16

Trends of Risk and Security Problems for States
and Emerging Strategies for Coping with those Trends

by Robert Ellsworth

When one considers very carefully the risk and security problems that states face
today, and then looks at how states are attempting to cope with those problems, one
is almost forced to the old definition of strategy as: "When you have run out of
bullets, how to keep on firing."

Introduction

We live today in an "Age of Peace ". What does one mean by that phrase - an
age of peace? It is surely something different from the condition of having recently
recovered from a war, or getting ready to fight the next war, which are the conditions
that most of mankind has been in for most of history. In an age of peace, on the other
hand, there is no war or prospect of war, between the major powers, of the kind which
the powers maintain their main forces to fight. There have been a few periods like this
in recent history: after the Napoleon period, there was a wide-spread determination
in Europe never to let anything like that happen again. After World War I, which
was rhetorically "the war to end all wars ", there was a wide-spread determination not
to have any more war. Ages of peace don't rule out revolutions, or wars with lesser
powers, but the age of peace which we have enjoyed for about 30 years is different.
It's unique in two respects: first, in the length of time it's lasted; and secondly the
intensity and the wide-spread scope of the feeling that a war between the major powers,
with the strategic nuclear weapons that they maintain, is absolutely unthinkable. So that
we do live in a unique age of peace.

And of course the first great risk for states is the risk of the collapse of that
condition.

Another great set of risks that we face today - as states and as peoples - is the
risks that come from an apparent global shortage of material resources. The energy
crisis is one example. There are a number of other examples and we will examine some
of them. There is a specific risk in the build-up of military forces on the part of the
Soviet Union. Not just in the strategic nuclear realm, but also in their deployments in
Europe, in terms of their naval build-up and deployments, in their capabilities for
projecting and exercising power beyond Eurasia, and in their utiisation of modern
technology.

There are, in a general sense, two other kinds of risks that states face today. On the
one hand, there is always the risk of being taken by surprise. In military history one is
familiar with the surprises that have been visited on various states: Operation Barba-
rossa, the German invasion of Russia in June 1941; Pearl Harbour, the Japanese attack
on the United States in December of that year; and in the Middle East the Israeli
attack on Egypt in June 1967 and the Egyptian attack on the Sinai in October 1973.



Also in the non-military field, states were taken quite by surprise in October 1973 by the
oil embargo, and during that winter by the 400 % increase in crude oil prices
suddenly imposed by OPEC. What happens is that states decline to look at signs which,
in retrospect, are always said to have been quite visible. States decline to see what is
unpleasant for them to see, and they tend to get taken by surprise.

Contrarywise another risk is that states in contemplating the external world tend
to exaggerate certain risks and therefore make unwise, and unnecessary concessions. For
example in the case of the German re-occupation in the Rheinland in 1936 the Western
powers exaggerated the risks of response if they offered resistance to the re-occupation
of the Rheinland. In 1972, risks were exaggerated with the result that the United States
conceded too much in the Interim Agreement covering Offensive Nuclear Weapons,
in SALT I. That was corrected later at Vladivostok in 1974, but there is almost always
the risk of exaggerating risks, and of making unnecessary and unwise concessions, or
yielding unnecessarily, as a result.

Oil pricing practices
Let us look first at some of the specific risks involved in oil pricing practices:

a problem with which all states are confronted today, not just the oil-consuming
industrial states. The non-oil lesser developed countries have even worse problems coping
with current oil pricing practices, and in my judgment the oil-producing states themselves
have certain problems associated with the pricing practices that they are pursuing today.

For the last five years the lowest inflation rates in the industrial world have been
well above what had been considered unacceptably high levels of inflation during the
entire post World War II era. And then, there are the particular problems imposed on
the industrial countries not just by the level of inflation, which is extremely high, but
also by the fact that among different countries the rates are different. Within the OECD,
for example, inflation rates today range between 5 % in some countries to as high as
20 % in other countries. That creates very great problems in trade, monetary policy, etc.

