[transcriber's note: obvious printer's errors have been corrected. hyphenation and accentuation have been standardised, all other inconsistencies are as in the original. the author's spelling has been maintained. {} are used to inclose superscript.] [illustration: _fighting by sea and sky._ _painting by john e. whiting._] aircraft and submarines the story of the invention, development, and present-day uses of war's newest weapons by willis j. abbot author of "the story of our army," "the story of our navy," "the nations at war" _with eight color plates and other illustrations_ g. p. putnam's sons new york and london the knickerbocker press copyright, by willis j. abbot the knickerbocker press, new york preface not since gunpowder was first employed in warfare has so revolutionary a contribution to the science of slaughtering men been made as by the perfection of aircraft and submarines. the former have had their first employment in this world-wide war of the nations. the latter, though in the experimental stage as far back as the american revolution, have in this bitter contest been for the first time brought to so practical a stage of development as to exert a really appreciable influence on the outcome of the struggle. comparatively few people appreciate how the thought of navigating the air's dizziest heights and the sea's gloomiest depths has obsessed the minds of inventors. from the earliest days of history men have grappled with the problem, yet it is only within two hundred years for aircraft and one hundred for submarines that any really intelligent start has been made upon its solution. the men who really gave practical effect to the vague theories which others set up--in aircraft the wrights, santos-dumont, and count zeppelin; in submarines lake and holland--are either still living, or have died so recently that their memory is still fresh in the minds of all. in this book the author has sketched swiftly the slow stages by which in each of these fields of activity success has been attained. he has collated from the immense mass of records of the activities of both submarines and aircraft enough interesting data to show the degree of perfection and practicability to which both have been brought. and he has outlined so far as possible from existing conditions the possibilities of future usefulness in fields other than those of war of these new devices. the most serious difficulty encountered in dealing with the present state and future development of aircraft is the rapidity with which that development proceeds. before a congressional committee last january an official testified that grave delay in the manufacture of airplanes for the army had been caused by the fact that types adopted a scant three months before had become obsolete, because of experience on the european battlefields, and later inventions before the first machines could be completed. there may be exaggeration in the statement but it is largely true. neither the machines nor the tactics employed at the beginning of the war were in use in its fourth year. the course of this evolution, with its reasons, are described in this volume. opportunities for the peaceful use of airplanes are beginning to suggest themselves daily. after the main body of this book was in type the postmaster-general of the united states called for bids for an aërial mail service between new york and washington--an act urged upon the government in this volume. that service contemplates a swift carriage of first-class mail at an enhanced price--the tentative schedule being three hours, and a postage fee of twenty-five cents an ounce. there can be no doubt of the success of the service, its value to the public, and its possibilities of revenue to the post-office. once its usefulness is established it will be extended to routes of similar length, such as new york and boston, new york and buffalo, or new york and pittsburgh. the mind suggests no limit to the extension of aërial service, both postal and passenger, in the years of industrial activity that shall follow the war. in the preparation of this book the author has made use of many records of personal experiences of those who have dared the air's high altitudes and the sea's stilly depths. for permission to use certain of these he wishes to express his thanks to the century co., for extracts from _my airships_ by santos-dumont; to doubleday, page & co., for extracts from _flying for france_, by james r. mcconnell; to charles scribner's sons, for material drawn from _with the french flying corps_, by carroll dana winslow; to _collier's weekly_, for certain extracts from interviews with wilbur wright; to _mcclure's magazine_, for the account of mr. ray stannard baker's trip in a lake submarine; to hearst's international library, and to the _scientific american_, for the use of several illustrations. w. j. a. new york, . contents page preface iii chapter i.--introductory ii.--the earliest flying men iii.--the services of santos-dumont iv.--the count von zeppelin v.--the development of the airplane vi.--the training of the aviator vii.--some methods of the war in the air viii.--incidents of the war in the air ix.--the united states at war x.--some features of aërial warfare xi.--beginnings of submarine invention xii.--the coming of steam and electricity xiii.--john p. holland and simon lake xiv.--the modern submarine xv.--aboard a submarine xvi.--submarine warfare xvii.--the future of the submarine index illustrations page fighting by sea and sky _frontispiece_ painting by john e. whiting dropping a depth bomb painting by lieut. farré a battle in mid-air painting by lieut. farré victory in the clouds painting by john e. whiting the fall of the boche painting by lieut. farré lana's vacuum balloon montgolfier's experimental balloon a rescue at sea painting by lieut. farré montgolfier's passenger balloon charles's balloon a french observation balloon on fire roberts brothers' dirigible giffard's dirigible a british kite balloon british "blimp" photographed from above. a kite balloon rising from the hold of a ship the giant and the pigmies painting by john e. whiting a french "sausage" photo by press illustrating co. a british "blimp" the death of a zeppelin photo by paul thompson a german dirigible, hansa type a wrecked zeppelin at salonika photo by press illustrating co. british aviators about to ascend langley's airplane a french airdrome near the front lilienthal's glider a german war zeppelin french observation balloon seeking submarines photo by press illustrating co. chanute's glider a german taube pursued by british planes the first wright glider pilcher's glider comparative strength of belligerents in airplanes at the opening of the war comparative strength of belligerents in dirigibles at the opening of the war the wright glider at a french airplane base international film service stringfellow's airplane the "america"--built to cross the atlantic a wright airplane in flight first americans to fly in france the lafayette escadrille distinguishing marks of american planes what an aviator must watch a caproni triplane a caproni triplane showing propellers and fuselage the terror that flieth by night painting by wm. j. wilson a curtis seaplane leaving a battleship photo by press illustrating co. launching a hydroaëroplane at a united states training camp a "blimp" with gun mounted on top aviators descending in parachutes from a balloon struck by incendiary shells the balloon from which the aviators fled german air raiders over england one aviator's narrow escape downed in the enemy's country position of gunner in early french machine later type of french scout photo by kadel & herbert a french scout airplane photo by press illustrating co. "showing off." a nieuport performing aërial acrobatics around a heavier bombing machine an air raid on a troop train painting by john e. whiting a burning balloon, photographed from a parachute by the escaping balloonist a caproni biplane circling the woolworth building cruising at feet. one biplane photographed from another an air battle in progress a curtis hydroaroplane the u. s. aviation school at mineola miss ruth law at close of her chicago to new york flight a french aviator between flights a german "gotha"--their favorite type a french monoplane a german scout brought to earth in france a gas attack photographed from an airplane a french nieuport dropping a bomb a bomb-dropping taube a captured german fokker exhibited at the invalides a british seaplane with folding wings british anti-aircraft guns an anti-aircraft outpost a coast defense anti-aircraft gun the submarine's perfect work painting by john e. whiting types of american aircraft for anti-aircraft service the latest french aircraft guns modern german airplane types a german submarine mine-layer captured by the british the exterior of first german submarine the interior of first german submarine, showing appliances for man-power a torpedo designed by fulton the method of attack by nautilus the capture of a u-boat painting by john e. whiting a british submarine sectional view of the nautilus u. s. submarine h- aground on california coast salvaging h- . views i, ii, and iii u. s. submarine d- off weehawken a submarine built for spain in the cape cod canal a critical moment painting by john e. whiting a submarine built for chili passing through cape cod canal a submarine entrapped by nets diagram of a german submarine mine-layer captured by british a submarine discharging a torpedo a german submarine in three positions sectional view of a british submarine the conquest of the air chapter i introductory it was at mons in the third week of the great war. the grey-green german hordes had overwhelmed the greater part of belgium and were sweeping down into france whose people and military establishment were all unprepared for attack from that quarter. for days the little british army of perhaps , men, that forlorn hope which the germans scornfully called "contemptible," but which man for man probably numbered more veteran fighters than any similar unit on either side, had been stoutly holding back the enemy's right wing and fighting for the delay that alone could save paris. at mons they had halted, hoping that here was the spot to administer to von kluck, beating upon their front, the final check. the hope was futile. looking back upon the day with knowledge of what general french's army faced--a knowledge largely denied to him--it seems that the british escape from annihilation was miraculous. and indeed it was due to a modern miracle--the conquest of the air by man in the development of the airplane. general french was outnumbered and in danger of being flanked on his left flank. his right he thought safe, for it was in contact with the french line which extended eastward along the bank of the somme to where the dark fortress of namur frowned on the steeps formed by the junction of that river with the meuse. at that point the french line bent to the south following the course of the latter river. namur was expected to hold out for weeks. its defence lasted but three days! as a matter of fact it did not delay the oncoming germans a day, for they invested it and drove past in their fierce assault upon joffre's lines. enormously outnumbered, the french were broken and forced to retreat. they left general french's right flank in the air, exposed to envelopment by von kluck who was already reaching around the left flank. the german troops were ample in number to surround the british, cut them off from all support, and crush or capture them all. this indeed they were preparing to do while general french, owing to some mischance never yet explained, was holding his ground utterly without knowledge that his allies had already retired leaving his flank without protection. [illustration: photo by peter a. juley. _dropping a depth bomb._ _from the painting by lieutenant farré._] when that fatal information arrived belatedly at the british headquarters it seemed like a death warrant. the right of the line had already been exposed for more than half-a-day. it was inexplicable that it had not already been attacked. it was unbelievable that the attack would not fall the next moment. but how would it be delivered and where, and what force would the enemy bring to it? was von kluck lulling the british into a false sense of security by leaving the exposed flank unmenaced while he gained their rear and cut off their retreat? questions such as these demanded immediate answer. ten years before the most dashing scouts would have clattered off to the front and would have required a day, perhaps more, to complete the necessary reconnaissance. but though of all nations, except of course the utterly negligent united states, great britain had least developed her aviation corps, there were attached to general french's headquarters enough airmen to meet this need. in a few minutes after the disquieting news arrived the beat of the propellers rose above the din of the battlefield and the airplanes appeared above the enemy's lines. an hour or two sufficed to gather the necessary facts, the fliers returned to headquarters, and immediately the retreat was begun. it was a beaten army that plodded back to the line of the marne. its retreat at times narrowly approached a rout. but the army was not crushed, annihilated. it remained a coherent, serviceable part of the allied line in the successful action speedily fought along the marne. but had it not been for the presence of the airmen the british expeditionary force would have been wiped out then and there. the battle of mons gave the soldiers a legend which still persists--that of the ghostly english bowmen of the time of edward the black prince who came back from their graves to save that field for england and for france. thousands of simple souls believe that legend to-day. but it is no whit more unbelievable than the story of an army saved by a handful of men flying thousands of feet above the field would have been had it been told of a battle in our civil war. the world has believed in ghosts for centuries and the archers of mons are the legitimate successors of the great twin brethren at the battle of lake regillus. but cæsar, napoleon, perhaps the elder von moltke himself would have scoffed at the idea that men could turn themselves into birds to spy out the enemy's dispositions and save a sorely menaced army. when this war has passed into history it will be recognized that its greatest contributions to military science have been the development and the use of aircraft and submarines. there have, of course, been other features in the method of waging war which have been novel either in themselves, or in the gigantic scale upon which they have been employed. there is, for example, nothing new about trench warfare. the american who desires to satisfy himself about that need only to visit the military park at vicksburg, or the country about petersburg or richmond, to recognize that even fifty years ago our soldiers understood the art of sheltering themselves from bullet and shrapnel in the bosom of mother earth. the trench warfare in flanders, the argonne, and around verdun has been novel only in the degree to which it has been developed and perfected. concrete-lined trenches, with spacious and well-furnished bomb-proofs, with phonographs, printing presses, and occasional dramatic performances for lightening the soldiers' lot present an impressive elaboration of the muddy ditches of virginia and mississippi. yet after all the boys of grant and lee had the essentials of trench warfare well in mind half a century before germany, france, and england came to grips on the long line from the north sea to the vosges. asphyxiating gas, whether liberated from a shell, or released along a trench front to roll slowly down before a wind upon its defenders, was a novelty of this war. but in some degree it was merely a development of the "stinkpot" which the chinese have employed for years. so too the tear-bomb, or lachrymatory bomb, which painfully irritated the eyes of all in its neighbourhood when it burst, filling them with tears and making the soldiers practically helpless in the presence of a swift attack. these two weapons of offence, and particularly the first, because of the frightful and long-continuing agony it inflicts upon its victims, fascinated the observer, and awakened the bitter protests of those who held that an issue at war might be determined by civilized nations without recourse to engines of death and anguish more barbaric than any known to the red indians, or the most savage tribes of asia. neither of these devices, nor for that matter the cognate one of fire spurted like a liquid from a hose upon a shrinking enemy, can be shown to have had any appreciable effect upon the fortunes of any great battle. each, as soon as employed by any one belligerent, was quickly seized by the adversary, and the respiratory mask followed fast upon the appearance of the chlorine gas. whatever the outcome of the gigantic conflict may be, no one will claim that any of these devices had contributed greatly to the result. but the airplane revolutionized warfare on land. the submarine has made an almost equal revolution in naval warfare. had the airplane been known in the days of our civil war some of its most picturesque figures would have never risen to eminence or at least would have had to win their places in history by efforts of an entirely different sort. there is no place left in modern military tactics for the dashing cavalry scout of the type of sheridan, custer, fitz lee, or forrest. the airplane, soaring high above the lines of the enemy, brings back to headquarters in a few hours information that in the old times took a detachment of cavalry days to gather. the "screen of cavalry" that in bygone campaigns commanders used to mask their movements no longer screens nor masks. a general moves with perfect knowledge that his enemy's aircraft will report to their headquarters his roads, his strength, and his probable destination as soon as his vanguard is off. during the federal advance upon richmond, stonewall jackson, most brilliant of the generals of that war, repeatedly slipped away from the federal front, away from the spot where the federal commanders confidently supposed him to be, and was found days later in the valley of the shenandoah, threatening washington or menacing the union rear and its communications. the war was definitely prolonged by this confederate dash and elusiveness--none of which would have been possible had the union forces possessed an aviation corps. [illustration: _a battle in mid-air._ (_note rifleman on wing of airplane._) _from the painting by lieutenant farré._ photo by peter a. juley.] it is yet to be shown conclusively that as offensive engines aircraft have any great value. the tendency of the military authorities of every side to minimize the damage they have suffered makes any positive conclusion on this subject difficult and dangerous at this moment. the airplane by day or the zeppelin by night appears swiftly and mysteriously, drops its bombs from a height of several thousand feet, and takes its certain flight through the boundless sky to safety. the aggressor cannot tell whether his bombs have found a fitting target. he reports flaming buildings left behind him, but whether they are munition factories, theatres, or primary schools filled with little children he cannot tell. nor does he know how quickly the flames were extinguished, or the amount of damage done. the british boast of successful air raids upon cuxhaven, zeebrugge, essen, and friedrichshaven. but if we take german official reports we must be convinced that the damage done was negligible in its relation to the progress of the war. in their turn the germans brag mightily of the deeds of their zeppelins over london, and smaller british towns. but the sum and substance of their accomplishment, according to the british reports, has been the slaughter and mutilation of a number of civilians--mostly women and children--and the bloody destruction of many humble working-class homes. at this writing, december, , it is not recorded that any battleship, munition factory, any headquarters, great government building, or fortress has been destroyed or seriously injured by the activities of aircraft of either type. this lack of precise information may be due to the censor rather than to any lack of great deeds on the part of airmen. we do know of successful attacks on submarines, though the military authorities are chary about giving out the facts. but as scouts, messengers, and guides for hidden batteries attacking unseen targets, aviators have compelled the rewriting of the rules of military strategy. about this time, however, it became apparent that the belligerents intended to develop the battleplanes. particularly was this true of the allies. the great measure of success won by the german submarines and the apparent impossibility of coping adequately with those weapons of death once they had reached the open sea, led the british and the americans to consider the possibility of destroying them in their bases and destroying the bases as well. but kiel and wilhelmshaven were too heavily defended to make an attack by sea seem at all practicable. the lesser ports of zeebrugge and ostend had been successfully raided from the air and made practically useless as submarine bases. discussion therefore was strong of making like raids with heavier machines carrying heavier guns and dropping more destructive bombs upon the two chief lurking places of the submarines. while no conclusion had been reached as to this strategy at the time of the publication of this book, both nations were busy building larger aircraft probably for use in such an attack. * * * * * the submarine has exerted upon the progress of the war an influence even more dominant than that of aircraft. it has been a positive force both offensive and defensive. it has been germany's only potent weapon for bringing home to the british the privations and want which war entails upon a civilian population, and at the same time guarding the german people from the fullest result of the british blockade. it is no overstatement to declare that but for the german submarines the war would have ended in the victory of the allies in . we may hark back to our own civil war for an illustration of the crushing power of a superior navy not qualified by any serviceable weapon in the hands of the weaker power. historians have very generally failed to ascribe to the federal blockade of confederate ports its proportionate influence on the outcome of that war. the confederates had no navy. their few naval vessels were mere commerce destroyers, fleeing the ships of the united states navy and preying upon unarmed merchantmen. with what was rapidly developed into the most powerful navy the world had ever seen, the united states government from the very beginning of the war locked the confederate states in a wall of iron. none might pass going in or out, except by stealth and at the peril of property and life. outside the harbour of every seaport in the control of the confederates the blockading men-of-war lurked awaiting the blockade runners. their vigilance was often eluded, of course, yet nevertheless the number of cargoes that slipped through was painfully inadequate to meet the needs of the fenced-in states. clothing, medicines, articles of necessary household use were denied to civilians. cannon, rifles, saltpetre, and other munitions of war were withheld from the confederate armies. while the ports of the north were bustling with foreign trade, grass grew on the cobble-stoned streets along the waterfronts of charleston and savannah. slow starvation aided the constant pounding of the northern armies in reducing the south to subjection. had the confederacy possessed but a few submarines of modern type this situation could not have persisted. then, as to-day, neutral nations were eager to trade with both belligerents. there were then more neutrals whose interests would have compelled the observance of the laws of blockade, which in the present war are flagrantly violated by all belligerents with impunity. a submarine raid which would have sunk or driven away the blockading fleet at the entrance to a single harbour would have resulted in opening that harbour to the unrestricted uses of neutral ships until the blockade could be re-established and formal notice given to all powers--a formality which in those days, prior to the existence of cables, would have entailed weeks, perhaps months, of delay. how serious such an interruption to the blockade was then considered was shown by the trepidation of the union naval authorities over the first victories of the _merrimac_ prior to the providential arrival of the _monitor_ in hampton roads. it was then thought that the confederate ram would go straight to wilmington, charleston, and savannah, destroy or drive away the blockaders, and open the confederacy to the trade of the world. even then men dreamed of submarines, as indeed they have since the days of the american revolution. of the slow development of that engine of war to its present effectiveness we shall speak more fully in later chapters. enough now to say that had the confederacy possessed boats of the u- type the story of our civil war might have had a different ending. the device which the allies have adopted to-day of blockading a port or ports by posting their ships several hundred miles away would have found no toleration among neutrals none too friendly to the united states, and vastly stronger in proportion to the power of this nation than all the neutrals to-day are to the strength of the allies. [illustration: _victory in the clouds._ _painting by john e. whiting._] from the beginning of the great war in europe the fleets of the teutonic alliance were locked up in port by the superior floating forces of the entente. such sporadic dashes into the arena of conflict as the one made by the german high fleet, bringing on the battle of jutland, had but little bearing on the progress of the war. but the steady, persistent malignant activity of the german submarines had everything to do with it. they mitigated the rigidity of the british blockade by keeping the blockaders far from the ports they sought to seal. they preyed on the british fleets by sinking dreadnoughts, battleships, and cruisers in nearly all of the belligerent seas. if the british navy justified its costly power by keeping the german fleet practically imprisoned in its fortified harbours, the german submarines no less won credit and glory by keeping even that overwhelming naval force restricted in its movements, ever on guard, ever in a certain sense on the defensive. and meanwhile these underwater craft so preyed upon british foodships that in the days of the greatest submarine activity england was reduced to husbanding her stores of food with almost as great thrift and by precisely the same methods as did germany suffering from the british blockade. aircraft and submarines! twin terrors of the world's greatest war! the development, though by no means the final development, of dreams that men of many nations have dreamed throughout the centuries! they are two of the outstanding features of the war; two of its legacies to mankind. how much the legacy may be worth in peaceful times is yet to be determined. the airplane and the dirigible at any rate seem already to promise useful service to peaceful man. already the flier is almost as common a spectacle in certain sections of our country as the automobile was fifteen years ago. the submarine, for economic reasons, promises less for the future in the way of peaceful service, notwithstanding the exploits of the _deutschland_ in the ocean-carrying trade. but perhaps it too will find its place in industry when awakened man shall be willing to spend as much treasure, as much genius, as much intelligent effort, and as much heroic self-sacrifice in organizing for the social good as in the last four years he has expended in its destruction. chapter ii the earliest flying men the conquest of the air has been the dream of mankind for uncounted centuries. as far back as we have historic records we find stories of the attempts of men to fly. the earliest greek mythology is full of aeronautical legends, and the disaster which befell icarus and his wings of wax when exposed to the glare of the midsummer sun in greece, is part of the schoolboy's task in ovid. we find like traditions in the legendary lore of the peruvians, the east indians, the babylonians, even the savage races of darkest africa. in the hebrew scriptures the chief badge of sanctity conferred on god's angels was wings, and the ability to fly. if we come down to the mythology of more recent times we find our pious ancestors in new england thoroughly convinced that the witches they flogged and hanged were perfectly able to navigate the air on a broomstick--thus antedating the wrights' experiments with heavier-than-air machines by more than years. it is an interesting fact, stimulating to philosophical reflection, that in the last decade more has been done toward the conquest of the air, than in the twenty centuries preceding it, though during all that period men had been dreaming, planning, and experimenting upon contrivances for flight. moreover when success came--or such measure of success as has been won--it came by the application of an entirely novel principle hardly dreamed of before the nineteenth century. some of the earlier efforts to master gravity and navigate the air are worthy of brief mention if only to show how persistent were the efforts from the earliest historic ages to accomplish this end. passing over the legends of the time of mythology we find that many-sided genius, leonardo da vinci, early in the sixteenth century, not content with being a painter, architect, sculptor, engineer and designer of forts, offering drawings and specifications of wings which, fitted to men, he thought would enable them to fly. the sketches are still preserved in a museum at paris. he modelled his wings on those of a bat and worked them with ropes passing over pulleys, the aviator lying prone, face downward, and kicking with both arms and legs with the vigour of a frog. there is, unhappily, no record that the proposition ever advanced beyond the literary stage--certainly none that da vinci himself thus risked his life. history records no one who kicked his way aloft with the da vinci device. but the manuscript which the projector left shows that he recognized the modern aviator's maxim, "there's safety in altitude." he says, in somewhat confused diction: the bird should with the aid of the wind raise itself to a great height, and this will be its safety; because although the revolutions mentioned may happen there is time for it to recover its equilibrium, provided its various parts are capable of strong resistance so that they may safely withstand the fury and impetus of the descent. [illustration: _the fall of the boche._ _from the painting by lieutenant farré._ photo by peter a. juley.] the fallacy that a man could, by the rapid flapping of wings of any sort, overcome the force of gravity persisted up to a very recent day, despite the complete mathematical demonstration by von helmholtz in that man could not possibly by his own muscular exertions raise his own weight into the air and keep it suspended. time after time the "flapping wings" were resorted to by ambitious aviators with results akin to those attained by darius green. one of the earliest was a french locksmith named besnier, who had four collapsible planes on two rods balanced across his shoulders. these he vigorously moved up and down with his hands and feet, the planes opening like covers of a book as they came down, and closing as they came up. besnier made no attempt to raise himself from the ground, but believed that once launched in the air from an elevation he could maintain himself, and glide gradually to earth at a considerable distance. it is said that he and one or two of his students did in a way accomplish this. others, however, experimenting with the same method came to sorry disaster. among these was an italian friar whom king james iv. of scotland had made prior of tongland. equipped with a pair of large feather wings operated on the besnier principle, he launched himself from the battlements of stirling castle in the presence of king james and his court. but gravity was too much for his apparatus, and turning over and over in mid-air he finally landed ingloriously on a manure heap--at that period of nascent culture a very common feature of the pleasure grounds of a palace. he had a soul above his fate however, for he ascribed his fall not to vulgar mechanical causes, but wholly to the fact that he had overlooked the proper dignity of flight by pluming his wings with the feathers of common barn-yard fowl instead of with plumes plucked from the wings of eagles! in sharp competition with the aspiring souls who sought to fly with wings--the forerunners of the airplane devotees of to-day--were those who tried to find some direct lifting device for a car which should contain the aviators. some of their ideas were curiously logical and at the same time comic. there was, for example, a priest, le père galien of avignon. he observed that the rarified air at the summit of the alps was vastly lighter than that in the valleys below. what then was to hinder carrying up empty sacks of cotton or oiled silk to the mountain tops, opening them to the lighter air of the upper ranges, and sealing them hermetically when filled by it. when brought down into the valleys they would have lifting power enough to carry tons up to the summits again. the good father's education in physics was not sufficiently advanced to warn him that the effort to drag the balloons down into the valley would exact precisely the force they would exert in lifting any load out of the valley--if indeed they possessed any lifting power whatsoever, which is exceedingly doubtful. another project, which sounded logical enough, was based on the irrefutable truth that as air has some weight--to be exact . pounds for a column one inch square and the height of the earth's atmosphere--a vacuum must be lighter, as it contains nothing, not even air. accordingly in the seventeenth century, one francisco lana, another priest, proposed to build an airship supported by four globes of copper, very thin and light, from which all the air had been pumped. the globes were to be twenty feet in diameter, and were estimated to have a lifting force of pounds. the weight of the copper shells was put at pounds, leaving a margin of possible weight for the car and its contents of pounds. it seemed at first glance a perfectly reasonable and logical plan. unhappily one factor in the problem had been ignored. the atmospheric pressure on each of the globes would be about tons. something more than a thin copper shell would be needed to resist this crushing force and an adequate increase in the strength of the shells would so enhance their weight as to destroy their lifting power. [illustration: lana's vacuum balloon.] to tell at length the stories of attempt and failure of the earliest dabblers in aeronautics would be unprofitable and uninteresting. not until the eighteenth century did the experimenters with lighter-than-air devices show any practical results. not until the twentieth century did the advocates of the heavier-than-air machines show the value of their fundamental idea. the former had to discover a gaseous substance actually lighter, and much lighter, than the surrounding atmosphere before they could make headway. the latter were compelled to abandon wholly the effort to imitate the flapping of a bird's wings, and study rather the method by which the bird adjusts the surface of its wings to the wind and soars without apparent effort, before they could show the world any promising results. nearly every step forward in applied science is accomplished because of the observation by some thoughtful mind of some common phenomenon of nature, and the later application of those observations to some useful purpose. it seems a far cry from an ancient greek philosopher reposing peacefully in his bath to a modern zeppelin, but the connection is direct. every schoolboy knows the story of the sudden dash of archimedes, stark and dripping from his tub, with the triumphant cry of "eureka!"--"i have found it!" what he had found was the rule which governed the partial flotation of his body in water. most of us observe it, but the philosophical mind alone inquired "why?" archimedes' answer was this rule which has become a fundamental of physics: "a body plunged into a fluid is subjected by this fluid to a pressure from below to above equal to the weight of the fluid displaced by the body." a balloon is plunged in the air--a fluid. if it is filled with air there is no upward pressure from below, but if it is filled with a gas lighter than air there is a pressure upward equal to the difference between the weight of that gas and that of an equal quantity of air. upon that fact rests the whole theory and practice of ballooning. the illustration of james watt watching the steam rattle the cover of a teapot and from it getting the rudimentary idea of the steam engine is another case in point. sometimes however the application of the hints of nature to the needs of man is rather ludicrously indirect. charles lamb gravely averred that because an early chinaman discovered that the flesh of a pet pig, accidentally roasted in the destruction by fire of his owner's house, proved delicious to the palate, the chinese for years made a practice of burning down their houses to get roast pig with "crackling." early experimenters in aviation observed that birds flapped their wings and flew. accordingly they believed that man to fly must have wings and flap them likewise. not for hundreds of years did they observe that most birds flapped their wings only to get headway, or altitude, thereafter soaring to great heights and distances merely by adjusting the angle of their wings to the various currents of air they encountered. in a similar way the earliest experimenters with balloons observed that smoke always ascended. "let us fill a light envelope with smoke," said they, "and it will rise into the air bearing a burden with it." all of which was true enough, and some of the first balloonists cast upon their fires substances like sulphur and pitch in order to produce a thicker smoke, which they believed had greater lifting power than ordinary hot air. in the race for actual accomplishment the balloonists, the advocates of lighter-than-air machines, took the lead at first. it is customary and reasonable to discard as fanciful the various devices and theories put forward by the experimenters in the middle ages and fix the beginning of practical aeronautical devices with the invention of hot-air balloons by the montgolfiers, of paris, in . the montgolfier brothers, joseph and jacques, were paper-makers of paris. the family had long been famous for its development of the paper trade, and the many ingenious uses to which they put its staple. just as the tanners of the fabled town in the middle ages thought there was "nothing like leather" with which to build its walls and gates, thereby giving a useful phrase to literature, so the montgolfiers thought of everything in terms of paper. sitting by their big open fireplace one night, so runs the story, they noticed the smoke rushing up the chimney. "why not fill a big paper bag with smoke and make it lift objects into the air?" cried one. the experiment was tried next day with a small bag and proved a complete success. a neighbouring housewife looked in, and saw the bag bumping about the ceiling, but rapidly losing its buoyancy as the smoke escaped. [illustration: montgolfier's experimental balloon.] "why not fasten a pan below the mouth of the bag," said she, "and put your fire in that? its weight will keep the bag upright, and when it rises will carry the smoke and the pan up with it." acting upon the hint the brothers fixed up a small bag which sailed up into the air beyond recapture. after various experiments a bag of mixed paper and linen thirty-five feet in diameter was inflated and released. it soared to a height of six thousand feet, and drifted before the wind a mile or more before descending. the ascent took place at avonay, the home at the time of the montgolfiers, and as every sort of publicity was given in advance, a huge assemblage including many officials of high estate gathered to witness it. a roaring fire was built in a pit over the mouth of which eight men held the great sack, which rolled, and beat about before the wind as it filled and took the form of a huge ball. the crowd was unbelieving and cynical, inclined to scoff at the idea that mere smoke would carry so huge a construction up into the sky. but when the signal was given to cast off, the balloon rose with a swiftness and majesty that at first struck the crowd dumb, then moved it to cheers of amazement and admiration. it went up six thousand feet and the montgolfiers were at once elevated to almost an equal height of fame. the crowd which watched the experiment was wild with enthusiasm; the montgolfiers elated with the first considerable victory over the force of gravity. they had demonstrated a principle and made their names immortal. what remained was to develop that principle and apply it to practical ends. that development, however, proceeded for something more than a century before anything like a practical airship was constructed. but for the moment the attack on the forces which had kept the air virgin territory to man was not allowed to lag. in paris public subscriptions were opened to defray the cost of a new and greater balloon. by this time it was known that hydrogen gas, or "inflammable air" as it was then called, was lighter than air. but its manufacture was then expensive and public aid was needed for the new experiment which would call at the outset for a thousand pounds of iron filings and pounds of sulphuric acid wherewith to manufacture the gas. the first experiment had been made in the provinces. this one was set for paris, and in an era when the french capital was intellectually more alert, more eager for novelty, more interested in the advancement of physical science and in new inventions than ever in its long history of hospitality to the new idea. they began to fill the bag august , in the _place des victoires_, but the populace so thronged that square that two days later it was moved half filled to paris's most historic point, the _champ de mars_. the transfer was made at midnight through the narrow dark streets of mediæval paris. eyewitnesses have left descriptions of the scene. torch-bearers lighted on its way the cortège the central feature of which was the great bag, half filled with gas, flabby, shapeless, monstrous, mysterious, borne along by men clutching at its formless bulk. the state had recognized the importance of the new device and cuirassiers in glittering breastplates on horseback, and halbardiers in buff leather on foot guarded it in its transit through the sleeping city. but paris was not all asleep. an escort of the sensation-loving rabble kept pace with the guards. the cries of the quarters rose above the tramp of the armed men. observers have recorded that the passing cab drivers were so affected by wonder that they clambered down from their boxes and with doffed hats knelt in the highway while the procession passed. the ascension, which occurred two days later, was another moving spectacle. in the centre of the great square which has seen so many historic pageants, rose the swaying, quivering balloon, now filled to its full capacity of twenty-two thousand feet. whether from the art instinct indigenous to the french, or some superstitious idea like that which impels the chinese to paint eyes on their junks, the balloon was lavishly decorated in water colours, with views of rising suns, whirling planets, and other solar bodies amongst which it was expected to mingle. ranks of soldiers kept the populace at a distance, while within the sacred precincts strolled the king and the ladies and cavaliers of his court treading all unconsciously on the brink of that red terror soon to engulf the monarchy. the gas in the reeling bag was no more inflammable than the air of paris in those days just before the revolution. with a salvo of cannon the guy-ropes were released and the balloon vanished in the clouds. benjamin franklin, at the moment representing in france the american colonies then struggling for liberty, witnessed this ascension! "of what use is a new-born child?" he remarked sententiously as the balloon vanished. 'twas a saying worthy of a cautious philosopher. had franklin been in paris in he would have found the child, grown to lusty manhood, a strong factor in the city's defence. it is worth noting by the way that so alert was the american mind at that period that when the news of the montgolfiers' achievement reached philadelphia it found david rittenhouse and other members of the philosophical society already experimenting with balloons. [illustration: _a rescue at sea._ _from the painting by lieutenant farré._ photo by peter a. juley.] a curious sequel attended the descent of the montgolfier craft which took place in a field fifteen miles from paris. long before the days of newspapers, the peasants had never heard of balloons, and this mysterious object, dropping from high heaven into their peaceful carrot patch affrighted them. some fled. others approached timidly, armed with the normal bucolic weapons--scythes and pitchforks. attacked with these the fainting monster, which many took for a dragon, responded with loud hisses and emitted a gas of unfamiliar but most pestiferous odour. it suggested brimstone, which to the devout in turn implied the presence of satan. with guns, flails, and all obtainable weapons they fell upon the emissary of the evil one, beat him to the ground, crushed out of him the vile-smelling breath of his nostrils, and finally hitched horses to him and dragged him about the fields until torn to tatters and shreds. when the public-spirited m. charles who had contributed largely to the cost of this experiment came in a day or two to seek his balloon he found nothing but some shreds of cloth, and some lively legends of the prowess of the peasants in demolishing the devil's own dragon. the government, far-sightedly, recognizing that there would be more balloons and useful ones, thereupon issued this proclamation for the discouragement of such bucolic valour: a discovery has been made which the government deems it wise to make known so that alarm may not be occasioned to the people. on calculating the different weights of inflammable and common air it has been found that a balloon filled with inflammable air will rise toward heaven until it is in equilibrium with the surrounding air; which may not happen till it has attained to a great height. anyone who should see such a globe, resembling the moon in an eclipse, should be aware that far from being an alarming phenomenon it is only a machine made of taffetas, or light canvas covered with paper, that cannot possibly cause any harm and which will some day prove serviceable to the wants of society. came now the next great step in the progress of aeronautics. it had been demonstrated that balloons could lift themselves. they had even been made to lift dumb animals and restore them to earth unhurt. but if the conquest of the air was to amount to anything, men must go aloft in these new machines. lives must be risked to demonstrate a theory, or to justify a calculation. aeronautics is no science for laboratory or library prosecution. its battles must be fought in the sky, and its devotees must be willing to offer their lives to the cause. in that respect the science of aviation has been different from almost any subject of inquiry that has ever engaged the restless intellect of man, unless perhaps submarine navigation, or the invention of explosives. it cannot be prosecuted except with a perfect willingness to risk life. no doubt this is one of the reasons why practical results seemed so long in the coming. nor have men been niggardly in this enforced sacrifice. though no records of assured accuracy are available, the names of forty-eight aeronauts who gave up their lives in the century following the montgolfiers' invention are recorded. that record ended in . how many have since perished, particularly on the battlefields of europe where aircraft are as commonplace as cannon, it is too early yet to estimate. [illustration: montgolfier's passenger balloon.] after the success of the ascension from the _champ de mars_, the demand at once arose for an ascension by a human being. it was a case of calling for volunteers. the experiments already made showed clearly enough that the balloon would rise high in air. who would risk his life soaring one thousand feet or more above the earth, in a flimsy bag, filled with hot air, or inflammable gas, without means of directing its course or bringing it with certainty and safety back to a landing place? it was a hard question, and it is interesting to note that it was answered not by a soldier or sailor, not by an adventurer, or devil-may-care spirit, but by a grave and learned professor of physical science, pilatre de rozier. presently he was joined in his enterprise by a young man of the fashionable world and sporting tastes, the marquis d'arlandes. aristocratic paris took up aviation in the last days of the eighteenth century, precisely as the american leisure class is taking it up in the first days of the twentieth. the balloon for this adventure was bigger than its predecessors and for the first time a departure was taken from the spherical variety--the gas bag being seventy-four feet high, and forty-eight feet in diameter. like the first montgolfier balloons it was to be inflated with hot air, and the car was well packed with bundles of fuel with which the two aeronauts were to fill the iron brazier when its fires went down. the instinct for art and decoration, so strong in the french mind, had been given full play by the constructors of this balloon and it was painted with something of the gorgeousness of a circus poster. a tremendous crowd packed the park near paris whence the ascent was made. always the spectacle of human lives in danger has a morbid attraction for curiosity seekers, and we have seen in our own days throngs attracted to aviation congresses quite as much in the expectation of witnessing some fatal disaster, as to observe the progress made in man's latest conquest over nature. but in this instance the occasion justified the widest interest. it was an historic moment--more epoch-making than those who gathered in that field in the environs of paris could have possibly imagined. for in the clumsy, gaudy bag, rolling and tossing above a smoky fire lay the fundamentals of those great airships that, perfected by the persistence of count zeppelin, have crossed angry seas, breasted fierce winds, defied alike the blackest nights and the thickest fogs to rain their messages of death on the capital of a foe. contemporary accounts of this first ascension are but few, and those that have survived have come down to us in but fragmentary form. it was thought needful for two to make the ascent, for the car, or basket, which held the fire hung below the open mouth of the bag, and the weight of a man on one side would disturb the perfect equilibrium which it was believed would be essential to a successful flight. the marquis d'arlandes in a published account of the brief flight, which sounds rather as if the two explorers of an unknown element were not free from nervousness, writes: "our departure was at fifty-four minutes past one, and occasioned little stir among the spectators. thinking they might be frightened and stand in need of encouragement i waved my arm." this solicitude for the fears of the spectators, standing safely on solid earth while the first aeronauts sailed skywards, is characteristically gallic. the marquis continues: m. de rozier cried: "you are doing nothing, and we are not rising." i stirred the fire and then began to scan the river, but pilatre again cried: "see the river. we are dropping into it!" we again urged the fire, but still clung to the river bed. presently i heard a noise in the upper part of the balloon, which gave a shock as though it had burst. i called to my companion: "are you dancing?" the balloon by this time had many holes burnt in it and using my sponge i cried that we must descend. my companion however explained that we were over paris and must now cross it; therefore raising the fire once more we turned south till we passed the luxembourg, when, extinguishing the flames, the balloon came down spent and empty. if poor pilatre played the part of a rather nervous man in this narrative he had the nerve still to go on with his aeronautical experiments to the point of death. in he essayed the crossing of the english channel in a balloon of his own design, in which he sought to combine the principles of the gas and hot-air balloons. it appears to have been something like an effort to combine nitro-glycerine with an electric spark. at any rate the dense crowds that thronged the coast near boulogne to see the start of the "charles--montgolfier"--as the balloon was named after the originators of the rival systems--saw it, after half an hour's drift out to sea, suddenly explode in a burst of flame. de rozier and a friend who accompanied him were killed. a monument still recalls their fate, which however is more picturesquely recorded in the signs of sundry inns and cafés of the neighbourhood which offer refreshment in the name of _les aviateurs perdus_. thereafter experimenters with balloons multiplied amazingly. the world thought the solution of the problem of flight had been found in the gas bag. within two months a balloon capable of lifting eighteen tons and carrying seven passengers ascended three thousand feet at lyons, and, though sustaining a huge rent in the envelope, because of the expansion of the gas at that height, returned to earth in safety. the fever ran from france to england and in , only a year after the first montgolfier experiments, lunardi, an italian aeronaut made an ascension from london which was viewed by king george iii. and his ministers, among them william pitt. but the early enthusiasm for ballooning quickly died down to mere curiosity. it became apparent to all that merely to rise into the air, there to be the helpless plaything of the wind, was but a useless and futile accomplishment. pleasure seekers and mountebanks used balloons for their own purposes, but serious experimenters at once saw that if the invention of the balloon was to be of the slightest practical value some method must be devised for controlling and directing its flight. to this end some of the brightest intellects of the world directed their efforts, but it is hardly overstating the case to say that more than a century passed without any considerable progress toward the development of a dirigible balloon. [illustration: charles's balloon.] but even at the earlier time it was evident enough that the quaker philosopher, from the american colonies, not yet the united states, whose shrewd and inquiring disposition made him intellectually one of the foremost figures of his day, foresaw clearly the great possibilities of this new invention. in letters to sir joseph banks, then president of the royal society of london, franklin gave a lively account of the first three ascensions, together with some comments, at once suggestive and humorous, which are worth quoting: some think [he wrote of the balloon] progressive motion on the earth may be advanc'd by it, and that a running footman or a horse slung and suspended under such a globe so as to have no more of weight pressing the earth with their feet than perhaps or pounds, might with a fair wind run in a straight line across countries as fast as that wind, and over hedges, ditches and even waters. it has been even fancied that in time people will keep such globes anchored in the air to which by pullies they may draw up game to be preserved in the cool and water to be frozen when ice is wanted. and that to get money it will be contriv'd, by running them up in an elbow chair a mile high for a guinea, etc., etc. with his new england lineage franklin could hardly have failed of this comparison: "a few months since the idea of witches riding through the air upon a broomstick, and that of philosophers upon a bag of smoke would have appeared equally impossible and ridiculous." to-day when aircraft are the eyes of the armies in the greatest war of history, and when it appears that, with the return of peace, the conquest of the air for the ordinary uses of man will be swiftly completed, franklin's good-humoured plea for the fullest experimentation is worth recalling. and the touch of piety with which he concludes his argument is a delightful example of the whimsical fashion in which he often undertook to bolster up a mundane theory with a reference to things supernatural. [illustration: _a french observation balloon on fire._ © u. & u.] i am sorry this experiment is totally neglected in england, where mechanic genius is so strong. i wish i could see the same emulation between the two nations as i see between the two parties here. your philosophy seems to be too bashful. in this country we are not so much afraid of being laught at. if we do a foolish thing, we are the first to laugh at it ourselves, and are almost as much pleased with a _bon mot_ or a _chanson_, that ridicules well the disappointment of a project, as we might have been with its success. it does not seem to me a good reason to decline prosecuting a new experiment which apparently increases the power of man over matter, till we can see to what use that power may be applied. when we have learnt to manage it, we may hope some time or other to find uses for it, as men have done for magnetism and electricity, of which the first experiments were mere matters of amusement. this experience is by no means a trifling one. it may be attended with important consequences that no one can foresee. we should not suffer pride to prevent our progress in science. beings of a rank and nature far superior to ours have not disdained to amuse themselves with making and launching balloons, otherwise we should never have enjoyed the light of those glorious objects that rule our day & night, nor have had the pleasure of riding round the sun ourselves upon the balloon we now inhabit. b. franklin. the earliest experimenters thought that oars might be employed to propel and direct a balloon. the immediate failure of all endeavours of this sort, led them, still pursuing the analogy between a balloon and a ship at sea, to try to navigate the air with sails. this again proved futile. it is impossible for a balloon, or airship to "tack" or manoeuvre in any way by sail power. it is in fact a monster sail itself, needing some other power than the wind to make headway or steerage way against the wind. the sail device was tested only to be abandoned. only when a trail rope dragging along the ground or sea is employed does the sail offer sufficient resistance to the wind to sway the balloon's course this way or that. and a trailer is impracticable when navigating great heights. [illustration: roberts brothers' dirigible.] for these reasons the development of the balloon lagged, until count zeppelin and m. santos-dumont consecrated their fortunes, their inventive minds, and their amazing courage to the task of perfecting a dirigible. in a book, necessarily packed with information concerning the rapid development of aircraft which began in the last decade of the nineteenth century and was enormously stimulated during the war of all the world, the long series of early experiments with balloons must be passed over hastily. though interesting historically these experiments were futile. beyond having discovered what could _not_ be done with a balloon the practitioners of that form of aeronautics were little further along in when count zeppelin came along with the first plan for a rigid dirigible than they were when blanchard in , seizing a favourable gale drifted across the english channel to the french shore, together with dr. jefferies, an american. it was just years later that bleriot, a frenchman, made the crossing in an airplane independently of favouring winds. it had taken a century and a quarter to attain this independence. in a vague way the earliest balloonists recognized that power, independent of wind, was necessary to give balloons steerage way and direction. steam was in its infancy during the early days of ballooning, but the efforts to devise some sort of an engine light enough to be carried into the air were untiring. within a year after the experiments of the montgolfier brothers, the suggestion was made that the explosion of small quantities of gun-cotton and the expulsion of the resulting gases might be utilized in some fashion to operate propelling machinery. though the suggestion was not developed to any useful point it was of interest as forecasting the fundamental idea of the gas engines of to-day which have made aviation possible--that is, the creation of power by a series of explosions within the motor. in the effort to make balloons dirigible one of the first steps was to change the form from the spherical or pear-shaped bag to a cylindrical, or cigar-shape. this device was adopted by the brothers robert in france as early as . their balloon further had a double skin or envelope, its purpose being partly to save the gas which percolated through the inner skin, partly to maintain the rigidity of the structure. as gas escapes from an ordinary balloon it becomes flabby, and can be driven through the air only with extreme difficulty. in the balloon of the robert brothers air could from time to time be pumped into the space between the two skins, keeping the outer envelope always fully distended and rigid. in later years this idea has been modified by incorporating in the envelope one large or a number of smaller balloons or "balloonets," into which air may be pumped as needed. the shape too has come to approximate that of a fish rather than a bird, in the case of balloons at least. "the head of a cod and the tail of a mackerel," was the way marey-monge, the french aeronaut described it. though most apparent in dirigible balloons, this will be seen to be the favourite design for airplanes if the wings be stripped off, and the body and tail alone considered. complete, these machines are not unlike a flying fish. in england, sir george cayley, as early as studied and wrote largely on the subject of dirigibles but, though the english call him the "father of british aeronautics," his work seems to have been rather theoretical than practical. he did indeed demonstrate mathematically that no lifting power existed that would support the cumbrous steam-engine of that date, and tried to solve this dilemma by devising a gas engine, and an explosive engine. with one of the latter, driven by a series of explosions of gunpowder, each in a separate cell set off by a detonator, he equipped a flying machine which attained a sufficient height to frighten cayley's coachman, whom he had persuaded to act as pilot. the rather unwilling aviator, fearing a loftier flight, jumped out and broke his leg. though by virtue of this martyrdom his name should surely have descended to fame with that of cayley it has been lost, together with all record of any later performances of the machine, which unquestionably embodied some of the basic principles of our modern aircraft, though it antedated the first of these by nearly a century. [illustration: giffard's dirigible.] we may pass over hastily some of the later experiments with dirigibles that failed. in the count de lennox built an airship feet long to be driven by oars worked by man power. when the crowd that gathered to watch the ascent found that the machine was too heavy to ascend even without the men, they expressed their lively contempt for the inventor by tearing his clothes to tatters and smashing his luckless airship. in , another frenchman, henry giffard, built a cigar-shaped balloon feet long by feet in diameter, driven by steam. the engine weighed three hundred pounds and generated about h.-p.--about / as much power as a gas engine of equal weight would produce. even with this slender power, however, giffard attained a speed, independent of the wind, of from five to seven miles an hour--enough at least for steerage way. this was really the first practical demonstration of the possibilities of the mechanical propulsion of balloons. several adaptations of the giffard idea followed, and in renard and krebs, in a fusiform ship, driven by an electric motor, attained a speed of fifteen miles an hour. by this time inventive genius in all countries--save the united states which lagged in interest in dirigibles--was stimulated. germany and france became the great protagonists in the struggle for precedence and in the struggle two figures stand out with commanding prominence--the count von zeppelin and santos-dumont, a young brazilian resident in paris who without official countenance consecrated his fortune to, and risked his life in, the service of aviation. chapter iii the services of santos-dumont in his book _my airships_ the distinguished aviator a. santos-dumont tells this story of the ambition of his youth and its realization in later days: i cannot say at what age i made my first kites, but i remember how my comrades used to tease me at our game of "pigeon flies." all the children gather round a table and the leader calls out "pigeon flies! hen flies! crow flies! bee flies!" and so on; and at each call we were supposed to raise our fingers. sometimes, however, he would call out "dog flies! fox flies!" or some other like impossibility to catch us. if any one raised a finger then he was made to pay a forfeit. now my playmates never failed to wink and smile mockingly at me when one of them called "man flies!" for at the word i would always raise my finger very high, as a sign of absolute conviction, and i refused with energy to pay the forfeit. the more they laughed at me the happier i was, hoping that some day the laugh would be on my side. among the thousands of letters which i received after winning the deutsch prize (a prize offered in for sailing around the eiffel tower) there was one that gave me peculiar pleasure. i quote from it as a matter of curiosity: "do you remember, my dear alberto, when we played together 'pigeon flies!'? it came back to me suddenly when the news of your success reached rio. 'man flies!' old fellow! you were right to raise your finger, and you have just proved it by flying round the eiffel tower. "they play the old game now more than ever at home; but the name has been changed, and the rules modified since october , . they call it now 'man flies!' and he who does not raise his finger at the word pays the forfeit." the story of santos-dumont affords a curious instance of a boy being obsessed by an idea which as a man he carried to its successful fruition. it offers also evidence of the service that may accrue to society from the devotion of a dilettante to what people may call a "fad," but what is in fact the germ of a great idea needing only an enthusiast with enthusiasm, brains, and money for its development. because the efforts of santos-dumont always smacked of the amateur he has been denied his real place in the history of aeronautics, which is that of a fearless innovator, and a devoted worker in the cause. born on one of those great coffee plantations of brazil, where all is done by machinery that possibly can be, santos-dumont early developed a passion for mechanics. in childhood he made toy airplanes. he confesses that his favourite author was jules verne, that literary idol of boyhood, who while writing books as wildly imaginative as any dime tale of redskins, or nickel novel of the doings of "nick carter" had none the less the spirit of prophecy that led him to forecast the submarine, the automobile, and the navigation of the air. at fifteen santos-dumont saw his first balloon and marked the day with red. [illustration: © u. & u. _a british kite balloon._ (_the open sack at the lower end catches the breeze and keeps the balloon steady._)] i too desired to go ballooning [he writes]. in the long sun-bathed brazilian afternoons, when the hum of insects, punctuated by the far-off cry of some bird lulled me, i would lie in the shade of the veranda and gaze into the fair sky of brazil where the birds fly so high and soar with such ease on their great outstretched wings; where the clouds mount so gaily in the pure light of day, and you have only to raise your eyes to fall in love with space and freedom. so, musing on the exploration of the aërial ocean, i, too, devised airships and flying-machines in my imagination. [illustration: © u. & u. _a british "blimp" photographed from above._] from dreaming, the boy's ambitions rapidly developed into actions. good south americans, whatever the practice of their northern neighbours, do not wait to die before going to paris. at the age of eighteen the youth found himself in the capital of the world. to his amazement he found that the science of aeronautics, such as it was, had stopped with giffard's work in . no dirigible was to be heard of in all paris. the antiquated gas ball was the only way to approach the upper air. when the boy tried to arrange for an ascension the balloonist he consulted put so unconscionable a price on one ascent that he bought an automobile instead--one of the first made, for this was in --and with it returned to brazil. it was not until six years later that, his ambition newly fired by reading of andrée's plans for reaching the pole in a balloon, santos-dumont took up anew his ambition to become an aviator. his own account of his first ascent does not bear precisely the hall-mark of the enthusiast too rapt in ecstasy to think of common things. "i had brought up," he notes gravely, "a substantial lunch of hard-boiled eggs, cold roast beef and chicken, cheese, ice cream, fruits and cakes, champagne, coffee, and chartreuse!" the balloon with its intrepid voyagers nevertheless returned to earth in safety. a picturesque figure, an habitué of the clubs and an eager sportsman, santos-dumont at once won the liking of the french people, and attracted attention wherever people gave thought to aviation. liberal in expenditure of money, and utterly fearless in exposing his life, he pushed his experiments for the development of a true dirigible tirelessly. perhaps his major fault was that he learned but slowly from the experiences of others. he clung to the spherical balloon long after the impossibility of controlling it in the air was accepted as unavoidable by aeronauts. but in having become infatuated with the performances of a little sixty-six pound tricycle motor he determined to build a cigar-shaped airship to fit it, and with that determination won success. amateur he may have been, was indeed throughout the greater part of his career as an airman. nevertheless santos-dumont has to his credit two very notable achievements. he was the first constructor and pilot of a dirigible balloon that made a round trip, that is to say returned to its starting place after rounding a stake at some distance--in this instance the eiffel tower, - / miles from st. cloud whence santos-dumont started and whither he returned within half an hour, the time prescribed. this was not, indeed, the first occasion on which a round trip, necessitating operation against the wind on at least one course, had been made. in captain renard had accomplished this feat for the first time with the fish-shaped balloon _la france_, driven by an electric motor of nine horse-power. but though thus antedated in his exploit, santos-dumont did in fact accomplish more for the advancement and development of dirigible balloons. to begin with he was able to use a new and efficient form of motor destined to become popular, and capable, as the automobile manufacturers later showed, of almost illimitable development in the direction of power and lightness. except for the gasoline engine, developed by the makers of motor cars, aviation to-day would be where it was a quarter of a century ago. moreover by his personal qualities, no less than by his successful demonstration of the possibilities inherent in the dirigible, santos-dumont persuaded the french government to take up aeronautics again, after abandoning the subject as the mere fad of a number of visionaries. turning from balloons to airplanes the brazilian was the first aviator to make a flight with a heavier-than-air machine before a body of judges. this triumph was mainly technical. the wrights had made an equally notable flight almost a year before but not under conditions that made it a matter of scientific record. but setting aside for the time the work done by santos-dumont with machines heavier than air, let us consider his triumphs with balloons at the opening of his career. he had come to france about forty years after henry giffard had demonstrated the practicability of navigating a balloon feet long and feet in diameter with a three-horse-power steam-engine. but no material success attended this demonstration, important as it was, and the inventor turned his attention to captive balloons, operating one at the paris exposition of that took up forty passengers at a time. there followed captain renard to whose achievement we have already referred. he had laid down as the fundamentals of a dirigible balloon these specifications: a cigar, or fishlike shape. an internal sack or ballonet into which air might be pumped to replace any lost gas, and maintain the shape of the balloon. a keel, or other longitudinal brace, to maintain the longitudinal stability of the balloon and from which the car containing the motor might be hung. a propeller driven by a motor, the size and power of both to be as great as permitted by the lifting power of the balloon. a rudder capable of controlling the course of the ship. santos-dumont adopted all of these specifications, but added to them certain improvements which gave his airships--he built five of them before taking his first prize--notable superiority over that of renard. to begin with he had the inestimable advantage of having the gasoline motor. he further lightened his craft by having the envelope made of japanese silk, in flat defiance of all the builders of balloons who assured him that the substance was too light and its use would be suicidal. "all right," said the innovator to his favourite constructor, who refused to build him a balloon of that material, "i'll build it myself." in the face of this threat the builder capitulated. the balloon was built, and the silk proved to be the best fabric available at that time for the purpose. a keel made of strips of pine banded together with aluminum wire formed the backbone of the santos-dumont craft, and from it depended the car about one quarter of the length of the balloon and hung squarely amidships. the idea of this keel occurred to the inventor while pleasuring at nice. later it saved his life. one novel and exceedingly simple device bore witness to the ingenuity of the inventor. he had noticed in his days of free ballooning that to rise the aeronaut had to throw out sand-ballast; to descend he had to open the valves and let out gas. as his supply of both gas and sand was limited it was clear that the time of his flight was necessarily curtailed every time he ascended or descended. santos-dumont thought to husband his supplies of lifting force and of ballast, and make the motor raise and lower the ship. it was obvious that the craft would go whichever way the bow might be pointed, whether up or down. but how to shift the bow? the solution seems so simple that one wonders it ever perplexed aviators. from the peak of the bow and stern of his craft santos-dumont hung long ropes caught in the centre by lighter ropes by which they could be dragged into the car. in the car was carried a heavy bag of sand, which so long as it was there held the ship in a horizontal plane. was it needful to depress the bow? then the bow rope was hauled in, the bag attached, and swung out to a position where it would pull the forward tip of the delicately adjusted gas bag toward the earth. if only a gentle inclination was desired the bag was not allowed to hang directly under the bow, but was held at a point somewhere between the car and the bow so that the pull would be diagonal and the great cylinder would be diverted but little from the horizontal. if it were desired to ascend, a like manipulation of the ballast on the stern rope would depress the stern and point the bow upwards. for slight changes in direction it was not necessary even to attach the sand bag. merely drawing the rope into the car and thus changing the line of its "pull" was sufficient. the deutsch prize which stimulated santos-dumont to his greatest achievements with dirigibles was a purse of twenty thousand dollars, offered by mr. henry deutsch, a wealthy patron of the art of aviation. not himself an aviator, m. deutsch greatly aided the progress of the air's conquest. convinced that the true solution of the problem lay in development of the gasoline engine, he expended large sums in developing and perfecting it. when he believed it was sufficiently developed to solve the problem of directing the flight of balloons he offered his prize for the circuit of the eiffel tower. the conditions of the contest were not easy. the competitor had to sail from the aero club at st. cloud, pass twice over the seine which at that point makes an abrupt bend, sail over the bois de boulogne, circle the tower, and return to the stopping place within a half an hour. the distance was about seven miles, and it is noteworthy that in his own comment on the test santos-dumont complains that that required an average speed of fifteen miles an hour of which he could not be sure with his balloon. to-day dirigibles make sixty miles an hour, and airplanes not infrequently reach miles. moreover there could be no picking of a day on which atmospheric conditions were especially good. mr. deutsch had stipulated that the test must be made in the presence of a scientific commission whose members must be notified twenty-four hours in advance. none could tell twenty-four hours ahead what the air might be like, and as for utilizing the aviator's most favourable hour, the calm of the dawn, m. santos-dumont remarked: "the duellist may call out his friends at that sacred hour, but not the airship captain." the craft with which the brazilian first strove to win the deutsch prize he called _santos-dumont no. v._ it was a cylinder, sharp at both ends, feet long and driven by a -horse-power motor. a new feature was the use of piano wire for the support of the car, thus greatly reducing the resistance of the air which in the case of the old cord suspensions was almost as great as that of the balloon itself. another novel feature was water ballast tanks forward and aft on the balloon itself and holding together twelve gallons. by pulling steel wires in the car the aviator could open the stop-cocks. the layman scarcely appreciates the very slight shift in ballast which will affect the stability of a dirigible. the shifting of a rope a few feet from its normal position, the dropping of two handfuls of sand, or release of a cup of water will do it. a humorous writer describing a lunch with santos-dumont in the air says: "nothing must be thrown overboard, be it a bottle, an empty box or a chicken bone without the pilot's permission." after unofficial tests of his "no. " in one of which he circled the tower without difficulty, santos-dumont summoned the scientific commission for a test. in ten minutes he had turned the tower, and started back against a fierce head-wind, which made him ten minutes late in reaching the time-keepers. just as he did so his engine failed, and after drifting for a time his ship perched in the top of a chestnut tree on the estate of m. edmond rothschild. philosophical as ever the aeronaut clung to his craft, dispatched an excellent lunch which the princess isabel, comtesse d'eu, daughter of dom pedro, the deposed emperor of brazil, sent to his eyrie in the branches, and finally extricated himself and his balloon--neither much the worse for the accident. he had failed but his determination to win was only whetted. the second trial for the deutsch prize like the first ended in failure, but that failure was so much more dramatic even than the success which attended the third effort that it is worth telling and can best be told in m. santos-dumont's own words. the quotation is from his memoir, _my airships_: and now i come to a terrible day-- th of august, . at : a.m. in presence of the scientific commission of the aero club, i started again for the eiffel tower. i turned the tower at the end of nine minutes and took my way back to st. cloud; but my balloon was losing hydrogen through one of its two automatic gas valves whose spring had been accidentally weakened. i had perceived the beginning of this loss of gas even before reaching the eiffel tower, and ordinarily, in such an event, i should have come at once to earth to examine the lesion. but here i was competing for a prize of great honour and my speed had been good. therefore i risked going on. the balloon now shrunk visibly. by the time i had got back to the fortifications of paris, near la muette, it caused the suspension wires to sag so much that those nearest to the screw-propeller caught in it as it revolved. i saw the propeller cutting and tearing at the wires. i stopped the motor instantly. then, as a consequence, the airship was at once driven back toward the tower by the wind which was strong. [illustration: photo by international film service co. _a kite balloon rising from the hold of a ship._] at the same time i was falling. the balloon had lost much gas. i might have thrown out ballast and greatly diminished the fall, but then the wind would have time to blow me back on the eiffel tower. i therefore preferred to let the airship go down as it was going. it may have seemed a terrific fall to those who watched it from the ground but to me the worst detail was the airship's lack of equilibrium. the half-empty balloon, fluttering its empty end as an elephant waves his trunk, caused the airship's stern to point upward at an alarming angle. what i most feared therefore was that the unequal strain on the suspension wires would break them one by one and so precipitate me to the ground. why was the balloon fluttering an empty end causing all this extra danger? how was it that the rotary ventilator was not fulfilling its purpose in feeding the interior air balloon and in this manner swelling out the gas balloon around it? the answer must be looked for in the nature of the accident. the rotary ventilator stopped working when the motor itself stopped, and i had been obliged to stop the motor to prevent the propeller from tearing the suspension wires near it when the balloon first began to sag from loss of gas. it is true that the ventilator which was working at that moment had not proved sufficient to prevent the first sagging. it may have been that the interior balloon refused to fill out properly. the day after the accident when my balloon constructor's man came to me for the plans of a "no. " balloon envelope i gathered from something he said that the interior balloon of "no. ," not having been given time for its varnish to dry before being adjusted, might have stuck together or stuck to the sides or bottom of the outer balloon. such are the rewards of haste. i was falling. at the same time the wind was carrying me toward the eiffel tower. it had already carried me so far that i was expecting to land on the seine embankment beyond the trocadero. my basket and the whole of the keel had already passed the trocadero hotels, and had my balloon been a spherical one it would have cleared the building. but now at the last critical moment, the end of the long balloon that was still full of gas came slapping down on the roof just before clearing it. it exploded with a great noise; struck after being blown up. this was the terrific explosion described in the newspaper of the day. i had made a mistake in my estimate of the wind's force, by a few yards. instead of being carried on to fall on the seine embankment, i now found myself hanging in my wicker basket high up in the courtyard of the trocadero hotels, supported by my airship's keel, that stood braced at an angle of about forty-five degrees between the courtyard wall above and the roof of a lower construction farther down. the keel, in spite of my weight, that of the motor and machinery, and the shock it had received in falling, resisted wonderfully. the thin pine scantlings and piano wires of nice (the town where the idea of a keel first suggested itself) had saved my life! after what seemed tedious waiting, i saw a rope being lowered to me from the roof above. i held to it and was hauled up, when i perceived my rescuers to be the brave firemen of paris. from their station at passy they had been watching the flight of the airship. they had seen my fall and immediately hastened to the spot. then, having rescued me, they proceeded to rescue the airship. the operation was painful. the remains of the balloon envelope and the suspension wires hung lamentably; and it was impossible to disengage them except in strips and fragments! the later balloon "no. vi." with which santos-dumont won the deutsch prize may fairly be taken as his conception of the finished type of dirigible for one man. in fact his aspirations never soared as high as those of count zeppelin, and the largest airship he ever planned--called "the _omnibus_"--carried only four men. it is probable that the diversion of his interest from dirigibles to airplanes had most to do with his failure to carry his development further than he did. "no. vi." was feet long, and feet in diameter with an eighteen-horse-power gasoline engine which could drive it at about nineteen miles an hour. naturally the aeronaut's first thought in his new construction was of the valves. the memory of the anxious minutes spent perched on the window-sill of the trocadero hotel or dangling like a spider at the end of the firemen's rope were still fresh. the ballonet which had failed him in "no. v." was perfected in its successor. notwithstanding the care with which she was constructed the prize-winner turned out to be a rather unlucky ship. on her trial voyage she ran into a tree and was damaged, and even on the day of her greatest conquest she behaved badly. the test was made on october , . the aeronaut had rounded the tower finely and was making for home when the motor began to miss and threatened to stop altogether. while santos-dumont was tinkering with the engine, leaving the steering wheel to itself, the balloon drifted over the bois de boulogne. as usual the cool air from the wood caused the hydrogen in the balloon to contract and the craft dropped until it appeared the voyage would end in the tree tops. hastily shifting his weights the aeronaut forced the prow of the ship upwards to a sharp angle with the earth. just at this moment the reluctant engine started up again with such vigour that for a moment the ship threatened to assume a perpendicular position, pointing straight up in the sky. a cry went up from the spectators below who feared a dire catastrophe was about to end a voyage which promised success. but with incomparable _sang-froid_ the young brazilian manipulated the weights, restored the ship to the horizontal again without stopping the engines, and reached the finishing stake in time to win the prize. soon after it was awarded him the brazilian government presented him with another substantial prize, together with a gold medal bearing the words: _por ceos nunca d'antes navegados_ ("through heavens hitherto unsailed"). in a sense the reference to the heavens is a trifle over-rhetorical. santos-dumont differed from all aviators (or pilots of airplanes) and most navigators of dirigibles in always advocating the strategy of staying near the ground. in his flights he barely topped the roofs of the houses, and in his writings he repeatedly refers to the sense of safety that came to him when he knew he was close to the tree tops of a forest. this may have been due to the fact that in his very first flight in a dirigible he narrowly escaped a fatal accident due to flying too high. as he descended, the gas which had expanded now contracted. the balloon began to collapse in the middle. cords subjected to unusual stress began to snap. the air pump, which should have pumped the ballonet full of air to keep the balloon rigid failed to work. seeing that he was about to fall into a field in which his drag rope was already trailing the imperilled airman had a happy thought. some boys were there flying kites. he shouted to them to seize his rope and run against the wind. the balloon responded to the new force like a kite. the rapidity of its fall was checked, and its pilot landed with only a serious shaking. but thereafter santos-dumont preached the maxim--rare among airmen--"keep near the ground. that way lies safety!" most aviators however, prefer the heights of the atmosphere, as the sailor prefers the wide and open sea to a course near land. after winning the deutsch prize, santos-dumont continued for a time to amuse himself with dirigibles. i say "amuse" purposely, for never did serious aeronaut get so much fun out of a rather perilous pastime as he. in his "no. ix." he built the smallest dirigible ever known. the balloon had just power enough to raise her pilot and sixty-six pounds more beside a three-horse-power motor. but she attained a speed of twelve miles an hour, was readily handled, and it was her owner's dearest delight to use her for a taxicab, calling for lunch at the cafés in the bois, and paying visits to friends upon whom he looked in, literally, at their second-story windows. he ran her in and out of her hangar as one would a motor-car from its garage. one day he sailed down the avenue des champs Élysées at the level of the second-and third-story windows of the palaces that line that stately street. coming to his own house he descended, made fast, and went in to _déjeuner_, leaving his aërial cab without. in the city streets he steered mainly by aid of a guide rope trailing behind him. with this he turned sharp corners, went round the arc de triomphe, and said: "i might have guide-roped under it had i thought myself worthy." on occasion he picked up children in the streets and gave them a ride. though before losing his interest in dirigibles santos-dumont carried the number of his construction up to ten, he cannot be said to have devised any new and useful improvements after his "no. vi." the largest of his ships was "no. x.," which had a capacity of eighty thousand cubic feet--about ten times the size of the little runabout with which he played pranks in paris streets. in this balloon he placed partitions to prevent the gas shifting to one part of