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ID: 300511.0, MPI für Ökonomik / Strategic Interaction Group
Social identity and trust : An experimental investigation
Authors:Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria M.; Ploner, Matteo
Language:English
Place of Publication:Jena
Publisher:Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2006
Total Number of Pages:34
Title of Series:Papers on Strategic Interaction
Issue / Number:41-2006
Corporate Body (Series Editor):Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik
Copyright:2006
Review Status:Internal review
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving from the standard investment game (where no group identity is prompted) to minimal group identity to two-dimensional group identity, we find no significant differences in trust decisions. However, trust is significantly and positively correlated with contribution decisions, suggesting that "social" trust is behaviorally important.
Free Keywords:experiment; investment game; trust; group identity
Classification / Thesaurus:JEL classification: C72; C92
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Paper
Affiliations:MPI für Ökonomik/Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Identifiers:ISSN:1618-7547
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