Unemployment is another high-risk condition which has been exacerbated by the
oil pricing practices of the world today, and I need not say to this group that inflation
and unemployment together have historically been the father of confrontation and
upheaval and the grand-father of war.

A further very great risk stems from the fact that we are entrapped in a vicious
circle. Whenever recovery commences in the industrial countries, that is used as a
justification by the oil producing countries to increase their prices. That of course
takes the edge off the recovery, reinstitutes conditions of virulent inflation and unemploy-
ment and calls forth measures to cope with those undesirable and risky conditions.
It doesn't work. The world does not work today under the oil pricing practices currently
being followed.

Here is a case where I think it's fair to say the strategies of states are largely an
exercise in how to keep on firing after you have run out of bullets. No one today has
any strategy for dealing directly with current oil pricing practices. Of course states
are trying to sell goods to the oil producers to cope with balance of payments problems,
taking certain modest measures of conservation, going into debt up to their eyeballs,
or doing all of the above. But essentially there is no strategy today for dealing directly
with oil pricing practices as such.

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The reason, or one of the reasons why this is so, is that economically recoverable
oil exists only in limited quantities in the earth and that within a certain number of
years it will be necessary to replace oil with alternative sources of energy. And in order
to develop alternatives to oil as a source of energy it is necessary that oil prices be
at something like their present levels. Still, there is some room for the exercise of
strategy in this important area.

One of the partial alternatives to oil which creates some risks is nuclear energy.
In 1973 / 74 the oil embargo and price rise gave a tremendous ifilip to the development
of nuclear energy in a number of states because for them there is absolutely no option
other than nuclear power as a source of electricity. That created the virtual certainty
within 10 years of very large amounts of plutonium (which is a nuclear explosive) in
stockpiles all over the world in spent fuel from nuclear reactors. That - coupled with
the nuclear explosion of India in May 1974 - regenerated the spectre of nuclear
weapons proliferation on a world-wide basis, which was not a new concern but had
been quiescent for a number of years. In addition, a number of industrial countries in
the early 1970's had begun a spirited competition in the export of nuclear technology
which must increase the risks of weapons proliferation.

There is now an effort by states to develop a strategy to cope; initial steps are
being taken. In many cases those steps are a little bit stumbling. For example last week,
on April 6th, President Carter made a statement in Washington aimed at the elimination
of plutonium from the world economy. In order to induce states to forego access to
plutonium, he alluded to the possibility of the United States supplying the world with
enriched fuel so that the world could avoid reprocessing and the creation of free
plutonium. To put it directly: President Carter has asked the world, as a part of a
strategy to avoid the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, to forego access to nuclear
fuel except that which might be supplied by the U.S.A. That is not a viable basis for
a widely shared or a long lasting international regime. Other steps will have to be
taken to develop a strategy for dealing with the problem of proliferation as the world
develops nuclear energy to substitute partially for oil.

Global resource shortages
The energy crisis, based as it is on the realization that there is a limited supply of

economically recoverable oil available, is only one example of what many believe is
a much wider problem: the risks of broad global resource shortages.

With regard to that problem there are two conflicting views. The "catastrophists"
believe that the earth's resources will soon be exhausted, and the approach of this
condition will lead to the collapse of society, including the end of the age of peace to
which I referred at the beginning of my remarks.

The conflicting view, that of the "cornucopians ", holds that most of the earth's
essential raw materials are virtually infinite and that as we exhaust one raw material
we will turn to inexhaustible substitutes. According to this view we will ultimately settle
into a steady state of substitution and recycling of materials.

In order to bring a little perspective to these two conflicting views, it is useful to
realize that 80 % of all the molecules that we take out of the earth and use are fossil
fuel. All our technological civilization, and especially our transportation, is based on an

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addiction to fossil fuel - an addiction that cannot be broken, or at least cannot be
broken in the foreseeable future. That is a very special problem.

But the minerals that we depend upon - iron, aluminium, and copper - are present
in very large quantities throughout the world and at high concentrations. For those
elements like mercury or silver that are not so widely present there are in fact large
possibilities for substitution. Therefore, the energy problem is different in degree to the
extent that it is a different problem in kind. It is necessary not to confuse the two.
Certainly there are great risks associated with both.

