in behind the anchored
Castilla, off Sangley Point.
A shell burst against the side of the American
flagship, close to one of the ports. Another cut
the halyards, just above the hands of the signal-
ling officer on her after bridge. Captain Grid-
ley, stepping out of the turret, received an injury
which, although it was thought at the time to be
a very trifling matter, led soon after to his being
invalided home. The Baltimore did not escape
so easily. A shot passed right through her, hap-
pily touching no one. Then a shell ripped up
her main deck, smashed the carriage of a six-
inch gun, put it out of action, and exploding
some of the ammunition that lay near it, seriously
wounded eight men. Another small shell struck
the Boston's foremast, just above the head of her
[823]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
captain, who stood on her forward bridge.
Luckily for him it failed to burst. Fires were
caused by shells bursting in her wardroom and
hammock nettings, but these were quickly put
out.
But meanwhile it was going badly with the
Spanish fleet. The battery on the Point was
running short of ammunition, and its fire had
almost ceased. Close by, the old Castilla had
burst into flames under the rain of shells. Her
guns were silent, and her crew was abandoning
her. The Reina Cristina, Montojo's flagship,
had been hit some seventy times in the first three-
quarters of an hour. Her steering gear was
shattered by a shell, which made her unmanage-
able. Another burst in the engine-room and
destroyed the main pipe of the condenser. On
the gun deck men were lying between the guns,
dead, or desperately wounded. Montojo him-
self had been hit by a fragment of a shell, but
still stuck to his post, with a handkerchief tied
round his wounded leg. The chaplain was
killed as he tried to help a wounded sailor. The
boatswain and chief gunner were dead. One
of the doctors, the chief engineer, and three
other officers were wounded. Some fifty men
had lost their lives, and three times as many were
more or less badly injured — this out of a crew
of three hundred and seventy officers and men.
[324]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
timore, and Concord, the other of the Raleigh.
Boston, and Petrel. At a quarter-past eleven
they opened fire on the Sangley Point battery
and on Cavite arsenal and fort at long range.
The Spanish reply was slow and feeble, the shells
all falling short. It was for the Americans more
like target practice than a battle. Soon a white
flag was run up on Cavite. Fire ceased for a
few minutes while a launch went in from the
fleet to parley with the commandant. He said
he did not want to surrender, but only to have
time to get the women and children out of
Cavite.
The American officer answered that he had no
wish to cause useless bloodshed, but that he was
determined to destroy the arsenal and what was
left of the fleet, Then for awhile Cavite was left
unmolested, while the larger ships engaged the
Sangley Point battery, and the smaller ships,
the Petrel and Concord, stood into Bakor Bay,
and with their shells set fire to the ships that
were scuttled and aground in the shallows. At
half-past eleven a heavy shell burst in the bat-
tery, sending up a huge column of earth and
débris. After this the guns at Sangley were
silent. The ships in the bay were all ablaze.
Cavite reopened fire for a few minutes, then
about twelve the last shot was fired by the Span-
iards, and a few minutes later Dewey signalled
[328]


Admiral Dewey and the Battle of Manila
to cease firing. The victory was complete. The
Spanish Pacific squadron had ceased to exist.
And this great success had been cheaply bought.
Eight officers and men wounded represented the
American injury by the Spanish fire. The chief
engineer of the despatch-boat McCulloch was
dead. He had died of heat apoplexy during
the fight.
The Spaniards had lost some eight hundred
men. No praise could be too high for their de-
voted valor. When Captain Boado, the chief
of Montojo's staff, went on board the Boston
with a message from the admiral after the action,
Lamberton, her commander, said to the Spanish
officer, “You have fought us with four very bad
ships, not warships. There was never seen be-
fore braver fighting under such unequal condi-
tions. It is a great pity that you exposed your
lives in vessels not fit for fighting.” And Dewey
sent through the British consul a message to
Montojo that he congratulated him on his gal-
lant conduct, and would be glad to grasp his
hand.
[829]


XIV
With Roosevelt on San
Juan Hill
By A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
HE morning of June 22 broke clear and
| fine, with very little surf along the shore. ,
It was ideal weather for the landing.
All along the coast for miles west and east of
Santiago American battleships and cruisers were
bombarding every likely landing-place, while
on the land side here and there the Cuban bands
came down and opened fire on the Spanish
outposts.
At nine o'clock the cruisers Machias, Detroit,
and Suwanee, and the gunboat Wasp, joined
the New Orleans, and a rain of shells was sent
pouring into the wooded slopes above Daiquiri
and into the little village. Soon flames and
smoke rose from some of the houses. The
Spaniards had fired the village before abandon-
ing it. There were only a handful of them in
the place, not more than a company of infantry.
They left the pier intact, no explosives were
available for its destruction, and they also evacu-
[880]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
and part of General Bates’ brigade, belonging
to the First Division, besides a portion of Wheel-
er's dismounted cavalry. None of the artillery
could yet be got ashore, the only guns landed
being a machine-gun battery. Nor was much
of the transport disembarked. Some horses
and mules were dropped overboard and made to
swim ashore. Altogether, by evening, General
Lawton had some six thousand men landed, and
had besides with him about one thousand Cubans
under General Castillo.
The Spanish detachments that had watched
the hills and the coast villages were retiring west-
ward towards Santiago. Linares had decided
that it was useless to fritter away his small force
by trying to hold the numerous blockhouses to
the eastward, nor did he mean to expose his men
to the fire of the American warships. On the
evening of the 22d his outposts were at Sevilla
and Firmeza, north of Juragua and the coast
village of Siboney, both of them some miles west
of Daiquiri. Before Siboney was evacuated the
Spanish detachment there had lost heavily, and
its commander, Major Bollini, had been killed
by a bursting shell. The evacuation of the vil-
lage and the hills behind it gave the Americans a
new landing-place, for in the bay of Siboney
there was a level beach, shelving regularly, so
[884]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
miles out from Siboney, they might expect at
any moment to meet an enemy.
What really occurred we know down to the
smallest detail, for there were some of the ablest
correspondents of the New York press with both
the columns. Amongst others, Mr. Richard
Harding Davis of the Herald, and Mr. Edward
Marshall of the Journal, were with Colonel
Wood, and Mr. Caspar Whitney was with Gen-
eral Young. They not only sent long despatches
to their papers at the time, but several of them
have since published lengthy narratives of the
fight. On these data, compared with each other
and with the Spanish official account of the day's
work, the following story of the action of Las
Guasimas is based. It will be seen that the day
was an honorable one for all who took part in
the little battle.
Just before dawn on Friday morning General
Young marched out from Siboney with his four
hundred regulars, black and white, and his
Hotchkiss guns. He had expected to be joined
early in his advance by three hundred of Gen-
eral Castillo's Cubans, but though he actually
marched past their camps, none of them, except
a few scouts, came to his help till all the fighting
WaS OWer.
It was a close, hot morning. The recent rains
had made the ground on the track and in the
[336]


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
woods soft and muddy. The so-called road
proved in places to be almost impassable. The
bush grew down upon it, and the tangle of cac-
tus, thorn trees, and palms formed such a dense
mass away to the left that during the march not
a glimpse was to be seen of the Rough Riders'
column, which was following the path on the
wooded spur on that side.
At first the regulars tramped along the muddy
tracking, chatting, and joking together, though
even in this early stage of the march the advance
was covered by a screen of vigilant scouts well in
front. A mile and a half from Siboney, as it was
felt that the point of danger was being ap-
proached, the order was given to “load maga-
zines,” and in an instant all were silent and on
the alert. Then the advance was resumed.
Mr. Whitney thus describes the anxious min-
utes before the first contact with the enemy. To
understand what he says as to how the column
was protected it must be noted that the word
“picket,” which in the British army means the
body of men on an outpost line that sends out
and immediately supports the sentries, in the
United States means a sentry or a scout.
“We moved forward,” he says, “now with
one troop somewhat in advance of the others,
and a strong line of pickets reconnoitring every
[337)


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
the slope they had dug shelter trenches, and
made some rough breastworks of loose stone.
Their left on an adjoining slope could sweep the
front of the hill with a cross fire. Their right
was in the bush on the other side of the valley,
holding the northern end of the spur by which
the Rough Riders were advancing. All this
was only gradually discovered by the Americans
as the fight developed. The Spaniards had no
intention of holding on doggedly to the very ex-
tended line taken up by their small force. Al-
caniz was fighting a rearguard action to cover
the general retirement of the outlying Spanish
detachments by Sevilla or Santiago. He had
held the Las Guasimas ridges for forty-eight
hours, and would necessarily retire if attacked
in force, only showing enough fight to delay the
advance of the invaders from Siboney.
Two of the Hotchkiss guns were placed in
position to the left of the road near the beginning
of its curve to the west. They were carefully
screened in the bush, for Young was anxious
not to begin the action till he had given Wood's
column a little more time to come up on his left.
The guns were ready at seven o'clock, but it was
not till seven-twenty that they began to shell the
Spanish position on the hill. The enemy's rifles
answered by a volley so accurately aimed that one
of the gunners was killed beside his piece. Three
[339]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
troops of the First Cavalry were already working
forward through the bush towards the hill in
front, the fourth troop working up the hollow
of a creek or stream to the left. They now
opened fire, and were promptly answered by
volleys of the fire of scattered sharpshooters in the
bush and grass on the slopes in front, and above
all rang out the rapid crackling fire of the ma-
chine gun near the hill-top. Several men and
officers went down before this heavy fire, the
leading troop of the First Cavalry losing in rapid
succession its captain, lieutenant, and senior
sergeant. Young had still in hand the four
troops of the Tenth Cavalry — negro soldiers
with useful experience of Indian warfare in the
Far West. He sent one troop up the creek to
strengthen his left, and pushed out two more to
the right, where the close and heavy fire of the
Spaniards east of the hill made him think that
they were trying to outflank him. The fourth
troop he kept in reserve on the road.
Meanwhile the other column, composed of the
Rough Riders, had also come in contact with
the Spaniards, and was hotly engaged in a close
fight in the dense bush that covered the long
spur to the left of the road. The column had
marched at 5 A.M., for the first part of the march
was up a steep ascent, and then the track rose
and fell along the ridge and was only a muddy,
[340]


