ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE 

DURING THE FIRST WAR OF RELIGION: 

1561 - 1563 

by 

DANIEL RICHARD BIRCH 

B.R.E., Northwest B a p t i s t T h e o l o g i c a l C o l l e g e , i960 
B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1963 

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF 

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 

MASTER OF ARTS 

i n the 

Department of H i s t o r y 

We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming 
to the r e q u i r e d standard 

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 

March, 1968 



In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an 

advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t the 

L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r 

agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y 

p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n -

t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r 

f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . 

Department o f H i s t o r y  

The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 
Vancouver 8, Canada 

Date M a r c h 2 1 , 1968 



- ABSTRACT -

The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s was to i n v e s t i g a t e the p r i n c i p a l 

c h a l l e n g e s t o r o y a l a u t h o r i t y and the means by which r o y a l 

a u t h o r i t y was maintained i n France d u r i n g the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n 

(1561-1563). The l a t t e r h a l f of the s i x t e e n t h century was a 

c r i t i c a l p e r i o d f o r the French monarchy. Great noble f a m i l i e s 

attempted t o r e - e s t a b l i s h t h e i r f e u d a l power at the expense of 

the crown. F r a n c i s I I and C h a r l e s IX, kings who were merely boys, 

succeeded s t r o n g monarchs on the throne. The kingdom was im-

p o v e r i s h e d by f o r e i g n wars and overrun by veteran s o l d i e r s , i l l -

absorbed i n t o c i v i l l i f e . C a l v i n i s m spread r a p i d l y and became not 

only a r e l i g i o u s but a p o l i t i c a l movement drawing i d e o l o g i c a l and 

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l support from Geneva. The powerful Hapsburg 

monarch, P h i l i p I I , watched a f f a i r s i n France with a s u s p i c i o u s 

eye and f r e q u e n t l y manipulated matters a f f e c t i n g the French c o u r t . 

Not only were h i s border t e r r i t o r i e s i n the Pyrenees threatened 

but the Spanish k i n g r i g h t l y f e a r e d t h a t r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i n 

France would have r e p e r c u s s i o n s i n h i s r i c h low country t e r r i t o r i e s . 

The p r o v i n c e of Guyenne was chosen as a s e t t i n g f o r t h i s study 

because i t was the p r o v i n c e of the f i r s t p r i n c e of the blood, i t 

was c l o s e to the Spanish kingdom, i t had a h i s t o r y of concern f o r 

l o c a l p r e r o g a t i v e s , and i t had a l a r g e number of Huguenot b e l i e v e r s 

and c o n g r e g a t i o n s . 



i i i 

Not l e a s t among the reasons f o r choosing Guyenne i n which 

to study r o y a l government was the a v a i l a b i l i t y of abundant 

documentary s o u r c e s . T h i s t h e s i s i s based p r i m a r i l y upon the 

examination of memoirs and correspondence. Most important of the 

memoirs are those of B l a i s e de Monluc, l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of 

Guyenne. The c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n of these together with a biography 

and a study of the h i s t o r i c a l accuracy and s i g n i f i c a n c e of Monluc 

Commentaires have been prepared by P r o f e s s o r P a u l C o u r t e a u l t . 

Among the documents a v a i l a b l e i s the e x t e n s i v e correspondence of 

C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , the l e t t e r s of Antoine de Bourbon, those of 

Monluc, and many l e t t e r s of C h a r l e s IX and of p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e r s 

Royal government i n France was not based on a f i n a n c i a l , 

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or m i l i t a r y foundation adequate f o r the k i n g to 

f o r c e h i s w i l l upon h i s s u b j e c t s . I n t e r e s t groups a l l i e d to the 

k i n g had p o p u l a r i z e d an i d e o l o g y of r o y a l a u t h o r i t y which served 

r o y a l i n t e r e s t s . P e r s o n a l contact w i t h h i s s u b j e c t s , e s p e c i a l l y 

with the n o b i l i t y enhanced r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . The b a s i s of r o y a l 

government, however, was the g o o d w i l l and c o - o p e r a t i o n of 

i n d i v i d u a l s i n p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e . King C h a r l e s IX and 

C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , the queen mother, c o n s t a n t l y sought to 

gain and maintain such g o o d w i l l and support. They granted 

o f f i c e s and honours which c a r r i e d with them the o p p o r t u n i t y of 

p r o f e s s i o n a l advancement and p e r s o n a l enrichment. An e x t e n s i v e 



i v 

correspondence tended t o maintain t h e i r knowledge of a f f a i r s 

throughout the kingdom and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over t h e i r s u b j e c t s . 

N e v e r t h e l e s s they had to balance i n d i v i d u a l noble a g a i n s t noble, 

f a c t i o n a g a i n s t f a c t i o n , Parlement a g a i n s t governor i n constant 

n e g o t i a t i o n to m a i n t a i n r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . 

The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the personnel who r e p r e s e n t e d the 

k i n g i n Guyenne r e v e a l s ways i n which p r o v i n c i a l r e s o u r c e s c o u l d 

be m o b i l i z e d f o r the crown and a g a i n s t the crown. In a p e r i o d 

of c i v i l war the m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n of the r o y a l army w i t h i n 

the p r o v i n c e was of c r i t i c a l importance p a r t i c u l a r l y when the 

army was l a r g e l y l o c a l . L o c a l n o t a b l e s appointed o f f i c e r s , 

r e c r u i t e d s o l d i e r s and commanded the f o r c e s . Just as important 

to the crown were the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the p r o v i n c e . 

As with the m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t i s e s s e n t i a l to determine 

the ways i n which those i n s t i t u t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e d r o y a l government 

and the ways i n which they c o u l d be made to serve the p a r t i c u l a r 

i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups other than the crown. 

The d e s i g n a t i o n " a b s o l u t e " as a p p l i e d to the s i x t e e n t h -

century French monarchy must be somewhat q u a l i f i e d as a r e s u l t ' : o f 

an examination of the f u n c t i o n i n g of l o c a l and p r o v i n c i a l 

i n s t i t u t i o n s : v o l u n t a r y ( l e a g u e s ) , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ( E s t a t e s ) and 

appointed (Parlement). I t i s t o the nature of that monarchy 

that the present study i s addressed. The p r o v i n c e of Guyenne 

and the f i r s t years of c i v i l war p r o v i d e the h i s t o r i c a l setting,, 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. THE MONARCHY AND CHALLENGES TO ROYAL GOVERNMENT . . 1 

Absolute Monarchy . 1 

The Great Nobles L 

The Guise Regency 6 

C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s as Regent . . . 8 

Prelude t o C i v i l War . . . . . 9 

Huguenot O r g a n i z a t i o n 11 

C a t h e r i n e ' s View of the Monarchy 17 

Royal A u t h o r i t y i n Guyenne 22 

I I . PERSONNEL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE 24 

P r i n c e s of the Blood 26 

L i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l kO 

Governors of C i t i e s 53 

I I I . MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ROYAL AUTHORITY . . . . 63 

M i l i t a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n and Forces i n Guyenne . . . 67 

L " O r d i n a i r e des Guerres 68 

L * E x t r a o r d i n a i r e des Guerres 78 

Recruitment and Appointments 86 

Command 93 

IV. FINANCE AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 99 



v i 

CHAPTER PAGE 

V. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 132 

The F i r s t War of R e l i g i o n - Summary of Events . . 132 

C a t h o l i c Leagues i n Guyenne 139 

L o c a l E s t a t e s l*+7 

The Parlement of Bordeaux 152 

C o u n c i l s and Commissions 158 

Summary and C o n c l u s i o n 161 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 166 



PROVINCES OF FRANCE 



CHAPTER I 

THE MONARCHY AND CHALLENGES TO ROYAL GOVERNMENT 

A b s o l u t e Monarchy 

The F r e n c h monarchy of the m i d - s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y was as 

p o w e r f u l as at any time i n h i s t o r y . L o u i s X I I (1498-1515)i 

F r a n c i s I (1515-1547) and Henry I I (154-7-1559) each c o n t r i b u t e d 
to the p r e s t i g e and a u t h o r i t y of the crown. W i d e l y h e l d p o l i t i c a l 

t h e o r y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t the k i n g r e c e i v e d h i s s o v e r e i g n t y from God 

and was the law i n c a r n a t e . In s p i t e of the p e r s i s t e n t t r a d i t i o n 

t h a t t h e y must l i v e on the revenue from t h e i r own domain, these 

monarchs i n c r e a s e d t h e i r a b i l i t y t o t a x s u b j e c t s at w i l l . At the 

same time t h e y extended r o y a l c o n t r o l over f i n a n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 

l e g i s l a t i o n and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d 

great f e u d a l r i v a l s were e l i m i n a t e d and t h e i r l a n d s r e t u r n e d t o the 

crown. Georges Pages e x p r e s s e d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 

many h i s t o r i a n s i n the words, " F r a n c i s I and Henry I I were as 

p o w e r f u l as any o t h e r k i n g s of F r a n c e ; i t was at the b e g i n n i n g of 

the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h a t the a b s o l u t e monarchy t r i u m p h e d . " ^ 

The term " a b s o l u t e " a p p l i e d t o the F r e n c h monarchy of the 

s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y must be c a r e f u l l y q u a l i f i e d . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 

Quoted by J . R u s s e l l M a j o r , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e I n s t i t u t i o n s  
i n R e n a i s s a n c e F r a n c e , 1421-1559 (Madison:. U n i v e r s i t y of W i s c o n s i n 
P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ) , p. 3. 



encompassed t e n or t w e l v e thousand o f f i c e r s and was the l a r g e s t 

i n Europe.*'" A p r o f e s s i o n a l army g a r r i s o n e d f o r t i f i e d p l a c e s and 
2 

e n c l o s e d c i t i e s throughout the kingdom. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the k i n g ' s 

a b i l i t y t o e n f o r c e h i s w i l l from one end of h i s e x t e n s i v e kingdom 

t o the o t h e r was l i m i t e d . By the time of Cateau-Cambresis i n 1559 

decades of war i n I t a l y had extended r o y a l c r e d i t to the b r e a k i n g 
3 

p o i n t and the monarchy was deeply i n debt. On the one hand the 
f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of the crown l i m i t e d the patronage t h a t c o u l d 

k 

be d i s p e n s e d . O f f i c e r s went unremunerated sometimes f o r y e a r s . 

On the o t h e r hand more o f f i c e s were c r e a t e d . f o r the revenue t h e y 

would b r i n g . The s a l e of o f f i c e s was f i r s t s y s t e m a t i z e d under 

F r a n c i s I and grew i n , s p i t e of p e r i o d i c - l e g i s l a t i o n t o the c o n t r a r y 

T h i s v e n a l i t y of o f f i c e s l i m i t e d r o y a l power s i n c e an o f f i c e - h o l d e r 

c o u l d o n l y be removed by r e p u r c h a s i n g h i s o f f i c e or by means of a 

l e n g t h y t r i a l . R o y a l c o n t r o l over o f f i c e - h o l d e r s was f u r t h e r 

l i m i t e d s i n c e men named t h e i r own s u c c e s s o r s or r e s i g n e d i n f a v o u r 

"""Roland Mousnier, Les X V I e et X V I i e S i e c l e s ( V o l . Iv of 
H i s t o i r e Generale des C i v i l i s a t i o n s , ed. Maurice C r o u z e t , 3rd 
e d i t i o n ; P a r i s : P r e s s e s U n i v e r s i t a i r e de F r a n c e , 1961), p. 116. 

2 I b i d . 

^ H e n r i Hauser, "The European F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s of 1559," 
J o u r n a l of Economic and B u s i n e s s H i s t o r y , I I ( F e b r u a r y , 1930). 

4 
Alphonse de R u b l e , A n t o i n e de Bourbon et Jeanne d ' A l b r e t 

( P a r i s : Adolphe L a b i t t e , 1882), I I I , 261. 
5 
Mousnier, op. c i t . , pp. 118-119* 



3 

of men of their choice. The. large number of r o y a l officers was 

thus a mixed blessing and important tasks were frequently 

committed to the holders of short-term commissions. 

A second q u a l i f i c a t i o n must be placed upon the term 

"absolute" when i t i s applied to the monarchy of 1559' The 

monarchy was personal i n nature; i t was no abstract kingship to 

which the French bowed. When the king'-s power was exercised by 

someone else on his behalf, other great persons refused to obey. 

Factions formed, at the court, r i v a l r y for power ensued and those 

exercising r o y a l power were accused of holding the sovereign as 

a prisoner."'" The personal nature of the monarchy was recognized 

by Francis I and Henry II who sought to c a p i t a l i z e on i t . Only 

upon the death of Henry II and the accession of Francis II and 

Henry III as minors did t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the monarchy 

become a serious drawback. 

Before speaking of an "absolute monarchy" i t is essential 

to i d e n t i f y at least a t h i r d l i m i t a t i o n . The French kingdom was 

far from homogeneous, i n fact, i t was made up of many states 

within the state. A man was Gascon or Breton before he was French 

and consequently the authority of l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and l o c a l 

notables could be much greater than that of orders from a distant 

c a p i t a l . This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the kingdom could be exploited by 

James W. Thompson, The Wars of Religion i n France, 1559- 
1576 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909), p. lTTT 



the monarch who maintained l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and directed them 

to his purposes. S i m i l a r l y royal power was enhanced when i t was 

exercised by men of the most prestigious l o c a l houses. On the 

other hand, l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s could become 

preoccupied with l o c a l p r i v i l e g e s and on occasion, acted i n l o c a l 

rather than royal i n t e r e s t s . 

The Great Nobles 

The old feudalism based on the granting of f i e f s was 

complemented by a "new feudalism" i n which the lord-vassal 

r e l a t i o n s h i p was replaced by a patron-client r e l a t i o n s h i p . A few 

great nobles were able to gain tremendous power through the size 

and importance of t h e i r followings. Economic conditions forced 

many of the lesser n o b i l i t y to seek advancement i n the service of 

these great lords.''' The c l i e n t offered l o y a l service in exchange 

for advancement 'and protection before the law. The c l i e n t s of a 

great l o r d occupied positions ranging from minor household posts 

and men of arms i n his company to captains of chateaux and 
2 

o f f i c e r s i n the royal service. 

To three noble families, Guise, Montmorency and Bourbon, 

p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the n o b i l i t y were a l l i e d by t i e s of vassalage, 

J . Russell Major, "The Crown and the Aristocracy i n 
Renaissance France," American H i s t o r i c a l Review, V o l . 69 ( A p r i l , 
1964), pp. 630-646. 

2 I b i d . 



family or clientage. In 1559 the Guises were most powerful and 

they dominated a l l the provinces of the east: Champagne, Lorraine, 

Bourgogne, Lyonnais and Dauphin!. From the border of Artois to 

the Pyrenees the Bourbon name was obeyed. In the southwest 

Antoine de Bourbon was king of Navarre and governor of Guyenne 

while north of the Loire the prince de CondS governed or had a 

large following i n P i c a r d i e , the Ile-de-France, Normandie, Orleanais, 

Vendomois, Touraine and Bretagne. The Guises were a l l i e d by 

marriage to the crowns of France, Scotland and Denmark. Under 

Henry II they enjoyed royal favour and gained great wealth. The 

Bourbon t i e s were t i e s of blood and Antoine de Bourbon,^ the f i r s t 

prince of the blood was next i n l i n e for the throne after the sons 

of the k i n g . Unlike the Guises, the Bourbon family was disunited 

and the younger brother, Condi*, possessed greater character and a 

stronger following but lacked the authority of the f i r s t prince of 

the blood. The t h i r d great family was the house of Montmorency 

and i t s influence f e l l between Bourbon and Guise, both geographically 

and i n the p o l i t i c s of the court. The constable Anne de Montmorency 

was the.greatest landholder i n the kingdom. Consequently his 

support came from the large number of vassals who held f i e f s from 

him. His family lacked the blood and the t i t l e s of Bourbon or 

Guise and they owed everything to Francis I and Henry I I . Hence 

Lucien, Romier, Le Royaume de Catherine de Medicis (Paris: 
P e r r i n , 1922), I, 223. 



6 

they were above a l l , l o y a l t o the crown. Guise and Bourbon 

a m b i t i o n s were i n c o m p a t i b l e and t o support e i t h e r house was t o 

a l i e n a t e the o t h e r . T h e r e f o r e , the Montmorency f a m i l y h e l d the 

balance of power.''' 

The G u i s e Regency 

Immediately upon the death of Henry I I the G u i s e s s e i z e d 

and s u r r o u n d e d the p e r s o n of the new k i n g , F r a n c i s I I . They were 

a b l e t o g a i n c o n t r o l p a r t l y t h r o u g h t h e i r n i e c e Mary S t u a r t , 

F r a n c i s ' queen. S i n c e the new k i n g was f i f t e e n and t e c h n i c a l l y 

of age, the G u i s e s had him announce t h a t " h i s u n c l e s were t o 
2 

manage h i s a f f a i r s . " The p r i n c e s of the b l o o d were sent t o 

F l a n d e r s and S p a i n on s t a t e a f f a i r s . B e f o r e the f i r s t p r i n c e of 

the b l o o d was summoned the c o n s t a b l e was b a n i s h e d from the c o u r t 

t o p r e v e n t a meeting of two n o b l e s who might pose a t h r e a t t o the 

government of the due de Guise and h i s b r o t h e r , the c a r d i n a l of 

L o r r a i n e . The duke took charge of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and the 

c a r d i n a l c o n t r o l l e d f i n a n c i a l and s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 

F r a n c i s I I was a minor i n f a c t , i f not i n law, and the 

G u i s e s e x e r c i s e d a b a d l y v e i l e d r e g e n c y . L e g a l l y , i n the m i n o r i t y 

of a k i n g the regency belonged t o the f i r s t p r i n c e of the b l o o d . 

Hence the p e r s o n i n the best p o s i t i o n t o c h a l l e n g e Guise a u t h o r i t y 

1 I b i d . , p. 228. 
2 Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. 6. 



was Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, and he lacked the 

fortitude to make such a challenge. Because of their weakness 

and to buy support the Guises d i s t r i b u t e d a number of governor-

ships to keep certain notables happy.""" Many offices and d i g n i t i e s 

were d i s t r i b u t e d among the Guise family and following so the 

Guises determined to placate their c r i t i c s by requesting the king 

to create two new gouvernements i n the centre of the kingdom for 

princes of the blood. The due de Montpensier was made governor 

of Touraine-Anjou-Maine and the prince de l a Roche-sur-yon was 

granted Orleans-Berry. The appointments were l i t t l e more than a 

farce since for the f i r s t time lieutenants were appointed over 

the governors. Thus giving them governorships i n central France 

served to keep these princes of the blood under surveillance and 
2 

to l i m i t t h e i r authority. 

The office of governor i s an important one i n the sixteenth 

century. In the two preceding centuries members of the royal 

family had been granted apanages, large t e r r i t o r i e s administratively 

detached from the kingdom i n which those princes had become v i r t u a l 

monarchs. In the century to follow certain of the great nobles 

were to approximate royal power i n the office of governor. The new 

gouvernements created by the Guises were fashioned from the 

Gaston Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs de provinces au XVI e s i e c l e , " 
Revue historique, CLXXXV (1939), p. 225. 

2 
I b i d . , p. 2^7. c f . Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , pp. 62-63-



8 

t e r r i t o r y of the l a s t apanagists. The Estates-General of 1561 

was c a l l e d by gouvernements for the f i r s t time i n d i c a t i n g that 

the entire kingdom was thus divided."*" 

Catherine de Medicis as Regent 

In March, 1560 the i l l - c o n c e i v e d conspiracy of Amboise 

directed against the Guises was overthrown. In November Conde 

was condemned for alleged complicity i n the plot but the death of 

Francis II on December 5 brought about a shift i n power and the 

freeing of the p r i n c e . Charles IX was only ten years of age and 

no f i c t i o n could make him anything but a minor. A regency was 

required. The position r i g h t l y belonged to Antoine de Bourbon 

2 
although there was a precedent for a regency of the queen mother. 

Catherine de Medicis acted d e c i s i v e l y , associated Antoine with her 

as lieutenant-general of the kingdom and claimed the position of 

regent h e r s e l f . Catherine had the guardianship of the person of 

the k i n g . She out-maneuvred the Guises in a l l their attempts to 

recapture a measure of c o n t r o l . 
She governed as i f she were k i n g . She appointed to offices 

and to benefices; she granted pardon; she kept the seal; she 
had the l a s t word to say i n c o u n c i l ; she opened the l e t t e r s of 
the ambassadors and other ministers. 

"*"Zeller, "Gouverneurs . . . , " p . 231. 
2 

e.g. During the imprxsonment of Francis I following the 
battle of Pavia his mother acted as regent. Ernest Lavisse, 
Histoire de France (Paris: Hachette, 1904), V:2, 37-38. 

^Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. 75* 



The Estates-General met at Orleans i n December, I56O and 

recommended a general pardon for those accused of heresy through-

out the kingdom. The Estates were asked to seek a solution to 

the f i n a n c i a l problems of the monarchy for the king's debts 

t o t a l l e d more than forty m i l l i o n francs."'" L i t t l e was accomplished 

although the way was prepared for large revenues from the clergy 

over a period of five years. The delegates were to return to 

their regions and new elections were to be held for a meeting of 

the Estates-General at Pontoise i n May. 

Prelude to C i v i l . War 

In A p r i l , I56I with secret encouragement from his Catholic 

majesty, P h i l i p II of Spain, a famous association of strongly 

Catholic nobles was formed. It became known as the Triumvirate 

i n reference to i t s most important members, the due de Guise, the 
2 

constable Montmorency and the marshal Saint-Andre. This 

c o a l i t i o n was a blow to Catherine and the appeal of the Triumvirate 

to P h i l i p II was a further threat to her authority. The association 

was implacable i n i t s opposition to the Huguenots who had r a p i d l y 

increased i n numbers and gained confidence after the death of 

Henry I I . Nevertheless, the Edict of July was promulgated reserving 

""Ibid., p. 8 l . 
2 I b i d . , p. 9 ? . 



10 

judgment for heresy to e c c l e s i a s t i c a l courts and l i m i t i n g sentences. 

The Huguenot movement continued to spread and incidents of unrest 

were more common than ever. The king of Navarre was susceptible 

to promises to restore the Spanish portion of his kingdom or to 

give him compensation for i t . Consequently, under the influence 

of the Spanish ambassador, he i n c l i n e d increasingly towards the 

Catholic r e l i g i o n and towards the Triumvirate.^ 

It would seem that the parties were extremely unequal for 

Montmorency and Guise had effected a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and Antoine de 

Bourbon was inclined towards them, leaving leadership of the 

Huguenot cause to his brother Conde. A s p l i t i n the Montmorency 

ranks, however, evened the sides somewhat. The constable's three 

nephews, the C h a t i l l o n brothers, Gaspard de Coligny, Francois 

d'Andelot and Odet, cardinal of C h S t i l l o n , had a l l espoused the 
2 

Huguenot cause. Catherine hoped to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 

between the leaders of the Catholics and the Protestants i n 

September, I56I when the clergy met at the colloquy of Poissy 

while the other two estates met at Pontoise. Her efforts were doomed 

to disappointment."^ She was no more successful i n effecting peace 

through the tolerant Edict of January. The kingdom was hastening 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV. See the pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s 
for examples of Spanish influence over Antoine. 

2 

Romier, Le Royaume.•., p. 2 2 9 . 

^Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 4 . 



11 

down the path to c i v i l war and the spark was ignited by an 

incident which took place at Vassy i n Champagne. The soldiers of 

the due de Guise discovered a Huguenot congregation meeting i n a 

barn, wounded and k i l l e d a number of them. "Charles, cardinal of 

Lorraine, at the colloquy of Poissy had made union between the two 

faiths impossible. His brother, the duke of Guise, by the massacre 

at Vassy had made war i n e v i t a b l e . " """ 

Huguenot Organization 

The e f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y organization of the Huguenots and 

their rapid mustering of forces for the f i r s t War of Religion i s 

impressive and for i t s achievement required both an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 

organization readily adaptable to the support of a m i l i t a r y effort 

and a plausible rationale with the support, or at least apparent 

support, of the regent. Individual C a l v i n i s t churches were governed 

by minister and elders who together formed the d i s c i p l i n a r y committee 

known as the consistory. Ministers and elders from a number of 

neighbouring churches formed a colloquy, a committee concerned with 

matters referred to i t by i n d i v i d u a l churches and with the general 

supervision of the churches i n the area. Over the consistories and 

colloquies of a larger region such as a province, authority was 

exercised by a synod and, i n France, a national synod capped the 

organizational pyramid. Common t i e s with Geneva tended further to 

Bernerd C. Weber, "The Diplomatic Relations between France 
and Spain during the Reign of Charles IX (1560-157^)" (unpublished 
Doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1935), 
P. 57. 



12 
strengthen and unify the Huguenot churches. The synodal organ-

i z a t i o n was i d e a l l y adapted to the development of a concomitant 

m i l i t a r y organization. 

Protestant p o l i t i c a l ideas were expressed and gained wide 

attention when Anne du Bourg, imprisoned by Henry I I , wrote an 

attack on the legitimacy of any monarch who t r i e d to force his 

subjects to l i v e contrary to the w i l l of God."'" Beza's p u b l i c a t i o n , 

On the Authority of the Magistrate i n the Punishment of Heretics, 

written i n 155*+ contained i n embryonic form j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the 

right of a prince to r e s i s t superior authority on r e l i g i o u s issues. 

At the time of the Conspiracy of Amboise, an abortive attempt to 

overthrow the Guise regency, the highest leaders of the Reformed 

church including Calvin himself expressed the conviction that the 

revolt would have been l e g a l had i t been led by a prince of the 

blood and preferably by the f i r s t prince of the blood. Predictably, 

i n 1562 when Conde i n fact led the r e v o l t , Calvin supported his 

cause. The Huguenots of France had a r t i c u l a t e d c l e a r l y the doctrine 

of l e g a l resistance led by a prince of the blood. 

The organizational structure for the r a i s i n g of an army was 

inherent i n the church organization and a doctrine of resistance 

had been a r t i c u l a t e d , only the actual mobilization remained and 

Robert M. Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of  
Religion i n France, 1555-1565 ( V o l . XXII of Travaux d'Humanisme  
et Renaissance; Geneva: Droz, 1956), p. 64. 



13 
this was i n i t i a t e d long before the f i r s t War df R e l i g i o n . The 

churches of Guyenne i n November, 1560, were ordered by the Synod 

of C l a i r a c to begin organizing m i l i t a r y cadres. One year l a t e r 

the Synod of Upper Guyenne at Sainte-Foy chose m i l i t a r y commanders 

for the provinces of Bordeaux and Toulouse. The hierarchy of 

command included colonels over each colloquy and captains 

responsible for the forces of each church. Thus forces were organ-

ized and ready to respond quickly to Condi's summons i n 1562.""' 

The Huguenot m i l i t a r y leaders found war more acceptable i f 

they could represent their actions as expressing l o y a l support of 

the sovereign. In this Catherine de Medicis unwittingly gave them 

assistance for she requested the Huguenot delegates returning from 

the Colloquy of Poissy to make a survey of their churches to 

determine the m i l i t a r y force they could muster. Wholehearted 

support was expressed by 2,150.churches and the survey was followed 

by guarded instructions to muster m i l i t a r y forces of both foot and 
2 

horse. On March 16, against the orders of the queen mother, the 

due de Guise entered Paris with two or three thousand men. He was 

loudly acclaimed as the champion of Catholicism and the provost 

of merchants offered him two m i l l i o n i n gold to serve i n defence 

of the Catholic r e l i g i o n . On the same day, Condi returned to Paris 

from the court with seven or eight hundred men. The s i t u a t i o n 

I b i d . , p. 109. 

I b i d . , p. 106. 



14 

was explosive and Conde withdrew to Orleans where he mustered 

an army. Catherine was not permitted to take the young king 

to Orleans but was detained by the Guise faction as a v i r t u a l 

1 
prisoner. 

Once more Catherine helped the Huguenot cause for with 

the young king she was detained i f not imprisoned by the 

Triumvirate and she exchanged a secret correspondence with 
s 2 • 

Conde, seeking his support. Conde was to publish extracts 

from her l e t t e r s i n days to come to justify his m i l i t a r y 

actions as an attempt to free the king and the regent. Catherine 

had no doubt wanted Conde merely to return unarmed to the court 

for had he done so the Triumvirate would have had no excuse to 

remain i n Paris under arms and continued detention of the king 

would only have been possible by arms, a crime of lese-majeste. 

Conde however, did not obey but from Orleans he offered asylum 

to Catherine and Charles IX.^ 

The Huguenot army at Orleans was augmented by the a r r i v a l 

of contingents from the provinces of the west and south. Again 

Catherine contributed for when the comte de l a Rochefoucauld, 

^Lucien.Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots a l a Cour de  
Charles IX (Paris: P e r r i n , 1924), p. 328. 

Hector de l a F e r r i e r e , e d . , Lettres de Catherine de  
Medicis (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1880), I, 282n. 283. 

"^Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots, pp. 330-333• 



15 

Conde's brother-in-law, sent his lieutenant, Jean de Mergey, to 

seek orders from her, the regent assured him he would cause no 

d i f f i c u l t y by joining the prince. She was to spend much of her 

energy i n ensuing months negotiating with Conde and i t may be 

that, expecting to gain his support, she wished him to have 

s u f f i c i e n t authority to enable her to withstand the threats of 

the Triumvirate. The Catholic party had hoped that l a 

Rochefoucauld, an old lieutenant of the due de Guise, would not 

take arms against his former captain and that the vicomte de 

Rohan, cousin of Jeanne d'Albret, would not r e s i s t the authority 

of the king of Navarre. But very soon after the taking of Orleans 

news reached the court that these two lords were making their way 

from Poitou and Bretagne respectively, leading troops which the 

l i n g ' s lieutenants were powerless to stop. The comte de l a 

Rochefoucauld arrived on A p r i l 20, 1562 with about four hundred 

men, mounted and armed. Wherever, fighting took place Gascon 

soldiers were to be found and 4,000 Gascon foot soldiers soon 

arrived i n Orleans under the leadership of the comte de Gramont 

to be followed by 1,200 soldiers from Languedoc 

Catherine de Medicis maneuvred desperately i n the attempt 

to avert war and to bolster her own control of a f f a i r s . While 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 152ff. 



messengers and envoys were s h u t t l i n g between Orleans and the court, 

Catherine sent a message to Jeanne d'Albret, en route from Meaux 

to Vendome. The message was twofold, a l e t t e r merely requested 

the queen of Navarre to ask Conde to lay down his arms and return 

to court but the bearer brought a message o r a l l y because Catherine 

had been obliged to write her l e t t e r under the eyes of Francois 

d'Escars, the confidante of the king of Navarre. O r a l l y , the 

messenger was reported to have stated that Catherine desired the 

opening of h o s t i l i t i e s and the triumph of the Huguenots and that 

she requested Jeanne to go to Amboise and take the young brother 

and s i s t e r of the queen as hostages to Conde i n Orleans."'" The 

web of negotiations was indeed a tangled one. 

Even as Conde's army increased at Orleans and the royal 

army was amassed to meet i t and as both sides sought reinforcements 

from neighbouring countries, f i g h t i n g was going on throughout the 

kingdom. The king's lieutenant i n Dauphine, l a Motte-Gondrin, was 
2 

k i l l e d by rebel forces under the baron des Adrets. The commanders 

i n - c h i e f both of the Huguenots and of the C a t h o l i c s , were to be 

plagued throughout the war by the problems inherent i n attempting 

to mount a major army while at the same time protecting the home 

t e r r i t o r i e s of their adherents and s a t i s f y i n g the ambitions of 

Alphonse de Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e 
(Paris: L i b r a i r e s de l a Bibliotheque Nationale, 1897), 1̂  189. 

^Romier, op. c i t . , p. 3*+5• 



!7 
l o c a l c h i e f s . The war took on the appearance of many l o c a l wars 

and often of g u e r i l l a warfare. In fact the strategy of the 

Triumvirate early i n the contest was to divide their forces and 

separate Conde from his reinforcements to the west. Conde found 

i t d i f f i c u l t to r e c r u i t adequate foot soldiers for the Huguenot 

army while on the Catholic side royal demands for reinforcements 

were to go long unheeded.""" Meanwhile Huguenot and Catholic forces 

would wage war i n Guyenne as armies semi-independent of central 

authority, recruited l o c a l l y , under l o c a l command and maintained 

in their home region by l o c a l exigencies. It i s under these 

circumstances that the nature of royal government i n Guyenne must 

be studied. 

Catherine's View of the Monarchy 

Catherine de Medicis recognized the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 

of the crown. She saw c l e a r l y the personal nature of French king-

ship and the absolute necessity of personal encounter between the 

king and the n o b i l i t y . Perhaps more c l e a r l y than anyone else she 

knew that the monarch must recognize l o c a l differences, l o c a l 

p r i v i l e g e s . In short, she r e a l i z e d that the power of the throne 

was grounded upon the goodwill of men throughout the kingdom. Her 

concern was to gain the goodwill of s t r a t e g i c a l l y valuable men 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, p. 291. 



18 

and through them to control others. A few months after the Peace 

of Ambolse Catherine had the majority of the young king Charles IX 

declared and soon thereafter she dictated for him a long l e t t e r on 

the methods by which he could best restore his kingdom to complete 

obedience."'' The queen mother's l e t t e r revealed those things which 

she f e l t needed to be restored. Beginning with the routine and 

pomp of court l i f e , Catherine dealt with the conduct of court 

business, the secretaries, the C o u n c i l , dispatches, audiences, and 

concluded with clear directions on the question of royal patronage. 

The queen mother reviewed i n her mind the events of the 

preceding three years encompassing the b r i e f reign of Francis II 

during which she had been excluded from government by the Guises 

and the f i r s t years of the reign of Charles IX in which r e l i g i o u s 

differences coupled with r i v a l r y among the great nobles had erupted 

into b i t t e r c i v i l war. As she looked back in time these events 

seemed l i k e a bad dream to be blamed on the minority of Francis II, 

and Catherine was anxious to forget that bad dream and recapture 

the conditions which had prevailed i n the reigns of Francis I and 

Henry I I . Charles must r e - e s t a b l i s h the Church and through the 

administration of justice he must cleanse the kingdom and recover 

royal authority and obedience to the royal w i l l . The routine of 

court l i f e Catherine considered as essential to restoring confidence 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 9 0 - 9 5 . 



19 

i n the monarch on the part of the n o b i l i t y and the people, and 

the king must be p a r t i c u l a r l y careful that the nobles be 

associated with him by their presence i n his chamber at his 

r i s i n g hour, by accompanying him to mass, and by walking, r i d i n g 

or jousting with him. He must oversee the d i s c i p l i n e at the 

court and ensure that men discharged their duties whether those 

duties be l i g h t i n g torches, locking gates, guarding keys, or 

sending dispatches. 