What are the risks? The present stage of the world, while we are using up fossil
fuel at a terrific rate, may be called Stage I. Stage III, I see as the age of substitutability.
The risks lie in developing appropriate strategies to get from Stage I to Stage III. So far
the strategies that have been spoken about and attempted seem to be quite unadequate.
First, it takes a long time to transition just in the case of energy: it took 60 years to
transition from wood to coal, it took about the same period to transition from coal to
oil and gas. As we look at strategies for transitionning from oil and gas to something
else - it seems clear that rising environmental concerns, and shortages of capital, may
stretch that process even further.

That risk is multiplied many times by the short time horizons of most government
agencies and corporations responsible for resource policy. Decision-making in corpora-
tions is conditioned by interest rates which encourage indifference to costs and benefits
that won't be realized within about five years. Inflation further shortens the time horizon.
In the case of governments, the next election prevents most policies that could return
great benefits over the long term, so that governments tend to have a short time horizon.
Totalitarian and authoritarian governments do not seem to be doing much better, so
I am not certain that the answer is the abandonment of democracy. There is no model
anywhere in the world of a state dealing with the problem in a way that offers much
help.

What are in fact the emerging strategies? First, we see competition for access to oil.

CHART I

The possibility of there being a balance between OPEC's ability and willingness to
provide oil to the world on the one hand, and the needs of the OECD countries for

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ESTIMATED 1985 OPEC
EXPORT LEVELS

(in million barrels a day)

ESTIMATED 1985 OECD
IMPORT NEEDS

(in million barrels a day)
Policy Exports Assumption Imports

Low 29,9 High Growth 38,8
Medium-Low 32,1 Medium Growth 35,0
Medium-High 35,5 Low Growth 31,9
High 38,6 Accelerated Policy 24,3

Source: OCD, World Energy Outlook, Source: Rustow, "Foreign Affairs ", April
1977, pp 9, 91, 94-96. 1977, p. 50q.



oil, on the other hand, is very slight. Unless we are very lucky indeed, the figures
portend in fairly clear terms a major world crisis in the early or mid 1980's because
of the fact that there may not be enough oil from OPEC to satisfy the needs of the
OECD countries. This alarming situation assumes zero interest on the part of the Soviet
Union in OPEC oil by 1985. That is an assumption which appears to be quite optimistic
inasmuch as the Soviets have their energy problem too. They are experiencing rising
industrial and consumer demand for energy. They have great difficulties developing
their energy resources in Sibiria. They have not been able to get the capital or the
technology from the West. The U.S.S.R. therefore will turn more and more to the
Gulf and Middle East for access to that low cost and easy to extract (though not
low price) oil. Although the OPEC price is something over $ 11.00 a barrel, it costs
only about 29 cents a barrel to extract. The Soviets - I expect - will need oil from
the Gulf and Middle East by 1985 to the tune of somewhere between 2 and 4 million
barrels a day. That will cause horrendous problems for all of us: Europeans, Americans,
Japanese, and Russians.

Competition for access, then, is one of the strategies that has begun to emerge for
dealing with the energy crisis. There are also the beginnings of another strategy for
dealing with the overall global resource shortage problem, and that strategy could be
called the deliberate societal shift toward placing an intrinsic value on conservation,
on low material and energy growth. This, perhaps, holds out considerable hope, for
two reasons. First, it is only by having a set of values that one can develop a strategy:
that is in fact what a strategy is. A strategy is basically a set of values that permits
one to take a longer term view of matters whatever those matters are - than would
be dictated by short term tactical considerations. The emergence of a set of values,
therefore, is a hopeful sign. Secondly major deliberate societal shifts in values of this
kind can take place quickly, have done so in the past. Between 1880 and 1900 in
Europe a rapid and pervasive social change took place as nation after nation abandoned
high rates of marital fertility and adopted contraception on a wide scale. As a result,
in this short 20-year period there was a very great reduction in the birth rate in Europe
as a deliberate internalisation of a set of values and therefore of a strategy. This was
rather suggested not imposed by any corporation or government.