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
Some of the cow-boy soldiers gave vent to their
excitement in wild oaths, but Roosevelt’s voice
was heard sternly commanding: “Stop that
swearing. I don't want to hear any cursing
to-day.” The men were soon perfectly in hand.
It had been predicted that the cow-boys and
hunters, once they were in action, would shoot
according to their own independent judgment,
and pay very little heed to orders; but in this
Las Guasimas fight the men fired volleys, waiting
patiently for the order to fire and not wasting
ammunition wildly. They threw away all im-
pedimenta, even their water bottles, keeping
only their rifles and cartridge belts, and then
began working forward through the bush, keep-
ing a very good line. The Spaniards were re-
tiring slowly from the first. Twice they stood
for awhile and checked the American advance,
and the tangle of the wood was so thick that any
rapid movement was impossible. Roosevelt
took personal command of the left of the line,
Wood sending him one of the reserve companies.
The other two were extended to the right towards
the valley, in order to give touch with General
Young's column of regulars, but the fight had
been more than an hour in progress before this
was effected. The firing had begun in the wood
long before Young came into action in the val-
ley, but the regulars do not seem for some time
[343)


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
true that Colonel Alcaniz had never meant to do
more than make a show of resistance, the per-
fectly legitimate impression alike in the ranks of
Young's regulars and Wood and Roosevelt’s
volunteers was that they had won a brilliant
little victory. It was a most encouraging open-
ing for the campaign.
The losses of the victors had been heavy.
Among the wounded was Mr. Edward Mar-
shall, a correspondent of the New York Journal.
Shot through the back near the spine, and partly
paralyzed, he was carried to the field hospital,
where he was told he had not long to live."
Lying on the stretcher, he dictated the story of
the battle to be telegraphed to his paper. It
was written down by one of the volunteers who
knew shorthand, and it was only when the long
telegram was completed that Marshall discovered
that his kindly helper had been writing with a
wounded hand.
Mr. Marshall recovered against all hope, and
has since told his impressions when the Spanish
bullet struck him down. He seems to have felt
very little pain, though this was not the impres-
sion of those who saw him. Mr. Harding Davis
says: “When I saw him he was suffering the
most terrible agonies and passing through a suc-
cession of convulsions.” But it seems that these
convulsive movements were not conscious for
[345]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Mr. Marshall, according to his own account of
what he felt when he was hit. “The bullet,”
he says, “came diagonally from the left. I was
standing in the open. “Chug' came the bullet,
and I fell into the long grass, as much like a
lump as had the other fellows whom I had seen
go down. There was no pain, no surprise. The
tremendous shock so dulled my sensibilities that
it did not occur to me that anything extraordi-
nary had happened — that there was the least
reason to be worried. I merely lay perfectly
satisfied and entirely comfortable in the long
grass. It was a long time before anyone came
near me. The fighting passed away from me
rapidly. There were only left in the neighbor-
hood the dead, other wounded, and a few first-
aid-for-the-injured men, who were searching for
us. I heard two of these men go by calling out
to the wounded to make their whereabouts
known, but it did not occur to me to answer
them. The sun was very hot, and I had some
vague thoughts of sunstroke, but they were not
specially interesting thoughts, and I gave them
up. It seemed a good notion to go to sleep, but
I didn’t do it. Finally three soldiers found me,
and putting half a shelter-tent under me carried
me to the shade.”.
The surgeon came along and examined his
wound. “He told me,” says Mr. Marshall,
[346]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
tined for the attack of El Caney passed the night
on the edge of the woods fronting the Spanish
position. No fires were allowed in the bivouacs,
and the soldiers were told to make as little noise
as possible, for it was feared that if the enemy
became aware of the preparations in progress
for the attack he might abandon the little town
without fighting, and the plan of operations had
for its object not the mere occupation of El Caney
but the capture of its garrison. The Americans
at this period very much underestimated the
fighting capacity of the Spaniards, and every one
in the attacking force believed that even if the
Spaniards did not give way before the mere
menace of an attack, they would be driven out
by the first rush.
At sunrise the men were roused from their
sleep, and while the hot mist still hung in the
valleys, the columns were marshalled for the
fight. General Lawton's division worked up
to the low ridges close to El Caney without meet-
ing with the least resistance, for the Spaniards
had no outposts or patrols in front of their posi-
tion, and were awaiting the attack inside their
defences. Lawton had eight battalions of regu-
lars and one of volunteers under his orders.
Only one light battery of four guns, under Cap-
tain Allyn Capron, had been assigned to his
division. His right, the exposed flank, was pro-
[348]


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
tected by the only two troops of mounted cavalry
with the army. Still farther away to the right
were some of Garcia's Cubans, but already the
Americans had learned to set very little depen-
dence on their fighting capacity.
Away to his left General Kent's division, also
of three brigades (eight battalions of regulars
and one of New York volunteers), was waiting
to attack San Juan as soon as Caney had fallen.
Kent had another four-gun battery, under Cap-
tain Grimes, which was in position on the hill
near El Pozo farm. The dismounted cavalry
and Rough Riders under General Sumner held
the right of Kent's position, and there were more
Cubans on both sides of the ground assigned to
his division. Bates’ brigade was held in re-
serve, and Duffield's brigade of volunteers was
moving along the coast railway to attack Agua-
dores, supported by the fleet, which stood in
towards the harbor mouth, bombarded the
forts, and sent its shells flying over the hills into
Santiago itself.
The sky was overcast, and the morning was
hot and sultry. But at twenty minutes to seven,
when the first shot was fired on the right by
Capron's battery, the clouds overhead began to
break, and the sun shone out brightly. “Boys,”
said a soldier, as the first cannon shot echoed in
the wooded hills, “this is the first of July. It's
- [849]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
a pity we can't keep Santiago for the Fourth.”
It was going to be kept a good deal longer.
The chief defence of El Caney was an old-
fashioned stone fort on a conical hill to the south-
east of the little town. The houses on each
front of the place were loopholed, and there were
some blockhouses on each side, linked together
by shelter trenches and wire entanglements.
The village church, a solid stone building, was
also prepared for defence. The houses were
single-storied cottages, and the few streets of the
town were wide and open and planted with trees.
“From the crest of the ridge,” writes Captain
Lee, the British attaché who accompanied Law-
ton's staff, “we could look right down into the
village, its thatched and tiled roofs half hid-
den by the large shade-trees that we afterward
learned to dread as the lurking-places of sharp-
shooters. In the village itself profound quiet
reigned, and there was no sign of life beyond a
few thin wisps of smoke that curled from the
cottage chimneys. Beyond lay the fertile valley
with a few cattle grazing, and around us on three
sides arose, tier upon tier, the beautiful Maestra
Mountains, wearing delicate pearly tints in the
first rays of the rising sun. To our left stretched
the rich green jungle, with its rippling bam-
boo groves and clumps of royal palm. The
only landmark in all this wide expanse was the
[350]


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
great red-roofed Ducoureaud House, a deserted
country-seat that lay midway between El Caney
and Santiago. Three miles away in this direc-
tion loomed the long, undulating ridge of San
Juan, streaked with Spanish trenches, and be-
hind it showed up clearly the faint pink buildings,
with twinkling windows and innumerable Red
Cross flags, that marked the city of Santiago.”
As the first shell of Capron's battery burst
over the fort, a group of Spanish soldiers that
had been lounging near its entrance disappeared
into cover, and on the slope of the hill below
some straw hats appeared here and there in line,
showing where the infantry were lining the shel-
ter trenches. But not a shot was fired in reply
for a quarter of an hour, and so silent was the
fort that one of Lawton's staff suggested that it
had been evacuated, and that the straw hats
were stuck up on sticks as dummies to delude
the attacking force into the idea that the trenches
were held. The shells were knocking stones
out of the walls of the fort, and one of them had
all but demolished a blockhouse, but still the
Spaniards held their fire. Not a shot came
from the trenches till Lawton's infantry began
to deploy for the advance.
The plan of attack was that General Chaffee,
with the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth In-
fantry, should work round to the north of El
- [351]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
Caney; Colonel Miles's brigade, the First, Fourth,
and Twenty-fifth Infantry (these last negroes),
was to advance against the west side of the town,
and General Ludlow, with the Eighth and
Twenty-second Regulars and the Second Mas-
sachusetts Volunteers, was to move against the
place from the south. It was expected that in
this way not merely would the town be quickly
captured, but that its garrison would be made
prisoners. It was expected that the business
would be all over early in the day, and then Law-
ton's division could move against the flank of
the Spaniards at San Juan and help Kent to
turn them out.
Miles's and Ludlow's brigades were the first to
come into action, opening up on El Caney with
volleys at about a thousand yards, from grassy
ridges to the west and south. Chaffee had fur-
ther to march with his three regiments, and
reached his ground somewhat later. At a quar-
ter past seven all the infantry was moving for-
ward, and the Spaniards had opened fire from
the little stone fort, the trenches, the block-
houses on three sides of El Caney, shots also
coming from sharpshooters on house-roofs and
in tree-tops along the edge of the town. There
had been till now a very general impression that
Spaniards could not shoot straight, but the men
who held El Caney shot coolly, deliberately, and
[852 ) -


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
some hours more, during which the attack
merely held their own. The Second Massa-
chusetts had been withdrawn before this from
the firing line. The volunteers had behaved
well, advancing steadily and losing several men.
But while the regulars were properly armed
with modern rifles using smokeless powder, the
volunteers, with the exception of Roosevelt’s
men, had only their old Springfield rifles and
cartridges loaded with the old-fashioned black
powder. The result was, that as the Massachu-
setts men advanced they were enveloped in a
thick cloud of smoke, which drew the fire of the
enemy's trenches, and would doubtless soon
have been a mark for the artillery of the works
nearer Santiago. General Ludlow had there-
fore to reduce his brigade to the two regular
regiments, sending the Massachusetts men back
some hundreds of yards to the rear, where he
kept them in reserve.
Chaffee's brigade on the right had the heav-
iest share of the fighting. His three fine regi-
ments worked forward to a long grassy ridge that
lies about three hundred yards in front of the
northeast side of El Caney. A sunken road be-
hind the ridge affords some cover; but at the
close quarters the crest where the firing line was
placed was swept by a deadly rain of Mauser
bullets. Colonel Haskell, of the Seventeenth
[854]


