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Kissinger and Brazil
Thiago Galvão Gehre

I
n Kissinger and Brazil Matias Spektor addresses 

an important episode in Brazil and the United 

States’ relations. He tells how Henry Kissinger 

became a focal point for Brazilian diplomacy in its 

quest for great power status. 

Spektor, one of the new generation of Brazilian 

historians of international relations, heads the 

Center for the Study of International Relations of 

the Getulio Vargas Foundation and is an expert on 

archival research. The book’s main thesis is that 

Brazil has worked its way into the international 

system, seeking recognition from other countries 

for its own national goals. With the U.S., Brazil 

sought to avoid either submission or rivalr y, 

establish itself as one of the building blocks of 

global order, and not follow without serious 

thought the precepts of the Northern giant.

The book describes the evolution of the 

rapprochement during the 1970s between U.S. 

and Brazil under the skillful diplomatic command 

of Henry Kissinger and Antonio Francisco Azeredo 

da Silveira, the Brazilian foreign minister. Spektor 

covers Kissinger’s experiment in bringing Brazil 

to the center of U.S. foreign policy; the efforts of 

Matias Spektor, 
Kissinger e o Brasil

(Rio de Janeiro: 
Jorge Zahar Ed, 
2009). 234p.

Thiago Galvão Gehre is professor of the history of international 

relations in the Department of International Relations at the 

Federal University of Roraima – UFRR. He holds a Ph.D. in 

international relations from the University of Brasilia  – UnB. 

thiago.gehre@gmail.com. 



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Kissinger and da Silveira to build up a partnership; 

the estrangement with President Jimmy Carter; 

and the dismantling of the partnership by Ronald 

Reagan in the 1980s.

Kissinger’s experiment was an effort to modify 

the static landscape of Brazil-US relations. A 

controlling concept was “delegation” — the 

transfer of responsibilities to major regional 

players. Spek tor explains that, in seeking to 

make U. S. foreign p olic y conceptually and 

philosophically more consistent, Kissinger opened 

the way for countries like Brazil, China, Indonesia, 

and South Africa to carry more weight in their 

relations with the U.S. The aim was to rid the U.S. 

of the stigma of imperialism and create a sense 

of partnership to legitimize U.S. actions around 

the globe.

The partnership started with the visit of Brazilian 

President Ernesto Geisel to the U.S. capital on 

December 7, 1971. Preparation for the trip was 

turbulent. There was unresolved tension between 

activism and withdrawal in Brazil’s foreign policy 

because of a rift between the president and the 

Foreign Ministry. There was also a divergence 

between how Brazil and the U.S. conceived of the 

partnership. Spektor points out that “from the 

American point of view, approaching Brazil would 

be consciously elusive” (p. 50). In any event, after the 

first step, both countries benefitted from improved 

relations based more on the personal relations 

of policy makers than on any formal institutional 

framework.

President Geisel and da Silveira developed a 

new strategic model that advocated searching 

for new partnerships and revising relations with 

Argentina and the U.S. Da Silveira’s foreign affairs 

management is regarded as highly activist; during 

his term “the international ambitions of Brazil grew 

more than [in] any previous period” (p. 63).

Da Silveira searched for “small spaces of 

‘autonomy’ on the margins of the liberal west” 

to support Brazil’s national development project. 

He tried to conceptually advance foreign policy 

to address Brazil’s economic growth and growing 

international influence. Spektor points out that 

the problem was not in the international system: 

“at home Brazil’s strategic concepts had become 

archaic” (p. 75).

The book celebrates the compatibility between 

da Silveira and Kissinger and their efforts to build 

a more constructive engagement between their 

countries, a “special non-aligned relationship.” The 

world in 1970 was witnessing the rise of peripheral 

powers and the crisis of traditional powers that 

according to Spektor would move “the tectonic 

plates of international politics” ( p. 90 ) . The 

bilateral agenda covered trade issues, the global 

energy crisis, nuclear proliferation, activity in post-

independence Africa, and the Cuban presence in 

South America. Brazil struggled against distrust, 

anxiety, and a lack of willingness in the U.S. to 

recognize it as a great power. But the U.S. kept 

the dialogue open even as it contained Brazil’s 

ambitions. 