We cannot predict the future, but we can have value systems - a strategy - that
will help us move from Stage I to Stage III. Those values would be a) conservation;

efficiency and effectiveness in the transformation of raw resources into food, fertilizer,
electricity, and machinery, placing a premium if you will on science and technology;

cooperation instead of competition; d) steadiness of purpose; e) resilience in response
to change These are some of the characteristics and qualities of a viable strategy which
can help us move from Stage I to Stage III without having a collapse of society, a
termination of the age of peace.

The Russian military build-up

In the meanwhile however, we are confronted with the risks of a very substantial
Russian build-up. For the last ten years, the Soviet Union has been adding between
3 % and 4 % a year, in real terms, to the resources devoted to military purposes. In
1972 those resources exceeded the comparable resources devoted to military purposes

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by the United States, and have exceeded the U.S. in every year since then. In 1976
the Soviets were spending, in real terms, 40 % more on their military than the United
States. As for the future effects of present spending, the U.S.S.R. has been spending
on investment account - that is to say on procurement, and research and develop-
ment - at a higher rate than the overall rate, i.e. at 4 % p.a. This broadly based and
persistent build-up poses three main risks

It adds fuel to the competitive fires and works against cooperation, which was one
of the qualities of Stage I - Stage III strategy which has been mentioned as highly
desirable.

Because the facts of this Russian military build-up are quite unpleasant to contem-
plate, it may be overlooked or ignored in the wider world; that could lead to
unpleasant surprises later on.

Or on the contrary the build-up can be exaggerated, as for example our own retired
Major General Keegan has been exaggerating it by saying that the Russians are
already superior to the United States. And that exaggeration could lead - if it
became widely accepted - to unnecessary and unwise concessions in various
political areas.

Let us look for a moment at some specific aspects of the build-up. In the strategic
nuclear realm, the Soviets' build-up began after the Cuba Missile Crisis of 1962, some
15 years ago. But one of the most intensive periods of the Soviets' strategic nuclear
build-up has taken place in the last 5 years: that is, since the 1972 SALT-I agreements.
In that five-years period the Soviets have deployed three new land-based ICBM missiles
and two new submarine-based ballistic missiles. All of the new missiles deployed since
1972 are equipped with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV's).
They have high throw-weights and they have been provided with warheads with increas-
ing accuracy. Thus, the Russians have provided themselves in the last five years with
a hard-target counterforce threat to the ICBM force of the United States; in addition
they have under development one further land-based ICBM and two further submarine-
based ICBM's. Moreover, they have deployed the Backfire bomber, and since 1971 have
embarked on a very substantial programme of civil defence.

The result is that, between the United States and the Soviet Union, as far as strategic
nuclear forces are concerned, a condition of rough equivalence now obtains. (See
chart II). The chart shows trends over the last several years. It is a chart which indicates
a US advantage, until about 1970, in those static measures of the balance which are
charted (it's been impossible to chart warhead accuracy): equivalent megatonnage,
throw-weight, numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (which includes land-based
ICBM, submarine-based ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers), and numbers of war-
heads. The Soviet Union has the advantage in 1977 in equivalent megatonnage because
their land-based ICBM's have high throw-weight. They have a slight advantage in
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In numbers of warheads the United States has an
advantage. What does it mean? All of these things are so abstract.

It surely means something, though. One must recall, for example, the reaction of
Mao-Tse-Tung in 1957 to the Russian sputnik. Mao took that as meaning the Soviets
had missile superiority over the United States. He therefore asked Khrushchev for help
in standing up to the United States over Quemoy and Matsu. Khrushchev refused, and

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that was one of the things which lead to the great schism between the Chinese and the
Russians. One must also recollect the American presidential campaign of 1960: the
so-called missile gap. So, these things do have some kind of political meaning although
in themselves they are quite abstract.