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
Infantry, had tried to lead his men forward
through a gap in the middle of the ridge to line a
hedge and bank nearer the town, but the attempt
had to be abandoned. The colonel fell hit at
once by three bullets — one in the breast, one in
the knee, and one in the heel. The men lay
down along a swell of the ground to open fire.
The colonel had fallen some yards in front down
the slope; five men went out to bring him in.
They succeeded, but three of them were shot
down. Lieutenant Dickinson, who had assisted
in rescuing his wounded colonel, though already
wounded himself, received three other wounds
while being helped back to the rear. The
wounded lay in a long line in the sunken road.
There were few doctors with the army; there
were none of them up at the front with Chaffee's
brigade. There was no help for the seriously
wounded for hours. The dressing station es-
tablished farther to the rear near the artillery
position gave help to the more slightly wounded
who were able to walk back so far; but there
were no stretcher parties to bring in the seriously
injured. It was a piece of scandalous misman-
agement. It looked as if the Washington gov-
ernment seriously believed that its army, like its
navy, could win battles with only half a dozen
casualties. Here is the description of the scene
in the road where these neglected wounded lay,
[355)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
as given by Captain Lee, who accompanied
Chaffee's attack:
“On reaching the spot, I found over a hun-
dred killed and wounded laid out in as many
yards of road, and so close were they that one
could only pass by stepping over them. There
was a strange silence among these men, not a
whimper or a groan, but each lay quietly nursing
his wound with closed eyes and set teeth, only
flinching when the erratic sleet of bullets clipped
the leaves off the hedge close above their heads.
Many looked up quietly at my strange uniform
as I passed, and asked quickly and quietly, “Are
you a doctor, sir?' I could but shake my head,
and they would instantly relapse into their
strained, intense attitudes, whilst I felt sick at
heart at the thought of my incompetence. Some
of the slightly wounded were tending those who
were badly hit, and nothing could have surpassed
the unskilled tenderness of these men. I was
astonished, too, at their thoughtful considera-
tion. ‘Keep well down, sir, several said as I
stopped to speak to them; ‘them Mausers is
flying pretty low, and there's plenty of us here
already.” The heat in the little road was in-
tense, there was no shade nor a breath of air,
and the wounded lay sweltering in the sun till
the head reeled with the rank smell of sweat and
saturated flannel. Right amongst the wounded
[356 )


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
gap in the line southeast of El Caney, between
the right of General Ludlow's brigade and the
left of General Chaffee's. Lawton had by this
time a battery and eight battalions in action, and
three in reserve, and it was just eight hours since
the first shot had been fired.
According to General Shafter's plan, the
Spanish outpost on his own left at San Juan
hill was not to be attacked till Lawton, having
got to El Caney, could co-operate. But events
so worked that General Kent, whose division
fronted San Juan, carried out his part of the
day's work on lines not contemplated in the plan
dictated by the headquarters of the army.
On the previous evening his division, consist-
ing, like Lawton's, of three brigades of three
battalions each, had tramped up the muddy trail
to the edge of the woods. Like his colleague, he
had for all his artillery a single battery of four
small guns. It was under the command of Cap-
tain Grimes, and its position was the low hill on
which stands the farm of El Pozo.
Shortly before 8 A.M. Grimes's battery opened
fire from the hill. Its target was the Spanish
blockhouse on the top of the opposite hill of San
Juan, twenty-four hundred yards away. Be-
tween was a mass of jungle-like forest, traversed
near its edge by the double stream of the San
Juan river, and with open ground beyond. There
[360)


With Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
were some Cubans in El Pozo farmhouse, and
behind the battery and a little to its right were
two dismounted regiments of regular cavalry.
General Wheeler had been officially placed on
the sick list, and General Sumner commanded
the cavalry brigade, which, however, did not
prevent “fighting Joe Wheeler” from hurrying
up to the front as soon as he heard the firing.
Sumner's cavalrymen were tramping up the
track through the woods and forming to the
right front of El Pozo on the margin of the bush.
To the left, packed close together on the muddy
trail, the infantry regiments of Kent's division
were working to the front.
For fully a quarter of an hour the Spaniards
made no answer to the fire of the American bat-
tery. A crowd of correspondents, artists, and
foreign naval and military attachés stood close to
the guns, chatting, smoking, sketching, watching
the front through their glasses, and guessing as
to what was happening away to the right, whence
came the distant boom of Capron's battery in
action against El Caney. The mass of smoke
from its guns could be plainly seen hanging in
the still air like a white, sunny cloud. The
trenches on San Juan hill could be easily made
out, and, beyond, the blockhouses on the edge of
the city. But the Spaniards made no sign of
fight for awhile, and the whole scene as viewed
[861]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
from El Pozo suggested peace maneuvers rather
than war.
But this was not to last long. Though no one
could see where was the battery from which it
came (for the Spanish guns used smokeless pow-
der), a screaming roar in the air told that a shrap-
nel was winging its way towards the battery.
As it burst — luckily a little short — the group
of distinguished spectators bolted pell-mell for
cover on the reverse slope of the hill. “Is this
kind of thing allowed P” asked an artist corre-
spondent, engaged in his first battle, of the officer
who lay down beside him. “Well,” was the
answer, “I don't suppose either you or I could
exactly stop those shells.” It was clear the
Spaniards had the range; the second shell burst
in the farmhouse and turned out the Cubans,
killing and wounding several of them. Another
burst among the guns. Another, going a little
to the right, laid low several of the regular cav-
alrymen, who had been so placed that any shell
going wide of the battery burst among them.
The Cubans carried away their wounded on
improvised stretchers, and one of the spectators
remarked that it took about ten Cubans to carry
every wounded man.
The Spanish fire came from guns on the flank
of San Juan, and farther to the rear, near the
margin of the city. They were so well masked
[362]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
villa, and it was dragged up the track till it got to
near the point where the San Juan road opened
from the woods. There it was anchored about
a hundred feet above the trees in easy range of
the Spanish guns and rifles. A mile to the rear.
and at a greater height it might have done good
service; here it only drew a heavy fire from
the Spaniards, and everything that missed the
balloon did deadly execution among the infantry
packed beneath and behind it on the track.
There was general rejoicing among the Ameri-
cans when a Spanish shrapnel tore a great gap
in the balloon and it came slowly down, the up-
per part of it gathering in the net on the top of
it and forming a parachute. Colonel Derby of
the Engineers, who was in the car of the balloon,
escaped unhurt. He brought down one useful
item of information. He had seen another trail
through the wood a little to the left, which might
be used for some of the troops.
One brigade was massed on this new road.
The two others used the old trail. To their
right the dismounted cavalry regiments worked
to the front, the Rough Riders dragging with
them a dynamite field gun, which, however,
jammed almost at once, and proved useless. A
battery of machine guns came into action near
El Pozo, and did better work than the artillery.
The men were now crowded along the edge of
[864]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
to fall, and after midnight it increased to a heavy
downpour. This made the night the darkest
and most inclement that had been so far ex-
perienced during the campaign. The troops
destined for the attack were lying down in the
open to the east of the camp, and officers and
men were drenched to the skin. When, at last
the advance began, it was found impossible to
keep touch and direction unless by marching the
troops in the close solid formation of mass of
quarter columns; that is, the companies, each
formed on its full front, followed each other at
a distance of six paces, and in each brigade bat-
talion followed battalion.
The Highland Brigade, under General Wau-
chope, was in the center. It was to move against
the big Magersfontein kopje. To its right rear,
and nearer the river, the Guards Brigade ad-
vanced in support. The Ninth Brigade, on the
left, held the camp and the railway line, and on
the other side of the railway the mounted troops
were to make a demonstration against the ene-
my's right.
Before starting on the night march, General
Wauchope had seen Lord Methuen, and the
two generals had gone carefully over the plan
for the attack. There seems not to be any
foundation whatever for the story, that found
general acceptance for awhile, that Wauchope
[868]


The Battle of Magersfontein
protested against the orders given to him as
likely to lead to disaster. The plan of attack
assigned to the Highland Brigade is thus ex-
plained by Lord Methuen:
“The brigade was to march in mass of quar-
ter columns, the four battalions keeping touch,
and, if necessary, ropes were to be used for the
left guides” (that is, a rope would be held by
the sergeants acting as guides on the left flank
of the companies, so as to prevent them losing
touch and distance). “These ropes were taken,
but, I believe, used by only two battalions. The
three battalions were to extend just before day-
break, two companies in firing line, two com-
panies in support, and four companies in reserve,
all at five paces’ interval.” Wauchope intended
to swing round two of his companies against the
left rear of the main kopje and attack it on two
sides.
It will thus be seen that the plan was not, as
was at first supposed in England, copied from
Wolseley's at Tel-el-Kebir. On that occasion .
the troops were brought close up to the Arab lines
in the dark and rushed them shoulder to shoulder
at dawn. Here Lord Methuen tried to get his
attacking force over most of the open ground in
front of Cronje's lines under cover of darkness.
But there was to be no sudden rush of a mass
with fixed bayonets. The men were to deploy
[369]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
in the darkness into three extended lines, and
then advance firing as day broke. The plan
was much too elaborate for a night attack. In
the pitch darkness and driving rain of the night
between December 10 and 11 it was hopeless.
It should have been put off when it was found
that the conditions of weather were so unfavor-
able for a prolonged movement of large bodies
of men.
So much for the plans. Let us now see what
happened. Dawn was at 3.25. At that hour
the Highland Brigade was advancing. Wau-
chope was just about to give orders to deploy.
Apparently neither he nor any other of the lead-
ers knew how close they were to the Boer
trenches. Just at this time a couple of rifles
were accidentally discharged. One wonders why
even a single rifle had been loaded! It is said
that there had also been some dangerous flashes
of light from a badly shaded lantern, and, ac-
cording to at least one account, at this critical
moment the great searchlight of Kimberly sent
its white ray of electric light sweeping over the
veldt, and it shone for a moment through a gap
in the kopjes and revealed, like a ghostly army,
the leading battalions of the Highland Brigade.
But whatever it was that warned the Boers
that the column was so near, there is no doubt
as to what next happened. The Boers were on
[870]