the envelope, and to guard against losing it all in the event of a tear. the same principle was fundamental in count zeppelin's airships. in he brought a dirigible to the united states expecting to compete for a prize at the st. louis exposition. but while suffering exasperating delay from the red-tape which enveloped the exposition authorities, he discovered one morning that his craft had been mutilated almost beyond repair in its storage place. in high dudgeon he left at once for paris. the explanation of the malicious act has never been made clear, though many americans had an uneasy feeling that the gallant and sportsman-like brazilian had been badly treated in our land. on his return to paris he at once began experimenting with heavier-than-air machines. of his work with them we shall give some account later. despite his great personal popularity the airship built by santos-dumont never appealed to the french military authorities. probably this was largely due to the fact that he never built one of a sufficient size to meet military tests. the amateur in him was unconquerable. while von zeppelin's first ship was big enough to take the air in actual war the frenchman went on building craft for one or two men--good models for others to seize and build upon, but nothing which a war office could actually adopt. but he served his country well by stimulating the creation of great companies who built largely upon the foundations he had laid. first and greatest of these was the company formed by the lebaudy brothers, wealthy sugar manufacturers. their model was semi-rigid, that is, provided with an inflexible keel or floor to the gas bag, which was cigar shaped. the most successful of the earlier ships was feet long, with a car suspended by cables ten feet below the balloon and carrying the twin motors, together with passengers and supplies. although it made many voyages without accident, it finally encountered what seems to be the chief peril of dirigible balloons, being torn from its moorings at châlons and dashed against trees to the complete demolition of its envelope. repaired in eleven weeks she was taken over by the french department of war, and was in active service at the beginning of the war. her two successors on the company's building ways were less fortunate. _la patrie_, after many successful trips, and manoeuvres with the troops, was insecurely moored at verdun, the famous fortress where she was to have been permanently stationed. came up a heavy gale. her anchors began to drag. the bugles sounded and the soldiers by hundreds rushed from the fort to aid. hurled along by the wind she dragged the soldiers after her. fearing disaster to the men the commandant reluctantly ordered them to let go. the ship leaped into the black upper air and disappeared. all across france, across that very country where in the trenches cut their ugly zigzags from the channel to the vosges, she drifted unseen. by morning she was flying over england and wales. ireland caught a glimpse of her and days thereafter sailors coming into port told of a curious yellow mass, seemingly flabby and disintegrating like the carcass of a whale, floating far out at sea. her partner ship _la république_ had a like tragic end. she too made many successful trips, and proved her stability and worth. but one day while manoeuvring near paris one of her propellers broke and tore a great rent in her envelope. as the _titanic_, her hull ripped open by an iceberg, sunk with more than a thousand of her people, so this airship, wounded in a more unstable element, fell to the ground killing all on board. two airships were built in france for england in . one, the _clement-bayard ii._, was of the rigid type and built for the government; the other, a _lebaudy_, was non-rigid and paid for by popular subscriptions raised in england by the _morning post_. both were safely delivered near london having made their voyages of approximately miles each at a speed exceeding forty miles an hour. these were the first airships acquired for british use. in the united states the only serious effort to develop the dirigible prior to the war, and to apply it to some definite purpose, was made not by the government but by an individual. mr. walter wellman, a distinguished journalist, fired by the effort of andrée to reach the north pole in a drifting balloon, undertook a similar expedition with a dirigible in . a balloon was built feet in length and feet in diameter, and was driven by a seventy-to eighty-horse-power motor. a curious feature of this craft was the guide rope or, as wellman called it, the equilibrator, which was made of steel, jointed and hollow. at the lower end were four steel cylinders carrying wheels and so arranged that they would float on water or trundle along over the roughest ice. the idea was that the equilibrator would serve like a guide rope, trailing on the water or ice when the balloon hung low, and increasing the power of its drag if the balloon, rising higher, lifted a greater part of its length into the air. wellman had every possible appliance to contribute to the safety of the airship, and many believe that had fortune favoured him the glory of the discovery of the pole would have been his. unhappily he encountered only ill luck. one season he spent at dane's island, near spitzenberg whence andrée had set sail, waiting vainly for favourable weather conditions. the following summer, just as he was about to start, a fierce storm destroyed his balloon shed and injured the balloon. before necessary repairs could be accomplished admiral peary discovered the pole and the purpose of the expedition was at an end. wellman, however, had become deeply interested in aeronautics and, balked in one ambition, set out to accomplish another. with the same balloon somewhat remodelled he tried to cross the atlantic, setting sail from atlantic city, n. j., october , . but the device on which the aeronaut most prided himself proved his undoing. the equilibrator, relied upon both for storage room and as a regulator of the altitude of the ship, proved a fatal attachment. in even moderate weather it bumped over the waves and racked the structure of the balloon with its savage tugging until the machinery broke down and the adventurers were at the mercy of the elements. luckily for them after they had been adrift for seventy-two hours, and travelled several hundred miles they were rescued by the british steamer _trent_. not long after wellman's chief engineer vanniman sought to cross the atlantic in a similar craft but from some unexplained cause she blew up in mid-air and all aboard were lost. neither great britain nor the united states has reason to be proud of the attitude of its government towards the inventors who were struggling to subdue the air to the uses of man. nor has either reason to boast much of its action in utterly ignoring up to the very day war broke that aid to military service of which lord kitchener said, "one aviator is worth a corps of cavalry." it will be noted that to get its first effective dirigible great britain had to rely upon popular subscriptions drummed up by a newspaper. that was in . to-day, in , the united states has only one dirigible of a type to be considered effective in the light of modern standards, though our entrance upon the war has caused the beginning of a considerable fleet. in aviation no less than in aerostatics the record of the united states is negligible. our country did indeed produce the wright brothers, pioneers and true conquerors of the air with airplanes. but even they were forced to go to france for support and indeed for respectful attention. so far as the development of dirigible balloons is concerned there is no more need to devote space to what was done in england and the united states than there was for the famous chapter on snakes in iceland. chapter iv the count von zeppelin the year that witnessed the first triumphs of santos-dumont saw also the beginning of the success of his great german rival, the count von zeppelin. these two daring spirits, struggling to attain the same end, were alike in their enthusiasm, their pertinacity, and their devotion to the same cause. both were animated by the highest patriotism. santos-dumont offered his fleet to france to be used against any nation except those of the two americas. he said: "it is in france that i have met with all my encouragement; in france and with french material i have made all my experiments. i excepted the two americas because i am an american." count zeppelin for his part, when bowed down in apparent defeat and crushed beneath the burden of virtual bankruptcy, steadily refused to deal with agents of other nations than germany--which at that time was turning upon him the cold shoulder. he declared that his genius had been exerted for his own country alone, and that his invention should be kept a secret from all but german authorities. a secret it would be to-day, except that accident and the fortunes of war revealed the intricacies of the zeppelin construction to both france and england. santos-dumont had the fire, enthusiasm, and resiliency of youth; zeppelin, upon whom age had begun to press when first he took up aeronautics, had the dogged pertinacity of the teuton. both were rich at the outset, but zeppelin's capital melted away under the demands of his experimental workshops, while the ancestral coffee lands of the brazilian never failed him. of the two zeppelin had the more obstinacy, for he held to his plan of a rigid dirigible balloon even in face of its virtual failure in the supreme test of war. santos-dumont was the more alert intellectually for he was still in the flood tide of successful demonstration with his balloons when he saw and grasped the promise of the airplane and shifted his activities to that new field in which he won new laurels. zeppelin won perhaps the wider measure of immediate fame, but whether enduring or not is yet to be determined. his airships impressive, even majestic as they are, have failed to prove their worth in war, and are yet to be fully tested in peace. that they remain a unique type, one which no other individual nor any other nation has sought to copy, cannot be attributed wholly to the jealousy of possible rivals. if the monster ship, of rigid frame, were indeed the ideal form of dirigible it would be imitated on every hand. the inventions of the wrights have been seized upon, adapted, improved perhaps by half a hundred airplane designers of every nation. but nobody has been imitating the zeppelins. [illustration: _the giant and the pigmies._ _painting by john e. whiting._] that, however, is a mere passing reflection. if the zeppelin has not done all in war that the sanguine german people expected of it, nevertheless it is not yet to be pronounced an entire failure. and even though a failure in war, the chief service for which its stout-hearted inventor designed it, there is still hope that it may ultimately prove better adapted to many ends of peace than the airplanes which for the time seem to have outdone it. stout-hearted indeed the old _luftgraaf_--"air scout"--as the germans call him, was. his was a bismarckian nature, reminiscent of the iron chancellor alike physically and mentally. in appearance he recalls irresistibly the heroic figure of bismarck, jack-booted and cuirassed at the congress of vienna, painted by von werner. heir to an old land-owning family, ennobled and entitled to bear the title _landgraf_, count von zeppelin was a type of the german aristocrat. but for his title and aristocratic rank he could never have won his long fight for recognition by the bureaucrats who control the german army. in youth he was anti-prussian in sentiment, and indeed some of his most interesting army experiences were in service with the army of south germany against prussia and her allied states. but all that was forgotten in the national unity that followed the defeat of france in . before that, however, the young count--he was born in --had served with gallantry, if not distinction, in the union army in our civil war, had made a balloon ascension on the fighting line, had swum in the niagara river below the falls, being rescued with difficulty, and together with two russian officers and some indian guides had almost starved in trying to discover the source of the mississippi river--a spot which can now be visited without undergoing more serious hardships than the upper berth in a pullman car. it was at the siege of paris that zeppelin's mind first became engaged with the problem of aërial navigation. from his post in the besieging trenches he saw the almost daily ascent of balloons in which mail was sent out, and persons who could pay the price sought to escape from the beleaguered city. as a colonel of cavalry, he had been employed mainly in scouting duty throughout the war. he was impressed now with the conviction that those globes, rising silently into the air, above the enemy's cannon shot and drifting away to safety would be the ideal scouts could they but return with their intelligence. was there no way of guiding these ships in the air, as a ship in the ocean is guided? the young soldier was hardly home from the war when he began to study the problem. he studied it indeed so much to the exclusion of other military matters that in the general staff abruptly dismissed him from his command. they saw no reason why a major-general of cavalry should be mooning around with balloons and kites like a schoolboy. the dismissal hurt him, but deterred him in no way from the purpose of his life. indeed the fruit of his many years' study of aeronautic conditions was ready for the gathering at this very moment. on the surface of the picturesque lake constance, on the border line between germany and switzerland, floated a huge shed, open to the water and more than five hundred feet long. in it, nearing completion, floated the first zeppelin airship. in the long patient study which the count had given to his problem he had reached the fixed conclusion that the basis of a practical dirigible balloon must be a rigid frame over which the envelope should be stretched. his experiments were made at the same time as those of santos-dumont, and he could not be ignorant of the measure of success which the younger man was attaining with the non-rigid balloon. but it was a fact that all the serious accidents which befell santos-dumont and most of the threatened accidents which he narrowly escaped were fundamentally caused by the lack of rigidity in his balloon. the immediate cause may have been a leaky valve permitting the gas to escape, or a faulty air-pump which made prompt filling of the ballonet impossible. but the effect of these flaws was to deprive the balloon of its rigidity, cause it to buckle, throwing the cordage out of gear, shifting stresses and strains, and resulting in ultimate breakdown. whether he observed the vicissitudes of his rival or not, count zeppelin determined that the advantages of a rigid frame counted for more than the disadvantage of its weight. moreover that disadvantage could be compensated for by increasing the size, and therefore the lifting power of the balloon. in determining upon a rigid frame the count was not a pioneer even in his own country. while his experiments were still under way, a rival, david schwartz, who had begun, without completing, an airship in st. petersburg, secured in some way aid from the german government, which was at the moment coldly repulsing zeppelin. he planned and built an aluminum airship but died before its completion. his widow continued the work amidst constant opposition from the builders. the end was one of the many tragedies of invention. nobody but the widow ever believed the ship would rise from its moorings. it was in charge of a man who had never made an ascent. to his amazement and to the amazement of the spectators the engine was hardly started when the ship mounted and made headway against a stiff breeze. on the ground the spectators shouted in wonder; the widow, overwhelmed by this reward for her faith in her husband's genius, burst into tears of joy. but the amateur pilot was no match for the situation. affrighted to find himself in mid-air, too dazed to know what to do, he pulled the wrong levers and the machine crashed to earth. the pilot escaped, but the airship which had taken four years to build was irretrievably wrecked. the widow's hopes were blasted, and the way was left free for the count von zeppelin. freed, though unwillingly, from the routine duties of his military rank, zeppelin thereafter devoted himself wholly to his airships. he was fifty-three years old, adding one more to the long list of men who found their real life's work after middle age. with him was associated his brother eberhard, the two forming a partnership in aeronautical work as inseparable as that of wilbur and orville wright. like wilbur wright, eberhard von zeppelin did not live to witness the fullest fruition of the work, though he did see the soundness of its principles thoroughly established and in practical application. there is a picturesque story that when eberhard lay on his death-bed his brother, instead of watching by his side, took the then completed airship from its hangar, and drove it over and around the house that the last sounds to reach the ears of his faithful ally might be the roar of the propellers in the air--the grand pæan of victory. [illustration: photo by press illustrating service. _a french "sausage"._] though count von zeppelin had begun his experiments in it was not until that he actually began the construction of his first airship. the intervening years had been spent in constructing and testing models, in abstruse calculations of the resistance of the air, the lifting power of hydrogen, the comparative rigidity and weight of different woods and various metals, the power and weight of the different makes of motors. in these studies he spent both his time and his money lavishly, with the result that when he had built a model on the lines of which he was willing to risk the construction of an airship of operative size, his private fortune was gone. it is the common lot of inventors. for a time the count suffered all the mortification and ignominy which the beggar, even in a most worthy cause, must always experience. hat in hand he approached every possible patron with his story of certain success if only supplied with funds with which to complete his ship. a stock company with a capital of $ , of which he contributed one half, soon found its resources exhausted and retired from the speculation. appeals to the emperor met with only cold indifference. an american millionaire newspaper owner, resident in europe, sent contemptuous word by his secretary that he "had no time to bother with crazy inventors." that was indeed the attitude of the business classes at the moment when the inventors of dirigibles were on the very point of conquering the obstacles in the way of making the navigation of air a practical art. a governmental commission at berlin rejected with contempt the plans which zeppelin presented in his appeal for support. members of that commission were forced to an about-face later and became some of the inventor's sturdiest champions. but in his darkest hour the government failed him, and the one friendly hand stretched out in aid was that of the german engineers' society which, somewhat doubtfully, advanced some funds to keep the work in operation. [illustration: © u. & u. _a british "blimp"._] with this the construction of the first zeppelin craft was begun. though there had been built up to the opening of the war twenty-five "zeps"--nobody knows how many since--the fundamental type was not materially altered in the later ones, and a description of the first will stand for all. in connection with this description may be noted the criticisms of experts some of which proved only too well founded. the first zeppelin was polygonal, feet long, broad, and feet high. this colossal bulk, equivalent to that of a -ton ship necessary to supply lifting power for the metallic frame, naturally made her unwieldy to handle, unsafe to leave at rest, outside of a sheltering shed, and a particularly attractive target for artillery in time of war. actual action indeed proved that to be safe from the shells of anti-aircraft guns, the zeppelins were forced to fly so high that their own bombs could not be dropped with any degree of accuracy upon a desired target. the balloon's frame is made of aluminum, the lightest of metals, but not the least costly. a curious disadvantage of this construction was made apparent in the accident which destroyed _zeppelin iv._ that was the first of the airships to be equipped with a full wireless outfit which was used freely on its flight. it appeared that the aluminum frame absorbed much of the electricity generated for the purpose of the wireless. the effect of this was two-fold. it limited the radius of operation of the wireless to miles or less, and it made the metal frame a perilous storehouse of electricity. when _zeppelin iv._ met with a disaster by a storm which dragged it from its moorings, the stored electricity in her frame was suddenly released by contact with the trees and set fire to the envelope, utterly destroying the ship. the balloon frame was divided into seventeen compartments, each of which held a ballonet filled with hydrogen gas. the purpose of this was similar to the practice of dividing a ship's hulls into compartments. if one or more of the ballonets, for any reason, were injured the remainder would keep the ship afloat. the space between the ballonets and the outer skin was pumped full of air to keep the latter taut and rigid. moreover it helped to prevent the radiation of heat to the gas bags from the outer envelope whose huge expanse, presented to the sun, absorbed an immense amount of heat rays. two cars were suspended from the frame of the zeppelin, forward and aft, and a corridor connected them. a sliding weight was employed to raise or depress the bow. in each car of the first zeppelin was a sixteen-horse-power gasoline motor, each working two screws, with four foot blades, revolving one thousand times a minute. the engines were reversible, thus making it possible to work the propellers against each other and aid materially in steering the ship. rudders at bow and stern completed the navigating equipment. in the first zeppelins, the corridor connecting the two cars was wholly outside the frame and envelope of the car. later the perilous experiment was tried of putting it within the envelope. this resulted in one of the most shocking of the many zeppelin disasters. in the case of the ship _l-ii._, built in , the corridor became filled with gas that had oozed out of the ballonets. at one end or the other of the corridor this gas, then mixed with air, came in contact with fire,--perhaps the exhaust of the engines,--a violent explosion followed while the ship was some nine hundred feet aloft, and the mass of twisted and broken metal, with the flaming envelope, fell to the ground carrying twenty-eight men, including members of the admiralty board, to a horrible death. but to return to the first zeppelin. her trial was set for july , , and though the immediate vicinity of the floating hangar was barred to the public by the military authorities, the shores and surface of the lake were black with people eager to witness the test. boats pulled out of the wide portal the huge cigar-shaped structure, floating on small rafts, its polished surface of pegamoid glittering in the sun. as large as a fair-sized ocean steamship, it looked, on that little lake dotted with pleasure craft, like a leviathan. men were busy in the cars, fore and aft. the mooring ropes were cast off as the vessel gained an offing, and ballast being thrown out she began to rise slowly. the propellers began to whir, and the great craft swung around breasting the breeze and moved slowly up the lake. the crowd cheered. count von zeppelin, tense with excitement, alert for every sign of weakness watched his monster creation with mingled pride and apprehension. two points were set at rest in the first two minutes--the lifting power was great enough to carry the heaviest load ever imposed upon a balloon and the motive power was sufficient to propel her against an ordinary breeze. but she was hardly in mid-air when defects became apparent. the apparatus for controlling the balancing weight got out of order. the steering lines became entangled so that the ship was first obliged to stop, then by reversing the engines to proceed backwards. this was, however, a favourable evidence of her handiness under untoward circumstances. after she had been in the air nearly an hour and had covered four or five miles, a landing was ordered and she dropped to the surface of the lake with perfect ease. before reaching her shed, however, she collided with a pile--an accident in no way attributable to her design--and seriously bent her frame. the story told thus baldly does not sound like a record of glorious success. nevertheless not count zeppelin alone but all germany was wild with jubilation. _zeppelin i._ had demonstrated a principle; all that remained was to develop and apply this principle and germany would have a fleet of aërial dreadnoughts that would force any hostile nation to subjection. there was little or no discussion of the application of the principle to the ends of peace. it was as an engine of war alone that the airship appealed to the popular fancy. but at the time that fancy proved fickle. with a few repairs the airship was brought out for another test. in the air it did all that was asked for it, but it came to earth--or rather to the surface of the lake--with a shock that put it out of commission. when count zeppelin's company estimated the cost of further repairs it gave a sigh and abandoned the wreck. thereupon the pertinacious inventor laid aside his tools, got into his old uniform, and went out again on the dreary task of begging for further funds. it was two years before he could take up again the work of construction. he lectured, wrote magazine articles, begged, cajoled, and pleaded for money. at last he made an impression upon the emperor who, indeed, with a keen eye for all that makes for military advantage, should have given heed to his efforts long before. merely a letter of approval from the all-powerful kaiser was needed to turn the scale and in this was forthcoming. the factories of the empire agreed to furnish materials at cost price, and sufficient money was soon forthcoming to build a second ship. this ship took more than two years to build, was tested in january, , made a creditable flight, and was dashed to pieces by a gale the same night! the wearisome work of begging began again. but this time the kaiser's aid was even more effectively given and in nine months _zeppelin iii._ was in the air. more powerful than its predecessors it met with a greater measure of success. on one of its trials a propeller blade flew off and penetrated the envelope, but the ship returned to earth in safety. in october, , the minister of war reported that the airship was extremely stable, responded readily to her helm, had carried eleven persons sixty-seven miles in two hours and seventeen minutes, and had made its landing in ease and safety. accepted by the government "no. iii." passed into military service and zeppelin, now the idol of the german people, began the construction of "no. iv." that ship was larger than her predecessors and carried a third cabin for passengers suspended amidships. marked increase in the size of the steering and stabling planes characterized the appearance of the ship when compared with earlier types. she was at the outset a lucky ship. she cruised through alpine passes into switzerland, and made a circular voyage carrying eleven passengers and flying from friedrichshaven to mayence and back via basle, strassburg, mannheim, and stuttgart. the voyage occupied twenty-one hours--a world's record. the performance of the ship on both voyages was perfection. even in the tortuous alpine passes which she was forced to navigate on her trip to lucerne she moved with the steadiness and certainty of a great ship at sea. the rarification of the air at high altitudes, the extreme and sudden variations in temperature, the gusts of wind that poured from the ice-bound peaks down through the narrow canyons affected her not at all. when to this experience was added the triumphant tour of the six german cities, count von zeppelin might well have thought his triumph was complete. but once again the cup of victory was dashed from his lips. after his landing a violent wind beat upon the ship. an army of men strove to hold her fast, while an effort was made to reduce her bulk by deflation. that effort, which would have been entirely successful in the case of a non-rigid balloon, was obviously futile in that of a zeppelin. not the gas in the ballonets, but the great rigid frame covered with water-proofed cloth constituted the huge bulk that made her the plaything of the winds. in a trice she was snatched from the hands of her crew and hurled against the trees in a neighbouring grove. there was a sudden and utterly unexpected explosion and the whole fabric was in flames. the precise cause of the explosion will always be in doubt, but, as already pointed out, many scientists believe that the great volume of electricity accumulated in the metallic frame was suddenly released in a mighty spark which set fire to the stores of gasoline on board. with this disaster the iron nerve of the inventor was for the first time broken. it followed so fast upon what appeared to be a complete triumph that the shock was peculiarly hard to bear. it is said that he broke down and wept, and that but for the loving courage and earnest entreaties of his wife and daughter he would then have abandoned the hope and ambition of his life. but after all it was but that darkest hour which comes just before the dawn. the demolition of "no. iv." had been no accident which reflected at all upon the plan or construction of the craft--unless the great bulk of the ship be considered a fundamental defect. what it did demonstrate was that the zeppelin, like the one-thousand-foot ocean liner, must have adequate harbour and docking facilities wherever it is to land. the one cannot safely drop down in any convenient meadow, any more than the other can put into any little fishing port. germany has learned this lesson well enough and since the opening of the great war her territory is plentifully provided with zeppelin shelters at all strategic points. [illustration: _the death of a zeppelin._ photo by paul thompson.] fortunately for the count the german people judged his latest reverse more justly than he did. they saw the completeness of the triumph which had preceded the disaster and recognized that the latter was one easily guarded against in future. enthusiasm ran high all over the land. begging was no longer necessary. the emperor, who had heretofore expressed rather guarded approval of the enterprise, now flung himself into it with that enthusiasm for which he is notable. he bestowed upon the count the order of the black eagle, embraced him in public three times, and called aloud that all might hear, "long life to his excellency, count zeppelin, the conqueror of the air." he never wearied of assuring his hearers that the count was the "greatest german of the century." with such august patronage the count became the rage. next to the kaiser's the face best known to the people of germany, through pictures and statues, was that of the inventor of the zeppelin. the pleasing practice of showing affection for a public man by driving nails into his wooden effigy had not then been invented by the poetic teutons, else von zeppelin would have outdone von hindenburg in weight of metal. the story that zeppelin had refused repeated offers from other governments was widely published and evoked patriotic enthusiasm. with it went shrewd hints that in these powerful aircraft lay the way to overcome the hated english navy, and even to carry war to the very soil of england. it was then eight years before the greatest war of history was to break out, but even at that date hatred of england was being sedulously cultivated among the german people by those in authority. as a result of this national attitude count zeppelin's enterprise was speedily put on a sound financial footing. though "no. iv." had been destroyed by an accident it had been the purpose of the government to buy her, and $ , of the purchase price was now put at the disposal of the count von zeppelin. a popular zeppelin fund of $ , , was raised and expended in building great works. thenceforward there was no lack of money for furthering what had truly become a great national interest. but the progress of the construction of zeppelins for the next few years was curiously compounded of success and failure. fate seemed to have decreed to every zeppelin triumph a disaster. each mischance was attributed to exceptional conditions which never could happen again, but either they did occur, or some new but equally effective accident did. outside of germany, where the public mind had become set in an almost idolatrous confidence in zeppelin, the great airships were becoming a jest and a byword notwithstanding their unquestioned accomplishments. indeed when the record was made up just before the declaration of war in it was found that of twenty-five zeppelins thus far constructed only twelve were available. thirteen had been destroyed by accident--two of them modern naval airships only completed in . the record was not one to inspire confidence. in , during a voyage in which he made nine hundred miles in thirty-eight hours, the rumour was spread that von zeppelin would continue it to berlin. some joker sent a forged telegram to the kaiser to that effect signed "zeppelin." it was expected to be the first appearance of one of the great ships at the capital, and the emperor hastened to prepare a suitable welcome. a great crowd assembled at the templehoff parade ground. the berlin airship battalion was under orders to assist in the landing. the kaiser himself was ready to hasten to the spot should the ship be sighted. but she never appeared. if von zeppelin knew of the exploit which rumour had assigned to him--which is doubtful--he could not have carried it out. his ship collided with a tree--an accident singularly frequent in the zeppelin records--so disabling it that it could only limp home under half power. a rather curt telegram from his imperial master is said to have been count von zeppelin's first intimation that he had broken an engagement. however, he kept it two months later, flying to berlin, a distance of miles. he was greeted with mad enthusiasm and among the crowd to welcome him was orville wright the american aviator. it is a curious coincidence that on the day the writer pens these words the new york newspapers contain accounts of mr. wright's proffer of his services, and aeronautical facilities, to the president in case an existing diplomatic break with germany should reach the point of actual war. mr. wright accompanied his proffer by an appeal for a tremendous aviation force, "but," said he, "i strongly advise against spending any money whatsoever on dirigible balloons of any sort." thereafter the progress of count von zeppelin was without interruption for any lack of financial strength. his great works at friedrichshaven expanded until they were capable of putting out a complete ship in eight weeks. he was building, of course, primarily for war, and never concealed the fact that the enemy he expected to be the target of his bomb throwers was england. what the airships accomplished in this direction, how greatly they were developed, and the strength and weakness of the german air fleet, will be dwelt upon in another chapter. but, though building primarily for military purposes, zeppelin did not wholly neglect the possibilities of his ship for non-military service. he built one which made more than thirty trips between munich and berlin, carrying passengers who paid a heavy fee for the privilege of enjoying this novel form of travel. the car was fitted up like our most up-to-date pullmans, with comfortable seats, bright lights, and a kitchen from which excellent meals were served to the passengers. the service was not continued long enough to determine whether it could ever be made commercially profitable, but as an aid to firing the teutonic heart and an assistance in selling stock it was well worth while. the spectacle of one of these great cars, six hundred or more feet long, floating grandly on even keel and with a steady course above one of the compact little towns of south germany, was one to thrill the pulses. but the ill luck which pursued count von zeppelin even in what seemed to be his moments of assured success was remorseless. in he produced the monster _l-i_, feet long, feet in diameter, of , cubic feet capacity, and equipped with three sets of motors, giving it a speed of fifty-two miles an hour. this ship was designed for naval use and after several successful cross-country voyages she was ordered to heligoland, to participate in naval manoeuvres with the fleet there stationed. one day, caught by a sudden gust of wind such as are common enough on the north sea, she proved utterly helpless. why no man could tell, her commander being drowned, but in the face of the gale she lost all control, was buffeted by the elements at their will, and dropped into the sea where she was a total loss. fifteen of her twenty-two officers and men were drowned. the accident was the more inexplicable because the craft had been flying steadily overland for nearly twelve months and had covered more miles than any ship of zeppelin construction. it was reported that her captain had said she was overloaded and that he feared that she would be helpless in a gale. but after the disaster his mouth was stopped by the waters of the north sea. [illustration: _a german dirigible, hansa type._ © u.& u.] this calamity was not permitted long to stand alone. indeed one of the most curious facts about the zeppelin record is the regular, periodical recurrence of fatal accidents at almost equal intervals and apparently wholly unaffected by the growing perfection of the airships. while _l-i_ was making her successful cross-country flights, _l-ii_ was reaching completion at friedrichshaven. she was shorter but bulkier than her immediate predecessor and carried engines giving her nine hundred horse power, or four hundred more than _l-i._ on its first official trip this ship exploded a thousand feet in air, killing twenty-eight officers and men aboard, including all the officials who were conducting the trials. the calamity, as explained on an earlier page, was due to the accumulation of gas in the communicating passage between the three cars. [illustration: _a wrecked zeppelin at salonika._ photo by press illustrating service.] this new disaster left the faith and loyalty of the german people unshaken. but it did decidedly estrange the scientific world from count von zeppelin and all his works. it was pointed out, with truth, that the accident paralleled precisely one which had demolished the _severo pax_ airship ten years earlier, and which had caused french inventors to establish a hard and fast rule against incorporating in an airship's design any inclosed space in which waste gas might gather. this rule and its reason were known to count von zeppelin and by ignoring both he lent new colour to the charge, already current in scientific circles, that he was loath to profit by the experiences of other inventors. whether this feeling spread to the german government it is impossible to say. nor it is easy to estimate how much official confidence was shaken by it. the government, even before the war, was singularly reticent about the zeppelins, their numbers and plans. it is certain that orders were not withheld from the count. great numbers of his machines were built, especially after the war was entered upon. but he was not permitted longer to have a monopoly of government aid for manufacturers of dirigibles. other types sprung up, notably the schutte-lanz, the gross, and the parseval. but being first in the field the zeppelin came to give its name to all the dirigibles of german make and many of the famous--or infamous--exploits credited to it during the war may in fact have been performed by one of its rivals. it would be futile to attempt to enumerate all these rivals here. among them are the semi-rigid parseval and gross types which found great favour among the military authorities during the war. the latter is merely an adaptation of the highly successful french ship the _lebaudy_, but the parseval is the result of a slow evolution from an ordinary balloon. it is wholly german, in conception and development, and it is reported that the kaiser, secretly disgusted that the zeppelins, to the advancement of which he had given such powerful aid, should have recorded so many disasters, quietly transferred his interest to the new and simpler model. despite the hope of a more efficient craft, however, both the gross and the parseval failed in their first official trials, though later they made good. the latter ship was absolutely without any wooden or metallic structure to give her rigidity. two air ballonets were contained in the envelope at bow and stern and the ascent and descent of the ship was regulated by the quantity of air pumped into these. a most curious device was the utilization of heavy cloth for the propeller blades. limp and flaccid when at rest, heavy weights in the hem of the cloth caused these blades to stand out stiff and rigid as the result of the centrifugal force created by their rapid revolution. one great military advantage of the parseval was that she could be quickly deflated in the presence of danger at her moorings, and wholly knocked down and packed in small compass for shipment by rail in case of need. to neither of these models did there ever come such a succession of disasters as befell the earlier zeppelins. it is fair to say however that prior to the war not many of them had been built, and that both their builders and navigators had opportunity to learn from count von zeppelin's errors. among the chief german rivals to the zeppelin is the schutte-lanz, of the rigid type, broader but not so long as the zeppelin, framed of wood bound with wire and planned to carry a load of five or six tons, or as many as thirty passengers. no. i of this type met its fate as did so many zeppelins by encountering a storm while improperly moored. called to earth to replenish its supply of gas it was moored to an anchor sunk six feet in the ground, and as an additional precaution three hundred soldiers were called from a neighbouring barracks to handle it. it seems to have been one of the advantages of germany as a place in which to manoeuvre dirigibles, that, even in time of peace, there were always several hundred soldiers available wherever a ship might land. but this force was inadequate. a violent gust tore the ship from their hands. one poor fellow instinctively clung to his rope until one thousand feet in the air when he let go. the ship itself hovered over the town for an hour or more, then descended and was dashed to pieces against trees and stone walls. the danger which was always attached to the landing of airships has led some to suggest that they should never be brought to earth, but moored in mid-air as large ships anchor in midstream. it is suggested that tall towers be built to the top of which the ship be attached by a cable, so arranged that she will always float to the leeward of the tower. the passengers would be landed by gangplanks, and taken up and down the towers in elevators. kipling suggests this expedient in his prophetic sketch _with the night mail_. the airship would only return to earth--as a ship goes into dry dock--when in need of repairs. a curious mishap that threatened for a time to wreck the peace of the world, occurred in april, , when a german zeppelin was forced out of its course and over french territory. the right of alien machines to pass over their territory is jealously guarded by european nations, and during the progress of the great war the dutch repeatedly protested against the violation of their atmosphere by german aviators. at the time of this mischance, however, france and germany were at peace--or as nearly so as racial and historic antipathies would permit. accordingly when officers of a brigade of french cavalry engaged in manoeuvring near the great fortress of luneville saw a shadow moving across the field and looking up saw a huge zeppelin betwixt themselves and the sun they were astonished and alarmed. signs and faint shouts from the aeronauts appeared to indicate that their errand was at least friendly, if not involuntary. the soldiers stopped their drill; the townspeople trooped out to the champs de mars where the phenomenon was exhibited and began excitedly discussing this suspicious invasion. word was speedily sent to military headquarters asking whether to welcome or to repel the foe. [illustration: © u. & u. _british aviators about to ascend._ _note position of gunner on lower seat._] meantime the great ship was drifting perilously near the housetops, and the uniformed officers in the cars began making signals to the soldiers below. ropes were thrown out, seized by willing hands and made fast. the crew of germans descended to find themselves prisoners. the international law was clear enough. the ship was a military engine of the german army. its officers, all in uniform, had deliberately steered her into the very heart of a french fortress. though the countries were at peace the act was technically one of war--an armed invasion by the enemy. diplomacy of course settled the issue peacefully but not before the french had made careful drawings of all the essential features of the zeppelin, and taken copies of its log. as germany had theretofore kept a rigid secrecy about all the details of zeppelin construction and operation this angered the military authorities beyond measure. the unlucky officers who had shared in the accident were savagely told that they should have blown the ship up in mid-air and perished with it rather than to have weakly submitted it to french inspection. they suffered court-martial but escaped with severe reprimands. the story of the dirigibles of france and germany is practically the whole story of the development to a reasonable degree of perfection of the lighter-than-air machine. other nations experimented somewhat, but in the main lagged behind these pioneers. out of spain indeed came a most efficient craft--the astra-torres, of which the british government had the best example prior to the war, while both france and russia placed large orders with the builders. how many finally went into service and what may have been their record are facts veiled in the secrecy of wartime. belgium and italy both produced dirigibles of distinctive character. the united states is alone at the present moment in having contributed nothing to the improvement of the dirigible balloon. chapter v the development of the airplane the story of the development of the heavier-than-air machine--which were called aëroplanes at first, but have been given the simpler name of airplanes--is far shorter than that of the balloons. it is really a record of achievement made since when the plane built by professor langley of the smithsonian institution came to utter disaster on the potomac. in , at the time of writing this book, there are probably thirty distinct types of airplanes being manufactured for commercial and military use, and not less than fifty thousand are being used daily over the battlefields of europe. no invention save possibly the telephone and the automobile ever attained so prodigious a development in so brief a time. wise observers hold that the demand for these machines is yet in its infancy, and that when the end of the war shall lead manufacturers and designers to turn their attention to the commercial value of the airplane the flying craft will be as common in the air as the automobiles at least on our country roads. the idea of flying like a bird with wings, the idea basicly underlying the airplane theory, is old enough--almost as old as the first conception of the balloon, before hydrogen gas was discovered. in an earlier chapter some account is given of early experiments with wings. no progress was made along this line until the hallucination that man could make any headway whatsoever against gravity by flapping artificial wings was definitely abandoned. there was more promise in the experiments made by sir george cayley, and he was followed in the first half of the nineteenth century by half a dozen british experimenters who were convinced that a series of planes, presenting a fixed angle to the breeze and driven against it by a sufficiently powerful motor, would develop a considerable lifting power. this was demonstrated by henson, in , stringfellow, in , wenham, who arranged his planes like slats in a venetian blind and first applied the modern term "aeroplane" to his invention, and sir hiram maxim, who built in the most complicated and impressive looking 'plane the world has yet seen. but though each of these inventors proved the theorem that a heavier-than-air machine could be made to fly, all failed to get practical results because no motor had then been invented which combined the necessary lightness with the generation of the required power. in america we like to think of the brothers wright as being the true inventors of the airplane. and indeed they did first bring it to the point of usefulness, and alone among the many pioneers lived to see the adoption of their device by many nations for serious practical use. but it would be unjust to claim for them entire priority in the field of the glider and the heavier-than-air machine. professor langley preceded them with an airplane which, dismissed with ridicule as a failure in his day, was long after his death equipped with a lighter motor and flown by glenn curtis, who declared that the scientist had solved the problem, had only the explosive engine been perfected in his time. despite, however, the early period of the successful experiments of the wrights and professor langley, it would be unjust for america to arrogate to herself entire priority in airplane invention. any story of that achievement which leaves out lilienthal, the german, and pilcher, the englishman, is a record in which the truth is subordinated to national pride. [illustration: langley's airplane.] otto lilienthal and his brother gustav--the two like the wrights were always associated in their aviation work--had been studying long the problem of flight when in they jointly published their book _bird flight as the basis of the flying art_. their investigations were wholly into the problem of flight without a motor. at the outset they even harked back to the long-abandoned theory that man could raise himself by mere muscular effort, and otto spent many hours suspended at the end of a rope flapping frantically a pair of wings before he abandoned this effort as futile. convinced that the soaring or gliding of the birds was the feat to emulate, he made himself a pair of fixed, bat-like wings formed of a light fabric stretched over a willow frame. a tail composed of one vertical and one horizontal plane extended to the rear, and in the middle the aviator hung by his armpits, in an erect position. with this device he made some experimental glides, leaping from slight eminences. with his body, which swung at will from its cushioned supports, he could balance, and even steer the fabric which supported him, and accomplished long glides against the wind. not infrequently, running into the teeth of the breeze down a gentle slope he would find himself gently wafted into the air and would make flights of as much as three hundred yards, steering to either side, or rising and falling at will. he was even able to make a circuitous flight and return to his starting place--a feat that was not accomplished with a motor-driven airplane until years later. lilienthal achieved it with no mechanical aid, except the wings. he became passionately devoted to the art, made more than two thousand flights, and at the time of his death had just completed a motor-driven airplane, which he was never able to test. his earlier gliding wings he developed into a form of biplane, with which he made several successful flights, but met his death in by the collapse of this machine, of the bad condition of which he had been warned. [illustration: © kadel & herbert. _french airdrome near the front._] lilienthal was more of a factor in the conquest of the air than his actual accomplishments would imply. his persistent experiments, his voluminous writings, and above all his friendly and intelligent interest in the work of other and younger men won him a host of disciples in other lands who took up the work that dropped from his lifeless hands. [illustration: lilienthal's glider.] in england percy s. pilcher emulated the lilienthal glides, and was at work on a motor-propelled machine when he was killed by the breakage of a seemingly unimportant part of his machine. he was on the edge of the greater success, not to that moment attained by anyone, of building a true airplane propelled by motor. many historians think that to lilienthal and pilcher is justly due the title "the first flying men." but le bris, a french sailor, utterly without scientific or technical equipment, as far back as had accomplished a wonderful feat in that line. while on a cruise he had watched an albatross that followed his ship day after day apparently without rest and equally without fatigue. his imagination was fired by the spectacle and probably having never heard of the punishment that befell the ancient mariner, he shot the albatross. "i took the wing," he wrote later, "and exposed it to the breeze, and lo, in spite of me, it drew forward into the wind; notwithstanding my resistance it tended to rise. thus i had discovered the secret of the bird. i comprehend the whole mystery of flight." a trifle too sanguine was sailor le bris, but he had just the qualities of imagination and confidence essential to one who sets forth to conquer the air. had he possessed the accurate mind, the patience, and the pertinacity of the wrights he might have beaten them by half a century. as it was he accomplished a remarkable feat, though it ended in somewhat laughable failure. he built an artificial bird, on the general plan of his albatross. the wings were not to flap, but their angles to the wind were controlled by a system of levers controlled by le bris, who stood up in the basket in the centre. to rise he required something like the flying start which the airplanes of to-day get on their bicycle wheels before leaving the ground. as le bris had no motor this method of propulsion was denied him, so he loaded the apparatus in a cart, and fastened it to the rail by a rope knotted in a slip knot which a jerk from him would release. as they started men walked beside the cart holding the wings, which extended for twenty-five feet on either side. as the horses speeded up these assistants released their hold. feeling the car try to rise under his feet le bris cast off the rope, tilted the front end of the machine, and to his joy began to rise steadily into the air. the spectators below cheered madly, but a note of alarm mingled with their cheers, and the untried aviator noticed a strange and inexplicable jerking of his machine. peering down he discovered, to his amaze, a man kicking and crying aloud in deadly fear. it was evident that the rope he had detached from the cart had caught up the driver, who had thus become, to his intense dismay, a partner in the inventor's triumph. indeed it is most possible that he contributed to that triumph for the ease and steadiness with which the machine rose to a height estimated at three hundred feet suggests that he may have furnished needed ballast--acted in fact as the tail to the kite. humanity naturally impelled le bris to descend at once, which he did skilfully without injuring his involuntary passenger, and only slightly breaking one of the wings. [illustration: © u. & u. _a german war zeppelin._] had le bris won this success twenty years later his fame and fortune would have been secure. but in the time was not ripe for aeronautics. le bris was poor. the public responded but grudgingly to his appeals for aid. his next experiment was less successful--perhaps for lack of the carter--and he ultimately disappeared from aviation to become an excellent soldier of france. [illustration: photo by press illustrating service. _a french observation balloon seeking submarines._] perhaps had they not met with early and violent deaths, the lilienthals and pilcher might have carried their experiments in the art of gliding into the broader domain of power flight. this however was left to the two americans, orville and wilbur wright, who have done more to advance the art of navigating the air than all the other experimenters whose names we have used. the story of the wright brothers is one of boyhood interest gradually developed into the passion of a lifetime. it parallels to some degree the story of santos-dumont who insisting as a child that "man flies" finally made it a fact. the interest of the wrights was first stimulated when, in , their father brought home a small toy, called a "helicopter," which when tossed in the air rose up instead of falling. every child had them at that time, but curiously this one was like the seed which fell upon fertile soil. the boys went mad, as boys will, on the subject of flying. but unlike most boys they nurtured and cultivated the passion and it stayed with them to manhood. from helicopters they passed to kites, and from kites to gliders. by calling they were makers and repairers of bicycles, but their spare time was for years devoted to solving the problem of flight. in time it became their sole occupation and by it they won a fortune and world-wide fame. their story forms a remarkable testimony to the part of imagination, pertinacity, and courage in winning success. after years of tests with models, and with kites controlled from the ground, the brothers had worked out a type of glider which they believed, in a wind of from eighteen to twenty miles an hour, would lift and carry a man. but they had to find a testing ground. the fields near their home in ohio were too level, and their firm unyielding surface was not attractive as a cushion on which to light in the event of disaster. moreover the people round about were getting inquisitive about these grown men "fooling around" with kites and flying toys. to the last the wrights were noted for their dislike of publicity, and it is entirely probable that the sneering criticisms of their "level headed" and "practical" neighbours had a good deal to do with rooting them in this distaste. low steep hills down the sides of which they could run and at the proper moment throw themselves upon their glider; a sandy soil which would at least lessen the shock of a tumble; and a vicinage in which winds of eighteen miles an hour or more is the normal atmospheric state were the conditions they sought. these they found at a little hamlet called kitty-hawk on the coast of north carolina. there for uncounted centuries the tossing atlantic had been throwing up its snowy sand upon the shore, and the steady wind had caught it up, piled it in windrows, rolled it up into towering hills, or carried it over into the dunes which extended far inland. it was a lonely spot, and there secure from observation the wrights pitched their camp. for them it was a midsummer's holiday. not at first did they decide to make aviation not a sport but a profession. to their camp came visitors interested in the same study, among them chanute, a well-known experimenter, and some of his associates. they had thought to give hours at a time to actual flight. when they closed their first season, they found that all their time spent in actual flight footed up less than an hour. lilienthal, despite all he accomplished, estimated that he, up to a short time before his death, spent only about five hours actually in the air. in that early day of experimentation a glide covering one hundred feet, and consuming eight or ten seconds, was counted a triumph. [illustration: chanute's glider.] but the season was by no means wasted. indeed such was the estimate that the wrights put upon it that they folded their tents determined that when they returned the year following it would be as professionals, not amateurs. they were confident of their ability to build machines that would fly, though up to that time they had never mounted a motor on their aircraft. in the clear hot air of a north carolina midsummer the wrights used to lie on their backs studying through glasses the methods of flight of the great buzzards--filthy scavenger birds which none the less soaring high aloft against a blue sky are pictures of dignity and grace. bald eagles, ospreys, hawks, and buzzards give us daily exhibitions of their powers [wrote wilbur wright]. the buzzards were the most numerous, and were the most persistent soarers. they apparently never flapped except when it was absolutely necessary, while the eagles and hawks usually soared only when they were at leisure. two methods of soaring were employed. when the weather was cold and damp and the wind strong the buzzards would be seen soaring back and forth along the hills or at the edge of a clump of trees. they were evidently taking advantage of the current of air flowing upward over these obstructions. on such days they were often utterly unable to soar, except in these special places. but on warm clear days when the wind was light they would be seen high in the air soaring in great circles. usually, however, it seemed to be necessary to reach a height of several hundred feet by flapping before this style of soaring became possible. frequently a great number of them would begin circling in one spot, rising together higher and higher till finally they would disperse, each gliding off in whatever direction it wished to go. at such times other buzzards only a short distance away found it necessary to flap frequently in order to maintain themselves. but when they reached a point beneath the circling flock they began to rise on motionless wings. this seemed to indicate that rising columns of air do not exist everywhere, but that the birds must find them. they evidently watch each other and when one finds a rising current the others quickly make their way to it. one day when scarce a breath of wind was stirring on the ground we noticed two bald eagles sailing in circling sweeps at a height of probably five hundred feet. after a time our attention was attracted to the flashing of some object considerably lower down. examination with a field-glass proved it to be a feather which one of the birds had evidently cast. as it seemed apparent that it would come to earth only a short distance away, some of our party started to get it. but in a little while it was noted that the feather was no longer falling, but on the contrary was rising rapidly. it finally went out of sight upward. it apparently was drawn into the same current in which the eagles were soaring and was carried up like the birds. it was by such painstaking methods as these, coupled with the mathematical reduction of the fruits of such observations to terms of angles and supporting planes, that the wrights gradually perfected their machine. the first airplane to which they fitted a motor and which actually flew has been widely exhibited in the united states, and is to find final repose in some public museum. study it as you will you can find little resemblance in those rectangular rigid planes to the wings of a bird. but it was built according to deductions drawn from natural flight. [illustration: photo by paul thompson. _a german taube pursued by british planes._] the method of progress in these preliminary experiments was, by repeated tests, to determine what form of airplane, and of what proportions, would best support a man. it was evident that for free and continuous flight it must be able to carry not only the pilot, but an engine and a store of fuel as well. having, as they thought, determined these conditions the wrights essayed their first flight at their home near dayton, ohio. it was a cold december day in . the first flight, with motor and all, lasted twelve seconds; the fourth fifty-nine seconds. the handful of people who came out to witness the marvel went home jeering. in the spring of the next year a new flight was announced near dayton. the newspapers had been asked to send reporters. a crowd of perhaps fifty persons had gathered. again fate was hostile. the engine worked badly and the airplane refused to rise. the crowd dispersed and the newspapermen, returning the next day, met only with another disappointment. [illustration: the first wright glider.] these repeated failures in public exhibitions resulted in creating general indifference to the real progress that the wrights were making in solving the flight problem. while the gliding experiments at kitty-hawk were furnishing the data for the plans on which the tens of thousands of airplanes used in the european war were afterwards built, no american newspaper was sufficiently interested to send representatives to the spot. the people of the united states were supremely indifferent. perhaps this was due to the fact that superficially regarded the machine the wrights were trying to perfect gave promise of usefulness only in war or in sport. we are not either a warlike or a sporting people. ready enough to adopt a new device which seems adapted for utilitarian purposes, as is shown by the rapid multiplication of automobiles, we leave sport to our professional ball players, and our military equipment to luck. [illustration: pilcher's glider.] so after continued experimental flights in the open fields near dayton had convinced them that the practical weaknesses in their machine had been eliminated, the wrights packed up their flyer and went to france. before so doing they tried to get encouragement from the united states government, but failed. neither the government nor any rich american was willing to share the cost of further experiments. all that had been done was at their own cost, both in time and money. in france, whither they went in , they had no coldness to complain of. it was then the golden day of aviation in the land which always afforded to the knights of the air their warmest welcome and their most liberal support. two years had elapsed since santos-dumont, turning from dirigibles to 'planes, had made a flight of yards. this the wrights had at the time excelled at home but without attracting attention. france on the contrary went mad with enthusiasm, and claimed for the brazilian the honour of first demonstrating the possibility of flight in a heavier-than-air machine. england, like the united states, was cold, clinging to the balloon long after all other nations had abandoned it. but france welcomed the wrights with enthusiasm. they found rivals a-plenty in their field of effort. santos-dumont, bleriot, farman, latham were all flying with airplanes, but with models radically different from that of the american brothers. nevertheless the latter made an instant success. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _the comparative strength of belligerents in airplanes at the opening of the war._ _the french army had at least aëroplanes. england had about aëroplanes of all types russia had aëroplanes--austria had at least aëroplanes germany is about the equal of france, having flyers._] from the moment they found that they had hit upon the secret of raising, supporting, and propelling an airplane, the wrights made of their profession a matter of cold business. in many ways this was the best contribution they could possibly have made to the science of aviation, though their keen eye to the main chance did bring down on them a certain amount of ridicule. europe laughed long at the _sang-froid_ with which wilbur wright, having won the michelin prize of eight hundred pounds, gave no heed to the applause which the assembled throng gave him as the money was transferred to him with a neat presentation speech. without a word he divided the notes into two packets, handed one to his brother orville, and thrust the other into his own pocket. for the glory which attended his achievement he cared nothing. it was all in the day's work. later in the course of trials of a machine for the united states government at fort myer, just across the potomac from washington, the wrights seriously offended a certain sort of public sentiment in a way which undoubtedly set back the encouragement of aviation by the united states government very seriously. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _the comparative strength of belligerents in dirigibles at the opening of the war._ _france must be credited with at least eighteen airships of various types--england had only seven--russia had probably not more than three airships available--belgium had one airship austria had not less than three, not more than five airships available--germany had twenty three airships of the rigid, semi-rigid, and non-rigid type._] in , they had received a contract from the government for a machine for the use of the signal service. the price was fixed at $ , , but a bonus of $ was to be paid for every mile above forty miles an hour made by the machine on its trial trip. that bonus looked big to the wrights, but it cost the cause of aviation many times its face value in the congressional disfavour it caused. aviation was then in its infancy in the united states. every man in congress wanted to see the flights. but fort myer, whose parade was to be the testing ground, was fully fourteen miles from the capitol, and reached only most inconveniently from washington by trolley, or most expensively by carriage or automobile. day after day members of the house and senate made the long journey across the potomac. time and again they journeyed back without even a sight of the flyer in the hangar. one after another little flaws discovered in the machine led the aviators to postpone their flight. investigating statesmen who thought that their position justified them in seeking special privileges were brusquely turned away by the military guard. the dusk of many a summer's night saw thousands of disappointed sightseers tramping the long road back to washington. the climax came when on a clear but breezy day wilbur wright announced that the machine was in perfect condition and could meet its tests readily, but that in order to win a bigger bonus, he would postpone the flight for a day with less wind. all over washington the threat was heard that night that congress would vote no more money for aviation, and whether or not the incident was the cause, the sequence was that the american congress was, until the menace of war with germany in , the most niggardly of all legislative bodies in its treatment of the flying corps. when the wrights did finally fly they made a triumphant flight before twelve thousand spectators. the test involved crossing the potomac, going down its north side to alexandria, and then back to fort myer. ringing cheers and the crashing strains of the military band greeted the return of the aviator, but oblivious to the enthusiasm wilbur wright stood beside his machine with pencil and pad computing his bonus. it figured up to five thousand dollars, and the reporters chronicled that the wrights knew well the difference between solid coin and the bubble of reputation. [illustration: wright glider.] but this seemingly cold indifference to fame and single-minded concentration on the business of flying on the part of the wrights was in fact of the utmost value to aviation as an art and a science. they were pioneers and successful ones. their example was heeded by others in the business. in every way they sought to discourage that wild reaching after public favour and notoriety that led aviators to attempt reckless feats, and often sacrifice their lives in a foolish effort to astonish an audience. no one ever heard of either of the wright brothers "looping-the-loop," doing a "demon glide," or in any other fashion reducing the profession of aviation to the level of a circus. in a time when brave and skilful aviators, with a mistaken idea of the ethics of their calling, were appealing to sensation lovers by the practice of dare-devil feats, the wrights with admirable common sense and dignity stood sturdily against any such degradation of the aviator's art. in this position they were joined by glenn curtis, and the influence of the three was beginning to be shown in the reduced number of lives sacrificed in these follies when the great war broke upon the world and gave to aviation its greatest opportunity. the world will hope nevertheless that after that war shall end the effort to adapt the airplane to the ends of peace will be no less earnest and persistent than have been the methods by which it has been made a most serviceable auxiliary of war. in july, , _collier's weekly_ published an interview with orville wright in which that man, ordinarily of few words, set up some interesting theories upon the future of airplanes. "the greatest use of the airplane to date," said mr. wright, "has been as a tremendously big factor of modern warfare. but-- "the greatest use of the airplane eventually will be to prevent war. "some day there will be neither war nor rumours of war, and the reason may be flying machines. "it sounds paradoxical. we are building airplanes to use in time of war, and will continue to build them for war. we think of war and we think of airplanes. later on, perhaps, we shall think of airplanes in connection with the wisdom of keeping out of war. "the airplane will prevent war by making it too expensive, too slow, too difficult, too long drawn out--in brief, by making the cost prohibitive. "did you ever stop to think," inquires wright, "that there is a very definite reason why the present war in europe has dragged along for a year with neither side gaining much advantage over the other? the reason as i figure it out is airplanes. in consequence of the scouting work done by the flying machines each side knows exactly what the opposing forces are doing. "there is little chance for one army to take another by surprise. napoleon won his wars by massing his troops at unexpected places. the airplane has made that impossible. it has equalized information. each side has such complete knowledge of the other's movements that both sides are obliged to crawl into trenches and fight by means of slow, tedious routine, rather than by quick, spectacular dashes. "my impression is that before the present war started the army experts expected it to be a matter of a few weeks, or at the most, a few months. to-day it looks as if it might run into years before one side can dictate terms. now, a nation that may be willing to undertake a war lasting a few months may well hesitate about engaging in one that will occupy years. the daily cost of a great war is of course stupendous. when this cost runs on for years the total is likely to be so great that the side which wins nevertheless loses. war will become prohibitively expensive. the scouting work in flying machines will be the predominating factor, as it seems to me, in bringing this about. i like to think so anyhow." "what, in your opinion, has the present war demonstrated regarding the relative advantages of airplanes and zeppelin airships?" the inventor was asked. "the airplane seems to have been of the more practical use," replied wright. "in the first place, dirigible airships of the zeppelin type are so expensive to build, costing somewhere around a half million dollars each, that it is distinctly disadvantageous to the nation operating them to have one destroyed. but what is more important is the fact that the zeppelin is so large that it furnishes an excellent target, unless it sails considerably higher than is comparatively safe for an airplane. and when the zeppelin is at a safe height it is too far above the ground for your scout to make accurate observations. similarly, when the zeppelin is used for dropping bombs, it must be too high for the bomb thrower to show much accuracy." "you think that the use of flying machines for scouting purposes will be of considerably more importance than their use as a means of attack?" was another question. "that has been decidedly true so far," replied wright. "about all that has been accomplished by either side from bomb dropping has been to kill a few non-combatants and that will have no bearing on the result of the war. [illustration: _at a french airplane base._ © international pilot service.] "english newspapers have long talked of the danger of zeppelin attacks or airplane attacks, but it was all for a purpose, because they did not believe the country was sufficiently prepared for war and sought to arouse the people and the war department to action by means of the airship bogy. [later history showed mr. wright sadly in error on this point.] "aside from the use of the machines for war purposes the war will give a great boost to aviation generally. it has led more men to learn to fly, and with a higher degree of skill than ever before. it has awakened people to aviation possibilities. [illustration: stringfellow's airplane.] "just like the automobile, it will become more and more fool-proof, easier to handle and safer. there is no reason why it should not take the place of special trains where there is urgent need of great speed. "the airplane has never really come into its own as a sporting proposition. of late years the tendency has been to develop a high rate of speed rather than to build machines that may be operated safely at a comparatively low speed. you see, a machine adapted to make from seventy to one hundred miles an hour cannot run at all except at a pretty rapid clip, and this means difficulty in getting down. one must have a good, smooth piece of ground to land on and plenty of it. when we get an airplane that will fly along at twenty miles an hour, one can land almost any place,--on a roof, if necessary,--and then people will begin to take an interest in owning an airplane for the enjoyment of flying." "is it true that you and your brother had a compact not to fly together?" "yes, we felt that until the records of our work could be made complete it was a wise precaution not to take a chance on both of us getting killed at the same time. we never flew together but once. from to the total time in the air for both wilbur and myself, all put together, was only about four hours." mr. wright's statement of the brevity of the time spent in actual flying in order to learn the art will astonish many people. few novices would be so rash as to undertake to steer an automobile alone after only four hours' practice, and despite the fact that the aviator always has plenty of space to himself the airplane can hardly yet be regarded as simple a machine to handle as the automobile. nevertheless the ease with which the method of its actual manipulation is acquired is surprising. more work is done in the classroom and on the ground to make the fighting pilot than in the air. as we have traced the development of both dirigible and airplane from the first nascent germ of their creation to the point at which they were sufficiently developed to play a large part in the greatest of all wars, let us now consider how hosts of young men, boys in truth, were trained to fly like eagles and to give battle in mid-air to foes no less well trained and desperate than they. chapter vi the training of the aviator the great war, opening in europe in and before its end involving practically the whole world, including our own nation, has had more to do with the rapid development of aircraft, both dirigible balloons and airplanes, than any other agency up to the present time. it tested widely and discarded all but the most efficient. it established the relative value of the dirigible and the airplane, so relegating the former to the rear that it is said that the death of count zeppelin, march , , was in a measure due to his chagrin and disappointment. it stimulated at once the inventiveness of the constructors and the skill and daring of the pilots. when it opened there were a few thousand machines and trained pilots in all the armies of europe. before the war had been in progress three years there were more flying men over the battlefields of the three continents, europe, asia, and africa, than there were at that time soldiers of all classes enlisted in the regular army of the united states. before that war the three arms of the armed service had been infantry, artillery, and cavalry. the experience of war added a new arm--the aviation corps--and there is to-day some doubt whether in importance it should not be ranked above the cavalry. [illustration: "_america"--built to cross the atlantic ocean._ © u. & u.] when war was declared none of the belligerent nations had its aërial fleet properly organized, nor was the aviation department in any of them equal in preparedness to the rest of the army. the two great antagonists did not differ greatly in the strength of their flying forces. germany possessed about airplanes, exclusive of about in private hands, of all which it is estimated about were ready for immediate service. fourteen zeppelins were in commission, and other large dirigibles of different types brought the number of the craft of this sort available up to forty. [illustration: _wright airplane in flight._] france was stronger in airplanes but weaker in dirigibles. of the former she had about ; of the latter not more than twenty-five. the land was swept for planes in the hands of private owners and, as the french people had from the first taken a lively interest in aviation, more than were thus obtained. the french furthermore at the very outset imperilled their immediate strength in the air for the sake of the future by adopting four or five machines as army types and throwing out all of other makes. more than machines were thus discarded, and their services lost during the first weeks of the war. the reason for this action was the determination of the french to equip their aviation corps with standardized machines of a few types only. thus interchangeable parts could always be kept in readiness in case of an emergency, and the aviation corps was obliged to familiarize itself with the workings of only a few machines. the objection to the system is the fact that it practically stopped all development of any machines in france except the favoured few. moreover it threw out of the service at a stroke, or remanded for further instruction, not less than four hundred pilots who had been trained on the rejected machines. the order was received with great public dissatisfaction, and for a time threatened serious trouble in the chamber of deputies where criticisms of the direction of the flying service even menaced the continuance of the ministry in power. at the outset of the war great britain lagged far behind the other chief belligerents in the extent of her preparations for war in the air. as has been pointed out the people of that nation had never taken the general interest in aviation which was manifested in france, and there was no persistent count von zeppelin to stir government and citizens into action. the situation was rather anomalous. protected from invasion by its ring of surrounding waters, england had long concentrated its defensive efforts upon its navy. but while the danger of invasion by the air was second only to that by sea the british contemplated with indifference the feverish building of zeppelins by germany, and the multiplication of aircraft of every sort in all the nations of the continent. the manufacture of aircraft was left to private builders, and not until the war was well under way did the government undertake its systematic supervision. the royal aërial factory, then established, became the chief manufacturer of machines for army and navy use, and acted also as the agent for the inspection and testing of machines built by private firms. control of the royal flying corps is vested in the admiralty, the government holding that the strategy of airships was distinctly naval. in the use of seaplanes the british were early far in the lead of other nations, as we shall see in a later chapter. and in the prompt and efficient employment of such aircraft as she possessed at the opening of the war she far outclassed germany which in point of numbers was her superior. at that moment great britain possessed about five hundred machines, of which two hundred were seaplanes, and fifteen dirigibles. despite this puny force, however, british aviators flew across the channel in such numbers to the headquarters in france that when the expeditionary army arrived on the scene it found ready to its hand a scouting force vastly superior to anything the germans could put in the air. it is no exaggeration to say that the royal flying corps saved sir john french's army in his long and gallant fight against the overwhelming numbers of the foe. russia before the war had hidden her aeronautic activities behind the dreary curtain of miles of steppe and marsh that shut her off from the watchfulness of western europe. professional aviators, indeed, had gone thither to make exhibition flights for enormous purses and had brought back word of huge airplanes in course of construction and an eager public interest in the subject of flying. but the secrecy which all the governments so soon to be plunged in war sought to throw about their production of aircraft was especially easy for russia in her isolation. when the storm burst her air fleet was not less than eight hundred airplanes, and at least twenty-five dirigibles. a competent authority estimates that at the outbreak of the war the various powers possessed a total of aircraft of all sorts. this sounds like a colossal fleet, but by it was probably multiplied more than tenfold. of the increase of aircraft we can judge only by guesswork. the belligerents keep their output an inviolable secret. it was known that many factories with a capacity of from thirty to fifty 'planes a week were working in the chief belligerent lands, that the united states was shipping aircraft in parts to avoid violation of neutrality laws before their entrance upon the war, and that american capital operated factories in canada whence the completed craft could be shipped regardless of such laws. how great was the loss to be offset against this new construction is a subject on which no authoritative figures are available. it was estimated early in the war that the life of an airplane in active service seldom exceeded three weeks. in passing it may be mentioned that by some misapprehension on the part of the public, this estimate of the duration of a machine was thought to cover also the average life of the aviators in service. happily this was far from true. the mortality among the machines was not altogether due to wounds sustained in combat, but largely to general wear and tear, rough usage, and constant service. the slightest sign of weakness in a machine led to its instant condemnation and destruction, for if it should develop in mid-air into a serious fault it might cost the life of the aviator and even a serious disaster to the army which he was serving. as the war went on the period of service of a machine became even briefer, for with the growing demand for faster and more quickly controllable machines everything was sacrificed to lightness and speed. the factor of safety which early in the war was six to eight was reduced to three and a half, and instances were known in all services of machines simply collapsing and going to pieces under their own weight without wound or shock. about the extent to which the belligerent governments developed their air forces after the outbreak of war there was during the continuance of that conflict great reticence maintained by all of them. at the outset there was little employment of the flyers except on scouting reconnaissance work, or in directing artillery fire. the raids of zeppelins upon england, of seaplanes on kiel and cuxhaven, of airplanes on friedrichshaven, essen, and venice came later. it has been noted by military authorities that, while germany was provided at first with the largest aviation force of all the belligerents, she either underestimated its value at the outset, or did not know how to employ it, for she blundered into and through belgium using her traditional uhlans for scouts, to the virtual exclusion of airmen. the effectiveness of the belgian fight for delay is ascribed largely to the intelligent and effective use its strategists made of the few aircraft they possessed. wellington was wont to say that the thing he yearned for most in battle was to "see the other side of that hill." napoleon wrote: nothing is more contradictory, nothing more bewildering than the multitude of reports of spies, or of officers sent out to reconnoitre. some locate army corps where they have seen only detachments; others see only detachments where they ought to have seen army corps. [illustration: © u. & u. _the lafayette escadrille--first americans to fly in france._ (_lufbery on left, thaw on right._)] so the two great protagonists of the opening years of the nineteenth century deplored their military blindness. in the opening years of the twentieth it was healed. all that wellington strove to see, all that the cavalry failed to find for napoleon is to-day brought to headquarters by airmen, neatly set forth in maps, supported by photographs of the enemy's positions taken from the sky. before describing the exploits of the airmen in actual campaign let us consider some account of how they were trained for their arduous and novel duties. to the non-professional an amazing thing about the employment of aircraft in war has been the rapidity with which pilots are trained. the average layman would think that to learn the art of manoeuvring an airplane with such swiftness as to evade the attacks of an enemy, and to detect precisely the proper moment and method of attacking him in turn, would require long and arduous practice in the air. but as we have seen in earlier chapters, inventors like the wrights, bleriot, and farman learned to fly with but a few hours spent in the air, with flights lasting less than ten minutes each. so too the army aviators spent but little time aloft, though their course of instruction covered in all a period of about four months. some account of the method of instruction as reported by several out of the hundred or more american boys who went to fly for france may be interesting. as a rule the aviators were from twenty to twenty-five years of age. "below twenty boys are too rash; above twenty-five they are too prudent," said a sententious french aviator. a slight knowledge of motors such as would be obtained from familiarity with automobiles was a marked advantage at the start, for the first task of the novice was to make himself familiar with every