His own existence must be as s t r i c t l y d i s c i p l i n e d as that 

of his s e r v i t o r s . R i s i n g at a standard hour, probably about s i x , 

Charles must admit to his chamber a l l the princes, l o r d s , captains, 

knights of the order, gentlemen of the chamber, maitres d'hotel 

and serving men. This custom should build the confidence of the 

n o b i l i t y . R i s i n g accomplished, the king must go to business, 

having a l l leave save those p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned and the four 

s e c r e t a r i e s . An hour or two reading dispatches must follow after 

which he should go to mass accompanied by the n o b i l i t y . If time 

permitted, a walk for his health might precede the king's dinner 

scheduled for eleven o'clock. Twice a week Charles should give 

audience to his subjects after dinner and only after that could he 

r e t i r e b r i e f l y to the quarters of the queen mother. Three o'clock 

could be the time to walk or ride with the n o b i l i t y two or three 

times weekly. The king should sup with his family and two evenings 

per week the b a l l room was to be next on the schedule. Catherine 



20 

s u g g e s t e d a b o v e a l l o t h e r r e a s o n s t h a t c o u r t l i f e s h o u l d be 

r e g u l a t e d and d i s c i p l i n e d s o t h a t t h e p e o p l e w o u l d know what t o 

e x p e c t o f t h e i r k i n g a n d so t h a t t h e n o b i l i t y w o u l d be c o n t e n t e d . 

C a t h e r i n e i m p r e s s e d on t h e y o u n g k i n g t h a t he must c o n v e y 

t o h i s s u b j e c t s h i s c o n c e r n f o r them. T h i s w o u l d be p o s s i b l e by 

d e a l i n g i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h d i s p a t c h e s f r o m r e m o t e a r e a s o f t h e 

p r o v i n c e , t o c o r r e c t t h e i m p r e s s i o n r e c e n t l y g i v e n by d e l a y s o f 

a month o r e v e n s i x weeks i n a n s w e r i n g them. C h a r l e s must s e t 

a s i d e a c o n v e n i e n t h o u r d a i l y and r e a d d i s p a t c h e s f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r 

r e g i o n o f t h e k i n g d o m . I f t h e y s h o u l d c o n t a i n m a t t e r s f o r t h e 

C o u n c i l he must have t h e c h a n c e l l o r r a i s e t h e s e m a t t e r s b e f o r e 

a d m i t t i n g t h e ma£tres d e s r e q u e t e s f o r t h e C o n s e i l des p a r t i e s . " ' " 

The k i n g was t o l d t o command t h e s e c r e t a r i e s t o make a p p r o p r i a t e 

r e p l i e s t o d i s p a t c h e s , r e p l i e s he must e x a m i n e , s i g n a n d s e n d t h e 

n e x t m o r n i n g b e f o r e l o o k i n g a t a n y t h i n g new. To c o n v e y t o h i s ' 

p e o p l e h i s c o n c e r n f o r them, t h e k i n g must f i n d t i m e t o s e e a l l 

t h o s e who h a d come f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e s t o s e e k a u d i e n c e . He s h o u l d 

d i s c u s s w i t h them t h e i r o f f i c e s a n d t h e r e g i o n f r o m w h i c h t h e y 

"'"Every m o r n i n g t h e C o n s e i l E ~ t r o i t o r C o n s e i l P r i v e met f i r s t 
t o c o n s i d e r t h e most i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , f i n a n c i a l and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a f f a i r s . The C o n s e i l E t r o i t c o n s i s t e d o f a few g r e a t 
n o b l e s w i t h t h e c h a n c e l l o r p r e s e n t t o t a k e o r d e r s . R o g e r D o u c e t , 
L e s I n s t i t u t i o n s de l a F r a n c e au X V I e S i d c l e ( P a r i s : P i c a r d , 1948), 
I I , 1 4 2 . T h e C o n s e i l d ' E t a t w i t h a w i d e r m e m b e r s h i p met t o c o n s i d e r 
m a t t e r s o f f i n a n c e a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . T w i c e w e e k l y i t 
c o n s i d e r e d p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l s and d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n p e o p l e ( p r e s u m -
a b l y a p p e a l s ) . On t h o s e o c c a s i o n s i t was c a l l e d t h e C o n s e i l d e s  
P a r t i e s . D o u c e t , I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 1^5. 



21 
had come. In this way his reputation would spread throughout 

the kingdom. 

The balance of Catherine's l e t t e r dealt with patronage, a 

subject which assumed great importance i n her mind. Louis XII 

was the i d e a l she held up before the young Charles IX for Louis 

XII had devised a system to eliminate importuning at the court 

for appointment to o f f i c e . He maintained a r o l l containing the 

names of a l l the honours that were his to bestow. One or two of 

the p r i n c i p a l officers i n each province were responsible to 

report any vacancies, confiscations or fines to the king by 

express l e t t e r to be placed personally i n the king's hands and 

not to go to the secretaries or anyone else. Louis XII then 

proceeded to make an appointment' on the basis of the information 

he possessed, attempting to reward the f a i t h f u l officers who 

remained i n their places and to deny office to any who importuned 

at the court. The v i t a l concern was that i n f l u e n t i a l l o c a l notables 

be appointed to strategic offices where they could exercise their 

influence on behalf of the crown. Francis I was supposed to have 

made a practice of maintaining a nucleus of men i n every aspect of 

royal government i n each province. Thus the command of f o r t i f i e d 

places and high e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and j u d i c i a l offices would be 

exercised by men who owed their position and i t s rewards d i r e c t l y 

to their k i n g . To Charles IX, Catherine suggested that the 

recipients of his patronage should not be members of the n o b i l i t y 



22 

alone but that i n each c i t y he must have the support of the 

p r i n c i p a l bourgeois i n order to extend his influence into 

municipal government. 

The advice emphasized by Catherine as she instructed her 

son i n the art of government was that he should be as d i r e c t l y 

accessible to his subjects as possible and convey to them that he 

cared for them. Catherine was soon to i n i t i a t e an extensive 

i t i n e r a r y throughout the kingdom on behalf of her son precisely 

to implement this p r i n c i p l e and to allow as many of his subjects 

as possible to gain access to him, to see him personally, and thus 

identify with him. 

Royal Authority In Guyenne 

In the province of Guyenne as i n the rest of the kingdom 

royal authority depended on the personal influence of the king 

over the n o b i l i t y . The extent of that influence depended on the 

extent to which p a r t i c u l a r i n f l u e n t i a l nobles perceived their 

interests as a l l i e d with those of the k i n g . Not only must royal 

service be to the mutual benefit of the sovereign and his subject 

but the sovereign must honour the l o c a l p r i v i l e g e s of the region. 

The province of Guyenne was far removed from the court and had a 

history of l o c a l resistance to central authority. D e f i n i t i v e l y 

re-united to the kingdom for l i t t l e more than a century, Guyenne 

was t r a d i t i o n a l l y exempt from the gabelle or s a l t tax. When 

Henry II sought to increase his revenue by imposing the gabelle 



23 

on Guyenne, that province became the scene of a bloody revolt.'*' 

The n o b i l i t y of Guyenne had a history of independent action and 

armed r e v o l t . They also had an enviable record i n royal m i l i t a r y 

s e r v i c e . 

Guyenne provides a good s e t t i n g for the study of r o y a l 

government because i t was the gouvernement of Antoine de Bourbon, 

king of Navarre and f i r s t prince of the blood. Like his father-

in-law, although he was as governor a representative of the crown, 

his personal concerns as king of Navarre played a much greater 

role i n motivating his actions. Also l i k e his father-in-law, 

Antoine was often non-resident and i n his absence the r o y a l 

government was exercised by lieutenants of the king who owed 

allegiance both to the king and to their governor, dual l o y a l t i e s 

not always i n harmony with each other. 

S. - C . Gigon, La Revolte de l a Gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549 
(Paris: Honor! Champion, 1906), pp. 11-12. 



CHAPTER II 

PERSONNEL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE 

An examination of r o y a l government i n Guyenne during the 

d i f f i c u l t days of c i v i l war reveals that Catherine's advice to 

Charles IX was in fact the p o l i t i c a l creed according to which she 

herself acted. She recognized the necessity of gaining the good-

w i l l and l o y a l support of i n f l u e n t i a l members of the l o c a l n o b i l i 

of both great and lesser f a m i l i e s . And she r e a l i z e d that merely 

gaining t h e i r confidence was not s u f f i c i e n t for royal o f f i c e r s 

were subject to influence by l o c a l groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s , by 

great patrons, and even by foreign powers. By judicious use of 

the patronage at her disposal the regent sought to maintain the 

support of those best able to mobilize the l o c a l resources necess 

ary to uphold royal authority i n the province. 

Representatives of royal authority i n Guyenne received 

their offices from the king and yet demonstrated remarkable 

independence of ..'the king i n the exercise of those o f f i c e s . The 

king did not have a completely free choice in making appointments 

i t was l i m i t e d i n r e l a t i o n to the highest office by the need to 

s a t i s f y the f i r s t prince of the blood and by the increasingly 

hereditary nature of the o f f i c e . In other appointments the king 

and the queen mother were limited by the desires of Antoine de 

Bourbon, the f i r s t prince of the blood, and by the necessity to 



25 

choose from among men of renown within the province to ensure the 

obedience of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y . Men appointed from among the 

l o c a l n o b i l i t y were able to gain support i n t h e i r home province 

for independent a c t i o n . The Parlement, the estates, the c i t i e s and 

the n o b i l i t y were a l l at times mobilized on behalf of the king's 

representatives. The c i t i e s of Guyenne found f i n a n c i a l resources 

with which to reward the lieutenant-general on more than one 

occasion. Men who accepted appointment did not simply owe a l l e g -

iance to the monarch and to l o c a l pressure groups but also to 

great noble patrons including, of course, Antoine de Bourbon, the 

governor. The appointee might be influenced, because of personal 

ambitions, by a foreign monarch, P h i l i p II of Spain. The degree 

to which the crown was able to control i t s representatives i n 

spite of c o n f l i c t i n g influences was the important issue i n r o y a l 

government i n Guyenne. 

The men who bore the t i t l e s of governor, lieutenant, and 

lieutenant-general i n Guyenne were of three d i s t i n c t ranks. At 

the peak of the hierarchy, were great nobles, the Bourbon princes 

of the blood. These princes f i l l e d two kinds of post, that of 

governor and that of commissioner sent into the province on a 

special mission. At the second l e v e l were prominent members of 

the l o c a l n o b i l i t y with i l l u s t r i o u s m i l i t a r y careers behind them. 

The office of lieutenant-general was their charge and their t i t l e 



26 

was q u a l i f i e d with the words "in the absence o f . . . . " Since the 

governor was consistently absent and the highest authority was 

delegated to his lieutenant-general, the l a t t e r office carried 

with i t a great deal of prestige. The t h i r d rank was that of 

governors of c i t i e s or of f o r t i f i e d places and i t , too, was f i l l e d 

by members of the most prominent noble families or by lesser nobles 

of proven m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y . This l a s t office was one which 

increased i n number greatly during the Wars of R e l i g i o n . 

Princes of the Blood 

The most i l l u s t r i o u s and powerful nobles of the kingdom 

held office as governors of provinces. It was a prestigious 

o f f i c e . During their regency in I56O the Guises divided the 

major offices among their own family and following. They 

recognized the necessity of s a t i s f y i n g the princes of the blood 

for only because the king was l e g a l l y of age were the Guises 

able to deprive these princes of a regency that should 

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y be t h e i r s . To s a t i s f y the Bourbon princes 

without sending them out to the f r o n t i e r provinces where they 

could better mobilize resources against the regency, two new 

gouvernements were created in the centre of the kingdom. These 

t e r r i t o r i e s had not previously come under the administration of 

governors because they had been administered as the personal 



27 
domains of r o y a l p r i n c e s , i . e . as apanages.^ The o f f i c e of 

governor was not i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y w i t h i t the degree of independ-

ence e x e r c i s e d by a p a n a g i s t p r i n c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t was an 

o f f i c e g r a n t e d o n l y t o men of the h i g h e s t r a n k , men whose b i r t h 

and power demanded adequate r e c o g n i t i o n . 

Antoine. de Bourbon, k i n g of Navarre and f i r s t p r i n c e of the 

b l o o d , was governor and l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of Guyenne. H i s tenure 

i l l u s t r a t e s common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of appointment, n o n - r e s i d e n c e , 

and s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e . A l t h o u g h the post of 

l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l had once been a commission t o be t e r m i n a t e d 

a c c o r d i n g t o the k i n g ' s w i l l , i t had become an o f f i c e t o be e x e r -

c i s e d much l o n g e r or even f o r l i f e . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t f r e q u e n t l y 

passed from a g r e a t noble t o h i s h e i r , a s i t u a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d by 

e v e n t s i n Guyenne. F o r most of the second q u a r t e r of the c e n t u r y 

H e n r i d ' A l b r e t , k i n g of N a v a r r e , had been governor of Guyenne w i t h 

a u t h o r i t y e x t e n d i n g over P o i t o u , La R o c h e l l e and l ' A u n i s . A n t o i n e 

de Bourbon f o l l o w e d i n h i s f a t h e r - i n - l a w ' s f o o t s t e p s not o n l y as 

k i n g of Navarre but as governor of Guyenne and of P o i t o u , by then 
2 

a s e p a r a t e gouvernement. H i s a u t h o r i t y a l s o extended over La 

R o c h e l l e and l ' A u n i s , a r e g i o n a d m i n i s t e r e d by a s e p a r a t e l i e u t -

Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 247. 
2 I b i d . , p. 240. 



28 

enant and- sometimes r e f e r r e d to as a g o u v e r n e m e n t T h e f i r s t 

prince of the blood exercised the a u t h o r i t y of governor over the 

western coast of France from the Pyrennees to the border of 

B r i t t a n y . To t h i s were added the o f f i c e s of admiral of Guyenne 

and, from March, 1561 u n t i l his death i n November, 1562, 

l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of the kingdom. 

Governors frequently received t h e i r o f f i c e s through 

i n h e r i t a n c e and the same was true i n the case of those o f f i c e r s 

designated "lieutenants-general en 1'absence des gouverneurs." 

Sebastien de Luxemburg, vicomte de Martigues, nephew of Jean de 

Brosse, due d'Etampes and governor of Bretagne, acted as l i e u t e n a n t -

general i n the absence of h i s uncle and, when E"tampes died c h i l d -
2 

l e s s , Martigues succeeded him as governor. The governorship of 

Provence was exercised f o r many years by Claude de Savoie, comte 

de Tende, a close r e l a t i v e of the Montmorency family which was very 

powerful i n the south of France. Upon h i s death i n I566 the o f f i c e 

passed to h i s son Honore de Savoie, comte de Tende and de Sommerive, 

who as l i e u t e n a n t had exercised more a u t h o r i t y than h i s father for 

s e v e r a l years and had come i n t o c o n f l i c t with him.^ In I56O 

under Antoine de Bourbon, Guy de D a i l l o n , comte du Lude was made 

L e t t r e s de Catherine de Medicis, I, 4 l 8 . 
2 

A L u b l i n s k a j a , ed., Documents Pour S e r v i r a l ' h i s t o i r e des  
Guerres C i v i l e s en France (I56I-I563) (Moscow, I962), No. 11. 
Hereafter c i t e d as Documents Pour S e r v i r a..... 

^ L e t t r e s de Catherine de Medicis, I, 304-305. 



29 
lieutenant-general of Poitou f i l l i n g an office which had been 

vacant for three years. In a s p i r i n g to that office he was follow-

ing his father, Jean de D a i l l o n , who had been lieutenant-general 

under Henri d'Albret i n both Guyenne and Poitou u n t i l his death 

in 1557. 

Certainly the most s t r i k i n g example of the hereditary 

nature of the office of governor was the succession of Henri de 

Bourbon, prince of Navarre, to the offices held by his father. 

Antoine de Bourbon died i n November, 1562 of a wound received i n 

battle and i n December "pouvoir de gouverneur et lieutenant general 

en Guyenne" was granted by the king to the prince of N a v a r r e . 1 The 

prince was a precocious lad but s t i l l short of ten years of age. 

and hardly ready to exercise the powers granted him. In addition 

to the office of governor he was given that of admiral of Guyenne 

and his father's company of one hundred hommes d'armes and i t 

was even rumoured that he would succeed his father as lieutenant-
2 

general of the kingdom. A few days after having relayed that 

rumour to his government, the Venetian ambassador reported that the 

office would be l e f t vacant, that neither the prince de Navarre nor 

the prince de Conde would receive i t . ' ' The granting of important 

offices to Antoine de Bourbon resulted from the need to s a t i s f y 

Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e (Paris: L i b r a i r e s 
de l a Bibliotheque Nationale, 1897), I, 467. 

2 
Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 439. 

5 I b i d . 



30 

the f i r s t prince of the blood who should by law have been regent. 

The m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of offices i n the hands of his son, however, 

resulted as much from the desire of the regent to f i l l those 

offices with someone too young to exercise them as from the need 

to grant favours to the princes of the blood. By b i r t h the young 

Prince Henry was f i t t e d to receive high office and by granting 

him such offices when he was s t i l l too young to exercise them, 

Catherine f o r e s t a l l e d the efforts of those who might have pressured 

her for appointment. At the same time she l e f t the way open to 

make her own influence f e l t more d i r e c t l y i n the province. 

Antoine de Bourbon was obsessed with the v i s i o n of himself 

as master of an independent kingdom and his personal ambition made 

him w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e a l l else to the achievement of his goal. 

An essential part of his dream was the restoration of Spanish 

Navarre taken by Ferdinand the Catholic i n 1512. His tendency 

to dance l i k e a puppet on a s t r i n g when the least promise of 

t e r r i t o r i a l compensation was dangled i n front of him made the 

king of Navarre a very undependable royal s e r v i t o r . Catherine 

knew well his weakness and sought to exploit i t but i t got beyond 

her control to the extent that P h i l i p II.could manipulate at w i l l 

the f i r s t prince of the blood. By making vague promises hinting 

that Antoine would be given Sardinia or Tunisia P h i l i p gained 

from him the reactions he desired. The king of Navarre was the 

subject of extensive correspondence between Chantonnay, the 



31 
Spanish ambassador, and P h i l i p II."'" Through Antoine de Bourbon 

the Spanish King was able to achieve changes i n the education of 

Charles IX and of Prince Henri de Navarre when Chantonnay feared 

those youths were not receiving i n s t r u c t i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y Catholic 

i n flavour. P h i l i p II took advantage of his influence over the 

Bourbon prince to have councillors changed at the French court 

and even to have Antoine's own wife banished from the court where 

i n her Protestant zeal she might unduly influence the queen 
2 

mother. At times Catherine's p o l i c y was seriously endangered 

by Antoine*s enslavement to his dream and to the king of Spain. 

In June, 1562 with sporadic f i g h t i n g throughout the kingdom, 

Catherine was determined to negotiate with Conde a peaceful 

settlement and Antoine was her representative. The two brothers 

agreed to decree a convention leading to a general disarmament 

but upon receipt of a long delayed dispatch from the king of 

Spain promising compensation, the king of Navarre s a c r i f i c e d the 

peaceful convention.^ Nevertheless, Catherine found i t necessary 

to keep the f i r s t prince of the blood s a t i s f i e d and, i f possible, 

associated with her for his support would have been invaluable to 

her enemies. In f a c t , responding to the encouragement of his 

wife and of his brother and seeing i n i t the opportunity to 

"'"Numerous examples are included i n the pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s 
of Alphonse de Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV. 

2 
I b i d . , 384-388, correspondence of Chantonnay. 

• ' i b i d . , 256. 



32 

f u r t h e r h i s own ends, A n t o i n e de Bourbon had j o i n e d the Huguenots 

f o r a s h o r t time i n I56O. The a b i l i t y of P h i l i p I I and of the 

P r o t e s t a n t s t o i n f l u e n c e A n t o i n e show t h a t at l e a s t one governor 

was s u s c e p t i b l e t o p r e s s u r e s which l e d him t o a c t i n ways 

d i r e c t l y opposed t o r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . 

H e n r i d ' A l b r e t r e s i d e d not i n h i s gouvernement but i n the 

c i t y of Pau i n h i s domain and h i s s o n - i n - l a w and grandson i n 

t u r n d i d l i t t l e t o improve the r e s i d e n c e r e c o r d of the governor 

of Guyenne. A u t h o r i t y was e x e r c i s e d i n t h e i r absence by 

" l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l en l'absence des gouverneur s .'* P e r i o d i c a l l y 

d u r i n g t i m e s of c i v i l s t r i f e the queen d e c i d e d t o send a. commissioner 

as her p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to b o l s t e r her a u t h o r i t y and t o 

p a c i f y the r e g i o n . L i k e the h i s t o r i c p o s i t i o n of l i e u t e n a n t -

g e n e r a l , such a commission was p r i m a r i l y , though not. e x c l u s i v e l y , 

m i l i t a r y and i t might c a r r y a u t h o r i t y over s e v e r a l p r o v i n c e s 

r a t h e r than one a l t h o u g h the commissioner might be governor i n 
2 

one. As a commission, t h i s post was temporary and was r e v o k e d at 

the monarch's w i l l or t e r m i n a t e d upon the c o m p l e t i o n of the m i s s i o n . 

C a t h e r i n e planned such commissions f o r Guyenne t h r e e t i m e s d u r i n g 

the y e a r s I56I t o I563. In each case the commission was to be 

g r a n t e d t o a Bourbon p r i n c e of the b l o o d , t w i c e t o the p r i n c e de 

Conde and once t o the due de M o n t p e n s i e r . Only the due de 

G i g o n , La. R e v o l t e de l a G a b e l l e , p. 30. 

Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 227. 



33 
Montpensier f u l f i l l e d his commission. 

In August, 1562 Burie and Monluc, the king's lieutenants 

i n Guyenne, received a t a c t f u l l e t t e r from Catherine de Medicis 

encouraging them and complimenting them on the work they were 

accomplishing i n cleansing the province of r e b e l s . She added that 

she had decided to send Montpensier with his company to reinforce 

them and also "to have more authority with the q u a l i t y . " To the 

n o b i l i t y , extremely conscious of a man's blood, t h i s Bourbon 

prince represented much greater authority than the lieutenants. 

Several of the prominent nobles i n Guyenne were either openly 

i d e n t i f i e d with the Huguenots or leaning in that d i r e c t i o n and 

i t was important to the royal cause to reverse the trend. Monluc 

recorded that Montpensier was sent because he and Burie were 

hardly i n good accord and added the suggestion that command 

should never be given to two; one lesser captain would even be 

better than two good ones together. Nevertheless, he concurred 

in the solution; he would always counsel the king to deal with a 

d i v i s i o n i n the army by sending a prince of the blood to take 
2 

o v e r a l l command. 

Montpensier's requests of the king's council reveal his 

conception of the nature and importance of his commission. To 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 376. 
2 

Paul Courteault, e d . , Comrnentaires de Blaise de Monluc, 
Marechal de France (Paris: Picard, I91D1 I I , 524, 525- Hereafter 
cited as Monluc, Comrnentaires. 



3^ 
h i s r e q u e s t s f o r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , m u n i t i o n s and f i n a n c e s f o r 

m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s the c o u n c i l r e p l i e d t h a t he would have t o 

l i m i t h i m s e l f c h i e f l y t o the r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n the f i e l d t o 

which he was g o i n g . He i n f o r m e d - t h e c o u n c i l he would need 1 , 0 0 0 

l i v r e s e v e r y month f o r the maintenance of h i s t a b l e and expenses 

a c c o r d i n g t o the custom of l i e u t e n a n t s of the k i n g , a statement 

to which the c o u n c i l r e p l i e d o n l y , " c e l l a e s t t r e s r a i s o n n a b l e . " 

The c o u n c i l l o r s d e c i d e d t h a t the Parlement of Bordeaux s h o u l d 

e l e c t two from i t s number t o f i l l the need e x p r e s s e d i n 

M o n t p e n s i e r ' s r e q u e s t f o r a m a i t r e de r e q u e t e s t o r e n d e r j u s t i c e 

and t o hear c o m p l a i n t s . A p e r s o n a l guard of t h i r t y a r q u e b u s i e r s , 

a monthly a l l o w a n c e f o r payment of c o u r i e r s and c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s 

r e g a r d i n g h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the s u s p e n s i o n of d i s l o y a l 

o f f i c e r s and the appointment of i n t e r i m r e p l a c e m e n t s were a l l 

among r e q u e s t s grante'd t o the due de Montpensier by the c o u n c i l . 

The f i r s t q u e s t i o n asked by M o n t p e n s i e r was which k n i g h t s of the 

o r d e r , e x p e r i e n c e d c a p t a i n s and o t h e r persons of note he would 

have f o r h i s c o u n c i l . The r o y a l a d v i s o r s , however, d i d not seem 

unduly concerned about the c o m p o s i t i o n of M o n t p e n s i e r ' s c o u n c i l 

and suggested t h a t he would be a s s i s t e d by such men of t h i s 

q u a l i t y as were i n the p r o v i n c e s and t h a t he would be accompanied 

from the c o u r t by t h r e e n o b l e s , the s e i g n e u r s de l a Vauguyon, de 

Candale and de Chavigny.""' Jean Peyrusse d ' E s c a r s , s e i g n e u r de l a 

Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 48. 



35 
Vauguyon, belonged t o a f a m i l y h i g h l y favoured by A n t o i n e de 

Bourbon. H e n r i de F o i x , comte de Oandale, s c i o n of the f a m i l y 

of the n o t e d Odet de F o i x , p l a y e d a prominent p a r t i n the 

C a t h o l i c cause throughout the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n and at 

Monluc's i n s t i g a t i o n formed the league of C a t h o l i c n o b i l i t y 

i n the B o r d e l a i s . F r a n c o i s l e Roy, s e i g n e u r de Chavigny, was 

governor of the c i t y of Blaye."*" The l a t t e r two were from 

prominent noble f a m i l i e s of Guyenne. 

The due de Montpensier h e l d the o f f i c e of governor of 

T o u r a i n e , Anjou and Maine a l o n g w i t h h i s commission as l i e u t e n a n t -

g e n e r a l of Guyenne w i t h a u t h o r i t y over P o i t o u , La R o c h e l l e , and 

l ' A u n i s . The m u l t i p l e a l l e g i a n c e and m u l t i p l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 

which c o m p l i c a t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the kingdom are i l l u s t r a t e d 

by the c o n c e r n m a i n t a i n e d by t h i s p r i n c e f o r c e r t a i n l a n d s of h i s 
2 

own i n h e r i t a n c e i n the duchy of M o n t p e n s i e r . W r i t i n g t o the 

l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of the kingdom he s t a t e d t h a t he had g i v e n 

the government of h i s duchy of Montpensier t o the s e i g n e u r d ' E f f i a t , 

one of h i s v a s s a l s and s u b j e c t s . T h i s v a s s a l l a b o u r e d so i n d u s t r i o u s -

l y t h a t the due's chateaux of M o n t p e n s i e r and A i g u e s p e r s e and h i s 

town of the same p l a c e , on which the s a f e t y of the n e i g h b o u r i n g 

a r e a depended, were i n an e x c e l l e n t s t a t e of d e f e n c e . D ' E f f i a t , 

Alphonse de R u b l e , ed., Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s de B l a i s e  
de Monluc ( P a r i s : Renouard, I87O), IV, 210, n o t e . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d 
as Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s . 

Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 52. 



36 

h a v i n g e v e r y d e s i r e t o r e s p e c t the a u t h o r i t y of monsieur de 

S a i n t - G e r a n , l i e u t e n a n t f o r the k i n g i n the r e g i o n i n the absence 

of che marechal de Sa-int-Andre, took from him c o n f i r m a t i o n of the 

a u t h o r i t y Montpensier had g r a n t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the s e i g n e u r 

de H a u l t f u e i l l e , e s t a b l i s h e d by S a i n t - G e r a n as governor of 

Clermont, R i o n , M o n t f e r r a n t and o t h e r n e i g h b o u r i n g towns, wished 

t o i n c l u d e i n h i s commission M o n t p e n s i e r ' s town of A i g u e s p e r s e . 

M o n t p e n s i e r wished the k i n g of Navarre t o i n t e r v e n e , command 

H a u l t f u e i l l e t o keep o u t , and t h u s a l l e v i a t e the d i s o r d e r and 

c o n f u s i o n a r i s i n g i n the duchy.""" 

A f t e r u n d e r t a k i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of h i s commission 

M o n t p e n s i e r r e p o r t e d t o the k i n g from P o i t i e r s . He had c o n f i r m e d 

the l o y a l t y of c e r t a i n c i t i e s , a d j u s t e d the s i z e of t h e i r g a r r i s o n s , 

c o n s u l t e d w i t h Sansac and La Vauguy.on about the a d v i s a b i l i t y of 

a t t a c k i n g the Huguenot f o r c e s under the s e i g n e u r de l a R o c h e f o u c a u l d 

and d e c i d e d a g a i n s t i t , and had g i v e n the o r d e r t o have c e r t a i n 

sums of money conducted t o her m a j e s t y . A f t e r h a v i n g observed 

c o n d i t i o n s i n the r e g i o n , he recommended t h a t , s i n c e Bourges had 

been d e l i v e r e d , the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s under B u r i e r e q u e s t e d t o be 
2 

sent from Guyenne s h o u l d be kept i n the p r o v i n c e . 

Montpensier j o i n e d Monluc and B u r i e o n l y a f t e r t h e i r major 

I b i d . , No. 5 .̂ 
2 I b i d . 



37 

m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y over Duras at the battle of Vergt, or rather, 

they joined him.''" He warmly congratulated Monluc and agreed to 

support his request for an office and company for his brother, 
2 

Joachim de Monluc, seigneur de Lioux. Monluc was overjoyed at 

the a r r i v a l of a prince of the blood and gave him detailed 

recommendations for deployment of personnel i n the province 

including the sending of Burie into France with the troops which 

had been requested.^ Montpensier, however, f e e l i n g that the work 

of p a c i f i c a t i o n i n Guyenne was proceding favourably, travelled 

north into Saintonge. In November Montpensier sent a represent-

ative to report to the court on his mission i n Guyenne. The i s l e s 

had been reduced to obedience, fortresses razed, arms seized, and 

divine service re-established. He reported with concern that 

La Rochelle had dispatched to the court the elu and some others 

armed with 4,000 or 5,000 ecus with which to reward the o f f i c e r s 

who could assist them i n their attempt to be r i d of the garrison. 

S.uch men would surely l i e about t h e i r loyalty and the prince 

feared that the c i t y would f a l l into the hands of the rebels who 

had already plotted to k i l l , Jarnac, their governor. Much of his 

report was devoted to m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l needs but the extent 

of his authority was indicated by the fact that he pointed out the 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 563• 

I b i d . , II, 564 and Documents Pour S e r v i r a . . . , No. 64. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et Letcres, IV, 171. 



38 

necessity of commissioning men to j u d i c i a l and other essential 

offices vacant by the absence of the holders, defeated i n the 

r e b e l l i o n or deceased."'" He did not seem to think i t necessary 

to make personal recommendations to those o f f i c e s . 

Months before sending Montpensier Catherine had planned 

to send Conde into Guyenne with a special commission. In December, 

1561 when r e l i g i o u s passions were inflamed and Burie, the 

lieutenant-general, appeared incapable of pacifying them, the 

queen hoped that the presence of a prince of the blood would win 

obedience from the Catholics and that the presence of their chief 
2 

would calm the Huguenots. In February, 1562 preparations were 

almost completed. At the same time Catherine sent Crussol, f i r s t 

peer of France, into Languedoc and Provence with analogous powers. 

It may be that she did not want to place undue emphasis on her 

intended reliance on the Huguenot leader and, therefore, avoided 

making his commission unique. Conde was instructed to v i s i t the 

c i t i e s , restore e c c l e s i a s t i c s to benefices and churches usurped 

by the Protestants, restore to office those forced out by the 

seditious, punish p i l l a g e r s and warn Protestants about unauthor-

ized p u b l i s h i n g . To those of the reformed f a i t h who complained 

"'"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7^. 
2 

Paul Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, Blaise de Monluc 
(Paris: P i c a r d , 1909), pp. 1560157. 



39 
about h a v i n g no p l a c e t o worship God, Conde was t o make g e n t l y 

u n d e r s t o o d t h a t , i f they c o u l d f i n d a p l a c e o u t s i d e the c i t i e s 

except i n a church or temple, he would.give o r d e r s t o the r o y a l 

o f f i c e r s t o t u r n t h e i r eyes the o t h e r way. 

Had Conde f u l f i l l e d the commission, the Huguenots might 

w e l l have been t r e a t e d more f a v o u r a b l y than even the r e g e n t had 

p l a n n e d . However, the m i s s i o n was not t o be f o r P h i l i p I I had 

o t h e r p l a n s and A n t o i n e de Bourbon responded t o the p r e s s u r e 

p l a c e d on him t o thwart C a t h e r i n e ' s p l a n s . The S p a n i s h monarch 

would have p r e f e r r e d the m i s s i o n t o have been conducted 

p e r s o n a l l y by the man whom he r e f e r r e d t o as the s e i g n e u r de 

VendSme, f o r he would never address him as k i n g of N a v a r r e . The 

S p a n i a r d s a l s o made events then t a k i n g p l a c e i n Guyenne work t o 

t h e i r advantage. A member of the n o b i l i t y , the baron de Furnel, 

had been murdered by h i s Huguenot t e n a n t s and B l a i s e de Monluc 

was g a t h e r i n g a m i l i t a r y f o r c e t o avenge the murder and q u e l l the 

l o c a l u p r i s i n g s . S p a n i s h o f f i c e r s c l a i m e d t h a t t r o o p s were b e i n g 

mustered f o r an a t t a c k on S p a n i s h Navarre t o be l e d by Conde. 

E x p l o i t i n g these c l a i m s , P h i l i p I I i n f o r m e d A n t o i n e t h a t he would 

c o n t i n u e n e g o t i a t i o n s over the l o s s of Navarre o n l y at the p r i c e 

of Conde's r e t u r n i n t o P i c a r d y . A n t o i n e had been the f i r s t t o 

approve C o n d i ' s m i s s i o n i n t o Guyenne and he was the f i r s t t o 

oppose i t . As a r e s u l t the m i s s i o n d i d not take place.""" 

R u b l e , A n t o i n e de Bourbon, p. 5 0 f f . 



Lieutenants-general 

In the absence of the governor or of s p e c i a l commissioners 

r o y a l a u t h o r i t y was exercised by s e v e r a l l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l . 

There were three or four i n the region under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 

Antoine de Bourbon, one f o r P o i t o u , one for La Rochelle and l'Aunis 

and two f o r Guyenne. At l e a s t Guyenne had two i n p r a c t i c e from 

December, 1561, and o f f i c i a l l y , from March, 1563« The career of 

B l a i s e de Monluc demonstrates the ambition and opportunism of a 

l i e u t e n a n t , and the extent to which he could mobilize l o c a l 

support both for the crown and on h i s own behalf. 

Monluc was from a noble family i n the Agenais, a family 

of better breeding than fortune. As a lad he served as a page 

i n the household of the due de Guise and i n the f i r s t years of 

the r e i g n of F r a n c i s I he began what was to be a b r i l l i a n t m i l i t a r y 

career i n I t a l y . S h o r t l y before the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis he 

replaced d'Andelot f o r a time as colonel-general of the i n f a n t r y , 

one of the highest posts i n the m i l i t a r y command. A f t e r the peace 

he r e t i r e d to the Chateau d ' E s t i l l a c near Agen where i n the s p r i n g 

of 1560, perhaps to please the Guises, he responded to the plea 

of some municipal o f f i c i a l s and a s s i s t e d i n the expulsion of the 

Protestant m i n i s t e r s of Agen. In response a band of f i v e or s i x 

hundred Huguenots besieged his home. The old captain e a s i l y 

r e p e l l e d them but as a r e s u l t of h i s complaint Charles IX ordered 



the k i n g of Navarre to assure the peace of the Gascon hero."*" 

A n t i - G u i s e sentiment had swept the country as a r e s u l t of t h e i r 

harsh r e p r i s a l s f o l l o w i n g the C o n s p i r a c y of Amboise, a 

P r o t e s t a n t p l o t to remove F r a n c i s II from the i n f l u e n c e of the 

G u i s e s . Seeking to take advantage of the u n p o p u l a r i t y of the 

government, Antoine de Bourbon had i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f with the 

Huguenot cause. For t h i s reason he was l i t t l e i n c l i n e d to favour 
2 

Monluc 1 s a c t i o n s i n support of the C a t h o l i c o f f i c i a l s . Due 

F r a n c o i s de Guise to whom Monluc appealed a d v i s e d him to r e g a i n 

the favour of the k i n g of Navarre, advice that very n e a r l y l e d 
3 

to h i s d o w n f a l l . 