The Battle of Magersfontein
the alert. They had manned their trenches, so
as to be ready to meet an attack at dawn. The
dense mass of Highlanders was within two hun-
dred yards of the most advanced trench. Sud-
denly along half a mile of front the enemy's
Mausers blazed and roared in rapid, independent
fire, and showers of bullets tore through the
dense ranks of Wauchope's brigade. Men and
officers fell in scores. The general himself was
hit in several places. He called out “Extend,
men — extend!” and fell to the ground, dying
almost immediately. It is just possible that even
then a bold rush would have carried the brigade
into the trenches and given the Highlanders a
chance with the bayonet. But their leader was
down. Some tried to extend into a firing line
and answer the Mausers with their Lee-Met-
fords. A few dashed forward, only to be caught
by the barbed wires of a high entanglement that
extended along the front of the trench about a
hundred yards from it. But most of the brigade
were falling back. In a few minutes it was clear
that the attack had failed.
But a long, determined effort was made to re-
deem the day. The Highlanders rallied, and
deployed along the veldt a few hundred yards
in the rear of the point where they had been
caught by the Boer fire. On their right the
Guards had formed the battle, and for artillery
[371]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
had opened fire upon the Boer defences. From
various points on the kopjes the Boer guns were
replying. The sun, rising over the ridges, lit up
a fiercely contested battlefield.
The Seaforths were extended along the front
of the ground over which the Highlanders had
advanced. The rest of the brigade had been
rallied further back, and were lying down along
the veldt. To the right the Guards had come
into action. For some hours it was a repetition
of the Modder River fight. The long firing line
of the British poured bullets almost at random
into the position held, as it was, by an unseen
enemy, so that aiming was out of the question.
Over the heads of the infantry the artillery sent
its shells into the kopjes. The big naval gun had
been dragged nearer the hills, and its heavy lyd-
dite shells seemed to be bursting well. Towards
noon Lord Methuen brought up the Gordons
from the camp, and sent them to the sup-
port of the Highlanders. The balloon had been
sent up from a knoll near the camp, and the
officer in the car reported that the enemy was
also receiving reinforcements, some from the
direction of Spytfontein, others from Jacobsdal.
But the Boer guns had ceased firing. Even
their riflemen seemed to be tiring of the pro-
longed struggle to hold the trenches under the
ceaseless shower of bullets and shells. From
[872]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
For some time the story of this reverse was
kept back by the military censorship. The
telegrams told only of the slaughter of the High-
landers at dawn. They said nothing of this
incident of the midday battle. Even the letters
of the correspondents were in some cases opened,
and the story of the second attack cut out of
them. But some narratives of the battle were
allowed to pass through telling the plain truth.
The correspondent of the Morning Post watched
the advance from a knoll where a battery of
horse artillery had taken up a position to sup-
port the Guards Brigade. Here is his impres-
sion of the scene:
“The sad feature of the day was yet to come.
Between half-past one and two the rifle fire,
which for some time had been rather desultory,
became suddenly louder all along the line.
Simultaneously the level ground on our left took
a new aspect. A Grenadier on the right looked
across and saw the dust rising on the plain, and
thought the Boers were coming out of their
trenches. An officer beside him, using his field-
glasses, assured him that it was only our cavalry
galloping across to cut off the enemy in the rear.
What both saw was the Highland Brigade in
full retreat. Who gave the order I cannot tell,
and in any case it is a matter of no importance.
Back they came in a wave that no officer could
[374]


The Battle of Magersfontein
stop. From a point of vantage on the Horse
Artillery hill one could see them swarming like
bees over the veldt, until they were almost out
of range, and the guns were left out in the open
with no one to support them. It was, perhaps,
the most unpleasant sight that a British soldier
of to-day has ever beheld — it was certainly a
sight never to be forgotten. The guns, though
they were left unprotected within short rifle
range of the enemy's trenches, came to the rescue
in magnificent fashion, pouring their shells over
the trenches until the Boer fire became less de-
structive.
Sitting there on the hill by the Horse Artillery,
one thanked Providence that a few Gordons re-
mained in front with a solid line of Coldstream
Guards, who never budged an inch in the gen-
eral retreat; one thanked Providence, too, that
the Boers had no artillery in action to scatter
shrapnel over the Highlanders' retreat. It was
difficult to say what would happen next, until
Major Ewart, the brigade major of the High-
landers, rode up with an order from the com-
manding officer, which was almost an entreaty,
to the effect that all he asked of the Highland
Brigade was to hold the position until dark. So
riddled and shattered was the brigade that Ewart
had actually no other officer with him to help
him give the orders to the scattered men, and
[375]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
he was glad to have the assistance of Colonel
Dawnay, who was there not as a soldier, but as
a civilian, surveying the battle from the Horse
Artillery hill.
It was only two o'clock now, so that it was
no small thing to ask of the Highlanders that
they should again face the galling fire from the
trenches for five mortal hours. Still, a very fair
rally was effected; the pipers played somewhat
dolefully, the bugles blew the assembly, and the
brigade, stiffened by the support of the Scots
Guards, at least got back to the guns, where
they had a certain amount of cover, and were
not subject to the dropping fire from the top of
the kopjes, where a few Boers were still lying
in shelter.”
Lord Methuen, in his report, says that the
heaviest losses of the day occurred during this
retreat. His idea now was to hold on until dark
and then try to rush the Boer position. So
through the afternoon the firing continued.
But as the day went on it became more and
more clear that the men were not capable of
further effort. The Boers, on the other hand,
encouraged by having twice repulsed an attack
and held the force opposed to them at bay during
a long day, seemed to be becoming aggressive.
Once or twice there were reports that they were
abandoning the kopjes, but these were only the
[876]


The Battle of Magersfontein
movements of bodies of men being transferred
from point to point of Cronje's line of battle.
On the left of the Magersfontein hills he tried
to push forward a counter attack along the river
bank, but this was repulsed by the Guards and
part of the Ninth Brigade. At half-past five
the Boer guns, till then silent for hours, began
to heavily bombard the left and center of the
British line. As the first shells burst over the
Highlanders the brigade again gave way and fell
back as far as the field hospital. With troops
thus beaten a night attack was out of the ques-
tion.
The firing gradually died away as darkness
came on. The tired troops bivouacked where
they stood, and the doctors and ambulance
parties set to work to bring in the wounded.
The Boers had taken a few prisoners. In the
early morning, some of the Black Watch, the
leading regiment of Wauchope's brigade, had
dashed at the trenches, and those of them who
were not shot down were cut off from their com-
rades when the general retreat began, and were
taken prisoners. When the second advance
was made, an officer and about thirty Highland-
ers who had pressed well to the front found
themselves alone within close range of the Boer
trenches. They lay down and found some shel-
ter in a hollow of the ground, from which they
[37]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
was peace along the veldt by the Modder River.
The truce was perilously near being interrupted
when, on the first day, the naval brigade by
mistake opened fire. Some of our doctors were
talking with Cronje just outside his entrench-
ments. The Boer general took out his watch
and said that he would give them five minutes
to get to a place of safety in their own lines be-
fore he opened fire. “We made a record run,”
wrote one of the party, “but before we were
half way we met one of Lord Methuen's staff
officers riding across to explain to Commandant
Cronje that the guns had been fired by a mis-
take of the officer in command.” The Com-
mandant accepted the explanation with the re-
mark that he hoped it would be remembered
that mistakes might happen on both sides.
[882]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
zags, which made it impossible to really enfilade
them. As a further protection against enfilade
fire, ground was left unbroken every five or six
feet for a distance of a foot or two, and this un-
broken ground formed traverses, or solid walls,
across the trench, dividing it into short sections,
and if a shell dropped or burst in one of these,
it would only injure the two or three men in the
section, without hurting those on the right or
left.
The trenches were dug in a stiff, stony soil, and
the excavation was a little wider at the bottom
than at the top, so that men crouching in the
trench close to its side were very completely shel-
tered. Besides these trenches, the Boers dug
little caves and holes in both sides of the river
bank. A few of these were large enough to
stable horses in them. They had two British
officers prisoners with them, and they dug a cave
for them, where they could crouch during the
bombardment, and so be sheltered from the fire
of their own countrymen. After the battle on
the Sunday, Cronje buried his dead in the dry
bed of the river, but he could not thus dispose
of the large number of horses, draught oxen, and
mules that had been killed by the bombardment.
Some of these he succeeded in floating down the
river; some of the oxen were cut up and cooked
for food; but do what he would, there were hun-
[384]


The Capture of Cronje
dreds of carcasses rotting in the hot sun, fouling
the air and the water, and making the en-
trenched laager almost uninhabitable. The mar-
vel is that under such conditions the Boers held
out so long.
About four miles to the southeast De Wet’s
small force held a group of kopjes, and his pres-
ence there prevented Cronje from being com-
pletely surrounded during the first four days of
the attack upon him. De Wet was not strong
enough to bring him effectual succor, but was
in hopes of being reinforced — for the news had
spread through all the Boer armies that Cronje,
the besieger of Mafeking and Kimberley, and the
victor of Krugersdorp and Magersfontein, was
himself besieged, and in desperate straits, at
Paardeberg. From Colesberg, from Stormberg,
and from the camp before Ladysmith, the Free
Staters were trooping back into their own coun-
try to co-operate with De Wet in an attempt to
relieve him. The Boers who had besieged Kim-
berley and escaped to the northward had been
skirmishing with Methuen's outposts on the
railway between Kimberley and Fourteen
Streams. But a portion even of this force was
making its way into the Free State, part of it
across the veldt by Boshof, and part of it through
the Transvaal. This latter force marched up
the north bank of the Vaal to Klarksdorp, and
[885]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
was then sent on by railway to Johannesburg
and Kroonstad.
If the Boer leaders had anticipated that Cronje
would be able to hold the river-bed for ten days,
they might have arranged a combined movement
of a large force for his rescue; but they thought,
not unnaturally, that he might be forced to sur-
render at any moment, and in their eagerness to
assist him they came up in an ill-organized, frag-
mentary way, and these small parties, coming
into action in succession, were driven off or held
at bay by the British cavalry and mounted in-
fantry. Meanwhile the movement had for its
chief result the weakening of the resistance they
could oppose to Clements at Arundel, to Gatacre
near Stormberg, and to Buller on the Tugela.
They might have hoped for better results if they
had kept their army intact in Natal, and used
the forces that were actually moved northwards
to the Orange River for a march westward
against the railway and the convoy route on
which Lord Roberts depended for his supplies.
Beginning as soon as he reached the scene of
action, Lord Roberts proceeded to entrench the
positions held by his own troops, and to bring
up every gun' and howitzer he could dispose of
to bombard Cronje's laager, until at last he had
one hundred and twenty guns in position. Day
after day these poured a storm of shells into the
[386)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
battery, started after the Boers at a gallop, but
the horses soon tired, and then the guns unlim-
bered and shelled the Boer column.
The only result of this fire was to disable a
wagon which the enemy abandoned. It was
found to be a captured British Royal Engineer
wagon full of miscellaneous stores. After secur-
ing the disabled wagon the cavalry and guns
again moved forward, and five or six hundred
mounted men were seen to the right front. They
were thought at first to be Broadwood's brigade,
which was on that side, but suddenly a number
of them dismounted and began to advance, firing
rapidly with their rifles. The guns were or-
dered to come into action against them, but the
ground was encumbered with wire fences, and
some of the teams got mixed up with them, so
that there was an anxious moment of confusion.
But as soon as the battery opened fire the enemy
again retreated. Gordon's brigade now came
up and pursued for a while, capturing about
thirty prisoners and some wagons, but his horses
were so tired that it was impossible to go far.
So De Wet got away with his guns. Neverthe-
less, the morning's work had a substantial result,
for the kopjes which they had held for two days
were now clear of the Boers, and Cronje was
completely surrounded. French established his
headquarters at Koodoosrand Drift, east of
[388]