type of airplane engine. the army pilot in all the armies was the aristocrat of the service. mechanics kept his motor in shape, and helpers housed, cleaned, and brought forth his machine for action. but while all but the actual piloting and fighting was spared him, there was always the possibility of his making an untimely landing back of the enemy's lines with an engine that would not work. to prepare for such an emergency he was taught all the intricacies of motor construction, so that he might speedily correct any minor fault. in our army, and indeed in all others, applicants for appointment to the aviation corps were subjected to scientific tests of their nerves, and their mental and physical alertness. how they would react to the sudden explosion of a shell near their ears, how long it took the candidate to respond to a sudden call for action, how swiftly he reacted to a sensation of touch were all tested and measured by delicate electric apparatus. a standard was fixed, failing to attain which, the applicant was rejected. the practical effect might be to determine how long after suddenly discovering a masked machine gun a given candidate would take before taking the action necessary to avoid its fire. or how quickly would he pull the lever necessary to guard against a sudden gust of wind. to the layman it would appear that problems of this sort could only be solved in the presence of the actual attack, but science, which enables artillerists to destroy a little village beyond the hills which they never see, was able to devise instruments to answer these questions in the quiet of the laboratory. one of the best known flying schools of the french army was at pau, where on broad level plains were, in , four separate camps for aviators, each with its group of hangars for the machines, its repair shops, and with a tall wireless tower upstanding in the midst for the daily war news from paris. on these plains the wright brothers had made some of their earliest french flights. a little red barn which they had made their workshop was still standing there when war suddenly turned the spot into a flying school often with as many as five thousand pupils in attendance. "to-day that little red barn," writes carroll dana winslow, one of the americans who went to fly for france, "stands as a monument to american stupidity, for when we allowed the wrights to go abroad to perfect their ideas instead of aiding them to carry on their work at home we lost a golden opportunity. now the united states which gave to the world the first practical airplane is the least advanced in this all-important science." arrived at the school the tyro studies the fundamentals of flying in the classroom and on the field for two months before he is allowed to go up--to receive as they express it, his _baptême de l'air_. he picks motors to pieces, and puts them together, he learns the principles of airplane construction, and can discourse on such topics as the angle of attack of the cellule, the incidence of the wings, and the carrying power of the tail-plane. more than any other science aviation has a vocabulary of its own, and a peculiarly cosmopolitan one drawn from all tongues, but with the french predominating. america gave the airplane to france, but france has given the science its terminology. the maps of the battlefields of this war are the marvels of military science. made from the air they show every road and watercourse, every ditch and gully, every patch of woodland, every farmhouse, church, or stonewall. much of the early work of the aviator is in learning to make such maps, both by sketches and by the employment of the camera. it is no easy task. from an airplane one thousand feet up the earth seems to be all a dead level. slight hills, gentle elevations, offer no contrast to the general plain. a road is not easy to tell from a trench. all these things the aviator must first learn to see with accuracy, and then to depict on his map with precision. he must learn furthermore to read the maps of his fellows--a task presupposing some knowledge of how they had been made. he must learn to fly by a map, to recognize objects by the technical signs upon it, to estimate his drift before the wind because of which the machine moves sidewise _en crabe_--or like a crab as the french phrase it. his first flight the novice makes in a machine especially fitted for instruction. the levers are fitted with double handles so that both learner and tutor may hold them at once. if the greenhorn pushes when he should pull the veteran's grip is hard on the handle to correct the error before it can cost two lives--for in the air there is little time to experiment. either set of controls will steer the machine. the pupil grasps his levers, and puts his feet on the pedals. at first the instructor will do the steering, the pupil following with hands and feet as the motions made by the instructor are communicated to him by the moving levers. for a time the two work together. then as the instructor senses that the student himself is doing the right thing he gradually lessens his own activity, until after a few days' practice the student finds that he is flying with a passenger and directing the machine himself. in france, at any rate, they teach in brief lessons. each flight for instruction is limited to about five minutes. at first the student operates in a "penguin"--a machine which will run swiftly along the ground but cannot rise. it is no easy trick at first, to control the "penguin" and keep its course direct. then he will try the "jumps" in a machine that leaps into the air and descends automatically after a twenty to forty yards' flight. as darius green expressed it so long ago, the trouble about flying comes when you want to alight. that holds as true to-day with the most perfect airplanes, as in boyhood days when one jumped from the barn in perfect confidence that the family umbrella would serve as a parachute. to alight with an airplane the pilot--supposing his descent to be voluntary and not compelled by accident or otherwise--surveys the country about him for a level field, big and clear enough for the machine to run off its momentum in a run of perhaps two hundred yards on its wheels. then he gets up a good rate of speed, points the nose of the 'plane down at a sharp angle to the ground, cuts off the engine, and glides. the angle of the fall must be great enough for the force of gravity to keep up the speed. there is a minimum speed at which an airplane will remain subject to control. loss of speed--"_perte de vitesse_," as the french call it--is the aviator's most common peril in landing. if it occurs after his engine is cut off and he has not the time to start it again, the machine tilts and slides down sideways. if it occurs higher up a _vrille_ is the probable result. in this the plane plunges toward the ground spinning round and round with the corner of one wing as a pivot. in either case a serious accident is almost inevitable. in fact the land is almost as dangerous to the navigator of the air as it is to him of the sea. to make good landings is an art only perfected by constant practice. to shut off the engine at precisely the right moment, to choose an angle of descent that will secure the greatest speed and at the same moment bring you to your landing place, to change at the most favourable time from this angle to one that will bring you to the ground at the most gentle of obtuse angles, and to let your machine, weighing perhaps a ton, drop as lightly as a bird and run along the earth for several hundred feet before coming to a full stop, are all features of making a landing which the aviator has to master. in full air there are but few perils to encounter. all airmen unite in declaring that even to the novice in an airplane there is none of that sense of dizziness or vertigo which so many people experience in looking down from high places. the flyer has no sense of motion. a speed of forty miles an hour and of one hundred miles are the same to him. as he looks down the earth seems to be slipping away from him, and moving by, tailwards, like an old-fashioned panorama being unwound. everything about the control of an airplane has to be learned mechanically. once learned the aviator applies his knowledge intuitively. he "senses" the position and progress of the craft by the feel of the controls, as the man at the yacht's tiller tells mysteriously how she is responding to the breeze by "the feel." even before the 'plane responds to some sudden gust of wind, or drops into a hole in the air, the trained aviator will foresee precisely what is about to happen. he reads it in some little thrill of his lever, a quiver in the frame, as the trained boxer reads in his antagonist's eyes the sort of blow that is coming. this instinctive control of his machine is absolutely essential for the fighting pilot who must keep his eyes on the movements of his enemy, watch out for possible aircraft guns below, and all the time be striving to get an advantageous position whence he can turn his machine gun loose. a row of gauges, dials, a compass, and a map on the frame of the car in which he sits will engage his attention in any moments of leisure. it is needless to remark that the successful pilot must have a quick eye and steady nerves. nerve and rapidity of thought save the aviator in many a ticklish position. it is perhaps a tribute to the growing perfection of the airplanes that in certain moments of peril the machine is best left wholly to itself. its stability is such that if freed from control it will often right itself and glide safely to earth. this not infrequently occurs in the moment of the dreaded _perte de vitesse_, to which reference has been made. in his book, _with the french flying corps_, mr. carroll dana winslow, a daring american aviator, tells of two such experiences, the one under his observation, the other happening to himself: the modern airplane is naturally so stable [he says] that if not interfered with it will always attempt to right itself before the dreaded _vrille_ occurs, and fall _en feuille morte_. like a leaf dropping in an autumn breeze is what this means, and no other words explain the meaning better. a curious instance of this happened one day as i was watching the flights and waiting for my turn. i was particularly interested in a machine that had just risen from the "grande piste." it was acting very peculiarly. suddenly its motor was heard to stop. instead of diving it commenced to wabble, indicating a _perte de vitesse_. it slipped off on the wing and then dove. i watched it intently, expecting it to turn into the dreaded spiral. instead it began to climb. then it went off on the wing, righted itself, again slipped off on the wing, volplaned, and went off once more. this extraordinary performance was repeated several times, while each time the machine approached nearer and nearer to the ground. i thought that the pilot would surely be killed. luck was with him, however, for his slip ceased just as he made contact with the ground and he settled in a neighbouring field. it was a very bumpy landing but the airplane was undamaged. the officers rushed to the spot to find out what was the matter. they found the pilot unconscious, but otherwise unhurt. later in the hospital he explained that the altitude had affected his heart and that he had fainted. as he felt himself going he remembered his instructions and relinquished the controls, at the same time stopping his motor. his presence of mind and his luck had saved his life--his luck i say, for had the machine not righted itself at the moment of touching the ground it would have been inevitably wrecked. the spectacle, though terrifying, proved valuable as an education to young winslow who a few days later was ordered to a test of ascension of two thousand feet. this is his story: i had a narrow escape. i had received orders to make a flight during a snow-storm. i rose to the prescribed height and then prepared to make my descent. a whirling squall caught me in the act of making a spiral. i felt the tail of my machine go down and the nose point up. i had a classical _perte de vitesse_. i looked out and saw that i was less than eight hundred feet above the ground and approaching it at an alarming rate of speed. i had already shut off the motor for the spiral, and turning it on, i knew, would not help me in the least. suddenly i remembered the pilot who fainted. i let go of everything, and with a sickening feeling i looked down at the up-rushing ground. at that instant i felt the machine give a lurch and right itself. i grabbed the controls, turned on the motor, and resumed my line of flight only two hundred feet in the air. all this happened in a few seconds, but my helplessness seemed to have lasted for hours. i had had a very close call--not as close as the man who fainted, but sufficiently so for me. [illustration: _distinguishing marks of american planes._] we have said that the process of training a flyer is remarkably expeditious. so far as the fundamentals of his profession are concerned it is. but his education in fact never ends. in the mere matter of reconnaissance, for example, experience is everything. one might imagine that ten thousand men marching on a road would look alike in numbers whatever the nationality. not so. to the untrained eye five thousand or six thousand french troops will look as numerous as ten thousand british or germans. why? because the french march in much more extended order. into their democratic military methods the precision and mechanical exactitude of german drill do not enter. with the same number of troops they will extend further along the road by at least a third than would a detachment of either of the other armies. [illustration: _what an aviator must watch._ _watch_ _altimeter-registering height_ _compass_ _pressure gauges for two gasoline tanks_ _dial registering engine revolutions_ _inclinometer, registering level fore and aft_ _oil pulsator_ _control stick, with thumb switch_ _switches, two magnetos_ _air speed indicator_ _gasolene supply pipe_] and again. great skill has been developed in the course of the war in the art of concealing positions and particularly in disguising cannon. the art has given a new word to the world--_camouflage_. correspondents have repeatedly told of their amazement in suddenly coming across a battery of 's, or a great siege gun so cunningly hidden in the edge of a thicket they would be almost upon it before detecting it. from an airplane feet or more in the air it requires sharp eyes to penetrate artillery disguises. a french poilu in a little book of reminiscences tells with glee how a german observation aviator deceived his batteries. a considerable body of french troops being halted in an open field, out of sight of the enemy batteries, found the glare of the sun oppressive, and having some time to wait threw down their equipment and betook themselves to the cool shadows of a neighbouring wood. along came an enemy aviator. from his lofty height the haversacks, blanket-rolls, and other pieces of dark equipment lying upon the grass looked like a body of troops resting. after sailing over and around the field twice as though to make assurance doubly sure he sailed swiftly away. in a very few minutes shells from a concealed battery began dropping into that field at the rate of several a minute. every foot of it was torn up, and the french soldiers from their retreat in the woods saw their equipment being blown to pieces in every direction. the spectacle was harrowing, but the reflection that the aviator undoubtedly thought that he had turned his guns on a field full of men was cheering to them in their safety. an art which the fighting aviator must master early in his career is that of high diving. many of us have seen a hawk, soaring high in air, suddenly fold his pinions and drop like a plummet full on the back of some luckless pigeon flapping along ungainly scores of feet below, or a fishhawk drop like a meteor from the sky with a resounding splash upon the bosom of some placid stream and rise again carrying a flapping fish to his eyrie in the distant pines. the hunting methods of the hawk are the fighting methods of the airman. but his dives exceed in height and daring anything known to the feathered warriors of the air. boelke, most famous of all the german airmen--or for that matter of all aërial fighters of his day--who in held the record for the number of enemy flyers brought down, was famed for his savage dives. he would fly at a great height, fifteen thousand or more feet, thus assuring himself that there was no enemy above him. when he sighted his prey he would make an absolutely vertical nose dive, dropping at the rate of miles an hour or more and spattering shots from his machine gun as he fell. six hundred shots a minute and the sight of this charging demon were enough to test the nerve of any threatened aviator. in some fashion boelke was enabled to give a slight spiral form to his dive so that his victim was enveloped in a ring of bullets that blocked his retreat whichever way he might turn for safety. personality in fighting counted much for success. boelke's method, its audacity and fierceness, placed him first in the list of airmen with killing records. captain immelman, also a german, who rolled up a score of thirty enemies put out of action before he himself was slain, followed entirely different tactics. his battle manoeuvre savoured much of the circus, including as it did complete loop-the-loop. for instead of approaching his adversary from the side, or as would be said in the sea navy, on the beam, he followed squarely behind him. his study was to get the nose of his machine almost on the tail of the aircraft he was pursuing. this gave him, to begin with, what used to be called in the navy a raking position, for his shots would rake the whole body of the enemy airplane from tail to nose with a fair chance of hitting either the fuel tank, the engine, or the pilot. failing to secure the position he most coveted, this daring german would surrender it with apparent unconcern to the enemy who usually fell into the trap. for just as the foeman's machine came up to the tail of immelman's craft the latter would suddenly turn his nose straight to earth, drop like a stone, execute a backward loop, and come up behind his surprised adversary who thus found the tables suddenly turned. these two german aviators long held the record for execution done in single combat. boelke was killed before the air duel vanished to be replaced by the battle of scores of planes high in air. immelman survived longer, but with the incoming of the pitched battle his personal prowess counted for less and his fame waned. in july, , arrangements were complete in the united states for the immediate training in the fundamentals of aviation of ten thousand young americans. the expectation was that long before the end of the year facilities would be provided for the training of many more. both france and great britain sent over squads of their best aviators, some of them so incapacitated from wounds as to be disqualified for further fighting, but still vigorous enough for the work of an instructor. the aërial service took hold upon the imagination and the patriotism of young america as did no other. the flock of volunteers was far beyond the capacity of the government to care for, and many drifted over into private aviation schools which were established in great numbers. the need for the young students was admittedly great. more and more the impression had grown in both great britain and france that the airplane was to be the final arbiter in the war. it was hailed at once as the most dangerous enemy of the submarine and the most efficient ally of troops in the field. no number seemed too great for the needs of the entente allies, and their eagerness to increase their flying force was strengthened by the knowledge of the fact that germany was building feverishly in order that its fleet in the air might not be eclipsed. perhaps the best description of an idealized aviator was given by lieutenant lufbery, of the lafayette escadrille, who came to the united states to assist in training the new corps of american flying men. lufbery himself was a most successful air fighter--an "ace" several times over. though french by lineage, he was an american citizen and had been a soldier in the united states army. in october of his record was thirteen boches brought down within the allied lines. in the allied air service one gets no credit for the defeated enemy plane if it falls within the enemy lines. while young americans were being drilled into shape for service in the flying corps, lufbery gave this outline of the type of men the service would demand: it will take the cream of the american youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six to man america's thousands of airplanes, and the double cream of youth to qualify as chasers in the republic's new aërial army. intensive and scientific training must be given this cream of youth upon which america's welfare in the war must rest. experience has shown that for best results the fighting aviator should be not over twenty-six years old or under eighteen. the youth under eighteen has shown himself to be bold, but he lacks judgment. men over twenty-six are too cautious. the best air fighters, especially a man handling a chaser, must be of perfect physique. he must have the coolest nerve and be of a temperament that longs for a fight. he must have a sense of absolute duty and fearlessness, the keenest sense of action, and perfect sight to gain the absolute "feel" of his machine. he must be entirely familiar with aërial acrobatics. the latter frequently means life or death. fighting twenty-two thousand feet in the air produces a heavy strain on the heart. it is vital therefore that this organ show not the slightest evidence of weakness. such weakness would decrease the aviator's fighting efficiency. the american boys who come over to france for this work will be subject to rapid and frequent variations in altitude. it is a common occurrence to dive vertically from six thousand to ten thousand feet with the motor pulling hard. sharpness of vision is imperative. otherwise the enemy may escape or the aviator himself will be surprised or mistake a friendly machine for a hostile craft. the differences are often merely insignificant colours and details. america's aviators must be men who will be absolute masters of themselves under fire, thinking out their attacks as their fight progresses. experience has shown that the chaser men should weigh under pounds. americans from the ranks of sport, youth who have played baseball, polo, football, or have shot and participated in other sports will make the best fighting aviators. chapter vii some methods of the war in the air the fighting tactics of the airmen with the various armies were developed as the war ran its course. as happens so often in the utilization of a new device, either of war or peace, the manner of its use was by no means what was expected at the outset. for the first year of the war the activities of the airmen fell far short of realizing tennyson's conception of the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue. the grappling was only incidental. the flyers seemed destined to be scouts and rangefinders, rather than fighters. such pitched combats as there were took rather the form of duels, conducted with something of the formality of the days of chivalry. the aviator intent upon a fight would take his machine over the enemy's line and in various ways convey a challenge to a rival--often a hostile aviator of fame for his daring and skill in combat. if the duel was to the death it would be watched usually from the ground by the comrades of the two duellists, and if the one who fell left his body in the enemy's lines, the victor would gather up his identification disk and other personal belongings and drop them the next day in the camp of the dead man's comrades with a note of polite regret. it was all very daring and chivalric, but it was not war according to twentieth century standards and was not long continued. [illustration: © u. & u. _a caproni triplane._] when at first the aviators of one side flew over the enemy's territory diligently mapping out his trenches, observing the movements of his troops, or indicating, by dropping bunches of tinsel for the sun to shine upon or breaking smoke bombs, the position of his hidden battery, the foe thus menaced sought to drive them away with anti-aircraft guns. these proved to be ineffective and it may be said here that throughout the war the swift airplanes proved themselves more than a match for the best anti-aircraft artillery that had been devised. they could complete their reconnaissances or give their signals at a height out of range of these guns, or at least so great that the chances of their being hit were but slight. it was amazing the manner in which an airplane could navigate a stretch of air full of bursting shrapnel and yet escape serious injury. the mere puncture, even the repeated puncture, of the wings did no damage. only lucky shots that might pierce the fuel tank, hit the engine, touch an aileron or an important stay or strut, could affect the machine, while in due course of time a light armour on the bottom of the fusillage or body of the machine in which the pilot sat, protected the operator to some degree. other considerations, however, finally led to the rejection of armour. [illustration: © u. & u. _a caproni triplane_ (_showing propellers and fuselage_).] accordingly it soon became the custom of the commanders who saw their works being spied out by an enemy soaring above to send up one or more aircraft to challenge the invader and drive him away. this led to the second step in the development in aërial strategy. it was perfectly evident that a man could not observe critically a position and draw maps of it, or seek out the hiding place of massed batteries and indicate them to his own artillerists, and at the same time protect himself from assaults. accordingly the flying corps of every army gradually became differentiated into observation machines and fighting machines--or _avions de réglage_, _avions de bombardement_, and _avions de chasse_, as the french call them. in their order these titles were applied to heavy slow-moving machines used for taking photographs and directing artillery fire, more heavily armed machines of greater weight used in raids and bombing attacks, and the swift fighting machines, quick to rise high, and swift to manoeuvre which would protect the former from the enemy, or drive away the enemy's observation machines as the case might be. in the form which the belligerents finally adopted as most advantageous the fighting airplanes were mainly biplanes equipped with powerful motors seldom of less than horse-power, and carrying often but one man who is not merely the pilot, but the operator of the machine gun with which each was equipped. still planes carrying two men, and even three of whom one was the pilot, the other two the operators of the machine guns were widely adopted. they had indeed their disadvantages. they were slower to rise and clumsier in the turns. the added weight of the two gunmen cut down the amount of fuel that could be carried and limited the radius of action. but one curious disadvantage which would not at first suggest itself to the lay mind was the fact that the roar of the propeller was so great that no possible communication could pass between the pilot and the gunner. their co-operation must be entirely instinctive or there could be no unity of action--and in practice it was found that there was little indeed. the smaller machine, carrying but one man, was quicker in the get-away and could rise higher in less time--a most vital consideration, for in the tactics of aërial warfare it is as desirable to get above your enemy as in the days of the old line of battleships it was advantageous to secure a position off the stern of your enemy so that you might rake him fore and aft. the machines ultimately found to best meet the needs of aërial fighting were for the germans always the fokker, and the taube--so called from its resemblance to a flying dove, though it was far from being the dove of peace. the wings are shaped like those of a bird and the tail adds to the resemblance. the allies after testing the taube design contemptuously rejected it, and indeed the germans themselves substituted the fokker for it in the war's later days. the english used the "vickers scout," built of aluminum and steel and until late in the war usually designed to carry two aviators. this machine unlike most of the others has the propeller at the stern, called a "pusher" in contradistinction to the "tractor," acting as the screw of a ship and avoiding the interference with the rifle fire which the pulling, or tractor propeller mounted before the pilot to a certain degree presents. the vickers machine is lightly armoured. the english also use what was known as the "d. h. ," a machine carrying a motor of very high horse-power, while the sopwith and bristol biplane were popular as fighting craft. the french pinned their faith mainly to the farman, the caudron, the voisin, and the moraine-saulnier machines. the bleriot and the nieuport, which were for some reason ruled out at the beginning of the war, were afterwards re-adopted and employed in great numbers. it would be gratifying to an american author to be able to describe, or at least to mention, the favourite machine of the american aviators who flocked to france immediately upon the declaration of war, but the mortifying fact is that having no airplanes of our own, our gallant volunteer soldiers of the air had to be equipped throughout by the french with machines of their favourite types. after we entered the war we adopted a 'plane of american design to which was given the name "liberty plane." it may be worth while to revert for a moment to the distinction drawn in a preceding paragraph between the pusher propeller and the tractor which revolved in front of the aviator and of his machine gun. it would seem almost incredible that two heavy blades of hard wood revolving at a speed not less that twelve hundred times a minute, a speed so rapid that their passage in front of the eyes of the aviator interfered in no way with his vision, should not have blocked a stream of bullets falling from a gun at the rate of more than six hundred a minute. nevertheless it was claimed during the earlier days of the war that these bullets were not appreciably diverted by the whirling propellers nor were the latter apparently injured by the missiles. the latter assertion, however, must have been to some extent disproved because it came about that the propellers of the later machines were rimmed with a thin coating of steel lest the blades be cut by the bullets. but the amazing ability of modern science to cope with what seemed to be an insoluble problem was demonstrated by the invention of a device light and compact enough to be carried in an airplane, which applied to the machine gun and timed in accordance with the revolutions of the propeller so synchronized the shots with those revolutions that the stream of lead passed between the whirling blades never once striking. the machine was entirely automatic, requiring no attention on the part of the operator after the gun was once started on its discharge. this device was originally used by the germans who applied it to their fokker machines. it was claimed for it that by doing away with the wastage caused by the diversion of the course of bullets, which struck the revolving propellers, it actually saved for effective use about thirty per cent. of the ammunition employed. as the amount of ammunition which can be carried by an airplane is rigidly limited this gave to the appliance a positive value. [illustration: _the terror that flieth by night._ _painting by william j. wilson._] reference has been made to the extraordinary immunity of flying airplanes to the attacks of anti-aircraft guns. the number of wounds they could sustain without being brought to earth was amazing. grahame-white tells of a comparison made in one of the airdromes of the wounds sustained by the machines after a day's hard scouting and fighting. one was found to have been hit no less than thirty-seven times. curiously enough the man who navigated it escaped unscathed. wounds in the wings are harmless. but the puncture of the fuel tank almost certainly means an explosion and the death of the aviator in the flame thousands of feet in the air. during an air battle before arras, a british aviator encountered this fate. when his tank was struck and the fusillage, or body, of his machine burst into flames, he knew that he was lost. by no possibility could he reach the ground before he should be burned to death. a neighbouring aviator flying not far from him told the story afterwards: jack was not in the thick of this fight [said he]. he was rather on the outskirts striving to get in when i suddenly saw his whole machine enveloped in a sheet of flame. instantly he turned towards the nearest german and made at him with the obvious intention of running him down and carrying him to earth in the same cloud of fire. the man thus threatened, twisted and turned in a vain effort to escape the red terror bearing down upon him. but suffering acutely as he must have been, jack followed his every move until the two machines crashed, and whirling over and over each other like two birds in an aërial combat fell to earth and to destruction. they landed inside the german lines so we heard no more about them. but we could see the smoke from the burning débris for some time. as the range of anti-aircraft guns increased the flyers were driven higher and higher into the air to escape their missiles. at one time feet was looked upon as a reasonably safe height, but when the war had been under way about two years the weapons designed to combat aircraft were so improved that they could send their shots effectively , feet into the air. if the aircraft had been forced to operate at that height their usefulness would have been largely destroyed, for it is obvious that for observation purposes the atmospheric haze at such a height would obscure the view and make accurate mapping of the enemy's position impossible. for offensive purposes too the airplanes at so great an elevation would be heavily handicapped, if not indeed rendered impotent. as we shall see later, dropping a bomb from a swiftly moving airplane upon a target is no easy task. it never falls direct but partakes of the motion of the plane. it is estimated that for every thousand feet of elevation a bomb will advance four hundred feet in the direction that the aircraft is moving, provided its speed is not in excess of sixty miles an hour. as a result marksmanship at a height of more than five thousand feet is practically impossible. in the main this situation is met, as all situations in war in which efficiency can only be attained at the expense of great personal danger are met, namely, by braving the danger. when the aviators have an attack in contemplation they fly low and snap their fingers at the puff balls of death as the shrapnel from their appearance when bursting may well be called. naturally, efforts were made early in the war to lessen the danger by armouring the body of the machine sufficiently to protect the aviator and his engine--for if the aviator escaped a shot which found the engine, his plight would be almost as bad as if the missile had struck him. the main difficulty with armouring the machines grew out of the added weight. the more efficient the armour, the less fuel could be carried and the less ammunition. if too heavily loaded the speed of the machine would be reduced and its ability to climb rapidly upon which the safety of the aviator usually depends, either in reconnaissance or fighting, would be seriously impeded. the first essays in protective armour took the form of the installation of a thin sheet of steel along the bottom of the body of the craft. this turned aside missiles from below provided the plane were not so near the ground as to receive them at the moment of their highest velocity. but it was only an unsatisfactory makeshift. at the higher altitudes it was unnecessary and in conflict with other airplanes it proved worthless, because in a battle in the air the shots of the enemy are more likely to come from above or at least from levels in the same plane. the armoured airplane was quickly found to have less chance of mounting above its enemy, because of the weight it carried, and before long the principle of protecting an airplane as a battleship is protected was abandoned, except in the case of the heavier machines intended to operate as scouts or guides to artillery, holding their flights near the earth and protected from attack from above by their attendant fleet of swift fighting machines. of these the vickers machine used mainly by the british is a common type. it is built throughout of steel and aluminum, and the entire fusillage is clothed with steel plating which assures protection to the two occupants from either upward or lateral fire. the sides of the body are carried up so that only the heads of the aviators are visible. but to accomplish this measure of protection for the pilot and the gunner who operates the machine gun from a seat forward of the pilot, the weight of the craft is so greatly increased that it is but little esteemed for any save the most sluggish manoeuvre. indeed just as aircraft, as a factor in war, have come to be more like the cavalry in the army, or the destroyers and scout cruisers in the navy, so the tendency has been to discard everything in their design that might by any possibility interfere with their speed and their ability to turn and twist, and change direction and elevation with the utmost celerity under the most difficult of conditions. it is possible that should this war run into the indefinite future we may see aircraft built on ponderous lines and heavily armoured, and performing in the air some of the functions that the british "tanks" have discharged on the battlefields. but at the end of three years of war, and at the moment when aërial hostilities seemed to be engaging more fully than even before the inventive genius of the nations, and the dash and skill of the fighting flyers, the tendency is all toward the light and swift machine. [illustration: photo by press illustrating service. _a curtis seaplane leaving a battleship._] the attitude of the fighting airmen is somewhat reminiscent of that of america's greatest sea-fighter, admiral farragut. always opposed to ironclads, the hero of mobile bay used to say that when he went to sea he did not want to go in an iron coffin, and that when a shell had made its way through one side of his ship he didn't want any obstacle presented to impede its passing out of the other side. [illustration: © u. & u. _launching a hydroaëroplane._] the all important and even vital necessity for speed also detracted much from the value of aircraft in offensive operations. it was found early that you could not mount on a flying machine guns of sufficient calibre to be of material use in attacking fortified positions. if it was necessary for the planes to proceed any material distance before reaching their objective, the weight of the necessary fuel would preclude the carriage of heavy artillery. in the case of seaplanes which might be carried on the deck of a battleship to a point reasonably contiguous to the object to be attacked, this difficulty was not so serious. this was demonstrated to some extent by the british raids on the german naval bases of cuxhaven and wilhelmshaven, but even in these instances it was bombs dropped by aviators, not gunfire that injured the enemy's works. but for the airplane proper this added weight was so positive a handicap as to practically destroy its usefulness as an assailant of fortified positions. the heavier weapons of offence which could be carried by the airplane even of the highest development were the bombs. these once landed might cause the greatest destruction, but the difficulty of depositing them directly upon a desired target was not to be overcome. the dirigible balloon enjoyed a great advantage over the airplane in this respect, for it was able to hover over the spot which it desired to hit and to discharge its bombs in a direct perpendicular line with enough initial velocity from a spring gun to overcome largely any tendency to deviate from the perpendicular. but an airplane cannot stop. when it stops it must descend. if it is moving at the moderate speed of sixty miles an hour when it drops its missile, the bomb itself will move forward at the rate of sixty miles an hour until gravity has overcome the initial forward force. years before the war broke out, tests were held in germany and france of the ability of aviators to drop a missile upon a target marked out upon the ground. one such test in france required the dropping of bombs from a height of feet upon a target feet long by broad--or about the dimensions of a small and rather stubby ship. the results were uniformly disappointing. the most creditable record was made by an american aviator, lieutenant scott, formerly of the united states army. his first three shots missed altogether, but thereafter he landed eight within the limits. in germany the same year the test was to drop bombs upon two targets, one resembling a captive zeppelin, the other a military camp feet square. the altitude limit was set at feet. this, though a comparatively easy test, was virtually a failure. only two competitors succeeded in dropping a bomb into the square at all, while the balloon was hit but once. the character and size of the bombs employed by aircraft naturally differed very widely, particularly as to size, between those carried by dirigibles and those used by airplanes. the zeppelin shell varied in weight between two hundred and two hundred and fifty pounds. it was about forty-seven inches long by eight and a half inches in diameter. its charge varied according to the use to which it was to be put. if it was hoped that it would drop in a crowded spot and inflict the greatest amount of damage to human life and limb it would carry a bursting charge, shrapnel, and bits of iron, all of which on the impact of the missile upon the earth would be hurled in every direction to a radius exceeding forty yards. if damage to buildings, on the other hand, was desired, some high explosive such as picric acid would be used which would totally wreck any moderate-sized building upon which the shell might fall. in many instances, particularly in raids upon cities such as london, incendiary shells were used charged with some form of liquid fire, which rapidly spread the conflagration, and which itself was practically inextinguishable. shells or bombs of these varying types were dropped from airplanes as well as from the larger and steadier zeppelins. the difference was entirely in the size. it was said that a zeppelin might drop a bomb of a ton's weight. but so far as attainable records are concerned it is impossible to cite any instance of this being done. the effect on the great gas bag of the sudden release of a load so great would certainly cause a sudden upward flight which might be so quick and so powerful as to affect the very structure of the ship. so far as known pounds was the topmost limit of zeppelin bombs, while most of them were of much smaller dimensions. the airplane bombs were seldom more than sixty pounds in weight, although in the larger british machines a record of ninety-five pounds has been attained. the most common form of bomb used in the heavier-than-air machines was pear-shaped, with a whirling tail to keep the missile upright as it falls. steel balls within, a little larger than ordinary shrapnel, are held in place by a device which releases them during the fall. on striking the ground they fall on the explosive charge within and the shell bursts, scattering the two or three hundred steel bullets which it carries over a wide radius. bombs of this character weigh in the neighbourhood of six pounds and an ordinary airplane can carry a very considerable number. their exploding device is very delicate so that it will operate upon impact with water, very soft earth, or even the covering of an airship. other bombs commonly used in airplanes were shaped like darts, winged like an arrow so that they would fall perpendicularly and explode by a pusher at the point which was driven into the body of the bomb upon its impact with any hard substance. it seems curious to read of the devices sometimes quite complicated and at all times the result of the greatest care and thought, used for dropping these bombs. in the trenches men pitched explosive missiles about with little more care than if they had been so many baseballs, but only seldom was a bomb from aloft actually delivered by hand. in the case of the heavier bombs used by the dirigibles this is understandable. they could not be handled by a single man without the aid of mechanical devices. some are dropped from a cradle which is tilted into a vertical position after the shell has been inserted. others are fired from a tube not unlike the torpedo tube of a submarine, but which imparts only slight initial velocity to the missile. its chief force is derived from gravity, and to be assured of its explosion the aviator must discharge it from a height proportionate to its size. in the airplane the aviator's methods are more simple. sometimes the bombs are carried in a rack beneath the body of the machine, and released by means of a lever at the side. a more primitive method often in use is merely to attach the bomb to a string and lower it to a point at which the aviator is certain that in falling it will not touch any part of the craft, and then cut the string. half a dozen devices by which the aviator can hold the bomb at arm's length and drop it with the certainty of a perpendicular fall are in use in the different air navies. it will be evident to the most casual consideration that with any one of these devices employed by an aviator in a machine going at a speed of sixty miles an hour or more the matter of hitting the target is one in which luck has a very great share. there is good reason for the pains taken by the aviators to see that their bombs fall swift and true, and clear of all the outlying parts of their machines. the grenadier in the trenches has a clear field for his explosive missile and he may toss it about with what appears to be desperate carelessness--though instances have been known in which a bomb thrower, throwing back his arm preparatory to launching his canned volcano, has struck the back of his own trench with disastrous results. but the aviator must be even more careful. his bombs must not hit any of the wires below his machine in falling--else there will be a dire fall for him. and above all they must not get entangled in stays or braces. in such case landing will bring a most unpleasant surprise. a striking case was that of a bomber who had been out over the german trenches. he had a two-man machine, had made a successful flight and had dropped, effectively as he supposed, all his bombs. returning in serene consciousness of a day's duty well done, he was about to spiral down to the landing place when his passenger looked over the side of the car to see if everything was in good order. emphatically it was not. to his horror he discovered that two of the bombs had not fallen, but had caught in the running gear of his machine. to attempt a landing with the bombs in this position would have been suicidal. the bombs would have instantly exploded, and annihilated both machine and aviators. but to get out of the car, climb down on the wires, and try to unhook the bombs seemed more desperate still. stabilizers, and other devices, now in common use, had not then been invented and to go out on the wing of a biplane, or to disturb its delicate balance, was unheard of. nevertheless it was a moment for desperate remedies. the pilot clung to his controls, and sought to meet the shifting strains, while the passenger climbed out on the wing and then upon the running gear. to trust yourself two thousand feet in mid-air with your feet on one piano wire, and one hand clutching another, while with the other hand you grope blindly for a bomb charged with high explosive, is an experience for which few men would yearn. but in this case it was successful. the bombs fell--nobody cared where--and the two imperilled aviators came to ground safely. a form of offensive weapon which for some reason seems peculiarly horrible to the human mind is the fléchette. these are steel darts a little larger than a heavy lead pencil and with the upper two thirds of the stem deeply grooved so that the greater weight of the lower part will cause them to fall perpendicularly. these are used in attacks upon dense bodies of troops. particularly have they proved effective in assailing cavalry, for the nature of the wounds they produce invariably maddens the horses who suffer from them and causes confusion that will often bring grave disaster to a transport or artillery train. though very light, these arrows when dropped from any considerable height inflict most extraordinary wounds. they have been known to penetrate a soldier's steel helmet, to pass through his body and that of the horse he bestrode, and bury themselves in the earth. in the airplane they are carried in boxes of one hundred each, placed over an orifice in the floor. a touch of the aviator's foot and all are discharged. the speed of the machine causes them to fall at first in a somewhat confused fashion, with the result that before all have finally assumed their perpendicular position they have been scattered over a very considerable extent of air. once fairly pointed downward they fall with unerring directness points downward to their mark. [illustration: _at a united states training camp._ © u. & u.] it is a curious fact that not long after these arrows first made their appearance in the french machines, they were imitated by the germans, but the german darts had stamped upon them the words: "made in germany, but invented by the french." [illustration: _a "blimp" with gun mounted on top._ © u. & u.] one of the duties of the fighting airmen is to destroy the observation balloons which float in great numbers over both the lines tugging lazily at the ropes by which they are held captive while the observers perched in their baskets communicate the results of their observations by telephone to staff officers at a considerable distance. these balloons are usually anchored far enough back of their own lines to be safe from the ordinary artillery fire of their enemies. they were therefore fair game for the mosquitoes of the air. but they were not readily destroyed by such artillery as could be mounted on an ordinary airplane. bullets from the machine-guns were too small to make any rents in the envelope that would affect its stability. even if incendiary they could not carry a sufficiently heavy charge to affect so large a body. the skin of the "sausages," as the balloons were commonly called from their shape, was too soft to offer sufficient resistance to explode a shell of any size. the war was pretty well under way before the precise weapon needed for their destruction was discovered. this proved to be a large rocket of which eight were carried on an airplane, four on each side. they were discharged by powerful springs and a mechanism started which ignited them as soon as they had left the airplane behind. the head of each rocket was of pointed steel, very sharp and heavy enough to pierce the balloon skin. winslow was fortunate enough to be present when the first test of this weapon was made. in his book, _with the french flying corps_, he thus tells the story: swinging lazily above the field was a captive balloon. at one end of le bourget was a line of waiting airplanes. "this is the second; they have already brought down one balloon," remarked the man at my elbow. the hum of a motor caused me to look up. a wide-winged double motor, caudron, had left the ground and was mounting gracefully above us. up and up it went, describing a great circle, until it faced the balloon. everyone caught his breath. the caudron was rushing straight at the balloon, diving for the attack. "now!" cried the crowd. there was a loud crack, a flash, and eight long rockets darted forth leaving behind a fiery trail. the aviator's aim however was wide, and to the disappointment of everyone the darts fell harmlessly to the ground. another motor roared far down the field, and a tiny _appareil de chasse_ shot upward like a swallow. "a nieuport," shouted the crowd as one voice. eager to atone for his _copain's_ failure, and impatient at his delay in getting out of the way, the tiny biplane tossed and tumbled about in the air like a clown in the circus ring. "look! he's looping! he falls! he slips! no, he rights again!" cried a hundred voices as the skilful pilot kept our nerves on edge. suddenly he darted into position and for a second hovered uncertain. then with a dive like that of a dragon-fly, he rushed down to the attack. again a sheet of flame and a shower of sparks. this time the balloon sagged. the flames crept slowly around its silken envelope. "_touchez!_" cried the multitude. then the balloon burst and fell to the ground a mass of flames. high above the little nieuport saucily continued its pranks, as though contemptuous of such easy prey. [illustration: _aviators descending in parachutes from a balloon struck by incendiary shells._ © u. & u.] it may be properly noted at this point that the captive balloons or kite balloons have proved of the greatest value for observations in this war. lacking of course the mobility of the swiftly moving airplanes, they have the advantage over the latter of being at all times in direct communication by telephone with the ground and being able to carry quite heavy scientific instruments for the more accurate mapping out of such territory as comes within their sphere of observation. they are not easy to destroy by artillery fire, for the continual swaying of the balloon before the wind perplexes gunners in their aim. at a height of six hundred feet, a normal observation post, the horizon is nearly thirty miles from the observer. in flat countries like flanders, or at sea where the balloon may be sent up from the deck of a ship, this gives an outlook of the greatest advantage to the army or fleet relying upon the balloon for its observations of the enemy's dispositions. [illustration: _the balloon from which the aviators fled._ © u. & u.] most of the british and french observation balloons have been of the old-fashioned spherical form which officers in those services find sufficiently effective. the germans, however, claimed that a balloon might be devised which would not be so very unstable in gusty weather. out of this belief grew the parseval-siegfeld balloon which from its form took the name of the sausage. in fact its appearance far from being terrifying suggests not only that particular edible, but a large dill pickle floating awkwardly in the air. in order to keep the balloon always pointed into the teeth of the wind there is attached to one end of it a large surrounding bag hanging from the lower half of the main envelope. one end of this, the end facing forward, is left open and into this the wind blows, steadying the whole structure after the fashion of the tail of a kite. the effect is somewhat grotesque as anyone who has studied the numerous pictures of balloons of this type employed during the war must have observed. it looks not unlike some form of tumor growing from a healthy structure. captive or kite balloons are especially effective as coast guards. posted fifty miles apart along a threatened coast they can keep a steady watch over the sea for more than twenty-five miles toward the horizon. with their telephonic connections they can notify airplanes in waiting, or for that matter swift destroyers, of any suspicious sight in the distance, and secure an immediate investigation which will perhaps result in the defeat of some attempted raid. requiring little power for raising and lowering them and few men for their operation, they form a method of standing sentry guard at a nation's front door which can probably be equalled by no other device. the united states at the moment of the preparation of this book is virtually without any balloons of this type--the first one of any pretensions having been tested in the summer of . as late as the third year of the war it could not be said that the possibilities of aërial offense had been thoroughly developed by any nation. the germans indeed had done more than any of the belligerents in this direction with their raids on the british coast and on london. but, as already pointed out, these raids as serious attacks on strategic positions were mere failures. advocates of the increased employment of aircraft in this fashion insist that the military value to germany of the raids lay not so much in the possibility of doing damage of military importance but rather in the fact that the possibility of repeated and more effective raids compelled great britain to keep at home a force of thirty thousand to fifty thousand men constantly on guard, who but for this menace would have been employed on the battlefields of france. in this argument there is a measure of plausibility. indeed between january, , and june , , the germans made twenty-three disastrous raids upon england, killing more than seven hundred persons and injuring nearly twice as many. the amount of damage to property has never been reported nor is it possible to estimate the extent of injury inflicted upon works of a military character. the extreme secrecy with which great britain, in common with the other belligerents, has enveloped operations of this character makes it impossible at this early day to estimate the military value of these exploits. merely to inflict anguish and death upon a great number of civilians, and those largely women and children, is obviously of no military service. but if such suffering is inflicted in the course of an attack which promises the destruction or even the crippling of works of military character like arsenals, munition plants, or naval stores, it must be accepted as an incident of legitimate warfare. the limited information obtainable in wartime seems to indicate that the german raids had no legitimate objective in view but were undertaken for the mere purpose of frightfulness. the methods of defence employed in great britain, where all attacks must come from the sea, were mainly naval. what might be called the outer, or flying, defences consisted of fast armed fighting seaplanes and dirigibles. stationed on the coast and ready on the receipt of a wireless warning from scouts, either aërial or naval, that an enemy air flotilla was approaching the coast, they could at once fly forth and give it battle. a thorough defence of the british territory demanded that the enemy should be driven back before reaching the land. once over british territory the projectiles discharged whether by friend or foe did equal harm to the people on the ground below. accordingly every endeavour was made to meet and beat the raiders before they had passed the barrier of sea. beside the flying defences there were the floating defences. anti-aircraft guns were mounted on different types of ships stationed far out from the shore and ever on the watch. but these latter were of comparatively little avail, for flying over the channel or the north sea the invaders naturally flew at a great height. they had no targets there to seek, steered by their compasses, and were entirely indifferent to the prospect beneath them. moreover anti-aircraft guns, hard to train effectively from an immovable mount, were particularly untrustworthy when fired from the deck of a rolling and tossing ship in the turbulent channel. third in the list of defences of the british coast, or of any other coast which may at any time be threatened with an aërial raid, are defensive stations equipped not only with anti-aircraft guns and searchlights but with batteries of strange new scientific instruments like the "listening towers," equipped with huge microphones to magnify the sound of the motors of approaching aircraft so that they would be heard long before they could be seen, range finders, and other devices for the purpose of gauging the distance and fixing the direction of an approaching enemy. some brief attention may here be given to the various types of anti-aircraft guns. these differ very materially in type and weight in the different belligerent armies and navies. they have but one quality in common, namely that they are most disappointing in the results attained. mr. f. w. lancaster, the foremost british authority on aircraft, says on this subject: "anti-aircraft firing is very inaccurate, hence numbers of guns are employed to compensate." [illustration: photo by international film service. _german air raiders over england._ _in the foreground three british planes are advancing to the attack._] that is to say that one or two guns can be little relied upon to put a flyer _hors du combat_. the method adopted is to have large batteries which fairly fill that portion of the air through which the adventurous airman is making his way with shells fired rather at the section than at the swiftly moving target. "archibald," the british airmen call, for some mysterious reason, the anti-aircraft guns employed by their enemies, sometimes referring to a big howitzer which made its appearance late in the war as "cuthbert." the names sound a little effeminate, redolent somehow of high teas and the dancing floor, rather than the field of battle. perhaps this was why the british soldiers adopted them as an expression of contempt for the enemy's batteries. but contempt was hardly justifiable in face of the difficulty of the problem. a gun firing a twenty-pound shrapnel shell is not pointed on an object with the celerity with which a practised revolver shot can throw his weapon into position. the gunner on the ground seeing an airplane flying five thousand feet above him--almost a mile up in the air--hurries to get his piece into position for a shot. but while he is aiming the flyer, if a high-speed machine, will be changing its position at a rate of perhaps miles an hour. nor does it fly straight ahead. the gunner cannot point his weapon some distance in advance as he would were he a sportsman intent on cutting off a flight of wild geese. the aviator makes quick turns--zigzags--employs every artifice to defeat the aim of his enemy below. small wonder that in the majority of cases they have been successful. the attitude of the airmen toward the "archies" is one of calm contempt. the german mind being distinctly scientific invented early in the war a method of fixing the range and position of an enemy airplane which would be most effective if the target were not continually in erratic motion. the method was to arrange anti-aircraft guns in a triangle, all in telephonic connection with a central observer. when a flyer enters the territory which these guns are guarding, the gunner at one of the apexes of the triangle fires a shell which gives out a red cloud of smoke. perhaps it falls short. the central observer notes the result and orders a second gun to fire. instantly a gunner at another apex fires again, this time a shell giving forth black smoke. this shell discharged with the warning given by the earlier one is likely to come nearer the target, but at any rate marks another point at which it has been missed. between the two a third gunner instantly corrects his aim by the results of the first two shots. his shell gives out a yellow smoke. the observer then figures from the positions of the three guns the lines of a triangular cone at the apex of which the target should be. sometimes science wins, often enough for the germans to cling to the system. but more often the shrewd aviator defeats science by his swift and eccentric changes of his line of flight. at the beginning of the war germany was very much better equipped with anti-aircraft guns than any of her enemies. this was due to the remarkable foresight of the great munition makers, krupp and ehrhardt, who began experimenting with anti-aircraft guns before the aircraft themselves were much more than experiments. the problem was no easy one. the gun had to be light, mobile, and often mounted on an automobile so as to be swiftly transferred from place to place in pursuit of raiders. it was vital that it should be so mounted as to be speedily trained to any position vertical or horizontal. as a result the type determined upon was mounted on a pedestal fixed to the chassis of an automobile or to the deck of a ship in case it was to be used in naval warfare. the heaviest gun manufactured in germany was of - / -inch calibre, throwing a shell of forty pounds weight. this could be mounted directly over the rear axle of a heavy motor truck. to protect the structure of the car from the shock of the recoil these guns are of course equipped with hydraulic or other appliances for taking it up. they are manufactured also in the -inch size. germany, france, and england vied with each other in devising armored motor cars equipped with guns of this type--the british using the makes of vickers and hotchkiss, and the french their favourite creusot. the trucks are always armoured, the guns mounted in turrets so that the effect is not unlike that of a small battleship dashing madly down a country road and firing repeatedly at some object directly overhead. but the record has not shown that the success of these picturesque and ponderous engines of war has been great. they cannot manoeuvre with enough swiftness to keep up with the gyrations of an airplane. they offer as good a target for a bomb from above as the aircraft does to their shots from below. indeed they so thoroughly demonstrated their inefficiency that before the war had passed its third year they were either abandoned or their guns employed only when the car was stationary. shots fired at full speed were seldom effective. the real measure of the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns may be judged by the comparative immunity that attended the aviators engaged on the two early british raids on friedrichshaven, the seat of the great zeppelin works on lake constance, and on the german naval base at cuxhaven. the first was undertaken by three machines. from belfort in france, the aviators turned into germany and flew for miles across hostile territory. the flight was made by day though indeed the adventurous aviators were favoured by a slight mist. small single seated "avro" machines were used, loaded heavily with bombs as well as with the large amount of fuel necessary for a flight which before its completion would extend over miles. not only at the frontier, but at many fortified positions over which they passed, they must have exposed themselves to the fire of artillery, but until they actually reached the neighbourhood of the zeppelin works they encountered no fire whatsoever. there the attack on them was savage and well maintained. on the roofs of the gigantic factory, on neighbouring hillocks and points of vantage there were anti-aircraft guns busily discharging shrapnel at the invaders. it is claimed by the british that fearing this attack the germans had called from the front in flanders their best marksmen, for at that time the comparative worthlessness of the zeppelin had not been demonstrated and the protection of the works was regarded as a prime duty of the army. [illustration: © u. & u. _one aviator's narrow escape._] the invading machines flew low above the factory roofs. the adventurers had come far on an errand which they knew would awaken the utmost enthusiasm among their fellows at home and they were determined to so perform their task that no charge of having left anything undone could possibly lie. commander briggs, the first of the aviators to reach the scene, flew as low as one hundred feet above the roofs, dropping his bombs with deadly accuracy. but he paid for his temerity with the loss of his machine and his liberty. a bullet pierced his petrol tank and there was nothing for him to do save to glide to earth and surrender. the two aviators who accompanied him although their machines were repeatedly hit were nevertheless able to drop all their bombs and to fly safely back to belfort whence they had taken their departure some hours before. the measure of actual damage done in the raid has never been precisely known. germany always denied that it was serious, while the british ascribe to it the greatest importance--a clash of opinion common in the war and which will for some years greatly perplex the student of its history. the second raid, that upon cuxhaven, was made by seaplanes so far as the air fighting was concerned, but in it not only destroyers but submarines also took part. it presented the unique phenomenon of a battle fought at once above, upon, and below the surface of the sea. it is with the aërial feature of the battle alone that we have to do. christmas morning, , seven seaplanes were quietly lowered to the surface of the water of the north sea from their mother ships a little before daybreak. the spot was within a few miles of cuxhaven and the mouth of the river elbe. as the aircraft rose from the surface of the water and out of the light mist that lay upon it, they could see in the harbour which they threatened, a small group of german warships. almost at the same moment their presence was detected. the alarms of the bugles rang out from the hitherto quiet craft and in a moment with the smoke pouring from their funnels destroyers and torpedo boats moved out to meet the attack. two zeppelins rose high in the air surrounded by a number of the smaller airplanes, eager for the conflict. the latter proceeded at once to the attack upon the raiding air fleet, while the destroyers, the heavier zeppelins, and a number of submarines sped out to sea to attack the british ships. the mist, which grew thicker, turned the combat from a battle into a mere disorderly raid, but out of it the seaplanes emerged unhurt. all made their way safely back to the fleet, after having dropped their bombs with a degree of damage never precisely known. the weakness of the seaplane is that on returning to its parent ship it cannot usually alight upon her deck, even though a landing platform has been provided. it must, as a rule, drop to the surface of the ocean, and if this be at all rough the machine very speedily goes to pieces. this was the case with four of the seven seaplanes which took part in the raid on cuxhaven. all however delivered their pilots safely to the awaiting fleet and none fell a victim to the german anti-aircraft guns. in may of , the british royal naval air service undertook the mapping of the coast of belgium north from nieuport, the most northerly seaport held by the british, to the southern boundary of holland. this section of coast was held by the germans and in it were included the two submarine bases of zeebrugge and ostend. at the latter point the long line of german trenches extending to the boundary of switzerland rested its right flank on the sea. the whole coast north of that was lined with german batteries, snugly concealed in the rolling sand dunes and masked by the waving grasses of a barren coast. from british ships thirty miles out at sea, for the waters there are shallow and large vessels can only at great peril approach the shore, the seaplanes were launched. just south of nieuport a land base was established as a rendezvous for both air-and seaplanes when their day's work was done. from fleet and station the aërial observers took their way daily to the enemy's coast. every mile of it was photographed. the hidden batteries were detected and the inexorable record of their presence imprinted on the films. the work in progress at ostend and zeebrugge, the active construction of basins, locks, and quays, the progress of the great mole building at the latter port, the activities of submarines and destroyers within the harbour, the locations of guns and the positions of barracks were all indelibly set down. these films developed at leisure were made into coherent wholes, placed in projecting machines, and displayed like moving pictures in the ward rooms of the ships hovering off shore, so that the naval forces preparing for the assault had a very accurate idea of the nature of the defences they were about to encounter. this was not done of course without considerable savage fighting in mid-air. the germans had no idea of allowing their defences and the works of their submarine bases to be pictured for the guidance of their foes. their anti-aircraft guns barked from dawn to dark whenever a british plane was seen within range. their own aërial fighters were continually busy, and along that desolate wave-washed coast many a lost lad in leather clothing and goggles, crumpled up in the ruins of his machine after a fall of thousands of feet, lay as a memorial to the prowess of the defenders of the coast and the audacity of those who sought to invade it. but during the long weeks of this extended reconnaissance hardly a spadeful of dirt could be moved, a square yard of concrete placed in position, or a submarine or torpedo boat manoeuvred without its record being entered upon the detailed charts the british were so painstakingly preparing against the day of assault. when peace shall finally permit the publication of the records of the war, now held secret for military reasons, such maps as those prepared by the british air service on the belgian coast will prove most convincing evidence of the military value of the aërial scouts. what the lads engaged in making these records had to brave in the way of physical danger is strikingly shown by the description of a combat included in one of the coldly matter-of-fact official reports. the battle was fought at about twelve thousand feet above mother earth. we quote the official description accompanied by some explanatory comments added by one who was an eye-witness and who conversed with the triumphant young airman on his return to the safety of the soil. "while exposing six plates," says the official report of this youthful recording angel, "i observed five h. a.'s cruising." "h. a." stands for "hostile aeroplane." "not having seen the escort since returning inland, the pilot prepared to return. the enemy separated, one taking up a position above the tail and one ahead. the other three glided toward us on the port side, firing as they came. the two diving machines fired over rounds, hitting the pilot in the shoulder." as a matter of fact, the bullet entered his shoulder from above, behind, breaking his left collarbone, and emerged just above his heart, tearing a jagged rent down his breast. both his feet, furthermore, were pierced by bullets; but the observer is not concerned with petty detail. the observer held his fire until h. a., diving on tail, was within five yards. here it might be mentioned that the machines were hurtling through space at a speed in the region of one hundred miles an hour. the pilot of h. a., having swooped to within speaking distance, pushed up his goggles, and laughed triumphantly as he took sight for the shot that was to end the fight. but the observer, had his own idea how the fight should end. "i then shot one tray into the enemy pilot's face," he says, with curt relish, "and watched him sideslip and go spinning earthward in a train of smoke." he then turned his attention to his own pilot. the british machine was barely under control, but as the observer rose in his seat to investigate the foremost gun was fired, and the aggressor ahead went out of control and dived nose first in helpless spirals. suspecting that his mate was badly wounded in spite of this achievement, the observer swung one leg over the side of the fusillage and climbed on to the wing--figure for a minute the air pressure on his body during this gymnastic feat--until he was beside the pilot, faint and drenched with blood, who had nevertheless got his machine back into complete control. "get back, you ass!" he said through white lips in response to inquiries how he felt. so the ass got back the way he came, and looked around for the remainder of the h. a.'s. these, however, appeared to have lost stomach for further fighting and fled. the riddled machine returned home at one hundred knots while the observer, having nothing better to do, continued to take photographs. "the pilot, though wounded, made a perfect landing"--thus the report concludes. when the time came for the assault upon zeebrugge the value of these painstaking preparations was made evident. the attack was made from sea and air alike. out in the north sea the great british battleships steamed in as near the coast as the shallowness of the water would permit. from the forward deck of each rose grandly a seaplane until the air was darkened by their wings, and they looked like a monstrous flock of the gulls which passengers on ocean-going liners watch wheeling and soaring around the ship as it ploughs its way through the ocean. these gulls though were birds of prey. they were planes of the larger type, biplanes or triplanes carrying two men, usually equipped with two motors and heavily laden with high explosive bombs. as they made their way toward the land they were accompanied by a fleet of light draft monitors especially built for this service, each mounting two heavy guns and able to manoeuvre in shallow water. with them advanced a swarm of swift, low-lying, dark-painted destroyers ready to watch out for enemy torpedo boats or submarines. they mounted anti-aircraft guns too and were prepared to defend the monitors against assaults from the heavens above as well as from the sinister attack of the underwater boats. up from the land base at nieuport came a great fleet of airplanes to co-operate with their naval brethren. soon upon the german works, sheltering squadrons of the sinister undersea boats, there rained a hell of exploding projectiles from sea and sky. every gunner had absolute knowledge of the precise position and range of the target to which he was assigned. the great guns of the monitors roared steadily and their twelve and fourteen-inch projectiles rent in pieces the bomb proofs of the germans, driving the boches to cover and reducing their works to mere heaps of battered concrete. back and forth above flew seaplanes and airplanes, giving battle to the aircraft which the germans sent up in the forlorn hope of heading off that attack and dropping their bombs on points carefully mapped long in advance. it is true that the aim of the aviators was necessarily inaccurate. that is the chief weakness of a bombardment from the sky. but what was lacking in individual accuracy was made up by the numbers of the bombing craft. one might miss a lock or a shelter, but twenty concentrating their fire on the same target could not all fail. this has become the accepted principle of aërial offensive warfare. the inaccuracy of the individual must be corrected by the multiplication of the number of the assailants. the attack on zeebrugge was wholly successful. though the germans assiduously strove to conceal the damage done, the later observations of the ruined port by british airmen left no doubt that as a submarine base it had been put out of commission for months to come. the success of the attack led to serious discussion, in which a determination has not yet been reached, of the feasibility of a similar assault upon heligoland, kiel, or cuxhaven, the three great naval bases in which the german fleet has lurked in avoidance of battle with the british fleet. many able naval strategists declared that it was time for the british to abandon the policy of a mere blockade and carry out the somewhat rash promise made by winston churchill when first lord of the admiralty, to "dig the rats out of their holes." such an attack it was urged should be made mainly from the air, as the land batteries and sunken mines made the waters adjacent to these harbours almost impassable to attacking ships. rear-admiral fiske, of the united states navy, strongly urging such an attack, wrote in an open letter: the german naval general staff realizes the value of concentration of power and mobility in as large units as possible. the torpedo plane embodies a greater concentration of power and mobility than does any other mechanism. for its cost, the torpedo plane is the most powerful and mobile weapon which exists at the present day. an attack by allied torpedo planes, armed with guns to defend themselves from fighting airplanes, would be a powerful menace to the german fleet and, if made in sufficient numbers, would give the allies such unrestricted command of the north sea, even of the shallow parts near the german coast, that german submarines would be prevented from coming from a german port, the submarine menace abolished, and all chance of german success wiped out. i beg also to point out that an inspection of the map of europe shows that in the air raids over land the strategical advantage lies with germany, because her most important towns, like berlin, are farther inland than the most important towns of the allies, like london, so that aëroplanes of the allies, in order to reach berlin, would have to fly over greater distances, while exposed to the fire of other aëroplanes, than do aëroplanes of the germans in going to london for raids on naval vessels. however, the strategical advantage over water lies with the british, because their control of the deep parts of the north sea enables them to establish a temporary aeronautical base of mother ships sufficiently close to the german fleet to enable the british to launch a torpedo-plane attack from it on the german fleets in kiel and wilhelmshaven, while the germans could not possibly establish an aeronautical base sufficiently close to the british fleet. [illustration: © press illustrating service. _downed in the enemy's country._] this gives the allies the greatest advantage of the offensive. it would seem possible, provided a distinct effort is made, for the allies to send a large number of aeroplane mother ships to a point, say, fifty miles west of heligoland, and for a large force of fighting aëroplanes and torpedo planes to start from this place about two hours before dawn, reach kiel bay and wilhelmshaven about dawn, attack the german fleets there and sink the german ships. the distance from heligoland to kiel is about ninety land miles, and to wilhelmshaven about forty-five. the torpedo planes referred to are an invention of admiral fiske's which, in accordance with what seems to be a fixed and fatal precedent in the united states, has been ignored by our own authorities but eagerly adopted by the naval services of practically all the belligerents. one weakness of the aërial attack upon ships of war is that the bombs dropped from the air, even if they strike the target, strike upon the protective deck which in most warships above the gunboat class is strong enough to resist, or at least to minimize, the effect of any bomb capable of being carried by an airplane. the real vulnerable part of a ship of war is the thin skin of its hull below water and below the armor belt. this is the point at which the torpedo strikes. admiral fiske's device permits an airplane to carry two torpedoes of the regular whitehead class and to launch them with such an impetus and at such an angle that they will take the water and continue their course thereunder exactly as though launched from a naval torpedo tube. his idea was adopted both by great britain and germany. british torpedo planes thus equipped sank four turkish ships in the sea of marmora, a field of action which no british ship could have reached after the disastrous failure to force the dardanelles. the germans by employment of the same device sank at least two russian ships in the baltic and one british vessel in the north sea. the blindness of the united states naval authorities to the merits of this invention was a matter arousing at once curiosity and indignation among observers during the early days of our entrance upon the war. chapter viii incidents of the war in the air in time, no doubt, volumes will be written on the work of the airmen in the great war. except the submarine, no such novel and effective device was introduced into the conduct of this colossal struggle as the scouting airplane. the development of the service was steady from the first day when the belgian flyers proved their worth at liège. from mere observation trips there sprang up the air duels, from the duels developed skirmishes, and from these in time pitched battles in which several hundred machines would be engaged on each side. to this extent of development aërial tactics had proceeded by midsummer of . their further development must be left to some future chronicler to record. it must be noted, however, that at that early day the secretary of the treasury of the united states, pleading for a larger measure of preparation for the perils of war, asserted that the time was not far distant when this country would have to prepare to repel invading fleets of aircraft from european shores. this may have been an exaggeration. at that moment no aircraft had crossed the atlantic and no effort to make the passage had been made save those of wellman and vanniman. when the guns began to roar on the belgian frontier there was floating on keuka lake, new york, a huge hydro-airplane with which it was planned to make the trans-atlantic voyage. the project had been financed by mr. rodman wanamaker, of philadelphia, and the tests of the ship under the supervision of a young british army officer who was to make the voyage were progressing most promisingly. but the event that plunged the world into war put a sudden end to experiments like this for the commercial development of the airplane. there is every reason to believe, however, that such a flight is practicable and that it will ultimately be made not long after the world shall have returned to peace and sanity. [illustration: photo by kadel & herbert. _later type of french scout._ _the gun mounted on the upper wing is aimed by pointing the machine and is fired by the pilot._] airmen are not, as a rule, of a romantic or a literary temperament. pursuing what seems to the onlooker to be the most adventurous and exhilarating of all forms of military service, they have been chary of telling their experiences and singularly set upon treating them as all in the day's work and eliminating all that is picturesque from their narratives. sergeant james r. mcconnell, one of the americans in the french flying corps, afterwards killed, tells of a day's service in his most readable book, _flying for france_, in a way that gives some idea of the daily routine of an operator of an _avion de chasse_. he is starting just as the sky at dawn is showing a faint pink toward the eastern horizon, for the aviator's work is best done in early morning when, as a rule, the sky is clear and the wind light: [illustration: © u. & u. _position of gunner in early french machines._] drawing forward out of line, you put on full power, race across the grass, and take the air. the ground drops as the hood slants up before you and you seem to be going more and more slowly as you rise. at a great height you hardly realize you are moving. you glance at the clock to note the time of your departure, and at the oil gauge to see its throb. the altimeter registers feet. you turn and look back at the field below and see others leaving. in three minutes you are at about four thousand feet. you have been making wide circles over the field and watching the other machines. at forty-five hundred feet you throttle down and wait on that level for your companions to catch up. soon the escadrille is bunched and off for the lines. you begin climbing again, gulping to clear your ears in the changing pressure. surveying the other machines, you recognize the pilot of each by the marks on its side--or by the way he flies. the country below has changed into a flat surface of varicoloured figures. woods are irregular blocks of dark green, like daubs of ink spilled on a table; fields are geometrical designs of different shades of green and brown, forming in composite an ultra-cubist painting; roads are thin white lines, each with its distinctive windings and crossings--from which you determine your location. the higher you are the easier it is to read. in about ten minutes you see the meuse sparkling in the morning light, and on either side the long line of sausage-shaped observation balloons far below you. red-roofed verdun springs into view just beyond. there are spots in it where no red shows and you know what has happened there. in the green pasture land bordering the town, round flecks of brown indicate the shell holes. you cross the meuse. immediately east and north of verdun there lies a broad, brown band. from the woevre plain it runs westward to the "s" bend in the meuse, and on the left bank of that famous stream continues on into the argonne forest. peaceful fields and farms and villages adorned that landscape a few months ago--when there was no battle of verdun. now there is only that sinister brown belt, a strip of murdered nature. it seems to belong to another world. every sign of humanity has been swept away. the woods and roads have vanished like chalk wiped from a blackboard; of the villages nothing remains but grey smears where stone walls have tumbled together. the great forts of douaumont and vaux are outlined faintly, like the tracings of a finger in wet sand. one cannot distinguish any one shell crater, as one can on the pockmarked fields on either side. on the brown band the indentations are so closely interlocked that they blend into a confused mass of troubled earth. of the trenches only broken, half-obliterated links are visible. columns of muddy smoke spurt up continually as high explosives tear deeper into this ulcered area. during heavy bombardment and attacks i have seen shells falling like rain. the countless towers of smoke remind one of gustave doré's picture of the fiery tombs of the arch-heretics in dante's "hell." a smoky pall covers the sector under fire, rising so high that at a height of one thousand feet one is enveloped in its mist-like fumes. now and then monster projectiles hurtling through the air close by leave one's plane rocking violently in their wake. airplanes have been cut in two by them. for us the battle passes in silence, the noise of one's motor deadening all other sounds. in the green patches behind the brown belt myriads of tiny flashes tell where the guns are hidden; and those flashes, and the smoke of bursting shells, are all we see of the fighting. it is a weird combination of stillness and havoc, the verdun conflict viewed from the sky. far below us, the observation and range-finding planes circle over the trenches like gliding gulls. at a feeble altitude they follow the attacking infantrymen and flash back wireless reports of the engagement. only through them can communication be maintained when, under the barrier fire, wires from the front lines are cut. sometimes it falls to our lot to guard these machines from germans eager to swoop down on their backs. sailing about high above a busy flock of them makes one feel like an old mother hen protecting her chicks. the pilot of an _avion de chasse_ must not concern himself with the ground, which to him is useful only for learning his whereabouts. the earth is all-important to the men in the observation, artillery-regulating, and bombardment machines, but the fighting aviator has an entirely different sphere. his domain is the blue heavens, the glistening rolls of clouds below the fleecy banks towering above the vague aërial horizon, and he must watch it as carefully as a navigator watches the storm-tossed sea. on days when the clouds form almost a solid flooring, one feels very much at sea, and wonders if one is in the navy instead of aviation. the diminutive nieuports skirt the white expanse like torpedo boats in an arctic sea, and sometimes, far across the cloud-waves, one sights an enemy escadrille, moving as a fleet. principally our work consists of keeping german airmen away from our lines, and in attacking them when opportunity offers. we traverse the brown band and enter enemy territory to the accompaniment of an anti-aircraft cannonade. most of the shots are wild, however, and we pay little attention to them. when the shrapnel comes uncomfortably close, one shifts position slightly to evade the range. one glances up to see if there is another machine higher than one's own. low, and far within the german lines, are several enemy planes, a dull white in appearance, resembling sandflies against the mottled earth. high above them one glimpses the mosquito-like forms of two fokkers. away off to one side white shrapnel puffs are vaguely visible, perhaps directed against a german crossing the lines. we approach the enemy machines ahead, only to find them slanting at a rapid rate into their own country. high above them lurks a protection plane. the man doing the "ceiling work," as it is called, will look after him for us. getting started is the hardest part of an attack. once you have begun diving you're all right. the pilot just ahead turns tail up like a trout dropping back to water, and swoops down in irregular curves and circles. you follow at an angle so steep your feet seem to be holding you back in your seat. now the black maltese crosses on the german's wings stand out clearly. you think of him as some sort of a big bug. then you hear the rapid tut-tut-tut of his machine-gun. the man that dived ahead of you becomes mixed up with the topmost german. he is so close it looks as if he had hit the enemy machine. you hear the staccato barking of his mitrailleuse and see him pass from under the german's tail. the rattle of the gun that is aimed at you leaves you undisturbed. only when the bullets pierce the wings a few feet off do you become uncomfortable. you see the gunner crouched down behind his weapon, but you aim at where the pilot ought to be--there are two men aboard the german craft--and press on the release hard. your mitrailleuse hammers out a stream of bullets as you pass over and dive, nose down, to get out of range. then, hopefully, you redress and look back at the foe. he ought to be dropping earthward at several miles a minute. as a matter of fact, however, he is sailing serenely on. they have an annoying habit of doing that, these boches. zeppelins as well as the stationary kite balloons and the swiftly flying airplanes often tempted the fighting aviators to attack. one of the most successful of the british champions of the air, though his own life was ended in the second year of the war, was sub-lieutenant r. a. j. warneford, of the british flying corps. in his brief period of service warneford won more laurels than any of the british aviators of the time. he was absolutely fearless, with a marvelous control of the fast vickers scout which he employed, and fertile in every resource of the chase and of the flight. in an interview widely printed at the time, lieutenant warneford thus told the story of his casual meeting of a german zeppelin high in air between ghent and brussels and his prompt and systematic destruction of the great balloon. the story as told in his own language reads like the recountal of an everyday event. that to meet an enemy more than a mile above the earth and demolish him was anything extraordinary does not seem to have occurred to the aviator. i proceeded on my journey at an increased height [he says]. it was just three o'clock in the morning when all of a sudden i perceived on the horizon about midway between ghent and brussels a zeppelin flying fast at an altitude of about six thousand feet. i immediately flew toward it and when i was almost over the monster i descended about fifteen metres, and flung six bombs at it. the sixth struck the envelope of the ship fair and square in the middle. there was instantly a terrible explosion. the displacement of the air round about me was so great that a tornado seemed to have been produced. my machine tossed upward and then flung absolutely upside down, i was forced to loop the loop in spite of myself. i thought for a moment that the end of everything had come. in the whirl i had the pleasure of seeing my victim falling to the earth in a cloud of flames and smoke. then by some miracle my machine righted herself and i came to earth in the enemy's country. i was not long on the ground you may be sure. i speedily put myself and my machine into working order again; then i set my engine going. this time the fortunate aviator returned safely to his own territory. he had then served only four months, had attained the age of twenty-three, and even in so brief a service had received the cross of the legion of honour from france and the victoria cross from the british. only one week after this courageous exploit he was killed while on a pleasure flight and with him a young american journalist, henry beach needham, to whom he was showing the battlefield. during the early years of the war all of the governments were peculiarly secretive concerning all matters relative to their aviation services. this was probably due to the fact that the flying corps was a brand new branch of the service. no nation was adequately equipped with flyers. each was afraid to let its enemies know how insufficient were its air guards, or what measures were being taken to bring the aërial fleet up to the necessary point of efficiency. investigators were frowned upon and the aviators themselves were discouraged from much conversation about their work. about the beginning of the british suddenly awoke to the fact that even in war publicity has its value. it was necessary to arouse the enthusiastic support of the people for recruiting or for the conscription which ultimately was ordered. to do this graphic descriptions of what was doing at the front in the various branches of the service seemed necessary. the best writers in england were mobilized for this work. kipling wrote of the submarines, conan doyle of the fighting on the fields of france. the royal flying corps gave out a detailed story the authorship of which was not stated, but which describes most picturesquely the day of a flying man. in the united states it appeared in the _sun_, of new york, and sections of it are reprinted here: "the following bombing will be carried out by no.