The k i n g of Navarre and h i s brother Conde were then at 

Nerac g a t h e r i n g about them a band of men anxious to avenge them-

s e l v e s a g a i n s t the Guises f o r the bloody aftermath of Amboise and 

to Nerac went Monluc anxious to i n g r a t i a t e h i m s e l f with Antoine d 

Bourbon. There he attended the p r e a c h i n g of the reformed f a i t h , 

convinced Beza and Jeanne d ' A l b r e t of h i s l o y a l t y to t h e i r cause 

and assured Conde" t h a t the e f f o r t s of the p r i n c e s of the blood 

would tend only to the u t i l i t y of the k i n g and of the kingdom. 

T h i s sounded l i k e the statement of a good Huguenot, s k i l f u l at 

p u t t i n g the face of l o y a l t y on a c t i o n s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the 

Ruble, Jeanne d ' A l b r e t , I, 1 5 0 . 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 3 9 7 - 3 9 8 . 

' i b i d . 



k2 . 

g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e k i n g d o m . " ' " T h a t summer t h e G u i s e s a r r e s t e d a n 

a g e n t o f A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n who i n h i s c o n f e s s i o n s , c o m p r o m i s e d 

s e v e r a l n o b l e s , , i n c l u d i n g M o n l u c , who t h e n h a s t e n e d t o t h e c o u r t 

t o c l e a r h i m s e l f . He t r i e d f e v e r i s h l y t o p r o v e h i s l o y a l t y t o 

t h e e x t e n t o f e s p o u s i n g t h e u n p o p u l a r G u i s e p o s i t i o n i n t h e 

c o u n c i l o f t h e K n i g h t s o f t h e O r d e r when t h e m a j o r i t y came t o 

t h e d e f e n c e o f V i d a m e de C h a r t r e s , a p r o m i n e n t n o b l e a r r e s t e d 

f o r H u g u e n o t o p i n i o n s . M o n l u c was p r e s e n t a t t h e r e c e p t i o n o f 

e i g h t e e n new members i n t o t h e o r d e r , members a p p o i n t e d by t h e 

G u i s e s t o r e d r e s s t h e H u g u e n o t m a j o r i t y . M o n l u c had u n f o r t u n a t e -

l y c u r r i e d t h e f a v o u r o f N a v a r r e j u s t b e f o r e t h e f o r t u n e s o f t h e 

B o u r b o n p r i n c e s were e c l i p s e d , a l b e i t t e m p o r a r i l y , w i t h t h e 

i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d t r i a l o f Conde a n d t h e d i s g r a c e o f A n t o i n e . 

M o n l u c knew t h a t he h a d a l i e n a t e d h i m s e l f f r o m A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n , 

and p e r h a p s he knew t h a t A n t o i n e ' s f a v o u r i t e , F r a n c o i s d ' E s c a r s 

2 
was i n t r i g u i n g f o r o f f i c e . C o n v i n c e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t he h a d no 

c h a n c e o f r e c e i v i n g a n i m p o r t a n t o f f i c e i n G u y e n n e , he s o u g h t a n 

a p p o i n t m e n t i n D a u p h i n e , t h e G u i s e g o u v e r n e m e n t , where h i s b r o t h e r , 

J e a n de M o n l u c was b i s h o p o f V a l e n c e b u t h i s a d v a n c e s i n t h a t 

d i r e c t i o n were r e j e c t e d b y t h e G u i s e s . 

M o n l u c was s t i l l a t t h e c o u r t when t h e d e a t h o f F r a n c i s I I 

C o u r t e a u l t , Un C a d e t de G a s c o g n e , p . 1^9. 
2 

R o c h a m b e a u , L e t t r e s d ' A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n e t de J e h a n n e  
d ' A l b r e t ( P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1877), N o s . C X L V , C X L V I , C X L V I I . 



43 

brought about a sudden change i n the fortunes of the Bourbons, 

the Constable and the Guises. He assisted at the Estates-General 

of Orleans ^ and must have r e a l i z e d that the kingdom was not far 

from open war. Without having obtained office he returned to 

Guyenne i n January where he attached himself to Burie, the 

lieutenant-general, and proceeded to make himself indispensable, 

with a view to supplanting the old o f f i c e r . Charles de Coucys, 

seigneur de Burie, of a noble family in Saintonge, was, l i k e 

Monluc, a veteran of the I t a l i a n wars but he was almost seventy 

years of age, old and t i r e d . His wife was a s i s t e r of one of 

Conde's lieutenants and he had a number of r e l a t i v e s i n the 
2 

Huguenot camp, a fact Monluc was l a t e r to use against him. The 

old lieutenant-general had neither the strength nor the heart 

for the long struggle which lay ahead. 

In March Monluc was at Agen to play a prominent role i n 

the assembly of the Estates of the slne'chaussee. Moderating 

the influence of the Huguenots and reassuring the Catholics he 

played the r o l e of politique to perfection. This time he was 

following the policy of none less than the queen mother, a policy 

of t o l e r a t i o n . In June when troubles broke out at Layrolle and 

Serignac, Monluc sought and was given a mission by the king and 

Monluc, 
i 
Monluc, 

Comrnentaires, I I , 393« 

Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , i v , 158. 



44 
queen to deal with them."'' The ingenuous Burie recommended him 

2 

as being worthy of that charge or of a greater one. No one could 

have been more zealous i n applying the p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n than 

was Monluc. He was c e r t a i n that p l e a s i n g the queen mother was the 

only route to an o f f i c e which would b r i n g f u r t h e r honour and r i c h e s . 

Catherine's p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n underlay her attempt to b r i n g 

about a rapprochement between the C a t h o l i c and the Huguenot c l e r g y 

at the Colloquy of Poissy. One of those who worked hardest there 

to accomplish the queen mother's goals was Jean de Monluc, Bishop 

of Valence and brother of B l a i s e . The miscarriage of the colloquy 

was a setback for the p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n and B l a i s e de Monluc 

returned to the court to see which way the wind was blowing."^ 

When he a r r i v e d at Saint-Germain e a r l y i n December, Monluc, 

had at l a s t learned to commit himself only with caution, and t h i s 

time he received with prudent reserve Condi's e f f o r t s to r e c r u i t 

him. I t was not that becoming a Huguenot was repugnant i n i t s e l f 

for Monluc 1 s guide was the a t t i t u d e of the a u t h o r i t y on whom h i s 

advancement depended. Some time l a t e r i n w r i t i n g to the queen 

he spoke with horror of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Huguenots and he 

assured her that he could never change h i s r e l i g i o n unless h i s 

"""Lettres de Catherine de M e d i c i s , I , 2 1 1 . 
2 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 153. 

^Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 399. 



45 

king changed f i r s t . ^ While he was at the court word came of 

numerous uprisings i n Guyenne and i t was then that Catherine 

determined to send Conde to the province. The king of Navarre 

wished to send l e t t e r s i n s t r u c t i n g Burie to take measures to 

restore order i n the meantime but the queen mother suggested 
2 

sending Monluc and Charles IX signed the patent. Monluc was 

empowered to use the companies from the garrisons and to raise 

a few hundred arquebusiers but his commission was intended only 

as a preliminary to the mission of Conde. However, when Conde 

was not sent, and Montpensier appeared only b r i e f l y many months 

l a t e r , Monluc's role assumed much greater importance. In recount-

ing his commission Monluc made no reference to the impending 

mission of Conde and presented his own as p a r a l l e l to that of 

Crussol thus exaggerating his own importance.^ With the sending 

of Monluc the Spanish ambassador, knowing his m i l i t a r y reptuation 

and his energetic nature, wrote that Guyenne had found i t s saviour 

Shortly after his return to Guyenne, Monluc's attitude and 

actions toward the Protestants underwent an abrupt change. From 

t o l e r a t i o n he turned to stern repression and bloody r e p r i s a l for 

acts of r e b e l l i o n . Several factors contributed to this change of 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 237• 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 400. 

' i b i d . , I I , 401. 

Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, 152. 



46 

a t t i t u d e . De Franc, lieutenant i n the town of Condom revealed 

that the Huguenots had a plan for Monluc ! s assassination."1" 

Worse s t i l l , they were p l o t t i n g to seize the king, his brothers, 
2 

the queen mother and the Guises. But, probably the most important 

factor to influence Monluc was the degree to which the Huguenot 

movement was threatening the n o b i l i t y . One of the prominent 

nobles, the baron de Fumel, had been k i l l e d by the peasants of 

his own estate, a.crime Monluc was charged to investigate. The 

Huguenots were boasting not only that they would pay no more 

dimes to the Church but that they would not pay either the t a i l l e 

to the king or their seigneurial rents and dues to their l o r d s . ^ 

Like the other nobles Monluc was h o r r i f i e d by these threats to 

the very foundations of sixteenth century s o c i a l order. Encouraged 

by the willingness of the n o b i l i t y to make him their champion, 

Monluc counselled harsh treatment of the Huguenots. Writing to 

the queen and to the king of Navarre, Monluc reported that the 

reform had the support of no more than one-tenth of the population 

and that he had the solut ion; force the lords of the region to 

their homes, for some among them supplied Huguenot m i l i t a r y 

leadership, put to death the p r i n c i p a l ministers and banish the 

remainder. To accomplish this i t would be necessary to move quickly. 

"'"Monluc, Comme nt a i r es, I I , 412. 
2 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 161. 
3 I b i d . , II, 421. 
4 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 114-118. 



47 

I n M a r c h , 1562 w h e n M o n l u c o f f e r e d t h i s a d v i c e , s u c h c o u n c i l s 

h a d s o m e c h a n c e o f b e i n g h e a r d f o r t h e C a t h o l i c T r i u m v i r a t e o f 

t h e d u e d e G u i s e , t h e c o n s t a b l e d e M o n t m o r e n c y a n d t h e m a r e c h a l 

S a i n t - A n d r e , w a s g a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e a t t h e c o u r t . 

A c t i n g d e c i s i v e l y , M o n l u c a c h i e v e d t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n o f 

T o u l o u s e . . " ' " F i n a l l y h e h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e e x p l o i t w h i c h w a s 

s u r e t o b r i n g h i m h o n o u r a n d r e w a r d . W h a t a b l o w i t w a s t o f i n d 

t h a t d ' E s c a r s h a d b e e n a c c r e d i t e d a s l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l o f t h e 

p r o v i n c e w h i l e h e h i m s e l f w a s s t i l l o p e r a t i n g w i t h o u t o f f i c e ' . 

I n a v i o l e n t l e t t e r t o t h e q u e e n , M o n l u c a s k e d t o b e a l l o w e d t o 

l e a v e t h e p r o v i n c e a n d l e t d ' E s c a r s b e r e s p o n s i b l e h i m s e l f f o r t h e 

2 

d i s a s t e r w h i c h w o u l d f o l l o w . I n t h e l i g h t o f M o n l u c ' s b r i l l i a n t 

s e r v i c e t h e q u e e n c o u l d n o t a l l o w t h a t s i t u a t i o n t o c o m e a b o u t 

a n d d ' E s c a r s h a d t o w a i t a l m o s t a y e a r b e f o r e r e c e i v i n g a n 

a l t e r n a t e a p p o i n t m e n t . S h e c o n g r a t u l a t e d M o n l u c o n h i s s u c c e s s , 

a c c o r d e d h i m 3,000 l i v r e s f o r h i s p e r s o n a l e x p e n s e s a n d a 

c o n f i s c a t i o n he h a d r e q u e s t e d , a n d g a v e h i m c a r t e b l a n c h e t o 

3 
c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s . 

M o n l u c h a d s e v e r a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o i n c r e a s e h i s p o p u l a r 

s u p p o r t i n G u y e n n e b y c o n t e s t i n g o r d e r s f r o m t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t , 

M o n l u c , C o m r n e n t a i r e s , I I , 444- 4 5 9 ' 
2 

M o n l u c , C o m r n e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s , I V , 144. 

^ L e t t r e s d e C a t h e r i n e d e M e d i c i s , I , 331-332, 339; M o n l u c , 
C o m r n e n t a i r e s , I I , 469-470. 



u s u a l l y b e c a u s e t h e o r d e r s h a d b e e n b a s e d on l a c k o f k n o w l e d g e 

o f a f f a i r s i n G u y e n n e . T h i s was t h e ' c a s e i n t h e summer o f 1562 

when t h e c o u r t , a p p a r e n t l y t h i n k i n g t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e 

p r o v i n c e w e l l a d v a n c e d , commanded B u r i e t o l e a d i n t o F r a n c e 

n u m b e r s o f t r o o p s w h i c h w o u l d a l m o s t s t r i p G u y e n n e o f m i l i t a r y 

f o r c e s . I n o p p o s i n g t h e s e o r d e r s M o n l u c o n c e a g a i n r a i s e d h i s 

s t o c k w i t h t h e G a s c o n n o b i l i t y . M o n l u c h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f 

w i n n i n g t h e g r a t i t u d e o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o f t h e c i t y o f B o r d e a u x 

by c o m i n g t o t h e i r d e f e n c e when a n a t t e m p t was made t o s e i z e t h e 

c i t y . H i s p o p u l a r i t y a n d s u p p o r t i n t h e p r o v i n c e i n c r e a s e d 

c o n s t a n t l y among t h e C a t h o l i c s w h i l e t h e H u g u e n o t s h a t e d a n d 

f e a r e d h i m f o r he p r a c t i s e d j u s t i c e by e x e c u t i n g men t o make 

" e x a m p l e s " o f t h e m t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he was a c c o m p a n i e d b y 

two hangmen whom p e o p l e f a c e t i o u s l y c a l l e d h i s l a c k e y s . 

T h r o u g h o u t S e p t e m b e r M o n l u c ' s d e s i r e was t o do b a t t l e 

w i t h t h e H u g u e n o t c h i e f , S y m p h o r i e n de D u r f o r t , s e i g n e u r de 

D u r a s , b u t B u r i e was r e l u c t a n t a n d t h e p r o j e c t r e q u i r e d a l l t h e 

a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s i n G u y e n n e . F u r i o u s w i t h t h e o l d l i e u t e n a n t -

g e n e r a l , M o n l u c w r o t e a n g r y l e t t e r s t o t h e q u e e n m o t h e r m a k i n g 

r e f e r e n c e s t o B u r i e ' s H u g u e n o t r e l a t i v e s . " ' " He c l a i m e d t h a t i f 

he had h a d s o l e command, two m o n t h s 'would h a v e s e e n h i m d e a d o r 

M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s , I V , 160. 



L9 

Duras defeated but that every time he had sought to do battle 

with the Huguenot leader Burie had ruined his plans."*" The f i e r y 

Gascon captain f i n a l l y got his opportunity i n spite of his 

associate. The anticipated battle took place at Vergt on 

October 9, 1562 and the Catholic forces under Monluc won a 

decisive victory over the Huguenots. As he had done after the 

p a c i f i c a t i o n of Toulouse, Monluc immediately attempted to 

exploit his victory by requesting favours from the crown. For 

his brother he asked a company of l i g h t horse and the post of 
2 

governor i n the c i t y of Perigueux. For himself he asked the 

p r i v i l e g e of granting decrees of pardon and the restoration of 

the county of Gaure, previously granted him and then taken away 

i n a reunion of the royal domain. The king r e p l i e d t e l l i n g him 

that his requests had been found unreasonable and that he should 

content himself with the 500 l i v r e s he received monthly for his 

t a b l e . 5 

E a r l y i n 1563 when victory for the Catholic army seemed 

l i k e l y , Monluc was instrumental i n the formation of a Catholic 

association i n the senechaussle of Agen ^ and the a f f i l i a t i o n 

1 I b i d . , IV, 158. 
2 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 63. 

^ I b i d . , No. 76; Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 196. 
k 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 190-195« 



50 

of that association with the great ligue embracing a l l the 

t e r r i t o r y i n Languedoc and Guyenne under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 

Parlement of Toulouse."'' In so doing he was cementing his 

position as champion and spokesman for the n o b i l i t y but he was 

also forming a Catholic organization to p a r a l l e l the synods of 

the Huguenots and to keep the l a t t e r under control when the 
2 

garrisons would be disbanded or reduced. A s i m i l a r league was 

formed at Bordeaux at Monluc's suggestion by Frederic de F o i x , 

comte de Candale, who informed the queen of i t s organization i n 

March, I563. The Catholic n o b i l i t y i n a remonstrance to the crown 

complained that while they had been commanded to disband, the 

Huguenots were s t i l l allowed their assemblies.^ Catherine de 
4 

Medicis, hearing of the leagues, commanded Monluc to destroy them. 

She had recently had experience with the association formed by 

Conde and with the triumvirate, both avowedly l o y a l to the crown 

yet both committed to achieving a purpose, i f necessary, i n spite 

of the crown and she was convinced that a l l leagues constituted a 

threat to the crown. Furthermore, l i k e the Huguenot organization, 

the leagues were l o c a l l y formed and such a manifestation of prov-

i n c i a l independence could not pass unnoticed. 

"""Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197-
2 
Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, 344-345. 

^Documents Pour Servir a. . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 

^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 551-552. 
5 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197-



51 
Monluc arrived i n Bordeaux i n March and received n o t i f i c -

ation of his appointment as lieutenant-general of the king i n 

Haute-Guyenne Burie was to r e t a i n authority i n that part of the 

province west of the River L o t . This was a source of d i s s a t i s -

faction to Monluc for Burie, old and s i c k , had r e t i r e d to his lands 

i n Saintonge the previous October. Courteault suggests that 

Catherine did not want to aggrandize the vain captain too much or 

to offend the representatives of the old Gascon families too 
2 

greatly by favouring t h i s parvenu. According to his cwn none 

too modest account Monluc was prevailed upon to accept the appoint-

ment by the combined efforts of a l l the nobles and officers 

present i n Bordeaux.5 

Antoine de N o a i l l e s , governor of Bordeaux, had died just 

before Monluc's a r r i v a l i n the c i t y and his successor did not take 

office u n t i l the end of May. Burie was i n Saintonge. The govern-

ment of the region and the execution of the edict accompanying 

the Peace of Amboise was l e f t e n t i r e l y to Monluc who remained 

i n Bordeaux almost three months. In f a c t , i n June Charles IX 

wrote to Monluc that he had told d'Escars that i f he did not go 

immediately to Bordeaux the king would send another in his place 

to whom he would give the o f f i c e . He had also commanded Burie to 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 577. 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 580. 



52 

go t o h i s gouvernement t o g i v e o r d e r and oversee the maintenance 

of the e d i c t . W h e n Monluc l e f t Bordeaux he had o b t a i n e d from 

the Parlement support f o r the demand he addressed t o the k i n g t h a t 

Guyenne be d i v i d e d between h i m s e l f and B u r i e by senechaussees and 

not by r i v e r . He had not been g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y over the whole of 

the p r o v i n c e and i t would o n l y add i n s u l t t o i n j u r y i f he had t o 

share w i t h B u r i e a u t h o r i t y over h i s home r e g i o n , the A g e n a i s , 

because i t was d i v i d e d by a r i v e r . 

At Agen Monluc was g i v e n a t r i u m p h a l e n t r y . C i t y o f f i c i a l s 

p r e s e n t e d him the keys of the c i t y w h i l e one hundred costumed 

c h i l d r e n shouted, " V i v e l e r o i et l e s i e u r de Monluc son l i e u t e n a n t ' . " 

At Condom the c o n s u l s o f f e r e d him a c h a i n of g o l d w i t h the o r d e r of 

S a i n t - M i c h e l worth 308 l i v r e s . The E s t a t e s of Agenais which met 

i n June was s t r o n g l y . C a t h o l i c and p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t the terms of 

the Peace of Amboise. They r e g a r d e d Monluc as t h e i r l i b e r a t o r 

and asked t h a t the p a r t of t h e i r s i n e c h a u s s e e l y i n g west of the 

Lot be t a k e n from B u r i e ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n and p l a c e d under Monluc. 

The d i v i s i o n of the gouvernement c o n t i n u e d t o be a bone of 

c o n t e n t i o n w i t h Monluc who wrote t o the queen t h a t he understood 

B u r i e , a f t e r l e a v i n g the o t h e r p a r t of the gouvernement, had gone 

t o the c o u r t and t h a t a l l the r e g i o n s t i l l B u r i e ' s was i n r e v o l t 

Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 107. 

C o u r t e a u l t , Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 205. 



53 
with no one doing anything about i t . "He has promised so many 

times to give you t h i s gouvernement," continued Monluc i r o n i c a l l y , 

"that you send him promptly to do his duty. As for me, I have 

no wish to be valet to him or to any other save the king and 

you; and w i l l do my duty i n the charge I've been g i v e n . . . . " """ 

Monluc was to wait u n t i l the beginning of 1565 when Catherine 

and Charles IX came into the province for further reward. At 

that time to encourage him Catherine made him a member of the 

Privy C o u n c i l . Immediately thereafter Burie, with impeccable 

timing for once, died leaving no reasonable alternative but to 

make Blaise de Monluc lieutenant-general of the king i n the entire 

province, an appointment to which was added the office of v i c e -
2 

admiral of Guyenne. 

Governors of C i t i e s 

The t h i r d echelon of royal lieutenants i n the province 

of Guyenne was composed of those who commanded garrisons i n major 

c i t i e s and had authority over the neighbouring regions. They 

were known as governors of c i t i e s and resided i n such important 
3 

centres as Dax, Blaye, Bayonne and Bordeaux. The governor of a 

c i t y or f o r t i f i e d place was subordinate to the lieutenant-general 

though i n some cases not subordinate enough to please the l a t t e r 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 218. 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 216. 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 199-200. 



5^ 

o f f i c e r . Men of the leading noble families such as the F o i x -

Gandale were appointed to these o f f i c e s , often as one of several 

offices they possessed. 

Antoine de Noailles was captain of the Chateau du Ha and 

governor of Bordeaux, both royal o f f i c e s , and mayor of the c i t y , 

a municipal o f f i c e . The office of mayor had been occupied 

previously by another royal o f f i c e r , Jean de D a i l l o n , comte du 

Lude, who had been lieutenant-general of the king i n Guyenne and 

Poitou i n the absence of the king of Navarre. Noailles 

commanded a lieutenant and one hundred men and for remuneration 

he received 1 0 0 l i v r e s monthly, twice the stipend of his 

lieutenant and one-fifth that of Burie or Monluc. He rendered 

s u f f i c i e n t l y important service that Catherine wrote that the king 

was "sending him the gold chain of the order of Saint-Michel by 

the comte Des Cars, not wishing to leave him unremunerated for 

his s e r v i c e . " Burie, the senior o f f i c i a l i n the region, resented 

the influence of Noailles and sounded l i k e a petulant c h i l d when 

he gave instructions to his representative to t e l l the king that 

the seigneur de Noailles was l i v i n g i n the Chateau du Ha where 

he (Burie) wished to l i v e . Should not N o a i l l e s , as mayor of the 

town, l i v e i n the mayor's residence? Burie also reported that 

the keys of the c i t y were delivered nightly to Noailles and he 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, X , 8 l , 88. 



55 
f e l t that when he was i n the c i t y they should be delivered to 

him as lieutenant-general."'" Like any administration the govern-

ment of Guyenne could be hampered by the pettiness of i t s 

members i n their relationships with one another. 

Antoine de Noailles had long been a f a i t h f u l royal o f f i c e r 
2 

and had served as ambassador i n England. His brother, de l ' l s l e , 

became Bishop of Dax and l a t e r ambassador to London and to 

Constantinpole. Through his wife, Jeanne de Gontaut, Antoine de 

Noailles was related to Jean de S a i n t - S u l p i c e , the competent and 

i n f l u e n t i a l ambassador to the court of P h i l i p I I . Thus Noailles 

was a member of a family well rewarded for f a i t h f u l service to 

the crown. 

At the end of January, 1563, soon after Catherine's l e t t e r 

announcing to him the king's award of the chain with the order of 

S a i n t - M i c h e l , Antoine de Noailles addressed a long memoire to the 

king on measures to be taken i n Guyenne to assure the p a c i f i c a t i o n 

of the province. He outlined the l e t t e r s i t would be important 

for the king to write, the appreciation to be expressed, recompense 

to be promised, admonitions to be given and f i n a n c i a l arrangements 

to be made. In his thorough analysis even the lieutenant-general 

"'"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. 
2 
Edmond Cabie, Guerres de Religion dans le Sud-ouest de l a  

France et Principalement dans le Quercy d'apres les Papiers des  
Seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 i 1590 ) A l b i : Imprimerie 
Noguies, 1906), p. 12. 



56 

received due attention; i t was necessary to write a very a f f e c t -

ionate l e t t e r to Burie for the conservation of La Rochelle and the 

rest of Saintonge and the Angoumois, especially the ports threatened 

by the E n g l i s h . Similar l e t t e r s should be written to the l a 

Tremoille brothers, monsieur de Pons, and to a l l the senechaux, 

e s p e c i a l l y the senechal of Perigord who deserved p a r t i c u l a r praise 

and promise of recompense. The comte de Ventadour must be cautioned 

to take care i n the c i t y of Limoges and other important places i n 

Limousin. Laiazun, royal officer i n the c i t y of Bragerac, had not 

been r e s i d i n g i n that c i t y and the king should reprove him for i t . 

Good l e t t e r s should be sent to Candale and to the marquis de Trans, 

men with much credit and favour i n the region, who were very l o y a l 

and eager to be employed in the king's service. Candale had often 

offered to assist Noailles with his presence and that of his numerous 

followers. La Mote, lieutenant to the chateau and town of Dax, 

needed a l e t t e r of encouragement for his captain was i l l and i t 

would be well to write to the o f f i c e r s of the town also. Bordeaux, 

N o a i l l e s ' f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , required repaires to i t s walls and, 

above a l l , pay for i t s s o l d i e r s . The governor had held assemblies 

of the inhabitants several times, assisted by d'Escars i n the l a s t , 

and with his memoire he was sending his majesty the record of the 

deliberations and the dispatch of d'Escars."*" Whereas many of 

Monluc's l e t t e r consisted either of p a r t i c u l a r d e t a i l s or of 

Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, kS9. 



57 

g r a n d d e s i g n s , N o a i l l e s ' memoire p r o v i d e d a t h o u g h t f u l and 

p r a c t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f a c t i o n s r e q u i r e d f r o m t h e k i n g t o m a i n t a i n 

and e x p l o i t t h e l o y a l t y o f h i s s u b j e c t s i n Guyenne. 

L a c k o f s u c h a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a t t h e c o u r t a b o u t 

a f f a i r s i n Guyenne l e d t o many d i f f i c u l t i e s . A n t o i n e de 

P a r d a i l l a n , b a r o n de G o n d r i n , l e f t t h e c o u r t a t p o n t a i n e b l e a u 

c o n g r a t u l a t i n g h i m s e l f on h i s a p p o i n t m e n t a s g o v e r n o r o f B o r d e a u x 

and c a p t a i n o f t h e C h a t e a u du Ha. The r e g e n t had h e a r d h i s 

r e q u e s t a n d b e s t o w e d an a p p r o p r i a t e r e w a r d on t h e l o y a l n o b l e . 

What a b l o w i t was t o l e a r n t h a t t h e o f f i c e was n o t v a c a n t I The 

d e a t h o f N o a i l l e s had b e e n n o t h i n g more t h a n r u m o u r . Some t i m e 

l a t e r t h i s man who h a d come s o c l o s e t o o f f i c e o n l y t o be d i s -

a p p o i n t e d w r o t e t o t h e queen e x p r e s s i n g h i s l a c k o f c o n f i d e n c e 

i n h e r g o v e r n o r s i n s e v e r a l m a j o r c i t i e s . He a s s u r e d h e r t h a t he 

had no u l t e r i o r m o t i v e i n s o d o i n g b u t r e m i n d e d h e r t h a t when t h e 

g o u v e r n e m e n t o f B o r d e a u x had n o t b e e n v a c a n t , she had p r o m i s e d h i m 

p r e f e r e n c e i n t h e n e x t s i m i l a r a p p o i n t m e n t . A f t e r t h e d e a t h o f 

A n t o i n e de N o a i l l e s t h e . o f f i c e was r e q u e s t e d by F r a n c o i s d ' E s c a r s 

and he had r e c e i v e d i t but t h e s e n d i n g o f t h e l e t t e r s p a t e n t was 

d e l a y e d . M o n l u c p r o t e s t e d t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h i s new f a v o u r t o 
2 

d ' E s c a r s and t h e d e l a y i n s e n d i n g . t h e l e t t e r s p a t e n t l e d h i m . t o 

"""Documents P o u r S e r v i r . a . , . , ;No 86. 
' 2 

M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s , I V , 209. 



believe that the appointment had been revoked. In addition to 

d'Escars and Gondrin there were at least two other candidates 

seeking the appointment, N o a i l l e s ' son and Jean de V a i l l a c , the 

l a t t e r supported by Monluc. Jean de V a i l l a c even exercised the 
2 

office for a time under, a commission from Monluc. A l l the 

candidates pressed their cases at the court, assuring the queen 

of the men and means they would bring to the task. Gondrin, for 

example, told Catherine that i f i t pleased her to make provision 

for him, her majesty and the king would have "a f a i t h f u l subject 

and servitor who would have the means of making the king obeyed' 

.and preventing troubles, as much as any man i n Guyenne," a 

reference to the favour he possessed and the size of his s u i t e . 5 

The efforts of V a i l l a c and Gondrin to obtain the office were of 

no a v a i l and they continued to serve as commanders of companies 

i n the province. 

Appointments at each l e v e l i n the royal government of 

the province were much sought a f t e r . Burie, already occupying 

a high o f f i c e , the duties of which he f a i l e d to f u l f i l , enlisted 

the support of the due de Montpensier and requested the office of 
4 

admiral of Guyenne after the death of the king of Navarre. That 

1 I b i d . - , IV, 243. 

2 I b i d . 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 86. 
4 

I b i d . , No. 80. 



59 

office was granted to the young Prince Henry of Navarre but Burie 

was made v i c e - a d m i r a l . ' Monluc had avidly sought appointment both 

i n Dauphine and i n Piedmont before beginning his r i s e in Guyenne 

and many candidates sought appointment as governors of c i t i e s . 

Their eagerness stemmed from ambition or merely from avarice for 

each office carried f i n a n c i a l remuneration and the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n 

of offices brought a commensurate m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of income. 

Moreover, the office carried opportunities for f i n a n c i a l gain 

from groups who wished to influence the o f f i c e r , and t h i s income 

was much greater than the stipend i t s e l f . The f i n a n c i a l returns 

alone, however, do not explain the zealous seeking after the 

o f f i c e . For the Gascon n o b i l i t y the path to honour and renown 

lay most often i n m i l i t a r y office and advancement. That riches 

should accompany honour was to be expected. In f a c t , Courteault 

said of Monluc that he could not conceive of honours without 
1 

money. 

The appointment to office required sponsors, the more 

i n f l u e n t i a l the better. In seeking appointment Monluc attempted 

to e n l i s t the support of the due de Guise, son of his o r i g i n a l 

patron, and to ingratiate himself with the king of Navarre. D'Escars 

r e l i e d upon his friendship with Antoine de Bourbon who interceded 

for him at times with the king, the queen mother, the due de Guise 

and the cardinal of Lorraine. In the youth of Henry II d'Escars 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 2 0 7 . 



60 

had been one of h i s f a v o u r i t e s . For appointment i n the p r o v i n c e 

of Guyenne i t was h e l p f u l t o have some c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the 

g o v e r n o r , A n t o i n e de Bourbon. In 1559 A n t o i n e ' s war c o u n c i l 

c o n s i s t e d of B u r i e , Monluc, J a r n a c and d ' E s c a r s , a l l of whom were 

t o be g r a n t e d i m p o r t a n t o f f i c e s i n the r e g i o n under h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 

Appointments were made by the crown but i t would appear t h a t they 

were n o r m a l l y recommended by the governor f o r the crown's 

r a t i f i c a t i o n . Thus upon the death of the g o v e r n o r , N o a i l l e s wrote 

the queen a s k i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s office"'" and B u r i e wrote 
2 

t h a n k i n g the k i n g f o r c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s . 

Remuneration d i d not c o n s i s t merely of s a l a r y f o r the 

performance of d u t i e s . Many t h i n g s were r e q u i r e d f o r a man's 

honour, c h i e f l y t h a t he l i v e as b e f i t t e d h i s s t a t i o n and t h a t h i s 

whole f a m i l y r e f l e c t h i s honour. I t was f e u d a l t r a d i t i o n t h a t the 

k i n g m a i n t a i n the f a m i l i e s of h i s v a s s a l s . Monluc took advantage 

of h i s v i c t o r i e s t o p r e s s h i s c l a i m s upon the crown and i n a d d i t i o n 

to honours f o r h i m s e l f he sought them f o r h i s b r o t h e r and f o r h i s 

sons. Monluc was a l s o k e e n l y c o n s c i o u s of the i m p r e s s i o n he 

conveyed by the manner of d r e s s , by the t a b l e he s p r e a d , and by 

the g e n e r o s i t y he d i s p l a y e d . On one o c c a s i o n he had the o p p o r t u n i t y 

t o e n t e r t a i n the due de Guise and the due de Saxe i n h i s p a v i l i o n . 

I t was Monluc's boast t h a t a f t e r the due de G u i s e t h e r e was no 

Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 78. 

"""Ruble, Jeanne d ' A l b r e t , I , 466. 



61 

table i n the camp longer or better than h i s . After enjoying a 

sumptuous repast Monluc's guests complimented him and he r e p l i e d 

that i f they would speak to the king on his behalf for s i l v e r 

vessels, the next time he would be able to serve them as they 

deserved. They did indeed t e l l the king, Henry I I , about the 

dinner, assuring him that even the king could not have provided 

better meats, better wines or colder and that Monluc deserved 

s i l v e r vessels for his t a b l e . The king promised to provide them."*" 

Monluc missed few opportunities to seek tangible rewards even to 

the extent of replying ungraciously to l e t t e r s of congratulation 
2 

that when he spread his table words made poor meat. 

When men amassed multiple offices i t was impossible for 

them to personally perform the accompanying duties. Indeed, some 

officers seem to have been l i t t l e inclined to f u l f i l l the r e q u i r e -

ments of any of their o f f i c e s . The governor of Guyenne was not 

resident i n the province. Burie and d'Escars were both rebuked 

by Charles IX for non-residence. Jarnac repeatedly asked permission 
3 

to leave La Rochelle and attend to a f f a i r s at his home. Both Burie 

and Jarnac were old men and the s t r a i n of events, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , 

was hard on them. That they wished at times to escape from the 

pressure was to be expected. Even at the l e v e l of the governors of 

c i t i e s non-residence was a problem as Noailles pointed out to the 

queen. Monluc seems to have been the exception among the highest 

"''Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 362-364. 
2 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 214. 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . . , No. 51. 