CHART II
US/USSR STRATEGIC FORCES ADVANTAGE

-4-

22

1964 65

EMT Yield 2/3

TW Throwweight

170

SNDV = Stragegic Nuclear
Delivery Vehicle

.f:.-...
SNDV

175

Warheads

ENT

I 80

Let me also mention very briefly the United States' strategic programmes for the
future: the new mobile land-based ICBM, called MK; the MK 12A warhead which
is a very high yield warhead with great accuracy. (Accuracy of any kind of explosive
is much more important as far as destructive effect is concerned than is yield. Destructive
effect varies as the 2/3 power of yield, but destructive effect of accuracy varies as the
square of the distance from target.) The B-I bomber is in abeyance for the moment,
the Cruise Missile is under development, the Trident submarine is in series production
as programmed All these US strategic programmes may be accelerated or held in status
quo, pending the outcome of further negotiations with the Soviet Union over the exten-
sions of the 1972 Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Weapons, which expires
October 1 this year.

The new SALT proposals put forward recently in Moscow by the United States
were in two categories: one category was a proposal that the 1974 Vladivostok Accord,

Ballistic Missile
Reentry Vehicles,
and Aircraft
Delivered Warheads

Warheads

HE'
o
tj

I



which limited both sides to 2400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, be reduced to treaty
form and signed. That proposal was rejected by the Russians.

The other set of United States proposals was a very far reaching call for substantial
reductions on both sides: strategic nuclear vehicles reduced from 2400 down to about
1900, limitations on flight testing of new missiles, a ban on cruise missiles having a
range in excess of 2500 km. and certain assurances with regard to deployment and
utilisation of the Russian Backfire bomber. All these proposals were designed an4
intended to preserve the invulnerability of the forces of both sides, and therefore to
work in the direction of technical military stability. That is to say, the technical charac-
teristics of the forces of both sides would not themselves, in a time of crisis, contribute
to tension because of tempting vulnerability.

I do not think the Soviets are interested in things like technical stability. I think
the Soviets look to their strategic nuclear forces for political effect. The Soviets continue
to be interested in the competitive political effects of having a huge and dynamic pro-
gramme - just as the communities of the middle ages expressed their aspirations, their
skills, their strength, through the erection of magnificent cathedrals. I myself doubt
that anything like the Carter proposals will be accepted by the Russians for a long time
- probably during the Carter Presidency. That poses certain risks to the world. But
then the Russian military build-up in Europe causes certain risks also.

What are those risks, and why worry about the Russian build-up in Europe? After
all, NATO does have the capability to respond adequately to a Warsaw Pact attack.
After all, the wars in the 19th and early part of the 20th century had what numerically
was the greatest military establishment in the world; there was not anything like the
worry that there is today over the Russian military build-up in Europe. Even the Soviets
- after the collapse of the Russian army in World War I - by 1928 had rebuilt
the Red Army so that again it was, numerically, the greatest military establish-
ment in the world. Yet, it was not a source of great concern. Why is it a source of
concern today?

There are three important geo-strategic differences between the situation then and
the situation now.

World War II eliminated the military strength of Russia's two strongest neighbours
and rivals - Germany and Japan. In the aftermath of World War II there was a
power vacuum on both sides of the old Russian Empire.

As a result of World War II, the Russian military advance into Eastern and Central
Europe gave to Russia for the first time in history a permanent military deployment
in the very heart of Central Europe.
Moreover, the Russian economy, particularly Soviet military industry, was placed
in intimate association with the sophisticated and advanced industrial and techno-
logical potential of Germany and Czechoslovakia. After several decades, that has
been extremely important to the Russians, particularly in the fields of naval ship
building, military electronics, and aircraft and missile design and construction.
During most of the time since World War II NATO - the West - has relied on

two advantages:
1. Nuclear superiority, and

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2. Technological superiority.
Thus, although NATO at present does have the capability to respond adequately

to a Warsaw Pack attack, the balance in the future may be less secure than it has been
in the past. The immediate questions facing NATO - the risks - are not the old easy
questions of numerical and qualitative comparisons of divisions, tanks, aircraft and the
like. Rather they are hard questions, risky questions:

Is NATO prepared to respond on extremely short notice?
Could NATO actually carry out a surge in readiness in a crisis?
How capable is NATO in making the transition from peace time to war time
command and communications systems?
How vulnerable are our theater nuclear forces?
Has NATO adequately thought through how her forces and her governments would
respond to possible Soviet probes on the northern or southern flanks of Europe?
Is NATO organized to carry out such responses?
The questions point to certain risks, but the real risk is that the competent NATO

authorities may not ask and answer those questions with sufficient rigour. The situation
may put at risk certain political positions, for example in Berlin. There has been in
recent months a continuous pressure once again on Berlin. Chancelier Schmidt has said
he would not repay a pin-brick with a pin-brick and that is a good attitude to have.
But the question is: how many pin-bricks does it take to change the Four Power Status
of Berlin? Western Europe, all of western Europe today, is characterized by weak
minority governments. There is in the East a strong civil rights movement. Since
Helsinki there has been a noticeable upsurge in so-called "Helsinki-Committees ", and
civil rights movements, all over eastern Europe, and not just in the Soviet Union. The
combination of weakness in the West and pressures for change in the East is a risky
combination.

Beyond Europe, the Soviets have developed a navy which has world-wide operating
capabilities. It has a base near the Indian Ocean and very substantial fleet operations
in the Indian Ocean on continuing basis. The Russians are quite active in Africa
at the present time. They have a strong interest in the Persian Gulf - I have
outlined that from the standpoint of the energy crisis. And there is a certain risk that
the Soviets may underestimate either the interests of the West, or the willingness of the
West to pursue and defend those interests, due to the lassitude which has been displayed
over the last years or so. I must say, however, that the French in providing some support
to Morocco and to Zaire are demonstrating a commendable sense of a strategy for
dealing with those risks outside of Europe. It is a hopeful sign.

Conclusion

What can one conclude about appropriate strategies for coping with the risks and security
problems with which states are faced today? One can read almost daily in the press
that the world's resources are distributed inequitably: that 30 % of the earth's popula-
tion consume 70 % of the earth's resources after having taken them away unfairly
from 70 % of the earth's population. What is left out of that accounting is the fact

24



that the industrious 30 % of the world, which consumes 70 % of the earth's resources,
live in a highly evolved culture which is so far the only culture that has demonstrated
a capability to efficiency and effectively transform raw resources into food, machinery,
fertilizer, and electricity. Without these, no part of the world can have any hope.
Without that high culture, and without that capability, the world would be confronted
with the risk of lurching into a disintegrative anticivilization that would be reminiscent
of the Dark Ages.

Of course, these issues are not new. The original walls of Jericho, which were
built ten thousand years ago, were built by farmers who had accumulated a surplus of
grain which was the object of lustful and aggrandizing attention from desert warriors
who did not have the capability of accumulating grain, and who wanted it for them-
selves. That is essentially what war has been about ever since: getting somebody else's
surplus, or defending your surplus against somebody who could not provide one for
himself.

Today we are faced with a whole range of very grave risks. We are going to have
to change, and more rapidly rather than slowly. We are faced not just with an oil and
economics crisis, not just a social and political crisis, not just a political-military crisis.
One can say that several hours are striking simultaneously on the clock of history. We
must face up to the great complex crisis. We must bring to bear the best of our rich
and powerful heritage: the best of our intelligence, the best of our imagination, the
best of our courage. But about all what is required is a sense and spirit of conviction.
It is not exactly stylish in a lecture on strategy to talk about a spirit of conviction,
but that is what is required: a conviction which manifests itself in a spirit of concern
and engagement. We must go beyond tactics, we must go beyond economics, we must
go beyond competition. We have to be clear about a system of values. We must be
unambiguous about what our values are: it is only by holding and living according to
a set of values that we can have strategies for coping with the trends in risk and security
with which we are confronted in the present hour.

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	Trends of Risk and Security Problems for States and Emerging Strategies for Coping with those Trends
	Introduction
	Oil pricing practices
	Global resource shortages
	The Russian military build-up
	Conclusion