--squadron at night ( p.m., midnight, and a.m.). at each of these times three machines, each carrying eight twenty-pound bombs, will bomb respectively p----, c----, h----." thus the operation order read one evening in france. just an ordinary order too, for bombing is carried out day and night incessantly. bombing by night is usually carried out on towns and villages known to be resting places of the german troops, and it is part of the work of the royal flying corps to see that the hun never rests. fritz after a hard spell in the trenches is withdrawn to some shell torn village behind his lines to rest. he enters the ruined house, that forms his billet, and with a sigh of contentment at reaching such luxury after the miseries of trench life prepares to sleep in peace. he dreams of home, and then out of the night comes the terror of the air. a bomb falls in his billet, exploding with a terrific report and doing more damage to the already ruined walls. possibly a few of his comrades are wounded or killed. other explosions take place close by and the whole village is in turmoil. fritz does not sleep again. his nerves are jangled and all possibility of sleep is gone. the next day he is in a worse condition than after a night in the trenches. this continues night after night. the damage to german morale is enormous. from the aërial point of view things are different. a pilot warned for night flying takes it as he takes everything else, with apparent unconcern. he realizes that he will have an uninteresting ride in the dark; the danger from "archie" will be small, for an airplane is a difficult target to keep under observation with a searchlight, and the danger from hostile aircraft will be smaller still. over the trenches the star shells of the infantry may be seen, occasionally the flash of a badly concealed gun glints in the darkness or the exploding bombs of a trench raiding party cause tiny sparks to glimmer far below. probably the enemy, hearing the sound of engines, will turn on his searchlights and sweep the sky with long pencils of light. the pilot may be picked up for a second, and a trifle later the angry bang, bang, bang of "archie" may be heard, firing excitedly at the place where the aeroplane ought to be but is not--the pilot has probably dipped and changed his course since he was in the rays of the searchlight. he may be caught again for an instant and the performance is repeated. before long the vicinity of the target is reached and he prepares to drop his bombs, usually eight in number. a little before he is over the spot the first bombs will be released, for the trajectory of the bomb follows the course of the machine if the latter keeps on a straight course and when it explodes the airplane is still overhead. down far below will be seen a tiny burst of flame; possibly a large fire blazes up and the pilot knows that his work is good. he then turns and repeats his performance until all his bombs are exhausted, when he turns for home. bombs are usually dropped from a low altitude at night in order to be surer of getting the target. if during the performance any local searchlights are turned on "archie" gets busy and a merry game of hide and seek in and out the beams takes place. if the airplane is very low, and bombs are sometimes dropped from a height of only a few hundred feet, it is highly probable that the bursting shells do more damage than the airplane's bombs, and it is almost impossible to wing an airplane by night. [illustration: photo by press illustrating service. _a french scout airplane._] over the lines the pilot probably meets more searchlights, dodges them, and gradually descends. below him he sees the aerodromes of the surrounding squadrons lighted up for landing purposes. should he be in doubt as to which is his own he fires a certain combination of signal lights and is answered from below. he then lands, hands his machine over to the mechanics, and turns in. [illustration: photo by international film service. "_showing off._" _a nieuport performing aërial acrobatics around a heavier bombing machine._] so much for night bombing. by day it is different. though at night it is the billets which usually form the target, by day bombing is carried out for the purpose of damaging specific objects. railroads, dumps of stores and ammunition, and enemy aerodromes are the favourite targets. the raiding machines fly in formation and are surrounded by other machines used solely for protective purposes. generally a raid is carried out by machines from two squadrons, the bomb carriers belonging to a corps wing and the escorting machines to an army wing. all the machines meet at a prearranged rendezvous well on our side of the line at a certain time and a given altitude. there they manoeuvre into their correct formation. a flight commander leads the raid and his machine is distinguished by streamers tied to it. once over the target the fighters scatter and patrol the neighbourhood while the bombers discharge their missiles on the objective. usually, unless anti-aircraft fire is very heavy, they descend a few thousand feet to make surer of the target, and when their work is completed rise again to the level of the escort. results can usually be fairly judged by day. an ammunition dump quickly shows if it is hit and stores soon burst into flame. railway stations or junctions show clearly damage to buildings or overturned trucks, but the damage to the track itself is hard to estimate. aerodromes may be bombed for the purpose of destroying enemy machines in their hangars or merely in order to spoil the landing by blowing holes all over the place. it is with great delight that a pilot remarks in his report that a hostile machine, surrounded by mechanics, was about to ascend, but that instead he had descended to within a few hundred feet and obtained a direct hit, with the result that the enemy machine, including the surrounding men, seemed to be severely damaged. one officer on a bomb raid saw his chance in this way, descended to four hundred feet under intense rifle fire, successfully bombed the enemy machine, which was just emerging from its hangar, and then tried to make off. unfortunately at this moment his engine petered out, possibly on account of the enemy's fire, and he had to descend. by skillful planing he managed to descend about three quarters of a mile away, in full view of the enemy. instead of giving up the ghost and at once firing his machine, this officer jumped out and, utterly unperturbed by the german fire or by the huns making across country to take him prisoner, commenced to inspect the engine. luckily he found the cause of the trouble at once, put it right,--it was only a trifling mishap,--adjusted the controls, and swung the propeller. the engine started, he jumped in, with the nearest hun only a hundred yards off, and opening the throttle raced over the ground and into the air pursued by a futile fusillade of bullets. his engine held out and he safely regained his aerodrome, after having been reported missing by his comrades. for this escapade he received the military cross--a well-earned reward. when all the bombs have been dropped and the formation resumed the machines head for home. it is on the homeward journey that events may be expected, for time enough has elapsed for the hun to detail a squadron to intercept our returning machines and pick off any stragglers that may fall behind. it is a favourite boche manoeuvre to detail some of his slow machines to entice our fighters away from the main body, and when this has been accomplished, to attack the remainder with fokkers, which dive from aloft onto the bombing machines. this trick is now well-known and the fighters rarely leave their charges until the latter are in comparative safety. sometimes a hun of more sporting character than his brothers will wait alone for the returning convoy, hiding himself thousands of feet up in the clouds until he sees his moment. then singling out a machine he will dive at it, pouring out a stream of bullets as he falls. sometimes he achieves his object and a british machine falls to earth, but whatever the result, the hun does not alter his tactics. he dives clean through the whole block of machines, down many thousands of feet, only flattening out when close to the ground. the whole affair is so swift--just one lightning dive--that long before a fighter can reach the hun the latter is away thousands of feet below and heading for home and safety. every fokker pilot knows that once his surprise dive is over he has no chance against another machine--the build of the fokker only allows this one method of attack--and he does not stop to argue about it. his offensive dive becomes a defensive one--that is the sole difference. sometimes a large squadron of german machines, composed of various types of airplanes, intercepts a returning formation. if it attacks a grand aërial battle ensues. the british fighting machines spread out in a screen to allow the bombing machines a chance of escape and then attack the huns as they arrive. in one place one british airplane will be defending itself from two or three german machines; close by two or three of our busses will be occupied in sending a hun to his death; elsewhere more equal combats rage and the whole sky becomes an aërial battlefield, where machines perform marvellous evolutions, putting the best trick flying of pre-war days very much in the shade. no sooner has a pilot accounted for his foe, by killing him, forcing him to descend, or making him think discretion the better part of valour, than he turns to the help of a hard-pressed brother, surprising the enemy by an attack from the rear or otherwise creating a diversion. a single shot in the petrol tank proves fatal; loss of pressure ensues, the engine fails, and the pilot is forced to descend. he can usually land safely, but should he be in enemy territory he must fire his machine and prepare for a holiday in germany. should he be fortunate enough to plane over our lines little damage is done; the tank can be repaired and the machine made serviceable again. but for the time being he is out of the fight. sometimes the escaping petrol may ignite and the pilot and observer perish in the flames--the most terrible fate of all. the aërial battle ends in one of two ways: one side is outmanoeuvred, outnumbered, and has lost several machines and flies to safety, or, the more usual ending, both sides exhaust their ammunition, only a limited quantity perforce being carried, and the fight is of necessity broken off. meanwhile the bombing machines have probably crossed the line in safety, and their duty is finished. should they be attacked by a stray machine they are armed and quite capable of guarding themselves against any attack except one in force. during these bomb raids photographs of the target are frequently obtained or should the staff require any district crossed on the journey and taken they are generally secured by bombing machines. it is wonderful what minute details may be seen in a photograph taken at a height of from eight to twelve thousand feet, and our prints, which are far superior to those taken by the hun, have revealed many useful points which would otherwise have remained unknown. when it is remembered that a single machine crossing the line is heavily shelled it may be conceived what an immense concentration of "archies" is made on the raiders on their return. it is remarkable what feeble results are obtained considering the intensity of the bombardment, but rarely is a machine brought down, though casualties naturally occur occasionally. lieutenant c., in company with other machines, had successfully bombed his target and had meanwhile been heavily shelled, with the result that his engine was not giving its full number of revolutions and he lagged a little behind the rest of the formation. no hostile aircraft appeared and all went well until he was about to cross the lines, when a terrific bombardment was opened on him. he dodged and turned to the best of his ability, but a well-aimed shell burst just above him and a piece of the "archie" hit him on the head, not seriously wounding him, but knocking him unconscious. the machine, deprived of the guiding hand, immediately got into a dive and commenced a rapid descent from ten thousand feet, carrying the unconscious pilot with it, to be dashed to pieces on the ground. whether the rush of air, the sudden increase of pressure, or the passing off of the effect of the blow caused the disabled man to come to his senses is not known, but when the machine was only a few hundred feet from the ground, lieutenant c. recovered his senses sufficiently to realize his position and managed to pull the machine up and make a landing. he then lapsed into unconsciousness again. had he remained in his state of collapse half a minute longer, he would inevitably have been killed. another curious case of wounding was that of lieutenant h., who was also returning from a bomb raid. when passing through the heavily shelled zone his machine was hit by a shell, which passed through the floor by the pilot's seat and out at the top without exploding. lieutenant h. thought it must have been very close to his leg, but he was so fully occupied with manoeuvring to dodge other shells that he had no time to think of it. he crossed the line and began to plane down when he was aware of a feeling of faintness, but pulling himself together he landed his machine, taxied up to the sheds, and attempted to get out. it was only then that he realized that his leg was shot almost completely off above the knee; the lower part was merely hanging by a piece of skin. incredible as it may seem the shell which hit his machine also tore through the leg--luckily without exploding--unknown to lieutenant h. probably the force of the blow and excitement of the moment caused it to pass unnoticed and the torn nature of the wound helped to close the arteries and prevent his bleeding to death. he recovered, and though no longer flying is still engaged in doing his duty for the duration of the war. [illustration: _raid on a troop train by john e. whiting._] the courage and dash of the american aviators, serving with the french army, led the allies to expect great things of our flying corps which should be organized immediately after our declaration of war. about the time of that declaration major l. w. b. rees, of the british flying corps, came to the united states for the purpose of giving to our authorities the benefit of british experience in raising and equipping aërial fleets and in the development of the most efficient tactics. major rees in an official statement set forth many facts of general interest concerning the various flying services of the belligerent armies. the british, he said, fly on three levels with three different kinds of machines. nearest the ground, about six thousand feet up, are the artillery directors who hover about cutting big figure eights above the enemy trenches and flash back directions by wireless to the british artillerists. these observers are, of course, exposed to attack from anti-aircraft guns, the effective range of which had by the middle of war become as great as ten thousand feet. yet, as has already been noted, the amount of execution done by these weapons was surprisingly small. the observers are protected from attack from above, first by the heavy fighting planes, flying at ten thousand feet, carrying two men to the plane and able to keep the air for four hours at a time at a speed of miles an hour. they are supposed to use every possible vigilance to keep the enemy's fighters away from the slower and busy observing machines. in this they are seconded by the lighter one-man fighting machines which cruise about at a height of fifteen thousand feet at a speed of miles an hour and able to make a straight upward dash at the rate of ten thousand feet in ten minutes. the aviators of these latter machines came to describe their task as "ceiling work," suggesting that they operated at the very top of the world's great room. they are able to keep the air only about two hours at a time. americans, perhaps, gave exaggerated importance to the work of the lafayette escadrille which was manned wholly by american boys, and which, while in service from the very beginning of the war, was the first section of the french army permitted to display the flag of the united states in battle after our declaration of war. it was made up, in the main, of young americans of good family and independent means, most of them being college students who had laid down their books for the more exciting life of an airman. they paid heavily in the toll of death for their adventure and for the conviction which led them to take the side of democracy and right in the struggle against autocracy and barbarism months, even years, before their nation finally determined to join with them. in the first two and a half years of the war, seven of the aviators in this comparatively small body lost their lives. harvard college was particularly well represented in the american flying corps--although this is a proper and pertinent place to say that the sympathy shown for the allied cause by the young collegians of the united states was a magnificent evidence of the lofty righteousness of their convictions and the spirit of democracy with which they looked out upon the world. when the leash was taken off by the declaration of war by the united states the college boys flocked to training camps and enlistment headquarters in a way that bade fair to leave those institutions of learning without students for some years to come. but to hark back to harvard, it had in the lafayette escadrille five men in ; three of these, kiffen rockwell, norman prince, and victor chapman, were killed in that year. a letter published in _harvard volunteers in europe_ tells of the way these young gladiators started the day's work: rockwell called me up at three: "fine day, fine day, get up!" it was very clear. we hung around at billy's [lieutenant thaw] and took chocolate made by his ordonnance. hall and the lieutenant were guards on the field; but thaw, rockwell, and i thought we would take _a tour chez les boches_. being the first time the _mechanaux_ were not there and the machine gun rolls not ready. however it looked misty in the vosges, so we were not hurried. "rendezvous over the field at a thousand metres," shouted kiffen. i nodded, for the motor was turning; and we sped over the field and up. [illustration: © u. & u. _a burning balloon, photographed from a parachute by the escaping balloonist._] in my little cockpit from which my shoulders just protrude i have several diversions besides flying. the compass, of course, and the map i keep tucked in a tiny closet over the reservoir before my knees, a small clock and one altimetre. but most important is the contour, showing revolutions of the motor which one is constantly regarding as he moves the manettes of gasoline and gas back and forth. to husband one's fuel and tease the motor to round eleven takes attention, for the carburetor changes with the weather and the altitude.... the earth seemed hidden under a fine web such as the lady of shalott wove. soft purple in the west, changing to shimmering white in the east. under me on the left the vosges like rounded sand dunes cushioned up with velvety light and dark masses (really forests), but to the south standing firmly above the purple cloth like icebergs shone the alps. my! they look steep and jagged. the sharp blue shadows on their western slopes emphasized the effect. one mighty group standing aloof to the west--mount blanc perhaps. ah, there are quantities of worm-eaten fields my friends the trenches--and that town with the canal going through it must be m----. right beside the capote of my engine, showing through the white cloth a silver snake--the rhine! what, not a quarter to six, and i left the field at five! thirty-two hundred metres. let's go north and have a look at the map. while thus engaged a black puff of smoke appeared behind my tail and i had the impression of hearing a piece of iron hiss by. "must have got my range first shot!" i surmised, and making a steep bank piqued heavily. "there, i have lost them now." the whole art of avoiding shells is to pay no attention till they get your range and then dodge away, change altitude, and generally avoid going in a straight line. in point of fact, i could see bunches of exploding shells up over my right shoulder not a kilometre off. they continued to shell that section for some time; the little balls of smoke thinning out and merging as they crossed the lines. in the earlier days of the war, when the american aviators were still few, their deeds were widely recounted in their home country, and their deaths were deplored as though a personal loss to many of their countrymen. later they went faster and were lost in the daily reports. among those who had early fixed his personality in the minds of those who followed the fortunes of the little band of americans flying in france was kiffen rockwell, mentioned in an earlier paragraph, and one of the first to join the american escadrille. rockwell was in the war from sincere conviction of the righteousness of the allies' cause. "i pay my part for lafayette, and rochambeau," he said proudly, when asked what he was doing in a french uniform flying for france. and pay he did though not before making the germans pay heavily for their part. once, flying alone over thann, he came upon a german scout. without hesitation the battle was on. rockwell's machine was the higher, had the better position. as aërial tactics demanded he dived for the foe, opening fire as soon as he came within thirty or forty yards. at his fourth shot the enemy pilot fell forward in his seat and his machine fell heavily to earth. he lighted behind the german lines much to the victor's disgust, for it was counted a higher achievement to bring your foe to earth in your own territory. but rockwell was able to pursue his victim far enough to see the wreck burst into flames. though often wounded, rockwell scorned danger. he would go into action so bandaged that he seemed fitter to go to an hospital. he was always on the attack--"shoved his gun into the enemy's face" as his fellows in the escadrille expressed it. so in september, , he went out after a big german machine, he saw flying in french territory. he had but little difficulty in climbing above it, and then dashed down in his usual impetuous manner, his machine gun blazing as he came on. but the german was of heavier metal mounting two machine guns. just as to onlookers it seemed that the two machines would crash together, the wings of one side of rockwell's plane suddenly collapsed and he fell like a stone between the lines. the germans turned their guns on the pile of wreckage where he lay, but french gunners ran out and brought his body in. his breast was all blown to pieces with an explosive bullet--criminal, of course, barbarous and uncivilized, but an everyday practice of the germans. rockwell was given an impressive funeral. all the british pilots, and five hundred of their men marched, and the bier was followed by a battalion of french troops. over and around the little french graveyard aviators flew dropping flowers. in later days less ceremony attended the last scene of an american aviator's career. another american aviator, also a harvard man, who met death in the air, was victor chapman of new york, a youth of unusual charm, high ideals, and indomitable courage. at the very outbreak of the war he enlisted in the french foreign legion--a rough entourage for a college-bred man. into the foreign legion drifted everything that was doubtful, and many that were criminal. no questions were asked of those who sought its hospitable ranks, and readers of ouida's novel _under two flags_ will recall that it enveloped in its convenient obscurity british lordlings and the lowest of catalonian thieves. but in time of actual war its personnel was less mixed, and chapman's letters showed him serving there contentedly as pointer of a mitrailleuse. but not for long. most of the spirited young americans who entered the french army aspired to serve in the aviation corps, and chapman soon was transferred to that field. there he developed into a most daring flyer. on one occasion, with a bad scalp wound, after a brush with four german machines, he made his landing with his machine so badly wrecked that he had to hold together the broken ends of a severed control with one hand, while he steered with the other. instead of laying up for the day he had his mechanician repair his machine while a surgeon repaired him, then, patched up together, man and machine took the air again in search for the boches. in june, , though still suffering from a wound in the head, he started in his machine to carry some oranges to a comrade lying desperately wounded in a hospital some miles away. on the way he saw in the distance behind the german lines two french airmen set upon by an overwhelming force of germans. instantly he was off to the assistance of his friends, plunging into so unequal a fight that even his coming left the other americans outnumbered. but he had scarce a chance to strike a blow. some chance shot from a german gun put him out of action. all that the other two americans, lufbery and prince, knew was that they saw a french machine come flying to their aid, and suddenly tip and fall away to earth. until nightfall came and chapman failed to return none was sure that he was the victim. the part played by young americans as volunteers for france before the united states entered upon the war was gallant and stimulating to national pride. it showed to the world--and to our own countrymen who needed the lesson as much as any--that we had among our youth scores who, moved by high ideals, stood ready to risk their lives for a sentiment--stood ready to brave the myriad discomforts of the trenches, the bursting shrapnel, the mutilating liquid fire, the torturing gas that german autocracy should be balked of its purpose of dominating the world. and the service of these boys aided far more than they knew. the fact that our countrymen in numbers were flying for france kept ever before the american people the vision of that war in the air of which poets and philosophers had dreamed for ages. it brought home to our people the importance of aviation before our statesmen could begin to see it. it set our boys to reading of aircraft, building model planes, haunting the few aviation fields which at the time our country possessed. and it finally so filled the consciousness of our people with conviction of the supreme importance of aviation as an arm of the national armed service that long before the declaration of war the government was embarrassed by the flood of volunteers seeking to be enrolled in the flying forces of the nation. chapter ix the united states at war the entrance of the united states upon the war was the signal for a most active agitation of the question of overwhelming the enemy with illimitable fleets of aircraft. though the agitation was most vociferous in this country whence it was hoped the enormous new fleets of aircraft would come, it was fomented and earnestly pressed by our allies. france sent a deputation of her leading flyers over to supervise the instruction of our new pilots. england contributed experts to advise as to the construction of our machines. the most comprehensive plans were urged upon congress and the administration for the creation of a navy of the air. a bill for an initial appropriation of $ , , , for aircraft purposes alone, was passed and one for a department of aeronautics to be established, co-ordinate with those of war and the navy, its secretary holding a seat in the cabinet, was introduced in congress. many of the most eminent retired officers of the navy joined in their support. retired officers only because officers in active service were estopped from political agitation. there was every possible reason for this great interest in the united states in wartime aviation. the nation had long been shamefaced because the development of the heavier-than-air machines, having their origin undoubtedly in the inventive genius of professor langley and the wrights, had been taken away from us by the more alert governments of france and germany. the people were ready to buy back something of our lost prestige by building the greatest of air fleets at the moment when it should exercise the most determinative influence upon the war. but more. we entered upon the war in our chronic state of unpreparedness. we were without an army and without equipment for one. to raise, equip, and drill an army of a million, the least number that would have any appreciable effect upon the outcome of the war, would take months. when completed we would have added only to the numerical superiority of the allies on the western front. the quality of a novel and decisive contribution to the war would be lacking. so too it was with our navy. the british navy was amply adequate to deal with the german fleet should the latter ever leave its prudent retreat behind helgoland and in the bases of kiel and wilhelmshaven. true it was not capable of crushing out altogether the submarine menace, but it did hold the german underwater boats down to a fixed average of ships destroyed, which was far less than half of what the germans had anticipated. in this work our ships, especially our destroyers, took a notable part. the argument for a monster fleet of fighting aircraft, thus came to the people of the united states in a moment of depression and perplexity. by land the germans had dug themselves in, holding all of belgium and the thousands of square miles of france they had won in their first dash to the marne. what they had won swiftly and cheaply could only be regained slowly and at heavy cost. true, the allies were, day by day, driving them back from their position, but the cost was disheartening and the progress but slow. by sea the germans refused to bring their fleet to battle with their foes. but from every harbour of belgium, and from wilhelmshaven and kiel, they sent out their sinister submarines to prey upon the commerce of the world--neutral as well as belligerent. against them the navies of the world were impotent. to the threat that by them germany would starve england into cowering surrender, the only answer was the despairing effort to build new ships faster than the submarines could sink those afloat--even though half a million tons a month were sent to the bottom in wasteful destruction. [illustration: photo by levick. _a caproni biplane circling the woolworth building._] faced by these disheartening conditions, wondering what they might do that could be done quickly and aid materially in bringing the war to a triumphant conclusion, the american people listened eagerly to the appeals and arguments of the advocates of a monster aërial fleet. [illustration: © international film service. _cruising at feet._ _one biplane photographed from another._] listen [said these advocates], we show you a way to spring full panoplied into the war, and to make your force felt with your first stroke. we are not preaching dreadnoughts that take four years to build. we are not asking for a million men taking nearly a year to gather, equip, drill, and transport to france, in imminent danger of destruction by the enemy's submarines every mile of the way. we ask you for a cheap, simple device of wood, wire, and cloth, with an engine to drive it. all its parts are standardized. in a few weeks the nation can be equipped to turn out of them weekly. we want within the year , of them. we do not ask for a million men. we want , bright, active, hardy, plucky american boys between and years of age. we want to give them four months' intensive training before sending them into the air above the enemy's lines. in time we shall want , to , but the smaller number will well do to open the campaign. and what will they effect? do you know that to-day the eyes of an army are its airplanes? cavalry has disappeared practically. if a general wishes to pick out a weak point in his enemy's line to assault he sends out airmen to find it. if he is annoyed by the fire of some distant unseen battery over the hills and far away he sends a man in an airplane who brings back its location, its distance, and perhaps a photograph of it in action. if he suspects that his foe is abandoning his trenches, or getting ready for an attack, the ready airmen bring in the facts. and of course the enemy's airmen serve their side in the same manner. they spy out what their foe is doing, and so far as their power permits prevent him from seeing what they are doing. now suppose one side has an enormous preponderance of aircraft--six to one, let us say. it is not believed, for example, that at this moment germany has more than , aircraft on the whole western front. let us imagine that through the enterprise of the united states our allies were provided with , on one sector which we intended to make the scene of an attack on the foe. say the neighbourhood of arras and lille. for days, weeks perhaps, we would be drawing troops toward this sector from every part of the line. through the reports of spies the enemy's suspicions would be aroused. it is the business of an efficient general to be suspicious. he would send out his airplanes to report on the activities of the other side. few would come back. none would bring a useful report. for every german plane that showed above the lines three allied planes would be ready to attack and destroy it or beat it back. the air would be full of allied airmen--the great bombing planes flying low and inundating the trenches with bombs, and the troops on march with the deadly fléchettes. over every german battery would soar the observation plane indicating by tinsel or smoke bombs the location of the guns, or even telegraphing it back by wireless to the allied batteries safe in positions which the blinded enemy could never hope to find. above all in myriads would be soaring the swift fighting scouts, the bleriots, nieuports, moranes or perhaps some new american machine to-day unknown. let the wing of a boche but show above the smoke and they would be upon him in hordes, beating him to the ground, enveloping him in flames, annihilating him before he had a chance to observe, much less to report. what think you would be the result on that sector of the battle line? why the foe would be cut to pieces, demolished, obliterated. blinded, he would be unrelentingly punished by an adversary all eyes. writhing under the concentrated fire of a thousand guns he could make no response, for his own guns could not find the attacking batteries. did he think to flee? his retreating columns would be marked down by the relentless scouts in the air, and the deadly curtain of fire from well-coached batteries miles away would sweep every road with death. if in desperation he sought to attack he would do so ignorant whether he were not hurling his regiments against the strongest part of the allied line, and with full knowledge of the fact that though he was blinded they had complete information of his strength and dispositions. the argument impressed itself strongly upon the mind of the country. there appeared indeed no public sentiment hostile to it nor any organized opposition to the proposition for an enormous appropriation for purposes of aviation. the customary inertia of congress delayed the actual appropriation for some months. but the president espoused its cause and the secretaries both of war and the navy warmly recommended it, although they united in opposing the proposition to establish a distinct department of aeronautics with a seat in the cabinet. being human neither one desired to let his share of this great new gift of power slip out of his hands. leading in the fight for this legislation was rear-admiral robert e. peary, u. s. n., retired, the discoverer of the north pole. admiral peary from the very outbreak of the war consecrated his time and his abilities to pushing the development of aeronautics in the united states. he was continually before congressional committees urging the fullest appropriations for this purpose. in his first statement before the senate committee he declared that "in the immediate future the air service will be more important than the army and navy combined," and supported that statement by reference to utterances made by such british authorities as mr. balfour, lord charles beresford, lord northcliffe, and lord montague. in an article published shortly after his appearance before the senate committee, the admiral summarized in a popular way his views as to the possibility of meeting the submarine menace with aircraft, and what the united states might do in that respect. he wrote: we are receiving agreeable reports as to the efficiency of the american destroyer flotilla now operating against submarines in the north sea. an unknown naval officer, according to the newspapers of may th, calls for the immediate construction of from to additional american destroyers. by all means let us have this force--when it can be made ready--but it would take at least two years to construct, equip, and deliver such a heavy additional naval tonnage, while fighting seaplanes, with a full complement of machine guns, bombs, microphones, and aërial cameras, could be put in active service in the north sea within six months. seaplanes, small dirigibles on the order of the english "blimp" type, and kite balloons have already shown themselves to be more effective in detecting submarines than are submarine chasers or armed liners. not only have the british, french, german, and turkish forces destroyed trawlers, patrol boats, and transports by aircraft, but successful experiments in airplane submarine hunting have also been made in this country. in september, , our first aërial coast patrol unit, in acting as an auxiliary to the mosquito squadron in the annual manoeuvres of the atlantic fleet, detected objects smaller than the latest type of german submarines from fifteen to twenty feet below the surface. a more complete aërial submarine hunt took place on march th of this year. this was the real thing, because the fliers were looking for german u-boats. inasmuch as the navy department is still waiting before establishing its first and only aeronautical base on the atlantic seaboard, the honour of having conducted the first aërial hunt of the enemy submarines in american history went to the civilian aviators who are soon to be a part of the aërial reserve squadron at governor's island and to the civilian instructors and aërial reservists connected with the army aviation school at mineola, long island. these hawks of the air darted up and down the coast in search of the enemy, often flying as far as eleven miles out to sea. the inlets and bays were searched, vessels plotted, compass direction and time when located were given. no enemy submarines were found. it developed that the supposed submarines were two patrol motor-boats returning from a trial trip. nevertheless the incident is illuminating, and the official statement of the navy department closed with the words: "this incident emphasizes the need of hydroaëroplanes for naval scouting purposes." it is also interesting to note what happened when lawrence sperry went out to sea one day last summer in his hydroplane and failed to return. two seaplanes and three naval destroyers were sent in search of him. in forty minutes the seaplanes returned with the news that they had located sperry floating safely on the water. at the end of the day, after several hours of search, the destroyers came back without having seen sperry at all. those who may still believe that we americans cannot build aircraft and that all the exploits we read so much about in the newspapers taking place on the other side are being done in foreign aircraft will be surprised to know that a large number of the big flying boats now in use in the english navy, harbour, and coast defence work are curtiss machines, designed and built in this country by americans, with american material and american engines. great britain wants all the machines of this type that it can get, and sees no reason why we cannot do the same thing in protecting our own atlantic seaboard. i quote from c. g. grey, editor of _the london aeroplane_: "curiously enough, these big flying boats originated in america, and, if america is seriously perturbed about the fate of american shipping and american citizens travelling by sea in the vicinity of europe, it should not be a difficult matter for america to rig up in a very small space of time quite a fleet of seaplane carriers suitable for the handling of these big seaplanes. if each seaplane ship were armed with guns having a range of five to ten miles, and if the gunners were practised in co-operating with airplane spotters, such ships ought to be the very best possible insurance for american lives and goods on the high seas." i quote from _the associated press_ report from paris on may th to show the relative importance of aëroplanes in submarine attacks: "during the last three months french patrol boats have had twelve engagements with submarines, french hydroaëroplanes have fought them thirteen times, and there have been sixteen engagements between armed merchantmen and submarines." henry woodhouse, one of the most distinguished authorities on aeronautics in the united states, in his standard _textbook on naval aeronautics_, published by the century company, has assembled the following data on submarine and aeroplane combats: "on may , , the german admiralty reported an engagement between a german dirigible and several british submarines in the north sea. the submarines fired on the dirigible without success, whereas bombs from the dirigible sank one submarine. "on may , , the german admiralty announced the sinking of a russian submarine by bombs dropped by german naval aviators near gotland. "on july , , the austrian submarine u- was destroyed in the adriatic by a french aeroplane, which swooped suddenly and dropped three bombs directly on the deck of the submarine. the craft was destroyed and the entire crew of twenty-five were lost. "on july , , a german submarine in the dardanelles was about to launch a torpedo at a british transport filled with troops and ammunition, when british aviators gave the alarm to the transport, and immediately began dropping bombs at the submarine, which had to submerge and escape hurriedly, without launching its torpedo. "on august , , the turkish war office stated that an allied submarine had been sunk in the dardanelles by a turkish aeroplane. "on august , the secretary of the british admiralty announced that squadron commander arthur w. bigsworth in a single-handed attack bombed and destroyed a german submarine off ostend. "lieutenant viney received the victoria cross and lieutenant de sincay was recommended for the legion of honour for having flown over a german submarine and destroyed it with bombs off the belgian coast on november , . "early in an austrian seaplane sank the french submarine _foucault_ in the southern adriatic. lieutenant calezeny was the pilot and the observer was lieutenant von klinburg. after crippling the submarine they then performed the remarkable feat of calling another austrian seaplane and rescuing the entire french crew, two officers and twenty seven men, in spite of the fact that a high sea was running at the time." it will be noted that admiral peary lays great stress on the supreme value of aircraft as foes of the submarine. this was due to the fact that at about the time of his appearance before the senate committee the world was fairly panic-stricken by the vigour and effect of the german submarine campaign and its possible bearing upon the outcome of the war. of that campaign i shall have more to say in the section of this book dealing with submarines. but the subject of the undersea boat in war became at this time inextricably interwoven with that of the aërial fleets, and the sudden development of the latter, together with the marked interest taken in it by our people, cannot be understood without some description of the way in which the two became related. from the very beginning of the war the germans had prosecuted a desultory submarine warfare on the shipping of great britain and had extended it gradually until neutral shipping also was largely involved. all the established principles of international law, or principles that had been supposed to be established, were set at naught. in bygone days enemy merchant ships were subject to destruction only after their crews had been given an opportunity to take to the boats. neutral ships bearing neutral goods, even if bound to an enemy port, were liable to destruction only if found upon visit to be carrying goods that were contraband of war. the list of contraband had been from time immemorial rigidly limited, and confined almost wholly to munitions of war, or to raw material used in their construction. but international law went by the board early in the war. each belligerent was able to ascribe plausible reasons for its amendment out of recognizable form. great britain established blockades two hundred miles away from the blockaded ports because the submarines made the old practice of watching at the entrance of the port too perilous. the list of contraband of war was extended by both belligerents until it comprehended almost every useful article grown, mined, or manufactured. but the amendment to international law which acted as new fuel for the flames of war, which aroused the utmost world-wide indignation, and which finally dragged the united states into the conflict, was that by which germany sought to relieve her submarine commanders of the duty of visiting and searching a vessel, or of giving its people time to provide for their safety, before sinking it. [illustration: © u. & u. _an air battle in progress._] the german argument was that the submarine was unknown when the code of international law then in force was formulated. it was a peculiarly delicate naval weapon. its strength lay in its ability to keep itself concealed while delivering its attack. if exposed on the surface a shot from a small calibred gun striking in a vital point would instantly send it to the bottom. if rammed it was lost. should a submarine rise to the surface, send an officer aboard a ship it had halted, and await the result of his search, it would be exposed all the time to destruction at the hands of enemy vessels coming up to her aid. indeed if the merchantman happened to carry one gun a single shot might put the assailant out of business. accordingly the practice grew up among the germans of launching their torpedoes without a word of warning at their helpless victim. the wound inflicted by a torpedo is such that the ship will go down in but a few minutes carrying with it most of the people aboard. the most glaring, inexcusable, and criminal instance of this sort of warfare was the sinking without warning of the great passenger liner, _lusitania_, by which more than eleven hundred people were drowned, one hundred and fourteen of them american citizens. [illustration: photo by u. & u. _a curtis hydroaëroplane._] against this policy--or piracy--the united states protested, and people of this country waxed very weary as month after month through the years and germany met the protests with polite letters of evasion and excuse continuing the while the very practice complained of. but late in january, , her government announced that there would be no longer any pretence of complying with international law, but that with the coming month a campaign of unlimited submarine ruthlessness would be begun and ships sunk without warning and irrespective of their nationality if they appeared in certain prohibited zones. within twenty-four hours the united states sent the german ambassador from the country and within two months we were at war. at once the submarine was seen to be the great problem confronting us. its attack was not so much upon the united states, for we are a self-contained nation able to raise all that we need within our own borders for our own support. but england is a nation that has to be fed from without. seldom are her stores of food great enough to avert starvation for more than six weeks should the steady flow of supply ships from america and australia to her ports be interrupted. this interruption the germans proposed to effect by means of their underwater boats. von tirpitz and other leaders in the german administration promised the people that within six weeks england would be starved and begging for peace at any price. the output of submarines from german navy yards was greatly increased. their activity became terrifying. the germans estimated that if they could sink , , tons of shipping monthly they would put england out of action in two or three months. for some weeks the destruction accomplished by their boats narrowly approached this estimate, but gradually fell off. at the same time there was no period in up to the time of admiral peary's statement, or indeed up to that of the preparation of this book, when it was not felt that the cause of the allies was in danger because of the swarms of german submarines. it was that feeling, coupled with the wide-spread belief that aircraft furnished the best means of combating the submarine, that caused an irresistible demand in the united states for the construction of colossal fleets of these flying crafts. congress enacted in midsummer the law appropriating $ , , for the construction of aircraft and the maintenance of the aërial service. the secretaries of war and the navy each appealed for heavy additional appropriations for aërial service. the arguments which have already been set forth as supporting the use of aircraft in military service were paralleled by those who urge its unlimited use in naval service. consider [said they] the primary need for attacking these vipers of the sea in their nests. once out on the broad atlantic their chances of roaming about undetected by destroyers or other patrol boats are almost unlimited. but we know where they come from, from kiel, antwerp, wilhelmshaven, ostend, and zeebrugge. catch them there and you will destroy them as boys destroy hornets by smoking out their nests. but against this the germans have provided by blocking every avenue of approach save one. the channels are obstructed and mined, and guarded from the shore by heavy batteries. no hostile ships dare run that gauntlet. even the much-boasted british navy in the three years of the war has not ventured to attack a single naval base. you could not even seek out the submarines thus sheltered by other submarines because running below the surface our boats could not detect either mines or nets and would be doomed to destruction. the enemy boats come out on the surface protected by the batteries and naval craft. but the air cannot be blocked by any fixed defences. give us more and more powerful aircraft than the germans possess and we will darken the sky above the german bases with the wings of our airplanes, and rain explosive shells upon the submarines that have taken shelter there until none survive. the one essential is that our flyers shall be in overwhelming numbers. we must be able not only to take care of any flying force that the germans may send against us, but also to have enough of our aircraft not engaged in the aërial battle to devote their entire attention to the destruction of the enemy forces below. from every country allied with us came approval of this policy. at the time the debate was pending in congress our allies one after another were sending to us official commissions to consult upon the conduct of the war, to give us the benefit of their long and bitter experience in it, and to assist in any way our preparations for taking a decisive part in that combat. the subject of the part to be played by aircraft was one frequently discussed with them. with the french commission came two members of the staff of general joffre, major tulasne and lieutenant de la grange, experts in aviation service. a formal interview given out by these gentlemen expressed so clearly the point of view on aviation and its possibilities held in france where it has reached its highest development that some extracts from it will be of interest here: "at the beginning of the war the germans were the only ones who had realized the great importance of aviation from a military point of view," said these officers. "france had looked upon aviation as a sport, germany as a powerful weapon in war. this is illustrated by the fact that even in august, , german artillery fire was directed by airplanes. "it was only after the retreat from belgium and the battle of the marne that the allies realized the great importance of aviation. between august and the french general staff thought that the greater part of the german army was concentrated in alsace and that only a few army corps were coming through belgium. it was only through the reports of the aviators that they realized that this was a mistake and that almost the whole of the german army was invading belgium. "immediately after the battle of the marne the greatest efforts were made in france to develop the aviation corps in every possible way. the english army, then in process of formation, profited by the experience of the french. since that time the allied as well as the german aviation corps has grown constantly. "a modern army is incomplete if it has not a strong aviation corps. all the different services are obliged to turn to the aviation corps for help in their work. an army without airplanes is like a soldier without eyes. an army which has the superiority in aviation over its adversary will have the following advantages: "it will have constantly the latest information on the movements of the enemy. in this way, no concentration of troops will be ignored and no surprise attack will be possible. the attack against the enemy positions will be rendered easier because all the details of these positions will be thoroughly known beforehand. the artillery fire will be much more accurate. many enemy machines will be brought down by the superior fighting machines and the result will be to strengthen the morale both of the aviators and of the army." the next question put to the french experts was: "why do we need to make a great effort to obtain the superiority in the air?" they answered with much interesting detail: "because the germans have understood the importance of aviation from a military point of view and have concentrated all their forces to develop this service. "owing to the large number of scientists and technicians they possess they are able constantly to perfect motors and planes. owing to their great industrial organization they are able to produce an enormous number of the best machines. "the german aviation service is now fully as strong as that of the allies as far as numbers are concerned. the superiority in the air can only remain in the hands of the allies because of the spirit of self-sacrifice of their aviators and their greater skill. "germany feels that the decisive phase of the war is imminent and the efforts she will make next year will be infinitely greater than any she has made before. she will try in every way to regain the supremacy of the air. realizing what a formidable enemy america can be in the air, she will strengthen her aviation forces in consequence. "the aeroplane is by far the most powerful of all the modern weapons. if the allies have the supremacy of the air the german artillery will lose its accuracy of aim. it is impossible, because of the long range, for modern guns to fire without the help of airplanes. the accuracy of artillery fire depends entirely on its being directed by an airplane. "this was clearly illustrated during the battle of the somme in . the french at that time had concentrated such a large number of fighting machines that no german machine was allowed to fly over the lines. on the other hand, the allies' reconnaissance machines were so numerous that each french battery could have its fire directed by an airplane. "the destruction of the enemy positions was in consequence carried out very effectively and very rapidly, while the germans were obliged to fire blindly and scatter their shells over large areas, incapable as they were of locating our battery emplacements and the positions of our troops. unluckily, a few weeks later the germans had called from the different parts of the line a good many of their squadrons, and were able to carry out their work under better conditions. "we need such a superiority that it will be impossible for any german airplane to fly anywhere near the lines. "every german kite balloon, every airplane would immediately be attacked by a number of allied machines. in this way the german aviation will not only be dominated but will be entirely crushed. "if we can prevent the germans from seeing, through their airplanes, what we are preparing we will be very near the end of the war. it will require a huge effort to carry out this plan. neither the english nor the french are able to do so by their own means. "as far as france is concerned, she is able to keep on building machines rapidly enough to increase her aviation corps at about the same rate as germany is increasing hers. if she wanted to double or triple her production of machines she could do so, but she would have to call back from the trenches a certain number of skilled workmen, and this would weaken her fighting power. she needs in the trenches all the men who are able to carry a rifle. "if the allies are to have the absolute supremacy of the air which we have been describing it will be the privilege of america to give it to them. we want three or four or even five allied machines for one german. america only has the possibilities of production which would allow her to build an enormous number of machines in a very short time. "the airplane is a great engine of destruction. it tells the artillery where to fire, it drops bombs, it gives the enemy all the information he needs to plan murderous attacks. drive the german airplanes down and you will save the lives of thousands of men in our trenches. as ulysses in the cavern put out the eye of the cyclops, so the eyes of the beast must be put out before you can attempt to kill it." major tulasne and lieutenant de la grange then outlined what the aviation programme of the united states should be, saying: "american industry must be enabled to begin building at once. no time must be lost in experiments. america must profit by the experience of the allies. she must choose the best planes and build thousands of them. "she must build reconnoissance machines which she will need for her army; she must build a large number of fighting machines because it is these machines that will destroy german planes; she must also build squadrons of powerful bombing machines which will go behind the german lines to destroy the railway junctions and bomb the enemy cantonments, so as to give the soldiers no rest even when they have left the trenches. "bombing done by a few machines gives poor results. the same cannot be said of this operation carried out by a large number of machines which can go to the same places and bomb continually. "besides the number of men that are actually killed in these raids, great disturbance is caused in the enemy's communication lines, thereby hindering the operations. for example, since the british admiralty has increased the number of its bombing squadrons in northern france and has decided to attack constantly the two harbours of ostend and zeebrugge and the locks, bridges, and canals leading to them they have greatly interfered with the activity of these two german bases. "it is certain that shortly, owing to this, these two ports will no more be used by german torpedo boats and submarines. what the english royal naval air service has been able to accomplish with machines the flying corps of the united states with machines must be able to carry out on other parts of the front. "the work of the bombing machines is rendered difficult now by the fact that the actual lines are far from germany. but it is hoped that soon fighting will be carried on near the enemy frontier and then a wonderful field will be opened to the bombing machines. "all the big ammunition factories which are in the rhine and ruhr valleys, like krupp's, will be wonderful targets for the american bombing machines. if these machines are of the proper type--that is to say, sufficiently fast and well armed and able to carry a great weight of bombs--nothing will prevent them from destroying any of these important factories. "as germany at the present time is only able to continue the war because of her great stock of war material the destruction of her sources of production would be the end of her resistance. for this also the allies must turn to america. such a large number of machines is required to produce results that america must be relied on to manufacture them. "every man in this country must know that it is in the power of the united states, no matter what can be done in other fields, to bring the war to an end simply by concentrating all its energies on producing an enormous amount of material for aviation, and to enlist a corresponding number of pilots. but this will not be done without great effort. in order to be ready for the great offensive work must be begun at once." the extreme secrecy which in this war has characterized the operation of the governments--our own most of all--makes it impossible to state the amount of progress made in in the construction of our aërial fleet. during the debate in congress orators were very outspoken in their prophecies that we should outnumber the kaiser's flying fleet two or three to one. the press of the nation was so very explicit in its descriptions of the way in which we were to blind the germans and drive them from the air that it is no wonder the kaiser's government took alarm, and set about building additional aircraft with feverish zeal. in this it was imitated by france and england. it seemed, all at once about the middle of , that the whole belligerent world suddenly recognized the air as the final battlefield and began preparations for its conquest. all statistical estimates in war time are subject to doubt as to their accuracy--and particularly those having to do in any way with the activities of an enemy country. but competent estimators--or at any rate shrewd guessers--think that germany's facilities for constructing airplanes equal those of france and england together. if then all three nations build to the very limit of their abilities there will be a tie, which the contribution of aircraft from the united states will settle overwhelmingly in favour of the allies. how great that contribution may be cannot be foretold with certainty at this moment. the building of aircraft was a decidedly infant industry in this country when war began. in the eight years prior to the government had given orders for just fifty-nine aircraft--scarcely enough to justify manufacturers in keeping their shops open. orders from foreign governments, however, stimulated production after the war began so that when the united states belatedly took her place as national honour and national safety demanded among the entente allies, mr. howard e. coffin, chairman of the aircraft section of the council of national defence was able to report eight companies capable of turning out about , machines in six months--a better showing than british manufacturers could have made when great britain, first entered the war. a feature in the situation which impressed both congress and the american people was the exposure by various military experts of the defenceless condition of new york city against an air raid by a hostile foreign power. at the moment, of course, there was no danger. the only hostile foreign power with any considerable naval or aërial force was germany and her fleet was securely bottled up in her own harbours by the overpowering fleet of great britain. yet if one could imagine the british fleet reduced to inefficiency, let us say by a futile, suicidal attack upon kiel or heligoland which would leave it crippled, and free the germans, or if we could conceive that the german threat to reduce great britain to subjection by the submarine campaign, proved effective, the peril of new york would then be very real and very immediate. for, although the harbour defences are declared by military authorities to be practically impregnable against attack by sea, they would not be effective against an attack from the air. a hostile fleet carrying a number of seaplanes could round-to out of range of our shore batteries and loose their flyers who could within less than an hour be dropping bombs on the most congested section of manhattan island. it is true that our own navy would have to be evaded in such case, but the attack might be made from points more distant from new york and at which no scouts would ever dream of looking for an enemy. the development in later months of the big heavily armed cruising machines makes the menace to any seaport city like new york still greater. the germans have built great biplanes with two fuselages, or bodies, armoured, carrying two machine guns and one automatic rifle to each body. they have twin engines of three hundred and forty horse power and carry a crew of six men. they are able in an emergency to keep the air for not less than three days. it is obvious that a small fleet of such machines launched from the deck of a hostile squadron, let us say in the neighbourhood of block island, could menace equally boston or new york, or by flying up the sound could work ruin and desolation upon all the defenceless cities bordering that body of water. nor are the germans alone in possessing machines of this type. the giant sikorsky machines of russia, mentioned in an earlier chapter, have during the war been developed into types capable of carrying crews of twenty-five men with guns and ammunition. the french, after having brought down one of the big german machines with the double bodies, instantly began building aircraft of their own of an even superior type. some of these are driven by four motors and carry eleven persons, besides guns and ammunition. the caproni machines of italy are even bigger--capable of carrying nine guns and thirty-five men. the congressional committee was much impressed by consideration of what might be done by a small fleet of aircraft of this type launched from a hostile squadron off the capes of chesapeake bay and operating against washington. it is not likely that any foreign foe advancing by land could repeat the exploit of the british who burned the capitol in . but in our present defenceless state a dozen aircraft of the largest type might reduce the national capitol to ruins. if an enemy well provided with aërial force possesses such power of offence an equal power of defence is given to the nation at all well provided with flying craft. in imitation, or perhaps rather in modification, of the english plan for guarding the coasts of great britain, a well matured system of defending the american coasts has been worked out and submitted to the national authorities. it involves the division of the coasts of the united states into thirteen aeronautical districts, each with aeronautical stations established at suitable points and all in communication with each other. eight of these districts would be laid out on the atlantic coast extending from the northern boundary of maine to the rio grande river. just what the purpose and value of these districts would be may be explained by taking the case, not of a typical one, but of the most important one of all, the third district including the coast line from new london, conn., to barnegat inlet, new jersey. this of course includes new york and adjacent commercial centres and the entrance to long island sound with its long line of thriving cities and the ports of the places from which come our chief supplies of munitions of war. it includes the part of the united states which an enemy would most covet. the part which at once would furnish the richest plunder, and possession of which by a foe would most cripple this nation. to-day it is defended by stationary guns in land fortresses and in time of attack would be further guarded by a fringe of cruising naval vessels. apparently up to the middle of the government thought no aërial watch was needed. but if we were to follow the methods which all the belligerent nations of europe are employing on their sea coasts we would establish in this district ten aeronautical stations. this would be no match for the british system which has one such station to every twenty miles of coast. ours would be farther apart, but as the sound could be guarded at its entrance the stations need only be maintained along the south shore of long island and down the jersey coast. each station would be provided with patrol, fighting, and observation airplanes. it would have the mechanical equipment of microphones, searchlights, and other devices for detecting the approach of an enemy now employed successfully abroad. its patrolling airplanes would cruise constantly far out to sea, not less than eighty miles, keeping ever in touch with their station. as the horizon visible from a soaring airplane is not less than fifty miles distant from the observer, this would mean that no enemy fleet could approach within miles of our coast without detection and report. the montauk point station would be charged with guarding the entrance to long island sound and, the waters of nantucket shoals and block island sound where the german submarine u- did its deadly work in . the sandy hook station would of course be the most important of all, guarding new york sea-going commerce and protecting the ship channel by a constant patrol of aircraft over it. the modern airplane has a speed of from eighty to one hundred and sixty miles an hour--the latter rate being attained only by the light scouts. thus it is apparent that if an alarm were raised at any one of these stations between new london and barnegat three hours at most would suffice to bring the fighting equipment of all the stations to the point threatened. there would be thus concentrated a fleet of several hundred swift scouts, heavy fighting machines, the torpedo planes of the type designed by admiral fiske, hydroaëroplanes capable of carrying heavy guns and in brief every form of aërial fighter. moreover, by use of the wireless, every ship of the navy within a radius of several hundred miles would be notified of the menace. they could not reach the scene of action so swiftly as the flying men but the former would be able to hold the foe in action until the heavier ships should arrive. the enormous advantage of such a system of guarding our coasts needs no further explanation. it is not even experimental, for france on her limited coast has such stations. england, which started the war with , had in and was still building. we at that time had none, although the extent of our sea coast and the great multiplicity of practicable harbours make us more vulnerable than any other nation. chapter x some features of aËrial warfare as devices to translate german hate for england into deeds of bloody malignancy and cowardly murder the german aircraft have ranked supreme. the ruthless submarine war has indeed done something toward working off this peculiar passion, but it lacked the spectacular qualities which german wrath demanded. as the war proceeded, and it became apparent that the participation of great britain--at first wholly unexpected by the kaiser's advisers--was certain to defeat the german aims, the authorities carefully inculcated in the minds of the people the most malignant hatred for that power. as lissauer's famous hymn of hate had it-- french and russians it matters not, a blow for a blow, and a shot for a shot. ................................. we have one foe and one alone-- england! by way of at once gratifying this hatred and still further stimulating it the german military authorities began early in the war a series of air raids upon english towns. they were of more than doubtful military value. they damaged no military or naval works. they aroused the savage ire of the british people who saw their children slain in schools and their wounded in hospitals by bombs dropped from the sky and straightway rushed off to enlist against so callous and barbaric a foe. but the raids served their political purpose by making the german people believe that the british were suffering all the horrors of war on their own soil, while the iron line of trenches drawn across france by the german troops kept the invader and war's agonies far from the soil of the fatherland. [illustration: ©international film service. _the u. s. aviation school at mineola._] the first german air raids were by zeppelins on little english seaside towns--scarborough, hartlepool, and harwich. except in so far as they inflicted mutilation and death upon many non-combatants, mostly women and children, and misery upon their relatives and friends they were without effect. but early in began a systematic series of raids upon london, which, by october of , had totalled thirty-four, with a toll of persons killed, and wounded. it seems fair to say that for these raids there was more plausible excuse than for those on the peaceful little seaside bathing resorts and fishing villages. london is full of military and naval centres, arsenals and navy yards, executive offices and centres of warlike activity. an incendiary bomb dropped into the bank of england, or the admiralty, might paralyze the finances of the empire, or throw the naval organization into a state of anarchy. but as a matter of fact the german bombs did nothing of the sort. they fell in the congested districts of london, "the crowded warrens of the poor." they spread wounds and death among peaceable theatre audiences. one dropped on a 'bus loaded with passengers homeward bound, and obliterated it and them from the face of the earth. but no building of the least military importance sustained any injury. it is true, however, that the persistent raiding has compelled england to withhold from the fighting lines in france several thousand men and several hundred guns in order to be in readiness to meet air raids in which germany has never employed more than fifty machines and at most two hundred men, including both aviators and mechanics. it is entirely probable that the failure of the germans to strike targets of military importance and the slaughter they wrought among peaceful civilians were due to no intent or purpose on their part. hitting a chosen target from the air is no matter of certainty. the bomb intended for the railway station is quite as likely to hit the adjacent public school or hospital. if the world ever recurs to that moderate degree of sanity and civilization which shall permit wars, but strive to regulate them in the interest of humanity this untrustworthiness of the aircraft's aim will compel some form of international regulation, just as the vulnerability of the submarine will force the amendment of the doctrine of visitation and search. but neither problem can be logically and reasonably solved in the middle of a war. and so, while the german violation of existing international law had the uncomfortable result for germany of bringing the united states into the war, the barbarous raids upon london caused the british at last to turn aside from their commendable abstention from air raids on unfortified and non-military towns and prepare for reprisals in kind. from the beginning of the war the british had abstained from bombing peaceful and non-military towns. they had not indeed been weak in the employment of their air forces. general smuts speaking in october, , said that the british had, in the month previous, dropped tons of bombs behind the lines of the enemy. but the targets were airdromes, military camps, arsenals and munitions camps--not hospitals or kindergartens. the time had now come when this purely military campaign no longer satisfied an enraged british people who demanded the enforcement of the mosaic law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, against a people whom general smuts described as "an enemy who apparently recognizes no laws, human or divine; who knows no pity or restraint, who sung te deums over the sinking of the _lusitania_, and to whom the maiming and slaughter of women and children appear legitimate means of warfare." and premier lloyd george, speaking to an audience of poor people in one of the congested districts which had suffered sorely from the aërial activities of the hun, said: "we will give it all back to them, and we will give it soon. we shall bomb germany with compound interest." but whether undertaken as part of a general programme of frightfulness or as reprisals for cruel and indefensible outrages air raids upon defenceless towns, killing peaceable citizens in their beds, and children in their kindergartens, are not incidents to add glory to aviation. the mind turns with relief from such examples of the cruel misuse of aircraft to the hosts of individual instances in which the airman and his machine remind one of the doughty sir knight and his charger in the most gallant days of chivalry. there were hosts of such incidents--men who fought gallantly and who always fought fair, men who hung about the outskirts of an aërial battle waiting for some individual champion of their own choosing to show himself and join in battle to death in the high ranges of the sky. some of these have been mentioned in this book already. to discuss all who even as early as had made their names memorable would require a volume in itself. a few may well be mentioned below. there, for example, was captain georges guynemer, "king of the french aces." an "ace" is an aviator who has brought down five enemy aircraft. guynemer had fifty-three to his credit. still a youth, only twenty-three years of age at the time of his death, and only flying for twenty-one months, he had lived out several life times in the mad excitement of combat in mid-air. within three weeks after getting his aviator's license he had become an "ace." before his first year's service had expired he was decorated and promoted for gallantry in rushing to the aid of a comrade attacked by five enemy machines. he entered the combat at the height of ten thousand feet, and inside of two minutes had dropped two of the enemy. the others fled. he pursued hotly keeping up a steady fire with his machine gun. one boche wavered and fell, but just then an enemy shell from an "archie" far below exploded under guynemer, tearing away one wing of his machine. let him tell the rest of that story: i felt myself dropping [he said later]. it was ten thousand feet to the earth, and, like a flash, i saw my funeral with my saddened comrades marching behind the gun carriage to the cemetery. but i pulled and pushed every lever i had, but nothing would check my terrific descent. five thousand feet from the earth, the wrecked machine began to turn somersaults, but i was strapped into the seat. i do not know what it was, but something happened and i felt the speed descent lessen. but suddenly there was a tremendous crash and when i recovered my senses i had been taken from the wreckage and was all right. two records guynemer made which have not yet been surpassed--the first, the one described above of dropping three fokkers in two minutes and thirty seconds, and rounding off the adventure by himself dropping ten thousand feet. the second was in shooting down four enemy machines in one day. his methods were of the simplest. he was always alone in his machine, which was the lightest available. he would rather carry more gasoline and ammunition than take along a gunner. the machine gun was mounted on the plane above his head, pointing dead ahead, and aimed by aiming the whole airplane. once started the gun continued firing automatically and guynemer's task was to follow his enemy pitilessly keeping that lead-spitting muzzle steadily bearing upon him. in september, , he went up to attack five enemy machines--no odds however appalling seemed to terrify him--but was caught in a fleet of nearly forty boches and fell to earth in the enemy's country. one of the last of the air duels to be fought under the practices which made early air service so vividly recall the age of chivalry, was that in which captain immelman, "the falcon," of the german army, met captain ball of the british royal flying corps. immelman had a record of fifty-one british airplanes downed. captain ball was desirous of wiping out this record and the audacious german at the same time, and so flying over the german lines he dropped this letter: captain immelman: i challenge you to a man-to-man fight to take place this afternoon at two o'clock. i will meet you over the german lines. have your anti-air craft guns withhold their fire, while we decide which is the better man. the british guns will be silent. ball. presently thereafter this answer was dropped from a german airplane: captain ball: your challenge is accepted. the guns will not interfere. i will meet you promptly at two. immelman. the word spread far and wide along the trenches on both sides. tacitly all firing stopped as though the bugles had sung truce. men left cover and clambered up on the top to watch the duel. punctually both flyers rose from their lines and made their way down no man's land. let an eye witness tell the story: from our trenches there were wild cheers for ball. the germans yelled just as vigorously for immelman. the cheers from the trenches continued; the germans increased in volume; ours changed into cries of alarm. ball, thousands of feet above us and only a speck in the sky, was doing the craziest things imaginable. he was below immelman and was apparently making no effort to get above him, thus gaining the advantage of position. rather he was swinging around, this way and that, attempting, it seemed, to postpone the inevitable. we saw the german's machine dip over preparatory to starting the nose dive. "he's gone now," sobbed a young soldier, at my side, for he knew immelman's gun would start its raking fire once it was being driven straight down. then in a fraction of a second the tables were turned. before immelman's plane could get into firing position, ball drove his machine into a loop, getting above his adversary and cutting loose with his gun and smashing immelman by a hail of bullets as he swept by. immelman's airplane burst into flames and dropped. ball, from above, followed for a few hundred feet and then straightened out and raced for home. he settled down, rose again, hurried back, and released a huge wreath of flowers, almost directly over the spot where immelman's charred body was being lifted from a tangled mass of metal. four days later ball too was killed. but the germans, too, had their champion airmen, mighty fliers, skillful at control and with the machine gun, in whose triumphs they took the same pride that our boys in france did in those of chapman, rockwell or thaw, the british in warneford, or the french in guynemer. chief of these was captain boelke, who came to his death in the latter part of , after putting to his credit over sixty allied planes brought down. a german account of one of his duels as watched from the trenches, will be of interest: for quite a long time an englishman had been making circles before our eyes--calmly and deliberately.... my men on duty clenched their fists in impotent wrath. "the dog--!" shooting would do no good. then suddenly from the rear a harsh, deep singing and buzzing cuts the air. it sounds like a german flyer. but he is not yet visible. only the buzz of an approaching motor is heard in the clouds