The Capture of Cronje
Paardeberg, and during the remaining days of
the siege his special work was to watch with
patrols the country to the east and south, while
two cavalry brigades and some batteries were
kept ready to turn out on the briefest notice, to
deal with any party of the enemy that might be
coming up to the rescue.
On the Wednesday morning there was a brief
truce, as Lord Roberts sent in a messenger with
a white flag to inform Cronje that he was willing
to allow the Boer women to come out of the
laager. He also offered to send him doctors and
a supply of medicine for the sick and wounded.
Cronje replied that he did not want any medical
assistance, and that the women would remain
in the laager. The bombardment then began
again. There was some skirmishing to the east-
ward between French and the Boer parties that
were in movement on the veldt, and about
seventy prisoners were taken. Altogether dur-
ing the investment the cavalry captured more
than four hundred of the enemy. A few more
prisoners were made every night by the infantry,
as in the dark some of the burghers would steal
out from Cronje's lines and surrender individ-
ually. A few others left the laager in the same
way under cover of darkness, but not to sur-
render. They were more determined men, who
recognized that the Boer resistance in the river-
[389)


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
bed must end before long, and who had resolved
to escape the surrender and continue the fight
under the Transvaal flag. They eluded the
sentries, stole in the darkness along some water-
course or ravine between the camps, and suc-
ceeded at last in joining one of the many parties
of Boers that were hovering round the lines.
Among those who thus escaped was the French
colonel, Villebois de Mareuil.
On the Thursday afternoon there was a heavy
thunderstorm, and the rain filled for a short time
a great part of the river-bed and flooded some of
the Boer trenches. At dawn on the Friday
morning De Wet made another attempt to suc-
cor the besieged. He had about fifteen hundred
men with him. He nearly succeeded in surpris-
ing the outposts on the south bank, and when
his first attack failed he held his own for some
hours on some low ridges near the Petrusburg
road. During the fighting Cronje tried to bring
his guns into action, but they were soon silenced
by the converging fire of Roberts's artillery. It
was not till the afternoon that De Wet retreated,
and about eighty of his men, who delayed their
retirement too long, were made prisoners by the
East Kent Regiment (“The Buffs”). Some of
the prisoners said they had come from Coles-
berg, others that they had just arrived from the
Boer laagers before Ladysmith.
[390)


The Capture of Cronje
When the second week of the siege began, the
engineers were put to work to the east as well as
to the west of the laager, their approaches having
the double purpose of preparing for the storming
of the Boer position and preventing the enemy
from escaping eastward along the great ravine
of the river-bed. The situation of the Boers was
becoming every day more difficult to maintain.
So much of their provisions had been destroyed
that supplies were running short. Enormous
quantities of ammunition had been blown up
by the bombardment; the water, and even the
air, in the ravine, were becoming pestilential,
and it was evident that De Wet’s efforts to open a
way for relief had ended in failure. Even be-
fore the end of the first week, several of the com-
mandants were anxious to surrender, but day
after day Cronje refused to listen to any talk of
negotiations, and his iron determination forced
the rest to continue the resistance.
On Monday, the 26th, there was a council of
war. The two commandants who stood next to
Cronje in rank — Wolmarans, who acted as his
chief of the staff, and De Roos, one of the Free
State leaders — both strongly urged that further
resistance had become impossible, and could only
end in useless death and suffering. De Roos
was too ill to leave the hole dug in the river bank,
in which he had been lying down for some days;
[391]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
but he set forth his views in a letter to the coun-
cil of war. Cronje at first maintained his “no
surrender” attitude, and protested that for his
part he preferred to die in the entrenchments
rather than become a prisoner. But he soon
saw that most of his officers would not support
him, and at last a compromise was reached.
The council decided that resistance should con-
tinue till next day. If the relief that had been so
long expected did not then arrive, the white flag
would be hoisted.
By a strange coincidence, the next day (Tues-
day, February 27) was the anniversary of Ma-
juba, and Lord Roberts had decided that an
attempt should be made that morning to storm
the Boer laager. The attack was to be made, in
the darkness before the dawn, along the river-
bed on the western side of the laager. On that
side, the trench in the bed of the river was now
only five hundred yards from the Boer defences.
The Canadian infantry of Smith-Dorrien's brig-
ade were to steal forward from the trench, and if
possible surprise the Boer defences and carry
them with the bayonet. The rest of the brigade
was placed in position partly on the banks on
each side, to protect the Canadians if they were
forced to retire, partly in the river-bed to follow
them up and support them if the first rush suc-
ceeded. The orders to the Canadians were
[392]


The Capture of Cronje
that if the surprise failed and the Boers opened
fire, they were at once to throw themselves on
their faces and then slip back into the trench.
It was a bright starlit night. The secret of
the coming attempt had been so well kept that
there was general surprise, even in the British
lines, when, an hour before dawn, a heavy rifle
fire burst out along the river on the west side of
the laager, and the rumor spread that the Boers
were making a desperate sortie and trying to cut
their way out in the darkness. What had really
happened was this: the Canadians, the First
French Company again leading, had stolen
silently forward until they were about fifty yards
from the nearest Boer trench. Then the enemy
became aware of their danger, and suddenly the
trench in front of the Canadians blazed with
Mauser flashes, and the flying bullets swept the
ravine, at this point only one hundred and fifty
yards wide.
Some officers and several men of the Cana-
dians fell, but the rest were perfectly steady and
obeyed their orders. It was no longer possible
to rush the trench, so they lay down, and with-
out firing a shot began to work their way back-
ward along the ravine. The Shropshire Regi-
ment, which had moved forward along the high
bank of the river on their flank, protected their
retreat by firing into the Boer trench, and it had
[893]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
also exchanged fire with some Boers in its own
front. After a few minutes the heavy firing
ceased, but for some time after occasional shots
were fired from various parts of the Boer lines,
as the enemy, now thoroughly on the alert,
imagined they saw signs of an attack upon them
in the dark. As the twilight began this irregular
firing ceased, and as the sun rose all was quiet
along the lines. For the first time for many
days the British guns remained silent, while it
was seen that a white flag had just been hoisted
on a small kopje near the drift and within the
Boer lines.
Cheer after cheer was raised by the British at
this sign of surrender, and men reminded each
other that it was Majuba Day. But it was a
few hours yet ere the surrender was completed.
Cronje was making a last despairing attempt to
obtain terms. Commandant Wolmarans and
another Boer officer rode out with a white flag
to Lord Roberts's headquarters. It was no-
ticed that both of their horses were slightly
wounded, probably by shrapnel bullets during
the investment. The riders looked haggard and
worn, as they well might be. They suggested
that Cronje's army had by its honorable resist-
ance deserved to be given lenient terms, and they
asked that the burghers should be allowed to
depart to their homes. Lord Roberts, while
[894]


The Capture of Cronje
expressing his admiration for the way in which
the Boers had kept their flag flying for so many
days, told Wolmarans that the surrender must
be unconditional, and that Cronje and his army
must become prisoners of war. The officers
rode back to the laager with this message, and
at seven o'clock Cronje himself rode out with
Wolmarans. Lord Roberts received him with
chivalrous courtsey. An officer rode into the
headquarters' camp with the news that the Boer
general was coming, and Roberts at once ordered
that on his arrival the headquarters' guard
should turn out and present arms to the defeated
Boer leader. As he dismounted, Roberts walked
forward to meet him, shook hands with him,
and warmly congratulated him on the splendid
defence that he had made. Cronje asked that
he should be allowed to take with him, wherever
he was sent, his wife, who was just then coming
from the laager in a small cart, his grandson, his
secretary, and one of his staff officers. Lord
Roberts told him that his request would be
granted, and that he would be sent to Cape Town
escorted by a British general officer to insure
that he should be treated with due respect upon
the way.
The Boers had already begun streaming out
of the laager in crowds and laying down their
arms. It was with surprise that the British dis-
[895.]