62 

o f f i c e r s of Guyenne for he was always i n the f i e l d even to the 

extent of taking only ten days to settle a f f a i r s when his wife 

died. His advice to the king's lieutenant was to keep constantly 

on the move so that men, always expecting the o f f i c e r ' s a r r i v a l , 

would be more anxious to obey.""" 

A l o c a l noble of great renown because of his m i l i t a r y 

e x p l o i t s , the number and reputation of his c l i e n t s , and the 

patronage he bestowed, could gain great support from the 

p r o v i n c i a l Parlement, the l o c a l estates, the c i t i e s and especially 

from the n o b i l i t y . At times, l i s t e n i n g to the voices around him, 

he would forget that he was the representative of a far away 

central government. Although he might be the l o c a l champion, 

the l i b e r a t o r , the hero, he could s t i l l be useful to the crown. 

In fact, his l o c a l renown was the very factor-that made him most 

useful to the crown i f he could be controlled as Monluc was by 

f l a t t e r y and g i f t s . Because of the absence of the king of Navarre, 

the age and indecision of Burie, and the events of c i v i l war which 

called for the m i l i t a r y talents of the ambitious and energetic 

Blaise de Monluc, he was the central figure i n the drama of 

royal government i n Guyenne during the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n . 

His contribution supplemented by the work of a few i n t e l l i g e n t 

r e a l i s t s l i k e Antoine de Noailles went a long way toward the 

maintenance of royal authority i n the province. 

"'"Monluc, Commentaires, II, 469. 



CHAPTER I I I 

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 

I n an extended remonstrance addressed t o C h a r l e s IX Monluc 

o f f e r e d the k i n g d e t a i l e d a d v i c e r e g a r d i n g the appointment of 

m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . " * " The k i n g ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o see h i s o f f i c e r s 

p e r s o n a l l y was c o n s i d e r e d by the v e t e r a n s o l d i e r t o be e s s e n t i a l 

t o o b t a i n i n g l o y a l s e r v i c e . Law r e q u i r e d t h a t a s p i r a n t s t o such 

j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s as p r e s i d e n t , c o u n c i l l o r and l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l 

be examined by the d o c t o r s of the lav/ and the c o u n c i l l o r s of 

Parlement under the c h a i r m a n s h i p of the c h a n c e l l o r . Monluc 

assumed t h a t t h i s p r a c t i c e was c a r r i e d out and he recommended i t s 

a d o p t i o n f o r appointments t o m i l i t a r y o f f i c e as w e l l . The Gascon 

c a p t a i n accused the k i n g of awarding the o f f i c e s of governor and 

c a p t a i n too e a s i l y , even i n response to the r e q u e s t s of the 

women he danced w i t h . Such an o f f i c e r was e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t 

t o the defence of a c i t y f o r he c o u l d overcome i t s weaknesses 

and p r e p a r e i t s f o r c e s . Moreover, enemies, knowing h i s w e l l -

deserved r e p u t a t i o n , would a v o i d a t t a c k i n g . Young men s h o u l d 

not expect immediate advancement but s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o s e r v e 

an a p p r e n t i c e s h i p under o l d e r , e x p e r i e n c e d o f f i c e r s . L i k e the 

p o s i t i o n of governor and c a p t a i n of a c i t y , the o f f i c e s of 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I I , 374-398. 



marechal de camp and maitre de camp for cavalry and infantry 

were c r u c i a l offices not to be l i g h t l y f i l l e d . Men f i l l i n g them 

must be neither r i v a l s nor over-dependent on each other. Since 

victory and defeat depended on these o f f i c e r s , the king and his 

lieutenants should consider repeatedly and even tremble over the 

appointment.' Monluc feared that a l l these offices l i k e the 

honour of Knight of the Order were being given out too freely 

where once they had been t i t l e s of honour reserved for people of 

good name. 

The remedy proposed by the man who claimed to be the oldest 

captain i n the kingdom was to i n s t i t u t e an examination before 

a s p e c i a l board. The due d'Anjou, Charles' brother, who had won 

two battles even though he was s t i l l a youth, could serve as 

m i l i t a r y chancellor and the panel of doctors and councillors 

would be composed of o l d , experienced captains. Anyone who 

requested office would be summoned before the examining board 

to give an account of himself. He would be asked where he had 

performed his apprenticeship and under whom and what deeds of 

honour he had won. Only on the recommendation of the experienced 

captains would any appointment be made and the king could avoid 

importuning for m i l i t a r y office by making the fact known. 

Monluc claimed that many benefits would result from the 

adoption of his recommendations. The apprentices to the carrying 



65 

of arms, knowing that they couldn't enter by the window would 

work and study d i l i g e n t l y to impress those who must open the door 

to them. Those appointed to office would not slacken their 

efforts for they would wish to vindicate their choice by the 

captains and to ensure their continued promotion. Appointment 

of generals of cavalry and colonels of infantry would be beyond 

this scheme, according to Monluc, for these offices must be given 

to princes and great l o r d s . However, even youth and inexperience 

on their part would riot matter provided the maitre de camp was 

an experienced soldier chosen with care. 

Since many would be anxious to advance by arms, Monluc 

recommended that the king keep a r o l l by province of a l l men of 

promise and their p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s so that vacancies i n a 

province could be f i l l e d from among those- l i s t e d . Monluc was 

certain that those who knew they were on the l i s t would take 

heart and work hard to render service to the king and that those 

not on the l i s t would expose themselves to a thousand dangers to 

get their names placed on the l i s t . The king must be prompt to 

add the names of worthy men to the l i s t which Monluc suggested 

should bear the name, "book of honour." Like Catherine de 

Medicis,'*' Monluc attributed the use of this technique to Louis XII 

who even handled j u d i c i a l appointments by means of a r o l l of 

possible candidates according to a story Monluc recalled from 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 9 4 . 



66 

h i s y o u t h . F u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the b e n e f i t s of such a 

t e c h n i q u e f o r the a l l o c a t i o n of patronage were drawn from the 

p r a c t i c e of Odet de F o i x under whom Monluc had s e r v e d h i s own 

a p p r e n t i c e s h i p and from Monluc's p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e as governor 

i n S i e n n a and M o n t a l c i n o . 

Not o n l y s h o u l d the k i n g reward the f a i t h f u l by appointment 

t o o f f i c e but he s h o u l d be a c c e s s i b l e t o h i s s u b j e c t s . A g r a c i o u s 

word spoken by the k i n g was most important f o r t h e encouragement 

of h i s l o y a l s u p p o r t e r s . I f the spoken word c o u l d be accompanied 

by f i n a n c i a l reward so much the b e t t e r ! ' Monluc's recommendation 

was t h a t C h a r l e s IX make these f i n a n c i a l rewards p e r s o n a l l y . Not 

o n l y would i t i n c r e a s e the s u b j e c t ' s t i e s t o h i s s o v e r i e g n but 

the award would r e a c h i t s d e s t i n a t i o n d i r e c t l y w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o 

pass t h r o u g h the hands of o f f i c i a l s where much was c e r t a i n t o 

s t i c k . 

Monluc's s u g g e s t i o n s t o C h a r l e s IX r e g a r d i n g m i l i t a r y 

appointments i n the p r o v i n c e s obscure the s i t u a t i o n as i t was i n 

the e a r l y y e a r s of the Wars of R e l i g i o n . H i s remonstrance i m p l i e s 

a g r e a t e r degree of r o y a l c o n t r o l over such appointments i n 

Guyenne t h a n C h a r l e s IX- was a b l e t o a s s e r t . I f the wrong people 

e x e r c i s e d the o f f i c e of c a p t a i n no one s h o u l d bear g r e a t e r 

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y than Monluc h i m s e l f f o r he had as much c o n t r o l 

over r e c r u i t i n g and appointments i n the p r o v i n c e as anyone as 

the e v e n t s of 1561 t o 1563 show. C h a r l e s IX had a p p a r e n t l y 



67 

r e j e c t e d the charge t h a t he was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the appointment 

o f i n f e r i o r c a p t a i n s by s h i f t i n g the blame to h i s lieutenants.'*' 

Monluc r e f u s e d to accept the blame and s t a t e d that the k i n g had 

caused the problem by g r a n t i n g the o f f i c e to so many humble 

people that gentlemen no longer d e s i r e d such an appointment. 

T i t l e s t h a t were once the preserve of the high born were now 

a c c e s s i b l e to the common c a t t l e - d r o v e r . Monluc was concerned 

about the t i t l e s and honour given these men r a t h e r and the f a c t 

that they were granted the a u t h o r i t y t o command a s m a l l group of 

s o l d i e r s . He f e l t a p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n would be to i n c r e a s e 

companies t o one thousand, the s i z e of the l e g i o n s of F r a n c i s I . 

M i l i t a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n and Forces i n Guyenne 

French armed f o r c e s of the s i x t e e n t h century f e l l i n t o 

two major c a t e g o r i e s , those of the o r d i n a i r e des guerres and 

those of the e x t r a o r d i n a i r e des guerres,. d i v i s i o n s h i s t o r i c a l 

r a t h e r than l o g i c a l . The former was p r o v i d e d with i t s own 

r e s o u r c e s and t r e s o r i e r s . The ban and the a r r i e r e ban and 

companies of ordonnance came under the o r d i n a i r e des g u e r r e s . 

The e x t r a o r d i n a i r e des guerres c o n s i s t e d of bodies of troops 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I I , 390. 

I b i d . "Du temps que je commencay a p o r t e r . l e s armes, 
l e t i l t r e de c a p i t a i n e e s t o i t t i l t r e d'honneur, et des g e n t i l -
hommes de bonne maison ne se desdaignoient de l e p o r t e r . Je . 
n'ay pas a p p e l l e d'autre t i l t r e mes enfans. A present l e 
moindre picqueboeuf se f a i c t a p p e l l e r , s ' i l a eu quelque 
commandement." 



68 
i n i t i a l l y recruited for short time service but l a t e r as part of 

a standing army. It operated with exceptional resources, often 

improvised, and was administered by special personnel. Under 

i t s administration fought such forces as companies of mercenaries 

and gens de p i e d e t de cheval, both French and foreign. 

L'Ordinaire des Guerres 

'Of feudal o r i g i n , the ban and the a r r i e r e ban *"* consisted o 

a l l those who had a m i l i t a r y obligation to the king as possessors 

of f i e f s . Personal service was normal but a man unable to serve 

could present a replacement and a.man i n e l i g i b l e to serve, a 

commoner or churchman, must pay a tax which usually amounted to 

o n e - f i f t h : the value of his f i e f , . This feudal m i l i t a r y force was 

attached to the feudal administrative units, the b a i l l i a g e s and 

senechaussees. Letters patent for the convocation of the ban 

and the a r r i e r e ban were sent to b a i l l i s and senechaux. Two 

montres or reviews took place: a preliminary montre en robes 

at which the roll.;was checked, replacements presented, defaulters 

t r i e d , non-servers taxed and the taxes sent to an elected receveur 

and a montre en armes when the king wanted the ban to march. 

Units of the ban were enseignes consisting of three 

For the development of the ban and the a r r i e r e ban i n 
the sixteenth century see Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 610-617; 
and Gaston Z e l l e r , Les . Institutions de l a France au X V I e Siecle 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 312-314. 



69 

hundred men when on foot, of f i f t y hommes d'armes or of one 

hundred archers. Although the service had o r i g i n a l l y been 

unpaid as the feudal due of vassals, the Estates-General of 

1484 requested that men of the ban be paid and by the middle of 

the sixteenth century that pay was one hundred l i v r e s for a 

captain, f i f t y for a lieutenant, forty for lesser o f f i c e r s such 

as ensign bearer, twenty for hommes d'armes, ten for archers, 

and s i x to eight for foot s o l d i e r s . 

Exemptions from service under the ban extended from the 

great o f f i c e r s of the crown to the o f f i c e r s of sovereign courts 

and the bourgeois of major towns. Men who served i n companies 

of ordonnance were of necessity exempt since they couldn't serve 

i n two companies at the same time. Men f i t for service tended 

to pass into the companies of ordonnance and the ban lost i t s 

effectiveness as i t became comprised of old men unfit, for 

service and replacements o u t f i t t e d at the least possible expense. 

During the f i r s t of the c i v i l wars the due d'Etampes, 

governor of Bretagne, made repeated reference i n his corres-

pondence to men of the arriere ban. In June, 1562 the due de 

Montpensier requested troops from Etampes to a s s i s t him i n 

Angoumois.^ Etampes wrote to Catherine that men serving under 

the a r r i e r e ban made up the major part of his forces, that they 

'Documents Pour Servir a..., No. 2 6 . 



70 

would provide the service they owed the crown but that he could 

not force them to serve outside the region because of the protests 

they would make about their p r i v i l e g e s . However, he assured 

Catherine that i f she could arrange to have them paid at the 

king's expense, he would hope to be able to find both foot and 

horse s o l d i e r s of the a r r i l r e ban who would render good service 

wherever she should wish to employ them."'" Etamp.es wrote 

simultaneously to Antoine de Bourbon t e l l i n g him of Montpensier's 

request, surveying the scanty r e l i a b l e forces he had i n the 

major c i t i e s of, Bre;tagne, and stating that the remainder of his 

troops were of the a r r i l r e ban and so concerned about their 

p r i v i l e g e s that he would have to fight them to make them go out-

side the region. Again he stated that i f the king should care 

to send him a commission and some money he would be able to 

2 
raise men to serve i n the region or wherever his majesty desired. 

A t h i r d l e t t e r of the same date was addressed to Charles IX by 

Ijtampes to assure the king that a good number of the noblesse of 

the region were most anxious to obey the king's command but that 

they had been awaiting his w i l l for about six weeks and would not 

wait much longer. Furthermore, i f Charles should command FJtampes 

to serve outside the region, these men would be unwilling to do 

service under the a r r i e r e ban but i f the king could see f i t to 

I b i d . , No. 27. 
2 I b i d . , No. 28. 

http://Etamp.es


71 

grant t h e i r solde a good number would serve.* Less than ten days 

l a t e r Etampes wrote again to the king of Navarre stating that 

since Catherine and Antoine had both commanded him to go to the 

assistance of Montpensier and the inhabitants raised d i f f i c u l t i e s 

about the maintenance of their p r i v i l e g e s , he had undertaken to 

increase the forces i n his majesty's pay to a number indicated 

i n a statement he was sending. He promised that'othese troops 

would always be ready to march at Antoine's command but that he 

was r e t a i n i n g the "arierebans et autres forces ordinaires" of 
2 

the region for l o c a l defence. 

In Guyenne Monluc and Burie received r o y a l instructions 

early i n May to take the f i e l d . They were to assemble the 

noblesse of the region and the a r r i e r e ban i n order to supplement 

the forces at t h e i r d i s p o s a l . 5 Letters patent were published at 

Aix en Provence the preceding month for the convocation of the 

ban and a r r i e r e ban according to the comte de Tende. That these 

troops were not raised according to his command or by him as 

governor i s clear from the report he sent before the queen. 

However, i t i s equally clear that under normal circumstances they 

would have been and that he considered the m i l i t a r y authority his 

1 I b i d . , No.. 27. 2 I_bid., No. 3 0 . 

^Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 175« 
k \ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 16. 



72 

prerogative as governor, a prerogative being usurped by his own 

son and lieutenant, the comte de Sommerive. 

The freedom of men of the a r r i e r e ban from service outside 

the kingdom, a p r i v i l e g e i n effect from 15^8 to 1557 ̂  seems to 

have been extended, at least i n Bretagne where men of the a r r i e r e  

ban saw t h e i r obligation limited to service within the gouvernement 

Many of these men, however, were w i l l i n g to change their status, 

and pay, by e n l i s t i n g i n other kinds of forces for royal s e r v i c e . 

Under the administration of 1'ordinaire des guerres besides 

forces of the ban and the a r r i e r e ban were the companies of 

ordonnance.. These companies originated i n the reforms of Charles ~~~———"—~"~" .i 
VII, became- a permanent force i n the king's employ and formed the 

2 
nucleus of the royal army. The gendarmerie making up the 

companies were volunteers of "la qualite de gentilhomme", at least 

seventeen years of age for an archer and nineteen for an homme  

d'armes. They were grouped i n lances, small groups arranged about 

an homme d'armes armed with a lance. Usually a company had about 

half again as many archers as homines d'armes and many more support-

ing foot s o l d i e r s . Command of these companies was reserved for 

princes of the blood, great o f f i c e r s of the crown, and men of 

great reputation. The captain's stipend was eight hundred l i v r e s ; 

"''Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 6l6. 
2 

For the companies of ordonnance see Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , 
I I , 620-623. 



73 

the remuneration of the lieutenant who often exercised effective 

command, five hundred; of the enseigne and guidon, four hundred; 

of the hommes d'armes, one hundred eighty; and of the archers, 

ninety.* In addition to payment i n cash from the.royal finances, 

men of these companies were supposed to receive payment i n kind 

from the c i t y of t h e i r garrison. Montres for control and payment 

were scheduled for every three months i n February, May, August and 

November i n the presence of commissaires ordinaires des guerres 

and controleurs o r d i n a i r e s . These o f f i c e r s were accountable to 

a t r e s o r i e r de 1'ordinaire des guerres and a statement was 

ultimately submitted to the king's c o u n c i l . At the time of review 

men, mounts and armour were c a r e f u l l y inspected and the garrison 

c i t y was to provide each soldier with three month's supply of 

candles, vinegar and s a l t ; the c i t y was s i m i l a r l y responsible for 

fodder for the horses, lodging and firewood for the men. The 

companies were often required to be on the move with their 

i t i n e r a r i e s determined by the governor and t h e i r movements 

watched by a commissaire appointed by the k i n g . One quarter of 

the men were normally on three month's leave at any time although 

the practice developed of granting longer leave without pay i n 

peace time and r e c a l l i n g a l l s o l d i e r s of the company i n time of 

*The scale of pay was higher during the Wars of Religion 
although the l i k e l i h o o d of receiving the pay was often remote. 
See Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 625. The pay of the hommes d'armes 
was raised to 400 l i v r e s and that of the archer, to 200. 



74 

war. The chief o f f i c e r s were expected to serve four months 

annually i n the company with the captain taking personal command 

for the period from May through August when f i g h t i n g usually took 

place. Companies of ordonnance were the strongest element i n the 

armies of Louis XII and Francis I but development of firearms 

contributed to a decrease i n the value of such troops and especially 

of the heavily armed hommes d'armes who were supplanted by the more 

mobile chevaux-legers with modern arms."" 

Companies of ordonnance i n the province of Guyenne were 

under the command of such men as the king of Navarre, the marechal 
2 

de Thermes, de T e r r i d e , de Jarnac, Burie and Monluc. As d i f f i c u l t -

ies began to mount the weight of command f e l l upon Burie and Monluc 

who were without money and almost without troops. Each had a 

company of f i f t y hommes d'armes and they could mobilize the 

company of Antoine de Bourbon, a force of one hundred lances 

garrisoned at Agen, and the company of the marechal de Thermes 

comprising f i f t y lances. Henri de Beam, young son of the king 

At this period the proportion was one and one-half archers 
to each hommes d'armes and the archers were l i g h t cavalry 
(chevaux-legers). Ferdinand L o t , Recherches sur les E f f e c t i f s des  
Armees Francaises des Guerres d ' l t a l i e aux Guerres de R e l i g i o n , 
1494-1562 (Paris: S. E.V.P. E.N.. 1962), p. 191. ' 

2 
Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 138. 

•^Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 155. De Ruble 
states here that Burie and Monluc each had a company of ordonnance of 
t h i r t y hommes d'armes but i n the Pieces J u s t i f i c a t i v e s of the same 
volume, pp. 427-432 there appears an "Ordonnance de Burie pour l a 
p a c i f i c a t i o n de l a Guyenne" given at Agen i n October 156l~and signed 
among others by Burie and Monluc, captains of f i f t y "hommes d'armes 
des ordonnances." 



75 

of Navarre, must also have had a company for his father told 

Burie to ask captain Arne, guidon of A n t o i n e ' 8 company, to 
r 

mobilize what he could of his company so that the governor could 

command them together with Monluc's company and that of his own 

1 
son. 

Companies of ordonnance as standing forces were maintained 

when t h e i r commanders died and t h e i r disposition depended on the 

royal w i l l . When the marechal de Thermes died his company was 

divided between Francois d'Escars, favourite of the king of 

Navarre, and the vicomte de Martigues, nephew and lieutenant of 
2 

the governor of Bretagne. Monluc's protest to the king and queen 

over t h i s d i v i s i o n demonstrated his concern at the prospect of 

l o s i n g troops from Guyenne and perhaps, his jealousy for d'Escars 

but i t also revealed some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the company of 

ordonnance. Relatives "of de Thermes, of de Bellegarde, lieutenant 

of his company, and of de Masses, his enseigne, formed the major 

part of the company. In fact de Bellegarde, the lieutenant, was 

himself a brother-in-law of the marechal and de Masses, his 

enseigne, was s i m i l a r l y a close r e l a t i v e . Monluc asked the office 

senechal of Toulouse for Roger de Saint-Lary, seigneur de 

Bellegarde, and his request was granted but his request of the 

I b i d . , I, k2k. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 23, "Charles IX au vicomte 
de Martigues," mai, 1562. 



?6 
f u n c t i o n of v i g u i e r f o r the enseigne was denied. Monluc was 

convinced t h a t the s o l d i e r s , l o y a l r e l a t i v e s of the l a t e marechal 

de Thermes, would be u n w i l l i n g to c a r r y arms i f the company were 

d i v i d e d and h i s j e a l o u s y c l e a r l y showed i n h i s l e t t e r to the 

queen, "I wish to spend my l i f e c l o s e to you... and not to k i l l 

day and n i g h t here to make great and r i c h others whose only s e r v i c e 

i s to make those who do serve d i s c o n t e n t . " He i d e n t i f i e d the 

object of h i s c h o l e r f o r he suggested that C a t h e r i n e grant him 

leave and send d'Escars who had obtained a commission as 

l i e u t e n a n t of the k i n g i n Guyenne while Monluc had n e i t h e r 

"gaiges n i e s t a t " a p p r o p r i a t e t o the s e r v i c e he rendered and 

served at h i s own expense.* Two months l a t e r Monluc once again 

wrote t o the queen complaining about the d i v i s i o n of the company 
2 

which he c a l l e d one of the best of France. The o l d c a p t a i n 

emphasized the s t r a t e g i c importance of the gendarmerie and 

noblesse f o r the enemy had more gens de p i e d . T h i r t y - t w o 

hommes d'armes and forty-two a r c h e r s of the company had gone to 

t h e i r homes not w i s h i n g to serve under d'Escars but r a t h e r to 

have t h e i r o l d o f f i c e r s over them. D'Escars may have been 

regarded as an o u t s i d e r i n Guyenne f o r he came from Haute V i e n n e 5 

*Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 132-146. 

2 I b i d . , IV, 146-148. 

Cabie", Guerres de r e l i g i o n dans l e sud-ouest de l a France, 
p. 5, n. 1. 



77 

but had spent most of his career at the court. As early as 1536 

he was i n the forefront among the favourites of the Dauphin, l a t e r 

to be Henry II.""" The s i t u a t i o n was further complicated because 

Hugues de Thermes, guidon of the company, had gone before the 
2 

king after his father's death to request the command. While en 

route to the court he was taken by a Huguenot band and imprisoned 

at Orleans. Released by Cond^ about two and a half months l a t e r , 

he returned to Bordeaux but Burie who had heard that he was 

coming with fifteen commissions from the king ^ assumed that the 

commissions were forged and that their c a r r i e r was a Huguenot 

spy. The unfortunate young baron de Thermes was imprisoned at 

the Chateau du Ha and at the news of his arrest the hommes d'armes 
4 

devoted to the son of their old captain, abandoned the company. 

In spite of Monluc's protest and the ambition of Hugues de 

Thermes the company was divided and Masses, enseigne of the 

marechal became lieutenant of d'Escars' company while Boisjourdan, 

a guidon of the old company became Martigues' lieutenant.^ The 

"""Lucien Romier, La carriere d'un f a v o r i : Jacques d'Albon  
de Saint-Andre (Paris: P e r r i n , 1 9 0 9 ) , p. 2 5 . 

2 
Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, l47n. 1. 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 5 0 , "Burie et Monluc a 
Antoine de Bourbon," 7 aout, 1 5 6 2 . 

4 
Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 147. 

5 I b i d . , IV, 1 3 9 . Perhaps de Ruble f a i l e d to identify Hugues 
de Bazordan, seigneur de Thermes. c f . Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 441. 



78 

services of the o f f i c e r s of the company, and thus of the men, were 

assured by their promotion. 

New companies of ordonnance were created not only by the 

d i v i s i o n of e x i s t i n g ones but by royal decree and their command 

was a coveted p r i z e . Joachim de Monluc, seigneur de Lioux, brother 

of B l a i s e , was popular with n o b i l i t y and people. After leading 

a makeshift company of the noblesse against the Huguenots i n the 

defence of Perigueux his request for a company of ordonnance of 

f i f t y hommes d'armes * was supported by the due de Montpensier, 
2 

Burie and Monluc. Blaise de Monluc maintained that should the 

sedition continue i n France, he could come to the queen's aid and 

leave his popular brother to f i l l his role i n Guyenne. As further 

reason to grant the company, he suggested that he himself deserved 

much recompense for his services and the company for his brother 

could be regarded as a f i r s t instalment. In spite of the efforts 

of his sponsors Joachim de Monluc did not receive a company of 

ordonnance.5 

L'Extraordinaire des Guerres 

Companies of gens de pied came under the administration of 

^Documents Pour Servir 5..., No. 63- "Joachim de Monluc 
a Antoine de Bourbon." 11 octobre, 1562. 

2 
I b i d . , No. 6 4 , "Le due de Montpensier a Catherine de 

Medicis," 14. octobre, 1562; Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 
170, "Monluc a l a royne," 12 octobre, 1562. 

^Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 171n. 



79 

1'extraordinaire des guerres.*"" Throughout the sixteenth century 

their importance increased and they comprised an ever greater 

proportion of the armed forces. The improvement of l i g h t f i r e -

arms gave them an advantage over troops armed with lances. These 

bands were raised by commissions of the king usually granted to a 

captain with whom he dealt d i r e c t l y . The commission decreed the 

exact number of men to be raised and the captain was expected to 

raise no more for some would be without pay, forced to l i v e off 

the land, and to r a i s e no fewer for he would be making an i l l i c i t 

p r o f i t , pocketing the pay of the soldiers not r e c r u i t e d . Men 

were enrolled after being presented to commissaires and controleurs  

de 11 extraordinaire des,guerres. They were recruited by the captain 

i n a designated region under the surveillance of governor, senechaux, 

and b a i l l i s . Unlike the companies of ordonnance, bands of gens de  

pied usually had as captains men of war, sometimes of humble o r i g i n , 

who e f f e c t i v e l y commanded their own companies. Remuneration, 

supposedly paid at monthly reviews, -consisted of one hundred six 

l i v r e s for the captain, f i f t y - s i x for the lieutenant, twenty for 

sergents and caporaux, and six to nine for pikemen and musketeers. 

Although Doucet states that the king dealt d i r e c t l y with the 

captains for the r a i s i n g of gens de pied et de cheval the practice 

i n Guyenne and i n the other parts of the kingdom was to^grant 

For companies of gens de pied see Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 
632-638. !  



80 

commissions to the governor, lieutenant-general or another great 

m i l i t a r y figure i n the province. These commissions were sometimes, 

i f not always, blank so that the man to whom they were given 

could choose the captains and delegate the authority for r e c r u i t i n g 

the troops. Monluc recounted that Catherine de Medicis and the 

king of Navarre resolved to send him into Guyenne "avec patentes 

et permission de lever gens a pied et sicheval."* He arrived i n 

Bordeaux near the end of December 1561 and proceeded to r a i s e two 

hundred arquebusiers and one hundred argoulets whom he put under 
2 

the command of T i l l a d e t , a protege of h i s . Almost immediately 

Burie, on Monluc's advice, asked for a supplementary levy of five 

or s i x hundred arquebusiers. 5 

The gens de pied raised by Monluc were to become^an 

important part of the r o y a l army for those commanded by captain 

Charry became the nucleus of the f i r s t regiment of the gardes 

francais established i n 1563* _ 

In similar fashion, l e t t e r s and commissions had been sent 

to Burie i n September for the r a i s i n g of t r o o p s . 5 On May 8, 1562 

*Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , I I , 3*+5« 
2 I b i d . , I I , 348. 
5 R u b l e , Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 156. 
L 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 174n. 
5 R u b l e , Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 424, piece  

j u s t i f i c a t i f , "Le r o i de Navarre a M. de B u r i e , " 4 septembre, 1561, 



81 

Charles IX wrote at least eight l e t t e r s to Burie and Monluc, 

surely a r e f l e c t i o n of the degree of disruption i n the kingdom. 

Charles IX commanded them to take the f i e l d with a l l the companies 

of gens d'.armes at t h e i r disposal and the s i x or eight enseignes 

of gens de pied they had raised."'" He included once again blank 
2 • 

commissions for the r a i s i n g of gens de guerre. Sometimes the 

king's approval followed the r a i s i n g of gens de pied et de cheval 

rather than preceding i t . This was certainly the case when after 

the battle of Vergt Monluc recruited gens de pied and o f f i c e r s 

from the ranks of the defeated Huguenot army of Duras.^ The six 

companies of gens de pied raised after the battle of Vergt were 

granted by Monluc to the captains Mauvesin and Peyrelongue, two 

of Duras' best. When a c i t y . p r a region was taken by royal 

forces, the king's lieutenant undertook to see that i t was 

adequately garrisoned and Charles IX wrote Monluc sending the 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 21, "Memoire de'Charles IX 
au Burie et Monluc" includes reference to "eight ensigns that they 
were asked to have r a i s e d , " the e d i t o r ' s footnote gives an alternat 
reading of "seven" arid some of the l e t t e r s of 8 May, 1562 refer to 
s i x . 

2 
Eight l e t t e r s to Burie and/or Monluc dated 8 May, 1562 are 

contained i n the pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s of Ruble-, Jeanne d'Albret  
et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, kkl-hk2. On the same day Charles IX wrote 
to Noailles and to the Parlement of Toulouse and issued i n s t r u c t i o n 
to Negrepelisse whom he was sending into Guyenne and Languedoc to 
persuade the noblesse to join Monluc and B u r i e . 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, I83. 

I b i d . , IV, 315. 



82 
confirmation and authorization for the companies raised by the 

baron de Pardiant and the seigneur de La Chappelle on Monluc's 

orders for the defence of Lectoure.* 

Just as.blank commissions for the naming of officers and 

r a i s i n g of troops had been sent to Monluc and to Burie, so they 

were sent to Montpensier when.he was preparing to enter Guyenne 
2 

as lieutenant-general. The king urged him strongly to send 

into France under Burie's command reinforcements fqr the royal 

army and to raise new companies to be employed by Monluc i n 

Guyenne. 

Among the forces of 1'extraordinaire des guerres were the 

chevaux-legers, l i g h t l y armed cavalry. Captain Peyrot de Monluc, 

son of B l a i s e , was frequently entrusted with the command of 
3 

substantial numbers of the troops under his father's authority. 

Peyrot normally commanded a company of̂  one hundred chevaux-legers. 

After the Peace of Amboise when Monluc was commanded to disband 

most of the forces i n Guyenne he asked that his son's troops be 

converted in.to a company of f i f t y hommes d 1 armes, a change which 

would bring them under the ordinaire des guerres as a company of 
k 

ordonnance. Monluc also requested that some of the new companies 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. 

^ u b l e , Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, k^O. 
3 ^ 

Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 187. 
h 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 287. 



83 

be maintained and the king r e p l i e d that although he would prefer 

to see them disbanded, Monluc might maintain as many as he 

should judge to be indispensable.""" 

In addition to the companies they commanded, some of the 

king's o f f i c e r s were granted personal guards. Antoine de Bourbon 

obtained for himself a personal guard of twenty-five Swiss 
2 

s o l d i e r s . Monluc and Burie were each authorized to have a garde 

p a r t i c u l i e r e of t h i r t y hommes de pied and twenty arquebusiers a 

c h e v a l I n October and November 1563 Monluc asked that he and 
k 

Burie be allowed to maintain their guards but the next month he 

announced that his guard had been disbanded i n accordance with the 

command he had received.'' 

The defence of f o r t i f i e d places was undertaken by special 

troops sometimes headed by a captain given the honorable t i t l e of 

governor.^ Old s o l d i e r s , wounded or otherwise incapacitated for 
7 

active service, served under the name of mortes-payes. These 

•""Ibid., IV, 217. 
2 
Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 298. 

^Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 211 and n. 
4 I b i d . , IV, 281, 286. 
5 I b i d . , IV, 304. 
^Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 64?. 
7 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 290. Monluc requested 
the queen to see that the mortes-payes of the chSteaux de Bordeaux 
get t h e i r pay since they had not been paid for a year. 



84 

men, capable of manning firearms and performing similar defensive 

duties were given a reduced pay of five l i v r e s per month."'' Not 

only the old and lame found opportunity for defensive m i l i t a r y 

service but frequently an urban m i l i t i a was formed of those 

untrained for m i l i t a r y service but anxious to help protect t h e i r 
i 

property and goods. The Huguenots of Bordeaux addressed a 

remonstrance to the c i t y council i n which they expressed their 

desire to pledge themselves for service in a municipal m i l i t i a 

rather than entrust the defence of their c i t y to foreign troops. 

Soon after the outbreak of war Antoine de Bourbon,,lieutenant-

general of the kingdom, addressed to the prevot des marchands 

and to the echevins of the c i t y of Paris instructions regarding 

measures to be taken for the constitution of a municipal m i l i t i a . 

The t o t a l number of troops i n Guyenne fluctuated greatly 

but i t may be estimated with reference to a number of sources. 

In 1559 the statement of payment of soldiers i n garrisons 
4 

enumerated one thousand ninety i n Guyenne. The companies of 

ordonnance are not mentioned in. that document and the only 

garrison l i s t e d for Bordeaux was forty men under captain B a i l l a c 

( s i c ) i n the chSteau Trampette although the payment of Noailles 

Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 6 4 7 . 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 84. 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 3 9 8 . 

L o t , Recherches sur les E f f e c t i f s , p. 254. 



85 

and his lieutenant i s l i s t e d . Four years l a t e r N o a i l l e s ' 

garrison at the Chateau du Ha was twice the size of de. V a i l l a c ' s 
rt- • 

and i t may well have been so i n 1559** From August to October, 

1562 Charles urged Burie to bring into France reinforcements from 

Guyenne. At the end of October Burie wrote that the king had 

asked him to lead three thousand Spanish and two thousand French 
2 

hommes de p i e d . However, he claimed that i t was very d i f f i c u l t 

to make the Spaniards march. Burie had already had an experience 

with mutiny among the Spanish troops i n which four or five 

hundred of the f i r s t had deserted their enseignes and made t h e i r 
way back towards Spain without a captain, an enseigne or a 

3 
drummer. Now he wrote that of eleven or twelve enseignes, about 

three thousand men, he had led from Gascony only about fourteen 

or f i f t e e n hundred remained, a number which would shortly be r e -

organized into six enseignes. In addition to the forces under 

Burie, de Terride and Monluc had troops at Montauban where they 

were besieging the c i t y . The Spaniards and the companies of 

Charry were led into France by Louis Prevot de Sansac because 

Burie's attention was demanded by the uprisings "in his gouvernement. 

These troops were augmented substantially by men of the Huguenot 

*Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 199. 
2 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 71. 
5 I b i d . , No. 61. 