in the direction of the englishman. more than a hundred eyes scanned the horizon. there! far away and high among the clouds is a small black humming bird--a german battle aeroplane. its course is laid directly for the hostile biplane and it flies like an arrow shot with a clear eye and steady hand. my men crawl out of the shelters. i adjust my field glasses. a lump rises in our throats as if we are awaiting something new and wonderful. so far the other does not seem to have noticed or recognized the black flyer that already is poised as a hawk above him. all at once there is a mighty swoop through the air like the drop of a bird of prey, and in no time the black flyer is immediately over the englishman and the air is filled with the furious crackling of a machine gun, followed by the rapid ta-ta-ta of two or three more, all operated at the highest speed just as during a charge. the englishman drops a little, makes a circle and tries to escape toward the rear. the other circles and attacks him in front, and again we hear the exciting ta-ta-ta! now the englishman tries to slip from under his opponent, but the german makes a circle and the effort fails. then the enemy describes a great circle and attempts to rise above the german. the latter ascends in sharp half circles and again swoops down upon the biplane, driving it toward the german trenches. will the englishman yield so soon? scattered shouts of joy are already heard in our ranks. suddenly he drops a hundred yards and more through the air and makes a skillful loop toward the rear. our warrior of the air swoops after him, tackles him once more and again we hear the wild defiant rattle of the machine guns over our heads. now they are quite close to our trenches. the french infantry and artillery begin firing in a last desperate hope. neither of them is touched. sticking close above and behind him the german drives the englishman along some six hundred yards over our heads and then just above the housetops of st. a. once more we hear a distant ta-ta-ta a little slower and more scattered and then as they drop both disappear from our view. scarcely five minutes pass before the telephone brings up this news: lieutenant boelke has just brought down his seventh flyer. methods of air-fighting were succinctly described in a hearing before the senate committee on military affairs, in june, . the officers testifying were young americans of the lafayette escadrille of the french army. to the civilian the testimony is interesting for the clear idea it gives of military aviation. the extracts following are from the official record: _adjt. prince_: senator, there are about four kinds of machines used abroad on the western front to-day. the machines that adjt. rumsey and myself are looking after are called the battle machines. then there are the photography machines, machines that go up to enable the taking of photographs of the german batteries, go back of the line and take views of the country behind their lines and find out what their next line of attack will be, or, if they retreat from the present line, then everything in that way. probably we have, where we are, in my group alone, a hundred and fifty photographers who do nothing all day long except develop pictures, and you can get pictures of any part of the country that you want. when the germans retreated from the old line where they used to be, by peronne and chaulnes, we had absolute pictures of all the hindenburg line from where they are now right down to st. quentin, down to the line the french are on. we had photographs of it all. _senator kirby_: when they started on the retreat? [illustration: © kadel & herbert. _miss ruth law at close of her chicago to new york flight._] _adjt. prince_: yes, sir. so we knew exactly where their stand would be made. then, besides that, those photograph machines do a lot of scouting. they have a pilot and a photographer aboard. he has not only a camera, but quite often he has a lewis gun with him in order to ward off any hostile airmen if they should get through the battle planes that are above him; in other words, should get through us in order to fight him. they do a great deal of the scouting, because they fly at a lower level. the battle planes go up to protect photography machines, or to go man-hunting, as it is called; in other words, to fight the germans. we fly all day, like to-day, as high as we can go, or as high as the french go as a rule, about metres, about , to , feet. [illustration: © international film service. _a french aviator between flights._] _adjt. rumsey_: i think metres is about , feet. some go up metres, which makes about , feet. _adjt. prince_: we go up there, and we have a certain sector of the front to look after. if we are only man-hunting, we go backward and forward like a policeman to prevent the germans from getting over our own lines. we usually fly by fours, if we can, and the four go out together, so as not to be alone. we are usually fighting inside of the german lines, because the morale of the french and english is better than that of the germans to-day; and every fight i have had--i have never been lucky enough to have one inside of my own lines--they have all been inside of the german lines. _senator kirby_: what is the equipment of a battle plane such as you use? _adjt. prince_: i use the horse-power machine. it is called a "s. p. a. d.," which has a spanish motor. but a great many of the motors to-day are being built here in america. _senator kirby_: how many men do you carry? _adjt. prince_: we go up alone in these machines. we did have two guns. we had the lewis gun on our upper wing and the vickers down below, that shoots through the propeller as the propeller turns around. then we gave up the lewis above. it added more weight, and we did not need it so much. the trouble with the lewis gun is that it has only ninety-seven cartridges, while the vickers has five hundred, and you can do just as much damage with the vickers as you could with them both. _senator sutherland_: you drive and fight at the same time? _adjt. prince_: yes, sir. _adjt. rumsey_: the machine gun is fixed. _adjt. prince_: it is absolutely fixed on the machine, and if i should want to adjust it to shoot you, i would adjust my machine on you. the witness then took up the nature and work of some of the heavier machines. he testified: _adjt. prince_: then comes the artillery regulating machine. that machine goes up, and it may be a farman or a bi-motor, or some other kind of heavier machine, a machine that goes slowly. they go over a certain spot. they have a driver, who is a pilot, like ourselves; then they have an artillery officer on board, whose sole duty it is to send back word, mostly by marconi, to his battery where the shots are landing. he will say: "too far," "too short," "right," or "left," and he stays there over this battery until the work done by the french guns has been absolutely controlled, and above him he has some of these battle planes keeping him from being attacked from above by german airmen. of course, they may be shot at by anti-aircraft guns, which you can not help. that is artillery regulating. _the chairman_: are you always attacked from above? _adjt. prince_: by airplanes; yes, sir. it is always much safer to attack from above. then you have the bomb-dropping machines, which carry a lot of weight. they go out sometimes in the daytime, but mostly at night, and they have these new sights by which they can stay up quite high in the air and still know the spot they are going at. they know the wind speed, they know their height, and they can figure out by this new arrangement they have exactly when the time is to let go their bombs. _senator kirby_: something in the nature of a range-finder? _adjt. prince_: a sort of range-finder. _adjt. rumsey_: it is a sort of telescope that looks down between your legs, and you have to regulate yourself, observing your speed, and when you see the spot, you have to touch a button and off go these things. _adjt. rumsey_: in a raid my brother went on there were sixty-eight machines that left; the french heavy machines, the english heavy machines, and then the english sort of half-fighting machine and half-bombing machine. they call it a sopwith, and it is a very good machine. they went over there, and the first ones over were the frenchmen, and they dropped bombs on these mauser works, and the only thing that the english saw was a big cloud of smoke and dust, and they could not see the works so they just dropped into them. out of that raid the fighting machines got eight germans and dropped them, and the germans got eight frenchmen. so, out of sixty-eight they lost eight, but we also got eight germans and dropped six tons of this stuff, which is twenty times as strong as the melinite. we do not know what the name of the powder is. the fighting machines on that trip only carried gasolene for two hours, and the other ones carried it for something like six hours, so we escorted them out for an hour, came back to our lines, filled up with gasolene, went out and met them and brought them back over the danger zone. _adjt. prince_: near the trenches is where the danger zone is, because there the german fighting machines are located. _senator kirby_: how far was it from your battle front that you went? _adjt. rumsey_: i think it was about miles, there and back; it was between and miles there. _senator kirby_: beyond the battle front? _adjt. rumsey_: yes; or, to be more accurate, i think it was nearer than . _the chairman_: what do you think of the function of the airplane as a determining factor? _adjt. prince_: there is no doubt that if we could send over in huge waves a great number of these bomb-dropping machines, and simply lay the country waste--for instance, the big cities like strassburg, freiburg, and others--not only would the damage done be great, but i guess the popular opinion in germany, everything being laid waste, would work very strongly in the minds of the public toward having peace. i do not think you could destroy an army, because you could not see them, but you could go to different stations; you could go to strassburg, to brussels, and places like that. _the chairman_: then, sending them over in enormous numbers would also put out of business their airplanes, and they would be helpless, would they not? _adjt. prince_: absolutely. you not only have on the front a large number of bomb-dropping machines, but a large number of fighting machines. when the somme battle was started in the morning the germans knew, naturally, that the french and british were going to start the somme drive, and they had up these drachens, these observation balloons, and the first eighteen minutes that the battle started the french and the english, i think, got twenty-one "saucisse"; in other words, for the next five days there was not a single german who came anywhere near the lines, but the french and english could go ahead as they-felt like. _admiral peary_: have you any idea as to how many airplanes there are along that western front on the german side? _adjt. prince_: there must be about on that line in actual commission. _admiral peary_: that means, then, about , in all, at least? _adjt. prince_: i should think so; i should say the french have about and the english possibly , or we have about . _adjt. rumsey_: if they have we have ; that is, right on the line. _adjt. prince_: we have about more than they have, and we are up all the time. the day before i left the front i was called to go out five times, and i went out five times, and spent two hours every time i went out. it would be gratifying to author and to reader alike if it were possible to give some account of the progress in aërial equipment made by the united states, since its declaration of war. but at the present moment (february, ), the government is chary of furnishing information concerning the advance made in the creation of an aërial fleet. perhaps precise information, if available, would be discouraging to the many who believe that the war will be won in the air. for it is known in a broad general way that the activities of the administration have been centred upon the construction of training camps and aviation stations. orders for the actual construction of airplanes have been limited, so that a chorus of criticism arose from manufacturers who declared that they might have to close their works for lack of employment. the apparent check was discouraging to american airmen, and to our allies who had expected marvellous things from the united states in the way of swift and wholesale preparation for winning battles in the air. the response of the government to all criticism was that it was laying broad foundations in order that construction once begun would proceed with unabated activity, and that when aircraft began to be turned out by the thousands a week there would be aviators and trained mechanics a-plenty to handle them. in this situation the advocates of a special cabinet department of aeronautics found new reason to criticize the administration and congress for having ignored or antagonized their appeals. for responsibility for the delay and indifference--if indifference there was--rested equally upon the secretary of the navy and the secretary of war. each had his measure of control over the enormous sum voted in a lump for aviation, each had the further millions especially voted to his department to account for. but no single individual could be officially asked what had been done with the almost one billion dollars voted for aeronautics in . but if the authorities seemed to lag, the inventors were busy. mention has already been made of the new "liberty" motor, which report had it was the fruit of the imprisonment of two mechanical experts in a hotel room with orders that they should not be freed until they had produced a motor which met all criticisms upon those now in use. their product is said to have met this test, and the happy result caused a general wish that the secretaries of war and of the navy might be similarly incarcerated and only liberated upon producing plans for the immediate creation of an aërial fleet suited to the nation's needs. if, however, the liberty motor shall prove the complete success which at the moment the government believes it to be, it will be such a spur to the development of the airplane in peace and war, as could not otherwise be applied. for the motor is the true life of the airplane--its heart, lungs, and nerve centre. the few people who still doubt the wide adoption of aircraft for peaceful purposes after the war base their skepticism on the treachery of motors still in use. they repudiate all comparisons with automobiles. they say: it is perfectly true that a man can run his car repeatedly from new york to boston without motor trouble. but the trouble is inevitable sooner or later. when it comes to an automobile it is trifling. the driver gets out and makes his repairs by the roadside. but if it comes to the aviator it brings the possibility of death with it every time. if his motor stops he must descend. but to alight he must find a long level field, with at least two hundred yards in which to run off his momentum. if, when he discovers the failure of his motor, he is flying at the height of a mile he must find his landing place within a space of eight miles, for in gliding to earth the ratio of forward movement to height is as eight to one. but how often in rugged and densely populated new england, or pennsylvania is there a vacant level field half a mile in length? the aviator who made a practice of daily flight between new york and boston would inevitably meet death in the end. the criticism is a shrewd and searching one. but it is based on the airplane and the motor of to-day without allowance for the development and improvement which are proceeding apace. it contemplates a craft which has but one motor, but the more modern machines have sufficient lifting power to carry two motors, and can be navigated successfully with one of these out of service. experiments furthermore are being made with a device after the type of the helicopter which with the steady lightening of the aircraft motor, may be installed on airplanes with a special motor for its operation. this device, it is believed, will enable the airplane so equipped to stop dead in its course with both propellers out of action, to hover over a given spot or to rise or to descend gently in a perpendicular line without the necessity of soaring. it is obvious that if this device prove successful the chief force of the objections to aërial navigation outlined above will be nullified. the menace of infrequent landing places will quickly remedy itself on busy lines of aërial traffic. the average railroad doing business in a densely populated section has stations once every eight or ten miles which with their sidings, buildings, water tanks, etc., cost far more than the field half a mile long with a few hangars that the fliers will need as a place of refuge. indeed, although for its size and apparent simplicity of construction an airplane is phenomenally costly, in the grand total of cost an aërial line would cost a tithe of the ordinary railway. it has neither right of way, road bed, rails, nor telegraph system to maintain, and if the average flyer seems to cost amazingly it still foots up less than one fifth the cost of a modern locomotive though its period of service is much shorter. just at the present time aircraft costs are high, based on artificial conditions in the market. their construction is a new industry; its processes not yet standardized; its materials still experimental in many ways and not yet systematically produced. a light sporting monoplane which superficially seems to have about $ worth of materials in it--exclusive of the engine--will cost about $ . a fighting biplane will touch $ , . yet the latter seems to the lay observer to contain no costly materials to justify so great a charge. the wings are a light wooden framework, usually of spruce, across which a fine grade of linen cloth is stretched. the materials are simple enough, but every bit of wood, every screw, every strand of wire is selected with the utmost care, and the workmanship of their assemblage is as painstaking as the setting of the most precious stones. [illustration: © international film service. _a german "gotha"--their favorite type._] "remember the least negligence may cost a life!" is a sign frequently seen hanging over the work benches in an airplane factory. when stretched over the framework, the cloth of the wings is treated to a dressing down of a preparation of collodion, which in the jargon of the shop is called "dope." this substance has a peculiar effect upon the cloth, causing it to shrink, and thus making it more taut and rigid than it could be by the most careful stretching. though the layman would not suspect it, this wash alone costs about $ a machine. the seaplanes too--or hydroaëroplanes as purists call them--present a curious illustration of unexpected and, it would seem, unexplainable expense. where the flyer over land has two bicycle wheels on which to land, the flyer over the sea has two flat-bottomed boats or pontoons. these cost from $ to $ and look as though they should cost not over $ . but the necessity of combining maximum strength with minimum weight sends the price soaring as the machine itself soars. moreover there is not yet the demand for either air-or seaplanes that would result in the division of labour, standardization of parts, and other manufacturing economies which reduce the cost of products. to the high cost of aircraft their comparative fragility is added as a reason for their unfitness for commercial uses. the engines cost from $ to $ each, are very delicate and usually must be taken out of the plane and overhauled after about hours of active service. the strain on them is prodigious for it is estimated that the number of revolutions of an airplane's engine during an hour's flight is equal to the number of revolutions of an automobile's wheels during active service of a whole month. it is believed that the superior lightness and durability of the liberty motor will obviate some of these objections to the commercial availability of aircraft in times of peace. and it is certain that with the cessation of the war, the retirement of the governments of the world from the purchasing field and the reduction of the demand for aircraft to such as are needed for pleasure and industrial uses the prices which we have cited will be cut in half. in such event what will be the future of aircraft; what their part in the social and industrial organization of the world? ten or a dozen years ago rudyard kipling entertained the english reading public of the world with a vivacious sketch of aërial navigation in the year a.d. he used the license of a poet in avoiding too precise descriptions of what is to come--dealing rather with broad and picturesque generalizations. now the year is still far enough away for pretty much anything to be invented, and to become commonplace before that era arrives. airships of the sort mr. kipling pictured may by that period have come and gone--have been relegated to the museums along with the stage-coaches of yesterday and the locomotives of to-day. for that matter before that millennial period shall arrive men may have learned to dispense with material transportation altogether, and be able to project their consciousness or even their astral bodies to any desired point on psychic waves. if a poet is going to prophecy he might as well be audacious and even revolutionary in his predictions. mr. kipling tried so hard to be reasonable that he made himself recognizably wrong so far as the present tendency of aircraft development would indicate. _with the night mail_, is the story of a trip by night across the atlantic from england to america. it is made in a monster dirigible--though the present tendency is to reject the dirigible for the swifter, less costly, and more airworthy (leave "seaworthy" to the plodding ships on old ocean's breast) airplanes. if, however, we condone this glaring improbability we find mr. kipling's tale full of action and imaginary incident that give it an air of truth. his ship is not docked on the ground at the tempest's mercy, but is moored high in air to the top of a tall tower up which passengers and freight are conveyed in elevators. his lighthouses send their beams straight up into the sky instead of projecting them horizontally as do those which now guard our coasts. just why lighthouses are needed, however, he does not explain. there are no reefs on which a packet of the air may run, no lee shores which they must avoid. on overland voyages guiding lights by night may be useful, as great white direction strips laid out on the ground are even now suggested as guides for daylight flying. but the main reliance of the airman must be his compass. crossing the broad oceans no lighted path is possible, and even in a voyage from new york to chicago, or from london to rome good airmanship will dictate flight at a height that will make reliance upon natural objects as a guide perilous. the airman has the advantage over the sailor in that he may lay his course on leaving his port, or flying field, and pursue it straight as an arrow to his destination. no rocks or other obstacles bar his path, no tortuous channels must be navigated. all that can divert him from his chosen course is a steady wind on the beam, and that is instantly detected by his instruments and allowance made for it. on the other hand the sailor has a certain advantage over the airman in that his more leisurely progress allows time for the rectification of errors in course arising from contrary currents or winds. an error of a point, or even two, amounts to but little in a day's steaming of perhaps four hundred miles. it can readily be remedied, unless the ship is too near shore. but when the whole three thousand miles of atlantic are covered in twenty hours in the air, the course must be right from the start and exactly adhered to, else the passenger for new york may be set down in florida. it is not improbable that even before the war is over the crossing of the atlantic by plane will be accomplished. certainly it will be one of the first tasks undertaken by airmen on the return of peace. but it is probable that the adaptation of aircraft to commercial uses will be begun with undertakings of smaller proportions. already the united states maintains an aërial mail route in alaska, while italy has military mail routes served by airplanes in the alps. these have been undertaken because of the physical obstacles to travel on the surface, presented in those rugged neighbourhoods. but in the more densely populated regions of the united states considerations of financial profit will almost certainly result in the early establishment of mail and passenger air service. air service will cut down the time between any two given points at least one half, and ultimately two thirds. letters could be sent from new york to boston, or even to buffalo, and an answer received the same day. the carrying plane could take on each trip five tons of mail. philadelphia would be brought within forty-five minutes of new york; washington within two hours instead of the present five. is there any doubt of the creation of an aërial passenger service under such conditions? already a caproni triplane will carry thirty-five passengers beside guns--say, fifty passengers if all other load be excluded, and has flown with a lighter load from newport news to new york. it is easily imaginable that by the airplane capable of carrying eighty persons--or the normal number now accommodated on an inter-urban trolley car--will be an accomplished fact. the lines that will thus spring up will need no rails, no right of way, no expensive power plant. their physical property will be confined to the airplanes themselves and to the fields from which the craft rise and on which they alight, with the necessary hangars. these indeed will involve heavy expenditure. for a busy line, with frequent sailings, of high speed machines a field will need to be in the neighbourhood of a mile square. a plane swooping down for its landing is not to be held up at the switch like a train while room is made for it. it is an imperative guest, and cannot be gainsaid. accordingly the fields must be large enough to accommodate scores of planes at once and give each new arrival a long straight course on which to run off its momentum. it is obvious therefore that the union stations for aircraft routes cannot be in the hearts of our cities as are the railroad stations of to-day, but must be fairly well out in the suburbs. a form of machine which the professional airmen say has yet to be developed is the small monoplane, carrying two passengers at most, and of low speed--not more than twenty miles an hour at most. in this age of speed mania the idea of deliberately planning a conveyance or vehicle that shall not exceed a low limit seems out of accord with public desire. but the low speed airplane has the advantage of needing no extended field in which to alight. it reaches the ground with but little momentum to be taken up and can be brought up standing on the roof of a house or the deck of a ship. small machines of this sort are likely to serve as the runabouts of the air, to succeed the trim little automobile roadsters as pleasure craft. [illustration: © international film service. _a french monoplane._] the beginning of the fourth year of the war brought a notable change in aërial tactics. for three years everything had been sacrificed to speed. such aërial duels as have been described were encouraged by the fact that aircraft were reduced to the proportions needful for carrying one man and a machine gun. the gallant flyers went up in the air and killed each other. that was about all there was to it. while as scouts, range finders, guides for the artillery, they exerted some influence on the course of the war, as a fighting arm in its earlier years, they were without efficiency. the bombing forays were harassing but little more, because the craft engaged were of too small capacity to carry enough bombs to work really serious damage, while the ever increasing range of the "archies" compels the airmen to deliver their fire from so great a height as to make accurate aim impossible. [illustration: photo press illustrating service. _a german scout brought to earth in france._] but kiel, wilhelmshaven and zeebrugge are likely to change all this. the constant contemplation of those nests for the sanctuary of pestiferous submarines, effectively guarded against attack by either land or water, has stirred up the determination of the allies to seek their destruction from above. heavy bombing planes are being built in all the allied workshops for this purpose, and furthermore to give effect to the british determination to take vengeance upon germany, for her raids upon london. it is reported that the united states, by agreement with its allies, is to specialize in building the light, swift scout planes, but in other shops the heavy triplane, the dreadnought of the air is expected to be the feature of . with it will come an entirely novel strategic use of aircraft in war, and with it too, which is perhaps the more permanently important, will come the development of aircraft of the sort that will be readily adaptable to the purposes of peace when the war shall end. the submarine boat chapter xi beginnings of submarine invention in september, the british fleet in the north sea had settled down to the monotonous task of holding the coasts of germany and the channels leading to them in a state of blockade. the work was dismal enough. the ships tossing from day to day on the always unquiet waters of the north sea were crowded with jackies all of whom prayed each day that the german would come from hiding and give battle. not far from the hook of holland engaged in this monotonous work were three cruisers of about , tons, each carrying men and officers. they were the _cressy_, _aboukir_, and _hogue_--not vessels of the first rank but still important factors in the british blockade. they were well within the torpedo belt and it may be believed that unceasing vigilance was observed on every ship. nevertheless without warning the other two suddenly saw the _aboukir_ overwhelmed by a flash of fire, a pillar of smoke and a great geyser of water that rose from the sea and fell heavily upon her deck. instantly followed a thundering explosion as the magazines of the doomed ship went off. within a very few minutes, too little time to use their guns against the enemy had they been able to see him, or to lower their boats, the _aboukir_ sank leaving the crew floundering in the water. in the distance lay the german submarine u- --one of the earliest of her class in service. from her conning tower captain weddigen had viewed the tragedy. now seeing the two sister ships speeding to the rescue he quickly submerged. it may be noted that as a result of what followed, orders were given by the british admiralty that in the event of the destruction of a ship by a submarine others in the same squadron should not come to the rescue of the victim, but scatter as widely as possible to avoid a like fate. in this instance the _hogue_ and the _cressy_ hurried to the spot whence the _aboukir_ had vanished and began lowering their boats. hardly had they begun the work of mercy when a torpedo from the now unseen foe struck the _hogue_ and in twenty minutes she too had vanished. while she was sinking the _cressy_, with all guns ready for action and her gunners scanning the sea in every direction for this deadly enemy, suddenly felt the shock of a torpedo and, her magazines having been set off, followed her sister ships to the ocean's bed. in little more than half an hour thirty-six thousand tons of up-to-date british fighting machinery, and more than gallant blue jackets had been sent to the depths of the north sea by a little boat of tons carrying a crew of twenty-six men. the world stood aghast. with the feeling of horror at the swift death of so many caused by so few, there was mingled a feeling of amazement at the scientific perfection of the submarine, its power, and its deadly work. men said it was the end of dreadnoughts, battleships, and cruisers, but the history of the war has shown singularly few of these destroyed by submarines since the first novelty of the attack wore off. the world at the moment seemed to think that the submarine was an entirely new idea and invention. but like almost everything else it was merely the ultimate reduction to practical use of an idea that had been germinating in the mind of man from the earliest days of history. we need not trouble ourselves with the speculations of alexander the great, aristotle, and pliny concerning "underwater" activities. their active minds gave consideration to the problem, but mainly as to the employment of divers. not until the first part of the sixteenth century do we find any very specific reference to actual underwater boats. that appears in a book of travels by olaus magnus, archbishop of upsala in sweden. notwithstanding the gentleman's reverend quality, one must question somewhat the veracity of the chapter which he heads: "of the leather ships made of hides used by the pyrats of greenland." he professed to have seen two of these "ships," more probably boats, hanging in a cathedral church in greenland. with these singular vessels, according to his veracious reports the people of that country could navigate under water and attack stranger ships from beneath. "for the inhabitants of that countrey are wont to get small profits by the spoils of others," he wrote, "by these and the like treacherous arts, who by their thieving wit, and by boring a hole privately in the sides of the ships beneath (as i said) have let in the water and presently caused them to sink." leaving the tale of the archbishop where we think it must belong in the realm of fiction, we may note that it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that the first submarine boat was actually built and navigated. a hollander, cornelius drebel, or van drebel, born in , in the town of alkmaar, had come to london during the reign of james i., who became his patron and friend. drebel seems to have been a serious student of science and in many ways far ahead of his times. moreover, he had the talent of getting next to royalty. in he first conceived the idea of building a submarine. fairly detailed descriptions of his boats--he built three from - --and of their actual use, have been handed down to us by men whose accuracy and truthfulness cannot be doubted. the honorable robert boyle, a scientist of unquestioned seriousness, tells in his _new experiments, physico-mechanical touching the spring of the air and its effects_ about drebel's work in the quaint language of his time: but yet on occasion of this opinion of paracelsus, perhaps it will not be impertinent if, before i proceed, i acquaint your lordship with a conceit of that deservedly famous mechanician and chymist, cornelius drebel, who, among other strange things that he perform'd, is affirm'd, by more than a few credible persons, to have contrived for the late learned king james, a vessel to go under water; of which, trial was made in the thames, with admired success, the vessel carrying twelve rowers, besides passengers; one which is yet alive, and related it to an excellent mathematician that informed me of it. now that for which i mention this story is, that having had the curiosity and opportunity to make particular inquiries among the relations of drebel, and especially of an ingenious physician that married his daughter, concerning the grounds upon which he conceived it feasible to make men unaccustomed to continue so long under water without suffocation, or (as the lately mentioned person that went in the vessel affirms) without inconvenience; i was answered, that drebel conceived, that it is not the whole body of the air, but a certain quintessence (as chymists speak) or spirituous part of it, that makes it fit for respiration; which being spent, the remaining grosser body, or carcase, if i may so call it, of the air, is unable to cherish the vital flame residing in the heart; so that, for aught i could gather, besides the mechanical contrivances of his vessel, he had a chymical liquor, which he accounted the chief secret of his submarine navigation. for when, from time to time, he conceived that the finer and purer part of the air was consumed, or over-clogged by the respiration and steam of those that went in his ship, he would by unstopping a vessel full of this liquor, speedily restore to the troubled air such a proportion of vital parts, as would make it again, for a good while, fit for respiration whether by dissipating, or precipitating the grosser exhalations, or by some other intelligible way, i must not now stay to examine, contenting myself to add, that having had the opportunity to do some service to those of his relations that were most intimate with him, and having made it my business to learn what this strange liquor might be, they constantly affirmed that drebel would never disclose the liquor unto any, nor so much as tell the nature whereof he had made it, to above one person, who himself assured me what it was. this most curious narrative suggests that in some way drebel, who died in london in , had discovered the art of compressing oxygen and conceived the idea of making it serviceable for freshening the air in a boat, or other place, contaminated by the respiration of a number of men for a long time. indeed the reference made to the substance by which drebel purified the atmosphere in his submarine as "a liquor" suggests that he may possibly have hit upon the secret of liquid air which late in the nineteenth century caused such a stir in the united states. of his possession of some such secret there can be no doubt whatsoever, for samuel pepys refers in his famous diary to a lawsuit, brought in the king's courts by the heirs of drebel, to secure the secret for their own use. what was the outcome of the suit or the subsequent history of drebel's invention history does not record. throughout the next years a large number of inventors and near-inventors occupied themselves with the problem of the submarine. some of these men went no further than to draw plans and to write out descriptions of what appeared to them to be feasible submarine boats. others took one step further, by taking out patents, but only very few of the submarine engineers of this period had either the means or the courage to test their inventions in the only practicable way, by building an experimental boat and using it. in spite of this apparent lack of faith on the part of the men who worked on the submarine problem, it would not be fair to condemn them as fakirs. experimental workers, in those times, had to face many difficulties which were removed in later times. the study of science and the examination of the forces of nature were not only not as popular as they became later, but frequently were looked upon as blasphemous, savouring of sorcery, or as a sign of an unbalanced mind. [illustration: © kadel & herbert. _a gas attack photographed from an airplane._] england and france supplied most of the men who occupied themselves with the submarine problem between and . of the englishmen, the following left records of one kind or another concerning their labours in this direction. richard norwood, in , was granted a patent for a contrivance which was apparently little more than a diving apparatus. in , bishop wilkins published a book, _mathematical magick_, which was full of rather grotesque projects and which contained one chapter on the possibility "of framing an ark for submarine navigation." in , patents were granted on engines connected with submarine navigation to john holland--curious forerunner of a name destined to be famous two hundred years later--and on a submarine boat to sir stephen evance. in prance, two priests, fathers mersenne and fournier, published in a small book called _questions théologiques, physiques, morales et mathématiques_, which contained a detailed description of a submarine boat. they suggested that the hull of submarines ought to be of metal and not of wood, and that their shape ought to be as nearly fishlike as possible. nearly three hundred years have hardly altered these opinions. ancient french records also tell us that six years later, in , the king of france had granted a patent to jean barrié, permitting him during the next twelve years to fish at the bottom of the sea with his boat. unluckily barrié's fish stories have expired with his permit. in , a french engineer, de son, is said to have built at rotterdam a submarine boat. little is known concerning this vessel except that it was reported to have been seventy-two feet long, twelve feet high, and eight feet broad, and to have been propelled by a paddlewheel instead of oars. borelli, about whom very little seems to be known, is credited with having invented in a submarine boat, whose descent and ascent were regulated by a series of leather bottles placed in the hull of the boat with their mouths open to the surrounding water. the english magazine, _graphic_, published a picture which is considered the oldest known illustration of any submarine boat. this picture matches in all details the description of borelli's boat, but it is credited to a man called symons. twenty-seven years later, in , another englishman, j. day, built a small submarine boat, and after fairly extensive experiments, descended in his boat in plymouth harbour. this descent is of special interest because we have a more detailed record of it than of any previous submarine exploit, and because day is the first submarine inventor who lost his life in the attempt to prove the feasibility of his invention. the _annual register_ of gives a narration in detail of day's experiments and death and inasmuch as this is the first ungarbled report of a submarine descent, it may be quoted at length. _authentic account of a late unfortunate transaction, with respect to a diving machine at plymouth._ mr. day (the sole projector of the scheme, and, as matters have turned out, the unhappy sacrifice to his own ingenuity) employed his thoughts for some years past in planning a method of sinking a vessel under water, with a man in it, who should live therein for a certain time, and then by his own means only, bring himself up to the surface. after much study he conceived that his plan could be reduced into practice. he communicated his idea in the part of the country where he lived, and had the most sanguine hopes of success. he went so far as to try his project in the broads near yarmouth. he fitted a norwich market-boat for his purpose, sunk himself thirty feet under water, where he continued during the space of twenty-four hours, and executed his design to his own entire satisfaction. elated with this success, he then wanted to avail himself of his invention. he conversed with his friends, convinced them that he had brought his undertaking to a certainty; but how to reap the advantage of it was the difficulty that remained. the person in whom he confided suggested to him, that, if he acquainted the sporting gentlemen with the discovery, and the certainty of the performance, considerable betts would take place, as soon as the project would be mentioned in company. the sporting kalendar was immediately looked into, and the name of blake soon occurred; that gentleman was fixed upon as the person to whom mr. day ought to address himself. accordingly, mr. blake, in the month of november last, received the following letter: "sir, "i found out an affair by which many thousands may be won; it is of a paradoxical nature, but can be performed with ease; therefore, sir, if you chuse to be informed of it, and give me one hundred pounds of every thousand you shall win by it, i will very readily wait upon you and inform you of it. i am myself but a poor mechanic and not able to make anything by it without your assistance. "your's, etc. "j. day." mr. blake had no conception of mr. day's design, nor was he sure that the letter was serious. to clear the matter up, he returned for answer, that, if mr. day would come to town, and explain himself, mr. blake would consider of the proposal. if he approved of it, mr. day should have the recompence he desired; if, on the other hand, the plan should be rejected, mr. blake would make him a present to defray the expences of his journey. in a short time after mr. day came to town; mr. blake saw him and desired to know what secret he was possessed of. the man replied, "that he could sink a ship feet deep in the sea with himself in it, and remain therein for the space of hours, without communication with anything above; and at the expiration of the time, rise up again in the vessel." the proposal, in all its parts, was new to mr. blake. he took down the particulars, and, after considering the matter, desired some kind of proof of the practicability. the man added that if mr. blake would furnish him with the materials necessary, he would give him an occular demonstration. a model of the vessel, with which he was to perform the experiment, was then required, and in three or four weeks accomplished, so as to give a perfect idea of the principle upon which the scheme was to be executed, and, in time, a very plausible promise of success, not to mr. blake only, but many other gentlemen who were consulted upon the occasion. the consequence was, that mr. blake, agreeably to the man's desire, advanced money for the construction of a vessel fit for that purpose. mr. day, thus assisted, went to plymouth with his model, and set a man in that place to work upon it. the pressure of the water at feet deep was a circumstance of which mr. blake was advised, and touching that article he gave the strongest precautions to mr. day, telling him, at any expence, to fortify the chamber in which he was to subsist, against the weight of such a body of water. mr. day set off in great spirits for plymouth, and seemed so confident, that mr. blake made a bett that the project would succeed, reducing, however, the depth of water from yards to feet, and the time from to hours. by the terms of the wager, the experiment was to be made within three months from the date; but so much time was necessary for due preparation, that on the appointed day things were not in readiness and mr. blake lost the bett. [illustration: photo by international film service. _a french nieuport dropping a bomb._] in some short time afterwards the vessel was finished, and mr. day still continued eager for the carrying of his plan into execution; he was uneasy at the idea of dropping the scheme and wished for an opportunity to convince mr. blake that he could perform what he had undertaken. he wrote from plymouth that everything was in readiness and should be executed the moment mr. blake arrived. induced by this promise, mr. blake set out for plymouth; upon his arrival a trial was made in cat-water, where mr. day lay, during the flow of tide, six hours, and six more during the tide of ebb; confined all the time in the room appropriated for his use. a day for the final determination was fixed; the vessel was towed to the place agreed upon; mr. day provided himself with whatever he thought necessary; he went into the vessel, let the water into her and with great composure retired to the room constructed for him, and shut up the valve. the ship went gradually down in fathoms of water at o'clock on tuesday, june , in the afternoon, being to return at the next morning. he had three buoys or messengers, which he could send to the surface at option, to announce his situation below; but, none appearing, mr. blake, who was near at hand in a barge, began to entertain some suspicion. he kept a strict lookout, and at the time appointed, neither the buoys nor the vessel coming up, he applied to the _orpheus_ frigate, which lay just off the barge, for assistance. the captain with the most ready benevolence supplied them with everything in his power to seek for the ship. mr. blake, in this alarming situation was not content with the help of the _orpheus_ only; he made immediate application to lord sandwich (who happened to be at plymouth) for further relief. his lordship with great humanity ordered a number of hands from the dock-yard, who went with the utmost alacrity and tried every effort to regain the ship, but unhappily without effect. thus ended this unfortunate affair. mr. blake had not experience enough to judge of all possible contingencies, and he had now only to lament the credulity with which he listened to a projector, fond of his own scheme but certainly not possessed of skill enough to guard against the variety of accidents to which he was liable. the poor man has unfortunately shortened his days; he was not however tempted or influenced by anybody; he confided in his own judgment, and put his life to the hazard upon his own mistaken notions. many and various have been the opinions on this strange, useless, and fatal experiment, though the more reasonable part of mankind seemed to give it up as wholly impracticable. it is well-known, that pent-up air, when overcharged with the vapours emitted out of animal bodies, becomes unfit for respiration; for which reason, those confined in the diving-bell, after continuing some time under water are obliged to come up, and take in fresh air, or by some such means recruit it. that any man should be able after having sunk a vessel to so great a depth, to make that vessel at pressure, so much more specifically lighter than water, as thereby to enable it to force its way to the surface, through the depressure of so great a weight, is a matter not hastily to be credited. even cork, when sunk to a certain depth will, by the great weight of the fluid upon it, be prevented from rising. the english of the _annual register_ leaves much to be desired in clarity. it makes reasonably clear, however, that the unfortunate mr. day's knowledge of submarine conditions was, by no means, equal to mr. blake's sporting spirit. even to-day one hundred feet is an unusual depth of submersion for the largest submarines. the credit for using a submarine boat for the first time in actual warfare belongs to a yankee, david bushnell. he was born in saybrook, connecticut, and graduated from yale with the class of . while still in college he was interested in science and as far as his means and opportunities allowed, he devoted a great deal of his time and energy to experimental work. the problem which attracted his special attention was how to explode powder under water, and before very long he succeeded in solving this to his own satisfaction as well as to that of a number of prominent people amongst whom were the governor of connecticut and his council. bushnell's experiments, of course, fell in the period during which the revolutionary war was fought, and when he had completed his invention, there naturally presented itself to him a further problem. how could his device be used for the benefit of his country and against the british ships which were then threatening new york city? as a means to this end, bushnell planned and built a submarine boat which on account of its shape is usually called the _turtle_. general washington thought very highly of bushnell, whom he called in a letter to thomas jefferson "a man of great mechanical powers, fertile in inventions and master of execution." in regard to bushnell's submarine boat the same letter, written after its failure, says: "i thought and still think that it was an effort of genius, but that too many things were necessary to be combined to expect much against an enemy who are always on guard." during the whole period of the building of the _turtle_ bushnell was in ill health. otherwise he would have navigated it on its trial trip himself for he was a man of undoubted courage and wrapped up alike in the merits of his invention and in the possibility of utilizing it to free new york from the constant ignominy of the presence of british ships in its harbour. but his health made this out of the question. accordingly he taught his brother the method of navigating the craft, but at the moment for action the brother too fell ill. it became necessary to hire an operator. this was by no means easy as volunteers to go below the water in a submarine boat of a type hitherto undreamed of, and to attach an explosive to the hull of a british man-of-war, the sentries upon which were presumably especially vigilant, being in a hostile harbour, was an adventure likely to attract only the most daring and reckless spirits. in a letter to thomas jefferson, other portions of which we shall have occasion to quote later, bushnell refers to this difficulty in finding a suitable operator and tells briefly and with evident chagrin the story of the failure of the attempts made to utilize successfully his submarine: [illustration: photo by u. & u. _a bomb-dropping taube._] after various attempts to find an operator to my wish, i sent one who appeared more expert than the rest from new york to a -gun ship lying not far from governor's island. he went under the ship and attempted to fix the wooden screw into her bottom, but struck, as he supposes, a bar of iron which passes from the rudder hinge, and is spiked under the ship's quarter. had he moved a few inches, which he might have done without rowing, i have no doubt but he would have found wood where he might have fixed the screw, or if the ship were sheathed with copper he might easily have pierced it; but, not being well skilled in the management of the vessel, in attempting to move to another place he lost the ship. after seeking her in vain for some time, he rowed some distance and rose to the surface of the water, but found daylight had advanced so far that he durst not renew the attempt. he says that he could easily have fastened the magazine under the stem of the ship above water, as he rowed up to the stern and touched it before he descended. had he fastened it there the explosion of lbs. of powder (the quantity contained in the magazine) must have been fatal to the ship. in his return from the ship to new york he passed near governor's island, and thought he was discovered by the enemy on the island. being in haste to avoid the danger he feared, he cast off the magazine, as he imagined it retarded him in the swell, which was very considerable. after the magazine had been cast off one hour, the time the internal apparatus was set to run, it blew up with great violence. afterwards there were two attempts made in hudson's river, above the city, but they effected nothing. one of them was by the aforementioned person. in going towards the ship he lost sight of her, and went a great distance beyond her. when he at length found her the tide ran so strong that, as he descended under water for the ship's bottom, it swept him away. soon after this the enemy went up the river and pursued the boat which had the submarine vessel on board and sunk it with their shot. though i afterwards recovered the vessel, i found it impossible at that time to prosecute the design any farther. the operator to whom bushnell had entrusted his submarine boat was a typical yankee, ezra lee of lyme, connecticut. his story of the adventure differs but little from that of bushnell, but it is told with a calm indifference to danger and a seeming lack of any notion of the extraordinary in what he had done that gives an idea of the man. "when i rode under the stern of the ship [the _eagle_] i could see the men on deck and hear them talk," he wrote. "i then shut down all the doors, sunk down, and came up under the bottom of the ship." this means that he hermetically sealed himself inside of a craft, shaped like two upper turtle shells joined together--hence the name of the _turtle_. he had entered through the orifice at the top, whence the head of the turtle usually protrudes. this before sinking he had covered and made water-tight by screwing down upon it a brass crown or top like that to a flask. within he had enough air to support him thirty minutes. the vessel stood upright, not flat as a turtle carries himself. it was maintained in this position by lead ballast. within the operator occupied an upright position, half sitting, half standing. to sink water was admitted, which gathered in the lower part of the boat, while to rise again this was expelled by a force pump. there were ventilators and portholes for the admission of light and air when operating on the surface, but once the cap was screwed down the operator was in darkness. in this craft, which suggests more than anything else a curiously shaped submarine coffin, lee drifted along by the side of the ship, navigating with difficulty with his single oar and seeking vainly to find some spot to which he might affix his magazine. a fact which might have disquieted a more nervous man was that the clockwork of this machine was running and had been set to go off in an hour from the time the voyage was undertaken. as to almost anyone in that position minutes would seem hours, the calmness of sailor lee's nerves seems to be something beyond the ordinary. when he finally abandoned the attempt on the _eagle_ he started up the bay. off governor's island he narrowly escaped capture. when i was abreast of the fort on the island three hundred or four hundred men got upon the parapet to observe me; at length a number came down to the shore, shoved off a twelve oar'd barge with five or six sitters and pulled for me. i eyed them, and when they had got within fifty or sixty yards of me i let loose the magazine in hopes that if they should take me they would likewise pick up the magazine and then we should all be blown up together. but as kind providence would have it they took fright and returned to the island to my infinite joy.... the magazine after getting a little past the island went off with a tremendous explosion, throwing up large bodies of water to an immense height. during the last quarter of the eighteenth and during the first half of the nineteenth century france was the chief centre for the activities of submarine inventors. however, very few of the many plans put forward in this period were executed. the few exceptions resulted in little else than trial boats which usually did not live up to the expectations of their inventors or their financial backers and were, therefore, discarded in quick order. in spite of this lack of actual results this particular period was of considerable importance to the later development of the submarine. almost every one of the many boats then projected or built contained some innovation and in this way some of the many obstacles were gradually overcome. strictly speaking the net result of the experimental work done during these seventy-five years by a score or more of men, most of whom were french, though a few were english, was the creation of a more sane and sound basis on which, before long, other men began to build with greater success. the one notable accomplishment of interest, especially to americans, was the submarine built in - by robert fulton. fulton, of course, is far better known by his work in connection with the discovery and development of steam navigation. born in pennsylvania in , he early showed marked mechanical genius. in he went to england with the purpose of studying art under the famous painter west, but soon began to devote most of his time and energy to mechanical problems. not finding in england as much encouragement as he had hoped, he went, in , to paris and, for the next seven years, lived there in the house of the american minister, joel barlow. as soon as he had settled down in france, he offered his plans of a submarine boat which he called the _nautilus_ to the french government. though a special commission reported favourably on this boat, the opposition of the french minister of the marine was too strong to be overcome, even after another commission had approved a model built by fulton. in , however, he was successful in gaining the moral and financial support of napoleon bonaparte, then first consul of the french republic. fulton immediately proceeded to build the _nautilus_ and completed the boat in may, . it was cigar-shaped, about seven feet in diameter and over twenty-one feet in length. the hull was of copper strengthened by iron ribs. the most noticeable features were a collapsible mast and sail and a small conning tower at the forward end. the boat was propelled by a wheel affixed to the centre of the stern and worked by a hand-winch. a rudder was used for steering, and increased stability was gained by a keel which ran the whole length of the hull. [illustration: © u. & u. _a captured german fokker exhibited at the invalides._] soon after completion the boat was taken out for a number of trial trips all of which were carried out with signal success and finally culminated, on june , , in the successful blowing up of an old ship furnished by the french government. although the _nautilus_ created a great sensation, popular as well as official interest began soon to flag. fulton received no further encouragement and finally gave up his submarine experiments. [illustration: © u. & u. _a british seaplane with folding wings._] in he returned to america. by he had built another submarine boat which he called the _mute_. it was, comparatively speaking, of immense size, being over eighty feet long, twenty-one feet wide, and fourteen feet deep and accommodating a hundred men. it was iron-plated on top and derived its peculiar name from the fact that it was propelled by a noiseless engine. before its trials could be completed, fulton died on february , , and no one seemed to have sufficient interest or faith in his new boat to continue his work. in the middle of the nineteenth century for the first time a german became seriously interested in submarines. his name was wilhelm bauer. he was born in in a small town in bavaria and, though a turner by trade, joined the army in . bauer was even in his youth of a highly inventive turn of mind. he possessed an indomitable will and an unlimited supply of enthusiasm. step by step he acquired, in what little time he could spare from his military duties, the necessary mechanical knowledge, and finally, supported financially by a few loyal friends and patrons, he built his first submarine at kiel at a cost of about $ . it sank to the bottom on its first trial trip, fortunately without anyone on board. undaunted he continued his efforts. when he found that his support at kiel was weakening, he promptly went to austria. in spite of glowing promises, opposition on the part of some officials deprived bauer of the promised assistance. he went then to england and succeeded in enlisting the interest of the prince consort. a boat was built according to bauer's plans, which, however, he was forced by the interference of politicians to change to such an extent that it sank on its first trial with considerable loss of life. still full of faith in his ability to produce a successful submarine, bauer now went to russia. in , he built a boat at st. petersburg and had it accepted by the russian government. it was called _le diable marin_ and looked very much like a dolphin. its length was fifty-two feet, its beam twelve feet five inches, and its depth eleven feet. its hull was of iron. a propeller, worked by four wheels, furnished motive power. submersion and stability were regulated by four cylinders into which water could be pumped at will. the first trial of the boat was made on may , , and was entirely successful. in later trials as many as fourteen men at a time descended in _le diable marin_. it is said that bauer made a total of trips on his boat. all but two were carried out successfully. at one time, however, the propeller was caught in some seaweed and it was only by the quickest action that all the water was pumped out and the bow of the boat allowed to rise out of the water, so that the occupants managed to escape by means of the hatchway. like fulton in france, bauer now experienced in russia a sudden decrease of official interest. when he finally lost his boat, about four weeks later, he also lost his courage, and in he returned to germany where he later died in comparative poverty. contemporary with bauer's submarines and immediately following them were a large number of other boats. some of these were little more than freaks. others failed in certain respects but added new features to the sum-total of submarine inventions. as early as , m. marié-davy, professor of chemistry at montpellier university, suggested an electro-magnetic engine as motive power. in a well-known engineer, j. nasmith, suggested a submerged motor, driven by a steam engine. none of the boats of this period proved successful enough, however, to receive more than passing notice, and very few, indeed, ever reached the trial stage. but before long the rapid development of internal-combustion engines and the immense progress made in the study of electricity was to advance the development of submarines by leaps and bounds. chapter xii the coming of steam and electricity in the fall of , the federal fleet was blockading the harbour of charleston, s. c. included among the many ships was one of the marvels of that period, the united states battleship _ironsides_. armour-plated and possessing what was then considered a wonderful equipment of high calibred guns and a remarkably trained crew, she was the terror of the confederates. none of their ships could hope to compete with her and the land batteries of the southern harbour were powerless to reach her. [illustration: © u. & u. _a british anti-aircraft gun._] during the night of october , , the officer of the watch on board the _ironsides_, ensign howard, suddenly observed a small object looking somewhat like a pleasure boat, floating close to his own ship. before ensign howard's order to fire at it could be executed, the _ironsides_ was shaken from bow to stern, an immense column of water was thrown up and flooded her deck and engine room, and ensign howard fell, mortally wounded. the little floating object was responsible for all this. it was a confederate submersible boat, only fifty feet long and nine feet in diameter, carrying a fifteen-foot spar-torpedo. she had been named _david_ and the confederate authorities hoped to do away by means of her with the goliaths of the federal navy. manned only by five men, under the command of lieutenant w. t. glassel, driven by a small engine and propeller, she had managed to come up unobserved within striking distance of the big battleship. the attack, however, was unsuccessful. the _ironsides_ was undamaged. on the other hand the plucky little _david_ had been disabled to such an extent that her crew had to abandon her and take to the water, allowing their boat to drift without motive power. four of them were later picked up. according to an account in barnes, _torpedoes and torpedo warfare_, the engineer, after having been in the water for some time, found himself near her and succeeded in getting on board. he relighted her fires and navigated his little boat safely back to charleston. there she remained, making occasional unsuccessful sallies against the federal fleet, and when charleston was finally occupied by the federal forces, she was found there. in spite of this failure the confederates continued their attempts to break the blockade of their most important port by submarine devices. a new and somewhat improved _david_ was ordered and built at another port. news of this somehow reached the federal navy department and was immediately communicated to vice-admiral dahlgren, in command of the blockading fleet. despite this warning and instructions to all the officers of the fleet, the second _david_ succeeded in crossing charleston bar. this new boat was a real diving submarine boat and though frequently called _david_ had been christened the _hundley_. it had been built in the shipyards of mcclintock & hundley at mobile, alabama, and had been brought to charleston by rail. on her trial she proved very clumsy and difficult to manage. for her first trip a crew of nine men volunteered. not having any conning tower it was necessary that one of the hatchways should be left open while the boat travelled on the surface so that the steersman could find his bearings. while she was on her first trip, the swell from a passing boat engulfed her. before the hatchway could be closed, she filled with water. of course, she sank like a piece of lead and her entire crew, with the exception of the steersman, was drowned. in spite of this mishap the _hundley_ was raised and again put in commission. lieutenant payne who had steered her on her first fatal trip had lost neither his courage nor faith and again assumed command of her. soon after she started on her second trip a sudden squall arose. before the hatchways could be closed, she again filled with water and sank, drowning all of her crew with the exception of lieutenant payne and two of his men. undaunted he took her out on a third trip after she had again been raised. ill luck still pursued her. off fort sumter she was capsized and this time four of her crew were drowned. the difficulties encountered in sailing the _hundley_ on the surface of the water apparently made no difference when it came to finding new crews for her. by this time, however, the powers that be had become anxious that their submarine boat should accomplish something against an enemy, instead of drowning only her own men and it was decided to use her on the next trip in a submerged state. again lieutenant payne was entrusted with her guidance. her hatches were closed, her water tanks filled, and she was off for her first dive. something went wrong however; either too much water had been put in her tanks or else the steering gear refused to work. at any rate she hit the muddy bottom with such force that her nose became deeply imbedded and before she could work herself free her entire crew of eight was suffocated. lieutenant payne himself lost his life which he had risked so valiantly and frequently before. once more she was raised and once more volunteers rushed to man her. on the fifth trip, however, the _hundley_, while travelling underwater, became entangled in the anchor chains of a boat she passed and was held fast so long that her crew of nine were dead when she was finally disentangled and raised. thirty-five lives had so far been lost without any actual results having been accomplished. in spite of this a new crew was found. her commander, lieutenant dixon, was ordered to make an attack against the federal fleet immediately, using, however, the boat as a submersible instead of a submarine. admiral david porter in his _naval history of the civil war_ described the attack, which was directed against the u. s. s. _housatonic_, one of the newest federal battleships, as follows: at about . p. m., the officer of the deck on board the unfortunate vessel discovered something about one hundred yards away, moving along the water. it came directly towards the ship, and within two minutes of the time it was first sighted was alongside. the cable was slipped, the engines backed, and all hands called to quarters. but it was too late--the torpedo struck the _housatonic_ just forward of the mainmast, on the starboard side, on a line with the magazine. the man who steered her (the _hundley_) knew where the vital spots of the steamer were and he did his work well. when the explosion took place the ship trembled all over as if by the shock of an earthquake, and seemed to be lifted out of the water, and then sank stern foremost, heeling to port as she went down. only a part of the _housatonic's_ complement was saved. of the _hundley_ no trace was discovered and she was believed to have escaped. three years later, however, divers who had been sent down to examine the hull of the _housatonic_ found the little submarine stuck in the hole made by her attack on the larger ship and inside of her the bodies of her entire crew. the submarines and near-submarines built in the united states during the civil war were remarkable rather for what they actually accomplished than for what they contributed towards the development of submarine boats. perhaps the greatest service which they rendered in the latter direction was that they proved to the satisfaction of many scientific men that submarine boats really held vast possibilities as instruments of naval warfare. france still retained its lead in furnishing new submarine projects. one of these put forward in by olivier riou deserves mention because it provided for two boats, one driven by steam and one by electricity. both of these submarines were built, but inasmuch as nothing is known of the result of their trials, it is safe to conclude that neither of them proved of any practical value. two years later, in , two other frenchmen, captain bourgeois and m. brun, built at rochefort a submarine feet long and feet in diameter which they called the _plongeur_. they fitted it with a compressed-air engine of eighty horse-power. extensive trials were made with this boat but resulted only in the discovery that, though it was possible to sink or rise with a boat of this type without great difficulty, it was impossible to keep her at an even keel for any length of time. during the next few years, undoubtedly as a result of the submarine activities during the civil war, a number of projects were put forward in the united states, none of which, however, turned out successfully. one of them, for which a man by the name of halstead was responsible, was a submarine built for the united states navy in . it was not tried out until and it was not even successful in living up to its wonderful name, _the intelligent whale_. its first trial almost resulted in loss of life and was never repeated. in spite of this, however, the boat was preserved and may still be seen at the brooklyn navy yard. in the meantime, an invention had been made by an austrian artillery officer which before long was to exert a powerful influence on submarine development, though it was in no sense a submarine boat. the manner in which the submarines had attacked their opponents during the civil war suggested to him the need of improvements in this direction. as a result he conceived a small launch which was to carry the explosive without any navigators. before he could carry his plans very far he died. a brother officer in the navy continued his work and finally interested the manager of an english engineering firm located at fiume, mr. whitehead. the result of the collaboration of these two men was the whitehead torpedo. a series of experiments led to the construction of what was first called a "submarine locomotive" torpedo, which not only contained a sufficient quantity of explosives to destroy large boats, but was also enabled by mechanical means to propel itself and keep on its course after having been fired. the austrian government was the first one to adopt this new weapon. whitehead, however, refused to grant a monopoly to the austrians and in he sold his manufacturing rights and secret processes to the british government for a consideration of $ , . before very long, special boats were built for the purpose of carrying and firing these torpedoes and gradually every great power developed a separate torpedo flotilla. hand in hand with this development a large number of improvements were made on the original torpedo and some of these devices proved of great usefulness in the development of submarine boats. the public interest in submarines grew rapidly at this time. every man who was a boy in , or who had the spirit of boyhood in him then,--or perhaps now,--will remember the extraordinary piece of literary and imaginative prophecy achieved by jules verne in his novel _twenty thousand leagues under the sea_. little about the _nautilus_ that held all readers entranced throughout his story is lacking in the submarines of to-day except indeed its extreme comfort, even luxury. with those qualities our submarine navigators have to dispense. but the electric light, as we know it, was unknown in verne's time yet he installed it in the boat of his fancy. our modern internal-combustion engines were barely dreamed of, yet they drove his boat. his fancy even enabled him to foresee one of the most amazing features of the lake boat of to-day, namely the compressed air chamber which opened to the sea still holds the water back, and enables the submarine navigator clad in a diver's suit to step into the wall of water and prosecute his labors on the bed of the ocean. jules verne even foresaw the callous and inhuman character of the men who command the german submarines to-day. his captain nemo had taken a vow of hate against the world and relentlessly drove the prow of his steel boat into the hulls of crowded passenger ships, finding his greatest joy in sinking slowly beside them with the bright glare of his submarine electric lights turned full upon the hapless women and children over whose sufferings he gloated as they sank. the man who sank the _lusitania_ could do no more. more and more determined became the attempts to build submarine boats that could sink and rise easily, navigate safely and quickly, and sustain human beings under the surface of the water for a considerable length of time. steam, compressed air, and electricity were called upon to do their share in accomplishing this desired result. engineers in every part of the world began to interest themselves in the submarine problem and as a result submarine boats in numbers were either projected or built between and . one of the most persistent workers in this period was a well-known swedish inventor, nordenfeldt, who had established for himself a reputation by inventing a gun which even to-day has lost nothing of its fame. in he became interested in the work which had been done by an english clergyman named garret. the latter had built a submarine boat which he called the _resurgam_ (i shall rise)--thus neatly combining a sacred promise with a profane purpose. in another boat was built by him driven by a steam engine. nordenfeldt used the fundamental ideas upon which these two boats were based, added to them some improvements of his own as well as some devices which had been used by bushnell, and finally launched in his first submarine boat. the government of greece bought it after some successful trials. not to be outdone, greece's old rival, turkey, immediately ordered two boats for her own navy. both of these were much larger than the greek boat and by they had reached constantinople in sections where they were to be put together. only one of them, however, was ever completed. characteristic turkish delay intervened. the most typical feature of this boat was the fact that it carried a torpedo tube for whitehead torpedoes. on the surface of the water this boat proved very efficient, but as an underwater boat it was a dismal failure. more than in any other craft that had ever been built and accepted, the lack of stability was a cause of trouble in the _nordenfeldt ii._ as soon as any member of the crew moved from one part of the boat to another, she would dip in the direction in which he was moving, and everybody, who could not in time take hold of some part of the boat, came sliding and rolling in the same direction. when finally such a tangle was straightened out, only a few minutes elapsed before somebody else, moving a few steps, would bring about the same deplorable state of affairs. the _nordenfeldt ii._ acted more like a bucking bronco than a self-respecting submarine boat and as a result it became impossible to find a crew willing to risk their lives in manning her. before very long she had rusted and rotted to pieces. in spite of this lack of success, nordenfeldt built a fourth boat which displayed almost as many unfortunate features as her predecessors and soon was discarded and forgotten. [illustration: photo by bain news service. _an anti-aircraft outpost._] in the latter part of the nineteenth century the french government, which for so many years had shown a strong and continuous interest in the submarine problem, was particularly active. three different types of boats built in this period under the auspices and with the assistance of the french government deserve particular attention. the first of these was the _gymnote_, planned originally by a well-known french engineer, dupuy de lome, whose alert mind also planned an airship and made him a figure in the history of our panama canal. he died, however, before his project could be executed. m. gustave zédé, a marine engineer and his friend, continued his work after modifying some of his plans. the french minister of marine of this period, admiral aube who had long been strongly interested in submarines, immediately accepted m. zédé's design and ordered the boat to be built. as the earliest of successful submarines she merits description: [illustration: © u. & u. _a coast defense anti-aircraft gun._] the _gymnote_ was built of steel in the shape of a cigar. she was feet long, feet inches beam, and feet in diameter, just deep enough to allow a man to stand upright in the interior. the motive power was originally an electro-motor of horse-power, driven from accumulators. it was of extraordinary lightness, weighing only pounds, and drove the screw at the rate of two thousand revolutions a minute, giving a speed of six knots an hour, its radius of action at this speed being thirty-five miles. immersion was accomplished by the introduction of water into three reservoirs, placed one forward, one aft, and one centre. the water was expelled either by means of compressed air or by a rotary pump worked by an electro-motor. two horizontal rudders steered the boat in the vertical plane and an ordinary rudder steered in the horizontal. the _gymnote_ had her first trial on september , , and the paris _temps_ described the result in the following enthusiastic language: she steered like a fish both as regards direction and depth; she mastered the desired depth with ease and exactness; at full power she attained the anticipated speed of from nine to ten knots; the lighting was excellent, there was no difficulty about heating. it was a strange sight to see the vessel skimming along the top of the water, suddenly give a downward plunge with its snout, and disappear with a shark-like wriggle of its stern, only to come up again at a distance out and in an unlooked-for direction. a few small matters connected with the accumulators had to be seen to, but they did not take a month. following along the same lines as this boat another boat, considerably larger, was built. before it was completed, m. zédé died and it was decided to name the new boat in his honour. the _gustave zédé_ was launched at toulon on june , ; she was feet in length, beam feet inches, and had a total displacement of tons. her shell was of "roma" bronze, a non-magnetic metal, and one that could not be attacked by sea water. the motive power was furnished by two independent electro-motors of horse-power each and fed by accumulators. in order to endow the boat with a wide radius of action a storage battery was provided. the successive crews of the _gustave zédé_ suffered much from the poisonous fumes of the accumulators, and during the earlier trials all the men on board were ill. in the bows was a torpedo tube, and an arrangement was used whereby the water that entered the tube after the discharge of the torpedo was forced out by compressed air. three whitehead torpedoes were carried. in spite of the fact that a horizontal rudder placed at the stern had not proved serviceable on the _gymnote_, such a rudder was fitted in the _gustave zédé_. with this rudder she usually plunged at an angle of about °, but on several occasions she behaved in a very erratic fashion, seesawing up and down, and once when the committee of experts were on board, she proved so capricious, going down at an angle of °- °, often throwing the poor gentlemen on to the floor, that it was decided to fix a system of six rudders, three on each side. four water tanks were carried, one at each end and two in the middle, and the water was expelled by four pumps worked by a little electro-motor; these pumps also furnished the air necessary for the crew and for the discharge of the torpedoes. for underwater vision, an optical tube and a periscope had been provided. on july , , still another submarine boat was launched for the french navy. she was called the _morse_. she was feet long, feet beam, displaced tons, and was likewise made of "roma" bronze. the motive power was electricity and in many other respects she was very similar to the _gustave zédé_, embodying, however, a number of improvements. m. calmette, who accompanied the french minister of war on the trial trip of the _morse_, described his experience in the paris _figaro_ as follows: general andré, dr. vincent, a naval doctor, and i entered the submarine boat _morse_ through the narrow opening in the upper surface of the boat. our excursion was to begin immediately; in two hours we came to the surface of the water again three miles to the north to rejoin the _narval_. turning to the crew, every man of which was at his post, the commandant gave his orders, dwelling with emphasis on each word. a sailor repeated his orders one by one, and all was silent. the _morse_ had already started on its mysterious voyage, but was skimming along the surface until outside the port in order to avoid the numerous craft in the arsenal. to say that at this moment, which i had so keenly anticipated, i did not have the tremor which comes from contact with the unknown would be beside the truth. on the other hand, calm and imperturbable, but keenly curious as to this novel form of navigation, general andré had already taken his place near the commandant on a folding seat. there were no chairs in this long tube in which we were imprisoned. everything was arranged for the crew alone, with an eye to serious action. moreover, the minister of war was too tall to stand upright beneath the iron ceiling, and in any case it would be impossible to walk about. the only free space was a narrow passage, sixty centimetres broad, less than two metres high, and thirty metres long, divided into three equal sections. in the first, in the forefront of the tube, reposed the torpedoes, with the machine for launching them, which at a distance of from to metres were bound to sink, with the present secret processes, the largest of ironclads. in the second section were the electric accumulators which gave the light and power. in the third, near the screw, was the electric motor which transformed into movement the current of the accumulators. under all this, beneath the floor, from end to end, were immense water ballasts, which were capable of being emptied or filled in a few seconds by electric machines, in order to carry the vessel up or down. finally, in the centre of the tube, dominating these three sections, which the electric light inundated, and which no partition divided, the navigating lieutenant stood on the lookout giving his orders. there was but one thing which could destroy in a second all the sources of authority, initiative, and responsibility in this officer. that was the failure of the accumulators. were the electricity to fail everything would come to a stop. darkness would overtake the boat and imprison it for ever in the water. to avoid any such disaster there have been arranged, it is true, outside the tube and low down, a series of lead blades which were capable of being removed from within to lighten the vessel. but admitting that the plunger would return to the surface, the boat would float hither and thither, and at all events lose all its properties as a submarine vessel. to avoid any such disaster a combination of motors have been in course of construction for some months, so that the accumulators might be loaded afresh on the spot, in case of their being used up. the _morse_, after skimming along the surface of the water until outside the port, was now about to sink. the commandant's place was no longer in the helmet or kiosque whence he could direct the route along the surface of the sea. his place was henceforth in the very centre of the tube, in the midst of all sort of electric manipulators, his eyes continually fixed on a mysterious optical apparatus, the periscope. the other extremity of this instrument floated on the surface of the water, and whatever the depth of the plunge it gave him a perfectly faithful and clear representation, as in a camera, of everything occurring on the water. the most interesting moment of all now came. i hastened to the little opening to get the impression of total immersion. the lieutenant by the marine chart verified the depths. the casks of water were filled and our supply of air was thereby renewed from their stores of surplus air. in our tiny observatory, where general andré stationed himself above me, a most unexpected spectacle presented itself as the boat was immersed. the plunge was so gentle that in the perfect silence of the waters one did not perceive the process of descent, and there was only an instrument capable of indicating, by a needle, the depth to which the _morse_ was penetrating. the vessel was advancing while at the same time it descended, but there was no sensation of either advance or roll. as to respiration, it was as perfect as in any room. m. de lanessan, who since entering office has ordered eight more submarine vessels, had concerned himself with the question as a medical man also, and, thanks to the labours of a commission formed by him, the difficulties of respiration were entirely solved. the crew were able to remain under water sixteen hours without the slightest strain. our excursion on this occasion lasted scarcely two hours. towards noon, by means of the mysterious periscope, which, always invisible, floated on the surface and brought to the vessel below a reflection of all that passed up above, the captain showed us the _narval_, which had just emerged with its two flags near the old battery _impregnable_. from the depths in which we were sailing we watched its slightest manoeuvres until the admiral's flag, waving on the top of a fort, reminded us that it was time to return. [illustration: _the submarine's perfect work._ _painting by john e. whiting._] chapter xiii john p. holland and simon lake the naval committee of the house of representatives of the united states in the early part of held a meeting for the purpose of hearing expert testimony upon the subject of submarines. up to then the united states authorities had shown, as compared with the ruling powers of other navies, only a limited amount of interest in the submarine question. increased appropriations for the construction of submarine boats which were then beginning to become more frequent in other countries acted, however, as a stimulus at this time. the committee meeting took place a few days after some of the members of the committee, together with a number of united states navy officers, had attended an exhibition of a new submarine boat, the _holland no. _. the late admiral dewey gave the following opinion about this submarine to the committee, an opinion which since