Famous Battles of the XIXTH Century
covered that the force which had so long held
its own against them was a little over four thou-
sand strong. Two thousand seven hundred
were Transvaalers; the rest men of the Free
State. Their losses had been less than three
hundred, and they had nearly one hundred
severely wounded among them, and many sick.
The men were of all ages, from gray-bearded
veterans who had fought against the Zulus in the
early days of the republics, to young boys who
seemed hardly big enough to handle a rifle. All
looked haggard and worn, and very many were
evidently ill. They had thrown away their
bandoliers with their rifles, and as they wore no
uniform, and moved in no military formation,
they looked more like a crowd of ragged men out
of work than soldiers who had fought through a
campaign.
It must be said, to the honor of the British,
that as soon as the Boers came out among them,
they thought less of their success and of “Ma-
juba Day” than of succoring the prisoners. The
British were themselves on half-rations, but on
all sides they were seen sharing their biscuits
with the prisoners, giving them water from their
bottles, and offering them tobacco from their
pouches.
Cronje and his companions were sent off dur-
ing the morning en route for the railway to Cape
[896]


The Capture of Cronje
Town, under the escort of the Mounted Infantry
of the C.I.V., and accompanied by Lord Rob-
erts's old comrade of the Afghan war, General
Pretyman. There were very few of the foreign
officers among the prisoners, and the only one
of importance was Colonel Albrecht, the German
commander of the Free State Artillery. Four
of his Krupp guns were found in the laager, but
their sights, breech-blocks, and elevating screws
had been taken out and buried somewhere be-
fore the surrender. -
The Boer prisoners were sent down in parties
to Cape Town, where a number of them were
soon ill with enteric fever, the result of drinking
the infected water at Paardeberg. As the British
troops had had to use the water of the Modder
during the siege, the same disease soon showed
itself in many of their regiments. About fifteen
hundred British had been killed and wounded
during the operations, mostly in Kitchener's
battle, and the subsequent loss, by disease
contracted during the same period, was even
greater. On the day of the surrender, the vic-
torious army was almost as short of supplies as
Cronje's force, and after the victory Lord Rob-
erts halted his army for some days to give the
men a rest, obtain some more horses for the cav-
alry, and accumulate a much-needed reserve of
forage, provisions, and ammunition.
[897]


NOTES
The following brief résumé of the Wars from 1875 to 1900,
their causes and results, will give an idea of the historic setting, so
to speak, of the famous battles described in this volume. A num-
ber of small expeditions in Africa and India, and much revolu-
tionary fighting in South America, are not included in the list.
1875–Asia.-September 4 and 21: Russians invade Khokand
and defeat the Khan's troops. War begun between Dutch
in Sumatra and Sultan of Achim — continues till 1879.
AFRICA, ABYssinia.-October: Egyptian expedition defeated.
1876—SERVIAN WAR.—Servia and Montenegro, assisted by
Russia, make war on Turkey. July 1: War begins. July
2 and 3: Indecisive actions at Zaitschar. July 6: Turkish
victory at Novi-bazaar. July 28: Montenegrins defeat
Turks at Urbitza. August 5 and 7: Turkish victories
at Gurgusovatz. August–October: Servians holding en-
trenched camp at Alexinatz, receiving reinforcements and
supplies from abroad, and trying to hold on till they are
strong enough to assume offensive, or till Russia moves;
continual fighting round Alexinatz, much of it mere skir-
mishing, ending with (October 31) Battle of Alexinatz;
Russo-Servian army defeated; armistice follows.
CENTRAL Asia-Battle of Assake; decisive Russian victory
in Khokand.
AMERICA.—June: Battle of the Little Big Horn; destruction
of Custer's force by Indians.
[399]


Notes
1879–April 2: Battle of Futtehabad. October 6: Battle of
Charasiab. December : Fighting about Cabul.
ZULU WAR.—January 22: British force destroyed at Insandhl-
wana; defence of Rorke's Drift. July 4: Decisive defeat
of Zulus at Ulundi.
SouTH AMERICA.—Chili declares war against Peru and Bolivia.
October 8: Capture of Peruvian ram Huascar by the Chil-
ians. November 21: Battle of Dolores.
1880—AFGHAN WAR (continued).-April 19: Stewart's victory
at Ahmed Khel. July 27: Ayub Khan defeats Burrows at
Maiwand. September 1: Roberts completely defeats Ayub
near Cabul.
1881—TRANsvaAL WAR.—January 28: Battle of Laing's Nek;
February 8: Ingogo River; February 26: Majuba Hill;
British defeated by Boers. -
CENTRAL Asia.-January 24: Turkoman stronghold of Geok
Tepe taken by Russians under Skobeleff.
SouTH AMERICA.—War between Chili and Peru continued.
January 17: Battle of Miraflores; Peruvians defeated. June
21: Lima taken by Chilians; end of war.
North AFRICA.—French occupy Tunis; fighting at Sfax.
1882—EGYPTIAN WAR.—July 11: Bombardment of Alexandria.
August 24–25: Fighting at Tel-el-Mahuta and Masameh.
August 28 and September 9: Kassassin. September 13:
Battle of Tel-el-Kebir; defeat of Arabi by Wolseley.
1883—CAMPAIGNs AGAINST THE MAHDISTs.-November 3–5:
Battle of Kashgal; Egyptian Army under Hicks destroyed.
Asia.-French expedition to Tonkin; Admiral Courbet block-
ades the coast and forces Court of Hué to accept French
protectorate. December 11–16: Capture of Son-tai.
1884–AFRICA.—Mahdist War.—February 4: First Battle of
Teb; Baker's Egyptian army destroyed. February 29:
Second Battle of Teb; and March 13: Battle of Tamai;
Soudanese under Osman Digna defeated by British under
[401]


Notes
Graham; Gordon goes up to Khartoum, where he is be-
sieged by Mahdists during latter part of year; rescue expedi-
tion under Wolseley is sent up the Nile. September: Ad-
vance begins. November: Second Cataract passed. De-
cember: Desert Column under Stewart organized to march
across desert to Metemneh.
FRENch WAR witH CHINA.—August 24: French fleet destroys
Chinese flotilla, and bombards arsenal at Foochow. 1884–
5: French occupy Formosa.
1885–AFRICA.—MAHDIST WAR (Nile Expedition continued).-
January 17: Battle of Abu-Klea; Desert Column defeats
Mahdists. January 19: Battle of Gubat; Mahdist defeat.
January 26: Mahdists take Khartoum; Gordon killed.
January 28: Wilson with steamers arrives in sight of Khar-
toum; too late. February 10: Battle of Kerbekan; River
Column defeats Mahdists; Earle killed. Second Expedi-
tion to Suakim. March 20: Battle of Hasheen. March
22: Battle of Tofrek; Mahdist defeats.
CENTRAL Asia.-March 30: Russians attack and defeat Af-
ghan force at Ak Tapa.
AMERICA.—CANADA.—SEconD REvolt of RIEL.—Canadians
defeat rebels at Fish Creek (April 24), Battleford (May 3),
and Batoche (May 9).
Asia.-THIRD BURMESE WAR.—October: Ultimatum to King
Theebaw. November 15: British force under Prendergast
crosses Burmese frontier and ascends the Irrawaddy. No-
vember 28: Mandalay taken; Burmah annexed. (Coun-
try not completely pacified for two years, during which there
is desultory fighting with the Dacoits.)
SERVo-BULGARIAN WAR–November 14: Servian troops cross
Bulgarian frontier. November 17, 18, 19: Bulgarians de-
feat Servians in three-days' battle at Slivnitza. November
22: Bulgarians storm Dragoman Pass. November 24:
They defeat Servians at Zaribrod, and (November 26)
[402]


Notes
enter Servia. November 27: they take Pirot. November 28:
Armistice.
1887—AFRICA.—Battle of Dogali; Italian force destroyed by
Abyssinians.
1888—AFRICA.—December 20: Mahdists defeated near Suakim
by Anglo-Egyptian force under Grenfell.
1889—AFRICA.—Soudan.-July 2: Battle of Arguin; Wode-
house defeats Mahdists. August 3: Battle of Toski; Gren-
fell defeats Mahdists.
AFRICA (EAST).-October 27: Storming of Witu, near Zanzibar.
1891—AFRICA.—February 19: Battle of Tokar; Mahdists under
Osman Digna defeated.
SouTH AMERICA.—Crvil WAR IN CHILI.—August 28: Battle
of Placilla; the dictator Balmaceda defeated.
INDIA.—December: Hunza-Nagar expedition; storming of
the Nilt Forts.
1892—AFRICA.—January: Italians defeat Mahdists at Agordat
in the Soudan.
FRENCH ExPEDITION To DAHOMEY.—November.
1898—AFRICA.—French occupy Timbuctoo.
BRITISH INvAsion of MATABELELAND.
Asia.-FRENCH DisPUTE witH SLAM.–July 13: French gun-
boats force entrance of the Menam River.
1894–5—WAR BETweBN CHINA AND JAPAN.—August: War
declared. September 16: Battle of Ping-yang (Corea); Chi-
nese defeat. September 18: Naval Battle of the Yalu River.
November 21: Japanese take Port Arthur.
1895–February 14: Japanese take Wei-hai-wei.
BRITISH ExPEDITION to ChrtRAL.-April 3: Storming of the
Malakhand Pass.
INsuRRECTION IN CUBA begins on February 24.
FRENCH INvAsion of MADAGAscAR.—September.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN IN ABYssINLA.
1896—THE TRANsvAAL.—Jameson's raid. January 1 and 2.
[403?


GENERAL INDEX
Note. The names of authors of the articles are printed in capitals,
the titles of the articles in italics, and the subject entries in ordinary
type.
A
t
Bull Run -----------------
Attack on Queenston Heights,
M 's Raid ............
Red 's Last Victory, The
Storming of Ogdensburg. The
Story of Laura Secord, The.
d
Abercr in Egypt .........
Aboukir, Bay of
Klea ..................
Abu-Kru -------------------
Aculco, Battle of ............
Admiral Dewey and the Battle of
anila....
- Capitulation of............
Alma, Battle of the...........
- The River................
Alumbagh, The..............
Ameers, Surrender of the.....
Amoaful ... ----------------
Ana, Santa -----------------
Anecdotes of Sherman's March
Angostura, or Buena Vista....
Anº, Col., in the Trans-
i
:
. Page
31
13
Grant at ..
194
192
Wol
Arabi Pasha................. 4
— His Power Broken......... 4
Arickaree Fort, Fight of the... 3
Army, Destruction of a British 2
- y Retribution, The........ 2
— of the Potomac, The....... 3
— of hine, The ......... 3
Ashantis, Fighting with ...... 3
Atlanta Campaign, The ...... 3
- in Flames ................ 3.
-The Evacuation of......... 3
Athens, Demonstrations in .... 4
aulº on Queenston Heights, 1
ATTERIDGE A. HILLIARD
Admiral Dewey and the Bat-
tle of Manila............ 4
Battle of Domokos, The.... 4
Battle of Magersfontein, The 4
Battle of º Yang, The... 4
Capture of Cronje, The.... 4
Decisive Battle of the Franco- 3
4
With Kitchener in the Soudan 4
With Roosevelt on San Juan
Hill.................... 4
Auckland, Lord, and Dost Ma-
homed......-----------. 2
Augerau, General ........... 1.
Austerlitz, Napoleon at ....... 1.
Austria and Prussia at Sadowa 3
Austrians and Russians at Aus-
terlitz ------------------ 1.
Ayacucho, Battle at .......... 2
Ayoub Khan (see Maiwand and
Kandahar) ------------- 4
Ayoub's Army Routed ....... 4
B
Badajoz, Siege and Fall of.... 1
Baird, Smith, Engineer at Delhi 2
Balaclava --- ;
— The Battle of
- The Highland
. Page
148
167