86 

army who changed sides after the battle of Vergt."'' Monluc stated 

that Sansac led twenty-three enseignes of Spanish and French to 

the aid of the king, a force of about five thousand men. A 

statement for the payment'of gens de guerre a pied i n the 

garrisons of c i t i e s and chSteaux of Guyenne i n March 1563 showed 

one thousand four hundred men to be p a i d . 

Recruitment and Appointments 

The recruitment of a l l types of troops was dependent upon 

the r o y a l w i l l and the execution of that w i l l i n the province was 

under the authority of the governor and lieutenant-general, the 

king's personal representative. In Guyenne a second person 

shared the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the lieutenant-general; Monluc 

exercised equal authority with B u r i e . When Conde f a i l e d to accept 

the commission to go into Guyenne and pacify the province, Blaise 

de Monluc had been sent without a definite t i t l e but with a 

definite mission."^ At that time he and Burie commanded companies 

of ordonnance of equal s i z e , received equal stipends, were both 

sent commissions for the r a i s i n g of troops. It was not u n t i l 

early i n March 1563 that Monluc received word of his appointment 

as lieutenant-general with authority, l i k e Burie, over half the 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , I I I , 53, 5^. 
2 I b i d . , IV, 199. 

^Monluc, Commentaires, I I , kOO. 



8? 

province,* nevertheless he had styled himself at least a month 

e a r l i e r as "seigneur du dit l i e u (Agenois), c h e v a l l i e r de l ' o r d r e , 

cappitaine de cinquante hommes d*armes de ses ordonnances, et 
2 

lieutenant de sa Majeste au gouvernement de Guienne." Whether 

or not he had the t i t l e , Monluc occupied a position and exercised 

a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y equivalent to those of Burie, the lieutenant-

general i n the absence of the king of Navarre. 

The office exercised by the two veteran captains of 

campaigns i n Italy was primarily a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e . Some have 

held that i t was h i s t o r i c a l l y an office exclusively m i l i t a r y and, 

therefore, confined to the f r o n t i e r provinces and that the office 

spread to other provinces during the Wars of Religion because 

every province became a frontier i n a period of c i v i l w a r . 5 

Z e l l e r i d e n t i f i e d the o r i g i n of these ideas i n the writings of 

members of the sixteen th century Parlements, writers who had a 

r i v a l ' s interest i n de-emphasizing the administrative role of 

•the governors. Only occasionally did the Parlement of Bordeaux 

venture into m i l i t a r y matters. On one, such occasion i t seconded 

the lieutenant's judgment and requested the king to leave Burie 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , I I I , 66. 
2 I b i d . , IV, 190. 
5 Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 231. Z e l l e r attributes t h i s 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to such notable historians as Paul V i o l l e t and 
Gustave Dupont-Ferrier.. 

4 • 
Ibid'.., pp. 251-256. 



88 

and the three thousand Spaniards i n Guyenne."'" Following the 

Peace of Amboise the Parlement disagreed with Monluc and 

recommended to the king t o t a l disarmament. In t h i s m i l i t a r y 

matter the king was i n c l i n e d toward the decision of the Parlement 

but allowed his lieutenant to exercise his own judgment as to how 
2 

many troops he regarded as indispensable. The governor and 

lieutenant-general was the supreme m i l i t a r y authority within the 

province. 

Since the lieutenant-general commanded m i l i t a r y forces i n 

the province he was i n a position to dispense a considerable 

amount of patronage, a practice over which the king desired to 

maintain c o n t r o l . In his choice of captains for the companies 

he l e v i e d , . the lieutenant-general could offer incentives to l o c a l 

notables for the pay accompanying the office was considerable and 

the o f f i c e offered further opportunity for honour and enrichment. 

At the same time he could increase he own influence by appointing 

men l o y a l to him or by gaining the l o y a l t y of men through t h i s 

patronage. Thus some of the f i r s t troops raised by Monluc were 

placed under the command of Francois de Gassagnet de T i l l a d e t , 

seigneur de Saint-Orens et de l a Roque, sene"chal de Bazadois, 

who had f i r s t borne arms under Monluc i n I t a l y . The fortunes of 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 299. 

"Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 216 and.n. 



89 

T i l l a d e t continued to be t i e d to those of his mentor and i n 

1 5 6 7 under a commission from Monluc he became colonel of the 

legions of Guyenne. The next year Monluc claimed for him the 

c o l l a r of the order as recompense for his services and in 1 5 7 5 

he was mait.ce de camp i n the army of Monluc, marechal of France."'' 

Immediately after the f a l l of Orleans to Conde i n A p r i l 1 5 6 2 , 

Charles IX wrote Monluc asking him to come immediately with his 

own company, those of the king of Navarre and the mare'chal de 

Thermes, and s i x companies of gens de pied which he must r a i s e . 

Monluc quoted Charles as saying, "I am sending you the commissions, 

leaving the names of the captains blank, for you know better than 
2 

I who deserve i t . " Monluc l e f t Bordeaux for Agen and there 

assigned the s i x commissions to captains of his choice: two to 

Charry; two to Hugues de Bazordan, seigneur de Thermes; one to 
' 3 

the baron de Clermont, his own nephew; one to the captain Corne. 

The troops were recruited by their captains from among l o y a l men 

of t h e i r own region and the captains were appointed by Monluc 

from the ranks of men l o y a l to him. Therefore, the forces 

recruited and deployed i n Guyenne took on the aspect of a 

personal army, strongly l o y a l to Blaise de Monluc. 
Families frequently benefited through the influence of 

Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, II, 348 and n. 

Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 . 

'ibid., II, 4 4 1 . 

http://mait.ce


90 

their more i l l u s t r i o u s members. Blaise de Monluc's r i s e had 

been f a c i l i t a t e d more than once by his older brother Jean de 

Monluc, bishop of Valence. Both Jean and B l a i s e , i n turn, 
2 

sponsored t h e i r younger brother Joachim, sieur de Lioux. Blaise 

de Monluc1s second, t h i r d and fourth sons, Pierre-Bertrand c a l l e d 

Peyrot; Jean, chevalier de Malte; and Fabien, were a l l associated 

with t h e i r father i n m i l i t a r y matters. In 1560 captain Peyrot 
was sent from the court by the due de Guise with a message for his 

3 
father. When the Peace of Amboise was announced he was leading 

into France twelve companies of gens de pied and one of chevaux-

l e g e r s . Philippe de La Roche, baron de Fontenilhes, was Blaise 

de Monluc's son-in-law and also guidon of his company.5 Member-

ship i n the family and leadership i n the company were i n t e r r e l a t e d 

and Monluc had great confidence i n his son-in-law who played an 

important role i n the f i e l d e s p e c i a l l y at Vergt.^ The Monluc 

family was not unique i n the practice of nepotism and i t i s not 

s u r p r i s i n g that the lieutenant of Burie's company was his nephew 

7 
Corre. Nepotism had much to recommend i t as a useful practice 

*Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 133. 
2 

I b i d • , I I , 21 and Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, I 6 9 . 
3 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 3,98. 
4 5 

I b i d . , I I , 592. ^ I b i d . , I I , 415. 
6 I b i d . , I I , 546-562. 7 I b i d . , I i , 4?4. 



91 
i n m i l i t a r y organization f o r , provided the r e l a t i v e appointed 

was a competent person, the l i k e l i h o o d of greater co-operation 

contributed to improved service for the monarch. That the king 

exercised some control over appointments was demonstrated by his 

refusal to grant a company of ordonnance to Joachim de Monluc i n 

spite of his brother's lobbying and by the refusal to grant 

Monluc's request that Peyrot's company of chevaux-legers be 

converted into a company of ordonnance. 

The appointment of a group of noble counsellors chosen by 

the king to accompany a great noble on a mission was intended to 

increase the effectiveness of his mission. Trnas- when Montpensier 

was sent into Guyenne the king's council decided that he should 

be accompanied by the seigneurs de La Vauguyon, de Candale and 

de Chavigny.""" When he arrived i n Guyenne these three lords were 
2 

with him and also the seigneurs d'Estissac and de Lauzun. Jean 

de Peyrusse, sieur d'Escars, comte de La Vauguyon was a member of 

a family i n good favour with Antoine de Bourbon. Henri de F o i x , 

comte de Candale, was the lieutenant of Belzunce who was 

governor of Dax.^ Francois Le Roy, seigneur de Chavigny et de l a 

Baussoniere, comte de Clinchamp, was to become lieutenant-general 

of Anjou, Touraine and Maine and governor of Mans i n 1564. The 

"̂Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 
2 
Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 538. 

^Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 200n. 
4 

Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 538. 



92 

important o f f i c e of lieutenant-general i n Poitou was held by 

Louis Madaillan d'Estissac 1 and Francois Ier Nompar de Caumont, 

seigneur de Lauzun was lieutenant for the king of the chateaux, 
• 2 

c i t y , and comte of Blaye. A l l five were prominent nobles who 

contributed to the dignity and authority of Montpensier's 

commission. 

The king not only saw that Montpensier was accompanied 

by a council of nobles on his mission into Guyenne but he 

attempted to send proven nobles in;to the province at other times 

to encourage his o f f i c e r s and increase the support of the noblesse. 

Thus i n May, 1562 Charles promised Monluc and Burie that he would 

send into Guyenne for t h e i r assistance Biron, d'Ossun, Candale 

and N e g r e p e l i s s e . 5 These men were sent from the court to the 

province because as men of prominent families i n Guyenne, they 

had gone to the court seeking appointment and honours. In t h e i r 

a c t i v i t i e s within the province they'showed l i t t l e hesitation i n 

co-operating with Monluc as did Candale i n the formation of 

Catholic leagues. 

The r a i s i n g of troops was undertaken l o c a l l y as the 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , ,538. . 
2 I b i d . , I I , 205. 
5 R u b l e , Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 441. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 214. 



93 

appointment of commanders for them often was. In theory, the 

king maintained the ultimate control since he issued l e t t e r s 

patent and commissions and on the occasions when he had not 

authorized the levy or the appointment before the f a c t , his 

confirmation was given after the f a c t . Also i n theory, control 

of the purse strings by the king ensured his authority over 

m i l i t a r y and administrative a f f a i r s . However, l o c a l authorities 

found many opportunities to manipulate royal funds, to augment 

them from the s p o i l s of war, and to use them for personal gain. 

E f f e c t i v e r o y a l control over a f f a i r s i n a disrupted and distant 

province was impossible to maintain. 

Command 

As i n other aspects of authority m i l i t a r y command was 

c e n t r a l i z e d , i n theory. In practice the central command depended 

on l o c a l response for i t s effectiveness. As lieutenant-general 

of the kingdom, Antoine de Bourbonvwas supreme commander. The 

three Triumvirs were among his high o f f i c e r s : the constable was 

Antoine*s lieutenant; the due de Guise, chief of the avant-garde; 

the marechal Saint-Andre, chief of the a r r i e r e - g a r d e T h e royal 

army they commanded consisted of t h i r t y thousand men, i n camp or 
2 

promised. Three thousand German lansquenets, fourteen enseignes 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 2 3 5 . 

2 I b i d . , IV, 2 8 7 . 



94 

of Swiss and at least three thousand Spanish troops were included 

i n that number. These foreign troops i l l u s t r a t e the difference 

between an army on paper and an army i n the f i e l d . The three 

thousand Germans represented half the number i n i t i a l l y anticipated 

by Antoine who decided to settle for three thousand "now" rather 

than s i x thousand "sometime." The r e i t e r s arrived at the end of 

J u l y , 1562 and, after hearing from Conde, most of them changed 

sides and put themselves i n the service of the Huguenots.* The 

Spanish troops entered Guyenne i n September but were detained i n 
2 

that gouvernement by Burie and Monluc. Burie found them d i f f i c u l t 

to handle and the fact that they were unpaid contributed to their 

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . About five hundred mutinied and Monluc's s k i l l 

was required to pacify them. 5 At Vergt the wily Gascon commander 
4 

exploited the r i v a l r y between Spanish and Gascon. Of a l l the 

foreign troops expected only the Swiss .took the f i e l d r e l i a b l y 

as a n t i c i p a t e d . 

Forces from within the kingdom were likewise d i f f i c u l t to 

deploy through a centralized command. From August, 1562 the king, 

the queen and the lieutenant-general of the kingdom commanded 

Burie to lead from Guyenne into France both the Spanish companies 

I b i d . 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 59, 61. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 6l. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 554-557. 



95 
and troops raised in Guyenne."'" Repeated l e t t e r s and even a 

personal messenger, the seigneur de Malicorne, lieutenant of 

Randan's company, drew no immediate response i n terms of conduct-
2 

ing the troops to join with the r o y a l army. Both l o c a l concerns 

and l o c a l independence postponed the active response to that 

request. In November the gens de pied under, Jacques Prevost, 

seigneur de Charry and some of the Spaniards were f i n a l l y led into 

France by Louis Prevost, seigneur de Sansac, governor of Angoumois. 

The pre-eminent role of the lieutenant-general i n m i l i t a r y 

a f f a i r s of the gouvernement was advantageous i f he was a f o r c e f u l 

person and a competent commander* When authority was divided or 

the lieutenant-general was ineffectual the fact that he had 

t h e o r e t i c a l authority was no advantage to the m i l i t a r y cause i n 

the gouvernement. The r i v a l r y of Burie and Monluc had few 

serious repercussions for the f o r c e f u l Monluc was a more energetic 

person and a more able commander. Either they served i n different 

parts of the province or Monluc managed to get his own way by 

manipulating Burie or b u l l y i n g him. Rivalry i n Provence had much 

more serious r e s u l t s . The governor was Claude de Savoie, comte de 

Tende, nephew of the constable Montmorency. His son Honore de 

Savoie, comte de Sommerive, was lieutenant. The l a t t e r embraced 

1 r b i d . , I I , 514 and n. 
2 \ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 59* 

•̂ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 77 • 



96 

the party of the Guises while his father was very moderate. The 

son raised troops i n the king's name i n spite of his father's 

opposition and eventually the moderate father was maneuvered 

into the Huguenot camp.* The tragedy lay i n the fact that both 

father and sori'made war, p i l l a g i n g successively the same towns, 

both i n the king's name. 

The armies engaged i n battle i n the provinces of the west 

and southwest of France were predominantly l o c a l l y - r a i s e d troops 

commanded by royal o f f i c e r s of l o c a l o r i g i n . As a result they 

demonstrated strong regional l o y a l t i e s and were frequently 

reluctant to fight beyond the l i m i t s of their own provinces. Both 

o f f i c e r s and men preferred to remain i n their home t e r r i t o r y 

although on which side they fought seems to have been of second-

ary importance for many. The fact that the lieutenant-general 

i n large measure chose the captains and recruited the troops had 

the advantage that a strong personal l o y a l t y to the l o c a l 

commander tended to unify the troops. The Gascon n o b i l i t y 

c e r t a i n l y united behind Monluc and expressed t h e i r confidence i n 
p 

him i n A p r i l , 1562 as the c i v i l war was just beginning. The 

noblesse of Guyenne were convinced that the acceptance of the 

new r e l i g i o n meant the overthrow of the accepted s o c i a l order 

and they found evidence to strengthen their conviction i n the 

*Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 304. 
2 
Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, kkl. 



97 

assassination of the baron de Fumel by his own peasants, one'of 

the f i r s t events of the s t r i f e i n Guyenne."'" Refusal to pay the 

t a i l l e s to their secular lords was a small step for those Huguenots 

who had refused the payment of dimes to the Roman Catholic Church. 

The noblesse feared that their f i n a n c i a l and s o c i a l position and 

even t h e i r l i v e s were threatened by the Reform, a fear that was 

heightened as most of the men of finances of Guyenne joined the 

Reform and many of the o f f i c e r s of justice of the Parlements and 
2 

senechaussees. The Reform i t s e l f had a d i s t i n c t l y l o c a l 

character because of the nature of i t s organization and leader-

s h i p . In i t s struggles the s p i r i t of p r o v i n c i a l resistance was 

reborn so that i n the Bordelais region the revolt of the gabelle 

was evoked.^ It was to be expected that the noblesse would seek 

i n the king's lieutenant-general t h e i r champion. He was one of 

them and to a c l a s s , l a r g e l y m i l i t a r y , his renown as a m i l i t a r y 

leader was important. Monluc, on his side, was not reluctant to 

court the noblesse for he was sure that the crown would have to 

lean increasingly on the n o b i l i t y and to be t h e i r chosen leader 
k 

could only strengthen his p o s i t i o n . 

During the f i r s t War of Religion Blaise de Monluc was by 

"""Ibid., I I , 400; Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 156. 
2 

Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 395. 

^Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, pp. 161-162. 

Sbid., pp. 164, 167-168. 



98 

far the most important m i l i t a r y figure i n Guyenne. He possessed 

a high degree of independence i n the exercise of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . 

He r e c r u i t e d men, appointed o f f i c e r s and even imposed taxes for the 

expense of the army.* Many s o l d i e r s were available and w i l l i n g to 

f i g h t , seemingly with l i t t l e concern about which side engaged 

their s e r v i c e s . ? This fact raises a serious question about . tvhe 

contention that the Huguenot army was merely the congregation of 

the f a i t h f u l under arms. While the synodal organization of the 

Protestant Churches may have provided the skeleton of the 

Huguenot army, much of the flesh on that m i l i t a r y body must have 

come not from the congregations but from the ranks of professional 

s o l d i e r s seeking employment. That s i t u a t i o n i s i n accord with 

Romier's observation that, 

the many soldiers and captains from the I t a l i a n WarB could 
not. be threatened with the loss of their regular employment 
without p r e c i p i t a t i n g great d i s o r d e r . . . . On the other hand 
the economic and s o c i a l condition created by c o s t l y external 
wars must resolve i t s e l f i n an explosion of anarchy.^ 

The c o n f l i c t i n Guyenne was greatly magnified by the presence of 

many veteran soldiers who knew no other career and who found i n 

c i v i l war the employment they had l o s t with the cessation of 

h o s t i l i t i e s after the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis i n 1559» 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I I , 420. C f . discussion i n the next 
chapter. 

2 
Lucien Romier, Les Origines Politiques des Guerres de  

Religion (Paris: P e r r i n , 1914), pp. 235-23o\ 



CHAPTER IV 

FINANCE AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 

C o n t i n u a l war p l a c e d a heavy f i n a n c i a l burden upon the 

kingdom d u r i n g the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y . No sooner had the expense 

of f o r e i g n wars been removed than the expense of c i v i l war r e p l a c e d 

i t as a d r a i n upon the budget. These expenses l e n t impetus to 

f i n a n c i a l reforms and gave r i s e to new f i n a n c i a l expedients 

throughout the course of the century but i n s p i t e of reform and 

expedient the r o y a l budget was always i n the r e d . F r e q u e n t l y 

the k i n g was unable to meet h i s commitments, c r e d i t o r s went unpaid 

and e x t e n s i v e loans were r e - f i n a n c e d at higher i n t e r e s t . The most 

dramatic attempt to c o n s o l i d a t e the r o y a l debt was the Grand P a r t i 

of 1555» an attempt to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e t i r e the debt over a 

p e r i o d of only ten y e a r s . C r e d i t o r s were to be p a i d four times 

y e a r l y from revenues of the r e c e i p t s general of Lyon, Toulouse 

and M o n t p e l l i e r with i n t e r e s t at 5% per term or, 20% a n n u a l l y . In 

p r a c t i c e , payments remained i n a r r e a r s and f u r t h e r loans were 

c o n t r a c t e d . Many of these were i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Grand P a r t i 

so that by 1559 with other loans i t r e p r e s e n t e d a debt of more 

than 16,500,000 l i v r e s with annual i n t e r e s t of 3,200,000 l i v r e s . 1 

The f i n a n c i a l f a i l u r e of the French monarchy was postponed 

Roland Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France XVI^ S i e c l e , 2 p t i e , 
( P a r i s : Centre de Documentation U n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1959), p. 338. 



100 
a year or two after that of the Spanish monarchy * but i t was 

2 
hastened by the sudden death of Henry II i n 1 5 5 9 . Although the 

royal debts were very quickly acknowledged by his successor, 

Francis I I , the confidence of bankers who had extended far too 

much credit and had recently experienced the f i n a n c i a l collapse 

of Spain, was shaken by the succession of a boy to the throne. 

Therefore, at the outset of the c i v i l wars the a b i l i t y of the 

monarch to raise large sums from international bankers was 

seriously c u r t a i l e d and f i n a n c i a l problems were to plague the 

monarchy constantly and to hamper i t s m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s as i t 

attempted to combat the challenge of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n and c i v i l 

war. 

In time, of war, when the outcome depended upon the exploits 

of the royal troops i t was most important that t h e i r l o y a l t y and 

service be assured. Therefore, the extent to which the troops 

remained unpaid should serve as a reasonable index of the 

f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the monarchy. .It i s an index r e l a t i v e l y 

easy to examine because the governors and lieutenants-general, 

responsible for the command of the troops and the maintenance of 

garrisons within their gouvernements, were greatly concerned about 

the payment of t h e i r soldiers and that problem became a. regular 

1 I b i d . , pp. 335-338. 
2 
For the c r i s i s of that year seeHenri Hauser, "The European 

F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s of 1559*" Journal of Economic and Business History, 
II, 2 (February, 1930), 241-255-



101 

theme i n t h e i r l e t t e r s to Charles. IX and to Catherine de Medicis. 

The constant pleas of governors that t h e i r troops be paid 

probably did not arise primarily from any humanitarian concern 

for t h e i r soldiers but from the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n that unpaid 

troops were d i s s a t i s f i e d troops and i t was a small step from 

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n to d i s l o y a l t y . Even at the time of r e c r u i t i n g , 

the necessary resources were not always provided. D'Escars, 

following the king's orders, raised a company of t h i r t y arque-

busiers for Savignac for which provision was not made so Burie 

met the expenses personally and asked reimbursement thereafter."*" 

Burie asked money for a montre i n January, 1562 recognizing that 

i t would be necessary to maintain four or five hundred gens d'armes 
2 

i n the Agenais a l l summer. Montpensier wrote from P o i t i e r s that 

the troops were forced to p i l l a g e or starve and he asked permission 

to impose a levy on the inhabitants of the city."^ In August, 1562 

Burie was begging the king for the solde for his company and i n 

December he was s t i l l asking.^ The men l e f t i n garrison by the 

due de Montpensier had, not been paid by him and Burie did not dare 

decree a tax to raise their solde without the king's authorization, 

Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 426. "Burie 
au r o i , " 28 septembre,, 1561. 

2 I b i d . , I, 427. "Burie au r o i , " 28 septembre, 156I. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 54. 
4 

Ruble, op. c i t . , I, 451. "Burie au r o i , " 29 aout, 1562. 

^ I b i d . , I, 466. "Burie au r o i , " 14 decembre, 1562. 



102 

e s p e c i a l l y since i t amounted to twenty thousand l i v r e s per month. 

At the same time the baron de Jarnac reminded Catherine that the 

soldiers needed for the.defence of La Rochelle had to be paid or 

they would turn to sack and p i l l a g e . * His request arrived almost 

simultaneously with a l e t t e r from La Rochelle, written by Burie, 

s t a t i n g that Monpensier had l e f t troops there without providing 
2 

for their payment. . The s i t u a t i o n was so dire according to 

Jarnac, governor of La Rochelle that men of his company who had 

received no money for a year had been forced to leave for t h e i r 

homes penniless after having eaten t h e i r horses i n the g a r r i s o n . 5 

Pay had been scarce for the s i x companies of gens d'armes 

raised by Monluc and for his own company of chevaux-legers. 

Since they hadn't been paid for over four months, the r e a l i s t i c 

Monluc wondered i f they could be given two months' pay before they 

were disbanded. At the same time he pointed out that the company 

in garrison at Mont de Marsan and those i n Bordeaux had received 

nothing for more than eight months and the mortes-payes had been 

unpaid for a year. If any funds reached the troops, they were 

inadequate for Monluc indicated that Peyrot's chevaux-legers had 
5 

received only one thousand l i v r e s i n six months. At the normal 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79 • 

2 I b i d . , No. 80. 5 I b i d . , No. 79. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 286-290. "Monluc a l a 
royne pour les a f f a i r e s de Guyenne," octobre ou novembre, 1563. 

5 I b i d . , IV, 291. 



1 0 3 

pay of twenty l i v r e s per month * twelve times as much money would 

have been required to pay the company excluding i t s o f f i c e r s . 

Ransom demands for prisoners prolonged the c i v i l wars i n Monluc's 

view, however, he could not forbid the practice because "neither 
2 

gendarme nor soldier was p a i d . " 

The problem of maintaining unpaid troops was not eliminated 

by disbanding them for men accustomed to earning their l i v i n g by 

their arms would probably continue doing so and were not l i k e l y 

to view t h e i r employers with a theologically or p o l i t i c a l l y 

c r i t i c a l eye. D'Etampes expressed concern over the order to 

demobilize some troops saying that to do so would weaken him and 

strengthen his enemies "for such men go where the money i s . " 5 

That men should change sides to increase the l i k e l i h o o d of being 

paid i s not s u r p r i s i n g for they changed on occasion for other 

reasons. After the defeat of Duras at Vergt, Monluc recruited 

from the defeated army s i x companies of gens de pied with two 

purposes i n mind: to diminish the enemy and to f i l l his own ranks 

with needed troops. The effects were at times as devastating i f 

unpaid s o l d i e r s did not desert but merely resorted to l o o t i n g and 

robbery; a l l i e s could do as much damage to c i t i z e n s and t h e i r 

Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 6 V + . 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 4 7 8 - * + 7 9 . 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 3 8 . 



104 

c i t i e s as could enemies."'" The baron de Jarnac feared such 

c o n f l i c t between s o l d i e r s and inhabitants i n La Rochelle i f the 

men remained longer unpaid. Looting and robbery would lead to 

great scandal and he urged Catherine to avoid them by finding 
2 

the means to pay the troops. 

The f i n a n c i a l system at the beginning of the century lent 

i t s e l f to control by an oligarchy of f i n a n c i a l o f f i c e r s . Only 

the revenues of the Domain were centralized under the Changeur du  

Trgsor and the revenues from taxes were handled by nine receipts 

general.^ There was no unified accounting for a l l revenues and 
4 

the system for effecting payment was often extremely complicated. 

Thus i t was extremely d i f f i c u l t to co-ordinate f i n a n c i a l matters, 

to determine resources available or to devise means of supplement-

ing resources. Francis I introduced reforms i n 1523 which c e n t r a l -

ized and s i m p l i f i e d the f i n a n c i a l system by establishing two 

central agencies, the Tresorier de l'Epargne and the Tresorier des 

Parties casuelles, the f i r s t of which became the major agency of 

c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . As the pressure of f i s c a l operations on the 

Tresorier de 1'Epargne.mounted, i t was relieved by a return to 

e a r l i e r p r a c t i c e s . The accounting remained centralized i n his 

"""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. 
2 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. 

"^Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 597. 
4 

Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au X V I e S i S c l e , pp. 282-284. 



105 
hands but the administration of funds was decentralized to some 

degree under the l o c a l recettes generaux as funds were increas-
1 

ingly spent l o c a l l y . 1 

Revenues were c l a s s i f i e d as ordinary and extraordinary 

and early i n the century only domainal revenues were considered 

ordinary. Taxes of a l l kinds were classed as extraordinary since 

they had originated as temporary expedients in. times of f i n a n c i a l 

pressure such as the Hundred Years' War. They were to become i n 

the course of the century c l a s s i f i e d as ordinary i n contrast to 

new expedients developed to meet the f i n a n c i a l demands of the 

time. 

Like the administration of the armed forces the supporting 

f i n a n c i a l resources were divided into the receipts of 1'ordinaire' 
2 

des guerres and the receipts of 1'extraordinaire des guerres. 

The former consisted of the t a i l l e and t a i l l o n sent by receveurs  

generaux and receveurs du t a i l l o n to the two t r e s o r i e r s de 1'ordin- 

aire des guerres. The funds were then sent to the payeurs des  

compagnies de gendarmes responsible for paying the troops. 

Doucet observes that the t a i l l e and the t a i l l o n had both been 

considered h i s t o r i c a l l y as extraordinary taxes and were only 

Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI e S i e c l e , p. 334. 

Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 648-649. 



106 

classed as ordinary resources i n r e l a t i o n to those which supplied 

the extraordinaire des guerres.* Funds for the finances extra- 

ordinaire were drawn from the Epargne i n the form of mandates 

carrying receipts addressed to the recettes generales. The, funds 

were then distributed to the soldiers by payeurs des compagnies 

as i n the case of the finances ordinaires. 

When Montpensier was sent into Guyenne he asked for a clerk 

of the t r e s o r i e r de 1'extraordinaire des guerres supplied with 

receipts and signed blanks to serve for discharge to the receveurs 
2 

from whom money would be taken. The royal council informed him 

that one hundred•thousand l i v r e s had been assigned by the 

tre'sorier de l'Epargne for the m i l i t a r y needs of Burie and Monluc. 

He was instructed to ascertain how much had been spent and to 

make his needs known from the f i e l d when he knew them s p e c i f i c a l l y . 

No one was going to receive from the royal treasury a single sou 

u n t i l well after he needed i t and, i n case the need should become 

too pressing, the due de Montpensier could take the plate from the 

churches, an unpopular a c t i v i t y for which the council was always 

ready to grant authority. 

The annual revenues of the crown at the beginning of the 

Wars of Religion amounted to about 16,000,000 l i v r e s , three-

Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , II, 6 4 8 n . 

Documents Pour Servir a..., No. 4 8 . 



107 

quarters from revenus ordinaires and one-quarter from revenus  

extraordinaires. Of the revenus ordinaires about 6,000,000 

l i v r e s was derived from the t a i l l e s and crues, 2,700,000 from 

the aides and the gabelles, and 3,500,000 from the domain. 

D^cimes, g i f t s , forced loans, and the sale of offices contributed 

to the revenus extraordinaires."*" Mousnier maintains that the 

people of France could well have paid higher taxes but that taxes 

were not raised because of the way i n which they were viewed 

rather than because of any i n a b i l i t y to pay. The tax was 

considered as something abnormal by the sixteenth century mind 

for the king should l i v e on the proceeds of his domain. There-

fore, the crown sought other expedients for meeting i t s expenses. 

After the credit i n f l a t i o n of 1559, the French court, 

unable to obtain the needed financing on the open market.in 

such banking centres as Lyon, appealed to the pope, to the king 

of Spain and, not l e a s t , to the-people of France for g i f t s and 

loans. Many loans were forced, e s p e c i a l l y i f a man were so 

indiscreet as to l e t i t be known that he had money a v a i l a b l e . 

The c a r d i n a l de F e r r a r e , for example, l e t i t be known that he 

was planning to send 2,000 ecus to F a b r i c i o S e r b e l l o n i , the 

pope's nephew at Avignon. He found himself approached by the 

Mousnier, E t u d e s sur l a France au XVI e S i e c l e , p. 325. 
2 

I b i d . , p. 326 



108 

queen and the due de Guise who i n s i s t e d that he give t h i s sum 

to the seigneur de Suze who was being sent into Dauphine by the 

Triumvirate. In vain did he protest that he did not yet have the 

money on hand for he was required to pay half immediately and to 

present a note for the balance.* The gift and loan requested of 

the pope enabled him to make certain demands upon the French court. 

Upon the assurance that the king would r e - e s t a b l i s h the Roman 

Catholic Church, punish the h e r e t i c s , and send the chancellor 

from the court, the pope agreed to grant a g i f t of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ecus 
2 

and a loan of similar amount. 

Loans were often raised through the intermediary of 

municiapl o f f i c i a l s rather than d i r e c t l y from i n d i v i d u a l s . When 

the c i v i l war entered the stage of decisive operations about the 

beginning of August, 1 5 6 2 , Catherine c a l l e d the council of the 

c i t y of Paris and asked for a loan of 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 ecus. It was 

opened to the inhabitants for subscription with registers i n 

various parts of the c i t y . The f i r s t name recorded was that of 

the prevot, Guillaume de Marie, who gave part of his plate and 

another of the donors was Diane de P o i t i e r s , mistress of the late 

Henry I I , who brought a g i f t of 1 , 2 2 2 l i v r e s . 5 In June, 1563 the 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 1 9 8 . 

2 I b i d . , IV, 1 9 9 . 

3 I b i d . , IV, 2 9 2 . 



109 
" e c h e v i n s e t c o n s e i l l e r s de P a r i s ' * w e r e o n c e more r e q u e s t e d b y 

C h a r l e s t o b o r r o w f r o m t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e c i t y , t h i s t i m e t o 

t h e t u n e o f 100,000 l i v r e s . " * " A t t h e l e a s t p r e t e x t money was 
r a i s e d a n d c h a r g e d a g a i n s t a c i t y . T h u s when t h e c i t y o f B o u r g e s 

f e l l t o t h e C a t h o l i c a r m y , a c o n t r i b u t i o n o f 50,000 e c u s was 
r e q u i r e d f o r t h e e x p e n s e s o f t h e w a r . The amount was l a t e r 

r e d u c e d t o 20,000 e c u s t o be r a i s e d by a t a x on t h e r e f o r m e d 
2 

i n h a b i t a n t s . A l s o c a l c u l a t e d t o d e f r a y s l i g h t l y t h e c o s t o f 

m i l i t a r y e n d e a v o u r s were t h e t e r m s o f f e r e d t h e c i t y o f R o u e n 

b e f o r e i t s f a l l . T h a t c i t y was r e q u i r e d t o p a y 80,000 l i v r e s 
t o r a n s o m i t s e l f f r o m p i l l a g e . " ^ 

I n h i s a d d r e s s "A M o n s e i g n e u r " a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f h i s 

C o m m e n t a i r e s , M o n l u c d i r e c t e d t o t h e due d ' A n j o u a p e r s o n a l 

d e f e n c e i n w h i c h he r e p u d i a t e d t h e c h a r g e t h a t he h a d a c c u m u l a t e d 

a g r e a t f o r t u n e . He s t a t e d t h a t he l i v e d on h i s s t i p e n d a n d 
4 

l o a n e d a n y e x t r a c a p i t a l o u t a t i n t e r e s t . A t a t i m e when f o r c e d 

l o a n s w e r e t h e o r d e r o f t h e d a y a man was e x p e c t e d t o h a v e h i s 

m o n e y , a n d p r o b a b l y h i s p l a t e , l o a n e d f o r t h e k i n g ' s s e r v i c e . 

The t o n e o f M o n l u c ' s w r i t i n g s u g g e s t e d t h a t t o h a v e t o o much c a s h 

on h a n d when t h e m o n a r c h was i n d i r e n e e d was c o n s i d e r e d t a n t a m o u n t 

D o c u m e n t s P o u r S e r v i r a . . . . N o . 1 0 3 . 

*T":uble, A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n , I V , 310. 

3 I b i d . , I V , 3^6. 
4 

M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s , I, 14-19. 



110 

to treason 

One of the most basic expedients to supplement the resources 

of the monarch was the attempt to find someone else to foot the 

b i l l for at least part of the m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . This was accomplish-

ed by making c i t i e s responsible for the payment of troops garrisoned 

i n them, a practice reinforced by r o y a l policy i n 1562. In May 

Charles IX wrote Negrepelisse requesting him to raise four 

companies of gens de pied at Toulouse to be maintained at the 

expense of the c i t y and for i t s safety.* The execution of t h i s 

policy was supervised by the king's council for Montpensier stated 

that the council had resolved that the people of Chinon and Loudun 

would have two hundred hommes de pied and one hundred arquebusiers  

a cheval for the defence of the c i t i e s , chateaux and pais d'election 

of the region, two-rthirds of the expense to be borne by Loudun and 

one-third by Chinon. These regions, however, had not obtained 
2 

commissions to raise the required taxes. The troops, presumably, 

remained unpaid. Monluc's adjustment of the size and composition 

of the garrison at Lectoure was approved by the king provided that 

garrison was paid at the expense of the c i t y and of the neighbour-

ing v i l l a g e s "suyvant l a permission et octroy que j'ay f a i c t 

expedier aux habitanz d ' i c e l l e pour asseoir et imposer sur eulx 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 17. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . . , No. 76. 