The intensit y of the Brazil-US par tnership 

contrasts with the brevity of the dialogue between 

Kissinger and da Silveira. The partnership moved 

ahead amid the 1970s energy crisis, President 

Geisel’s decision to support the Arabs against 

Israel, and the involvement of Brazil in Angola’s 

independence movement. These three events 

tested the resilience of the American relationship 

with Brazil at a point where the partnership could 

well be formalized. Consequently, Brazil did not 

choose sides in the oil issue, assuming a pragmatic 

detachment; with regard to Israel, Brazil first chose 

The book’s main thesis is that 

Brazil has worked its way into 

the international system, seeking 

recognition from other countries 

for its own national goals.



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to abstain and then condemned the vote on the 

UN resolution that declared Zionism to be a form 

of racism. And it flinched when the cultural ties that 

justified a Brazilian presence in Angola clashed with 

the U.S. grand strategy to combat communism.

Da Silveira took advantage of small crises 

to catalyze a more consistent foreign policy. 

Spektor tells of Kissinger’s second trip to Brazil 

and its implications for Brazil-U.S. relations. The 

Brazilian challenge was to bring about a flexible 

partnership that would promote understanding 

between the two countries but that would not tie 

Brazil to joint commitments and would guarantee 

President Geisel control over the process of 

political opening in Brazil. The Memorandum 

of Understanding between the two countries 

was ingeniously “simple and vague,” allowing 

“maximum freedom of maneuver for each side” 

(p. 140). The resilience of the partnership would 

later be tested by a diplomatic imbroglio over the 

independence of East Timor, an alleged Brazilian 

plan to invade Guyana, and the tense relationship 

between the U.S. and Chile. In all these situations, 

the Memorandum guaranteed open channels to 

treat them in the light of common interests.

Progress was stymied by Brazilian fears of 

generating and later frustrating U.S. expectations, 

according to Spektor (p. 148); and the election 

of Jimmy Carter brought about an upheaval in 

U.S. and Brazil relations. The discomfort caused 

by systematic human rights abuses and the fear 

generated by the nuclear agreement between 

Brazil and Germany stirred up discussion. The 

Memorandum was the only defense available, a 

shield against Carter administration revisionism.

When Ronald Reagan came to power, Kissinger 

lef t the scene and da Silveira moved to the 

Brazilian Embassy in Washington. The Brazilian 

strategy then became a conscious distancing 

from Washington in view of the impossibility 

of dialogue and the neoliberal advance. Even 

so, Spek tor concludes, Brazil catapulted its 

position in the international hierarchy from an 

anti-communist agent to an international power, 

ensuring the country’s autonomy in the context of 

overwhelming asymmetry with Washington.

Matias Spektor writes in a clear and objective way 

that makes reading enjoyable even for those who 

are not specialists in international relations. He uses 

international relations theory parsimoniously — 

almost imperceptibly for the general reader. He has 

uncovered striking events deep within the records 

and has had access to unpublished national and 

foreign sources, contributing notably to research on 

the history of Brazil’s international relations. 

However, Spektor seems to give too much 

value to statesmen’s capacity to promote change 

in the world. He is of the view that “international 

politics is not predestined. With ideas and leaders 

willing to take risks, existing views may be adjusted 

or replaced with better ones”(p. 16). This raises 

questions: Did Kissinger make Brazil his laboratory 

for experiments with regional powers? Or was it 

da Silveira who discovered in Kissinger the cure 

for Brazil’s “invisible power” syndrome? In either 

case, the situation of Brazil and South America 

at the time must have certainly weighed on the 

decisions of policy makers. 

Kissinger opened the way for 

countries like Brazil, China, 

Indonesia, and South Africa 

to carry more weight in their 

relations with the U.S..

Progress [in Brazil-U.S. relations] 

was stymied by Brazilian fears of 

generating and later frustrating 

U.S. expectations.

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