[405]


General Indea:
Wol.
Baltimore, The, at Manila Bay 4
Bandoola, Burmese General ... 2
Baptism of Fire, a Prince's.... 3
Barbary States War. The ..... 1
Barksdale, Gen., at Fredericks-
burg ------- ------------ 3
Bastion, No. 1 .............. 2
Bates', General, Brigade ..... 4
“Bººk. §: the Clouds,” 3
attanooga. ........
- of the Alma........ ---- 2
- : #: #. --- ;
-0. gwater, -- ----
- of Domokos, The ... ---- 4
- of Inkerman, The....... --- 2
- of Magersfontein, The...... 4
- of Ligny, The......... ---- 1
- of Mars-la-Tour, The ...... 3
- of Ping Yang, The ....... ... 4
- of Waterloo, The..... 1
Battlefield, A Revisited 3
“Battle-thinker,” Moltke, the. 3
Battye, Lt., Quintin......... ... 2
Bavarians and Tyrolese, The... 1
"Bayard of India,” The ..... 2
Bazaine, Marshal........... ... 3
Bazeilles, The Burning of .... 3
Beauregard, Gen., and Fort
Sumter................. 3
- Gen. and Shiloh.. 3.
Beecher, Lt. F. H. ........... 3
Belgian War of Independence .. 2
Bell, Col., at Santiago........ 4
Bellairs, Col., in Transvaal ... 4
Bensdek, Austrian General at
Sadowa ................ 3
Benteen, Capt. 4
Beresford, Lord Charles
andria 4
Bernadotte, General 1
- at Iéna................ ... 1
Bezuidenhuit and Taxation in
the Transvaal ........... 4
Bººl Interest in this
ork ------------------ 4
Bismarck's policy of “Blood and
ron” ........... ------- 3
- 1
1
f 3
Bloodthirstiness of Ashantis... 3
Bloody Knife, Chief..... ----- 4
Blücher at Lign ---- 1
er War of 1 4
Bolivar, Gen......... 2
Bollini, Gen................. 4
B dment of Alexandria, 4
Boston, The, at Manila Bay... 4
Bourbaki, General ........... 3
Bowie, Jas., at the Alamo..... 2
“Bowie Knife,” Inventor of the 2
Boyd, BRIG. GEN. J. P. U. S.
The Fight at Chrystler's Farm 1
"Brabançonne,” The ........ 2
351
47
BRACKENRIDGE, H.M.
Qhesapeake and Shannon ...
Fight between the Constitu-
B º:and the $.” ---
, Capt., at Buena Vista..
*ś and Gen. Morgan....
- and Shiloh........... --
Brave Deed by a Girl .
Bravo, General
Brent, Spencer, -
Bridgwater, Battle of ...
Brindle, Father .............
Brock, Death of General .....
Bronkhorst Spruit...........
Brown, General, at Niagara...
- Sir George, at Inkerman...
Brulé, Sioux Indian Chief ....
Buell, General, and Shiloh,
Buena Vista ..... -------
Buford Seizes ºws
Bull Run, Battle of ..........
Burgoyne, Sir John, on the Se-
bastopol Forts ..........
Burke, Martin ...... --------
Burleigh, Mr. Bennett .......
Burnaby, Col. Fred, Death of .
#: Fi º: in Th -
of Moscow, ine.
Bush, #. Death of........
BUTLER, A. J.
A Famous Fight for Freedom
Byram, Lt., at tiago-------
Čaldwell, Major at Åråpuitepec
Calf * &. The Farmer
of ---------------------
Cº. of the Carolinas, The
- of New Orleans...........
— of the Wilderness, The.....
Campbell, Sir Colin, at Bala-
clava
da, Invasion of (See
The Attack on Queenston
Heights; The Story of Laura
Secord
)
Canadians, The, in South Africa
Candahar and Maiwand .....
Canrobert, Gen., at Inkerman.
Canrobert, Marshal..........
Cape Coast, The......
Capitulation of Paris
Capron, Capt., Alwin, at San-
Igan,
Carlist War
V
ol
:
;
i
i
. Page

















[406]


General Indez
Carnarvon, Lord.............
Carolinas, Campaign of the ...
cº, Col., at Arickaree
Cawnpore, surrender of ......
Cetewayo, The Zulu King ....
Chaffee, Gen., at Santiago ....
Champlain, S. de, and the Iro-
§º: º:
on time t Brigade ..
Hº: Prince Fred'k, at Sa-
owa ------------------
Charleston Evacuated
erol -----------
Charlier, : of .-----------
3. t. #: Lord ...
emulpo, e Japanese at ..
heraw Captured ...........
hesapeake and Shannon, The
heyenne, Indian Chief
Chrystler's Farm, * Fight at
:
Civil War, The ..............
31, 45, 54, 76, 93, 11
Clarke and McArthur's "Life of
Nelson” cited ...........
Cochrane, Sir A. ------------
Codrington, Gen., at Inkerman
Coffee, General .............
Collapse of the Confederacy, The
Colley, Sir G. Pomeroy, in South
frica ------------------
Collingwood, Admiral ---
Colombi º: ----------
— Throws off Spanish Yoke...
compº of the Army in the
Co ivil Yº, --------------
mrades in Opposing Ranks.
Concord, The, at Manila Bay..
Condor, Exploit of the ........
Confederacy, Collapse of the . .
Conquest of Scinde by Sir C.
apier -----------------
Constitution and Guerrière, The
— The, at Tripoli
Coomassie ----------------- -
Copenhagen, Nelson at .......
Cordova, Gen....... -------- -
Corregidor Island
Corse, Gen., at Allatoona .....
Corunna, The Rºtreat of......
Crazy Horse --
Crete, Insurrecticr in
Crimean War. The ..... -----
Crockett, Davy..............
Crook's Defeat by Indians....
Vol. Page
4 118
3 145
3 237
2 297
4 334
4 3.19
2 316
4 52
117
4 351
4 13
2 148
4 53
2 226
3 203
3 170
1 422
2 55
4 52
4 208
3 170
1 345
3 226
1 351
2 357
4 7
208, *::
1, 145.171
1 31
1 366
2 238
1 386
3 171
4 124
1 109
3 170
2 33
3 19
3 17
4 317
4 158
3 171
2 111
1 295
1 69
3 351
1 13
2 40
4 316
3 - 141
1 151
4 17
4 246
2 6
163, 182
2 79
4 18
Crow Indians
Crown Prince of Germany, The
Cuban War, The .....--------
Cuidad Roderigo, Siege and
Fall of
Cumberland, Army of the ....
Custer, Gen., and his Men start
for the Wilderness
– on the Bad Lands.....
Custer's Disappearance
The “ i; out” of the
Philadelphia
D
Daiguiri Bombarded
Danish War ............
—of 1864........ * ----------
Dannenberg, Russian General,
at Balaclava... -----------
Davis, President, receives Gen.
Lee's Message in Church .
Davis, Richard Harding, at San-
- at
Death of Sir John Moore..
Death of Nelson
Decatur, S., Life of
— on The Intrepid ---------.
Decisive Battle of the Franco-
German War, The
Delhi-----------------------
“Deliverer, The” (Gen. Bol-
ivar) -------------------
DeMareuil. Colonel, Villebors.
D'Erlon's Corps at Ligny-----
De Roos, Gen. -------- --
Dervishes, Fighting ---------.
Destruction ºfa British Army..
Detroit, The, at Santiago .....
De Wet, General.......
Dewey, Admiral Geo. .
Dewey Stoddard
Remember the Alamo......
Dickinson, Lt., at Santiago ...
Dickinson's Widow at the Alamo
“Diehards, The”............
Dolgorouki, Prince, and Napo-
“Don’t Give up the Ship”
Dost Mahomed
Donay, Gen.
Downfall of an Empire, The ..
Drummond, Gen., at Niagara .
Drunkenness of British Soldiers
Durnford, Colonel, called to
Isandhlwana ............
Dutch, The, and the Belgians.
- East India Company, The..
:
i
:
115











[407]