I l l 

les sommes de deniers qui seront necessaires pour l e d i c t pavement." 

After the Battle of Vergt when Burie took most of the forces from 

Guyenne to go into Saintonge, Monluc made use of three companies 

from Comminges which cost the king nothing for they were paid by 
2 

the bishops and the region. That the policy of l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 

for payment of the troops was a newly enforced p o l i c y during the 

f i r s t War of Religion i s indicated by the l e t t e r of Guy Chabot de 

Jarnac to the queen i n which he complained of the d i f f i c u l t y i n 

governing because of the changing of ordonnances^ a l e t t e r written 

within a few weeks of Montpensier's statement that La Rochelle was 

strongly opposed to supporting a garrison. 

The inhabitants of some regions demonstrated that they were 

w i l l i n g to spend considerable time and money to avoid the expense 

of supporting a company i n g a r r i s o n . Montpensier instructed the 

contrQleur Ruze" to t e l l the king, the queen, and the council 

that since the king and queen had decided to maintain at the 

expense of the c i t i e s and surrounding regions the s o l d i e r s 

necessary for their defence, the due asked that he be sent a 

commission and authority to impose the sums from which the pay 

could be taken. He was speaking of La Rochelle where a l l 

knowledgeable advisors stated at least eleven or twelve hundred 

I b i d . , No. 7k. 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 170. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. 

I b i d . , No. 7k. 



112 

men would have to be maintained and, therefore, the expense 

would be considerable. The leaders of the c i t y were businessmen 

prepared to invest a l o t of money to avoid paying for the garrison 

and Montpensier discovered that they had sent the elu and some 

others to the court bearing four or five thousand ecus and means 

of obtaining more to give to those i n a position to help them i n 

what they sought.* Whether they planned to approach Florimond 

de Robertet, sieur de Fresne, the secretary of state within whose 

departement the region l a y , i s not known. What i s known i s that 

they intended not merely to ask that they be r e l i e v e d of the 

garrison but to offer some incentive to those able to influence 

the d e c i s i o n . 

P a r t i c u l a r extraordinary taxes were used as another expedient 

i n the attempt to meet the f i n a n c i a l demands of c i v i l war. Local 

opposition to such taxes was at times aroused, especially when 

l o c a l interests were threatened. Catherine was informed by the 

baron de Jarnac that the interruption of the l i b e r t y of commerce 

and t r a f f i c of merchandise would destroy La Rochelle for there was 

nothing i n the region but commerce. It would also result i n a 

serious diminution of royal revenues. Either s p e c i a l taxes or 

other r e s t r i c t i o n s were i n t e r f e r i n g with the commerce of the c i t y 

and the municipal o f f i c i a l s were most concerned about i t , so much 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7k. ''Instructions du due 
de Montpensier au contrSleur Ruz6, 12 novembre, 1562, La Rochelle. 



113 
concerned that they sent a deputation to the governor at Jarnac, 

his home. Jarnac, the governor, i n turn planned to go to the 

court on their behalf."'' A spate of l e t t e r s from Burie and from 

the jurats of Bordeaux to the king and queen late i n 1561 

protested against the new tax of one ecu per b a r r e l on wine. Sales 

of wine to England represented an important part of the economy of 

the c i t y and English merchants, because of the price increase 
2 

dictated by the tax, were threatening to buy i n Spain. Nothing 

s t i r r e d l o c a l sentiments against the crown l i k e an unpopular tax, 

a fact i l l u s t r a t e d by the revolt of the gabelle i n Guyenne just 

twelve years e a r l i e r . 

A f i n a n c i a l expedient f i r s t systematized during the reign 

of Francis I was the sale of o f f i c e s , a practice which affected 

adversely royal authority. This practice enabled the king to 

raise large sums of money on occasion but at very high price for 

"each time the king sold an o f f i c e , he created a creditor for the 
3 

state." That i s , i n salary and taxes the crown paid more than 

i t received. At the Estates-General of Orleans, the Third Estate 

evaluated the s a l a r i e s of new o f f i c e r s created by Henry II alone 

at 1,200,000 l i v r e s - t o u r n o i s per year and Mousnier has calculated 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. 

"Tvuble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 425, ^33. 

•^Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI e S i e c l e , p. 300. 



114 

that the king paid 33% interest for the c a p i t a l he received.* 

Even more serious than the cost was the fact that men who owned 

their o f f i c e s could be much more independent i n the exercise of 

them.and thus the king's control over his o f f i c e r s was weakened. 

The r o y a l o f f i c e r s of Guyenne were among the leaders of the 
2 

r e b e l l i o n according to Monluc. The venality of offices 

contributed also to s o c i a l unrest for when the king was unable 

to meet his commitments for the s a l a r i e s of o f f i c e r s , they took 

matters into their own hands insofar as they were able and thus 

abused those under t h e i r authority. 

Men of the church were t h e o r e t i c a l l y exempt from taxation 

but i n r e a l i t y they contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the expenses of 

the k i n g . Decimes were c l a s s i f i e d as free g i f t s to indicate that 

the clergy was exempt from taxation and was contributing of i t s 

own free w i l l to the defence of the kingdom.5 Under Henry II 

the decimes increased i n size and frequency and during the 

reign of Charles IX they were systematized by the Contract of 

Poissy i n 1561. In the sixteen years i n which the Contract was 
if 

i n effect the clergy contributed 62,400,000 l i v r e s . In f a c t , 

at the Estates-General of Pontoise i n 1561 only the clergy had 

1 I b i d . , p. 300. 
2 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, IIj 4l6. 
5 Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au X V I e S i e c l e , pp. 323-324. 
if 
Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 837. 



1 ] - 5 

shown i t s e l f w i l l i n g to give any f i n a n c i a l support to the k i n g . 

The secular estates had proven w i l l i n g to a i r t h e i r grievances 

and even to threaten the position of the queen mother but 

unwilling to give anything i n support of the monarch, and by 

these actions they had condemned the Estates-General to disuse. 

The clergy, on the other hand, proved useful to the crown and 

thereby enhanced i t s own position."*" 

Contributions from the clergy were not only i n the form 

of dlcimes but i n the sale of the temporal holdings' of the 

church. For example, i n J u l y , 1 5 6 3 after the Peace of Amboise 

when r o y a l m i l i t a r y strength was turned to e j e c t i n g the English 

from Normandy, Charles IX gave instructions to the royal o f f i c e r s 
2 

decreeing the sale of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ecus of the temporel of the church. 

S i m i l a r l y , as Charles and his advisors looked for resources during 

the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n , the silverware of the churches seemed 

to hold promise as a means of r a i s i n g funds. Governors of the 

provinces were instructed to take the silverware from the churches 
3 

to underwrite their m i l i t a r y expenses. Several governors 

expressed their unwillingness to undertake such an unpopular 

assignment for while they might be protectors of the church they 

could see potential danger i n duplicating the Huguenot actions of 
1 J . R u s s e l l Major, "The Third Estate i n the Estates-General 

of Pontoise, 1 5 6 1 , " Speculum, XXIX ( 1 9 5 * 0 , 4 7 6 . 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . . No. 1 0 8 . 

^Documents Pour Servir a t . . . , Nos. 4 3 , 4 8 , 5 1 "for Bretagne, 
Guyenne and La Rochelle et l ' A u n i s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 



116 

r a i d i n g the churches, a l b e i t with r o y a l b l e s s i n g . The due 

d'Etampes suggested that for such a task commissions should be 

sent to the bishops or the men of j u s t i c e 1 and Jarnac also wished 
2 

to avoid being d i r e c t l y involved i n such work. The governors and 

lieutenants desired to dissociate themselves from a p o t e n t i a l l y 

unpopular royal f i s c a l p o l i c y . 

The governors and lieutenants-general, as important 

o f f i c e r s of the crown, were both the r e c i p i e n t s and the d i s t r i b u t o r s 

of patronage. The king found i t d i f f i c u l t but essential to reward 

them for their service; d i f f i c u l t because the r o y a l treasury was 

pressed beyond i t s resources; essential because these m i l i t a r y 

leaders could be as useful to his enemies as to himself. Local 

groups such as the municipal leaders i n a major c i t y of a 

gouvernement found i t desirable to reward the king's lieutenants 

whom they regarded as their protectors both at the court and 

against the r e b e l s . Even the Huguenots considered i t worthwhile 

on occasion to offer substantial sums of money to a lieutenant of 

the king i n exchange for certain guarantees. The lieutenant-

general i n t u r n , was i n a p o s i t i o n to arrange remunerative 

appointments for his proteges or, at l e a s t , to recommend them to 

the king as worthy recipients of royal largesse. 

Documents ,Pour Servir a . . . . No. kj>. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 51 • 



117 

High office did not automatically ensure the enrichment 

of i t s holder, however. In f a c t , the officer often assumed the 

f i n a n c i a l obligations of his monarch with l i t t l e immediate 

reward. Fifteen months after the battle of Vergt, Monluc was 

s t i l l w r i t i n g to the king and queen to ask reimbursement for the 

5 , 6 0 0 l i v r e s he had advanced personally i n order to raise the 

royal companies. By the time of writing he claimed to be out 

of pocket not only the 5 , 6 0 0 l i v r e s advanced to the t r e s o r i e r 

de 1'extraordinaire des guerres but a further 3 0 0 ecus.spent 

t r y i n g to recover the debt. Martiheau, Monluc*s secretary, had 

been at the court almost five months working on his behalf. In 

the same l e t t e r the old lieutenant asked for his pension of 

2 , 0 0 0 l i v r e s for the previous year, and, concluding the l e t t e r , 

he referred to a l e t t e r of ten days e a r l i e r i n which he had 

t o l d Catherine of the i l l n e s s and imminent death of the bishop 

of Condom and had asked her to remember him i n the appointment. 

The good bishop had recovered and Monluc relayed this news to 

the queen.* Later i n the year a new bishop was appointed and 

Monluc received annually a sum of 5 , 0 0 0 francs from the bishopric 

for five years u n t i l his t h i r d son, Jean de Monluc, received the 
2 

o f f i c e . Throughout the period of his command i n Guyenne, 

Blaise de Monluc complained that his services were not being 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 3 1 5 • 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 1 7 • 



118 
recognized with appropriate f i n a n c i a l rewards, a consistent 

theme with many v a r i a t i o n s . A t y p i c a l example i s found i n the 

l e t t e r to the queen mother i n which he stated that he had served 

f a i t h f u l l y for f o r t y - f i v e years and was unable to show that his 

house was worth one ecu more than in. the beginning. Having l o s t 

hope of recompense he asked to be allowed to r e t i r e to his home.' 

Catherine found i t possible to f l a t t e r and mollify him with the 

granting of periodic honours. 

The sentiments of Monluc were echoed by other royal 

o f f i c e r s such as d'Escars who wrote that he had been forced to 

spend 15. or 16,000 l i v r e s i n ten months as governor of Bordeaux 

and one more month would see his t o t a l r u i n . That the king's 

personal representative should assume the king's expenses was 

expected and accepted by men of the time. The Parlement of 

Bordeaux decided that Noailles should raise three hundred men 
3 

p a r t i a l l y at his own expense. The comte de Suze wrote from 

Avignon that for three months he had commanded sixteen ensigns 

and about three hundred horse and the only f i n a n c i a l help he had 

received had been 2,000 ecus given him by the legate when he 

l e f t the court and 10 or 12,000 francs from the c i t y and region. 

He had attempted to meet his expenses through loans on his own 

*Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 306. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 116. "Le comte d'Escars 
a Catherine de 'Medicis," 6 septembre, 1563. 

3 
Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , kkO. 



119 

property. 

The problem facing the monarch was to maintain the l o y a l 

support of his o f f i c e r s , the lieutenants-general, i n a time when 

the cash resources upon which he could draw for patronage were 

stretched to t h e i r l i m i t and beyond. Frequently the lieutenants 

received from one hand of the king g i f t s which were taken away 

by the other. The congratulations of the king and queen to 

Monluc after the battle of Vergt emboldened him to ask the return 

of revenues from the comte de Gaure granted him by Henry II and 
2 

taken away be Francis I I . Charles IX r e p l i e d that his i n a b i l i t y 

to reward the Gascon captain for his worthy service saddened him 

but the revenues of the comte de Gaure had been reclaimed for the 

crown i n a general reunion of the domain and to set a precedent 

by returning them to Monluc would endanger more than one hundred 

thousand l i v r e s of r e n t e s O f f i c e s , both e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and 

administrative, were granted to the lieutenants on occasion, not 

to be exercised d i r e c t l y by them but so that they might enjoy 

some of the revenues from the office to which they i n turn 

appointed someone. Monluc enjoyed revenue from the bishopric 

of Condom and the due d'Etampes wrote Catherine thanking her for 

the abbey she had given i n his favour and promising to see that 

"""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 57. 
2 1 
Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 196. 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. 



1 2 0 

appointments would be made from among l o y a l men.* Burie had 

been given the office of prevot general of Guyenne, an office 

which he granted to a man of arms of his company. Burie's man 

had resigned the office to a man who joined the Huguenots and 

was taken at Vergt and Burie asked the king to grant the office 
2 

to the bearer of his l e t t e r , a man he did not name. While 

Burie may not have received revenue from the office or from i t s 

sale he was able i n the f i r s t instance to use i t as part of the 

patronage that was his to grant. 

The granting of revenues from confiscations and fines was 

another means used by the king to reward the f a i t h f u l and 

maintain t h e i r l o y a l t y . Henri de F o i x , comte de Candale, upon 

returning from a mission to England wrote to the queen of the 

expenses his o f f i c e r s had been forced to bear i n the protection 

of his domains. He asked her to authorize a personal guard at 

expense of the Huguenots or at least of those who had been 

condemned by the Parlement of Bordeaux. This could be accomplish 

ed i f Catherine were to regularize the g i f t she had made him of 

the products of diverse f i n e s . 5 Sometimes the requests reaching 

the court were more s p e c i f i c l i k e B u r i e ' s l e t t e r containing an 

indictment against a merchant of Villeneuve d'Agen named Taisses. 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 27. 
2 

Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 466. Pidce 
J u s t i f i c a t i v e s , "Burie au r o i , " 14 decembre, 1 5 6 2 . 

5 I b i d . , I, 4 5 6 . "Candale a l a r e i n e , " 3 0 septerabre, 1 5 6 2 . 



1 2 1 

The merchant was imploring pardon but Burie asked that the king 

condemn him and grant the product of confiscations pronounced 

against him to Burie himself."*" The motive of the lieutenant-

general i n condemning Taisses was c e r t a i n l y open to question. 

Monluc, too, received the g i f t of a fine from Catherine; i n his 

case, a long unpaid fine levied against Colineau the receveur du 

2 

t a i l l o n of the B o r d e l a i s . More than a year l a t e r Monluc was 

s t i l l t r y i n g to obviate the requirements of the chancellor i n 

r e l a t i o n to forwarding the money to 11espargne and thence back to 

Monluc,. The only property held by Colineau was his o f f i c e , worth 

about f i f t e e n hundred ecus, and pledged to Monluc against the f i n e . 

The o f f i c e was exercised i n Monluc's name but the funds continued 

to go to his majesty's service and Monluc was unable to obtain 

authorization to take his part.'* Confiscations were granted to 

o f f i c e r s other than lieutenants-general for Charles IX wrote 

Monluc that he was sending him c e r t i f i c a t e s for the confiscation 

granted by the king to captain Monluc, his son, and to the 

seigneur de La Mothe-Rouge. A measure of Catherine's need to 

keep the f i r s t prince of the blood i d e n t i f i e d with her cause was 

the g i f t from Charles IX to the.king of Navarre, only two months 

"""Ibid.,"Burie a l a r e i n e , " 6 octobre, 1 5 6 2 . 
2 

Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 1 5 6 . 

3 I b i d . , IV, 2 8 9 . 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . . . No. 7 6 . 



122 

before the l a t t e r ' s f a t a l wounding of a l l the confiscations 

which would be pronounced against the rebels i n the provinces of 

Antoine and his wife.* The tendency of the crown to reward i t s 

o f f i c e r s by granting them revenues obtained from fines and 

confiscations may explain i n part the zeal displayed by Burie 

for the investigation of such revenues i n order to prevent men 
2 

of the Parlement from unduly enriching themselves. 

Pensions granted by the crown rewarded l o y a l service i n a 

continuing fashion and thus represented a continuing expense i f 

funds were found to pay them and a continuing cause of d i s s a t i s -

faction i f funds were not found. Monluc f i r s t received three 

thousand francs annually with another two thousand added when 

Henry II rewarded him with a pension for his exploits i n I t a l y 

and added the c o l l a r of the order of S a i n t - M i c h e l , and a rente 

from the r o y a l domain of three thousand francs on the comte de 

G a u r e . 5 A further pension of three thousand francs from Catherine 

when she and Charles IX were i n Angouleme brought Monluc's t o t a l 
it-pension to eight or nine thousand francs. 

The gages or pay accorded a man were, of course, part of 

Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 4-28. 
2 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. 
3 
^Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 17; I I , 192-193. In the i n t r o -

duction to his Comrnentaires Monluc maintained that the pension 
he received from Henry II was 2,000 francs and at the end of 
l i v r e III he stated that i t was 3,000 francs. 

Vbid., I, 17. 



123 

the patronage accompanying the office granted him. The range 

was extremely broad and was represented at one extreme by 

Antoine de Bourbon, lieutenant-general of the kingdom, who did 

not underestimate his own importance i n accepting two thousand 

five hundred l i v r e s monthly."*" In the camp of the royal army the 

two marshals of the camp and the colonel general of the infantry 

received three hundred l i v r e s monthly and the maxtres de camp, 
2 

two hundred. In the province of Guyenne Burie and Monluc each 

received five hundred l i v r e s , ^ half what the due de Montpensier 

was granted when he was sent on a special mission into the 

province. N o a i l l e s , governor of Bordeaux, and captain of the 

Chateau du Ha with one hundred men under his command, was paid 

one hundred l i v r e s per month and the services of his lieutenant 
5 

were valued at half that amount. The commissaires and 

contrdleurs who supervised the reviews of the troops each 

received about t h i r t y - f i v e l i v r e s . ^ The holder of a high non-

**"Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 235* 
2 I b i d . 

^Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 200. 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 

.^Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 199. "Estat de, ce que 
monte le paiement pour mois entier des gens de guerre a pied qui 
sont restes en garrison pour le service du r o i es v i l l e s et 
chasteaux de l a Guyenne," Toulouse, 4 mars, 1562 (I563). The 
gages of Noailles and his lieutenant had doubled from the statement 
for 1559 found i n F . ' L o t , Recherches sur les E f f e c t i f s , p. 254. 

^Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 201-202. 



124 

m i l i t a r y o f f i c e , that of f i r s t president i n the sovereign court 

of the Parlement of Bordeaux, received two hundred l i v r e s per 
1 2 month, an income he could undoubtedly augment. The salary of 

a counsellor of the Parlement of Paris was 600 l i v r e s annually 
3 

as compared to 375 l i v r e s for the same office i n Bordeaux. 

Salary and rewards from the crown were by no means the 

only source of revenue for the king's lieutenants. Major states 

that ''the p r o v i n c i a l estates l e v i e d taxes to pay royal o f f i c i a l s 

to convince the king that they were unable to pay the taxes he 

requested and that t h e i r respective provinces had p r i v i l e g e s 
4 

that must not be overridden." Although i t i s impossible to 

ascertain what was expected i n r e t u r n , i t i s clear that the c i t y 

of Toulouse appreciated Monluc's efforts and offered him 

g r a t i f i c a t i o n of 500 l i v r e s per month and wished to give him the 

sequestered property of Pierre d'Assezat, a town councillor charged 

by the Parlement with the crime of l e s e - M a j e s t l . D'Assezat was 

acquitted by the king's council and Monluc, therefore, did not 
5 

receive his property. There were times when representatives of 

^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 114. 
2 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 8 2 . 

^Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI e S i e c l e , p. 301. 
4 

J . Russell Major, "Crown and Aristocracy i n Renaissance 
France," p. 643. 

5 
Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , III, 8 9 ; IV, 198. 



125 

the Huguenot o r g a n i z a t i o n o f f e r e d f i n a n c i a l inducement to the 

k i n g ' s l i e u t n e n a n t s i n an attempt to win them over or, at l e a s t , 

to g a i n t h e i r promise of n e u t r a l i t y . Monluc's account of such 

an experience was c e r t a i n l y c o l o u r e d to make much of h i s l o y a l t y 

and honour but p r o b a b l y r e p r e s e n t e d a c t u a l events n e v e r t h e l e s s . 

Sums of 30,000 and 40,000 ecus were o f f e r e d Monluc on s u c c e s s i v e 

v i s i t s by Huguenot spokesmen i f he would merely a b s t a i n from 

t a k i n g arms a g a i n s t them.""" 

The k i n g ' s governors and l i e u t e n a n t s were i n a p o s i t i o n to 

dispense l i m i t e d patronage p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the form of m i l i t a r y 
2 

appointments. The n o b i l i t y of Guyenne sent one of t h e i r number 

before the k i n g s h o r t l y a f t e r the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n to 

c a r r y t h e i r remonstrance. Among t h e i r c h i e f g r i e v a n c e s was the 

o p p o s i t i o n of the Parlement of Bordeaux to the g r a n t i n g of g i f t s 

t o nobles by B u r i e and Monluc. I t was claimed by the nobles 

that they were a p a r t . o f the k i n g ' s army and the n o b i l i t y of 

Guyenne l e d by the seigneur de B u r i e and de Monluc and t h a t these 

l e a d e r s , l a c k i n g f i n a n c i a l means t o reward those who were most 

f a i t h f u l and those put to g r e a t e s t expense i n the k i n g ' s s e r v i c e , 

had made them s m a l l grants of p r o p e r t y . The p r o p e r t y granted was 

a p p a r e n t l y t h a t taken i n war from the r e b e l s and the k i n g ' s 

Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 403-413. 

Supr_a, Chapter I I I . " 



126 

council supported the judgment of the Parlement, l o c a l watchdog 

for r o y a l prerogatives, by r u l i n g that no lieutenant could grant 

the property of someone else."*" The type of patronage most often 

shown by the great nobles was i n recommending to office and the 

amount of patronage a noble could dispense depended upon the 

degree of influence he possessed at the court. Thus governors 

and lieutenants recommended individuals for recognition but the 
2 

king was most often the source of patronage. Even a lieutenant-

general seeking office attempted to gain the support of such men 
as the due de Montpensier, the king of Navarre and the due de 

3 

Guise. There would appear to be much j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 

statement, "Just as the medieval king was the p r i n c i p a l l o r d 

in the kingdom, so the Renaissance monarch was the greatest 

patron." ^ 
Monluc claimed that after a l i f e t i m e of service to the 

crown he could not show his house to be twenty thousand ecus 

r i c h e r for i t and i n his remonstrance to the king, Monluc 

defended himself against the charge of having used his office 

to amass a fortune of 300,000 ecus• He suggested i r o n i c a l l y 

that he wished the charge were true, providing the funds had 

""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 
2 I b i d . , Nos. 63, 6k. 

^ I b i d . , No. 80. Burie requested the office of Admiral of 
Guyenne and enlisted the support of Montpensier. 

k 
Major, "Crown and Aristocracy i n Renaissance France," p. 6^3. 



127 

been taken from t.he Huguenots. According to his own account he 

had taken from the Huguenots, of course, but only as legitimate 

s p o i l s of war and to prevent his s o l d i e r s from r e v o l t i n g at the 

sight of a vanquished enemy treated better than they were them-

selves. Furthermore, he claimed, he had found i t essential to 

overcome a reputation as a Huguenot sympathizer. C e r t a i n l y , had 

the r o y a l f i n a n c i a l o f f i c e r s been i n his place they would have 

taken a m i l l i o n ecus where he took only three thousand. 

Monluc touched on the system of royal patronage to 

recommend that Charles IX maintain i n his coffers purses contain-

ing various amounts with which he could personally reward his 

f a i t h f u l subjects according to t h e i r q u a l i t e . He predicted that 

the r o y a l f i n a n c i a l o f f i c i a l s would advise the king that i t was 

beneath his dignity to d i s t r i b u t e purses personally. Such 

advice should be ignored, claimed Monluc, since i t would be 

offered by those whose concern was to keep the money passing 

through t h e i r own hands.so that some might s t i c k . His estimate 

was that the man who was granted two thousand ecus by the king 

received only five hundred by the time i t had passed through 

o f f i c i a l hands. Giving f i n a n c i a l rewards personally would 

strengthen the r e l a t i o n s between the king and his nobles provided 

such g i f t s were d i s t r i b u t e d equitably. On the l a t t e r point, 

Monluc suggested with a l i t t l e bitterness that someone i n 

Guyenne had received the l i o n ' s share. Perhaps he was a l l u d i n g 



128 

to his long resented r i v a l , Francois Peyrusse d'Escars. 

It i s highly probable that i n spite of his s p i r i t e d defence, 

Monluc had accumulated a fortune of at least 300,000 ecus and his 

own defence contributes insights into the ways i n which he could 

have accomplished i t . Following his address to Charles IX, Monluc 

directed a remonstrance to the king's brother, the due d'Anjou. 

In that remonstrance he maintained that fame and glory were much 

more important to him than r i c h e s . Much evidence suggests that 

glory was indeed important to Monluc but there i s l i t t l e to suggest, 

that he conceived of glory and riches as separate e n t i t i e s . Monluc 

observed at length that the king was the source of a l l benefits 

and requested that his children receive due f i n a n c i a l recognition. 

He compared his own unselfish service with that of several 

prominent families who had served Louis XI and had been 

immortalized i n verse. 

To prove his own scrupulous honesty and disinterested 

service Monluc r e c a l l e d a l l the offices he had held and the 

opportunities they had presented for personal enrichment, 

opportunities he had eschewed, of course. Many captains of gens  

de pied became r i c h on the pay of t h e i r soldiers and on the money 

provided for their v i c t u a l s . With a good f o u r r i e r and a l i t t l e 

help i t was easy. He, Monluc, had been a captain of gens de pied 

seven or eight times without e x p l o i t i n g the opportunity. The 



129 

maitre de camp had even greater opportunities for he could make 

a deal with the commissaires des v i v r e s . And he himself was not 

slow to discover where there was an opportunity for gain. He 

had always had a good nose. Yet he had three times held the 

office of maitre de camp without enriching himself. 

As a governor of places he always had the opportunity of 

taking money from eighty or a hundred men who wished to escape 

m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . Having held these offices as long as he had 

and supervised as many montres as he had i n his l i f e , "avec 

quelque peu d'epargne, mon Dieu, quelle montagne d'or a u r o i s - j e i " 

Arid yet he claimed that was a mountain of gold he had not mined. 

As lieutenant of the king i n Sienna and Montalcino, Monluc had 

faced great opportunities to increase his fortune. Local 

merchants were more t h a n - w i l l i n g to work out agreements r e l a t i n g 

to the grain supply for the s o l d i e r s and loans could be made at 

high i n t e r e s t . Nevertheless when Monluc was relieved his 

successor found grain s t i l l i n the warehouse and the poor had 

been fed with the surplus. 

As a man progressed through the cursus honorum the opport-

unities for personal gain increased and Monluc indicated a few 

of the ways i n which other governors and lieutenants-general 

exploited their p o s i t i o n s . It would not be d i f f i c u l t , he maintained, 

to make arrangements with the receiver general of the province 



130 

and to f i l l one's personal coffers and to tap the money for 

montres, garrisons and the movement of a r t i l l e r y . Monluc could 

have raised many taxes, for the king had given him authority to 

do so, and he could have turned those taxes to his own p r o f i t . 

A t h i r d source of income could be the exaction of payment from 

towns and v i l l a g e s for the promise of exemption from the support 

of a g a r r i s o n . On t h i s point at l e a s t , Courteault states that 

there i s abundant evidence that Monluc refrained from this common 

practice as a matter of s c r u p l e . M o n l u c observed that he could 

have followed the example of others who exacted extortion from 

the Huguenots for the promise not to attack them even when they 

were l i v i n g peacably on their estates i n accordance with the 

e d i c t . 

Monluc declared his innocence of a l l the a r t i f i c e s he 

mentioned and reminded his reader that the gain he 'had had 

from C l a i r a c was with the s p e c i f i c permission of the k i n g . 

It i s impossible to ascertain the extent to which Blaise 

de Monluc used the techniques he described to increase his estate 

and to what extent he increased i t by other means. Some other 

sources were the stipends of his o f f i c e s , the pensions granted 

by the crown, the income from multiple offices granted to him, 

Monluc, Commentaires, I I I , 4-21, n . l . 



131 

g i f t s from c i t i e s and the estates of his wives. Beyond his own 

fame, his chief concern was the honour and,fortune which should 

come to his sons and grandsons. For t h i s reason he reminded 

Charles IX and the due d'Anjbu of the l e t t e r written by the king 

on December 3, 1570 bearing the promise, 

Tenez-vous tout asseure que j'auray souvenance a jamais 
de vos longs et grands services, desquels, s i vous ne pouvez 
recepvoir l a recompence condign!, vos enfans acheveront d'en 
c u e i l l i r le f r u i c t , joinct q u ' i l s sont t e l s et m'ont ja s i 
bien servy que d'eux-mesmes i l s ont merit! que l ' o n face pour 
eux ce que je seray bien aise de f a i r e , quand 1'occasion s'en 
presentera. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I I , 411. 



CHAPTER V 

LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 

The F i r s t War of Religion - Summary of Events 

Upon the death of Francis II and the succession of Charles 

IX Catherine de Medicis managed to obtain the regency. She organ-

ized the government around herself and three Bourbon princes, 

Antoine de Bourbon (king of Navarre), the c a r d i n a l de Bourbon and 

the prince de Conde. They were assisted by the constable Anne de 

Montmorency, the three C h a t i l l o n brothers, the due de Montpensier 

and the prince de l a R o c h e - s u r - Y o n T h e Guises l e f t the court 

2 

temporarily deprived of a share i n government. Catherine wrote 

to Sebastien de l'Aubespine, her ambassador i n Madrid, that "it 

has been found best by a l l the princes of the blood, the lords 

of the c o u n c i l , and other great personages of t h i s realm that the 

p r i n c i p a l and sovereign authority i n i t should remain i n my hands." 

Catherine was determined to preserve the monarchy and to 

maintain herself i n power and to those ends she attempted to steer 

a middle course between r i v a l factions, both r e l i g i o u s and 
4 

p o l i t i c a l . Her method was the method of c o n c i l i a t i o n and she 

Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. 7 3 . 
2 I b i d . 

^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 5 6 9 . 
4 

F r a n k l i n C . Palm, P o l i t i c s and Religion i n Sixteenth Century  
France, (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1 9 2 7 ) , p. 1 1 . 



133 
found.:,it inconceivable that there should be circumstances for 

which that method might prove inadequate.* In the summer of 

1561 e c c l e s i a s t i c a l estate was convened at Poissy with both 

Catholic and Protestant theological leaders present. Catherine 

aimed to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n but i n that she was unsuccessful. 

The powers of diplomacy were limited in matters of conscience. 

Nevertheless Catherine achieved at least an outward r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
s 2 

between Guise and Conde.. 

Catherine's policy of c o n c i l i a t i o n found expression i n the 

Edict of January, 1562. The Edict of July had forbidden judges 

and magistrates from pursuing the Huguenots; the new edict for the 

f i r s t time granted them the right to meet i n p u b l i c . 5 Following 

the massacre at Vassy i n March, 1562 the Triumvirate consolidated 

i t s p o s i t i o n i n Paris and threatened to completely dominate the 

crown. Catherine desired to maintain as much independence as 

possible and for that purpose she attempted to maintain the support 

of Conde. In t h i s attempt she contributed to the mobilization of 
4 

Protestant forces. 

Conditions i n the kingdom were ripe for c i v i l war. In fact, 

*John Neale, The Age of Catherine de Medicis (London: Cape, 
19-+3), P. 41. 

2 
Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , pp. 102-103. 
F . A. Isambert, Recueil General des Anciennes Lois Francaises 

(Paris: Plon, 1882), XIV, 124-129. 
4, 

Supra, p. 15 



134 

before the massacre of Vassy many parts of the kingdom had been 

subjected to r i o t s , iconoclastic demonstrations, and a l l kinds 

of disorders."*' The Peace of Cateau-Cambresis flooded the kingdom 

with s o l d i e r s and o f f i c e r s from the I t a l i a n Wars. These men 

could not be threatened with the loss of their regular employment 
2 

and income without p r e c i p i t a t i n g great disorder. The problem 

was i n t e n s i f i e d by the economic impact on the state and i t s kings 

of those costly foreign wars and by the fact that many of the 

s o l d i e r s had been converted to Protestantism during their s e r v i c e . 

The r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n contributed an issue for c i v i l war and 

Huguenot church organization contributed a basis for recruitment 

and organization of a m i l i t a r y force. 

From A p r i l to June, 1562 the king was i n the control of the 

Guise faction and the Protestant army increased at Orleans as 

Conde promoted the p o l i t i c a l theory that the king was a captive 
4 

and the Huguenots were struggling for his release. Under those 

circumstances Catherine's only hope to prevent c i v i l war and 

lessen Guise control was to persuade Conde to disarm and return 

to the court, thereby removing the Guise excuse for maintaining 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 2. In January 1561 the 
Parlement of Bordeaux wrote to Charles IX of the "inconveniens, 
scismes et divisions" which continued daily i n Guyenne over the 
r e l i g i o u s issue. 

2 
Lucien Romier, Les Origins Politiques des Guerres de  

Religion (Paris: P e r r i n , 1914), I I , 235. 
5 I b i d . , p. 253. 
4 

Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. 138. 



135 
a large force under arms. Conde's insistence on the removal of 

the Guise faction as a prerequisite to disarmament only ensured 

the continuation of preparations for war.* 

In seige and battle during the summer of 1562 the Catholic 

army regained much of the Loire region from Conde's forces. The 

m i l i t a r y s k i l l and t i r e l e s s efforts of Monluc saved Toulouse and 

Bordeaux, the major c i t i e s of the southwest from the Huguenots. 

That f o r c e f u l Gascon o f f i c e r was responsible also for regaining 

the c i t y of Lectoure from the Huguenots. His vi ctory over a large 

Huguenot force under Duras at the battle of Vergt (October) was 

p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t for i t prevented those Huguenots south 

of the Loire from joining the prince de Conde. It may thus have 

provided the measure of the Huguenot defeat at the c r u c i a l battle 
2 

of Dreux two months l a t e r . 

The concern of P h i l i p II over a f f a i r s i n France acted as 

a spur to the Catholic cause and repeatedly hampered Catherine's 

attempts at c o n c i l i a t i o n . His Catholic majesty could not help 

but be concerned with heresy i n France for that nation was a 

wedge between Spain and her valuable provinces of the Low 

Countries. Violent r e l i g i o u s changes i n France threatened the 

I b i d . , p. 150 
2 

I b i d . , p. 157« It i s a commentary on the general accuracy 
of Monluc's colourful and e g o t i s t i c a l commentaries that such a 
careful h i s t o r i a n as Thompson used them as the basis of t h i s part 
of his n a r r a t i v e . 