then has become rather famous: gentlemen: i saw the operation of the boat down off mount vernon the other day. several members of this committee were there. i think we were very much impressed with its performance. my aid, lieutenant caldwell, was on board. the boat did everything that the owners proposed to do. i said then, and i have said it since, that if they had two of those things at manila, i could never have held it with the squadron i had. the moral effect--to my mind, it is infinitely superior to mines or torpedoes or anything of the kind. with two of those in galveston all the navies of the world could not blockade the place. admiral dewey's approval of the _holland no. _ undoubtedly exerted a considerable influence on the naval committee and as a result of its recommendations the united states government finally purchased the boat on april , , for $ , . this amount was about $ , less than the cost of building to the manufacturers, the holland torpedo boat company. the latter, however, could well afford to take this loss because this first sale resulted a few months afterwards--on august th--in an order for six additional submarines. the british government also contracted in the fall of the same year for five hollands. the navy of almost every power interested in submarines soon followed the lead of the british admiralty. submarines of the holland type were either ordered outright, or else arrangements were concluded permitting the use of the basic patents held by the holland company. it will be noted that the united states government having discovered that it had a good thing benevolently shared it with the governments that might be expected to use it against us. [illustration: copyright by munn & co., inc. from the _scientific american._ _types of american aircraft._] the _holland no. _, as her very name indicates, was one of a long line of similar boats. as compared with other experimental submarine boats she was small. she was only fifty-three feet ten inches long, and ten feet seven inches deep. although these proportions made her look rather thickset, they were the result of experimental work done by the builder during a period of twenty-five years. she was equipped both with a gasoline engine of fifty horse-power and an electric motor run by storage batteries. the latter was intended for use when the boat was submerged, the former when she was travelling on the surface of the water. she was capable of a maximum speed of seven knots an hour. her cruising radius was miles and the combination of oil and electric motors proved so successful that from that time on every submarine built anywhere adopted this principle. two horizontal rudders placed at the stern of the boat steered her downward whenever she wanted to dive and so accomplished a diver was this boat that a depth of twenty-eight feet could be reached by her in five seconds. her conning tower was the only means of making observations. no periscopes had been provided because none of the instruments available at that time gave satisfaction. this meant that whenever she wished to aim at her target it was necessary for her to make a quick ascent to the surface. her stability was one of her most satisfactory features. so carefully had her proportions been worked out that there was practically no pitching or rolling when the boat was submerged. even the concussion caused by the discharge of a torpedo was hardly noticeable because arrangements had been made to take up the recoil caused by the firing and to maintain the balance of the boat by permitting a quantity of water equal to the weight of the discharged torpedo to enter special compartments at the very moment of the discharge. the _holland no. _ was built at lewis nixon's shipyards at elizabethport, new jersey, and was launched early in , just previous to the outbreak of the spanish-american war. although numerous requests were made to the united states government by her inventor and builder, john p. holland, for permission to take her into santiago harbour in an attempt to torpedo cervera's fleet, the navy authorities at washington refused this permission. why? presumably through navy hostility to the submarine idea. when the _monitor_ whipped the _merrimac_ in the former ship belonged to her inventor, not to the united states government. it would have been interesting had holland at his own expense destroyed the spanish ships. john p. holland at the time when he achieved his success was fifty-eight years old, irish by birth and an early immigrant to the united states. he had been deeply interested for many years in mechanical problems and especially in those connected with navigation. the change from the old wooden battleships to the new ironclads and the rapidly increasing development of steam-engines acted as a strong stimulus to the young irishman's experiments. it is claimed that his interest in submarine navigation was due primarily to his desire to find a weapon strong enough to destroy or at least dominate the british navy; for at that time holland was strongly anti-british, because he, like many other educated irishmen of that period, desired before everything else to free ireland. his plans for doing this by supplying to the proposed irish republic a means for overcoming the british navy found little support and a great deal of ridicule on the part of his irish friends. in spite of this he kept on with his work and in he built and launched his first submarine boat at paterson. this boat was far from being very revolutionary. she was only sixteen feet long and two feet in diameter, shaped like a cigar but with both ends sharply pointed. in many respects except in appearance she was similar to bushnell's _turtle_. room for only one operator was provided and the latter was to turn the propeller by means of pedals to be worked by his feet. she accomplished little beyond giving an opportunity to her inventor and builder to gather experience in actual underwater navigation. two years later in the _holland no. _ was built. in spite of the number of improvements represented by her she was not particularly successful. her double hull, it is true, provided space for carrying water ballast. but the leaks from this ballast tank continuously threatened to drown the navigator sitting inside of the second hull. a small oil engine of four horse-power was soon discarded on account of its inefficiency. the experience gathered by holland in building and navigating these two boats strengthened his determination to build a thoroughly successful submarine and increased his faith in his ability to do so. he opened negotiations with the fenian brotherhood. this was a secret society founded for the purpose of freeing ireland from british rule and creating an irish republic. holland finally succeeded in persuading his fenian friends to order from him two submarine boats and to supply him with the necessary means to build them. both of these boats were built. the lack of success of the first one was due primarily to the inefficiency of her engine. the second boat which was really the _holland no. _ was built in . it is usually known as the _fenian ram_, and is still in existence at new haven, connecticut, where a series of financial and political complications finally landed her. these two boats added vastly to holland's knowledge concerning submarine navigation. a few others which he built with his own means increased this fund of knowledge and step by step he came nearer to his goal. by his reputation as a submarine engineer and navigator had grown to such an extent that holland was asked by the famous philadelphia shipbuilders, the cramps, to submit to them designs for a submarine boat to be built by the united states government. only one other design was submitted and this was by the scandinavian, nordenfeldt. william c. whitney, then secretary of the united states navy, accepted holland's design. month after month passed by wasted by the usual governmental red tape, and when all preliminary arrangements had been made and the contract for the actual building of an experimental boat was to be drawn up, a sudden change in the administration resulted in the dropping of the entire plan. holland's faith in the future submarine and in his own ability was still unshaken, but this was not the case with his financial condition. none of the boats he had built so far had brought him any profits and on some he had lost everything that he had put into them. his financial support, for which he relied entirely upon relatives and friends, was practically exhausted. but fortunately on march , , congress appropriated a sum of money to defray the expenses of constructing an experimental submarine. invitations to inventors were extended. so precarious was holland's financial condition at that time that he found it necessary to borrow the small sum of money involved in making plans which he had to submit. it is claimed that he succeeded in doing this in a manner highly typical of his thoroughness. he needed only about $ . but even this comparatively small sum was more than he had. however, he happened to be lunching with a young lawyer just about this time and began to tell him about his financial difficulties. holland told him that if he only had $ . he could prepare the plans and pay the necessary fees. and that done, he was sure of being able to win the competition. his lawyer friend, of course, had been approached before by other people for loans. invariably they had asked him for some round sum and holland's request for $ . when he might just as well have asked for $ . aroused his interest. he asked the inventor what the nineteen cents were to be used for. quick as a flash he was told that they were needed to pay for a particular type of ruler necessary to draw the required plans. so impressed was the lawyer with holland's accuracy and honesty in asking not a cent more than he actually needed that he at once advanced the money. and a good investment it turned out to be. for in exchange he received a good-sized block of stock in the holland torpedo boat company which in later years made him a multi-millionaire. holland's plans did win the competition just as he asserted that they would; but, of course, winning a prize, offered by a government, and getting that government to do something about it, are two different matters. so two years went by before the holland torpedo boat company at last was able to start with the construction of the new submarine which was to be called the _plunger_. the principal feature of this new boat was that it was to have a steam engine for surface navigation and an electric motor for underwater navigation. this arrangement was not so much a new invention of holland's as an adaptation of ideas which had been promulgated by others. especially indebted was he in this respect to commander hovgaard of the danish navy who, in , had published an important book on the subject of double propulsion in submarines. though holland had made many improvements on these earlier theories, he soon found out that even at that there was going to be serious trouble with the _plunger's_ engines. the boat had been launched in ; but instead of finishing it, he persuaded the government to permit his company to build a new boat, and to return to the government all the money so far expended on the _plunger_. the new boat, _holland no. _, was started immediately and completed in record time but she, too, was unsatisfactory to the inventor. so without loss of time he went ahead and built another boat, the _holland no. _, which, as we have said, became the first united states submarine. two other men submitted plans for submarine boats in the competition which was won by the holland boat, george c. baker and simon lake. neither of these was accepted. mr. baker made no further efforts to find out if his plans would result in a practicable submarine boat. but simon lake was not so easily discouraged. it is very interesting that the united states navy department at that time demanded that plans submitted for this competition should meet the following specifications: . safety. . facility and certainty of action when submerged. . speed when running on the surface. . speed when submerged. . endurance, both submerged and on the surface. . stability. . visibility of object to be attacked. in spite of the many years that have passed since this competition and in spite of the tremendous progress that has been made in submarine construction these are still the essential requirements necessary to make a successful submarine boat. the designs submitted by mr. lake provided for a twin-screw vessel, feet long, feet beam, and tons displacement, with horse-power steam engines for surface propulsion and horse-power motors for submerged work. the boat was to have a double hull, the spaces between the inner and the outer hulls forming water ballast tanks. there were to be four torpedo tubes, two forward and two aft. in an article published in in _international marine engineering_, mr. lake says about his design: the new and novel feature which attracted the most attention and skepticism regarding this design was (the author was later informed by a member of the board) the claim made that the vessel could readily navigate over the waterbed itself, and that while navigating on the waterbed a door could be opened in the bottom of a compartment and the water kept from entering the vessel by means of compressed air, and that the crew could, by donning diving suits, readily leave and enter the vessel while submerged. another novel feature was in the method of controlling the depth of submergence when navigating between the surface and waterbed. the vessel was designed to always submerge and navigate on a level keel rather than to be inclined down or up by the back, to "dive" or "rise." this maintenance of a level keel while submerged was provided for by the installation of four depth regulating vanes which i later termed "hydroplanes" to distinguish them from the forward and aft levelling vanes or horizontal rudders. these hydroplanes were located at equal distances forward and aft of the center of gravity and buoyancy of the vessel when in the submerged condition, so as not to disturb the vessel when the planes were inclined down or up to cause the vessel to submerge or rise when under way. i also used, in conjunction with the hydroplanes, horizontal rudders which i then called "levelling vanes," as their purpose was just the opposite from that of the horizontal rudder used in the diving type of vessel. they were operated by a pendulum controlling device to be inclined so as to always maintain the vessel on a level keel rather than to cause her to depart therefrom. when i came to try this combination out in practice, i found hand control of the horizontal rudders was sufficient. if vessels with this system of control have a sufficient amount of stability, you will run for hours and automatically maintain both a constant depth and a level keel, without the depth control man touching either the hydroplane or horizontal rudder control gear. this automatic maintenance of depth without manipulating the hydroplanes or rudders was a performance not anticipated, nor claimed in my original patent on the above-mentioned combination, and what caused these vessels to function in this manner remained a mystery, which was unsolved until i built a model tank in in berlin, germany, and conducted a series of experiments on models of submarines. i then learned that a down pull of a hydroplane at a given degree of inclination varied according to its depth of submergence and that the deeper the submergence, the less the down pull. this works out to give automatic trim on a substantially level keel, and i have known of vessels running for a period of two hours without variation of depth of one foot and without once changing the inclination of either the hydroplanes or the horizontal rudder. a great deal of skepticism was displayed for many years towards this new system of controlling the depth of submergence. but in recent years all the latest submarine boats have been built on this plan. who, then, was this mechanical genius who was responsible for these far-going changes in submarine construction? simon lake was born at pleasantville, new jersey, september , . he was educated at clinton liberal institute, fort plain, new york, and franklin institute, philadelphia. early in life he displayed a marked interest in and genius for mechanical problems. his lack of success in the competition only spurred him on to further efforts. as long as the united states government was unwilling to assist him in building his submarine boat, there was nothing left for him except to build it from his own means. in , therefore, he set to work on an experimental boat, called the _argonaut, jr._ according to mr. lake's description as published in _international marine engineering_ in a series of articles from his pen the _argonaut, jr._, was provided with three wheels, two on either side forward and one aft, the latter acting as a steering wheel. when on the bottom the wheels were rotated by hand by one or two men inside the boat. her displacement was about seven tons, yet she could be propelled at a moderate walking gait when on the bottom. she was also fitted with an air lock and diver's compartment, so arranged that by putting an air pressure on the diver's compartment equal to the water pressure outside, a bottom door could be opened and no water would come into the vessel. then by putting on a pair of rubber boots the operator could walk around on the sea bottom and push the boat along with him and pick up objects, such as clams, oysters, etc. from the sea bottom. so much interest was aroused by this little wooden boat that mr. lake was enabled to finance the building of a larger boat, called the _argonaut_. it was designed in and built in at baltimore. concerning the _argonaut_ mr. lake says in the same article: the _argonaut_ as originally built was feet long and feet in diameter. she was the first submarine to be fitted with an internal-combustion engine. she was propelled with a thirty horse-power gasoline (petrol) engine driving a screw propeller. she was fitted with two toothed driving wheels forward which were revolved by suitable gearing when navigating on the waterbed, or they could be disconnected from this gearing and permitted to revolve freely, propulsion being secured by the screw propeller. a wheel in the rudder enabled her to be steered in any direction when on the bottom. she also had a diving compartment to enable divers to leave or enter the vessel when submerged, to operate on wrecks or to permit inspection of the bottom or to recover shellfish. she also had a lookout compartment in the extreme bow, with a powerful searchlight to light up a pathway in front of her as she moved along over the waterbed. this searchlight i later found of little value except for night work in clear water. in clear water the sunlight would permit of as good vision without the use of the light as with it, while if the water was not clear, no amount of light would permit of vision through it for any considerable distance. in january, [says mr. lake], while the _argonaut_ was submerged, telephone conversation was held from submerged stations with baltimore, washington, and new york. in , also, the _argonaut_ made the trip from norfolk to new york under her own power and unescorted. in her original form she was a cigar-shaped craft with only a small percentage of reserve buoyancy in her surface cruising condition. we were caught out in the severe november northeast storm of in which over vessels were lost and we did not succeed in reaching a harbour in the "horseshoe" back of sandy hook until, of course, in the morning. the seas were so rough they would break over her conning tower in such masses i was obliged to lash myself fast to prevent being swept overboard. it was freezing weather and i was soaked and covered with ice on reaching harbour. this experience caused me to apply to the _argonaut_ a further improvement for which i had already applied for a patent. this was, doubled around the usual pressure resisting body of a submarine, a ship-shape form of light plating which would give greater seaworthiness, better surface speed, and make the vessel more habitable for surface navigation. it would, in other words, make a "sea-going submarine," which the usual form of cigar-shaped vessel was not, as it would not have sufficient surface buoyancy to enable it to rise with the seas and the seas would sweep over it as they would sweep over a partly submerged rock. the _argonaut_ was, therefore, taken to brooklyn, twenty feet added to her length, and a light water-tight buoyancy superstructure of ship-shape form added. this superstructure was opened to the sea when it was desired to submerge the vessel, and water was permitted to enter the space between the light plating of the ship-shaped form and the heavy plating of the pressure resisting hull. this equalized pressure on the light plates and prevented their becoming deformed due to pressure. the superstructure increased her reserve of buoyancy in the surface cruising condition from about per cent. to over per cent. and lifted right up to the seas like any ordinary type of surface vessel, instead of being buried by them in rough weather. this feature of construction has been adopted by the germans, italians, russians, and in all the latest types of french boats. it is the principal feature which distinguishes them in their surface appearance from the earlier cigar-shaped boats of the diving type. this ship-shaped form of hull is only suited to the level keel submergence. in those days submarine boats were a much more unusual sight than they are to-day and simple fishermen who had never read or heard about submarines undoubtedly experienced disturbing sensations when they ran across their first underwater boat. mr. lake, a short time ago, while addressing a meeting of electrical engineers in brooklyn, told the following experience which he had on one of his trips in the _argonaut_: on the first trip down the chesapeake bay, we had been running along in forty feet of water and had been down about four hours. night was coming on, so we decided to come up to find out where we were. i noticed one of those chesapeake "bug eyes" lighting just to leeward of us, and, as i opened the conning tower hatch, called to the men aboard to find out where we were. as soon as i did so, he turned his boat around and made straight for the beach. i thought he was rather discourteous. he ran his boat up on that beach and never stopped; the last i saw of him was when he jumped ashore and started to run inland as hard as he and his helper could go. finally i learned we were just above the mouth of the york or rappahannock river and i found a sort of inland harbour back of it. i decided to put up there for the night. then learning that there was a store nearby, we called after dark for more provisions and i noticed a large crowd there. we got what we wanted, and stepped outside the door. he asked us where we were from. "we are down here in the submarine boat, _argonaut_, making an experimental trip down the bay." he then commenced to laugh. "that explains it," he said; "just before nightfall, captain so-and-so and his mate came running up here to the store just as hard as they could, and both dropped down exhausted, and when we were able to get anything out of them, they told a very strange story. that's why all these people are here." this is the story the storekeeper told me: "the men were out dredging and all at once they noticed a buoy with a red flag on it, and that buoy was going against the tide, and they could not understand it. it came up alongside, and they heard a 'puff, puff,' something like a locomotive puffing, and then they smelt sulphur." (the "puff, puff" was the exhaust of our engine and those fumes were what they thought was sulphur.) "just then the thing rose up out of the water, then the smokestack appeared, and then the devil came right out of that smokestack." in the january, , issue of _mcclure's magazine_ there appeared a profusely illustrated article entitled "voyaging under the sea." the first part of it, "the submarine boat _argonaut_ and her achievements," was written by simon lake himself. in it he quotes as follows from the log book of the _argonaut_ under date of july , . submerged at . a. m. in about thirty feet of water. temperature in living compartment, eighty-three degrees fahrenheit. compass bearing west-north-west, one quarter west. quite a lively sea running on the surface, also strong current. at . a. m. shut down engine; temperature, eighty-eight degrees fahrenheit. after engine was shut down, we could hear the wind blowing past our pipes extending above the surface; we could also tell by the sound when any steamers were in the vicinity. we first allowed the boat to settle gradually to the bottom, with the tide running ebb; after a time the tide changed, and she would work slightly sideways; we admitted about four hundred pounds of water additional, but she still would move occasionally, so that a pendulum nine inches long would sway one eighth of an inch (thwartship). at o'clock (noon) temperature was eighty-seven degrees fahrenheit; at . p. m. the temperature was still eighty-seven degrees fahrenheit. there were no signs of carbonic acid gas at . , although the engine had been closed down for three hours and no fresh air had been admitted during the time. could hear the whistle of boats on the surface, and also their propellers when running close, to the boat. at . the temperature had dropped to eighty-five degrees. at . found a little sign of carbonic acid gas, very slight, however, as a candle would burn fairly bright in the pits. thought we could detect a smell of gasoline by comparing the fresh air which came down the pipe (when hand blower was turned). storage lamps were burning during the five hours of submergence, while engine was not running. at . engine was again started, and went off nicely. went into diving compartment and opened door; came out through air-lock, and left pressure there; found the wheels had buried about ten inches or one foot, as the bottom had several inches of mud. we had pounds of air in the tanks, and it ran the pressure down to pounds to open the door in about thirty feet. the temperature fell in the diving compartment to eighty-two degrees after the compressed air was let in. cooked clam fritters and coffee for supper. the spirits of the crew appeared to improve the longer we remained below; the time was spent in catching clams, singing, trying to waltz, playing cards, and writing letters to wives and sweethearts. our only visitors during the day were a couple of black bass that came and looked in at the windows with a great deal of apparent interest. in future boats, it will be well to provide a smoking compartment, as most of the crew had their smoking apparatus all ready as soon as we came up. started pumps at . , and arrived at the surface at . . down altogether ten hours and fifteen minutes. people on pilot boat _calvert_ thought we were all hands drowned. the second part of this article was called "a voyage on the bottom of the sea." it was written by ray stannard baker, who had been fortunate enough to receive an invitation from mr. lake to accompany him on one of the trips of the _argonaut_. any one who has read jules verne's fascinating story _twenty thousand leagues under the sea_ must be struck immediately with the similarity between mr. baker's experiences and those of captain nemo's guests. it is not at all surprising, therefore, to have mr. baker tell us that during this trip mr. lake told him: "when i was ten years old, i read jules verne's _twenty thousand leagues under the sea_, and i have been working on submarine boats ever since." mr. baker's record of what he saw and how he felt is not only a credit to his keen powers of observation, but also a proof of the fact that, in many ways, there was little difference between the _argonaut_ of and the most up-to-date submarine of to-day. in part he says: simon lake planned an excursion on the bottom of the sea for october , . his strange amphibian craft, the _argonaut_, about which we had been hearing so many marvels, lay off the pier at atlantic highlands. before we were near enough to make out her hulk, we saw a great black letter a, framed of heavy gas-pipe, rising forty feet above the water. a flag rippled from its summit. as we drew nearer, we discovered that there really wasn't any hulk to make out--only a small oblong deck shouldering deep in the water and supporting a slightly higher platform, from which rose what seemed to be a squatty funnel. a moment later we saw that the funnel was provided with a cap somewhat resembling a tall silk hat, the crown of which was represented by a brass binnacle. this cap was tilted back, and as we ran alongside, a man stuck his head up over the rim and sang out, "ahoy there!" a considerable sea was running, but i observed that the _argonaut_ was planted as firmly in the water as a stone pillar, the big waves splitting over her without imparting any perceptible motion. we scrambled up on the little platform, and peered down through the open conning-tower, which we had taken for a funnel, into the depths of the ship below. wilson had started his gasoline engine. mr. lake had taken his place at the wheel, and we were going ahead slowly, steering straight across the bay toward sandy hook and deeper water. the _argonaut_ makes about five knots an hour on the surface, but when she gets deep down on the sea bottom, where she belongs, she can spin along more rapidly. the _argonaut_ was slowly sinking under the water. we became momentarily more impressed with the extreme smallness of the craft to which we were trusting our lives. the little platform around the conning-tower on which we stood--in reality the top of the gasoline tank--was scarcely a half dozen feet across, and the _argonaut_ herself was only thirty-six feet long. her sides had already faded out of sight, but not before we had seen how solidly they were built--all of steel, riveted and reinforced, so that the wonder grew how such a tremendous weight, when submerged, could ever again be raised. i think we made some inquiries about the safety of submarine boats in general. other water compartments had been flooded, and we had settled so far down that the waves dashed repeatedly over the platform on which we stood--and the conning-tower was still wide open, inviting a sudden engulfing rush of water. "you mustn't confuse the _argonaut_ with ordinary submarine boats," said mr. lake. "she is quite different and much safer." [illustration: © u. & u. _for anti-aircraft service._] he explained that the _argonaut_ was not only a submarine boat, but much besides. she not only swims either on the surface or beneath it, but she adds to this accomplishment the extraordinary power of diving deep and rolling along the bottom of the sea on wheels. no machine ever before did that. indeed, the _argonaut_ is more properly a "sea motorcycle" than a "boat." in its invention mr. lake elaborated an idea which the united states patent office has decided to be absolutely original. [illustration: photo by bain news service. _the latest french aircraft gun._] we found ourselves in a long, narrow compartment, dimly illuminated by yellowish-green light from the little round, glass windows. the stern was filled with wilson's gasoline engine and the electric motor, and in front of us toward the bow we could see through the heavy steel doorways of the diver's compartment into the lookout room, where there was a single round eye of light. i climbed up the ladder of the conning-tower and looked out through one of the glass ports. my eyes were just even with the surface of the water. a wave came driving and foaming entirely over the top of the vessel, and i could see the curiously beautiful sheen of the bright summit of the water above us. it was a most impressive sight. mr. lake told me that in very clear water it was difficult to tell just where the air left off and the water began; but in the muddy bay where we were going down the surface looked like a peculiarly clear, greenish pane of glass moving straight up and down, not forward, as the waves appear to move when looked at from above. now we were entirely under water. the rippling noises that the waves had made in beating against the upper structure of the boat had ceased. as i looked through the thick glass port, the water was only three inches from my eyes, and i could see thousands of dainty, semi-translucent jellyfish floating about as lightly as thistledown. they gathered in the eddy behind the conning-tower in great numbers, bumping up sociably against one another and darting up and down with each gentle movement of the water. and i realized that we were in the domain of the fishes. jim brought the government chart, and mr. lake announced that we were heading directly for sandy hook and the open ocean. but we had not yet reached the bottom, and john was busily opening valves and letting in more water. i went forward to the little steel cuddy-hole in the extreme prow of the boat, and looked out through the watch-port. the water had grown denser and yellower, and i could not see much beyond the dim outlines of the ship's spar reaching out forward. jim said that he had often seen fishes come swimming up wonderingly to gaze into the port. they would remain quite motionless until he stirred his head, and then they vanished instantly. mr. lake has a remarkable photograph which he took of a visiting fish, and wilson tells of nurturing a queer flat crab for days in the crevice of one of the view-holes. at that moment, i felt a faint jolt, and mr. lake said that we were on the bottom of the sea. here we were running as comfortably along the bottom of sandy hook bay as we would ride in a broadway car, and with quite as much safety. wilson, who was of a musical turn, was whistling _down went mcginty_, and mr. lake, with his hands on the pilot-wheel, put in an occasional word about his marvellous invention. on the wall opposite there was a row of dials which told automatically every fact about our condition that the most nervous of men could wish to know. one of them shows the pressure of air in the main compartment of the boat, another registers vacuum, and when both are at zero, mr. lake knows that the pressure of the air is normal, the same as it is on the surface, and he tries to maintain it in this condition. there are also a cyclometer, not unlike those used on bicycles, to show how far the boat travels on the wheels; a depth gauge, which keeps us accurately informed as to the depth of the boat in the water, and a declension indicator. by the long finger of the declension dial we could tell whether we were going up hill or down. once while we were out, there was a sudden, sharp shock, the pointer leaped back, and then quivered steady again. mr. lake said that we had probably struck a bit of wreckage or an embankment, but the _argonaut_ was running so lightly that she had leaped up jauntily and slid over the obstruction. we had been keeping our eyes on the depth dial, the most fascinating and interesting of any of the number. it showed that we were going down, down, down, literally down to the sea in a ship. when we had been submerged far more than an hour, and there was thirty feet of yellowish green ocean over our heads, mr. lake suddenly ordered the machinery stopped. the clacking noises of the dynamo ceased, and the electric lights blinked out, leaving us at once in almost absolute darkness and silence. before this, we had found it hard to realize that we were on the bottom of the ocean; now it came upon us suddenly and not without a touch of awe. this absence of sound and light, this unchanging motionlessness and coolness, this absolute negation--that was the bottom of the sea. it lasted only a moment, but in that moment we realized acutely the meaning and joy of sunshine and moving winds, trees, and the world of men. a minute light twinkled out like a star, and then another and another, until the boat was bright again, and we knew that among the other wonders of this most astonishing of inventions there was storage electricity which would keep the boat illuminated for hours, without so much as a single turn of the dynamo. with the stopping of the engine, the air supply from above had ceased; but mr. lake laid his hand on the steel wall above us, where he said there was enough air compressed to last us all for two days, should anything happen. the possibility of "something happening" had been lurking in our minds ever since we started. "what if your engine should break down, so that you couldn't pump the water out of the water compartments?" i asked. "here we have hand-pumps," said mr. lake promptly; "and if those failed, a single touch of this lever would release our iron keel, which weighs pounds, and up we would go like a rocket." i questioned further, only to find that every imaginable contingency, and some that were not at all imaginable to the uninitiated, had been absolutely provided against by the genius of the inventor. and everything from the gasoline engine to the hand-pump was as compact and ingenious as the mechanism of a watch. moreover, the boat was not crowded; we had plenty of room to move around and to sleep, if we wished, to say nothing of eating. as for eating, john had brought out the kerosene stove and was making coffee, while jim cut the pumpkin pie. "this isn't delmonico's," said jim, "but we're serving a lunch that delmonico's couldn't serve--a submarine lunch." by this time the novelty was wearing off and we sat there, at the bottom of the sea, drinking our coffee with as much unconcern as though we were in an up-town restaurant. for the first time since we started, mr. lake sat down, and we had an opportunity of talking with him at leisure. he is a stout-shouldered, powerfully built man, in the prime of life--a man of cool common sense, a practical man, who is also an inventor. and he talks frankly and convincingly, and yet modestly, of his accomplishment. having finished our lunch, mr. lake prepared to show us something about the practical operations of the _argonaut_. it has been a good deal of a mystery to us how workmen penned up in a submarine boat could expect to recover gold from wrecks in the water outside, or to place torpedoes, or to pick up cables. "we simply open the door, and the diver steps out on the bottom of the sea," mr. lake said, quite as if he was conveying the most ordinary information. at first it seemed incredible, but mr. lake showed us the heavy, riveted door in the bottom of the diver's compartment. then he invited us inside with wilson, who, besides being an engineer, is also an expert diver. the massive steel doors of the little room were closed and barred, and then mr. lake turned a cock and the air rushed in under high pressure. at once our ears began to throb, and it seemed as if the drums would burst inward. "keep swallowing," said wilson, the diver. as soon as we applied this remedy, the pain was relieved, but the general sensation of increased air pressure, while exhilarating, was still most uncomfortable. the finger on the pressure dial kept creeping up and up, until it showed that the air pressure inside of the compartment was nearly equal to the water pressure without. then wilson opened a cock in the door. instantly the water gushed in, and for a single instant we expected to be drowned there like rats in a trap. "this is really very simple," mr. lake was saying calmly. "when the pressure within is the same as that without, no water can enter." with that, wilson dropped the iron door, and there was the water and the muddy bottom of the sea within touch of a man's hand. it was all easy enough to understand, and yet it seemed impossible, even as we saw it with our own eyes. mr. lake stooped down, and picked up a wooden rod having a sharp hook at the end. this he pulled along the bottom.... we were now rising again to the surface, after being submerged for more than three hours. i climbed into the conning-tower and watched for the first glimpse of the sunlight. there was a sudden fluff of foam, the ragged edge of a wave, and then i saw, not more than a hundred feet away, a smack bound toward new york under full sail. her rigging was full of men, gazing curiously in our direction, no doubt wondering what strange monster of the sea was coming forth for a breath of air. chapter xiv the modern submarine holland and lake must be considered the fathers of the modern submarine. this claim is not made in a spirit of patriotic boastfulness, though, of course it is true that the latter was an american by birth, and the former by choice, and that, therefore, we, as a nation, have a right to be proud of the accomplishments of these two fellow-citizens of ours. without wishing to detract anything from the value of the work done by many men in many countries towards the development of the submarine after and contemporaneously with holland and lake, it still remains true that the work which these two did formed the foundation on which all others built. to-day, no submarine worthy of the name, no matter where it has been built and no matter where and how it is used, is without some features which are typical of either the holland or lake type. in many instances, and this is true especially of submarines of the highest type and the greatest development, the most significant characteristics of the holland and lake boats have been combined. during the years that followed the small beginnings of holland and lake, vast and highly efficient organizations have been built up to continue and elaborate their work. death claimed mr. holland shortly after the outbreak of the great war, on august , . mr. lake in was still personally connected with and the guiding spirit of the extensive industrial establishments which have been created at bridgeport, conn., as a result of his inventions. he, too, surrounded himself with a corps of experts who in co-operation with him have brought the lake submarines to a point of perfection which at the time of the _argonaut's_ first trip would have appeared all but impossible. roughly speaking, the beginning of the twentieth century may be called the turning point in the history of submarine invention and the beginning of the modern submarine. although, as we have heard, various governments, especially those of france and the united states, interested themselves in the submarine question and appropriated small sums of money towards its solution previous to , it was only after that year that governmental interest and influence were set to work with determination and purpose on behalf of submarine inventors. quite naturally this resulted in increased popular interest. experimental work on and with submarines no longer had to rely exclusively on private capital, frequently inconveniently timid and limited, but could count now on the vast financial resources of all the great nations of the world. this also made available the unlimited intellectual resources of serious scientists in every part of the universe. mechanical and electrical engineers, naval designers and constructors, active men of finance and business, and quiet thinkers and investigators in laboratories began to interest themselves in the further development of the submarine. the united states for a number of years after its adoption of the holland type remained true to its first choice. between , when the first holland boat was bought by the united states government, and all the united states submarine, boats were of the holland type. in the latter year, however, it was decided to give the lake boat a trial and since that time a number of boats of this type have been built. in all essential features both the holland and lake boats of later days were very similar to the original boats of these two types. in all the details, however, immense progress was made. each new boat thus became greatly superior to its predecessors. this was especially true in regard to size and speed and the improvements made in these two respects naturally resulted in a corresponding increase in radius of activity. the passing years also brought a wonderful refinement of all the technical details of the submarine boats. practically every feature was developed to a remarkable degree. there is, indeed, a great difference between the submarine boats of the early twentieth century which had to rely on their conning-tower for steering, and more recent boats with their wonderful periscopes and gyro compasses. similar progress was made in the development of the means of propulsion. the engines used for surface travelling became more powerful and efficient. this was also true of the electric motors, batteries, and accumulators employed in the submerged state. the problem of ventilation likewise has been worked out to such an extent that in the most modern submarines most of the inconveniences experienced by the crews of earlier boats have been removed. this perfection of technical details which was thus gradually approached also permitted a very considerable increase in the fighting power of submarine boats. the number of torpedo tubes was increased and it became possible to carry a larger reserve stock of torpedoes. submarines of to-day furthermore carry guns varying in calibre, attaining in some instances four inches, and when in later years it became evident that one of the most dangerous enemies of the submarine was the airplane, some of the boats were equipped even with anti-aircraft guns. [illustration: copyright by munn & co., inc. from the _scientific american_. _modern german airplane types._] in the united states navy the submarine has never been popular. indeed it is by no means certain that in comparison with other navies of the world the united states was not better off in underwater boats in than she was three years later when the warcloud broke. the bulk of our naval opinion has always been for the dreadnoughts. a change of political administration at washington in gave a temporary setback to naval development, and the submarines, being still a matter of controversy, languished. few were built and of those few many showed such structural weakness that the reports of their manoeuvres were either suppressed, or issued in terms of such broad generality that the public could by no possibility suspect, what all the navy knew to be the fact, that the submarine flotilla of the united states was weak to the point of impotence. happily we had nearly three years in which to observe the progress of the war before becoming ourselves embroiled in it. during this period our submarine fleet was somewhat increased, and upon our actual entrance upon the struggle a feverish race was begun to put us on an equality with other nations in underwater boats. it would have been too late had any emergency arisen. but germany had no ships afloat to be attacked by our submarines had we possessed them. her own warfare upon our merchant shipping could not be met in kind, for submarines cannot fight submarines. we have, therefore, up to the present time, not suffered from the perilous neglect with which we long treated this form of naval weapon. indeed the submarine fleet of the united states navy at the beginning of the war was so inconsiderable that foreign writers on the subject ignored it. in we had purchased nine of the type of submarines then put out by the holland company. one of these, the first in actual service, known as the "baby" holland was kept in commission ten years and upon becoming obsolete was honoured by being taken in state to the naval academy at annapolis and there mounted on a pedestal for the admiration of all comers. she was feet long and would make a striking exhibit placed next to one of the new german submersible cruisers which exceed feet and have a displacement of tons. these first holland ships which long constituted the entire underwater force of the united states were but trivial affairs compared with the modern vessel. their displacement was but tons, their engines for surface navigation were of horse-power, gasoline, and for underwater navigation horse-power, electric. they carried but one torpedo tube and two extra torpedoes and had a radius of action of but miles. at that time in fact the naval theory was that submarines were coast defence vessels altogether. after this war they are likely to form part of the first battle line of every navy. yet these pioneer vessels established their seaworthiness well in , when four of them accompanied by a parent ship to supply them with fresh stocks of fuel and to render assistance in case of need, crossed the pacific ocean under their own power to the philippines. this exploit tended to popularize these craft in the navy department, and soon after larger vessels known as the "viper" class were ordered. one of these was called the _octopus_, the first submarine to be fitted with twin screws. in many ways she represented a distinct advance in the art of submarine construction. she was in fact the first vessel built with the distinct idea of being a cruising, as well as a harbour defence ship. her type proved successful in this respect. the _octopus_ further established a record for deep sea submergence in when she descended to a depth of feet off boston, returning to the surface in entire safety. the ability to withstand the pressure of the water at great depths is a vital quality of a successful submarine. one american submarine narrowly escaped destruction because of structural weakness in this respect. she had by accident descended a few feet below the normal depth at which such boats navigate. the water pressure affected the valves which refused to work and the vessel slowly sank deeper and deeper. at a recorded depth of feet the sinking of the vessel became so much more rapid that the crew with frantic endeavours sought at once to stop the leaks and pump out the water which had entered. at that depth there was a pressure of - / pounds upon every square inch of the surface of the submarine. this the workers at the one hand pump had to overcome. it was a savage and a desperate struggle but the men finally won and the vessel regained the surface. as a result of this experience every navy prescribed submergence tests for its submarines before putting them into commission. how to make these tests was perplexing at first. a government did not want to send men down in a steel casket to see just how far they could go before it collapsed. but if no observer accompanied the ship it would be impossible to tell at what depth leakage and other signs of weakness became apparent. an italian naval architect, major laurenti, whose submarines are now found in every navy of the world, invented a dock in which these tests can be made up to any desired pressure while the observers inside the submarine are in communication with those without and the pressure can be instantly removed if signs of danger appear. in the united states navy boats to be accepted must stand a pressure equivalent to that encountered at feet. in the german navy the depth prescribed is feet. under normal conditions submarines seldom travel at a depth of more than feet although the "f- " of the united states navy accomplished the remarkable feat of making a six-hour cruise in san francisco bay at a depth of feet. at this depth the skin of the ship has to withstand a pressure of no less than pounds per square inch. specific information as to the nature of submarine construction in the united states since the beginning of the war in is jealously guarded by the navy department. in broad general terms the number of ships under construction is revealed to the public, but all information as to the size of individual vessels, their armour or the qualities of novelty with which every one hopes and believes american inventive genius has invested them, are kept secret. the _navy year book of _ summarized our submarine strength at that time as follows: _displacement_ submarines fit for action , tons " under construction , " " authorized and appropriated for , " --- ------ total , " in addition thirty-seven more had been authorized by congress without the appropriation of money for them. by this time however these appropriations have been made together with further heavy ones. while figures are refused at the navy department, it is declared that while the united states in was the last of the great powers in respect to submarine strength provided for, it is now well up to the foremost, even to germany. great britain like the united states continued for many years to build submarines of the holland type. naturally all the recent improvements were incorporated in the british boats. very little, however, is known concerning the details of the more recent additions to the british submarine flotilla because of the secrecy maintained by the british authorities in war time. at the beginning of the present war, the british navy possessed active submarines of different classes. they were all of the holland type, but in each class there were incorporated vast improvements over the preceding class. displacement, size, motive power, speed, radius of action, and armament were gradually increased until the "e" class contained boats possessing the following features: submerged displacement, tons; length feet; beam - / feet; heavy oil engines of h.-p.; electric engines of h.-p.; surface speed knots; submerged speed knots; cruising range miles; armament: torpedo tubes, space for torpedoes, and two -inch quick-firing, high-angle, disappearing guns; armoured conning-towers and decks; wireless equipment; panoramic periscopes. at the same time other submarines were said to be in course of construction. some of these were of the "f" class (holland type), similar to the "e" class except that every single characteristic had been greatly increased, in many instances even doubled. in addition to the "f" class holland-type boats, there were also under construction a number of boats of different types designated respectively as "v," "w," and "s" class. the "v" class were of the lake type, the "w" of the french "laubeuf" type, and the "s" class of the italian "f. i. a. t." or laurenti type; both of the last named were adaptations of the lake type. france, which was for many years the prodigal of the nations when it came to submarine building has continued this tendency. in a way this liberal expenditure of money did not pay particularly well. for, although it resulted in the creation of a comparatively large submarine fleet, this fleet contained boats of every kind and description. quite a number of the boats were little more than experiments and possessed not a great deal of practical value. the manning and efficient handling of a fleet having so little homogeneity naturally was a difficult matter and seriously restricted its fighting efficiency. at the outbreak of the war france had submarines in active service, belonging to different classes. in addition there had also been built at various times experimental boats which had been named: _argonaute_, _amiral bourgeoise_, _archimède_, _mariotte_, and _charles brun_. the majority of the boats belonging to the various classes were of the laubeuf type, an adaptation of the lake type made for the french navy by m. laubeuf, a marine engineer. in their various details these boats vary considerably. their displacement ranges from tons to tons, their length from feet to feet, their beam from feet to feet, their surface speed from - / knots to / knots, their submerged speed from knots to knots, the horse-power of their heavy oil engines from to and that of their electric motors from to . some of the boats, however, have steam engines, others gasoline motors, and still others steam turbines. the cruising range of the biggest and newest boats is miles. armament varies with size, of course, the latest boats carrying torpedo tubes for eight -inch torpedoes and two -pdr. quick-firing, high angle, disappearing guns. nine more submarines were in course of construction at the outbreak of war, most of which were of the improved "gustave zédé" class. during the war french shipyards were chiefly occupied with capital navy ships and it is not thought the submarine strength has been much increased. of the great naval powers, germany was, strangely enough, the last to become interested in the building of a submarine fleet. this, however, was not due to any neglect on the part of the german naval authorities. it is quite evident from the few official records which are available that they watched and studied very carefully the development of the submarine and growth of the various submarine fleets. during the early years of the twentieth century, however, the germans seemed to think that most of the boats that were being built then had not yet passed through the experimental stage and they also apparently decided that it would be just as well to wait until other nations had spent their money and efforts on these quasi experimental boats. not until submarines had been built in the united states, england, and france which had proved beyond all doubt that they were practicable vessels of definite accomplishments, did the germans seriously concern themselves with the creation of a german submarine fleet. when this period had been reached they went ahead with full power, and with the usual german thoroughness they adopted the best points from each of the various types developed by that time. the result of this attitude was a submarine boat built at first exclusively by krupp and known as the "germania" type. it was this type which formed the basis of the german submarine which has become known so extensively and disastrously during recent years. in most respects this type is perhaps more similar to the lake type than to any other, although some features of the holland type have been incorporated as well. at the beginning of the war germany was credited with only thirty submarines. six more were then rapidly approaching completion and the german naval law passed some time before provided for the building of seventy-two submarines by the end of . it is believed in fact that by that time the germans had not less than two hundred _unterseeboots_. from the very beginning the germans have designated their submarines by the letter "u" (standing for _unterseeboot_) followed by numbers. the first boat was built in and was named "u- ." it was a comparatively small boat of tons displacement. the motive power on the surface was a heavy-oil engine of h.-p. under water the boat was driven by electric motors of a little more than h.-p. submerged the "u- " was capable of a speed of knots only, which on the surface of the water could be increased to . her radius of action was about miles. only one torpedo tube had been provided. [illustration: © u. & u. _german submarine mine-layer captured by the british._] from this boat to the modern german submarine was indeed a long step taken in a comparatively short time. not very much is known regarding modern german submarines, but the latest boats completed before the war were vessels of tons displacement with heavy-oil engines of h.-p. and electric motors of h.-p., possessing a surface and submerged speed of and knots respectively and a cruising radius of miles. they had four torpedo tubes for eight torpedoes, two -pdr. quick-firing guns, and two -pdr. high-angle anti-aircraft guns. naturally they were also equipped with all the latest improvements, such as wireless apparatus, panoramic periscopes, armoured conning-towers, and decks. since the outbreak of the war the germans have built even more powerful submarine boats whose perfections in regard to speed, radius of action and armament became known through their accomplishments. of these we will hear more in a later chapter. at just what period of the war the germans woke up to the vital importance to them of an enormous submarine fleet is not known. it may have been immediately upon the amazing exploit of captain weddigen in the north sea. at any rate the war had not long progressed before the destruction caused by german submarine attacks began to awaken the apprehension of the allies and neutral nations. retaliation in kind was impossible. the germans had neither merchant nor naval ships at sea to be sunk. the rapidity with which the volume of the loss inflicted upon merchant shipping grew indicated an equally rapid increase in the size of the german underwater fleet. neutrals were enraged by the extension by the germans of the areas of sea in which they claimed the right to sink neutral ships, and their growing disregard for the restraining principles of international law. how greatly they developed the submarine idea was shown by their construction in of vessels with a displacement of tons; a length of feet, and a beam of feet; a surface speed of knots, cruising radius of miles, mounting to guns and carrying a crew of from to . but it was reported that two vessels designed primarily for surface cruising, but nevertheless submersible at will, had been laid down of tons, a length of feet, and a radius of , to , miles. these "submersible cruisers" as they were called, mounted to guns, torpedo tubes, and carried torpedoes. what part vessels of this type shall play in war is still to be determined. of the smaller naval powers, italy comparatively early had become interested in the building of submarines. most of her boats are of the laurenti type--which is a very close adaptation of the lake type. russia and japan, especially the latter, built up fairly efficient underwater fleets. the lesser countries, like austria, holland, sweden, denmark, norway, and spain have concerned themselves seriously with the creation of submarine fleets. the submarine boats of all of these countries in most instances were either of the lake or holland type though frequently they were built from plans of english, french or german adaptations rather than in accordance with the original american plans. the exact number of submarines possessed now by the various navies of the world is a matter of rather indefinite knowledge. great secrecy has been maintained by every country in this respect. from a variety of sources, however, it has been possible to compile the following list which at least gives an approximate idea of the respective strength of the various submarine fleets at the beginning of the war. the numbers assigned to each country are only approximate, however, and include both boats then in existence or ordered built: united states ; great britain ; france ; germany ; italy ; russia ; japan ; austria ; holland ; denmark ; sweden ; norway ; greece ; turkey ; brazil ; peru . having traced the development of the submarine from its earliest beginnings to recent times we are naturally now confronted with the question "what are the principal requirements and characteristics of the modern submarine?" the submarine boat of to-day, in order to do its work promptly and efficiently, must first of all possess seaworthiness. this means that no matter whether the sea is quiet or rough the submarine must be able to execute its operations with a fair degree of accuracy and promptness and must also be capable of making continuous headway. surface and underwater navigation must be possible with equal facility and it is necessary that a state of submergence can be reached without loss of time and without any degree of danger to the boat's safety. at all times, travelling above water or below, the submarine must possess mechanical means which will make it possible to control its evolutions under all conditions. furthermore, the ability of the submarine to find and to observe objects in its vicinity must not be greatly reduced when it is in a submerged position. in the latter it also becomes of extreme importance that the provisions for ventilation are such that the crew of the submarine should lose as little as possible in its efficiency and comfort. a fair amount of speed both on and below the surface of the water is essential and the maintenance of the speed for a fairly long period of time must be assured. in regard to their general outward appearance, submarines of various types to-day vary comparatively little. in many respects they resemble closely in shape, torpedo boats--the earlier submarines particularly. in size, of course, they differ in accordance with the purposes for which they have been designed. as compared with earlier submarines the most notable difference is that modern submarines possess more of a superstructure. almost all of them are built now with double hulls. the space between the outer and the inner hull is utilized primarily for ballast tanks by means of which submergence is accomplished and stability maintained and regulated. some of these tanks, however, are not used to carry water ballast, but serve as reservoirs for the fuel needed by the engines. the stability of the submarine and the facility with which it can submerge also depend greatly on the distribution of weight of its various parts. this problem has been worked out in such a way that to-day there is little room for improvement. its details, however, are of too technical a nature to permit discussion in this place. hydroplanes both fore and aft are now generally used to assist in regulating and controlling stability in the submerged state. the motive power of the modern submarine is invariably of a two-fold type. for travelling on the surface internal combustion engines are used. the gasoline engine of former years has been displaced by diesel motors or adaptations of them. although these represent a wonderful advance over the engines used in the past there is still a great deal of room for improvement. the opinions of engineers in this respect vary greatly, american opinion being generally unfavourable to the diesel type, and whether the final solution of this problem will lie in the direction of a more highly developed motor of diesel type, of an improved gasoline engine, or of some other engine not yet developed, only the future can tell. simplicity of construction and reliability of operation are the two essential features which must be possessed by every part of the power plant of a submarine. for underwater travel electric motors and storage batteries are employed exclusively. these vary, of course, in detail. in principle, however, they are very much alike. although this combination of electric and oil power is largely responsible for having made the submarine what it is to-day, it is far from perfect. mechanical complications of many kinds and difficulties of varying degrees result from it. up to comparatively recently these were considered insurmountable obstacles. but engineers all over the world are giving their most serious attention to the problem of devising a way to remove these obstacles and continuous progress is made by them. as an immediate result of the development of motive power in the submarine its speed both on and below the surface of the water as well as its radius of action has been materially increased. to-day submarines travel on the water with a speed which even a few years ago would have been thought quite respectable for the most powerful battleships or the swiftest passenger liners. and even under water, submarines attain a velocity which is far superior to that of which earlier submarines were capable on the surface of the water. how immensely extended the radius of action of the submarine has become in recent years, has impressed itself on the world especially in the last few years. both english and french submarines have travelled without making any stops from their home ports to the dardanelles and back again. and used to, and satiated as we are with mechanical wonders of all kinds the whole world was amazed when in german submarines made successful trips from their home ports to ports in the united states and returned with equal success. this meant a minimum radius of action of miles. in the case of the german u-boat which in appeared at newport for a few hours, then attacked and sank some merchantmen off the united states coast and later was reported as having arrived safely in a german port, it has never been established whether the boat renewed its supplies of food and fuel on the way or carried enough to make the trip of some miles. one other important feature without which submarines would have found it impossible to score such accomplishments is the periscope. in the beginning periscopes were rather crude appliances. they were very weak and sprung leaks frequently. moisture, formed by condensation, made them practically useless. in certain positions the image of the object picked up by the periscope became inverted. their radius of vision was limited, and in every way they proved unreliable and unsatisfactory. but, just as almost every feature of submarine construction was gradually developed and most every technical obstacle overcome, experts gradually concentrated their efforts on the improvement of periscopes. modern periscopes are complicated optical instruments which have been developed to a very high point of efficiency. a combination of prisms and lenses makes it possible now to see true images clearly. appliances have been developed to make the rotation of the periscope safe, prompt, and easy so that the horizon can be swept readily in every direction. magnification can be established at will by special devices easily connected or disconnected with the regular instrument. the range of vision of the modern periscope is as remarkable as its other characteristics. it differs, of course, in proportion to the height to which the periscope is elevated above the surface of the water. in clear weather a submarine, having elevated its periscope to a height of feet can pick up a large battleship at as great a distance as miles, while observers on the latter, even if equipped with the most powerful optical instruments, are absolutely unable to detect the submarine. this great distance is reduced to about yards if the periscope is only feet above the surface of the water and to about yards if the elevation of the periscope is foot. but even the highly developed periscope of to-day, usually called "panoramic periscope," has its limitations. the strain on the observer's eyes is very severe and can be borne only for short periods. in dirty weather the objectives become cloudy and the images are rendered obscure and indefinite, although this trouble has been corrected, at least in part, by forcing a strong blast through the rim surrounding the observation glass. at night, of course, the periscope is practically useless. formerly a shot which cut off the periscope near the water's edge might sink the boat. this has been guarded against by cutting off the tube with a heavy plate of transparent glass which does not obstruct vision but shuts off the entrance of water. important as the periscope is both as a means of observing the surroundings of the submarine and as a guide in steering it, it is not the only means of accomplishing the latter purpose. to-day every submarine possesses the most reliable type of compass available. at night when the periscope is practically useless or in very rough weather, or in case the periscope has been damaged or destroyed, steering is done exclusively by means of the compass. the latest type in use now on submarines is called the gyroscope compass which is a highly efficient and reliable instrument. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _the exterior of first german submarine._] in the matter of ventilation the modern submarine also has reached a high state of perfection. the fresh air supply is provided and regulated in such a manner that most of the discomforts suffered by submarine crews in times past have been eliminated. the grave danger which formerly existed as a result of the poisonous fumes, emanating from the storage batteries and accumulators, has been reduced to a minimum. in every respect, except that of space, conditions of life in a submarine have been brought to a point where they can be favourably compared with those of boats navigated on the surface of the water. of course, even at the best, living quarters in a submarine will always be cramped. however, it is so important that submarine crews should be continuously kept on a high plane of efficiency that they are supplied with every conceivable comfort permitted by the natural limitations of submarine construction. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _the interior of first german submarine. showing appliances for man-power._] submarine boats so far have been used almost exclusively as instruments of warfare. one of their most important features, therefore, naturally is their armament. we have already heard something about the use of torpedoes by submarines. the early submarines had as a rule only one torpedo tube and were incapable of carrying more than two or three torpedoes. gradually, however, both the number of torpedo tubes and of torpedoes was increased. the latest types have as many as eight or ten tubes and carry enough torpedoes to permit them to stay away from their base for several weeks. in recent years submarines have also been armed with guns. naturally these have to be of light weight and small calibre. they are usually mounted so that they can be used at a high angle. this is done in order to make it possible for submarines to defend themselves against attacks from airships. the mountings of these guns are constructed in such a way that the guns themselves disappear immediately after discharge and are not visible while not in use. though mounted on deck they are aimed and fired from below. as part of the armament of the submarine we must also consider the additional protection which they receive from having certain essential parts protected by armour plate. all these features have increased the safety of submarine navigation to a great extent. in spite of the popular impression that submarine navigation entailed a greater number of danger factors than navigation on the surface of the water, this is not altogether so. if we stop to consider this subject we can readily see why rather the opposite should be true. navigation under the surface of the water greatly reduces the possibility of collision and also the dangers arising from rough weather. for the results of the latter are felt to a much lesser degree below than on the surface of the water. many other factors are responsible for the comparatively high degree of safety inherent in submarines. up to the outbreak of the present war only about two hundred and fifty lives had been lost as a result to accidents to modern submarines. considering that up to a great deal of submarine navigation was more or less experimental this is a record which can bear favourable comparison with similar records established by overwater navigation or by navigation in the air. to the average man the thought of imprisonment in a steel tube beneath the surface of the sea, and being suddenly deprived of all means of bringing it up to air and light is a terrifying and nerve shattering thing. it is probably the first consideration which suggests itself to one asked to make a submarine trip. always the newspaper headlines dealing with a submarine disaster speak of those lost as "drowned like rats in a trap." men will admit that the progress of invention has greatly lessened the danger of accident to submarines, but nevertheless sturdily insist that when the accident does happen the men inside have no chance of escape. as a matter of fact many devices have been applied to the modern submarine to meet exactly this contingency. perhaps nothing is more effective than the so-called telephone buoy installed in our navy and in some of those of europe. this is a buoy lightly attached to the outer surface of the boat, containing a telephone transmitter and receiver connected by wire with a telephone within. in the event of an accident this buoy is released and rises at once to the surface. a flag attached attracts the attention of any craft that may be in the neighbourhood and makes immediate communication with those below possible. arrangements can then be made for raising the boat or towing her to some point at which salvage is possible. an instance of the value of this device was given by the disaster to the german submarine "u- " which was sunk at kiel in . through the telephone the imprisoned crew notified those at the other end that they had oxygen enough for forty-eight hours but that the work of rescue must be completed in that time. a powerful floating derrick grappled the sunken submarine and lifted its bow above water. twenty-seven of the imprisoned crew crept out through the torpedo tubes. the captain and two lieutenants conceived it their duty to stay with the ship until she was actually saved. in the course of the operations one of the ventilators was broken, the water rushed in and all three were drowned. in some of the holland ships of late construction there is an ingenious, indeed an almost incredible device by which the ship takes charge of herself if the operators or crew are incapacitated. it has happened that the shock of a collision has so stunned the men cooped up in the narrow quarters of a submarine that they are for quite an appreciable time unable to attend to their duties. such a collision would naturally cause the boat to leak and to sink. in these newer holland ships an automatic device causes the ship, when she has sunk to a certain depth, registered of course by automatic machinery, to start certain apparatus which empties the ballast tanks and starts the pumps which will empty the interior of the ship if it has become flooded. the result is that after a few minutes of this automatic work, whether the crew has sufficiently recovered to take part in it or not, the boat will rise to the surface. this extraordinary invention is curiously reminiscent of the fact chronicled in earlier chapters of this book that the most modern airplanes are so built that should the aviator become insensible or incapacitated for his work, if he will but drop the controls, the machine will adjust itself and make its own landing in safety. unaided the airplane drops lightly to earth; unaided the submarine rises buoyantly to the air. in recent years there have been developed special ships for the salvage of damaged or sunk submarines. at the same time the navies of the world have also produced special submarine tenders or mother ships. the purpose of these is to supply a base which can keep on the move with the same degree of facility which the submarine itself possesses. these tenders are equipped with air compressors by means of which the air tanks of submarines can be refilled. electric generators make it possible to replenish the submarine storage batteries. mechanical equipment permits the execution of repairs to the submarine's machinery and equipment. extra fuel, substitute parts for the machinery, spare torpedoes are carried by these tenders. the most modern of them are even supplied with dry dock facilities, powerful cranes, and sufficiently strong armament to repel attacks from boats of the type most frequently encountered by submarines. there are, of course, many other special appliances which make up the sum total of a modern submarine's equipment. electricity is used for illuminating all parts of the boat. heat is supplied in the same manner; this is a very essential feature because the temperature of a submarine, after a certain period of submergence, becomes uncomfortably low. electricity is also used for cooking purposes. every submarine boat built to-day is equipped with wireless apparatus. naturally it is only of limited range varying from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty miles, but even at that it is possible for a submarine to send messages to its base or some other given point from a considerable distance by relay. if the submarine is running on the surface of the water the usual means of naval communication-flag signals, wig-wagging or the semaphore, can be employed. the submarine bell is another means for signalling. it is really a wireless telephone, operating through the water instead of the air. up to the present, however, it has not been sufficiently developed to permit its use for any great distance. it is so constructed that it can also be used as a sound detector. some submarines, besides being equipped with torpedo tubes, carry other tubes for laying mines. in most instances this is only a secondary function of the submarine. there are, however, special mine-laying submarines. others, especially of the lake type, have diving compartments which permit the employment of divers for the purpose of planting or taking up mines. disappearing anchors, operated by electricity from within the boat, are carried. they are used for steadying the boat if it is desired to keep it for any length of time on the bottom of the sea in a current. from this necessarily brief description it can be seen readily that the modern submarine boat is a highly developed, but very complicated mechanism. naturally it requires a highly trained, extremely efficient crew. the commanding officers must be men of strong personality, keen intellect, high mechanical efficiency, and quick judgment. the gradual increase in size has brought a corresponding increase in the number of a submarine's crew. a decade ago from to officers and men were sufficient but to-day we hear of submarine crews that number anywhere from to . in spite of the marvellous advances which have been made in the construction, equipment, and handling of the submarine during the last ten years, perfection in many directions is still a long way off. how soon it will be reached, if ever, and by what means, are, of course, questions which only the future can answer. chapter xv aboard a submarine submarines have been compared to all kinds of things, from a fish to a cigar. life on them has been described in terms of the highest elation as well as of the deepest depression. their operation and navigation, according to some claims, require a veritable combination of mechanical, electrical, and naval genius--not only on the part of the officers, but even on that of the simplest oiler--while others make it appear as if a submarine was at least as simple to handle as a small motor boat. the truth concerning all these matters lies somewhere between these various extremes. it is quite true that except on the very latest "submerged cruisers" built by the germans, the space for the men operating a submarine is painfully straitened. they must hold to their positions almost like a row of peas in a pod. from this results the gravest strain upon the nerves so that it has been found in germany that after a cruise a period of rest of equal duration is needed to restore the men to their normal condition. before assignment to submarine duty, too, a special course of training is requisite. submarine crews are not created in a day. what the interior of the new german submarines with a length of feet, and a beam of feet may be, no man of the anglo-saxon race may know or tell. the few who have descended into those mysterious depths will have no chance to tell of them until the war is over. nor is it possible during wartimes to secure descriptions even of our own underwater boats. but the interior of the typical submarine may be imagined as in size and shape something like an unusually long street car. along the sides, where seats would normally be, are packed wheels, cylinders, motors, pumps, machinery of all imaginable kinds and some of it utterly unimaginable to the lay observer. the whole interior is painted white and bathed in electric light. the casual visitor from "above seas" is dazed by the array of machinery and shrinks as he walks the narrow aisle lest he become entangled in it. running on the surface the submarine chamber is filled with a roar and clatter like a boiler shop in full operation. the diesel engines are compact and powerful, but the racket they make more nearly corresponds to their power than to their size. on the surface too the boat rolls and pitches and the stranger passenger, unequipped with sea legs grabs for support as the subway rider reaches for a strap on the curves. but let the order come to submerge. the diesels are stopped. the electric motors take up the task, spinning noiselessly in their jackets. in a moment or two all rolling ceases. one can hardly tell whether the ship is moving at all--it might for all its motion tells be resting quietly on the bottom. if you could disabuse your mind for a moment of the recollection that you were in a great steel cigar heavy laden with explosives, and deep under the surface of the sea you would find the experience no more exciting than a trip through the pennsylvania tubes. but there is something uncanny about the silence. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _a torpedo designed by fulton._] go forward to the conical compartment at the very bow. there you will find the torpedo chamber for the submarine, like the cigar to which it is so often compared, carries its fire at its front tip. the most common type of boat will have two or four torpedo tubes in this chamber. the more modern ones will have a second torpedo chamber astern with the same number of tubes and carry other torpedoes on deck which by an ingenious device can be launched from their outside cradles by mechanism within the boat. in the torpedo chamber are twice as many spare torpedoes as there are tubes, made fast along the sides. here too the anchor winch stands with the cable attached to the anchor outside the boat and an automatic knife which cuts the cable should the anchor be fouled. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _the method of attack by nautilus._] immediately aft of the torpedo chamber, cut off by a water-tight partition, is the battery compartment. it gets its name because of the fact, that beneath the deck which is full of traps readily raised are the electric storage batteries of anywhere from to cells according to the size of the boat. this room is commonly used as the loafing place for the crew, being regarded as very spacious and empty. in it are nothing but the electric stove, the kitchen sink, the various lockers for food and all the housekeeping apparatus of the submarine. mighty trim and compact they all are. the builder of twentieth century flats with his kitchenettes and his in-door beds might learn a good deal from a study of the smaller type of submarine. next aft come the officers' staterooms, rather smaller than prison cells, each holding a bunk, a bureau, and a desk. each holds also a good deal of moisture, for the greatest discomfort in submarine life comes from the fact that everything is dripping with the water resulting from the constant condensation of the air within. the great compartment amidships given over to machinery is a place to test the nerves. the aisle down the centre is scarcely two feet wide and on each side are whirling wheels, engines, and electric motors. only the photographs can give a clear idea of the crowded appearance of this compartment. it contains steering wheels, the gyroscopic compass, huge valves, dials showing depth of submergence, kingston levers, motor controllers, all polished and shining, each doing its work and each easily thrown out of gear by an ignorant touch. the author once spending the night on a united states man-of-war was shown by the captain to his own cabin, that officer occupying the admiral's cabin for the time. at the head of the bunk were two small electric push buttons absolutely identical in appearance and about two inches apart. "push this button," said the captain genially, "if you want the jap boy to bring you shaving water or anything else. but be sure to push the right one. if you push the other you will call the entire crew to quarters at whatever hour of night the bell may ring." the possibility of mistaking the button rested heavily on the writer's nerves all night. a somewhat similar feeling comes over one who walks the narrow path down the centre of the machinery compartment of a submarine. he seems hedged about by mysterious apparatus a touch of which, or even an accidental jostle may release powerful and even murderous forces. while the submarine is under way, submerged, the operator at every piece of individual machinery stands at its side ready for action. here are the gunner's mates at the diving rudder. they watch steadily a big gauge on which a needle which shows how deep the boat is sinking. when the required depth is reached swift turns of two big brass wheels set the horizontal rudders that check the descent and keep the boat on an even keel. other men stand at the levers of the kingston valves which, when open, flood the ballast tanks with water and secure the submergence of the boat. most of the underwater boats to-day sink rapidly on an even keel. the old method of depressing the nose of the boat so as to make a literal dive has been abandoned, partly because of the inconvenience it caused to the men within who suddenly found the floor on which they were standing tilted at a sharp angle, and partly because the diving position proved to be a dangerous one for the boat. in the early days of the submarines the quarters for the men were almost intolerable. the sleeping accommodations were cramped and there was no place for the men off duty to lounge and relax from the strain of constant attention to duty. man cannot keep his body in a certain fixed position even though it be not rigid, for many hours. this is shown as well at the base ball grounds at the end of the sixth inning when "all stretch" as it was in the old time underwater boats. the crews now have space in which to loaf and even the strain of long silent watches under water is relieved by the use of talking machines and musical instruments. the efficiency of the boat of course is only that of her crew, and since more care and more scientific thought has been given to the comfort of the men, to the purity of the air they breathe, and even to their amusements, the effect upon the work done by the craft has been apparent. ten years ago hot meals were unthought of on a submarine; now the electric cooker provides for quite an elaborate bill of fare. but ten years ago the submarine was only expected to cruise for a few hours off the harbour's mouth carrying a crew of twenty men or less. now it stays at sea sometimes for as long as three months. its crews number often as many as fifty and the day is in sight when accommodations will have to be made for the housing of at least eighty men in such comparative comfort that they can stand a six months' voyage without loss of morale or decrease in physical vigour. it is, of course, very rare that a civilian has the chance to be present on a submarine when the latter is making either a real or a feigned attack. fred b. pitney, a correspondent of the new york _tribune_, was fortunate enough to have this experience, fortunate especially because it was all a game arranged for his special benefit by a french admiral. he writes of this interesting experience in the _tribune_ of sunday, may , , and at the same time gives a vivid description of a french submarine. it appears that mr. pitney was on a small vessel put at his disposal by the french ministry of marine to view the defences of a french naval base. this boat was attacked by what seemed to be an enemy submarine, but later turned out to be a french one which was giving this special performance for mr. pitney's information. we read: our officers were experts at watching for submarines, and though the little white wave made by the periscope disappeared, they caught the white wake of the torpedo coming toward the port quarter and sheered off to escape it. the torpedo passed harmlessly by our stern, but the adventure was not ended, for hardly a minute later we heard a shot from off the starboard quarter and, turning in that direction, saw that the submarine had come to the surface and was busily firing at us to bring us to. we stopped without any foolish waste of time in argument. i asked if a boat would be sent to us, or if we would have to get out our boat. "they carry a small folding boat," said the officer to whom i had been talking, "but we will have to send our boat." while we were getting our boat over the side, the submarine moved closer in, keeping her gun bearing on us all the time, most uncomfortably. the gun stood uncovered on the deck, just abaft the turret. it was thickly coated with grease to protect it when the vessel submerged. it is only the very latest type of submarines that have disappearing guns which go under cover when the vessel submerges and are fired from within the ship, which makes all the more surprising the speed with which a submarine can come to the surface, the men get out on deck, fire the gun, get in again and the vessel once more submerges. i was in the first boatload that went over to the submarine. from a distance it looked like nothing so much as a rather long piece of × floating on the water, with another block set on top of it and a length of lath nailed on the block. it lost none of these characteristics as we neared it. it only gained a couple of ropes along the sides of the × , while men kept coming mysteriously out of the block until a round dozen was waiting to receive us. the really surprising thing was that the men turned out to be perfectly good french sailors, with a most exceedingly polite french lieutenant to help us aboard the little craft.... [illustration: _the capture of a u-boat._ _painting by john e. whiting._] the vessel we were in was a -ton cruising submarine. it had just come from eight months' guarding the channel, and showed all the battering of eight months of a very rough and stormy career with no time for a lie-up for repairs. it was interesting to see the commander hand the depth gauge a wallop to start it working and find out if the centre of the boat was really nine feet higher than either end. we were fifty-four feet under water and diving when the commander performed that little experiment and we continued to dive while the gauge spun around and finally stopped at a place which indicated approximately that our back was not broken. i suppose that was one of the things my friend the lieutenant referred to when he said life on a submarine was such a sporting proposition. we boarded the submarine over the tail end and balanced our way up the long narrow block, like walking a tight rope, to the turret, where we descended through a hole like the opening into a gas main into a small round compartment about six feet in diameter exactly in the midship section, which was the largest compartment in the ship. running each way from it the length of the vessel were long corridors, some two feet wide. on each side of the corridors were rows of tiny compartments, which were the living and working rooms of the ship. naturally, most of the space was given up to the working rooms. the officers' quarters consisted of four tiny compartments, two on each side of the after corridor. the first two were the mess room and chart room, and the second pair were the cabins of the commander--a lieutenant--and his second in command, an ensign. behind them was an electric kitchen, and next came the engines, first two sets of diesel engines, one on each side of the corridor, each of four hundred horse-power. these were for running on the surface. then came four bunks for the quartermasters and last the electric motors for running under the surface. the motors were run from storage batteries and were half the power of the diesel engines. the quarters of the crew were along the sides of the forward corridor. the floors of the corridor were an unbroken series of trap doors, covering the storage tanks for drinking water, food, and the ship's supplies. the torpedo tubes were forward of the men's quarters. ten torpedoes were carried. the ammunition for the deck gun was stored immediately beneath the gun, which was mounted between the turret and the first hatch, abaft the turret. besides the turret there were three hatches in the deck, one forward and two aft. there were thirty-four men in the crew. the men are counted every two hours, as there is great danger of men being lost overboard when running on the surface, and in bad weather they are sometimes counted as often as every half hour. the turret was divided in two sections. in the after part was the main hatch and behind it a stationary periscope, standing about thirty inches above the surface of the water when the deck was submerged and only the periscope showing. there was no opening in the forward section of the turret, but the fighting periscope, which could be drawn down into the interior or pushed up to ten feet above the surface when the vessel was completely submerged, extended through the top. for two hours, turn and turn about, the commander and his second stand watch on the iron grips in the turret, one eye on the periscope, the other on the compass. and this goes on for weeks on end. it is only when they lie for a few hours fifty to seventy-five feet below the surface that they can get some rest. and even then there is no real rest, for one or the other of them must be constantly on duty, testing pipes and gauges, air pressure, water pressure, and a thousand other things. when we dropped through the hatch into the interior of the submarine and the cover was clamped down over our heads the commander at once ordered me back into the turret. "hurry, if you want to see her dive," he said. i climbed into the after section of the turret and fastened my eye to the periscope. around the top of the turret was a circle of bulls' eyes and i was conscious of the water dashing against them while the spray washed over the glass of the periscope. the little vessel rolled very slightly on the surface, though there was quite a bit of sea running. i watched the horizon through the periscope and watched for the dive, expecting a distinct sensation, but the first thing i noticed was that even the slight roll had ceased and i was surprised to see that the bulls' eyes were completely under water. the next thing there was no more horizon. the periscope also was covered and we were completely beneath the surface. "did it make you sick?" the commander asked, when i climbed down from the turret, and when i told him "no" he was surprised, for he said most men were made sick by their first dive. the thing most astonishing to me about that experience was how a submerged submarine can thread its way through a mine field. for though the water is luminous and translucent one can hardly make out the black hull of the boat under the turret and a mine would have to be on top of you before you could see it. the men who watch for mines must have a sense for them as well as particularly powerful sight. we continued to dive until we were sixty-eight feet below the surface, too deep to strike any mine, and there we ran tranquilly on our electric engines, while the commander navigated the vessel and the second in command opened champagne in the two by four mess room. after half an hour of underwater work we came near enough the surface for our fighting periscope to stick twenty inches out of the water and searched the lonely horizon for a ship to attack. it was not long before we sighted a mine trawler, steaming for the harbour, and speeded up to overtake her. "pikers!" said our commander, as we circled twice around the trawler; "they can't find us." five men on the trawler were scanning the sea with glasses looking for submarines. we could follow all their motions, could tell when they thought they had found us and see their disappointment at their mistakes, but though we were never more than five hundred yards from them, i did not think they were pikers because they did not find us. i had tried that hunt for the tiny wave of a periscope. "no use wasting a torpedo on those fellows," said our commander. "we will use the gun on them." "how far away can you use a torpedo?" i asked. "two hundred yards is the best distance," he said. "never more than five hundred. a torpedo is pure guesswork at more than five hundred yards." we crossed the bow of the trawler, circled around to her starboard quarter and came to the surface, fired nine shots and submerged again in forty-five seconds. the prey secured, we ran submerged through the mine field and past the net barrier to come to the surface well within the harbour and proceed peacefully to our mooring under the shelter of the guns of the land forts. life and work on a german submarine is known to us, of course, only from descriptions in german publications. one of these appeared, previous to our entry in the war, in various journals and was translated and republished by the new york _evening post_. it reads partly as follows: "u- will take provisions and clear for sea. extreme economical radius." a first lieutenant, with acting rank of commander, takes the order in the grey dawn of a february day. the hulk of an old corvette with the iron cross of on her stubby foremast is his quarters in port, and on the corvette's deck he is presently saluted by his first engineer and the officer of the watch. on the pier the crew of u- await him. at their feet the narrow grey submarine lies alongside, straining a little at her cables. "well, we've our orders at last," begins the commander, addressing his crew of thirty, and the crew grin. for this is u- 's first experience of active service. she has done nothing save trial trips hitherto, and has just been overhauled for her first fighting cruise. her commander snaps out a number of orders. provisions are to be taken in "up to the neck," fresh water is to be put aboard, and engine-room supplies to be supplemented. a mere plank is the gangway to the little vessel. as the commander, followed by his officers, comes aboard, a sailor hands to each a ball of cotton-waste, the sign and symbol of a submarine officer, which never leaves his hand. for the steel walls of his craft, the doors, and the companion-ladder all sweat oil, and at every touch the hands must be wiped dry. the doorways are narrow round holes. through one of the holes aft the commander descends by a breakneck iron ladder into the black hole lit by electric glow-lamps. the air is heavy with the smell of oil, and to the unaccustomed longshoreman it is almost choking, though the hatches are off. the submarine man breathes this air as if it were the purest ozone. here in the engine-room aft men must live and strain every nerve even if for days at a time every crack whereby the fresh air could get in is hermetically sealed. on their tense watchfulness thirty lives depend. here, too, are slung some hammocks, and in them one watch tries, and, what is more, succeeds in sleeping, though the men moving about bump them with head and elbows at every turn, and the low and narrow vault is full of the hum and purr of machinery. in length the vault is about ten feet, but if a man of normal stature stands in the middle and raises his arms to about half shoulder height his hands will touch the cold, moist steel walls on either side. a network of wires runs overhead, and there is a juggler's outfit of handles, levers, and instruments. the commander inspects everything minutely, then creeps through a hole into the central control station, where the chief engineer is at his post. with just about enough assistance to run a fairly simple machine ashore the chief engineer of a submarine is expected to control, correct, and, if necessary, repair at sea an infinitely complex machinery which must not break down for an instant if thirty men are to return alive to the hulk. forward is another narrow steel vault serving at once as engine-room and crew's quarters. next to it is a place like a cupboard, where the cook has just room to stand in front of his doll's house galley-stove. it is electrically heated, that the already oppressive air may not be further vitiated by smoke or fumes. a german submarine in any case smells perpetually of coffee and cabbage. two little cabins of the size of a decent clothes-chest take the deck and engine-room officers, four of them. another box cabin is reserved for the commander--when he has time to occupy it. at daybreak the commander comes on deck in coat and trousers of black leather lined with wool, a protection against oil, cold, and sea-water. the crew at their stations await the command to cast off. "machines clear," calls a voice from the control-station and "clear ship," snaps the order from the bridge. then "cast-off!" the cables slap on to the landing-stage, the engines begin to purr, and u- slides away into open water. a few cable-lengths away another submarine appears homeward bound. she is the u- returning from a long cruise in which she succeeded in sinking a ship bound with a cargo of frozen mutton for england. "good luck, old sheep-butcher," sings the commander of u- as the sister-ship passes within hail. the seas are heavier now, and u- rolls unpleasantly as she makes the light-ship and answers the last salute from a friendly hand. the two officers on the bridge turn once to look at the light-ship already astern, then their eyes look seaward. it is rough, stormy weather. if the egg-shell goes ahead two or three days without a stop, the officers in charge will get no sleep for just that long. if it gets any rougher they will be tied to the bridge-rails to avoid being swept overboard. if they are hungry, plates of soup will be brought to them on the bridge, and the north sea will attend to its salting for them. frequently this "meal" is interrupted by some announcement from the watch, such as: "smoke on the horizon off the port bow." then--so we are told: the commander drops his plate, shouts a short, crisp command, and an electric alarm whirs inside the egg-shell. the ship buzzes like a hive. then water begins to gurgle into the ballast-tanks, and u- sinks until only her periscope shows. "the steamship is a dutchman, sir," calls the watch officer. the commander inspects her with the aid of a periscope. she has no wireless and is bound for the continent. so he can come up and is glad, because moving under the water consumes electricity, and the usefulness of a submarine is measured by her electric power. after fifty-four hours of waking nerve tension, sleep becomes a necessity. so the ballast-tanks are filled and the nutshell sinks to the sandy bottom. this is the time for sleep aboard a submarine, because a sleeping man consumes less of the precious oxygen than one awake and busy. so a submarine man has three principal lessons to learn--to keep every faculty at tension when he is awake, to keep stern silence when he is ashore (there is a warning against talkativeness in all the german railway-carriages now), and to sleep instantly when he gets a legitimate opportunity. his sleep and the economy of oxygen may save the ship. however, the commander allows half an hour's grace for music. there is a gramophone, of course, and the "ship's band" performs on all manner of instruments. at worst, a comb with a bit of tissue paper is pressed into service. another american who suffered an enforced voyage on an _unterseeboot_ made public later some of his experiences. his captor's craft was a good sized one--about feet long, with a crew of men and mounting two - / inch guns. she could make knots on the surface and submerged and had a radius of miles of action. her accommodations were not uncomfortable. each officer had a separate cabin while the crew were bunked along either side of a narrow passage. the ventilation was excellent, and her officers declared that they could stand twenty-four hours continuous submergence without discomfort, after that for six hours it was uncomfortable, and thereafter intolerable because of the exudation of moisture--or sweating--from every part. at such times all below have to wear leather suits. the food was varied and cooked on an electric stove. the original stores included preserved pork and beef, vegetables, tinned soups, fruits, raisins, biscuits, butter, marmalade, milk, tea, and coffee. but the pleasures of the table depended greatly on the number of their prizes, for whenever possible they made every ship captured contribute heavily to their larder before sinking her. of the tactics followed the observer writes: it appears that per cent., or more than half, of the torpedoes fired miss their mark, and with this average they seem satisfied. once they let go at a ship two torpedoes at yards' range, and both missed, the range being too long but they did not care to come any nearer, as they believed the ship to be well armed. they prefer to fire at to yards, which means that at this range the track or "wake" of a projectile would be discernible for, say, twenty-five to thirty seconds--not much time, indeed, for any ship to get out of the way. at yards' range or less they do not care to fire unless compelled to, as the torpedo is nearly always discharged when the submarine is lying ahead of the object, _i. e._, to hit the ship coming up to it; it follows that a gun forward is more useful than one aft, the gun aft being of real service when a submarine starts shelling, which she will do for choice from aft the ship rather than from forward of her, where she would be in danger of being run over and rammed. chapter xvi submarine warfare at the moment of writing these words the outcome of the greatest war the world has ever known is believed by many to hang upon the success with which the allies can meet and defeat the campaign of the german submarines. the german people believe this absolutely. the allies and their sympathizers grudgingly admit that they are only too fearful that it may be true. to such a marvellous degree of military efficiency has the ingenuity of man brought these boats which so recently as our civil war were still in the vaguest experimental stage and scarcely possessed of any offensive power whatsoever! nevertheless these machines had reached a degree of development, and had demonstrated their dangerous character so early in the war that it was amazing that the british were so slow in comprehending the use that might be made of them in cutting off british commerce. it is true that the first submarine actions redounded in their results entirely to british credit. in september of a british submarine ran gallantly into heligoland bay and sank the german light cruiser _hela_ at her moorings. shortly after the germans sought retaliation by attacking a british squadron, but the effort miscarried. the british cruiser _birmingham_ caught a glimpse of her wake and with a well-aimed shot destroyed her periscope. the submarine dived, but shortly afterwards came up again making what was called a porpoise dive--that is to say, she came up just long enough for the officer in the conning tower to locate the enemy, then submerged again. brief, however, as had been the appearance of the conning tower, the british put a shell into it and in a few minutes the submarine and most of her crew were at the bottom of the sea. soon after followed the attack upon and sinking of the three cruisers by the submarine under the command of lieutenant commander otto von weddigen, the narrative of which we have already told. but while after that attacks upon british armed ships were many, successes were few. there were no german ships at sea for the british to attack in turn, but some very gallant work was done by their submarines against austrian and turkish warships in the mediterranean and the dardanelles. all this time the germans were preparing for that warfare upon the merchant shipping of all countries which at the end they came to believe would force the conclusion of the war. it seems curious that during this early period the allies were able to devise no method of meeting this form of attack. when the united states entered the war more than three years later they looked to us for the instant invention of some effective anti-submarine weapon. if they were disappointed at our failure at once to produce one, they should have remembered at least that they too were baffled by the situation although it was presented to them long before it became part of our problems. about no feature of the war have the belligerents thrown more of mystery than about the circumstances attending submarine attacks upon battleships and armed transports and the method employed of meeting them. even when later in the war the germans apparently driven to frenzy made special efforts to sink hospital and red cross ships the facts were concealed by the censors, and accounts of the efforts made to balk such inhuman and unchristian practices diligently suppressed. in the end it seemed that the british, who of course led all naval activities, had reached the conclusion that only by the maintenance of an enormous fleet of patrol boats could the submarines be kept in check. this method they have applied unremittingly. alfred noyes in a publication authorized by the british government has thus picturesquely told some of the incidents connected with this service: it is difficult to convey in words the wide sweep and subtle co-ordination of this ocean hunting; for the beginning of any tale may be known only to an admiral in a london office, the middle of it only to a commander at kirkwall, and the end of it only to a trawler skipper off the coast of ireland. but here and there it is possible to piece the fragments together into a complete adventure, as in the following record of a successful chase, where the glorious facts outrun all the imaginations of the wildest melodrama. there were suspicious vessels at anchor, one moonless night, in a small bay near the mumbles. they lay there like shadows, but before long they knew that the night was alive for a hundred miles with silent talk about them. at dawn his majesty's trawlers _golden feather_ and _peggy nutten_ foamed up, but the shadows had disappeared. the trawlers were ordered to search the coast thoroughly for any submarine stores that might have been left there. "thoroughly" in this war means a great deal. it means that even the bottom of the sea must be searched. this was done by grapnels; but the bottom was rocky and seemed unfit for a base. nothing was found but a battered old lobster pot, crammed with seaweed and little green crabs. probably these appearances were more than usually deceitful; for shortly afterward watchers on the coast reported a strange fishing boat, with patched brown sails, heading for the suspected bay. before the patrols came up, however, she seemed to be alarmed. the brown sails were suddenly taken in; the disguised conning tower was revealed, and this innocent fishing boat, gracefully submerging, left only the smiling and spotless april seas to the bewildered eyes of the coast guard. in the meantime signals were pulsing and flashing on land and sea, and the u-boat had hardly dipped when, over the smooth green swell, a great sea hawk came whirring up to join the hunt, a hawk with light yellow wings and a body of service grey--the latest type of seaplane. it was one of those oily seas in which a watcher from the air may follow a submarine for miles, as an olive green shadow under the lighter green. the u-boat doubled twice; but it was half an hour before her sunken shadow was lost to sight under choppy blue waters, and long before that time she was evidently at ease in her mind and pursuing a steady course. for the moment her trail was then lost, and the hawk, having reported her course, dropped out of the tale. [illustration: photo by u. & u. _a british submarine._] the next morning in the direction indicated by that report several patrol boats heard the sound of gunfire and overhauled a steamer which had been attacked by a submarine. they gave chase by "starring" to all the points of the compass, but could not locate the enemy. a little later, however, another trawler observed the wash of a submarine crossing her stern about two hundred yards away. the trawler star-boarded, got into the wake of the submarine and tried to ram her at full speed. she failed to do this, as the u-boat was at too great a depth. the enemy disappeared, and again the trawlers gathered and "starred." [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _sectional view of the nautilus._] in the meantime, certain nets had been shot, and, though the inclosed waters were very wide, it was quite certain that the submarine was contained within them. some hours later another trawler heard firing and rushed toward the sound. about sunset she sighted a submarine which was just dipping. the trawler opened fire at once without result. the light was very bad and it was very difficult to trace the enemy, but the trawler continued the search, and about midnight she observed a small light close to the water. she steamed within a few yards of it and hailed, thinking it was a small boat. there was a considerable amount of wreckage about, which was afterward proved to be the remains of a patrol vessel sunk by the submarine. there was no reply to the hail, and the light instantly disappeared. for the third time the patrols gathered and "starred" from this new point. and here the tale was taken up by a sailor who was in command of another trawler at the time. i give it, so far as possible, in his own words. "about o'clock in the morning i was called by deckhand william brown to come on deck and see if an object sighted was a submarine. i did so, and saw a submarine about a mile distant on the port bow. i gave the order, 'hard a-starboard.' the ship was turned until the gun was able to bear on the submarine, and it was kept bearing. at the same time i ordered hands to station, and about ten minutes afterward i gave the order to fire. the submarine immediately altered her course from w. to n. n. w., and went away from us very fast. i burned lights to attract the attention of the drifters, and we followed at our utmost speed, making about eight knots and shipping light sprays. we fired another shot about two minutes later, but it was breaking dawn, and we were unable to see the fall of the shots. after the second shot the submarine submerged. i hoisted warning signals and about half an hour later i saw a large steamer turning round, distant between two and three miles on our starboard beam. i headed toward her, keeping the gun trained on her, as i expected, judging by her action, that she had smelt the submarine. when we were about a mile and a half from the steamer i saw the submarine half a mile astern of her. we opened fire again, and gave her four shots, with about two minutes between 'em. the submarine then dodged behind the off quarter of the steamer." he paused to light his pipe, and added, quite gravely, "when she had disappeared behind the steamer i gave the order 'cease fire,' to avoid hitting the larger vessel." i made a mental note of his thoughtfulness; but, not for worlds would i have shown any doubt of his power to blast his way, if necessary, through all the wood and iron in the universe; and i was glad that the blue clouds of our smoke mingled for a moment between us. "i saw two white boats off the port quarter," he continued. "but i paid no attention to them. i ordered the helm to be star-boarded a bit more, and told the gunner to train his gun on the bow of the steamer; for i expected the submarine to show there next. a few minutes later she did so, and when she drew ahead i gave the order to fire. i should say we were about a mile and a quarter away. we gave him two more shots and they dropped very close, as the spray rose over his conning tower. he altered his course directly away from us, and we continued to fire. the third shot smothered his conning tower with spray. i did not see the fourth and fifth shots pitch. there was no splash visible, although it was then broad daylight; so i believe they must have hit him. a few moments after this the submarine disappeared. "i turned, then, toward the two white boats and hailed them. the chief officer of the steamer was in charge of one. they were returning to their ship, and told me that we had hit the submarine. we escorted them through the nets and parted very good friends." "but how did you get the scalp of this u-boat?" i asked. "we signalled to the admiral, and sent the daffy to investigate. she found the place, all right. it was a choppy sea, but there was one smooth patch in it, just where we told 'em the submarine had disappeared; a big patch of water like wavy satin, two or three hundred yards of it, coloured like the stripes on mackerel, all blue and green with oil. they took a specimen of the oil." "did it satisfy the admiralty?" "no. nothing satisfies the admiralty but certainties. they count the minimum losses of the enemy, and the maximum of their own. very proper, too. then you know where you are. but, mind you, i don't believe we finished him off that morning. oil don't prove that. it only proves we hit him. i believe it was the 'maggie and rose' that killed him, or the 'hawthorn.' no; it wasn't either. it was the 'loch awe.'" "how was that?" "well, as commander white was telling you, we'd shot out nets to the north and south of him. there were two or three hundred miles, perhaps, in which he might wriggle about; but he couldn't get out of the trap, even if he knew where to look for the danger. he tried to run for home, and that's what finished him. they'll tell you all about that on the 'loch awe.'" so the next day i heard the end of the yarn from a sandy-haired skipper in a trawler whose old romantic name was dark with new significance. he was terribly logical. in his cabin--a comfortable room with a fine big stove--he had a picture of his wife and daughters, all very rigid and uncomfortable. he also had three books. they included neither burns nor scott. one was the bible, thumbed by his grandfather and his father till the paper had worn yellow and thin at the sides. the second, i am sorry to say, was called _the beautiful white devil_. the third was an odd volume of froude in the _everyman_ edition. it dealt with the armada. "i was towin' my nets wi' the rest o' my group," he said, "till about o'clock i' the mornin' on yon occasion. it was fine weather wi' a kind o' haar. all at once, my ship gaed six points aff her coorse, frae s. e. to e. n. e., and i jaloused that the nets had been fouled by some muckle movin' body. i gave orders to pit the wheel hard a-port, but she wouldna answer. suddenly the strain on the nets stoppit. "i needna tell you what had happened. of course, it was preceesely what the admiralty had arranged tae happen when gentlemen in undersea boats try to cut their way through our nets. mind ye, thae nets are verra expensive." a different situation, however, has lately developed in the more unequal fight between submarines and merchant vessels. there the submarine unquestionably has gained and maintained supremacy. two factors are primarily responsible for this: lack of speed and lack of armament on the part of the merchantman. of course, recently the latter condition has been changed and apparently with good success. but even at best, an armed merchantman has a rather slim chance at escape. neither space nor available equipment permits a general arming of merchantmen to a sufficient degree to make it possible for the latter to attack a submarine from any considerable distance. then, too, what chance has a merchant vessel unprotected by patrol boats to escape the torpedo of a hidden submarine? how successfully this question will finally be solved, the future only will show. at present it bids fair to become one of the deciding factors in determining the final issue of this war. the first authentically known case of an attack without warning by a german submarine against an allied merchantman was the torpedoing of the french steamship _amiral ganteaume_ on october , , in the english channel. the steamer was sunk and thirty of its passengers and crew were lost. a number of other attacks followed during the remainder of and in january, . then came on february , , the now famous pronouncement of the german government declaring "all the waters around great britain and ireland, including the whole of the english channel, a war zone," and announcing that on and after feb. th, germany "will attempt to destroy every enemy ship found in that war zone, without its being always possible to avoid the danger that will thus threaten neutral persons and ships." germany gave warning that "it cannot be responsible hereafter for the safety of crews, passengers, and cargoes of such ships," and it furthermore "calls the attention of neutrals to the fact that it would be well for their ships to avoid entering this zone, for, although the german naval forces are instructed to avoid all violence to neutral ships, in so far as these can be recognized, the order given by the british government to hoist neutral flags and the contingencies of naval warfare might be the cause of these ships becoming the victims of an attack directed against the vessels of the enemy." this was the beginning of the submarine controversy between germany and the united states and resulted in a note from the united states government in which it was stated that the latter viewed the possibilities created by the german note with such grave concern, that it feels it to be its privilege, and, indeed, its duty, in the circumstances to request the imperial german government to consider before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the relation between this country and germany which might arise were the german naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the united states or cause the death of american citizens:--to declare and exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this government is reluctant to believe that the imperial government of germany in this case contemplates it as possible. after stating that the destruction of american ships or american lives on the high seas would be difficult to reconcile with the friendly relations existing between the two governments, the note adds that the united states "would be constrained to hold the imperial government of germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might feel necessary to take to safeguard american lives and property and to secure to american citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas." it is not within the province of this book to go in detail into the diplomatic history of the submarine controversy between germany and the united states. suffice it to say, therefore, that from the very beginning the controversy held many possibilities of the disastrous ending which finally came to pass when diplomatic relations were broken off between the two countries on february , , and a state of war was declared by president wilson's proclamation of april , . the period between germany's first war zone declaration and the president's proclamation--two months and three days more than two years--was crowded with incidents in which submarines and submarine warfare held the centre of the stage. it would be impossible within the compass of this story to give a complete survey of all the boats that were sunk and of all the lives that were lost. nor would it be possible to recount all the deeds of heroism which this new warfare occasioned. belligerents and neutrals alike were affected. american ships suffered, perhaps, to a lesser degree, than those of other neutrals, partly because of the determined stand taken by the united states government. on may , , the first american steamer, the _gulflight_, was sunk. six days later the world was shocked by the news that the _lusitania_, one of the biggest british passenger liners, had been torpedoed without warning on may , and had been sunk with a loss of lives, of whom were american citizens. before this nation was goaded into war, more than americans were slain. notes were again exchanged between the two governments. though the german government at that time showed an inclination to abandon its position in the submarine controversy under certain conditions, sinkings of passenger and freight steamers without warning continued. all attempts on the part of the united states government to come to an equitable understanding with germany failed on account of the latter's refusal to give up submarine warfare, or at least those features of it which, though considered illegal and inhuman by the united states, seemed to be considered most essential by germany. then came the german note of january , , stating that "from february , , sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice" in certain minutely described "prohibited zones around great britain, france, italy, and in the eastern mediterranean." the total tonnage sunk by german submarines from the beginning of the war up to february , , has been given by british sources as over three million tons, while german authorities claimed four million. the result of the german edict for unrestricted submarine warfare has been rather appalling, even if it fell far short of german prophesies and hopes. during the first two weeks of february a total of ninety-seven ships with a tonnage of about , tons were sent to the bottom of the sea. since then the german submarines have taken an even heavier toll. it has, however, become next to impossible, due to the restrictions of censorship, to compute any accurate figures for later totals, though it has become known from time to time that the allied as well as the neutral losses have been very much higher during the five months of february to july, than during any other five months. [illustration: © u. & u. _u. s. submarine h- aground on california coast._] the figures of the losses of british merchantmen alone are shown by the following table: ships over , under , week ending-- tons. tons. total. march march march march april april april april april may may may may june june june june july july july july july aug. aug. aug. aug. sept. sept. sept. sept. sept. oct. oct. oct. oct. nov. nov. the table with its week by week report of the british losses is of importance because at the time it was taken as a barometer indicative of german success or failure. the german admiralty at the moment of declaring the ruthless submarine war promised the people of germany that they would sink a million tons a month and by so doing would force england to abject surrender in the face of starvation within three months. during that period the whole civilized world looked eagerly for the weekly statement of british losses. only at one time was the german estimate of a million tons monthly obtained. most of the time the execution done by the undersea boats amounted to less than half that figure. so far from england being beaten in three months, at the end of ten she was still unshattered, though sorely disturbed by the loss of so much shipping. her new crops had come on and her statesmen declared that so far as the food supply was concerned they were safe for another year. during this period of submarine activity the united states entered upon the war and its government immediately turned its attention to meeting the submarine menace. in the first four months literally nothing was accomplished toward this end. a few submarines were reported sunk by merchantmen, but in nearly every instance it was doubtful whether they were actually destroyed or merely submerged purposely in the face of a hostile fire. americans were looked upon universally as a people of extraordinary inventive genius, and everywhere it was believed that by some sudden lucky thought an american would emerge from a laboratory equipped with a sovereign remedy for the submarine evil. prominent inventors indeed declared their purpose of undertaking this search and went into retirement to study the problem. from that seclusion none had emerged with a solution at the end of ten months. when the submarine campaign was at its very height no one was able to suggest a better remedy for it than the building of cargo ships in such quantities that, sink as many as they might, the germans would have to let enough slip through to sufficiently supply england with food and with the necessary munitions of war. many cruel sufferings befell seafaring people during the period of german ruthlessness on the high seas. an open boat, overcrowded with refugees, hastily provisioned as the ship to which it belonged was careening to its fate, and tossing on the open sea two or three hundred miles from shore in the icy nights of midwinter was no place of safety or of comfort. yet the germans so construed it, holding that when they gave passengers and crew of a ship time to take to the boats, they had fully complied with the international law providing that in the event of sinking a ship its people must first be given an opportunity to assure their safety. there have been many harrowing stories of the experiences of survivors thus turned adrift. under the auspices of the british government, rudyard kipling wrote a book detailing the agonies which the practice inflicted upon helpless human beings, including many women and children. some of the survivors have told in graphic story the record of their actual experiences. among these one of the most vivid is from the pen of a well-known american journalist, floyd p. gibbons, correspondent of the chicago _tribune_. he was saved from the british liner, _laconia_, sunk by a german submarine, and thus tells the tale of his sufferings and final rescue: i have serious doubts whether this is a real story. i am not entirely certain that it is not all a dream and that in a few minutes i will wake up back in stateroom b. on the promenade deck of the cunarder _laconia_ and hear my cockney steward informing me with an abundance of "and sirs" that it is a fine morning. i am writing this within thirty minutes after stepping on the dock here in queenstown from the british mine sweeper which picked up our open lifeboat after an eventful six hours of drifting, and darkness and baling and pulling on the oars and of straining aching eyes toward that empty, meaningless horizon in search of help. but, dream or fact, here it is: the first-cabin passengers were gathered in the lounge sunday evening, with the exception of the bridge fiends in the smoking-room. _poor butterfly_ was dying wearily on the talking-machine and several couples were dancing. about the tables in the smoke-room the conversation was limited to the announcement of bids and orders to the stewards. this group had about exhausted available discussion when the ship gave a sudden lurch sideways and forward. there was a muffled noise like the slamming of some large door at a good distance away. the slightness of the shock and the mildness of the report compared with my imagination was disappointing. every man in the room was on his feet in an instant. i looked at my watch. it was . . then came five blasts on the whistle. we rushed down the corridor leading from the smoking-room at the stern to the lounge, which was amidships. we were running, but there was no panic. the occupants of the lounge were just leaving by the forward doors as we entered. it was dark when we reached the lower deck. i rushed into my stateroom, grabbed life preservers and overcoat and made my way to the upper deck on that same dark landing. i saw the chief steward opening an electric switch box in the wall and turning on the switch. instantly the boat decks were illuminated. that illumination saved lives. the torpedo had hit us well astern on the starboard side and had missed the engines and the dynamos. i had not noticed the deck lights before. throughout the voyage our decks had remained dark at night and all cabin portholes were clamped down and all windows covered with opaque paint. the illumination of the upper deck, on which i stood, made the darkness of the water, sixty feet below, appear all the blacker when i peered over the edge at my station boat, no. . already the boat was loading up and men and boys were busy with the ropes. i started to help near a davit that seemed to be giving trouble, but was stoutly ordered to get out of the way and get into the boat. we were on the port side, practically opposite the engine well. up and down the deck passengers and crew were donning lifebelts, throwing on overcoats, and taking positions in the boats. there were a number of women, but only one appeared hysterical.... the boat started downward with a jerk toward the seemingly hungry rising and falling swells. then we stopped and remained suspended in mid-air while the men at the bow and the stern swore and tusselled with the lowering ropes. the stern of the boat was down, the bow up, leaving us at an angle of about forty-five degrees. we clung to the seats to save ourselves from falling out. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _salvaging h- , view i._] [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _salvaging h- , view ii._] [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _salvaging h- , view iii._] "who's got a knife? a knife! a knife!" bawled a sweating seaman in the bow. "great god! give him a knife," bawled a half-dressed, gibbering negro stoker who wrung his hands in the stern. a hatchet was thrust into my hand, and i forwarded it to the bow. there was a flash of sparks as it crashed down on the holding pulley. many feet and hands pushed the boat from the side of the ship and we sagged down again, this time smacking squarely on the billowy top of a rising swell. as we pulled away from the side of the ship its receding terrace of lights stretched upward. the ship was slowly turning over. we were opposite that part occupied by the engine rooms. there was a tangle of oars, spars and rigging on the seat and considerable confusion before four of the big sweeps could be manned on either side of the boat. the gibbering bullet-headed negro was pulling directly behind me and i turned to quiet him as his frantic reaches with his oar were hitting me in the back. "get away from her, get away from her," he kept repeating. "when the water hits her hot boilers she'll blow up, and there's just tons and tons of shrapnel in the hold." his excitement spread to other members of the crew in the boat. it was the give-way of nerve tension. it was bedlam and nightmare. we rested on our oars, with all eyes on the still lighted _laconia_. the torpedo had struck at . p. m. it was thirty minutes afterward that another dull thud, which was accompanied by a noticeable drop in the hulk, told its story of the second torpedo that the submarine had despatched through the engine room and the boat's vitals from a distance of two hundred yards. we watched silently during the next minute, as the tiers of lights dimmed slowly from white to yellow, then a red, and nothing was left but the murky mourning of the night, which hung over all like a pall. a mean, cheese-coloured crescent of a moon revealed one horn above a ragged bundle of clouds low in the distance. a rim of blackness settled around our little world, relieved only by general leering stars in the zenith, and where the _laconia's_ lights had shone there remained only the dim outlines of a blacker hulk standing out above the water like a jagged headland, silhouetted against the overcast sky. the ship sank rapidly at the stern until at last its nose stood straight in the air. then it slid silently down and out of sight like a piece of disappearing scenery in a panorama spectacle. boat no. stood closest to the ship and rocked about in a perilous sea of clashing spars and wreckage. as our boat's crew steadied its head into the wind a black hulk, glistening wet and standing about eight feet above the surface of the water, approached slowly and came to a stop opposite the boat and not six feet from the side of it. "what ship was dot?" the correct words in throaty english with a german accent came from the dark hulk, according to chief steward ballyn's statement to me later. "the _laconia_," ballyn answered. "vot?" "the _laconia_, cunard line," responded the steward. "vot did she weigh?" was the next question from the submarine. "eighteen thousand tons." "any passengers?" "seventy-three," replied ballyn, "men, women, and children, some of them in this boat. she had over two hundred in the crew." "did she carry cargo?" "yes." "well, you'll be all right. the patrol will pick you up soon." and without further sound save for the almost silent fixing of the conning tower lid, the submarine moved off. there was no assurance of an early pick-up, even tho the promise were from a german source, for the rest of the boats, whose occupants--if they felt and spoke like those in my boat--were more than mildly anxious about their plight and the prospects of rescue. the fear of some of the boats crashing together produced a general inclination toward further separation on the part of all the little units of survivors, with the result that soon the small craft stretched out for several miles, all of them endeavouring to keep their heads in the wind. and then we saw the first light--the first sign of help coming--the first searching glow of white brilliance, deep down on the sombre sides of the black pot of night that hung over us. it was way over there--first a trembling quiver of silver against the blackness; then, drawing closer, it defined itself as a beckoning finger, altho still too far away yet to see our feeble efforts to attract it.... we pulled, pulled, lustily forgetting the strain and pain of innards torn and racked from pain, vomiting--oblivious of blistered hands and wet, half frozen feet. then a nodding of that finger of light--a happy, snapping, crap-shooting finger that seemed to say: "come on, you men," like a dice-player wooing the bones--led us to believe that our lights had been seen. this was the fact, for immediately the coming vessel flashed on its green and red side-lights and we saw it was headed for our position. "come alongside port!" was megaphoned to us. and as fast as we could we swung under the stern, while a dozen flashlights blinked down to us and orders began to flow fast and thick. a score of hands reached out, and we were suspended in the husky tattooed arms of those doughty british jack tars, looking up into the weather-beaten, youthful faces, mumbling thanks and thankfulness and reading in the gold lettering on their pancake hats the legend "h. m. s. laburnum." of course, the submarine fleets of the various navies paid a heavy toll too. it has become, however, increasingly difficult to get any accurate figures of these losses. the british navy, it is known, has lost during , , and twelve boats, some of which foundered, were wrecked or mined while others simply never returned. the loss of eight german submarines has also been definitely established. others, however, are known to have been lost, and their number has been greatly increased since the arming of merchantmen. in it was estimated that the germans lost one u-boat a week and built three. just what sensations a man experiences in a submerged submarine that finds it impossible to rise again, is, of course, more or less of a mystery. for, though submarines, the entire crew of which perished, have been raised later, only one record has ever been known to have been made covering the period during which death by suffocation or drowning stared their occupants in the face. this heroic and pathetic record was written in form of a letter by the commander of a japanese submarine, lieutenant takuma faotomu, whose boat, with its entire crew, was lost on april , , during manoeuvres in hiroshima bay. the letter reads in part as follows: [illustration: © international film service, inc. _u. s. submarine d off weehawken._] although there is, indeed, no excuse to make for the sinking of his imperial majesty's boat and for the doing away of subordinates through my heedlessness, all on the boat have discharged their duties well and in everything acted calmly until death. although we are departing in pursuance of our duty to the state, the only regret we have is due to anxiety lest the men of the world may misunderstand the matter, and that thereby a blow may be given to the future development of submarines. while going through gasoline submarine exercise, we submerged too far, and when we attempted to shut the sluice-valve, the chain in the meantime gave way. then we tried to close the sluice-valve, by hand, but it was too late, the rear part being full of water, and the boat sank at an angle of about twenty-five degrees. the switchboard being under water, the electric lights gave out. offensive gas developed and respiration became difficult. the above has been written under the light of the conning-tower when it was . o'clock. we are now soaked by the water that has made its way in. our clothes are very wet and we feel cold. i have always expected death whenever i left my home, and therefore my will is already in the drawer at karasaki. i beg, respectfully, to say to his majesty that i respectfully request that none of the families left by my subordinates shall suffer. the only matter i am anxious about now is this. atmospheric pressure is increasing, and i feel as if my tympanum were breaking. at . o'clock respiration is extraordinarily difficult. i am breathing gasoline. i am intoxicated with gasoline. it is . o'clock. could there be a more touching record of the way in which a brave man met death? * * * * * more interest in submarine warfare than ever before was aroused in this country when the german war submarine u- unexpectedly made its appearance in the harbour of newport, r. i., during the afternoon of october , . about three hours afterwards, without having taken on any supplies, and after explaining her presence by the desire of delivering a letter addressed to count von bernstorff, then german ambassador at washington, the u- left as suddenly and mysteriously as she had appeared. this was the first appearance of a foreign war submarine in an american port. it was claimed that the u- had made the trip from wilhelmshaven in seventeen days. she was feet long, equipped with two guns, four torpedo tubes, and an exceptionally strong wireless outfit. besides her commander, captain rose, she was manned by three officers and thirty-three men. early the next morning, october , it became evident what had brought the u- to this side of the atlantic. at the break of day, she made her re-appearance southeast of nantucket. the american steamer _kansan_ of the american hawaiian company bound from new york by way of boston to genoa was stopped by her, but, after proving her nationality and neutral ownership was allowed to proceed. five other steamships, three of them british, one dutch, and one norwegian were less fortunate. the british freighter _strathend_, of tons was the first victim. her crew were taken aboard the nantucket shoals light-ship. two other british freighters, _west point_ and _stephano_, followed in short order to the bottom of the ocean. the crews of both were saved by united states torpedo boat destroyers who had come from newport as soon as news of the u- 's activities had been received there. this was also the case with the crews of the dutch _bloomersdijk_ and the norwegian tanker, _christian knudsen_. not often in recent years has there been put on american naval officers quite so disagreeable a restraint as duty enforced upon the commanders of the destroyers who watched the destruction of these friendly ships, almost within our own territorial waters, by an arrogant foreigner who gave himself no concern over the rescue of the crews of the sunken ships but seemed to think that the function of the american men of war. it was no secret at the time that sentiment in the navy was strongly pro-ally. probably had it been wholly neutral the mind of any commander would have revolted at this spectacle of wanton destruction of property and callous indifference to human life. it is quite probable that had this event occurred before the invention of wireless telegraphy had robbed the navy commander at sea of all initiative, there might have happened off nantucket something analogous to the famous action of commodore tatnall when with the cry, "blood is thicker than water" he took a part of his crew to the aid of british vessels sorely pressed by the fire of certain chinese forts on the yellow river. as it was it is an open secret that one commander appealed by wireless to washington for authority to intervene. he did not get it of course. no possible construction of international law could give us rights beyond the three-mile limit. he had at least however the satisfaction when the german commander asked him to move his ship to a point at which it would not interfere with the submarine's fire upon one of the doomed vessels, of telling him to move his own ship and accompanying the suggestion with certain phrases of elaboration thoroughly american. the rapid development of submarine warfare naturally made it necessary to find ways and means to combat this new weapon of naval warfare. much difficulty was experienced, especially in the beginning, because there were no precedents and because for a considerable period everything that was tried had necessarily to be of an experimental nature. to protect harbours and bays was found comparatively easy. nets were spread across their entrances. they were made of strong wire cables and to judge from the total absence of submarines within the harbours thus guarded they proved a successful deterrent. in most cases they were supported by extensive minefields. the danger of these to submarines, however, is rather a matter of doubt, for submarines can dive successfully under them and by careful navigating escape unharmed. the general idea of fighting submarines with nets was also adopted for areas of open water which were suspected of being infested with submarines. recently, serious doubts have been raised concerning the future usefulness of nets. reports have been published that german submarines have been fitted up with a wire and cable cutting appliance which would make it possible for them to break through nets at will, supposing, of course, that they had been caught by the nets in such a way that no vital parts of the underwater craft had been seriously damaged. a sketch of this wire cutting device was made by the captain of a merchantman, who, while in a small boat after his ship had been torpedoed, had come close enough to the attacking submarine to make the necessary observations. the sketch showed an arrangement consisting of a number of strands of heavy steel hawsers which were stretched from bow to stern, passing through the conning tower and to which were attached a series of heavy circular knives a foot in diameter and placed about a yard apart. even as early as january, , mr. simon lake, the famous american submarine engineer and inventor, published an article in the _scientific american_ in which he dwelt at length on means by which a submarine could escape mines and nets. one of the illustrations, accompanying this article, showed a device enabling submarines travelling on the bottom of the sea to lift a net with a pair of projecting arms and thus pass unharmed under it. [illustration: © international film service, inc. _submarine built for spain in the cape cod canal._] many other devices to trap, sink or capture submarines have been invented. a large number of these, of course, have been found impracticable. others, however, have been used with success. few details of any of these have been allowed to become known. the most dangerous power of submarines, is their ability to approach very closely to their object of attack without making their presence known to their prey. this naturally suggested that a way be found to detect the presence of submarines early enough to make it possible to stave off an attack or even to assume the offensive against the underwater boat. a recent invention, the perfection of which is due to the work of mr. william dubilier, an american electrical engineer, and of professor tissot, a member of the french academy of science, is the microphone. few details are known about this instrument except that it records sound waves at as great a distance as fifty-five miles. this would permit in most cases the calling of patrol boats or the use of other defensive means before the submarine would be able to execute an attack. at the present moment it would appear that the most dangerous enemy of the submarine yet discovered is the airplane or the dirigible. some figures as to the mortality among submarines due to the efforts of aircraft have been published in an earlier chapter. the chief value of aircraft in this work is due to the fact that objects under the water are readily discernible at a considerable depth when viewed from a point directly over them. an illustration familiar to every boy is to be found in the fact that he can see fish at the bottom of a clear stream from a bridge, while from the shore the refraction of the water is such that he can see nothing. from the air the aviator can readily see a submarine at a depth of fifty feet unless the water is unusually rough or turbid. the higher he rises the wider is his sphere of vision. with the lurking craft thus located the airman can either signal to watching destroyers or may bide his time and follow the submarine until it rises to the surface, when a well placed bomb will destroy it. both of these methods have been adopted with success. for a time the submarines were immune from this form of attack because of the difficulty of finding a bomb which would not explode on striking the surface of the water, thus allowing its force to be dissipated before it reached the submarine, or else would not have its velocity so greatly checked by the water that on reaching the submarine the shock of its impact would not be great enough to explode it at all. both of these difficulties have been overcome. the new high explosives have such power, taken in connection with the fact that water transmits the force of an explosion undiminished to a great distance, that many of them exploding at the surface will put out of action a submarine at a considerable depth. furthermore bombs have been invented, which being fired, not merely dropped from an airplane, will go through the water with almost undiminished momentum and explode on striking the target, or after a period fixed by the assailant. other bombs known as "depth bombs" are fitted with flanges that revolve as they sink, causing an explosion at any desired depth. about the actual achievements of the airplane as a foe to submarines there hangs a haze of mystery. it has been the policy of the allied governments to keep secret the record of submarines destroyed and particularly the methods of destruction. but we know that a few have met their fate from bolts dropped from the blue. in _the outlook_ lawrence la tourette driggs, himself a flying man of no contemptible record, describes the method and result of such an attack. after recounting the steps by which a brother airman attained a position directly above a submerged submarine preparatory to dropping his bomb, he says: down shot his plummet of steel and neatly parted the waters ahead of the labouring submarine. but it did not explode. i could see a whirling metal propeller on the torpedo revolve as it sank. it must have missed the craft by twenty feet. suddenly a column of water higher than my position in the air stood straight up over the sea, then slipped noiselessly back. by all that is wonderful how did that happen? as we covered the spot again and again in our circling machines, we were joined by two more pilots, and finally by a fast clipper steam yacht. the surface of the water was literally covered with oil, breaking up the ripple of the waves, and smoothing a huge area into gleaming bronze. here and there floated a cork belt, odd bunches of cotton waste, a strip of carpet, and a wooden three-legged stool. these fragments alone remained to testify to the _corpus delicti_. "philip," i said half an hour later, as the hot coffee was thawing out our insides, "what kind of a civilized bomb do you call that?" "that bears the simple little title of trinitrotoluol; call it t. n. t. for short," replied sergeant pieron. "but what made it hang fire so long?" i demanded. "it's made to work that way. when the bomb begins sinking the little propeller is turned as it is pulled down through the water. it continues turning until it screws to the end. there it touches the fuse-pin and that sets off the high explosive--at any depth you arrange it for." i regarded him steadfastly. then i remarked, "but it did not touch the submarine. i saw it miss." "yes, you can miss it fifty yards and still crush the submarine." he took up an empty egg shell. "the submarine is hollow like this. she is held rigidly on all her sides by the water. water is non-compressible like steel. now when the t. n. t. explodes, even some distance away, the violent expending concussion is communicated to this hollow shell just as though a battering ram struck it. the submarine can't give any because the surrounding water holds her in place. so she crumples up--like this." pieron opened his hand and the flakes of egg shell fluttered down until they struck the floor. gunfire undoubtedly is still the most reliable preventive against submarine attacks. comparatively small calibred guns can cause serious damage to submarines even by one well directed shot. submarines have been sunk both by warships and merchantmen in this way and many more have been forced to desist from attacks. not every merchantman, of course, can be equipped with the necessary guns and gunners. neither equipment nor men can be spared in sufficient quantities. but the efficiency of gun protection has been proved beyond all doubt by many authentic reports of successful encounters between armed merchantmen and submarines in which the latter were defeated. ramming, too, has been advocated and tried. it is, however, a procedure involving considerable danger to the attacking boat. for one thing all the submarine has to do is to dive quick and deep enough and it is out of harm's way. then, too, the chances are that the submarine can launch a torpedo in time to reach the ramming vessel before the latter can do any damage. [illustration: _a critical moment._ _painting by john e. whiting._] there have been reports of submarine duels between austrian and italian submarines in the adriatic in which it was claimed that in each at least one submarine was destroyed, and, at least, in one instance both the duellists were sunk. generally speaking the fact has been established, however, that submarines cannot fight submarines with any degree of success, except in exceptional cases and under exceptional conditions. since the outbreak of the war between the united states and germany the question of combating the submarine has become more acute than ever. the latest development has been along negative rather than affirmative lines. it has apparently been decided that none of the devices, known at present and capable of destroying submarines, is sufficient either alone or in combinations to defeat the submarines decisively. the best means of balancing as much as possible the losses which german submarines are inflicting on the shipping facilities of the allies at the present seems to be the unlimited and prompt building of large fleets of comparatively small ships. if this can be accomplished in time, the german submarines undoubtedly will find it impossible to destroy a tonnage sufficient to exert any great influence on the final outcome of the war. chapter xvii the future of the submarine the world will not always be at war. interminable as the conflict by which it is now racked seems, and endless as appear the resources of the nations participating in it, the time must come when victory or sheer exhaustion shall compel peace. people talk of that peace being permanent. that is perhaps too sanguine a dream while human nature remains what it is, and nations can still be as covetous, ambitious, and heedless of others' rights as are individuals. but beyond doubt a prolonged period of peace awaits the world. what then is to be the future of the aircraft and the submarine which had to wait for war to secure any recognition from mankind of their prodigious possibilities? of the future of the aircraft there can be no doubt. its uses in peace will be innumerable. poor old count zeppelin, who thought of his invention only as a weapon of war, nevertheless showed how it might be successfully adapted to the needs of peace merely as a byproduct. as for the airplane both for sport and business its opportunities are endless. easy and inexpensive to build, simple to operate with but little training on the part of the aviator, it will be made the common carrier of all nations. already the united states is maintaining an aërial mail service in alaska. already too, bi- and triplanes are built capable of carrying twenty-five to thirty men besides guns and ammunition. it is easy to foresee the use that can be made of machines of this character in times of peace. needing no tracks or right of way, requiring no expensive signalling or operative system, asking only that at each end of the route there shall be a huge level field for rising and for landing, these machines will in time take to themselves the passenger business of the world. but the future of the submarine is more dubious. always it will be a potent weapon of war. it may indeed force the relegation of dreadnoughts to the scrap heap. but of its peaceful services there is more doubt. that it can be made a cargo carrier is unquestionably true. but to what good? there is no intelligent reason for carrying cargoes slowly under water which might just as well be carried swiftly on the surface unless war compels concealment. underwater navigation must always be slower and more expensive than surface navigation, nor does it seem probable that the underwater boats can ever equal in size ordinary ships, though undoubtedly their present proportions are going to be greatly increased. as a result of the german submarine campaign it is possible that the united states may develop a fleet of underwater merchantmen to circumvent the enemy while this war continues, though there has been but little discussion of it. but even so, commonsense would indicate that such a fleet would be abandoned on the restoration of peace. if anything is to be done toward making the submarine a vessel of ordinary everyday use the present double system of motors--the diesels for surface navigation and the electric for submerged service--will have to be abandoned. inventors however are diligently working on this problem to-day. indeed so well known and successful a builder of submarines as mr. simon lake seemed to have faith in their possibilities as merchant craft. as early as february, , he announced that he had taken out a patent on a new form of cargo-carrying submarine which he described as made up of "nests of light-weight circular tanks of comparatively small diameter surrounded by a ship-shape form of hull." what advantage was to accrue from this type of vessel mr. lake has not explained. however the germans who seemed to originate everything successfully demonstrated that the merchant submarine was a practicable and useful craft with which to beat the blockade. this was proved by the two successful trips made by the unarmed german merchant submarine _deutschland_ between germany and the united states in . loaded with a cargo of dyestuffs and chemicals she left bremen on june , , and arrived in baltimore early in july. after a short stay, during which she took on a full return cargo, consisting chiefly of rubber and metal, she started on august , , for her return trip to bremen where she arrived safely soon after august , . once more, in october of the same year she made a successful round trip, docking this time in new london. there was considerable talk about additional trips by other german merchant submarines, but none of them were ever carried out. it has never become known whether this was due to the loss of these merchant submarines or to political relations between germany and the united states which were then gradually assuming a less friendly form. [illustration: photo by international film service. _a submarine built for chili, passing through cape cod canal._] of course, it is true that such boats are blockade runners and in a way, therefore, part and parcel of warfare. but they are unarmed merchantmen just the same and their exclusively mercantile character has been officially acknowledged by the united states government. under conditions of peace, however, it is very doubtful whether submarine merchantmen would pay, nor does it seem as if they possessed any advantages at all over surface merchant vessels. nevertheless they represent an entirely new development of submarine navigation and, therefore, deserve attention. during her stay in the united states, very few people were permitted to get more than a glance of the _deutschland_. as a result, comparatively little became known regarding her mechanical details. the _scientific american_, however, in its issue of july , , gives a fairly detailed description of this first merchant submarine. from this account we learn that the _deutschland_ conforms rather closely to the typical german naval u-boat. the hull proper consists of an internal cigar-shaped, cylindrical structure, which extends from stem to stern, and in its largest diameter measures about twenty feet. enclosing this hull is a lighter false hull, which is perforated, to permit the entrance and exit of the sea-water, and is so shaped as to give the submarine a fairly good ship model for driving at high speed on the surface and at a much lesser speed submerged. the upper portion of the false hull does not present such a flat deck-like appearance as is noticeable in the naval u-boats. in fact, the whole modelling of the _deutschland_, as compared with the naval boats, suggests that she has been fulled out somewhat, with a view to obtaining the necessary displacement for cargo carrying. the interior cylindrical hull is divided by four transverse bulkheads into five separate water-tight compartments. compartment no. , at the bow, contains the anchor cables and electric winches for handling the anchor; also general ship stores, and a certain amount of cargo. compartment no. is given up entirely to cargo. compartment no. , which is considerably larger than any of the others, contains the living quarters of the officers and crew. at the after end of this compartment, and communicating with it, is the conning tower. compartment no. is given up entirely to cargo. compartment no. contains the propelling machinery, consisting of two heavy oil engines and two electric motors. the storage batteries are carried in the bottom of the boat, below the living compartment. for purposes of communication, a gangway, feet inches wide by feet high, is built through each cargo compartment, thus rendering it possible for the crew to pass entirely from one end of the boat to the other. the length of the _deutschland_ is about feet; beam feet, and draught feet. for surface propulsion and for charging the batteries, the boat carries two -cylinder, diesel, heavy-oil motors of about h. p. each. the speed at the surface is from to knots; and submerged it is knots. at the surface the displacement of the boat is about tons, and she has a cargo capacity of about tons. the freeboard to the main deck, which runs the full length of the boat, but is only about - / feet wide, is about feet, and the cockpit at the top of the conning tower is about feet above the water. this cockpit, by the way, is suggestive of the protection afforded a chauffeur in an automobile, there being a shield in front of the quartermaster, so shaped as to throw the wind and spray upwards and clear of his face. two periscopes are provided; one at the forward end of the conning tower, and the other, of larger diameter, being forward and on the starboard of the conning tower. an interesting feature is the two folding, steel, wireless masts, about feet in height, both of which fold aft into pockets built in the deck of the ship. the forward one of these masts carries a crow's nest for the lookout. the commander of the _deutschland_, captain paul könig, was before the war a popular captain of north german lloyd liners. he has published a very vivid and interesting account of the _deutschland's_ trip, the _voyage of the deutschland_. in this book, he tells us how he was offered this novel command while the plans were still being drawn and that he immediately accepted, making, however, the proviso "if the thing really comes off." the men, backing the venture, lost no time and, so captain könig tells us, in less than two months a telegram called me to berlin to an important conference. here i looked at sketches, plans, and working drawings until my eyes swam. four more months passed which i utilized to the full. i then went to kiel and saw a remarkable framework of steel slowly take shape upon the stocks across the way at gaarden. rotund, snug, and harmless the thing lay there. inside it were hidden all the countless, complicated, and powerful features of those sketches and working drawings. i cannot boast that the reality as executed in steel and brass was any easier to grasp than the endless network of lines and circles which had bewildered me when inspecting the blueprints. those of you who have seen illustrations and photographs of the interior of the "central station" or the "turret" of a submarine, will understand what i mean. and should you have entered a submarine itself and felt yourself hopelessly confused by the bewildering chaos of wheels, vents, screws, cocks, pipes, conduits--above, below, and all about--not to speak of the mysterious levers and weird mechanisms, each of which has some important function to fulfill, you may find some consolation in the thought that my own brains performed a devils' dance at the sight. but after this monster, with its tangle of tubes and pipes, had been duly christened, and its huge grey-green body had slid majestically into the water, it suddenly became a ship. it swam in its element as though born to it--as though it had never known another. for the first time i trod the tiny deck and mounted the turret to the navigation platform. from here i glanced down and was surprised to see beneath me a long, slender craft--with gracious lines and dainty contours. only the sides, where the green body vaulted massively above the water, gave an indication of the huge size of the hull. i felt pride and rapture as my eye took in this picture. the fabric swayed slightly beneath my feet--an impressive combination of power and delicacy. and now i know that what had at first seemed to me nothing more than the product of some mad phantasy on the part of the technicians was in reality a ship. it was a ship in which oceans might be crossed, a real ship, to which the heart of an old sailor like myself might safely attach itself. then came a short period of trial trips and diving tests, all of which were carried off successfully, and at last the day of departure arrived. as soon as the last escort had turned around a final diving test was ordered. instantly the response came back from the turret and the central station, and the men hurried to their posts. the oil engines were still hammering away at a mad rate. i left the manhole of the turret. the cover was battened down, the engines stopped at the same moment. we felt a slight pressure in our ears for a moment. we were cut off from outside and silence reigned. but this silence was merely an illusion--and was due to the change. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _a submarine entrapped by nets._] "open the diving-valves! submerge!" the valves were flung open and the compressed air escaped hissing from the tanks. at the same time a gigantic, intermittent snorting ensued, like the blowing and belching of some prehistoric monster. there was an uncomfortable pressure in our ears, then the noise became more regular, followed by a buzzing and a shrill hum. all the high notes of the engines in the central station intermingled and made a bewildering noise. it was like a mad diabolical singsong. and yet it was almost like silence after the dull, heavy pounding of the oil-motors--only more insistent and irritating. the penetrating hum in the various vents announced the fact that the diving mechanism was in operation. it moaned and sang lower and lower in the scale of tones. these slowly diminishing and steadily deepening tones give one the physical feeling of mighty volumes of water pouring in and flooding full. you have the sensation of growing heavier and sinking as the boat grows heavier and sinks, even though you may not be able to see through the turret window, or the periscope, how the bows are gradually submerged and the water climbs higher and higher up the turret until all things without are wrapped in the eerie twilight of the depths. the faithful lamps burned, however, and then a real silence suddenly ensued. there was no sound but the gentle trembling rhythm of the electric engines. i then gave the order: "submerge to twenty meters!" "both engines half steam ahead!" i was able to follow our submersion by means of the manometer. through flooding the tanks, the boat is given several tons over-weight and the enclosed ship's space is made heavier than the displaced quantity of water. the titanic fish, therefore, began to sink downward in its element, that is to say, it began, in a certain sense, to fall. at the same time the electric engines are put into motion and the propulsive force of the propellers acts upon the diving rudders and causes the sinking to become a gliding. after the required depth has been reached--something which may easily be read from the manometer that records the depth--all further sinking may be stopped by simply lightening the hull, which is done by forcing out some of the water in the submarine's tanks. the furious growling of the pump is always a sure sign that the required depth is being approached. the noise ceased, only the electric motors continued to purr, and the word came from the central station: "twenty meters--even keel!" "rudder set!" so we forged ahead at a depth of twenty meters. of course we are "blind" under such conditions and can regulate our movements only by means of the depth recorder and that precious little jewel of the boat, our compass. no ray of light reached us any longer from without, the periscope was submerged long ago and the steel safety covers over the windows were closed. we had been metamorphosed completely into a fish.[ ] [footnote : ©] orders were then given to rise again. the _deutschland_ carried out this manoeuvre with the same facility with which she had taken the initial dive of her long voyage. in record time the ballast tanks were emptied and the change from electric motors to oil engines was completed without further loss of time. the boat was started at top surface speed towards her ultimate goal, the united states. on the following day the _deutschland_ barely escaped running foul of a british submarine chaser, disguised as a neutral merchantman. a quick dive alone saved her. when she came up again a wild storm and a heavy sea were raging. even before the change from the electric motors to the oil engines had been completed, another dangerous looking vessel appeared and before long was recognized as a hostile destroyer by captain könig. he tells us that he "made one jump into the turret and slammed the cover fast." "alarm! dive quickly! flood!" "set diving rudder!" "twenty meters' depth!" the commands were uttered in almost one breath. but the execution of them! to attempt to dive with such a sea running was sheer madness, as experience has taught us. what was i to do? the destroyer might have seen us already! well, we knew we must get under--and as quickly as possible. the men in the central below me were working away in silent haste. all the exhausts were opened wide, the compressed air hissed from the tanks--the diving vents were chanting in all possible keys. i stood with my lips pressed together and stared out of the turret window upon the tossing sea, and watched for the first sign of our going down. but our deck remained still visible and we were continually lifted into the air by some wave. there was not a moment to be lost. i ordered the diving rudder to be set still more sharply and both engines to drive ahead with full power. the whole vessel quivered and thrilled under the increased pressure of the engines and made several leaps. she staggered about in the furious seas--but still seemed loath to leave the surface. then she gave a jerk and her bows suddenly dipped and cut into the flood. she began to sink into the depths at an ever-increasing angle. the coming daylight vanished from the windows of the turret, the manometer in rapid succession showed -- -- -- meters' depth. but the angle of the boat also began to increase. we staggered about, leaned back, slipped off our feet. we then lost our footing entirely--for the floor of the _deutschland_ slanted sharply toward the front. i was just able to catch hold of the ocular or eye-piece of the periscope. down in the central the men were hanging on to the hand-wheels of the diving rudder. a few terrible seconds passed thus. we had not yet seized the full significance of this new situation when there came a severe shock. we were hurled to the floor and everything that was not fastened down went flying in all directions. we found ourselves in the queerest attitudes--and stared into one another's faces. there was a grim silence for a moment, then first officer krapohl remarked dryly: "well, we seem to have arrived!" this broke the ghastly tension. we were all rather pale around the gills, but at once tried to get our bearings. what had happened? what had caused this unnatural inclination of the boat? and why were the engines above us raving at intervals in a way that made the whole boat roar from stem to stern? before any of us had arrived at any solution of the mystery, our chief engineer, little klees, had jumped up from his crouching position, and, swift as lightning, had swept the engine-signal dial around to "stop!" and suddenly there was a deep silence. we slowly assembled our proper legs and arms and thought hard over what had happened. the vessel had slanted down toward the bows at an angle of about degrees. she was standing, so to speak, on her head. our bow was fast upon the bottom of the sea--our stern was still oscillating up and down like a mighty pendulum. the manometer showed a depth of about meters.[ ] [footnote : ©] [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _diagram of a german submarine mine-layer captured by british._] however, the _deutschland_ finally worked herself free and soon was again on the surface. luck must have been with her, for she had suffered no damage and, in spite of the mountains of water which she must have thrown up, the hostile destroyer had not discovered her. once more she was off on her way. so the days went by and before long the merchant submarine had passed, without having been detected, beyond the territory in which british patrol boats were operating. then came a succession of uneventful days and fine weather. practically every day diving tests were made. one of these the captain describes as follows: during these experimental diving tests we were treated to a spectacle of fairy-like loveliness. i had set the rudder in such a way that the turret was travelling about three yards under water. overhead the sun shone brilliantly and filled the deeps with a clear radiance. the pure water was luminous with colour--close at hand it was of a light azure blue, of fabulous clearness and transparent as glass. i could see the entire boat from the turret windows. the shimmering pearls of the air-bubbles which rise constantly from the body of the craft played about the entire length of the vessel from deck to bows, and every detail stood out in miraculous sharpness. farther ahead there was a multi-coloured twilight. it seemed as if the prow kept pushing itself noiselessly into a wall of opalescent green which parted, glistening, and grew to an ethereal, rainbow-like translucency close at hand. we were spell-bound by this vision of beauty. the fairy-like effect was increased by medusæ which, poised in the transparent blue, frequently became entangled in the wires of the mine-guards or the railings and glowed like trembling fires of rose, pale gold, and purple.[ ] [footnote : ©] but less pleasant things were in store for the _deutschland's_ crew. the nearer the boat came to the region of the gulf stream, the more violent the weather became. though she still ran most of the time on the surface, it became necessary to keep all openings battened down. even the manhole, leading to the turret, could be kept open only for short periods. naturally the temperature was rising all the time. it was midsummer and the gulf stream contributed its share of warmth. no wonder, therefore, that captain könig compares conditions below decks to a "veritable hell," and then continues: while in the gulf stream we had an outer temperature of ° celsius. this was about the warmth of the surrounding water. fresh air no longer entered. in the engine-room two -cylinder combustion motors kept hammering away in a maddening two-four time. they hurled the power of their explosions into the whirling crankshafts. the red-hot breath of the consumed gases went crashing out through the exhausts, but the glow of these incessant firings remained in the cylinders and communicated itself to the entire oil-dripping environment of steel. a choking cloud of heat and oily vapour streamed from the engines and spread itself like a leaden pressure through the entire ship. during these days the temperature mounted to ° celsius. and yet men lived and worked in a hell such as this! the watch off duty, naked to the skin, groaned and writhed in their bunks. it was no longer possible to think of sleep. and when one of the men fell into a dull stupor, then he would be aroused by the sweat which ran incessantly over his forehead and into his eyes, and would awake to new torment. it was almost like a blessed deliverance when the eight hours of rest were over, and a new watch was called to the central or the engine-room. [illustration: redrawn from _the sphere_. permission of _scientific american_. _a submarine discharging a torpedo._] but there the real martyrdom began. clad only in an undershirt and drawers, the men stood at their posts, a cloth wound about their foreheads to keep the running sweat from streaming into their eyes. their blood hammered and raced in their temples. every vein boiled as with fever. it was only by the exertion of the most tremendous willpower that it was possible to force the dripping human body to perform its mechanical duty and to remain upright during the four hours of the watch.... but how long would we be able to endure this? i no longer kept a log during these days and i find merely this one note: "temperature must not rise any higher if the men are to remain any longer in the engine-room." but they did endure it. they remained erect like so many heroes, they did their duty, exhausted, glowing hot, and bathed in sweat, until the storm centre lay behind us, until the weather cleared, until the sun broke through the clouds, and the diminishing seas permitted us once more to open the hatches.