General Indea:
Wol.
French and English in Alliance
– Empire a Republic
Frere, Sir Bartle,
against Zulus
Frossard, Gen. ..............
Futtehpore, The Fight at
Garcia's Cubans
ighting
Gladstone on the Transvaal...
“Gle y Fencibles,” The ..
Glyn, 8. in Zululand
Godfrey, Lieut. -------------
Godfrey's, Captain, Premoni-
tions about Custer ------.
Gordon, General, The Tragedy
of Khartoum
—The Death of
— Extracts from Diaries
- Story of -----------------
- Work in the Soudan.......
Grant, Gen., U.S.-----------
- How he Saved the Union...
- and Sherman Compared....
Gravelotte, at
Gravina, Admiral ...........
“Great Trek,” of 1815, The ..
“Great Silent One,” Moltke,
Jured - - - -
Griffiths, Maj. A
GRIFFITHs, MA.jor ARTHUR
The Battle of the Alma-...--
Battle of Balaclava, The....
Battle of Inkerman, The....
Fall of Vicksburg, The.....
Gettysburg ---------------
Siege of Sebastopol, The....
;
Storming of Kars, The....... 4
Griffin, Gen., Before Peters
Grimes, Capt., at Santiago....
Grover, Sharp ..............
Grover, Abner T. ..
Guard, the French at Waterloo
Gubbins, the Commissioner at
Lucknow --------------.
Guerrière and Constitution, The
Half-Yellow-Face............
Hall, Capt., of the Constitution
Halleck, Gen. ...............
Hamley, Gent on the March to
Tel-el Kebir ............
i
Vol. Page
E
Earle, General, in the Soudan. 4 186
Easton, General, receives Sher-
man's famous Instructions 3 143
Ecuador Throws off Spanish
Bºº... i ;
I cromby in...
#8. ---------- .------... 4 347
Ellenborough, Lord, in India... 2 107
Eloquence of Indian Warriors. 1 341
El Pozo.................... 4 347
Emeute on Brussels Streets.... 2 48
Empire, Germanic Confedera-
tion an ---------------- 3 329
—The Downfall of an ....... 3 301
Empress of India, Victoria.... 4 80
“England Expects,” etc. ..... 1 104
England's Interests in E ... 4 167
English and French in Alliance 2 167
Ethnike Hetaireia, The ....... 4 246
Ewell, Gen., at Gettysburg. ... 3 85
Excesses of Soldiers at Delhi... 2 302
Failly, General .............. 3 246
Fall of Chapultepec, The. 2 148
– of Vicksburg, The . . . . . . . . 3 93
Famous Fight for Freedom, A. 1 165
Farmer of Calf-Killer Creek,
The .------------------- 3 63
Fayetteville Captured.. 3 170
erry, M. Jules ------------- 3 320
Fight of the Arickaree Fork, The 3 218
— at Chrystler’s Farm, ... 1 351
– between the Chesapeake and
the Shannon ............ 1 345
Fighting with Ashantis at Am-
oaful and Coomassie...... 3 351
-with Savages in Burma..... 2 13
Fire, A Prince's Baptism of... 3 239
Fish, Sergt. Hamilton, Death of 4 341
Forbach .......... ---------- 3 240
For BEs, ARCHIBALD
The Collapse of the Confed-
eracy -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 171
A Prince's Baptism of Fire... 3 239
Battle of Ligny, The....... 1 404
Boer War of $1. The ..... 4 115
Destruction of a British Reg-
iment, The ------------- 2 88
Maiwand and Candahar.
The second Afghan War... 4 80
A Scene at Mars-la-Tour... 3 269
Sir C. Napier's Conquest of
Scinde ................. 2 111
Sherman's Atlanta Campaign 3 111
- March to the Sea 3 145
Forsyth, Col. G. A. -::.. 3 218
Fortifying Rorke’s Drift - 4 61
Franco-Prussian War ........ 3 239
246, 279, 301, 330
Frederick, King of Prussia (See
Napoleon at Iéna).......
{...ºf -------------- 3 45
edom, A Famous Fight for 1 165
Freiligrath's “Trumpeter of
-la-Tour".......... 264
Page
167
329
178
180





[408]


General Indez
Wol.
Napoleon and the Tyrolese....
Napoleon at Austerlitz
— at Iena
- at Ligny ....::...: ........
—Determines to Crush England
-in Spain.-----------------
– III and Bismarck
— Surrender of
Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow
Natal Mounted Police, The...
Nº. Bay, British Fleet at...
Nelson at Copenhagen ...
– Trafalgar
Death
- at Ligny ...
— at Waterloo -
Niagara Falls, Battle of.......
Nicholson, Brigadier at Delhi.
Night Attack on Kars, The...
Nightingale, Florence.........
Nodzu, General, in Korea ....
Nott in the First Afghan War.
O
O'Brien, Capt., at Buena Vista
Ogallalah, Indian Chief
3. The Storming of
Ohio, Army of the ...........
Ohrwalder, Father ...........
Olympia, The, at Manila Bay.
Omdurman
f
Oratory of Indian Warriors...
O'SHEA, John Augustus
Outram, º -------------
– and the Relief of Lucknow.
P
Paget, Lord Edward .........
Pakenham, Sir E., at New Or-
leans...................
Palo Alto, Battle at ..........
Paris Besieged and the Last
Sortie
-Capitulation of ...........
The Last Sortie from......
Parker, Admiral Sir Hyde.....
PARRY, D. H.
Death of Sir John Moore and
337
15
151
126
Vol. Page
Napoleon's Retreat from
Moscow ................ 1 258
Patterson, Gen. ............. 3 16
Pelham, Major, at Fredericks-
burg ------------------- 3 50
Pemberton, Gen., at Vicksburg 3 102
PEMBERton, MAx
The Bombardment of Alex-
andria 4 146
Peninsular War .. 1 445-7
—With Wellington in the..... 1 102
Pennefather, Col., in India ... 2 121
- at Inkerman.............. 2 247
Perez, General, at Chapultepec 2 161
Petersburg, The Attack on.... 3 172
- Evacuation of ............ 3 177
Petrel, The, at Manila Bay.... 4 317
Pharsala, Battle of .......... 4 251
Philadelphia, “Cutting out” of
the -------------------- 1 55
Pickett, Gen. Before Petersburg 3 173
Pietermaritzburg ............ 4 53
Pillow ..................... 2 149
Ping-Yang, The Battle of ..... 4 208
Pre # Commodore at Tripoli 1 56
Pretorius, Triumvir .......... 4 120
Prince's Baptism of Fire, A... 3 239
Prince Imperial of France, The : 2é
Privations in Paris Besieged... 3 331
Prussia and Austria at Sadowa 3 199
- King of, at Iéna .......... 1 126
Prussians, The, at Ligny ..... 1 407
Polk, Gen., and Shiloh ....... 3 33
Pollock, Gen., in the First
Afghan War 2 110
ontiac --------- 1 333
Port Arthur, 1894 4 225
– The Country around ...... 4 226
Porter, Admiral, at Wicksburg. 3 107
Potomac, Army of the ........ 3 112
uatre Bras----------------- 1 422
uirk's Scouts.... 3. 58
Quitman, General 2 149
“Queen of England's Own" .. 3 272
Queenston Heights ......... . 1 301
R
Raglan, Lord, in the Crimea... 2 168
-at Inkerman ............. 2 239
Raleigh, The, at Manila Bay... 4 317
Rangoon.------------------. 2 14
Red Jacket, Indian Orator.... 4 15
Red Man's Last Victory, The... 4 13
“Red Prince,” The 3 247
- at Sadowa....... 3 203
Redan, The ..... 2 186
Ree Indians ................ 4 18
Regnault, Henri, Painter, The
of ............--- 3 347
Relief of Lucknow, The. 2 332
-- the Alamo” ...... 2 71
“Remember the Maine” ..... 4 321












[411]


General Indez
Vol.
Remnant of an Army, The....
Réno, Major................
Republic, French Empire, A --
Retreat from Moscow, The...
Reynolds, Surgeon...........
Riall, Maj. Gen., at Niagara..
Ripley, Gen., at Niagara
RIPLEy, R. S.
The Fall of Chapultepec.;..;
Roberts, Sir Frederick, at Cabul
- Leaves Candahar..........
- Lord, on the Vaal ........
- Col. Tom, and his
ported "-------------
Robertson, W. B.
Breaking the Spanish Power
in South America........
“Roman Nose,” Chief ..
Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
—to the Bl
Rorke's Drift................
Rostopchin, Governor, of Mos-
cow --------------------
**ś and Ready” Taylor..
– Riders, The Southern......
Ruggles, Gen., and Shiloh
Ruperts' Land
Russell, HERBERT
With Nelson at Copenhagen
Ruº Clarke, Life of Nelson
cit
Russia Attacks Kars
Russo-Austrian Army at Auster-
t” --------------------
—Swedish War --
—Turkish War, The.........
S
Saarbruck ..................
ru
Sacking of Alexandria, The...
Sadowa, or Könni tz
St Arnaud, M , i
Crimea.................
St. Privat...
Salamanca........---------.
San Juan Hill, Roosevelt on ..
- Sebastian, Capture of ......
Sandbag Battery, The ........
Sand River Convention, The ..
jº. ” Hofer,
y Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Santa Ana (A. L. de Santa Ana)
Savannah Evacuated
Savages, Fighting with, in Bur-
ma. ---------------------
—in Warfare (see Fighting with
Ashantis) ...............
Scarlett, Gen., at Balaclava...
Schaerbeck, Fray at .........
Schleswig-Holstein and Bis-
:
Scotchmen in the War of 1812
Scott, Sir W. ........... -----
Scott, Sir Walter
The Battle of Waterloo.....
Scott, General, at Chapultepec
Scouting
Scudamore Boys, The ....
Scully's Heroic Deed
ea, Sherman's March to the,
Sebastopol Harbor
- The Siege of ....... ------
Secord, Laura --------.......
Sedan, The Capitulation of...
- The Town of ------.......
Sedgwick, Gen., at Gettysburg
dria .............
— Major, at Chapulte -
shº, General w - * -----
Shannon and Chesa
Shawnee War Chief
tone, Sir T. ............
nnexes the Transvaal to
Britain -----------------
Shere Mohammed
Sheridan before Petersburg ...
– General, at Sedan.........
- Confidence in Forsyth......
Sheridan's Campaign against
the Sioux -...----------.
Sherman and Grant Compared
– Assumes Command
– on Bull Run .............
—his March to the Sea and
through the Carolinas.....
Sherman's Atlanta Campaign .
“– Bummers” .............
- Campaign of the Carolinas.
— March to the Sea
Shiloh ................. -
Siboney, Bay of..............
Sickles, Gen., at Gettysburg...
Siege of Sebastopol, The
Signals Ignored by Nelso
Sioux Indians, The...........
Sitting Bull ...….........
— Chief of the Sioux
Slocum, Gen., at Gettysburg ..
—Maj. Gen., starts for the Sea
Smith, Capt., at the Alamo...
– Gen. C. F., and Shiloh....
- Sir Sidney................
Soimonoff, Russian General at
Inkerman ..............
Soudan, Gordon's Work in the
- War in the ...............
– With Kitchener in the .
Soult, General .
– at Iéna
She
;
marck ------------ -----
Schofield, Gen. ......
Scinde, Conquest of
Scotch, The, at Tel-el-Kebir. .
;














[412]


General Indea:
Willoughby, Lt., at Delhi.....
With Kitz in the Soudan.
— Roosevelt on San Juan Hill
Wolmarans, Gen.............
Wolseley, Sir Garnet, in Ashan-
tland ------------------
-in the Transvaal ..........
Wolseley's, Sir Garnet, Egyp-
tian Campaign...........
Wood, Col., at Santiago ......
Worth, The Crown Ce at.
Vol. Page Vol. Page
; Y
200 Yamagata, Marshal.......... 4 225
4 32 “You may fire when you are
2 267 are ready, Gridley” ...... 4 321
4 263 || “. Young B.º. The,” Extract
4 330 from ................... 1 192
4 391 Young, General, at Santiago .. 4 336
3 353
4 118 Z
Zelo o Polemos!.............. 4 246
4 168 Zouaves, The, in the Crimea ... 2 257
4 336 l Zulu War .................. 4 7
[414]








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