136 

Netherlands. As early as January, 1561 a Spanish envoy carried 

to the French court the word that P h i l i p II would be compelled to 

suppress any new sect permitted i n France "to preserve the 

t e r r i t o r i e s of his brother-in-law and to prevent his own 

dominions from being i n f e c t e d . " Catherine wrote and attempted 
2 

to explain her c o n c i l i a t o r y policy to her son-in-law. The 

Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay, was instrumental i n the formation 

of the Triumvirate and exercised great influence over i t s p o l i c i e s . ' 

The Spanish court brought constant pressure to bear on the court 

of France to extinguish heresy i n the kingdom. 

Foreign involvement i n French a f f a i r s extended to England 

where the Huguenot appeal to Elizabeth was accompanied by the 
4 

promise ultimately to restore Calais to the E n g l i s h . Both the 

Spanish and the English were held back from f u l l scale involvement 

i n France because neither could afford the r i s k of commercial 

injury through the breaking of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s i n Holland and 

Flanders.^ Nevertheless, the English occupied Havre early i n 

October and thus goaded the Catholic forces into redoubling 

"""Bernerd C. Weber, The Diplomatic Relations between France  
and Spain during the Reign~"of Charles IX, p. 40. 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 577-578. 
3 
Weber, op. c i t . , p. 4-3. 
4 

Lavisse, H i s t o i r e de France, VI: I , 68. 
5 
Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. I63. 



137 

their efforts to take Rouen from the Huguenots. The help of a 

small English force was i n s u f f i c i e n t to ensure Rouen's defence 

but i n the course of the seige Antoine de Bourbon was mortally 

wounded. 

According to the decision of the Estates-General of 

Orleans the prince de Conde should have succeeded the king of 

Navarre as lieutenant of the realm and the prince sent out 

commissions to a l l major officers ordering them to recognize 

his authority as the king's lieutenant-general and governor of 

France. The court and the Catholic party, however, set aside 

the r u l i n g of the Estates and no successor was immediately 

named. The Spanish government pressed the candidacy of the 

cardinal of Bourbon but expressed i t s willingness that Catherine 

have the entire government of a f f a i r s . * 

In December Condi's forces faced the much larger army of 

the due de Guise i n the battle of Dreux. In the course of the 

f i g h t i n g the marshal Saint-Andre was k i l l e d and Conde and the 

constable Montmorency taken prisoner by opposite sides. The 

depleted Huguenot forces under Coligny, prevented from joining 

2 

with the English i n Havre, retreated to Orleans. The assassin-

ation of the due de Guise i n February, 1563 was a serious blow 

Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. 1 7 1 . 

2 I b i d . , pp. I8O- I 8 I . 



138 

to the Catholic forces; two of the triumvirs were dead and the 

t h i r d , a prisoner. Catherine de Medicis wanted to negotiate a 

peace and to unite Catholic and Huguenot against the English i n 

the recovery of Havre. She was anxious to avoid a m i l i t a r y victory 

that would enable either side to dominate the crown.'*' 

The prince de Conde and the constable Montmorency were 

freed from prison to lead negotiations for a peace settlement. 

On March 19, 1563 the Edict of Amboise was decreed by the king 
2 

and his c o u n c i l . It was d e f i n i t e l y c o n c i l i a t o r y towards the 

Huguenots and the Parlement of Paris objected to i t s r e g i s t r a t i o n 

as did Parlements i n Rouen, Dijon, and T o u l o u s e . A l t h o u g h peace 

had been decreed the p a c i f i c a t i o n of the kingdom did not take 

place overnight. Many Catholics objected to the pardoning of 

Huguenots and the restoration of t h e i r property. In attempting 

to pacify the Protestants the crown offended many C a t h o l i c s . In 

Guyenne those who s a » themselves or their positions threatened 

found means of achieving their own ends. The Parlement of 

Bordeaux demonstrated i t s concern with the status and prerogatives 

of i t s members. The n o b i l i t y continued an association o f f i c i a l l y 

disbanded by the crown. In both cases l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s r e s i s t e d 

royal orders while i d e n t i f y i n g themselves staunchly with the crown. 

I b i d . , p. 172. 
i 

Isambert, Recueil des Anciennes L o i s , XIV, 135« 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I I , i v . 



139 

Catholic Leagues in,Guyenne 

The emergence of Catholic leagues i n Guyenne and Languedoc 

signalled the beginning of a trend that was to have great 

significance for the crown as the Wars of Religion continued. In 

1576 Henry III saw i n a Catholic League an organization which 

could provide either the opportunity for strengthening the crown 

or a powerful threat to royal authority. He decided to exploit 

the opportunity and declared himself head of the League.* The 

early leagues, however, were not greeted with royal enthusiasm. 

A Catholic league was formed at Toulouse i n March, 1563* The 

cardinals, Armagnac and S t r o z z i , as well as Monluc were 
2 

i n f l u e n t i a l i n i t s establishment. 
This organization, composed of many clergymen, nobles, 

and bourgeois of Languedoc and Guyenne, and under the direct 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Parlement of Toulouse, actually took 
up arms and pledged i t s e l f by oath to march wherever 
required for the defense of the Catholic r e l i g i o n . 5 

At Agen a league was formed one month before that at Toulouse 

and shortly thereafter the League of Cadillac was established 

by Monluc's lieutenant, Candale, and named for Candale's estate, 

the place of i t s founding. 5 Some of the leagues formed consisted 

*De Lemar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39. 
2 
Dom Claude Devic and dom Jean Joseph Vaissete, H i s t o i r e  

Generale de Languedoc (Toulouse: E. Privat, 1 8 7 2 - 1 8 9 2 ) , V, 2 4 9 . 
5 Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39• 
4 
Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 190-1.95. (This document 

i s the act establishing the league, i t s charter.) 
5 I b i d . , IV, 2 1 4 . 



iko 

c h i e f l y of artisans whose guilds "offered an i d e a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l 

structure for the organization and co-ordination of Catholic 

opposition to the growing Huguenot forces." """ 

Monluc, however, encouraged the noblesse to form an 

a s s o c i a t i o n . Such noble leagues were by no means a new phenomenon 

in France. "Organized resistance to royal c e n t r a l i z a t i o n among 

the seigneurs of the second rank showed i t s e l f i n the leagues of 

1314 and 1 3 1 5 T h e associations formed i n southwest France 

during the Wars of Religion were not primarily for the defence 

of l o c a l r i g h t s but for the defence of feudal prerogatives. 

Nobles whose interests were bound up with those of the king saw 

that the defection of royal o f f i c i a l s to the Huguenots was 

undermining the r o y a l administration of the province. Their own 

feudal p o s i t i o n was s i m i l a r l y threatened as emboldened tenants, 

converted to the Huguenot cause refused the decimes to the 

church, the t a i l l e to the crown and t h e i r feudal dues to the 

n o b l e s s e N o t only did the r o y a l cause depend upon the goodwill 

of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y but the well-being of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y 

depended upon the triumph of the crown. In leagues the Catholic 

Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39 and Thompson, Wars  
of .Religion, pp. 212-223. 

2 
John Le Patourel, "The King and the Princes i n Fourteenth-

Century France," Europe i n the Late Middle Ages, Hale, et a l , ed. 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 182. 

^Supra, p. 97-



1 4 1 

n o b i l i t y pledged person and goods to the defence of t h e i r own 

cause. 

The Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n of March, 1 5 6 3 forbade the 

establishment of new associations and commanded that those already 

formed be dissolved.* Catherine's firm l e t t e r to Monluc coincided 

with the e d i c t . She evidently regarded the formation of leagues 

as an inexcusable expression of p r o v i n c i a l independence. She 

soundly rebuked Monluc for his leadership i n the venture and 
2 

commanded him to undo the work he had done. In spite of Monluc's 

assurance that the league of Agen was dissolved, i t continued, 

without royal permission, and after August, 1 5 6 4 came to be 

known as the league of Guyenne.5 

In June, I 5 6 3 the king's council received a series of 

a r t i c l e s from the noblesse of Guyenne who had gathered i n 

Bordeaux and sent a representative to be t h e i r spokesman at the 
4 

court. The queen mother had received prior n o t i f i c a t i o n for i n 

A p r i l , Antoine de Pardaillan, baron de Gondrin, had written to 

report the establishment of the association of the noblesse of 

*Isambert, Recueil des Anciennes Lois, XIV, 1 4 5 . 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 551-552. (March 31, 1 5 6 3 ) 
5 Caleb G. Kelly, French Protestantism 1559- 1 5 6 2 . Series 

XXXVI, No. 4 of Johns Hopkins University Studies i n H i s t o r i c a l and  
P o l i t i c a l Science (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 1 8 ) , p. 79. 

4 
Documents Pour Servir a..., Nos. 91, 92. 



Ik2 

Guyenne."*" His description made the association sound s i n i s t e r 

i n purpose for he f e l t certain that the group, formed with a 

common purse, represented a plot on the part of some of the 

leading,nobles, to foment trouble and maintain s t r i f e when the 

peace had just been published. Gondrin was convinced that the 

majority of the magistrates of Guyenne were crooked, favoured 

the subversive association of the n o b i l i t y , and worked hand-in-

glove with them to enrich themselves. The reasons for Gondrin's 

opinion of the association and the nature of the association i t s e l f 

are c l a r i f i e d by the remaining contents of his l e t t e r . He proceed-

ed to speak of the "good and just quarrel" of the prince de Conde 

and to assure Catherine that the majority of the n o b i l i t y and 

s o l d i e r s of the region would never have taken arms had they not 

been persuaded of the c a p t i v i t y of the king and the queen mother. 

From the tone of his l e t t e r , Gondrin had been a l l i e d with the 

Huguenots. As he assured Catherine of his l o y a l t y , he explained 

his actions during the recent h o s t i l i t i e s with the standard 

Huguenot r a t i o n a l e . Thus his distrust of a Catholic association 

i s understandable. As the promulgation of the Edict of 

P a c i f i c a t i o n r e f l e c t e d the royal policy of pacifying the kingdom 

by making concessions to the Huguenots, an association ardently 

committed to the Catholic cause could very well become a threat 

^Documents Pour Servir a..., No. 86. 



Ik3 

to the peace. 

That most of the Catholic n o b i l i t y were d i s l o y a l to the 

crown, or even to the queen mother, and sought i n an association 

an outlet for their d i s l o y a l t y i s an untenable suggestion. Before 

the outbreak of c i v i l war, Burie declared that the n o b i l i t y 

awaited only the king's orders to give battle to a common enemy. 

He referred to the n o b i l i t y , sustained by the k i n g , a r i s i n g en 

masse against the r e b e l s , seeing that their p r i v i l e g e s , t h e i r 

revenues and their ancient rights were threatened.* At the 

outset of the war as Monluc and Burie took the f i e l d with their 

forces, they reported to Charles IX that Negrepelisse with a 

large number of gentlemen from the region of the Agenais, 

Armagnac, Quercy, Perigord, Ronergue, and Commenge had come 

before them to offer t h e i r persons and goods for the king's 
2 

s e r v i c e . Negrepelisse asked to come before the king to declare 

the support of the n o b i l i t y . Charles IX assured him that hearing 

of t h e i r devotion gave him great s a t i s f a c t i o n and then emphasized 

the fact that the n o b i l i t y could do nothing better than to present 

themselves, well-equipped, to his lieutenants, Burie and Monluc, 

and serve under them. 5 The king's authority was channelled 

through his appointed lieutenants and not through a band of nobles, 

Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 150, Memoire 
de Burie au r o i " 6 j u i l l e t , 1561. 

2 
Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 121. 
3 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . . . No. 1?. 



Ikk 

however l o y a l they might be. 

In their communication to the king, the noblesse of Guyenne 

maintained that they had created an association of good f a i t h 

with no other purpose than to pledge themselves to employ t h e i r 

l i v e s and goods for the king's a u t h o r i t y . 1 They attributed the 

queen mother's concern and suspicion to the fact that those 

d i s l o y a l to the king slandered anything introduced to r e s i s t them 

and had, therefore, attempted to make the association appear 

unjust. Whatever the source of Catherine's concern, however, 

when Monluc had made i t known to them, they had immediately 

obeyed and the association was dissolved "comme s i jamais t e l l e 

association n'eust eu commencement." The vicomte d'Uza, spokes-

man for t he noblesse, was to remind the king of the f a i t h f u l 

service rendered by the nobles of Guyenne and to obtain l e t t e r s 

of declaration and confirmation maintaining them i n their ancient 

l i b e r t i e s , franchises and p r i v i l e g e s . They believed that the 

Huguenots had greater credit with the Parlement than they, 

e s p e c i a l l y with the f i r s t president. P a r t i c u l a r l y g a l l i n g to the 

Catholic nobles were the l e t t e r s received by Huguenots declaring 

them good and f a i t h f u l servitors of the king while the l o y a l 

Catholics possessed no such declarations. Charles IX assured 

them he would investigate the charges against the f i r s t president 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 



145 
of the Parlement; i f necessary he would summon the man to the 

court. As for declarations of t h e i r l o y a l t y , there had never 

been l e t t e r s patent declaring them other than good subjects as 

i n the case of the Huguenots who had been declared r e b e l s . * 

The formation of leagues was the action of men who saw 

their positions threatened by the growth of the Huguenot movement. 

Monluc saw i n these associations a means of strengthening the 

Catholic position by compensating for the demobilization of 
2 

garrison troops required by the Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n . Moreover, 

he found i n the sponsorship of leagues an opportunity to enhance 

his own p o s i t i o n as t h e i r promoter and spokesman. The immediate 

reason for Catherine's fear and d i s t r u s t of associations may 

have stemmed from the actions of Conde. To unite his cohorts 

i n t h e i r common task, the prince had them sign on A p r i l 11, 1562 

an act of association i n four a r t i c l e s . By t h e i r signing they 

undertook to employ body and goods, to the l a s t drop of their 

blood, to the deliverance of the king and queen mother, the 

conservation of t h e i r edicts and ordonnances and the just 

punishment of those who held them i n contempt. Those who signed 

committed themselves to fight together u n t i l Charles IX came of 

age, and undertook i n person the government of his kingdom.5 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 
2 
Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 344-345. 

5Me"moires de Conde, t . I l l , p. 258. 



ike 

The avowed purpose of Conde and his associates was laudable, but 

under such loyal-sounding aims, they made war against the crown. 

Any group organized and committed to a p a r t i c u l a r purpose, i f 

need be i n spite of the crown, represented a threat to royal 

authority. Catherine demanded obedience to the king and to his 

appointed lieutenants rather than to a charter. 

Another source of concern to Catherine was the news that 

Monluc was i n t r i g u i n g with the Spanish. He had threatened to 

i n v i t e the Catholic king into Blarn i f Jeanne d'Albret continued 

to support the Protestants for, he s a i d , the n o b i l i t y and a l l the 

region favoured the Spanish k i n g . 1 As early as October, 1562, i t 

was rumoured that Monluc was planning to deliver the whole of 
2 

Guyenne into the hands of P h i l i p I I . The lieutenant-general of 

Guyenne entered into correspondence with P h i l i p II early i n 1564 

i n which he denounced the p o l i c i e s of the queen mother and her 

chancellor. He proposed to the Spanish king the formation of a 

league consisting of the pope, the emperor, the king of Spain, 

and a l l the Catholic princes of Germany and I t a l y . ^ P h i l i p II 
k 

showed interest and sent a spy to confer with Monluc. Catherine 

was no doubt disturbed to find that a royal o f f i c e r would intrigue 
"''Paul Courteault, Blaise de Monluc,' Historien (Paris: 

P i c a r d , 1908), p. k?0. 
2 
Weber, Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain, 

p. 89; Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, H i s t o r i e n , p. 485-
^Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 319-327. 

Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, H i s t o r i e n , p. 486. 



147 

with the sovereign of another state and, possible gain the support 

of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y for a project detrimental to royal authority. 

That i n i t s e l f was s u f f i c i e n t reason to be suspicious of any 

expression of p r o v i n c i a l independence and to decree that 

associations must be dissolved.. 

Local Estates 

F i r s t among the concerns of the noblesse of Guyenne was the 

finding of a forum for the expression of their l o y a l t y and of 

their concerns."*' They asked that Bordeaux be given the p r i v i l e g e 

of holding l o c a l estates and they pointed out that most provinces 

and even most parts of their own province had the custom of meet-

ing i n that way to consider what must be done for the king's 

service and for the conservation of the kingdom. They were 

concerned about being deprived of a means of making known their 

complaints and grievances. Charles IX was reluctant to permit 

such a convocation of estates and r e p l i e d that he did not wish to 

change that which was customarily done. Thus the nobles were 

unable to solve through the convocation of l o c a l estates the 

problem they had t r i e d to solve by the formation of an association, 

the problem of finding a forum i n which to make t h e i r voices 

heard. 

The decision of the king's council not to convoke the 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 



148 

l o c a l estates i n Bordeaux was reinforced i n the months that 

followed by l e t t e r s from Catherine to d'Escars and to the 

Archbishop of Bordeaux.* The l a t t e r had requested royal 

authorization for such a gathering to consider an old problem, 

the gabelle du s e l . 

The reluctance of Catherine and Charles to authorize a 

meeting of the p r o v i n c i a l estates i n Bordeaux stemmed i n part 

from events of 156l. The Estates of Orleans, convened the day 

after the death of Francis I I , adjourned at the end of January 

with Charles IX commanding the deputies to return to their 

b a i l l i a g e s i n order to find means for paying the king's debts. 

New assemblies were to be held i n each b a i l l i a g e or senechaussle 

i n March and i n the p r i n c i p a l c i t y of each gouvernement during 
2 

the same month. These assemblies were to r e s t r i c t their 

deliberations solely to f i n a n c i a l questions,and to name t h i r t y -

six delegates, one for each order i n each government, to meet 

i n the Estates-General at Melun on the f i r s t of May. 

Although the s t r i c t e s t l i m i t a t i o n s had been placed on the 

meetings of l o c a l estates i n March, they refused to obey these 

l i m i t s and r e s t r i c t consideration to the problem of paying the 

*Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I I , 115 and note. 
2 

Lucien Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots a l a Cour de  
Charles IX (Paris: L i b r a i r e Academique, 1924), p. 58. 



149 

king's debts. The assembly of the three estates i n the private 

of Paris immediately turned i t s attention to the question of the 

regency even though the president had announced that they must 

concern themselves only with finding means to pay the debts of 

the k i n g . They rejected the regency of Catherine, proposed 

Antoine de Bourbon, f i r s t prince of the blood, as regent, and 

revised the l i s t of members of the privy council to exclude the 

Guises and a l l other seasoned supporters of the k i n g . At the 

court i t was thought that t h i s coup had been directed by the 

comte de La Rochefoucauld and by Antoine Fumee at Conde's 
. . 1 suggestion. 

It was not only i n Paris that the estates were r e c a l c i t r a n t . 

The three estates of Guyenne, assembled at Bordeaux, s i m i l a r l y 

ignored the directive to concern themselves only with f i n a n c i a l 

matters. The king had published an ordonnance (18 February, 156l) 

convoking the se'ne'chausse'es of Guyenne, Landes, Perigord, Quercy, 

Armagnac, Limousin, Agen and the b a i l l i a g e of Labour, Comminges 

and the jugeries of Riviere-Verdun to deliberate on the 

propositions presented to the estates of Orleans and to name 
2 

their deputies. • Monluc reported to the queen on the assembly 

of the three estates i n the c i t y of Agen and assured her that 

the three representatives chosen to go to Bordeaux on the 

I b i d . , pp. 89-91. 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, l l O n . 



150. 

twentieth of the month were wise, virtuous, humble, and obedient 

and would make their way to Bordeaux i n accordance with the r o y a l 

l e t t e r s to give a response to the lieutenant of the king."'" Upon 

meeting i n Bordeaux the delegates re-examined the proposals of the 

king's council to the estates of Orleans and then turned t h e i r 

attention to r e l i g i o u s discussion and adopted a position of 
2 

absolute intolerance. Their views were d i r e c t l y opposed to the 

p o l i c y Catherine was following as she prepared the Edict of July 

and planned for the Colloquy of Poissy. The p r o v i n c i a l 

assemblies were i n no way helpful to the king i n the solution of 

the f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and they raised barriers before royal 

p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s p o l i c i e s . Catherine seized the only 

recourse available and prevailed upon Charles to annul the 

decisions taken, f i x the dates for e l e c t o r a l assemblies for May, 

the p r o v i n c i a l assembly for June, and the opening of the new 

Estates-General for August at Pontoise.^ 

By the time the deputies were a l l present i n Bordeaux and 

ready to assemble, Burie had received a l e t t e r from the king 

countermanding the order to convoke the assembly. The estates 

1 I b i d . , pp. 110-114. 
2 
Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , p. 38. 

^Georges P i c o t , H i s t o i r e des Etats Generaux (2nd e d i t i o n ; 
P a r i s : Hachette, 1888), I I , 55. 



151 
of Guyenne were delayed by the late a r r i v a l of several deputies 

and Burie received the king's l e t t e r June 13th. The king's 

l e t t e r indicated that the decisions of the e a r l i e r assemblies 

(20 March) were s u f f i c i e n t . The king's council was already 

showing a reluctance to convoke the p r o v i n c i a l estates for the 

l i k e l i h o o d was that t h e i r demands would be even greater than i n 

the previous meeting. The deputies, most of whom had been 

waiting i n Bordeaux for some time, ignored the king's l e t t e r 

and met anyway. The t h i r d estate showed a desire to use force 

to stamp out the reform but members of the n o b i l i t y were more 

moderate i n their attitude to the Huguenots. In fact, one 

representative of the second estate was Symphorien de Durfort, 

baron de Duras, who was to become the m i l i t a r y leader of the 

Huguenots i n Guyenne i n the following year. But they demanded 

that the king convoke the Estates-General annually, and recognize 

i t s competence i n matters of government "according to the ancient 

laws and observances of the kingdom." * Burie forwarded the 

proc^s-verbal of the assembly to the king without comment. The 

l o c a l estates had not proved useful but had shown themselves 

e n t i r e l y too independent and hard to handle for the king's l i k i n g . 

Therefore, i t was not strange that the request of the n o b i l i t y 

of Guyenne two years l a t e r for an assembly of the three estates 

I b i d . , p. kl. 



152 

in the senechaussee of Guyenne should bring a negative response 

from the king and the queen mother. 

The Parlement of Bordeaux 

Catherine de Medicis attempted to mobilize every possible 

resource on behalf of royal authority and i n the interests of 

pacifying the kingdom. In 1560 she convened at Fontainebleau 

an assembly of notables which included the r o y a l c o u n c i l , the 

princes, great o f f i c e r s of the crown and knights of the order."*' 

On that occasion Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence, urged the 

convocation of the Estates-General and the establishment of a 

national council to reform the church. The following year the 

clergy met at Poissy with the charge of finding a common ground 

between Roman Catholic and Protestant. Meetings of the Estates-

General at Orleans and at Pontoise were unable to achieve 

solutions either to the p o l i t i c a l or to the r e l i g i o u s problems 

of the kingdom. At the height of the f i r s t War of Religion 

Catherine de Medicis confided to the due d'ftampes, governor of 

Bretagne, that since the bishops at Poissy had done nothing to 

appease the troubles on account of r e l i g i o n , she intended to try 

another strategy. She planned to "assemble many good men from 

the courts of Parlement to consider means of ending the troubles 
2 

i n the kingdom and maintaining obedience to the k i n g . " 

Lavisse, H i s t o i r e de France, VI: I, 21-24. 

Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 243. 



153 
No such assembly was held but the Parlements did play a 

s i g n i f i c a n t role i n the maintenance of the monarchy nevertheless. 

As a sovereign court the Parlement of Bordeaux v e r i f i e d and 

registered royal e d i c t s , arranged for the publication of those 

e d i c t s , f i l l e d gaps i n l e g i s l a t i o n with i t s own decrees, took an 

active part i n the maintenance of order and heard appeals from 

l o c a l courts i n the province.* Generally the Parlement co-

operated with the governor i n the maintenance of r o y a l authority 

and that s p i r i t was demonstrated i n a l e t t e r to Antoine de Bourbon 

after a Huguenot plot had threatened the c i t y . The men of the 

Parlement assured him that they had sent deputies before Burie 

to pledge themselves to the l a s t drop of their blood and the 
x 2 l a s t ecu of t h e i r purses. 

Jealous defence of royal prerogatives led the Parlement 

of Bordeaux to issue a remonstrance to Charles IX against l e t t e r s 

patent granted by Jeanne d ' A l b r e t . 5 Monluc c a l l e d to the 

attention of the court l e t t e r s patent by which the queen of 

Navarre authorized C a l v i n i s t preaching i n a l l her towns and 

chateaux. The Parlement considered the l e t t e r s patent as 

Gaston Z e l l e r , "L'administration monarchique avant les 
intendants," Revue h i s t o r i q u e . V o l . 197 (19*+7), pp. I85-I87 and 
Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I, 210-211. 

2 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 31. 

5 I _ b i d . , No. 9k. 
k 

Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 239-253. 



154 

contrary to the king's edict and derogating from the king's 

authority. By promulgating them through the senechal of the 

duchy of Albret before presentation to the Parlement Jeanne 

d'Albret had registered them unlawfully and had trespassed on 

the sovereignty of Guyenne. Men of the sovereign court took 

p a r t i c u l a r exception to Jeanne d ' A l b r e t ' s use of the words "for 

such i s our pleasure," since t h e i r use pertained to the king 

a l o n e . 1 While they awaited the king's r u l i n g , the men of 

Parlement issued a provisional decree forbidding the sene"chaux 

of the duchy of Albret to publish similar l e t t e r s patent on 
2 

pain of a thousand l i v r e f i n e . 

Frequently the Parlement of Bordeaux offered advice to the 

k i n g . In 1561 i n view of l o c a l conditions, i t counselled the 

return of arms to the Catholics or the organizing of bands to 

disarm the Protestants.^ As the archbishop of Bordeaux was 

about to leave for the Council of Trent, the Parlement, fearing 

that his leaving would bring great trouble, asked the king to 
'4 

dispense with the t r i p . In addition to offering advice, the 

Parlement of Bordeaux acted to enforce the king's w i l l to such an 

extent that a constant stream of judgments emanated from that 

""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 94. 
2 
Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 240, n. 1. 

^Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 424. 
4 

I b i d . , p. 461. 



155 
court d u r i n g the p e r i o d of c i v i l war.* 

Although the men of the Parlement of Bordeaux were c l e a r l y 

l o y a l t o the k i n g , l i k e other r o y a l o f f i c e r s they saw t h e i r o f f i c e 

as a means f o r p e r s o n a l advantage. Two f a c t o r s suggest that 

members of that s o v e r e i g n court c o u l d e x p l o i t t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . 

On one hand they delayed the r e g i s t r a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n a l i e n 

to t h e i r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s . On the other they were widely 

accused of e n r i c h i n g themselves from the f i n e s they l e v i e d . In 

a remonstrance of August 31, 1563, Parlement informed C h a r l e s IX 

t h a t h i s p a t e n t s r e g a r d i n g the d e p o s i t i o n of arms, the d i s s o l u t i o n 

of a s s o c i a t i o n s and the announcement of h i s m a j o r i t y had been 

p u b l i s h e d but that h i s commissioners would be prevented from 

e x e c u t i n g t h e i r commissions u n t i l the Parlement had r e c e i v e d an 
2 

answer from him on t h e i r remonstrance. T h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 

grievance was the l a c k of immunity p r o v i d e d f o r them under the 

disarmament c l a u s e s . I t g a l l e d these men, who r e f e r r e d t o 

themselves as the k i n g ' s " l i e u t e n a n t z n a i z , " t h a t the n o b i l i t y 

were exempted while they, who must render j u s t i c e not only on 

the t h i r d e s t a t e but on the n o b i l i t y and the c l e r g y , were 

r e q u i r e d t o s t r i p themselves of arms. The Parlement emphasized 

the f a c t t h a t i t s members r e p r e s e n t e d the. k i n g ' s name and 

e.g. I b i d . , p. 446, " A r r e t du parlement de Bordeaux 
contre 104 de r e b e l l i o n , " 2 8 j u i l l e t , 1562. 



156 

authority i n his absence and saw no reason why they should be 

less p r i v i l e g e d than such extraordinaires as the prevSts de 

1'h8tel. Not only did they forward a remonstrance to the king 

but the Parlement made i t s concerns known to Burie, Monluc and 

d'Escars.* The l a t t e r r e p l i e d that men of the Parlement should 
2 

set the example i n speedy obedience to the king's w i l l . 

The Parlements were i n constant r i v a l r y with governors 

for administrative a u t h o r i t y . 5 At the end of 1562 after four 

or five months i n m i l i t a r y compaigns, Burie returned to 

Bordeaux and became most concerned about conditions i n that c i t y . 

The m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of commanders led to "monopolies, p a r t i a l i t y 

and confusion so that there followed i n d i g n i t i e s , larceny and 

robbery even by those who should repress these things." The 

best s o l u t i o n , i n B u r i e ' s eyes, was to make him s o l e l y responsible 

for the c i t y , to place the keys of the c i t y i n no one else's 

hands while he was there. The interests of the king would be 

best served, i n fact, i f Burie were sent a commission to under-

take a f u l l scale investigation of the administration of justice 

for he was convinced that there would be a major discrepancy 

^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 114. 

2 I b i d . , No. 116. 
5 Z e l l e r , "L'Administration monarchique...," p. 185. 
4 • X ' „ 
Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. "Instruction b a i l l e e 

par monsieur de Burye au thrgsorier Le Pyn pour faire entendre 
au ro y ." 



157 

between the record of fines and confiscations on one hand, and 

the amount by which the king's revenues had benefited on the 

other. If the king would send the commission empowering him 

to undertake such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Burie would choose those he 

thought best from the Parlement to assist him. He would also 

have the c l e r k of the court provide him immediately with a 

statement of a l l those convicted and subjected to fines and 

confiscations together with the amounts. He was sure he could 

recover a vast sum that had gone astray within the court, and 

set an example that could be followed throughout the kingdom to 

the king's p r o f i t . 

Charges made by the king's lieutenant against the o f f i c e r s 

of the Parlement must be balanced against the counter-charges of 

members of that court. Nobles i n the Catholic army enriched 

themselves by confiscating the goods of the Huguenots. In t h i s 

practice they had the blessing of their commanders who did the 

same. In a request addressed to the king the n o b i l i t y of Guyenne 

declared that during the days of the c i v i l wars when the king's 

army and the n o b i l i t y of the province were led by Burie and 

Monluc, those l o r d s , lacking finances from the king to reward the 

most f a i t h f u l nobles, granted them some small g i f t s of p r o p e r t y . 1 

The f i r s t president and members of the Parlement questioned the 

Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 



158 

authority of the lieutenants to make such g i f t s , and 

inconvenienced the receivers with summonses, arrests and fines, 

much to t h e i r annoyance. The nobles accused the court of 

favouring the Huguenots but the king's council sided with the 

Parlement. In t h e i r view i t was not a matter of favouring the 

Huguenots but of upholding law and t r a d i t i o n . The council 

decreed that the lieutenants had usurped a royal prerogative i n 

granting goods to t h e i r followers and that Parlement was merely 

defending that royal prerogative. 1 In the r i v a l r y between the 

Parlement and the lieutenants or governors both sides strongly 

supported royal authority and their own. The crown tended to 

favour the Parlement as i t had more to fear from the independence 
2 

of the governors. 

Councils and Commissions 

To a s s i s t and to control i t s o f f i c e r s the crown made use 

of councils. Before leaving for Guyenne Montpensier asked for 

a maitre des requetes to act as his j u d i c i a l assistant, to hear 

pleas, and to render justice to those found g u i l t y of sedition, 

r e b e l l i o n , and other crimes worthy of death. The royal council 

determined that he should be assisted by two councillors from 

the Parlement of Bordeaux and a blank commission for the 

Ibid. 

Z e l l e r , "L'Administration monarchique...," p. 211. 



159 
c o u n c i l l o r s to be elected was given to Montpensier. 1 S i m i l a r l y , 

when Monluc was sent into the province he was accompanied by two 
2 

c o u n c i l l o r s from the Parlement of P a r i s . They soon showed 
3 

Huguenot sympathies and Monluc harassed them u n t i l they f l e d . 

They were replaced by two men commissioned from the Parlement of 

Bordeaux and while awaiting them Monluc obtained the assistance 

of the lieutenant criminel from Agen and six c o u n c i l l o r s of that 
4 

senechaussee. In days of s t r i f e i t was often essential for 

the lieutenant to administer justice i n any l o c a t i o n and on short 

notice. Therefore, i t was advantageous to be accompanies by 
advisors who were learned i n the law and experienced i n t r i a l 

5 
procedure. During the c i v i l wars the crown depended increasingly on 

the use of commissions. A commission differed from an office i n 

that i t was created for a s p e c i f i c mission and i t terminated with 

the completion of that mission or at the king's pleasure. The 

""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 
2 

Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 402; Commentaires et L e t t r e s , 
IV, 11?. 

3 
Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I , 163-164. 
4 

Monluc,. Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 123-124. 
^In some provinces r e l i g i o u s controversy penetrated and 

paralyzed the sovereign courts. The due d'Etampes, governor of 
Bretagne asked that a maitre des requites be commissioned to 
assist him i n the administration of justice since the deadlock 
i n the Parlement rendered i t impotent. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , 
No. 22. 



160 

use of commissions became necessary as the sale of offices and 

succession practices enabled o f f i c e r s to become entrenched and 

to demonstrate considerable independence i n the exercise of 

their posts. Secondly, the conversion of royal o f f i c e r s to the 

Protestant f a i t h l e f t offices vacant or, more often, allowed 

the holders to exercise their authority on behalf of the 

Huguenots. F i n a l l y , the disruptions caused by war at times 

emptied offices altogether and at other times led to the claim-

ing of one office by several men. 

The Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n of 1563 was brought to Guyenne 

by two men commissioned to present i t to the Parlement of 

Bordeaux for r e g i s t r a t i o n and to see to i t s execution through-

out the p r o v i n c e . 1 They were delayed i n the Parlement of 

Bordeaux because that body wished "to make remonstrance to the 

king for the conservation of the authority of his sovereign 
2 

court." The two commissioners reported immediately to the 

king, the queen mother and to Monluc as governor of Guyenne. 

The important mission of executing the Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n was 

entrusted to capable and conscientious men who did their utmost 

to f u l f i l their r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In such commissioners the crown 

placed greater confidence than i n i t s regular o f f i c e r s s 

""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No 109. "Memoire des commissaires 
royaux Antoine Fumee et Hierosme Angenoust." Angenoust was a c o u n c i l -
l o r of the Parlement of P a r i s . Fumee was grand rapporteur of France. 
The Fumee family represented a veritable dynasty of'maitres de 
requites de l ' H S t e l du r o i , " Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I, 155. 

2 
Documents Pour Servir st..., NO . 109. 



161 
Summary and Conclusion 

In the f i r s t half of the sixteenth-century the position 

of the king i n France was greatly enhanced. The power of the 

great feudal lords as r i v a l s to the king waned. In 1523 the 

domains of the due de Bourbon returned to the crown; the duchy 

of Bretagne.followed i n 1532. The only remaining p r i n c i p a l i t y 

of any size was the kingdom of the Albrets i n the south. The 

king was able to tax his subjects v i r t u a l l y at w i l l and the 

efficiency of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s was improved. Accounting 

was centralized but the c o l l e c t i o n and expenditure of funds 

often took place on the l o c a l l e v e l . The o f f i c e r class increased 

i n number and function so that most agents of public authority 

were the king's representatives. 

The king appointed great nobles as governors of provinces 

and when they entered into r i v a l r y with the Parlements, he usually 

supported the Parlements. Thus the power of those courts increased 

and the power of the great nobles was c u r t a i l e d to some degree. 

Nevertheless, the governors were extremely important to r o y a l 

government for i n their provinces they were the pers.onal 

representatives of the k i n g . These men had to be chosen with care 

but i n a period of youthful kings and c i v i l war the choice was 

out of the king's hands i n some cases. The governorship of 

Guyenne was held by the r u l e r of Navarre throughout the century. 



162 

This increased the base of authority upon which that prince could 

act; i t extended the l i m i t s of his independence. The governor 

frequently resided outside his gouvernement and i n his absence 

lieutenants-general exercised royal authority. The king appointed 

these lieutenants-general but they owed a dual allegiance to king 

and governor. 

The application of the royal w i l l i n distant parts of the 

kingdom was hampered by the very distance and by the slowness of 

communications and c i v i l war only exaggerated such conditions. 

Boundaries of authority were very badly defined, both p o l i t i c a l l y 

and geographically and frequent clashes took place between 

different representatives of royal authority. The sale of offices 

raised some revenue but contributed to the entrenchment of 

o f f i c e r s i n positions which they exploited for their own benefit 

and from which i t was almost impossible to dislodge them. For 

this reason the king resorted increasingly to the use of 

commissions to carry out his orders at every l e v e l , a solution 

which increased not only his authority but his expenses. 

The Wars of Religion s p l i t the kingdom over r e l i g i o u s and 

p o l i t i c a l issues and the king was subjected to attack by 

extremists of both sides. The actions of l o y a l supporters of 

the crown could be just as detrimental to royal authority as 

those of enemies. Blaise de Monluc, lieutenant-general of the 



163 

k i n g i n Guyenne, a c t i n g o s t e n s i b l y to curb the t h r e a t to r o y a l 

a u t h o r i t y , i n t r i g u e d with -the k i n g of Spain and threatened t o 

t u r n over the p r o v i n c e of Guyenne to him. Doubtless t h i s f a c t 

c o n t r i b u t e d to C a t h e r i n e ' s r e l u c t a n c e to see Monluc appointed 

l i e u t e n a n t - g o v e r n o r . The same v a n i t y that made him r e s p o n s i v e 

to f l a t t e r y and reward made him s u s c e p t i b l e to i n t r i g u e . Not 

only were extreme C a t h o l i c s a t h r e a t but nobles committed to the 

Huguenot cause r e c r u i t e d thousands of s o l d i e r s i n the same 

p r o v i n c e . 

Recruitment and command of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s c o n t r i b u t e d to 

the a b i l i t y of a l o c a l strongman to act independently. He had 

the power to name c a p t a i n s and t o r a i s e men. S i n c e Monluc had 

a b r o t h e r , sons and son-in-law a l l commanding one or more 

companies, he had a v e r i t a b l e p r i v a t e army. Under those 

circumstances orders from the court were i n t e r p r e t e d with 

c o n s i d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e . 

L o c a l f o r c e s were at times marshalled e f f e c t i v e l y to 

oppose an unpopular r o y a l p o l i c y . When the c i t i z e n s of La R o c h e l l e 

opposed payment f o r the support of a g a r r i s o n i n the c i t y , they 

d i s p a t c h e d a d e l e g a t i o n to the court well-equipped with b r i b e 

money t o accomplish t h e i r purpose. Whether or not they achieved 

t h e i r g o a l , Jarnac r e p o r t e d that the men of the g a r r i s o n were 

reduced t o e a t i n g t h e i r horses before they disbanded and went 



164 

home. S i m i l a r l y the threat of a tax on export wine united the 

bourgeois, n o b i l i t y and .clergy of Bordeaux i n opposition. The 

king, however, frequently had the l a s t word i n f i n a n c i a l matters. 

In Guyenne one year the Estates voted a sum less than that asked 

on the pretext that inhabitants of parts of the province had 

already paid their quota. Therefore, Etienne Lemacon, the 

receiver general i n Guyenne was short. Charles IX insisted that 

the amount be raised i n spite of a l l opposition and that i t be 

furnished i n the meantime by Francois de L a v i l l e , a colleague of 

Lemacon.* 

In spite of so many threats royal government i n Guyenne 

was generally effective i n maintaining the king's authority. 

The energetic Monluc and such f a i t h f u l governors of c i t i e s as 

Noailles could pledge sincere allegiance to t h e i r monarch. The 

former practised swift r e t r i b u t i o n i n the form of hanging; the 

l a t t e r promoted personal recognition by the sovereign by sending 

detailed analyses of the need to the queen mother. Both these 

o f f i c e r s had brothers who were prominent bishops, of Valence 

and of Dax r e s p e c t i v e l y . The a b i l i t y to grant many e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 

offices lay i n the hands of the king and formed a small part of 

the patronage by which he was able to maintain his f a i t h f u l 

o f f i c e r s . The most powerful tool for the maintenance of royal 

Archives historique du departement de l a Gironde, V o l . I l l , 
No. LXXX (1861), 200-203. 



authority lay i n personal contact, personal appointment and 

personal reward by the king for those i n a position to further 

his w i l l . 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I . BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS 

F r a n k l i n , A l f r e d Louis Auguste. Les sources de l ' h i s t o i r e de  
France: notices bibliographiques et analytiques des invent- 
a i r e s et des r e c u e i l s de documents r e l a t i f s a l ' h i s t o i r e de  
France ". P a r i s : L i b r a i r i e de Firmin-Didot et c i e . , 1877• 

Hauser, H e n r i . Les sources de l ' h i s t o i r e de France. X V I e si&cle . 
(1494-1610). 4v. P a r i s : P i c a r d , 1906-1915. 

The standard bibliography for sixteenth-century French 
h i s t o r y . Volume I I I , Les guerres de r e l i g i o n (1559-1589) 
i s invaluable for an assessment of the primary sources. 

L a s t e y r i e , Robert de, et a l . Bibliographie des travaux historiques  
et archeologiques publies par les societe's savantes de l a  
France". 6 v.. i n C o l l e c t i o n de documents inedits sur l ' h i s t o i r e  
de France. P a r i s ! Imprimerie nationale, 1888-1918. 

A l i s t of a r t i c l e s i n French scholarly journals arranged 
geographically; updated by Rene Gandilhon so that with the 
accompanying volumes of Bibliographie Annuelle i t includes 
works published to 1940. 

Monod, Gabriel Jacques Jean. Bibliographie de l ' h i s t o i r e de France. 
Catalogue methodique et chronologique des sources et des  
ouvrages r e l a t i f s a l ' h i s t o i r e de France depuis les origines  
jusqu'en 1789. P a r i s : Hachette, 1888. 

Saulnier, E . and A. Martin. Bibliographie des travaux publies de  
1866 a 1897 sur l ' h i s t o i r e de France de 1500 a 1789. 271 
P a r i s : Presses Universitaires de France, 1932-1938. 

S o c i l t l de l ' h i s t o i r e de France. Annuaire-bulletin . P a r i s , 1863-
present. 

T i l l e y , Arthur. The Literature of the French Renaissance. 2v. 
Cambridge: University Press, 1904. 

Contains analyses of the style and content of many of the 
h i s t o r i e s and memoirs. 



II. PRINTED DOCUMENTS 168 

A. Major Collections 

C o l l e c t i o n de documents inedits sur 1'histoire de France. Many v. 
P a r i s : I m p r i m e r i e nationale, l836ff . 

I n i t i a t e d by Guizot, minister of public i n s t r u c t i o n ; 
directed by the Comite des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques 
since l 8 8 l . 

La F e r r i e r e , Hector, comte de and comte Gustave Baguenault de 
Puchesse, eds. Lettres de Catherine de M l d i c i s . l l v . 
1880-1943. 

Very important source, v . I , II and X contain l e t t e r s of 
t h i s period; v. XI i s a general index; many l e t t e r s to 
o f f i c i a l s i n Guyenne and to such confidantes of the queen 
mother as Sebastien de l'Aubespine, bishop of Limoges and 
Ambassador to the court of P h i l i p I I . 

P a r i s , Antoine Louis, ed. N^gociations, l e t t r e s et pieces  
diverses r e l a t i v e s au regne de Francois I I , tire~es du  
p o r t e f e u i l l e de Sebastien de l'Aubespine, eve~que de  
Limoges, l84l~ 

Dispatches to and from the French ambassador i n Spain, 
1559-1561. 

Tommaseo, Niccolo, ed. Relations des ambassadeurs venitiens  
sur les a f f a i r e s de France au XVI e siecle"! 2v. I838. 

O f f i c i a l reports; contains excellent descriptions and 
analyses of a f f a i r s at the French court. 

Michaud, Joseph Francois and Jean Joseph Poujoulat, eds. Nouvelle  
c o l l e c t i o n des memoires pour s e r v i r a 1*histoire de France, 
depuis le X I I I e s i e c l e jusqu'a l a , f i n du X V I I I e ; precede's~de  
notices pour caracteriser chaque auteur des memoires et son  
e"poque; s u i v i s de l'analyze des documents historiques qui s'y  
rapportent. Series I, 12v.; series I I , 10v.; series I I I , 10v.; 
32v. i n a l l . P a r i s , I836-I839. 

Conde, Louis de Bourbon, prince de. Memoires du prince de  
Conde. Recueil des choses memorables f a i t e s et passees  
pour le f a i c t de l a r e l i g i o n et estat de ce royaume,• 
depuis l a mort du roy Henri II jusqu'en l'annee 1564. 
Ser. I, v. 6 . 

F i r s t compiled i n Orleans to show Conde's role i n 
suppressing the troubles; not unbiased. 



169 

Guise, Francois de Lorraine, due de. Memoires de Francois  
de Lorraine, due d'Aumale et de Guise, concernant les  
a f f a i r e s de France et les negociations avec l'Ecdsse,  
l ' l t a l i e et l'Allemagne, pendant les annees 15̂ 7 a 1561, 
publies sur les manuscrits originaux. Ser. I, v. V I . 

La Noue, Francois de. Memoires du sieur Francois de La Noue. 
Ser. I, v. IX. 

The author was a Breton Huguenot gentleman who fought 
at Dreux; remarkably i m p a r t i a l . 

P e t i t o t , Claude Bernard, Alexandre P e t i t o t , Louis Jean Nicolas 
Monmerque, et_ a l , eds. C o l l e c t i o n complete des memoires  
r e l a t i f s a l ' h i s t o i r e de France, depuis le regne de Philippe  
A u g u s t a . . . avec des notices sur chaque auteur, et des  
observations sur chaque ouvrage. 130v. i n 131. P a r i s : 
Foucault, 1S20-1829. 

Mergey, Jean sieur de. Memoires du Sieur Jean de Mergey, 
gentilhomme champenois. Ser. I, v. XXXIV. 

These memoirs begin i n 1562 when the author was serving 
under La Rochefoucauld; they are very b r i e f . . 

Tavannes, Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de. Memoires de t r e s - 
noble et t r e s - i l l u s t r e Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de  
Tavannes, mareschal de France, gouverneur de Provence, 
c o n s e i l l e r du roy, et capitaine de cent hommes d'armes. 
Ser. I, v. XXIII-XXV. 

Actually written by Jean de Saulx-Tavannes to honour 
his father; useful for the battle of Dreux. 

B. Other Documents 

Cabie, Edmond. Guerres de r e l i g i o n dans le sud-ouest de l a France  
et principalement dans le Quercy, d'apres les papiers des  
seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 a 1390. A l b i : Imprimerie 
Noguies, 1906. 

Documents transcribed, helpful i n establishing i d e n t i t y and 
relationships of personnel. . 

Courteault, Paul. Commentaires de Blaise de Monluc, Marechal de  
France. 3v. P a r i s : Picard, 1911-1925. 

The d e f i n i t i v e edition of Monluc's commentaries; used ex-
tensively i n t h i s study. 



1 7 0 

Francois, Michel, ed. Journal de l'anne'e 1 5 6 2 par Pierre de  
Paschal. Paris: H. Champion, 1950. 

. La Correspondence de Francois, Cardinal de Tournon, 
• 1 5 2 1 - 1 5 5 2 T Paris: H. Champion, 19^6. 

Not an important source for t h i s period. 

Isambert, Francois Andre, et_ _al, eds. Recueil gene"rale des  
anciennes l o i s francaises, depuis l'an 420 jusqu'a 1st  
revolution de 1 7 8 9 . Paris: L i b r a i r i e de Plon Freres 
1 8 8 2 - ". 2 9 v . i n 24. 

Important edicts of the period under study are contained 
i n v. XIV ( 1 5 5 9 - 1 5 8 9 ) . 

"Journal de ce qui s'est passe en France durant I'annee 1 5 6 2 , 
principalement dans Paris et a l a cour," Revue retrospective, 
Ser. I, V, 8 1 - 1 1 6 , 1 6 8 - 2 1 2 ; 1 8 3 4 . 

Written by a Catholic gentleman at the court who enjoyed 
the confidence of Catherine de Medicis and the cardinal of 
Lorraine. 

Lot, Ferdinand. Recherches sur l e s e f f e c t i f s des armies francaises  
des guerres d ' l t a l i e au guerres de r e l i g i o n , 1 4 9 4 - 1 5 6 2 . P a r i s : 
S.E.V.P.E.N., 1 9 6 2 . : 

Contains documents showing size and type of forces, command 
and cost, 

Lublinskaja, Aleksandra Dmitrievna, ed. Documents pour s e r v i r a ' 
1'histoire des guerres c i v i l e s en France, 156I- I 5 6 3 . Moscow: 
Akademia nauk SSSR, Institut i s t o r i i , 1 9 6 2 . 

Contains many l e t t e r s from high royal o f f i c i a l s to the 
court; a valuable source for t h i s study, 

Rochambeau, Eugene A c h i l l e Lacroix de Vimeux, comte de. Lettres  
d'Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret. Paris: L i b r a i r i e 

. Renouard, 1 8 7 7 . ~' 
A major source for the king of Navarre, one of the key 

figures of the period. 

Ruble, Joseph Etienne Alphonse, baron de, ed. Comrnentaires et 
l e t t r e s de Blaise de Monluc. 5 v . Paris: L i b r a i r i e Renouard, 
1 8 6 4 - 1 8 7 2 . 

This edition of the commentaries was not based on the best 
text and has been superseded by Courteault's; v. IV and V 
contain 1 7 5 l e t t e r s including such documents as the charter 
of a league at Agen and a statement of the m i l i t a r y expenses 
of Guyenne; v. IV i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y useful source. 



171 
S u r i a n o , M i c h e l e a n d M a r c A n t o n i o B a r b a r o . D i s p a t c h e s , I56O-I563, 

t r a n s l a t e d a n d e d i t e d by S i r H e n r y L a y a r d , i n The H u g u e n o t 
S o c i e t y o f L o n d o n , P u b l i c a t i o n s , V I , L y m i n t o n , I89I. 

T e x t a n d t r a n s l a t i o n ; S u r i a n o , N o v e m b e r , I56O t o N o v e m b e r , 
1561; B a r b a r o , O c t o b e r , 1562 t o A u g u s t , 1563; some o f t h e 
c l e a r e s t a n a l y s e s o f e v e n t s a n d p e r s o n a l i t i e s a t t h e F r e n c h 
c o u r t . 

W i l k i n s o n , M a u r i c e , e d . " D o c u m e n t s i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e w a r s o f 
r e l i g i o n , 1569-1573," E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , X X V I , 127-
138; J a n u a r y , 1911. 

D o c u m e n t s f r o m t h e " R e g i s t r e s s e c r e t e s du p a r l e m e n t de 
B o r d e a u x ; " o f i n t e r e s t f o r s o u r c e r a t h e r t h a n d a t e . 

I I I . HISTORIES BY CONTEMPORARIES 

A u b i g n e , A g r i p p a d ' . H i s t o i r e u n i v e r s e l l e . P u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e 
s o c i e t e de l ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e . E d i t e d by A l p h o n s e de R u b l e . 
l O v . P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1886-1909. 

C l e a r l y H u g u e n o t v i e w p o i n t y e t r e m a r k a b l y f a i r ; b o r r o w e d 
f r e e l y f r o m o t h e r a u t h o r s . 

B e z e , T h e o d o r e d e . H i s t o i r e e c c l e s i a s t i q u e d e s e g l i s e s r e f o r m e e s  
a u r o y a u m e de F r a n c e . E d i t e d by G . Baum a n d E . C u n i t z . 
B a s e d o n t h e o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n , I58O. 3v. P a r i s : F i s c h b a c h e r , 
1883-1889. 

W r i t t e n f r o m P r o t e s t a n t p o i n t o f v i e w w i t h a p o l o g e t i c 
p u r p o s e ; l i k e d ' A u b i g n e , B e z e b o r r o w e d f r e e l y f r o m o t h e r 
h i s t o r i a n s . 

B r a n t o m e , P i e r r e de B o u r d e i l l e , s e i g n e u r d e . O e u v r e s c o m p l e t e s . 
P u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e s o c i e t e de l ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e . - E d i t e d 
by L u d o v i c L a l a n n e . l l v . P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1864-1882. 

C a t h o l i c w r i t e r ; v . X I i s a n i n d e x , e s s e n t i a l f o r p r o f i t -
a b l e u s e o f t h i s f r a g m e n t e d w o r k . 

L a P o p e l i n i e r e , L a n c e l o t V o i s i n , s i e u r d e . L ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e  
e n r i c h i e d e s p l u s n o t a b l e s o c c u r r e n c e s s u r v e n u e s e s p r o v i n c e s  
de l ' E u r o p e e t p a y s v o i s i n s d e p u i s l ' a n 1550 j u s q u ' a c e s  
t e m p s . 3v. ( A r r a s ? ) 1582. 

T h o u , J a c q u e s A u g u s t d e . H i s t o i r e u n i v e r s e l l e d e p u i s 1543 j u s q u '  
e n 1607, t r a d u i t s u r 1' e d i t i o n l a t i n e de L o n d r e s . I 6 v . L o n d o n : 
a n d P a r i s , 1734. 

P o l i t i q u e p o i n t o f v i e w ; g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on s u b s e q u e n t 
h i s t o r i e s o f t h e p e r i o d . 



172 

IV. GENERAL HISTORIES 

Lavisse, Ernest, ed. Histoire de France depuis ies origines  
jusqu'a l a r e v o l u t i o n . P a r i s : Hachette, 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 1 1 . 

The best general history of France; Volume V:2 (1519-1559) 
by Henry Lemonnier and volume VI:1 (1559-1598) by Jean H . 
Mariejol are u s e f u l . 

Mousnier, Roland. Les XVI® et X V I I e s i e c l e s , v. IV i n Maurice 
Crouzet, d i r e c t o r , Histoire generale des c i v i l i s a t i o n s . P a r i s : 
Presses Universitaires de F r a n c e ,I96I. 

Contains a good summary of Mousnier's view of French 
absolutism i n the sixteenth century. 

Romier, Lucien. History of France. Translated and completed by 
A . L . Rowse. New York: S t . Martin's Press, 1 9 5 3 . 

A good overview; too b r i e f to be useful for the period 
under study. 

•V. HISTORIES OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND 
OF THE WARS OF RELIGION 

Armstrong, Edward. The French Wars of R e l i g i o n , Their P o l i t i c a l  
Aspects. 2nd e d i t i o n ; Oxford: Blackwell, 1904. 

An expansion of three lectures; useful b r i e f synthesis. 

B a t t i f o l , L o u i s . The Century of the Renaissance, v. II i n The  
National History of France. Edited by F r . Funck-Brentano. 
6v. Translated by E . F . Buckley. London: Heinemann, 1916. 

Well-written survey without documentation. 

Grant, Arthur James. A History of Europe from 1494 to 1610, v. V 
i n Methuen's History of Medieval and Modern Europe, London: 
Methuen, 1931. 

L i v e t , Georges. Les guerres de r e l i g i o n . Que sais-je ? P a r i s : 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. 

Helpful analysis i n b r i e f form. 

Neale, John. The Age of Catherine de Medicis. London: Cape, 1943. 
An expansion of a lecture series; people and issues of the 

Wars of Religion c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d . 



173 
Thompson, James W e s t f a l l . The Wars of Religion i n France, 1559- 

1576; The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici:and P h i l i p I I . 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. 

S t i l l the standard work on the subject; considers p a r t i c u l a r -
l y the diplomatic and economic aspects of the c i v i l wars. 

V I . BOOKS ON SPECIAL TOPICS 

A l l e n , J.W. A History of P o l i t i c a l Theory i n the Sixteenth Century. 
London: Methuen, 1957. 

F i r s t published 1928, reprinted with revised bibliography 
1957. 

Champion, P i e r r e . La Jeunesse de Henri I I I . P a r i s : Bernard 
Grasset, 1941. 

Church, William F a r r . Constitutional Thought i n Sixteenth Century  
France, A Study i n the Evolution of Ideas, v. X i n Harvard  
H i s t o r i c a l Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 19^1. 

Courteault, Paul. Blaise de Monluc, h i s t o r i e n ; e"tude c r i t i q u e sur  
l e texte et l a valeur historique des commentaires. P a r i s : 
Alphonse P i c a r d , 1908. 

E s s e n t i a l source for f i l l i n g the gaps and correcting errors 
i n Monluc's Commentaires; contains much helpful explanatory 
m a t e r i a l . 

. Un cadet de gascogne au X V I e s i e c l e , Blaise de Monluc. 
P a r i s : Alphonse P i c a r d , 1909. 

A biography based on the author's detailed study of the 
sources; b r i e f and lacking documentation. 

Croze, Joseph de. Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe I I . P a r i s : 
d'Amyot, 1866. 

Devic, dom Claude and dom Jean Joseph Vaissete. Histoire generale  
de Languedoc avec des notes et l e s pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s . I6v. 
Toulouse: E . P r i v o t , 1872-1904. 

Volume XI deals with Languedoc i n the sixteenth century; 
contains many documents useful for the events i n and near 
Toulouse which had a bearing on Haute-Guyenne. 



174 

Doucet, Roger. JStude sur le gouvernement de Francois Ier dans  
ses rapports avec le Parlement de P a r i s . 2v. P a r i s : 
Champion, 1921-1926. 

. Les i n s t i t u t i o n s de l a France au XVie s i e c l e . 2v. 
P a r i s : P i c a r d , 1948. 

Excellent description of o r i g i n and development of French 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ; helpful bibliography. 

Gigon, S. - C . La Revolte de l a gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549. 
P a r i s : Honore Champion, 190o. 

Useful for observing the continuity of c o n f l i c t and concern 
for p r o v i n c i a l prerogatives. 

Grant, Arthur James. The French Monarchy, 1483-1789. i n Cambridge  
H i s t o r i c a l Series, George W. Prothero, ed. 2v. Cambridge: 
University Press, 1900. 

Hale, John Rigby, e_t a l , ed. Europe i n the Late Middle Ages. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965* 

Contains two good a r t i c l e s l i s t e d below on France i n the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 

H e r i t i e r , Jean. Catherine de M e d i c i . Charlotte Haldane, trans. 
London: George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1963* 

Translated from Catherine de Medicis. P a r i s : Artheme 
Fayard, 1959. The author interprets Catherine's p o l i t i c a l 
aims i n terms of "Machiavellism." 

Imbart de l a Tour, P i e r r e . Les origines de l a reforme. 4v. Paris 
Hachette, 1905-1935. 

Jensen, De Lemar. Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza  
and the French Catholic League. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1964. 

K e l l y , Caleb G. French Protestantism 1559-1562. Ser. XXXVI, No. 4 
i n Johns Hopkins University Studies i n H i s t o r i c a l and P o l i t i c a l  
Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1918. 

Emphasizes economic factors; of interest regarding origins 
of leagues. 

Kingdon, Robert McCune. Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of 
Religion i n France, 1555-1565"! v.22 i n Travaux d'humanisme et  
renaissance. Geneva: E . Droz, 1956. 

Invaluable for Protestant m i l i t a r y organization and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y for the r e l a t i o n of the Geneva Company of Pastors 
to the Huguenot movement i n France. 



175 

Kingdon, Robert McCune. Geneva and the Consolidation of the 
French Protestant Movement, 1564-1572; a contribution to the  
history of Congregationalism, Presbyterianism and C a l v i n i s t  
resistance theory. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 

Good bibliography. 

Leonard, Emile G. H i s t o i r e generale du protestantisme. 3 v . 
P a r i s : Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de F r a n c e , 1 9 6 1 . 

v. I, La Reformation, i s useful; v. I I , L'Etablissement, 
1 5 6 4 - 1 7 0 0 , contains a good section on Calvinism i n France. 

Le Patourel, John. "The King and the Princes i n Fourteenth 
Century France," i n John R. Hale, et a l , ed. Europe i n the  
Late Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1965. 

Lewis, P. S. "France i n the Fifteenth Century: Society and 
Sovereignty," i n John R. Hale, et a l , ed. Europe i n the Late  
Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 . 

Major, James R u s s e l l . The Deputies to the Estates General i n 
Renaissance France. No. 21 i n Studies presented to the Inter-
national Commission for the History of Representative and 
Parliamentary I n s t i t u t i o n s . Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, i 9 6 0 . 

. The Estates General of I56O. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1 9 5 1 . 

. Representative Institutions i n Renaissance France, 
T 5 2 I - I 5 5 9 . No. 22 i n Studies presented to the International 
Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary 
I n s t i t u t i o n s . Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, i 9 6 0 . 

M a r i e j o l , Jean Hippolyte. Catherine de Medicis. Paris: Hachette, 
1920. 

Mousnier, Roland. Etat et societe sous Francois Ier et pendant le  
gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV. Les Cours de Sorbonne. 
H i s t o i r e Moderne et Contemporaine• P a r i s : Centre de document-
ation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1966. 

P a r t i c u l a r l y good for government, society and customs, 
1 5 1 5 - 1 5 4 7 . 



176 
Mousnier, Roland. Etudes sur l a France au XVTe s i e c l e . 2 p t i e . 

Les Cours de Sorbonne. Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine. 
Paris: Centre de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1959* 

Good treatment of the development of royal government 
under Francis I and Henry II; more d e t a i l on f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s than-others. 

. E t u d e s sur l a France de 1494-1559• Les Cours de 
Sorbonne. Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine. Paris: Centre 
de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1964. 

- . La venalite des o f f i c e s sous Henri IV et Louis XIII. 
Rouen: Maugard,1945. 

The standard work on t h i s topic; focuses on a l a t e r period 
but useful for studying development of venality. 

Pages, Georges, ed. E t u d e s sur 1'histoire administrative et  
sociale de l'ancien r e g i m e " P a r i s : F e l i x Alcan, 1938. 

Chiefly concerned with the l a t e r years of the ancien  
regime. 

Palm, Franklin Charles. The Establishment of French Absolutism, 
1574-1610. New York: F. S. Crofts, 1928. 

. P o l i t i c s and Religion i n Sixteenth-century France; A 
Study of the Career of Henry of Montmorency-Damville, Uncrowned 

• King of the South. Boston: Ginn, 1927. 

Picot, Georges. Histoire des etats generaux consideres au point de  
vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de l a France de 1355- 
1614. 2nd e d i t i o n . 5v. Paris: Hachette, 1888. 

Romier, Lucien. La carriere d'un f a v o r i , Jacques d'Albon de Saint- 
Andre, Margchai de France, 1512-1562. Paris: Perrin, 1909. 

Excellent example of the r i s e of a l o y a l c l i e n t of Henry I I . 

Catholiques et huguenots a l a cour de Charles IX, 1560-
15o*2. Paris: Perrin, 1924. 

. La Conjuration d'Amboise. Paris: Perrin, 1923. 

. Les origines politiques des guerres de r e l i g i o n . 2v. 
P a r i s : Perrin, 1913-1914. 

Le royaume de Catherine de Medicis; La France a l a 
v e i l l e des guerres de r e l i g i o n . 2v. Paris: Perrin, 1922. 



177 
Ruble, Joseph Etienne Alphonse, baron de. Antoine de Bourbon et  

Jeanne d'Albret, suite de le mariage de~Jeanne d'Albret"! 4v. 
P a r i s : Adolphe L a b i t t e , 1881-1886. 

v. II-IV deal with the period from the death of Henry II 
to the death of Antoine de Bourbon; the extensive pieces  
j u s t i f i c a t i v e s i n each volume are the most helpful aspect of 
t h i s work e.g. for the influence of P h i l i p II on the king of 
Navarre. 

. Jeanne d'Albret et l a guerre c i v i l e . P a r i s : L i b r a i r e s 
de l a bibliotheque nationale, 1897, ~* 1~. 

v. I deals with the period under study; again the documents 
are helpful for events in Guyenne. 

Sutherland, N. M. The French Secretaries of State i n the Reign of  
Catherine de Medici, v. X i n University of London H i s t o r i c a l  
Studies. London: Athlone Press, 1962. 

Excellent account of the l i v e s of these important o f f i c e r s . 

Van Dyke, P a u l » Catherine de Medicis. 2v. London: Murray, 1923* 

Weber, Bernerd Clarke. "The Diplomatic Relations between France 
and Spain during the Reign of Charles IX (1560-157*+)." Un-
published Doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of C a l i f o r n i a , 
Berkeley, 1935. 

Very useful source since r e l a t i o n s with Spain were p a r t -
i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t for royal government i n Guyenne. 

W e i l l , Georges. Les theories sur le pouvoir r o y a l en France 
pendant les guerres de r e l i g i o n . P a r i s : Hachette, 1891. 

Z e l l e r , Gaston. Aspects de l a politique frangaise sous l ' a n c i e n  
regime. P a r i s ! P r e s s e s u n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France,1964. 

C o l l e c t i o n of Z e l l e r ' s a r t i c l e s published i n various 
journals between 1919 and i960; includes the a r t i c l e on the 
governors of provinces. 

. Les i n s t i t u t i o n s de l a France au XVie s i e c l e . P a r i s : 
. Presses u n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1948. 

Excellent b r i e f survey. 



178 

VII. PERIODICAL LITERATURE 

Armstrong, Edward. "The p o l i t i c a l theory of the Huguenots," 
English H i s t o r i c a l Review, IV (January, 1889),. 13-40. 

Baguenault de Puchesse. "La p o l i t i q u e de Philippe II dans les 
a f f a i r e s de France, 1559-1598," Revue des questions  
historiques, XXV (January, 1879), 5-66. 

Dupont-Ferrier, Gustave. "Ignorances et distractions administr-
atives en France aux XIVe et XVe s i e c l e s , " Bibliotheque de  
l ' e c o l e des chartes, C (1939), 145-156. 

Furgeot, Henri. "L'alienation des biens du c l e r g l sous Charles IX," 
Revue des questions historiques, XXIX ( A p r i l , l88l), 428-490. 

Hamilton, Blanche. "Paris under the last Valois kings," English  
H i s t o r i c a l Review, I ( A p r i l , 1886), 260-276. 

Hartung, F . and Roland Mousnier. "Quelques problemes concernant 
l a monarchie absolue," Relazioni del X congresso internazionale  
d i scienze s t o r i c h e , IV, S t o r i a Moderna (Florence, 1955), 1-55. 

Hauser, H e n r i . "Antoine de Bourbon et l'Allemagne, 1560-1561," 
Revue historique, XLV (January-April, 1891), 54-61. 

. "De l'humanisme et de l a rlforme en France, 1512-1552," 
Revue historique, LXIV (May-August, 1897), 258-297. 

. "The European F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s of 1559," Journal of 
Economic and Business History, II (February, 1930), 241-255. 

. "The French Reformation and the French People i n the 
Sixteenth Century," American H i s t o r i c a l Review, IV (January, 
1899), 217-227. 

. "Sur 1•authenticite des Discours de La Noue," Revue 
h i s t o r i q u e , LIII (September-December, 1893), 301-311. 

Koenigsberger, H. G. "Review of N. M. Sutherland, The French  
Secretaries of State i n the Reign of Catherine de Medicis," 
English H i s t o r i c a l Review, • LXXIX 11964), 114-116. 

La F e r r i e r e - P e r c y , Hector de Masso, comte de. "Catherine de 
Medicis et les P o l i t i q u e s , " , Revue des questions historiques, 
LVI (October, 1894), 404-439. 



179 

" L e t t r e s patentes de C h a r l e s IX pour l e paiement, au moyen d'un 
virement, des gages a r r i e r e s des vice-senechaux de Guyenne et 
des gardes de MM. de Burye et de Monluc," A r c h i v e s h i s t o r i q u e  
du departement de l a Gironde, v. I l l (l86l), No. LXXX, 200-203» 

Major, James R u s s e l l . "The Crown and the A r i s t o c r a c y i n Renaissance 
F r a n c e , " American H i s t o r i c a l Review, LXIX:3 ( A p r i l , 1964), 
630-646. 

"Payment of the Deputies to the French N a t i o n a l Assemblies, 
1*4^4-1627," J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y , XXVII (1955), 217-279. 

. "The T h i r d E s t a t e i n the E s t a t e s - G e n e r a l of P o n t o i s e , " 
Speculum, XXXIX (1954), 460-474. 

M e r c i e r , C h a r l e s . "Les t h e o r i e s p o l i t i q u e s des C a l v i n i s t e s en 
France au cours des guerres de r e l i g i o n , " B u l l e t i n de l a  
s o c i e t e d e ' 1 1 h i s t o i r e du P r o t e s t a n t i s m e f r a n c a i s , LXXXIII 
( A p r i l - J u n e , July-September, 1934), 225-260; 381-415. 

Pages, Georges. "La venalite" des o f f i c e s dans l'ancienne F r a n c e , " 
Revue h i s t o r i q u e , CLXIX (1932), 477-495. 

P a i l l a r d , C h a r l e s H i p p o l y t e . " A d d i t i o n s c r i t i q u e s a 1 ' h i s t o i r e 
de l a c o n j u r a t i o n d'Amboise," Revue h i s t o r i q u e , XIV (September-
December, 1880), 61-108; 311-355. 

Contains a b s t r a c t s of the correspondence of Chantonnay, the 
S p a n i s h ambassador i n France, w i t h Marguerite of Parma. 

Perroy, Edouard. "Feudalism or P r i n c i p a l i t i e s i n F i f t e e n t h Century 
F r a n c e , " i n U n i v e r s i t y of London, B u l l e t i n of the I n s t i t u t e of  
H i s t o r i c a l Research, XX:6l (1945), 181-185. 

Romier, Jean B a p t i s t e L u c i e n . "Les p r o t e s t a n t s f r a n c a i s e s a l a 
v e i l l e des guerres c i v i l e s , " Revue h i s t o r i q u e , CXXXIV (January-
A p r i l , 1917), 1-51; 225-286. 

Van Dyke, P a u l . " F r a n c o i s de Guise and the t a k i n g of C a l a i s , " 
Annual Report of the American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e  
Year 1911, 1,(1913), 101-107. 

Weiss, N o e l . "La maison de L o r r a i n e et l a reforme en France au 
XVie s i e c l e , " B u l l e t i n de l a s o c i e t e de 1 ' h i s t o i r e du  
P r o t e s t a n t i s m e f r a n c a i s , LVII (January-February, 1908), 316-



180 

Z e l l e r , Gaston. "L*administration monarchique avant les intendants, 
Parlements et Gouverneurs,'* Revue historique, CXCVII ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 
1 8 0 - 2 1 5 . 

. "Gouverneurs des provinces au XVI e s i e c l e , " Revue 
historique, CLXXXV ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 2 2 5 - 2 5 6 .