[ ] [footnote : ©] the _deutschland_ was now near her goal. without any trouble she entered hampton roads and was docked at baltimore. there her cargo was discharged and her return cargo loaded. this latter operation involved many difficulties. during her stay a united states government commission made a detailed inspection of the _deutschland_ to determine beyond all question her mercantile character. but at last the day of departure, august , had arrived. properly escorted she made the trip down the patapsco river and chesapeake bay. on her way down she made again diving trials which captain könig describes as follows: in order to see that everything else was tight and in good order, i gave the command to set the boat upon the sea bottom at a spot which, according to the reading upon the chart, had a depth of some meters. once again everything grew silent. the daylight vanished the well-known singing and boiling noise of the submerging vents vibrated about us. in my turret i fixed my eyes upon the manometer. twenty meters were recorded, then twenty-five. the water ballast was diminished--thirty meters appeared and i waited the slight bump which was to announce the arrival of the boat at the bottom. nothing of the sort happened. instead of this the indicator upon the dial pointed to --to --to meters.... i knocked against the glass with my finger--correct--the arrow was just pointing toward thirty-six. "great thunder! what's up?" i cried, and reached for the chart. everything tallied. thirty meters were indicated at this spot and our reckoning had been most exact. and we continued to sink deeper and deeper. the dial was now announcing meters. this was a bit too much for me. i called down to the central and got back the comforting answer that the large manometer was also indicating a depth of over forty meters! the two manometers agreed. this, however, did not prevent the boat from continuing to sink. the men in the central began to look at one another.... ugh! it gives one a creepy feeling to go slipping away into the unknown amidst this infernal singing silence and to see nothing but the climbing down of the confounded indicator upon the white-faced dial.... there was nothing else to be seen in my turret. i glanced at the chart and then at the manometer in a pretty helpless fashion. in the meantime the boat sank deeper; forty-five meters were passed--the pointer indicated forty-eight meters. i began to think the depth of the chesapeake bay must have some limit; we surely could not be heading for the bottomless pit? then--the boat halted at a depth of fifty meters without the slightest shock. i climbed down into the central and took counsel with klees and the two officers of the watch. there could be only one explanation; we must have sunk into a hole which had not been marked upon the chart.[ ] [footnote : ©] [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _a german submarine in three positions._] when orders were now given to rise, it was found that the exhaust pumps refused to work. after a while, however, the chief engineer succeeded in getting them started. they reached the surface after about two hours of submergence. it was dark by the time the merchant submarine was approaching the three-mile limit. outside of it hostile warships were lying in wait. that the _deutschland_ escaped them well illustrates the fact that submarines may be kept by various means from entering a bay or a harbour, but that to blockade their exit is practically impossible. this is how captain könig speaks of his escape. we knew that the most dangerous moment of our entire voyage was now approaching. we once more marked our exact position, and then proceeded to make all the preparations necessary for our breaking through. then we dived and drove forward. all our senses were keyed to the utmost, our nerves taut to the breaking-point with that cold excitement which sends quivers through one's soul, the while outwardly one remains quite serene, governed by that clear and icy deliberation which is apt to possess a man who is fully conscious of the unknown perils toward which he goes.... we knew our path. we had already been informed that fishermen had been hired to spread their nets along certain stretches of the three-mile limit; nets in which we were supposed to entangle ourselves; nets into which devilish mines had very likely been woven.... possibly these nets were merely attached to buoys which we were then supposed to drag along after us, thus betraying our position.... we were prepared for all emergencies, so that in case of extreme necessity we should be able to free ourselves of the nets. but all went well. it was a dark night. quietly and peacefully the lighthouses upon the two capes sent forth their light, the while a few miles further out death lay lowering for us in every imaginable form. but while the english ships were racing up and down, jerking their searchlights across the waters and searching again and again in every imaginable spot, they little surmised that, at times within the radius of their own shadows, a periscope pursued its silent way, and under this periscope the _u-deutschland_. that night at twelve o'clock, after hours of indescribable tension, i gave the command to rise. we had broken through! slowly the _deutschland_ rose to the surface, the tanks were blown out and the diesel engines flung into the gearing. at our highest speed we now went rushing toward the free atlantic.[ ] [footnote : ©] the homeward voyage was completed without untoward incident and long before the month had ended, the first--and probably last--merchant submarine was again safe and snug in her home port. the cargo-carrying submarine, however, is by no means the only type of underwater vessel engaged in peaceful pursuits which has been suggested so far. mr. simon lake, the american submarine engineer and inventor, has frequently pointed out the commercial possibilities of the submarine. in the early part of a series of articles from his pen appeared in _international marine engineering_. they contained a number of apparently feasible suggestions looking towards the commercial development of the submarine. first of all he tells of experiments made with submarines for navigation under ice. the proper development of this idea, of course, would be of immense commercial value. many harbours in various parts of the world are inaccessible during the winter months for vessels navigating on the surface. navigation on many important inland lakes likewise has to be stopped during that period. submarines, built so that they can safely travel under the ice, would overcome these conditions and would make it possible to use most ice-bound ports throughout the entire year at least in mr. lake's view. ever since mr. lake began inventing and building submarines he has been interested in the possibilities which submarines offer for the exploration of the sea-bottom and for the discovery of wrecks and recovery of their valuable cargoes. his first boat, the _argonaut_, as we have heard, possessed a diving chamber for just such purposes. he has continued his investigations and experiments along this line, and in these articles he shows illustrations of submarine boats and devices adapted for such work. properly financed and directed, the recovery of cargoes from wrecks undoubtedly would not only bring large financial returns to the backers of such a venture, but also do away with the immense waste which the total loss of sunken vessels and cargoes inflicts now on the world. submarines in peace may yet recover for the use of man much of the wealth which submarines in war have sent to the bottom of the sea. marine insurance, too, would be favourably affected by such an undertaking. still one other commercial submarine boat is advocated by mr. lake. this is to be used for the location and collection of shellfish on a large scale. of this vessel its inventor says: the design of this submarine oyster-dredging vessel is such that the vessel goes down to the bottom direct, and the water is forced out of the centre raking compartment so that the oysters may be seen by the operator in the control compartment. with only a few inches of water over them, headway is then given to the submarine and the oysters are automatically raked up, washed, and delivered through pipes into the cargo-carrying chambers. centrifugal pumps are constantly delivering water from the cargo compartments, which induces a flow of water through the pipes leading from the "rake pans" with sufficient velocity to carry up the oysters and deposit them into the cargo holds. in this manner the bottom may be seen, and by "tracking" back and forth over the bottom the ground may be "cleaned up" at one operation. this boat has a capacity of gathering oysters from good ground at the rate of five thousand bushels per hour. the use of the submarine will make the collection of oysters more nearly like the method of reaping a field of grain, where one "swathe" systematically joins on to another, and the whole field is "cleaned up" at one operation. man's greediness for profit has already driven the salmon from the rivers of new england where once they swarmed. mechanical devices for taking them by the hundreds of thousands threaten a like result in the now teeming rivers of washington and british columbia. mr. lake's invention has the demerit of giving conscienceless profiteers the opportunity to obliterate the oyster from our national waters. [illustration: permission of _scientific american_. _sectional view of a british submarine._] it does not appear, however, that, except as an engine of war the submarine offers much prospect of future development or future usefulness. and as we of the united states entered this war, which now engages our energies and our thoughts, for the purpose of making it the last war the world shall ever know, speculation on the future of the submarine seems rather barren. that does not mean however that there will be a complete stoppage of submarine construction or submarine development. war is not going to be ended by complete international disarmament, any more than complete unpreparedness kept the united states out of the struggle. a reasonable armament for every nation, and the union of all nations against any one or two that threaten wantonly to break the peace is the most promising plan intelligent pacifism has yet suggested. in such an international system there will be room and plenty for submarines. indeed it is into just such a plan that they intelligently fit. though not wholly successful in their operations against capital ships, they have demonstrated enough power to make nations hesitate henceforth before putting a score of millions into ponderous dreadnoughts which have to retire from submarine-infested waters as the british did in their very hour of triumph at jutland. they have not nullified, but greatly reduced the value of overwhelming sea power such as the british have possessed. a navy greater than those of any two other nations has indeed kept the german ships, naval and commercial, locked in port. but less than two hundred inexpensive submarines bid fair to sweep the seas of all merchant ships--neutral as well as british unless by feverish building the nations can build ships faster than submarines can sink them. huge navies may henceforth be unknown. the submarine has been the david of the war. it is a pity that its courage and efficiency have been exerted mainly in the wrong cause and that the missiles from its sling have felled the wrong goliath. aircraft and submarine! it is still on the cards that when the definitive history of the war shall be written, its outcome may be ascribed to one or the other of these novel weapons--the creation of american inventive genius. index a _aboukir_, , aërial mail service, aërial instruction, - aërial coast patrol unit, aerodromes, airplane costs, , american aviators in france, , , american flying corps, andré, general, - andrée, polar expedition, , , anti-aircraft guns, , , - , , , , , , , , , antwerp, "archies," _see_ anti-aircraft guns arlandes, marquis, d', archimedes, army aviation school, mineola, arras, astra-torres, austrian, submarine, u- , ; seaplane, ; warships _vs._, british submarines, ; submarines, , ; submarine strength of, , aviation, in england, , , ; in france, - ; germany, - , ; russia, ; united states, - , , , "avro" machines, b baker, ray stannard, quoted, - ball, captain, - baltic, bauer, wilhelm, , belgium, , , , belgium, mapping coast of, berlin, , , , , besnier, wings, blanchard, aeronaut, bleriot, aviator, , , ; airplane, blockade, united states, boelke, lieutenant, - ; story of air duel of, - brazil, submarine strength of, briggs, commander, bristol, biplane, british, , , , , , , , , , , , ; admiralty, , ; navy, , ; royal flying corps, , , , , , , ; royal naval air service, , ; submarine strength, , brussels, bushnell, david, - , c calmette, m., - canada, airplane factories in, caproni, airplanes, , cayley, sir george, , channel, english, , , , , , , chanute, chapman, victor, , , , charles, m., ; balloon, churchill, winston, civil war, , , , , , , _clement-bayard ii._, coffin, howard e., congress of the united states, , , , , , , , congressional committee, _cressy_, , curtis, glenn, , cuxhaven, , , , , , , d dardanelles, , , , da vinci, leonardo, day, j., - "d. h. ," denmark, submarine strength of, , department of aeronautics, deutsch, henry, prize for aviation, , - _deutschland_, the, , - dewey, admiral, , diesel motor, , , , , , douaumont, drachens, drebel, cornelius, - driggs, lawrence la tourette, , dubilier, william, e eiffel tower, , - , . _see also_ santos-dumont emperor of germany, , , england, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , essen, , expeditionary army, f faotomu, lieutenant takuma, , farman, , , farragut, admiral, fiske, rear-admiral, , , flanders, , fléchette, , fokker, , , , , , fort myer, , _foucault_, submarine, france, , , , , - , , , , , , , , , , , , - , , , , , , , , , franklin, benjamin, views of balloons, ; letters, , french, airplanes at battle of somme, ; commission to united states, ; guns, ; improve on german airplane, ; inspection of captive zeppelin, ; standardize their airplanes, ; submarine, ; submarine strength, , french, general sir john, - , friedrichshaven, , , , , , fulton, robert, , , g george, lloyd, german, admiralty, ; air champion, ; air raids on england, ; attempt to starve england, ; fleet, , ; submarine attacks on allied shipping, ; submarine destroyed by bombs, ; submarines _vs._ international law, ; submarine strength, - german u-boats, , , , , , , , , germany, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , - , , , - , , , , , , , , , , , ghent, gibbons, floyd p., - giffard, dirigible, , , , grange, de la, lieutenant, , great britain, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , great war, , , , , , , greece, submarine strength of, grey, c. g., quoted, gross, dirigible, , guynemer, captain georges, , , gyroscope compass, h hartlepool, harvard university, , harwich, heligoland, - , , _hogue_, , holland, , ; submarine strength of, , holland, john p., , - , ; submarine, - , , , , , , holland torpedo boat company, , , hotchkiss, _housatonic_, u. s. s., , hydro-airplane, , , , , hydroplane, , i icarus, immelman, captain, , - instruction, in aviation, - ; of american aviators, _ironsides_, , , italy, , ; submarine strength of, italian submarines, j japan, submarine strength of, , japanese submarines, joffre, general, , jutland, battle of, , k kaiser, . _also see_ emperor of germany kiel, , , - , , , , , , , kipling, rudyard, , , , , kitchener, lord, kitty-hawk, , kluck, general von, , könig, captain paul, - krebs, l lafayette escadrille, , , , lake constance, , lake, simon, - , , , - ; submarine, - , , , , lana, francisco, lancaster, f. w., langley, professor samuel, , , , _la patrie_, _la république_, latham, laurenti, major, ; submarine, , lebaudy brothers, ; airplane, , le bris, - lee, ezra, , lewis gun, liberty motor, , ; plane, liège, lilienthal, gustav, lilienthal, otto, - , lilienthals, lille, london, , , , , , , lufbery, captain raoul, , lunardi, aeronaut, _lusitania_, , , , m mcconnell, sergeant james r., marne, battle of, , , maxim, sir hiram, _merrimac_, meuse river, , _monitor_, mons, battle of, , montgolfier brothers, jos. & jacques, , ; balloon, , , , , , moranes, n namur, napoleon, , , naval committee, house of representatives, , navy department of u. s., , , , , , navy department, civil war, , navy, secretary of, , , needham, henry beach, nieuport, airplane, , , ; town of, , , nordenfeldt, swedish inventor, , , north sea, , , , , , , , , , , , , norway, submarine strength of, , noyes, alfred, quoted, - o ostend, , , , , , p paris, , - , , , - , , parseval, dirigible, , parseval-siegfeld, pau, père galien, periscopes, , , , , - , , petersburg, pilcher, percy s., , , pitney, fred b., quoted, - porter, admiral david, prince, norman, , , - r rees, major l. w. b., renard, , , richmond, roberts brothers' balloon, , rockwell, kiffen, - , royal aërial factory, rozier, pilatre de, , ; death of, rumsey, adjt., quoted, - russia, , , , ; submarine strength of, , russian ships sunk in baltic, ; submarine sunk by bombs, s santos-dumont, ; quoted, , - , - , - , , , , , , scarborough, schutte-lanz, dirigible, , schwartz, david, scott, lieutenant, seaplanes, , , , , , , , , , , _severo pax_, sikorsky, airplanes, sincay, lieutenant de, sopwith, biplane, , "s. p. a. d.," spain, ; submarine strength of, st. louis exposition, st. petersburg, submarine, controversy between u. s. and germany, ; cruise on, - ; interior of, - ; losses, - ; tenders, ; strength of different countries, , ; ventilation, , , , ; war zones, , submarine warfare, allied losses, ; british losses, , ; neutral losses, submarines: _argonaut_, - , _david_, , "e" class, _fenian ram_, "f- ," "f" (holland type), german type, _gustave zédé_, , _gymnote_, , _holland no. _, _holland no. _, _holland no. _, _holland no. _, - , _hundley_, - _intelligent whale_, _le diable marin_, laurenti type, _morse_, - _mute_, _narval_, , _nautilus_, _nordenfeldt ii._, _octopus_, _plongeur_, _plunger_, , _resurgam_, "s" class, (laurenti or "f. i. a. t." type) _turtle_, , , "u- ," "u- ," "u- ," - "v" class (lake type), "w" class (laubeuf type), "viper" class, submarines, aircraft as enemy of, , ; armament of, ; (general topic), , , - , ; marksmanship, ; microphone, ; motives powers of, , ; precautions and devices against, , , , ; requirements of modern, - sweden, submarine strength of, , switzerland, t taube, thaw, lieutenant william, tissot, professor, torpedo chamber, ; plane, , ; tubes, , , - , , , , , trocadero, - tulasne, major, , turkey, submarine strength of, turkish, , , u u- , , , , u-boat attacks on, allied merchantmen; _amiral ganteaume,_ ; _gulflight_, ; _lusitania_, , , , ; _laconia_, - ; _strathend_, ; _west point_, ; _stephano_, ; _bloomersdijk_, ; _christian knudsen_, ; in general, - united states, - , , , - , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ; government of, , , , , , ; declares war upon germany, ; navy, , , , ; submarine strength, v vanniman, , vaux, venice, verdun, , , , verne, jules, , , vickers, gun, ; scout airplane, , , , vicksburg, viney, lieutenant, von bernstorff, count, w wanamaker, rodman, war, department of, ; secretary of, , , war zones, , warneford, sub-lieutenant r. a. j., , , washington, d. c., , , washington, general george, watt, james, weddigen, captain, otto von, , , wellington, wellman, walter, , , white, claude graham, whitehead torpedo, , , , wilhelmshaven, , , , , , , winslow, carroll dana, , , , woodhouse, henry, wright brothers, , , , , , , , , , - , , , , , wright, orville, , , , - wright, wilbur, , , , z zédé, m. gustav, , , zeebrugge, , , , , , , , , zeppelin, count, von, , , , , , - , - , , , zeppelin, eberhard, zeppelin disasters: _zeppelin i._, - _iv._, , _l-i_, _l-ii_, zeppelin raids, , , zeppelins, , , , - , , , , , , , , - , , , _a selection from the catalogue of_ g. p. putnam's sons complete catalogues sent on application the making of a modern army and its operations in the field a study bated on the experience of three years on the french front - rené radiguet général de division, army of france translated by henry p. du bellet formerly american consul at rheims _ {o}. illustrations and diagrams. $ . net. by mail, $ . _ the younger americans who are now in training for active service in the field, and particularly those who have secured commissions as officers or who are preparing to compete for such commissions, will have a very direct interest in the instructions and suggestions presented by general radiguet in regard to the organization of an army and the method of its operations in the field. general radiguet's treatise is based upon a varied experience in the campaigns of the present war. the old text-books must be put to one side. the methods of organization and the methods of fighting have alike changed. it is only those who have had responsibilities as leaders in the present war whose instructions can be accepted as authoritative. life at the u. s. naval academy the making of the american navy officer: his studies, discipline, and amusements by ralph earle rear-admiral, u. s. n. (formerly head of the department of ordnance and gunnery, u. s. naval academy) with an introduction by franklin roosevelt assistant-secretary of the navy _ {o}. illustrations and a map. $ . net by mail, $ . _ this book follows the boy's procedure in entering and his first summer's course, after which it takes the midshipman through the course, not by years, but by clear discussions of the various activities that make up his daily life. the recitations, drills, practice cruises, physical training, medical care, athletics, recreations, and the career that the navy affords one after graduation are related in a manner that will make the midshipman's life easily understood by his parents and friends, and also show the boy intending to enter the academy just what he may expect there. _at all booksellers_ west point an intimate picture of the national military academy, and of the life of the cadet by robert c. richardson, jr. captain, d cavalry, u. s. a.; aide-de-camp to major-general thomas h. barry foreword by major-general hugh l. scott chief-of-staff, u. s. army _ {o}. illustrations, $ . net by mail, $ . _ the book, while of interest to all who have attended the institution, is addressed primarily to the general public so that that public may become better acquainted with the aims and ideals of their national military academy. to the prospective cadet the book is invaluable as a foretaste of the duties, responsibilities, and privileges obtaining at west point. tactics and duties for trench fighting by georges bertrand capitaine, chasseurs, de l'armée de france and oscar n. solbert major, corps of engineers, u. s. a. _ {o}. diagrams. $ . net. by mail, $ . _ . (od) st ind. war department, a. g. o., december , --to major o. n. solbert, corp of engineers, office of the chief of engineers. . the manuscript forwarded with this letter has been examined in the war college division and the opinion given that it has exceptional merit, presenting the principles governing trench warfare in such a clear and logical manner that the publication, with some changes and additions,[ ] will be of considerable value to our officers. [footnote : these changes have been made.] . you are directed to confer with the chief of the war college division regarding the effecting of the changes desired. by order of the secretary of war (signed) f. w. lewis adjutant general. g. p. putnam's sons new york london none annals of a fortress. [illustration: map of the land of ohet.] annals of a fortress. by e. viollet-le-duc. translated by benjamin bucknall, architect. [illustration] boston: james r. osgood and company, late ticknor & fields, and fields, osgood, & co. . university press: welch, bigelow, & co., cambridge. translator's note. the fortress whose transmutations during successive ages are so vividly described in the following pages is an ideal one; its supposed situation is on the cousin, an affluent of the saône. the practical genius of the author indicates the position which, in view of the new eastern frontier, should be fortified in order to command the saône. to his unrivalled talent as an architect, monsieur viollet-le-duc adds the highest qualifications of the military engineer. in this branch of applied science he is a recognised authority; and it may not be out of place to notice here that he was frequently consulted by the late emperor respecting the permanent defences of the country. it is not too much to assert that if his recommendations had been carried out the investment of paris would have been rendered impossible, whilst the progress of the german invasion elsewhere would have been attended with greater difficulties. as colonel of engineers, no officer displayed greater energy, skill, or bravery, in the defence of the city; and every operation planned and directed by him during the siege was successful. within two or three days after the signing of the armistice, the germans had done their utmost to destroy all evidences of their works of investment. nothing, however, had escaped the vigilant eye of m. viollet-le-duc. in that brief space of time he had surveyed and accurately noted all these works of investment; plans and descriptions of which are given in his interesting memoir of the siege. upon the outbreak of the commune, he was solicited by its chiefs to take the military command; and had he not made a timely escape would probably have paid the penalty of his life for refusing that questionable honour. from his retreat at pierrefonds he was recalled by general macmahon, to assist the versailles troops in re-entering paris. it is deserving of mention that in his absence a devoted band of craftsmen thrice gallantly defended his house from being burnt and pillaged. in presenting the _histoire d'une forteresse_ in an english form, the translator has considered it impossible to do justice to the original without adhering to its archaic style and manner; and aware that a translation must lose something either in point of sense or style, his chief aim has been to give a faithful rendering of the sense. benjamin bucknall, _architect._ oystermouth, swansea, _february , ._ contents. chapter i. page the first retreat chapter ii. the oppidum chapter iii. the first siege chapter iv. the cost of defenders chapter v. the second siege chapter vi. the permanent camp--foundation of a citÉ chapter vii. the fortified citÉ chapter viii. the third siege chapter ix. the feudal castle chapter x. the fourth siege chapter xi. the first defences against fire artillery chapter xii. the fifth siege chapter xiii. the citÉ of la roche-pont is fortified by errard de bar-le-duc, engineer to the most christian king of france and navarre chapter xiv. the sixth siege chapter xv. the town of la roche-pont is fortified by m. de vauban chapter xvi. the seventh siege chapter xvii. conclusion explanation of some of the technical terms used in this book list of illustrations. fig. page . map of the land of ohet _frontispiece_. the sapper _vignette_. . the oppidum . rampart of the oppidum . gates of the oppidum . the nÉmÈde and the druids' dwellings first siege.--sigild and tomar . " " wooden towers of the oppidum . " " advanced work of the oppidum . " " assault on the oppidum . the town and citÉ d'avon (war of the gauls) . second siege.--the roman 'agger' and 'vineÆ' . " " a stimulus . " " the movable tower . " " attack on the stronghold of the oppidum . the roman permanent camp . gates of the camp . the gallo-roman town. city juliana (_to face_) . section of the rampart wall . plans of the north gate . view of the north gate . general view of the great southern tÊte de pont . third siege.--the agger . " " work before the east gate . " " the 'vallum' . " " the northern salient . " " burning of the wooden bridge . " " the attack--the movable bridge intended for crossing the small arm of the river abonia . " " the agger . " " the onager battery . " " the mine and counter mine . " " the breach mine . " " defence of the breach . " " the breach occupied by the assailants . " " mining beneath the north-west corner tower . " " mining beneath the northern rampart wall . the old castle of la roche-pont . the castle of la roche-pont of the twelfth century (_to face_) . bird's-eye view of the castle of la roche-pont . bretÈche of the bridge . fourth siege.--the burgundian intrenchment of contravallation . " " night sortie of the garrison of the castle (_to face_) . " " the besiegers get possession of the barbican . " " the cat . " " the bosson (_to face_) . " " the breach and the burning of the north gate . " " the taking of the bailey (_to face_) . " " the small bosson . " " the movable tower (_to face_) . the town of la roche-pont is fortified by charles the bold . bird's-eye view of the northern boulevard and front . masonry tower for artillery . bird's-eye view of boulevard and ramparts . tÊte de pont and cavalier . fifth siege.--attack on the northern boulevard . " " defence of the northern boulevard . " " assault on the boulevard . " " attack of the old front (_to face_) . fifth siege.--the old north gate battered by fire artillery . " " taking of an artillery tower (_to face_) . the bastions of errard de le bar-le-duc . the north work . one of the bastions . sixth siege.--galas' works of approach . " " the attack on one of the besiegers' place d'armes (_to face_) . " " forcia's plan of siege . vauban's defences . vauban's outwork . sections of the outwork . trace of the outwork . revÊtement of the bastions . seventh siege.--the theoretical attack of vauban's work (_to face_) . " " the third parallel and the crowning of the couvert way (_to face_) . " " captain allaud's advanced work . " " sections and interior view of the work . " " captain allaud's crÉmaillÈre work . " " attack on the works of counter-approach . illustrations of the principles of attack and defence . ditto . ditto . application of the principle: "what defends should itself be defended" . illustration of the altered conditions necessitated by artillery of long range . plan of fortress showing how those conditions are met . block plan of the detached forts . theoretical plan of a modern fortress . employment of the polygonal system, detached forts . defensive system of great intrenched camp annals of a fortress. "je sçais bien qu'il faut perdre, qu'il faut gaigner, et n'y a rien d'imprenable; mais desirez cent mil fois plustost la mort si tous moyens ne vous deffaillent, que dire ce méchant et vilain mot: 'je la rends.'"--_comment._ de montluc. chapter i. _the first retreat._ many winters, as we are told by the old men of the district, have passed since human beings first settled in the land of ohet, a somewhat extensive valley of varying breadth, traversed by a winding stream running southward till it flows into a great river. the sides of the valley present a series of hills of moderate height, descending by gentle slopes where it widens, and more abruptly where it narrows. on the steeper hill-sides grey crags jut out, and the ground is strewn with fragments of rock. ascending the stream for some three hours' walk from the point where it joins the great river, we find on the right another stream separating into several small branches in a more elevated valley. in summer, some of these branches dry up, others form pools, whose banks are covered with reeds and water-lilies. the inhabitants of the vale dread this valley, which they believe to be haunted by evil spirits. it is dangerous to wander there, because of the number of bogs covered over with leaves and decaying branches in which the unwary sink. the forest in this valley is so dense, the plants and bushes are so thickly interlaced with the trunks and branches of dead trees, that the rays of the sun hardly penetrate through it, and only illuminate pools of water covered with a mantle of green. a kind of promontory divides the two water-courses at this point (frontispiece--fig. );--the river running from the north-west, and the smaller stream from the north-north-east. this elevated part of the country is covered with thick woods, and the inhabitants of the valley seldom go there except to hunt the wild ox, the boar, the wolf, and the deer. beyond, the country seems a wilderness; and strangers who occasionally visit the inhabitants of the vale to exchange amber, copper, gold, salt, and coarse woollen or hempen fabrics for skins of beasts, never come except by the way where flows the great river. the occupants live in families, in the open spaces amid the woods and on the banks of the rivers, inhabiting conical huts, made with stakes set in the ground, joined at the top, and covered with branches, earth, and rushes. the father of the family occupies one of these huts with his wife and children, and as his sons grow up, they build another cabin and take a companion. the products of the chase and fishing, with the wild roots which they dry and crush between stones, are their only means of subsistence; they do not till the soil, nor have they any flocks or herds. our informants add that they never had to fight men like themselves, and that if any disputes arise between the families, they call together the oldest chiefs of the other families to arbitrate between them. those who are unwilling to submit to their judgment are banished from the valley, together with their families; they descend the shores of the great river, and are no more heard of. when these old men are further asked whether there were other human beings before them settled in the valley, they answer that there were; but that they were small men--dwarfs--who ate earth, and had no bows and arrows to kill the wild beasts, nor hooks to catch fish, nor canoes to cross the river; that at the approach of the present inhabitants, these dwarfs disappeared, and took refuge underground, whence they came out sometimes in the night to do mischief--to cut the fastenings of boats, or sink the boats themselves--to cause children at the breast to die, or to break the bows, or warn the animals of the forest of an intended chase, so that they might get out of the way. for some time a report has been current--brought by strangers who have found their way along the river into the valley--that an alien race of great stature and strength, with fair hair, and mounted on horses, have already overspread the neighbouring countries, driving away their inhabitants, or killing those who do not fly at their approach; speaking an unknown tongue, and undertaking nothing without first deliberating in great numbers, and consulting the elders and women, sparing none but children, and employing these in labours of all kinds. this news has spread great consternation in the valley; the chiefs of the families meet together, and determine to watch by turns at the mouth of the river; young men posted at regular intervals are to give warning, by loud cries, of the arrival of the fair-haired people, so that all the inhabitants of the valley may be quickly warned, and take refuge with their families in the woods situated on the promontory which divides the river from the smaller stream at their confluence; lastly, each is to furnish himself with provisions such as will be sufficient for a hunting expedition of several days; and then they will consult as to what course shall be adopted. meantime, the elders of the people take counsel. they decide that at the first cry of alarm, and while the invaders are entering the valley by one of the banks, all the inhabitants of that side shall cross in the boats to the opposite side shore, in order to unite with those who inhabit that side, and that all together they shall hasten to bring their cargoes to the point where the valley divides, so as to moor the boats below the promontory on the left bank above the mouth of the stream; that the women, children, and old men shall take refuge on the promontory, so that the able-bodied, thus separated from the fair-haired men by the river and the rivulet, will be able to deliberate whether they should use their bows or fly to the forest above. some days after, just when the sun is beginning to decline, the valley resounds with the cry of alarm, a hundred times repeated, announcing that the fair-haired people are advancing and entering the valley on the western side. immediately the whole country--silent but a few minutes before--begins to be filled with a continued hum; most of the inhabitants of the right hasten in their boats to the left bank; but some, either through negligence, or because they have been away from their dwellings, cannot follow the advice of the elders. in the meantime, the invaders advance with caution: first, a detachment mounted on horses are seen riding round the woods, assembling in the openings, and appearing to deliberate before going further. a body of them have captured some unhappy loiterers among the inhabitants of the valley, who, fastened with cords, are driven onwards by their captors, and closely interrogated, but they do not understand what is said to them. in a little while, at every visible point in the direction of the river, the valley appears dotted with men on foot and on horseback, and with chariots; and every now and then shouts arise. the sun sinks upon the horizon, but the shouting continues to be heard, and the columns of smoke ascend from all sides; night comes, the valley appears lit up with fires, and silence gradually supervenes. assembled at the foot of the promontory, along the banks of the two streams, the men of the land of ohet have concealed their boats among the bulrushes; they have sent up the women, the children, and the aged to the plateau; they dare not light any fires, lest they should attract the attention of the invaders. the night is spent in fruitless deliberation; some bold young hunters propose to take advantage of the sleep of the fair-haired people to cross the river and fall upon them as they would upon wild beasts, and to kill them all with their stone hatchets; but the chiefs of the families consider that they are too few in number for the execution of any such design; they urge that this body of invaders is perhaps followed by others, that they have horses and can easily escape, that they appear to be tall and strong; and, moreover, that they do not appear to have killed the inhabitants they met with, as the strangers had reported. at break of day the valley echoes with unusual sounds, such as the inhabitants of the land of ohet had never heard before. it is not the shouting of men, nor the songs of women, nor the bellowing of wild bulls. these noises spread terror among the fugitives. they all abandon the boats and climb the promontory; there, in the woods, they can see through the trees what is taking place in the valley: they soon perceive a numerous body of men on the opposite side, not far from the river. some canoes which had been forgotten are being guided up the stream by the invaders. they go through the rushes, unfasten the boats, and draw them up with loud cries on the shore opposite the promontory. these cries are answered from other quarters, and the whole body rush to the shore. but at this juncture the chiefs seem to interfere; they parley for some time, and appear to threaten those who are impatient to get into the boats, often pointing to the plateau above. the main body retire again from the shore, and a dozen men only get into two boats, which make for the opposite bank at the foot of the promontory. with them are two of the inhabitants of the land of ohet, tied by the neck with leathern thongs. they land together, put the captives before them, and ascend to the plateau. the twelve fair-haired men are armed with sticks, terminated by a long, bright, metal point. some hold bows in their hands, with the arrows in place. they are dressed in short tunics of ornamented stuffs, their arms bare, and their legs up to the knee bound round with leathern thongs, to which are fastened covered sandals. about their loins is a belt of skin, to which is suspended a bag, also of skin, with the hair of the animal preserved, two knives--one long, the other very short--and a hatchet, the blade of which is of bronze; their necks and wrists are adorned with strings of large glass beads, or with circlets of metal. many have their hair fastened on the top of their heads, with large pins of bone or bronze; others have their hair divided into long tresses. their beards have been carefully removed, while their moustaches reach down to their breasts. their aspect is terrible, for they are tall; their light blue eyes, inclosed by black lines, sparkle like diamonds beneath bushy brows dyed of a brilliant red. approaching to within fifty paces of the brow of the promontory, where the ground is somewhat clear, they stop, and one of the captives speaks thus: "the fair-haired people have captured several of us; they have done us no harm; they have not burned our huts, nor killed the women and children. they wish to live in peace with us always, on the same ground. they will not hinder us from hunting or fishing, or from remaining with our wives and children. they say that the land is good, and can support a much greater number of inhabitants than it does now. they bring an abundance of things useful to man. they teach youths to ride, and to use arms against evil men. they say in fine that we have nothing to fear, and that you may return to your dwellings. "i am told all this by one of their people who speaks as we do, and who once lived in our valley, from which he was banished. they also say that if you will not return to your homes and live in peace with them, they will kill us all like wild beasts, for they are both numerous and strong. they will await your answer here until the sun reaches the middle of its daily course. this is all we have to say." several of the elders of the valley then came out of the wood and advanced towards the captives; but the party of fair-haired men made signs to them to come no farther, and fitted their arrows to the strings of their bows. the captive who had already spoken, again addressed them: "do not come any nearer; deliberate among yourselves, and give an answer quickly. this is all we have to say." the old men thereupon assembled, and having cut some branches of trees on which they seated themselves, one of them spoke thus: "these fair-haired people with painted faces are more numerous than we; they have murderous, weapons, and horses, and are brave; we are not able to drive them out of the valley; if they desire to live with us in peace, as they say they do, why not consider them as friends? is it to their advantage to kill us? no. they possess many things which we have not, and are provided with what they need. have you not observed the flocks and herds, the loaded waggons, and the women and children that accompany them? they are not empty-handed robbers. let us accept the conditions they offer us." one of the hunters, among the bravest in the valley, then rose and spoke in his turn: "why do these people with painted faces come into our valley? it is to take possession of it and drive us away. they are strangers to us, and we have never done them any harm. why do they not remain where they were born? will there be fish enough in the river and enough wild animals in the forest to feed them and us? they will take all and leave us nothing. fighting against them is impossible, it is true--but we can fly. there are other valleys and other rivers not far off. let us take our wives and children with us; i know the woods as far as three days' journey. let us leave our huts and our boats, and go and settle far away from these strangers." after the utterance of these contrary opinions a hundred voices were raised; some supporting the advice of the old man, others that of the hunter. a few young men even wished to fall upon the little troop of strangers and massacre them. some of the most venerated of the inhabitants of the val d'ohet tried more than once to impose silence and make themselves heard, but the tumult continuing to increase, the assembly was broken up into groups, and the women began to cry out and lament and the children to weep. meanwhile the little party of fair-haired men had begun to cut some bushes and briars and to make a rampart with them. not long afterwards twelve boats crossed the river, and sixty of the strangers came and joined the first twelve. these were bearing twelve oval shields of wicker-work covered with skin. they set up these shields by means of stakes driven in the ground, and placed themselves behind them; only their heads painted red and blue and their sparkling eyes remained visible. they were laughing together loudly. midday was at hand, and confusion continued to prevail among the fugitives. then were heard again those strange sounds which had so much alarmed the unhappy inhabitants of ohet at dawn; and the shore opposite to the promontory was covered with a multitude of fair-haired men in several detachments, all armed. they began to cross the river, and to seat themselves in a line on the shore beneath the plateau. then the captive who had already spoken advanced alone toward the forest, and when he was within hearing, said: "my friends, my brethren, you are going to be attacked: and we are to be killed before your eyes. have pity on yourselves--have pity on us; come down to the fair-haired men; they will do you no sort of harm; they have respected your houses and the women that have fallen into their hands. do not hope to defend yourselves, for they will kill you with their keen weapons!" at this last appeal the fugitives became silent, and one of the inhabitants of the valley, who had remained since the morning without speaking a word, rose up. he was a short, robust man, of dark complexion and crisp hair; he was well known as a skilful carpenter, and the best boats were his handy work. "there is no more time for discussion," said he. "let those who wish to stay in the valley come out from the wood, and let the rest hide themselves as quickly as possible in the forest. they will be able to fly with their families; for the strangers do not know how many we are. as for myself, i remain where i was born." a great number assembled round the carpenter with acclamations, accompanied by their wives and children; and all together without a moment's delay showed themselves to the troop of strangers. "we will return to our dwellings," was all the carpenter said to the captive interpreter, and then they advanced towards the little camp. many had bows and stone hatchets. "throw down your arms," said the captive; "throw down your arms, you have no need of them." the invaders who had taken up their position on the shore, dividing into two bodies, were rapidly climbing the sides of the promontory, to the right and left; so that in a few minutes the carpenter and his companions were surrounded by an innumerable crowd, which penetrating the mass of the fugitives, separated them into small parties and took possession of the few weapons which had been retained by some of their number. the strangers laughed, skipped, and leaned their brows on the breasts of the inhabitants of the valley in token of good will. thus some hundreds of the natives went down towards the river surrounded by their new guests. they were compelled to get into the boats, and they went back to their houses, which had been completely pillaged. many of the huts remained vacant, and the new-comers took possession of them, without troubling themselves much respecting the inhabitants and what had become of them. chapter ii. _the oppidum._ two centuries later, the land of ohet had assumed a new aspect, and its name was changed. it was then called the valley of avon. beautiful fields, affording pasture to flocks and herds, carpeted the slopes of the bordering hill; while in the vale below ripened harvests of barley and rye. the uplands were still covered with forest, and on all sides wooden houses peeped out from the meadows, with their inclosures of palisades painted in lively colours. the marshes of the rivulet were drained, and at the summit of the promontory was to be seen cutting the sky the talus of an _oppidum_ which commanded the valley and the two streams. its origin was as follows:-- not long after the invasion of the fair-haired people, the inhabitants of the valley who had fled into the woods had re-appeared, accompanied by a great multitude of men of the same race, and at dawn had fallen with great violence and loud cries upon the strangers. the latter, not expecting an attack, defended themselves as best they could; but the younger and more active among them assembled on the promontory, where they waited until night. then they descended noiselessly, crossed the stream, and fell in their turn upon the men of the ancient race, who thought to repossess themselves of the valley. the greater number were asleep; many had dispersed in search of food and plunder. the young fair-haired men massacred a vast number of them, making no distinction between the old inhabitants who had remained in their homes and those who presented themselves as enemies; the women and children alone were spared. after a council of the elders, and after having consulted the women, it was decided that in order to prevent fresh surprises, and to protect the inhabitants of the valley, they should form a vast camp on the promontory, where in case of alarm the people of the valley of avon could take refuge with their families, their flocks and herds, provisions and arms, defy every attack, and resume the offensive at the opportune moment. the summit of the promontory was therefore cleared; every able-bodied man was required to give one day's work in four till the camp was finished; and those of the old inhabitants who had escaped the massacre, as well as the children and women, had to labour without ceasing at the circumvallations. the women prepared food for the workmen, and the children carried earth in baskets or brought branches of trees which were mingled with the earth. following exactly the verge of the plateau, the chiefs of the eight tribes settled in the valley marked out the boundary of the camp, its entrances, its defences, the retreat of the elders, the place for the cattle, that of the huts for the families, and lastly the site proper for the erection of the némède--the sacred inclosure--the sanctuary of belen and the dwellings of the druids. first, with the aid of strong levers of wood hardened by fire, the stones which obtruded above the level of the plateau were forced out and arranged on the perimeter described; then upon this layer, behind which was heaped coarse gravel mixed with earth, were placed trunks of trees, crosswise, four feet apart. the width of the base was twenty feet. the interval between the trunks was filled with stones, earth, and branches. then another layer of stones mingled with earth, then three rows of trunks of trees, laid this time lengthwise, bound together with strong bands of green withy, always with gravel between. on this a third layer of stones, more trunks of trees across, overlapping the others, and a topping of gravel, of turf and soil, forming the rampart walk. stakes were placed upright, five feet apart, and firmly driven three feet down into the rampart on the outer edge, serving to fix, by means of osier bands, wattled hurdles five feet six inches high, so as to form a continuous parapet pierced with loop-holes. the rampart rose to a height of five feet. the inclosure completed, the druids marked out the area allotted to the eight tribes. to each of them was given a circular space of two hundred feet in diameter; the huts were disposed in two rings around the perimeter; in the middle was the paddock for the animals and the hut of the chief. [illustration: fig. .--the oppidum.] the general view of the camp is given in fig. , with the rampart, the two entrances, the sunk approaches, defended on the other side by a mound raised with the earth excavated to form these approaches, and the eight circles allotted to the tribes; at a, the némède and the dwelling of the druids and druidesses, surrounded by the sacred inclosure. wells were sunk in each of the circles of the tribes, and in the inclosure of the némède. [illustration: fig. .] fig. gives the section of the rampart with its terrace-walk, a, for the defenders, and, at intervals, the inclines, b, affording an easy means for ascending to the terrace-walk. the entrances were masked by a mound forming an advanced work, and leaving two ways out along the ramparts. fig. shows how these entrances were disposed. the two extremities of the rampart were strengthened by a wider embankment, h, affording space for a numerous assemblage of defenders. here is shown the screen thrown up outside the cutting, and at k the sunken road with its mound, l. [illustration: fig. .] fig. represents the némède, with its inclosure and the dwellings of the druids. [illustration: fig. .] the camp finished--except the habitations of the tribes, whose site was only marked by circles of stones--a certain number of young men were put to live there, who replaced each other every day. arriving there at sunset, they remained in the camp until the beginning of the next night. those of the former inhabitants of the valley who still lived were forbidden to enter the camp on pain of death. the tribes prospered, enriching themselves with the produce of the earth and with their cattle. some, having discovered copper ore in the neighbourhood, manufactured arms and utensils. there were also potters who wrought skilfully in clay. at certain periods of the year, merchants brought to the valley stuffs, salt, spices, and even wine in leathern bottles. they took in exchange articles of bronze, skins, cheese, and corn. the tribes, not having had any fresh attacks to resist during a lengthened period, left off guarding the camp, which was rarely visited except on occasion of certain solemnities and of assemblies convoked by the druids. the latter lived by themselves, surrounded by their college, within the vast inclosure which they cultivated, and where their sheep and cattle grazed. the ramparts, whose timber work had decayed, had sunk, and presented only a slight elevation. they were overgrown with vegetation in several places. but in the peaceful state in which the tribes were living, no one thought of repairing these defences. the inhabitants of the valley had been frequently embroiled with the neighbouring tribes, and had often come to blows with them; but peace was soon restored, for none of these groups of tribes cherished the intention of subjugating its neighbours and seizing their territory. nevertheless repose was irksome to them, and their youths would often quit the valley in quest of adventures, and to see the world. about b.c., a great number of men, attracted by the seductive eloquence of a brenn--a chief elected by certain tribes to command distant expeditions--had quitted their hearths in the hope of amassing wealthy spoils in the southern lands beyond the mountains. two years having passed away, a small number made their appearance again in the valley; they brought with them gold and costly fabrics, and marvellous were the tales they told of the countries they had traversed, and in which they had been incessantly fighting. they had seen cities environed by strong stone walls, and filled with magnificent public buildings and sumptuous mansions--richly fertile regions, where the vine and luscious fruits of every kind were cultivated. among other results of adventure, it was observed that those who returned from these distant expeditions had lost the habit of peaceful industry; and although more than half their comrades had perished by the way, their dreams were still of battles, and plunder, and adventures. they were idle, insolent, and irascible, and even aspired to a kind of lordship over the peaceable families that lived by industry. the latter had at first joyfully welcomed the unhoped-for return of these warriors; and had listened with admiration to the stories of their prowess and adventures recited around the family hearth; but their imperious bearing, their idleness and boasting, were beginning to become intolerable. every day saw new quarrels arise, which generally ended in blood. the wives of these heroes were still more insolent than the warriors themselves, and presumed to treat their dependents as slaves, such as were those of the ladies in the countries so gloriously traversed by their husbands. things being in this state, the tribes of the valley had been summoned to a meeting in the old camp, according to custom, to deliberate on their common interests, and to endeavour to put an end to feuds. the men always repaired to these assemblies armed; the women used to come bringing food and drink; for these meetings were usually terminated by festivities lasting the whole night. on the morning of the day appointed, the sound of trumpets re-echoed through the valley, and from every quarter the inhabitants might be seen flocking towards the hill. a wooden bridge had long since been built over the river near the mouth of the rivulet. when the chiefs of the tribes, accompanied by the mass of the people, presented themselves at the bridge, they found it occupied by the warriors, whose ranks had been increased by a large number of young men of the valley, and even other warriors, strangers to the tribes. "it is at the camp and not here that the people meet," said one of the chiefs; "let us pass over." "you shall not pass," replied one of the warriors, "without listening to the conditions we propose." "we have neither conditions to submit to nor conditions to impose," rejoined the first; "the men of this country are free, and the land is theirs, in the valley and on the mountain; let us pass on!" "it will be by force then," replied the warrior, half unsheathing his sword. a long-continued cry of indignation followed this defiance, and arms began to glitter in the sun among the crowd like flashes of lightning. the chiefs, however, imposed silence, and held the crowd in check. then advancing in concert to the entrance of the bridge, one of them spoke thus:--"what do you want? do you not belong to our tribes? have you not flocks, and wives, and children born in the valley? what conditions do you aim to impose upon us--us who are your equals? speak! what can you ask for more than you already possess? what wrongs have been done you? why bring with you men who are strangers to the country, whom we do not know, and who have no claim to an interest among us?" "answer him, answer him, sigild," said all the warriors with one voice. sigild advanced. he was a handsome young man, a native of the valley, tall and slight, with a mild look, and a beard just appearing; his breast covered with a small bronze cuirass which glittered in the sun: his white arms were bare, and adorned with bracelets of gold. he disdained a helmet, and his blonde hair, fastened at the top of his head with a long golden pin, fell down over his back; _chases_[ ] wrought in bright colours covered his legs; his waist was girt with a kind of scarf, which was gracefully thrown back over the shoulder and left arm. a narrow buckler and a sword hung at his side. he smiled, made a sign with his hand as if requesting silence, and said:--"friends and brethren, we are all free--all of the same blood; we ought to remain united to conquer those who desire to plunder or to enslave us. consider, however, that you have among you the élite of the warriors who have conquered powerful nations, and have spread the renown of the gallic name beyond the mountains. many have died in battle; but do not those who have returned to you after so many trials, bringing, with them a rich booty and having acquired skill in arms, deserve some consideration from you? inured to war and always ready to shed their blood, are they not more fitted to defend your hearths than men who have done nothing but tend cattle and till the soil? they do not, however, ask you to keep them in idleness, or to consider them as chiefs or masters; their only wish is to defend you. they know to what extent you are encompassed by rapacious and envious men, who, jealous of the prosperity of your valley, are cherishing the most sinister designs against you. they know this because they have seen many peoples of whose existence you do not dream, though they are close to your borders. lulled by a prolonged security, you are not in a condition to resist a serious attack. now these warriors--your relations, your brothers, your friends, of the same blood as yourselves--have been considering with painful anxiety this state of repose in which you are living. they have, therefore, formed the intention--they, as men of war, to occupy the camp, to fortify it effectually, to make it a reliable place of refuge in case of invasion, and to defend themselves in it to the death. is there any wrong in this? as to these warriors, whom you regard as strangers, they are brethren in arms who have fought side by side with us beyond the mountains, but who no longer finding their abodes on returning to their valleys devastated by marauders, ask an asylum with us. besides, if they do not belong to your tribes, are they not gauls like ourselves? "we have wished to say this to you here, and not in the place of rendezvous itself, in the fear lest our intentions should be misunderstood amid so great a concourse. if our proposals, conceived with a view to the common interest, appear to you just, and if you still persist in holding the assembly on the height above, we will go before you to the camp, and will remain there when you return to your habitations. "as for us, devoting ourselves to those new functions which we are competent to discharge, we will make of this camp a stronghold impregnable to any enemy that might dare to attack us." a long murmur followed this discourse and the chiefs of the tribes looked wistfully at each other. the most venerable of them, advancing in his turn replied thus: "sigild, your words are fair; but the act to which you and your companions are committing yourselves at this moment is insulting, and aims a blow at the liberty of the inhabitants of the valley. you parade before us imaginary dangers, with a view to remaining on that height under the pretext of defending our families, but really in order to separate yourselves from us and act according to your good pleasure. tell us who will support you and take care of your cattle while you are remaining on the height under arms, waiting for an enemy who perhaps will never make his appearance? sole masters of the bridge and the two streams, you will be able, if you choose, to debar the inhabitants of the valley from hunting in the woods that extend behind the camp, and from fishing in the waters of the upper stream which furnish the best supply. we shall thus be at your discretion. if the assembly thinks it desirable to strengthen the fortifications of the camp, every inhabitant of the valley will take his share in the work--yourselves with the rest. if it shall be necessary to defend the inclosure, all who are in a condition to bear arms must engage in the defence; for all are equally interested in protecting their families, in repelling an enemy, and not exposing themselves to insult. come, then, with us to the camp; we will deliberate on all that concerns the interests of the tribes, and you will only have to submit, like ourselves, to the result of our deliberation. as to the new-comers, if they ask for an asylum, you know that it will not be refused them; but they must fulfil the conditions imposed upon foreigners wishing to live among us. moreover, we shall have to consult the ovates." thrusting back sigild, who was preparing to give an answer, the first warrior, who had spoken so insolently, advanced to the edge of the bridge in front of the chiefs of the tribes, and putting aside their arms, he said, "no one shall pass; all this parleying is useless; go back to your houses; we will hold the camp." at these words a thousand voices arose, and in spite of the endeavours of the chiefs to restrain them, the crowd of the men of the valley rushed forward like a torrent. swords were drawn on both sides, and the clash of arms was mingled with the cries of the two parties. the imprecations of the women dispersed along the shore, and who were urging the men towards the bridge, were heard above the clamour of the multitude. the party that was endeavouring to obstruct the passages recoiled for the moment, with a view to concentrate themselves on the narrowest point; and, as the warriors had crowded together on the bridge to hear what was being said on both sides, and many had even mounted on the wooden parapets, this movement from front to rear threw confusion into the closely-packed mass, and several fell into the river. at sight of this a shout, followed by an immense burst of laughter, issued from the groups assembled on the shore; and the defenders of the bridge, and those who were advancing to meet them, having no conception of the cause of this laughter, stopped and looked behind them on either side. but the warriors who had fallen from the bridge into the water, embarrassed by their clothes and shackled by their armour, although able to swim, were being swept down by the current, with a rapidity increased by the swollen state of the river. they were all but engulfed in the rapid torrent. two boats were fastened to the bank on the valley side; in a moment some of the spectators pushed off in them, and rowing with might and main, and with the help of poles, had soon rescued the half-drowned warriors and brought them to the shore. three had lost consciousness; every assistance was afforded them, and the women especially lavished upon them the most assiduous attention. the result of this episode was the intermingling of the parties; the defenders of the bridge had advanced on the shore as far as the middle of the passage, and were surrounding the handsome sigild, who, with a smile upon his lips, was answering all the questions addressed to him by reassuring words. he might be seen slightly shrugging his shoulders and shaking his head in graceful fashion. an armed struggle was no longer possible, and the war-cry had been exchanged for laughter. a more compact group, however, consisting of members of the two parties, were keeping up a lively discussion along one of the parapets of the bridge, when one of the inhabitants of the valley, to whom the attention of those surrounding him seemed to be directed, mounted the hand-rail with agility, and, fastening his buckler to his shoulder, plunged into the river. he soon re-appeared, and swimming with vigour and address, gained a footing on the bank at the base of the promontory. the hurraing on the opposite shore recommenced; in an instant the two boats were filled by men of the valley, and others crossed swimming, partly aided by the boats, which soon reached the other side. some vessels towed across conveyed considerable numbers--so many, indeed, that the holders of the bridge saw themselves placed between two hostile bodies, should they persist in their resolution. the laughter was kept up on both sides, and was communicated even to the warriors posted on the passage. the knot of defenders became less and less dense, and if they did not retreat _en masse_--which would have called forth a fresh burst of hilarity--they were gradually retiring. soon the platform of the bridge was deserted by all but the surly instigator of the strife, whose insolent words had almost occasioned a sanguinary struggle. he indeed was not laughing; when he saw himself abandoned he threw his sword into the river, and making himself a passage through the crowd, he bent his steps towards the valley. the handsome sigild, surrounded by the greater part of the warriors, was on his way upwards towards the camp, and the whole multitude was following him. footnotes: [footnote : _chases_--a kind of trousers divided down the legs and fastened with bandelets.] chapter iii. _the first siege._ thirty years after the event just related, the valley of avon still preserved its smiling aspect and was covered with rustic habitations; there might be seen, however, in front of and behind the bridge just mentioned, two groups of houses in pretty close proximity: the first in the direction of the valley, the second on the lower slopes of the plateau. a considerable number of boats were moored on the two banks below the bridge, and were receiving or discharging packages covered with wrappers made of rushes. on the top of the promontory was seen the outline of a rampart made of stone, wood, and earth, but with square towers composed in great part of timber and wattle-work, about a hundred paces apart. outside the inclosure rose palisades of no great height, in front of a ditch six feet wide by three or four feet deep. the entrances to the oppidum, which still occupied the place previously indicated, were amply environed outside by stakes connected by branches of trees. at the lower end of the two sunk roads were raised besides two towers of timber and wattle-work. grave events had been the cause of these changes. the meeting announced in the preceding chapter had taken place on the plateau. the uproar and confusion that prevailed threatened a sanguinary conclusion. the warriors insisted on adhering to the programme sketched by the handsome sigild, and on reserving to themselves the privilege of guarding the camp. the chiefs of the tribes would not agree to this. the ovates, the wisest among the druids, had been consulted. but their responses, of a somewhat ambiguous character, did not satisfy the multitude. the latter (the ovates) declared in the first place, that the némède could not be touched without drawing down the gravest calamities upon the tribes; that the flocks belonging to the college must be allowed to graze undisturbed on the plateau; and that if any peril threatened the inhabitants of the valley, they, the druids, would be able to give timely warning to the defenders. during this deliverance the handsome sigild wore his accustomed smile and suavely shook his head in his usual manner, but said not a word. the druidesses, seated along the inclosure of the némède, their hands on their knees in a musing attitude, appeared to take no part in the discussion. the men were divided into groups, and it seemed as if no decision would be arrived at before sunset. hunger and thirst began to be keenly felt, and the women were spreading on the turf the provisions they had brought. at this juncture one of the druidesses, at the solicitation of her companions, advanced into the midst of the assembly. she was young, tall, and dressed in a long white robe--a kind of dalmatic without a girdle; and her bare arms were adorned with bracelets of black glass. on seeing her every voice was hushed, and surrounded by her companions, who had followed her, she spoke thus:-- "you who are assembled here, who live in peace, thinking you have no enemy to fear, are unable calmly to deliberate and adopt a wise resolution. how will it be when the enemy is upon you? and i warn you that such an enemy is near; he is preparing his arms and reckoning his spoils in the pillage of your flocks and the plunder of your houses; indeed he is already rejoicing in a victory which he deems certain because he knows you are not in a condition to act in concert to resist him. "abandon this place, which you are incapable of defending, since you know not how to fortify it; return to your houses, and await in careless ease the hour of peril." around the young woman, pale with emotion, and who spoke without a gesture or a movement, as if the words she was slowly pronouncing had issued from a statue, the multitude had assembled in a compact mass. a tremulous agitation ran through the crowd like the breeze through the corn. then, by one of those instinctive movements which sway the multitude, all eyes were turned towards sigild. the latter, standing in front of the druidess, who had remained rigid as a statue on the stone that served her as a tribune, had his eyes fixed on the ground contrary to his usual custom, as if he could not endure the fire of all these glances directed towards him. through the murmurs of the crowd the name of sigild could be vaguely distinguished. "let sigild be our brenn!" said a voice. immediately thousands of voices repeated, "let sigild be our brenn!" it seemed then as if all those who a few minutes before were of opinions widely contrary had but a single thought, a single soul, a single voice. sigild was therefore proclaimed brenn, and the night passed in joyous festivities. whether the young druidess had been informed of the projects formed against the happy inhabitants of the valley of avon, or whether inspiration or chance had led to the coincidence, only a few months had passed since the meeting in question, when they observed certain strangers roaming about the hills, who speedily disappeared when the inhabitants began to question them; and subsequently a larger number of merchants than was customary, arrived in the valley. they were insolent, endeavoured to embroil themselves with the inhabitants, and uttered menaces when their assumptions were met by reason; and several of them who were expelled from the country threatened to return and avenge themselves. one day, in fact, the heights that surrounded the valley appeared occupied one after the other by troops of armed men. meanwhile sigild, elected brenn, had lost no time. he had first assembled around him all his old companions in arms; and many young men who preferred a life of war to the peaceful pursuits of the shepherd or the husbandman had also joined him. the new brenn had gold, and on occasions would pay men to work at the oppidum. full of respect and deference for the druids, he had embellished the némède; and seemed to engage in no undertaking till he had consulted the ovates. he gave them the produce of his hunting expeditions, and had caused a decree to be made that the fishery above the bridge should be reserved for the college. the camp was assuming day by day a more formidable aspect, but the brenn and his men, with the college of the druids, were the only persons entitled to sojourn there. as on former occasions, every man of the valley was obliged to devote one day in four to the work of fortification; moreover, the inhabitants of the val d'avon supplied the warriors with provisions. they were, however, beginning to murmur, and to complain of the exactions of the latter; and things would probably have not long continued on this footing, when the threatened enemy appeared. the sound of trumpets was immediately heard in the camp: it was the signal agreed upon; and the unfortunate families of the valley might be seen rushing in disorder towards the bridge, driving their cattle before them, and carrying with them on their backs or in waggons their most valued property, with provisions, clothes, and even furniture. the bridge not being wide enough for the passage of the distracted multitude who were thronging towards it, boats were heavily laden with people, and many foundered. the armed bands that had appeared on the hills, whether as a matter of prudence or because they were waiting for the command to advance, made no haste to descend into the valley, and night came without a single enemy having quitted his post of observation. this night was a painful one for the inhabitants of the valley. it was autumn, and the cold was already beginning to be felt. they were arriving breathless in the camp, covered with sweat; the sharp air of the night was freezing their limbs. they were calling to or searching for each other in the crowd, and although space was not wanting, it seemed as if this multitude would never succeed in housing itself on the plateau. fires were being lighted, and the warriors, sigild's companions, were hastening to and fro on horseback among the distracted crowd, endeavouring to make themselves heard and to introduce a little order into this confusion; for each tribe had had its quarters traced out for it by the wise foresight of the brenn. but those who had arrived first at any spot were loath to quit it and take up their baggage again to carry it elsewhere. the animals were lowing or bleating, the children were crying, and the women lamenting. the valley presented a quite different spectacle; animated the night before, lighted up by the household fires that sparkled through the trees, and filled with the sounds of evening, it was now silent and deserted; not a light nor the least appearance of life could be distinguished. a pale fog was diffused over the meadows. at nightfall sigild ordered the barriers of the camp to be closed, prohibiting, on pain of death, their being opened to any person whatever. thus many belated families had to await the return of day below the ramparts. with smiling countenance the brenn was leisurely traversing on horseback the various quarters of the camp: he was addressing all he met, and his gentle, penetrating voice seemed to restore order and silence wherever it was heard. his words and counsels, and the fatigue that was taking possession of the crowd, had soon caused an appearance of calm to succeed the confusion that prevailed at first. then the brenn re-entered the hut he had caused to be constructed for himself on the projecting summit of the promontory, in front of the némède, and summoned tomar into his presence. tomar was one of the stranger warriors whom sigild had kept near him after the meeting above mentioned. had these foreign warriors been forced to quit their native regions in consequence of the devastation of their estates and the ruin of their families, as the brenn had affirmed; or had they been banished by their countrymen for certain misdeeds? we cannot say. certain it is that they were devoted body and soul to sigild, who on his part was in a position liberally to reward their devotion. tomar was of medium height, and his large head, on a short neck bristling with harsh, thick hair, seemed to move with difficulty. his face also preserved a kind of immobility; and but for his grey eyes, which, under his bushy eyebrows, seemed to penetrate in every direction, the man might have been taken for a rough-hewn image of wood. with curved back, long arms, always falling down by the side of his body, and legs heavy and bent, tomar could nevertheless perform a march of twelve hours in succession without turning his head. yet at the end of the journey this automaton-like being had seen all that was visible through the whole route, and could give an account of what he had observed with the most minute exactness and in the most perfect sequence. he could speak many gallic dialects, but no one--not even sigild--knew his past history. tomar rarely laughed. a travelling merchant had brought an ape into the valley; and witnessing the grimaces of this specimen of the quadrumana, tomar burst into a fit of laughter. it was almost the only time that he had permitted himself such an ebullition, and if any one wanted to provoke anything like a smile upon his rigid countenance, he must mention the ape. [illustration: sigild and tomar.] as his manner was, tomar entered the brenn's hut as noiselessly as a cat, and placing himself before sigild said, "here i am!" "tomar, i rely upon thy aid." "yes." "thou wilt go out of the camp without a single person--mind, a single person--suspecting thy departure." "yes." "thou wilt go to the border of the sequani; thou understandest? thou wilt speak to ditovix; thou understandest?" "yes." "thou wilt ask him for five hundred warriors who have nothing to lose." "yes." "thou wilt tell him that these warriors will find here lands and wealth." "yes." "thou wilt conduct them through the forests, getting all the information thou canst." "yes." "thou wilt require three days to go; one day to arrange matters with ditovix; to assemble the five hundred warriors, six days; to bring them here, four days; altogether fourteen days. the evening of the fourteenth, dating from to-morrow morning, thou and the five hundred warriors will be at a distance of three miles from the camp, towards the north, in the woods. at sunset thou wilt place a pole at the top of one of the highest trees; when the first quarter of the night has expired thou will hoist a lighted faggot on the summit of the pole. thy warriors will be under arms, and you will immediately rush upon the enemies between us and you. we shall make a sally at the same time, and fall upon them." "the enemies will be there?" "the enemies are sure to be there, because if they wish to besiege the camp they cannot take up any other position. they are sure to be there." "very well, i set out." "listen! if you meet any parties of the enemy, say that you have been wronged by us, and that you are seeking vengeance, knowing that we are on the point of yielding to them. they will either accept or refuse your co-operation. if they accept it, the warriors of ditovix will occupy a part of the enemy's camp, and at the signal agreed on will spread confusion on all sides, while we make a sortie from the ramparts, and fall upon them; if they refuse it, you will pretend to be greatly irritated, but will affect to retire, and at the close of the day you will return to the place mentioned." "but if the enemy occupy that spot?" "they will not occupy it, because we shall compel them to concentrate their forces around us. stop, here is gold, and a ring well known to ditovix. listen further. during the attack, as it will be at midnight, the warriors thou bringest and our men, not being acquainted with each other, might engage in mutual slaughter. before the battle let each of thy men put on a necklace of grass, and set fire to everything that can burn. that will be easy; the enemy will make himself a shelter with branches: we shall wear necklaces like yours, and will light fires on our side. next, when making the attack, let all thy men shout 'sigild!' ours will answer with the same cry. to ensure the lighting of the fires, take burning embers in earthen vessels; let there be at least one of these to every five men. if the enemy accept your aid, keep as much as possible in separate quarters, so that it will not be difficult for you to make your grass necklaces, and you will have your lighted fires to use, while you will also avail yourselves of the fire made by the enemy. but if through distrust they separate you into small parties, arrange beforehand your signals of attack, and instead of grass necklaces, have the right leg bare.... fourteen days!" "i understand." [illustration: fig. .] sigild had surrounded the camp with a number of wooden towers placed on the old rampart, which had been strengthened. these towers, whose appearance is shown in fig. , were made of trunks of trees piled one upon another, and framed at their extremities. they projected from the rampart. at their summit was constructed a wooden floor surrounded by a parapet of wattling; and this floor was reached by means of a ladder placed inside the tower. the under story gave shelter to the men charged with the defence of the towers, and who watched from the top. if they perceived any suspicious movement without, it was their duty to give the alarm by blowing a horn. sigild had fixed the number of men for each tower at twenty. two of these twenty men remained day and night on the platform, the day and the night being each divided into four parts; there were eight men on duty during the day and eight during the night. of the four remaining, the first was constituted chief of the tower; the second was intrusted with the stores, and the distribution of food and munitions; the third was to be at the disposal of the chief of the tower, to carry messages and seek for help in case of need; and the business of the fourth was to repair the injuries caused to the defences in the event of an attack. as the circumvallation measured four thousand five hundred paces, and the towers were one hundred paces apart, there were forty-five towers, including the stronger and loftier ones placed on the two sides of the entrances. nine hundred men sufficed to guard them. sigild had taken the precaution of having a store of timber and branches brought within the inclosure of the oppidum. by his care the wells had been deepened, and a trench dug outside the ramparts, towards the north. in addition to the flocks that habitually grazed within the camp, a great number of cattle had been brought by the fugitives to the plateau. but it would not have been possible to feed all these animals if stores of fodder had not been laid in beforehand. accordingly, great stacks of grass had been placed along beside the rampart, thatched with reeds. between the towers the guarding of the ramparts was intrusted to a thousand men, put under the order of fifty-three chiefs; the two entrances were under the command of warriors of tried courage, and well known to sigild. this garrison, consisting of about two thousand men, had long been settled in the camp, and had partly executed the work of its fortification. as to the fugitives, they might have amounted to twelve thousand; and out of this number two thousand at least were able to fight, were provided with arms, and had been habituated to endurance. in place of the original huts, which had fallen to decay, sigild had formed a kind of _halles_, or vast sheds. there were eight of these sheds; one for every tribe. in front of each were disposed, at regular distances, circular fire-places, formed with flat stones, and intended for cooking. as soon as the sun appeared above the horizon a confused sound of voices succeeded to the silence which had gradually fallen upon the plateau. but sigild had not lost time during the night. orders had been given to his trusty followers; eight mounted chiefs, followed by armed men, went among the multitude of fugitives, and pointed out to each tribe the locality that had been assigned it. whether through lassitude, or from a sense of danger, the multitude obeyed, and towards the middle of the day the camp had ceased to present the appearance of disorder it exhibited the evening before. around the sheds, which were insufficient for such a number of families, might be seen men making huts with branches. the larger animals were fastened to stakes, and browsed on the grass which had not been too much trodden; the sheep were folded, and the women were preparing the day's repast; in every quarter the children were running about, and seemed to enjoy this new life. as to the warriors, they silently kept watch on the ramparts and the towers. in the morning the valley was filled with a thick mist, and the hills were visible on either side above it; upon their ridges was no sign of the enemy, and from the white vapour which hid the valley, not a sound issued. had the enemy withdrawn? was it a false alarm? from the camp the course of the river was scarcely distinguishable beneath the thick cloud of mist which covered it. towards the end of the first quarter of the day sigild sent out a detachment of a hundred men, with orders to explore the bridge and the banks of the river and rivulet. if no enemy appeared they were to follow the course of the latter and to reconnoitre towards the north; they were to avoid engaging with the enemy. ten men were to remain upon the bridge to collect brushwood, and set fire to it the moment they saw the enemy in the valley. gradually the fog dispersed, and at noon the sun shone out in all its splendour through the whole extent of the valley. nothing broke the silence, the air was still, and in the distance, cattle that had been forgotten were seen quietly grazing. many of the fugitives wished to leave the camp and return to their houses, with a view to remaining there, or to fetch articles which they had been unable to bring away. sigild doubled the posts at the gates, with orders not to let any one go out. he went from one to another, trying to make the people understand that the enemy, far from withdrawing, was only waiting an occasion to seize the unwary who attempted to return to their homes. "they are in ambush," he urged; "they hope that you will relapse into security and will become their prey without a struggle; for though they covet your goods, they are still more anxious to get possession of your persons: they will carry you off to sell you, your wives and your children, as slaves among the nations beyond the mountains." despite this warning, however, a great number were crowding towards the points of exit, and the armed men had hard work to keep the multitude back, when there arrived at the eastern entrance fifty of the warriors sent by sigild to reconnoitre. they were covered with mud and sweat. when interrogated by the brenn, they said that about three thousand paces from the camp, towards the north, among the woods, and although they were proceeding cautiously, they saw themselves all at once surrounded by the enemy: that many of them had been killed or captured; that they owed their escape only to their knowledge of the neighbourhood, and that they effected it by rushing into a narrow ravine filled with underwood and decayed trunks of trees, and leading down to the rivulet, not far from the camp. "your chief is killed?" said the brenn. "we do not know." "you left him behind you!" "we had orders to avoid any engagement." "you have not abandoned your arms?" "we have our arms." "go and take rest." in an instant the entrances were clear, and the crowd returned in silence to its camping grounds. sigild then went to the northern end of the camp; he looked long through the depths of the forest; then he summoned to this front five hundred armed men from the tribes, besides those who were at their post; he stationed them behind the parapet, and ordered them to keep silence. he went into each of the towers raised on that side, and spoke in a low voice to each of the chiefs. then all at once a shout arose from the southern side of the plateau. the brenn mounted his horse and rode off hastily in that direction; but on his way he was told that the bridge was on fire, and that the ten warriors stationed there were coming in by the western gate. "you have seen the enemy?" said sigild, when the ten warriors made their appearance. "we have seen them: they were advancing in a strong body towards the bridge, endeavouring to screen themselves behind the reeds and willows." then sigild selected a hundred men from among his best warriors, and posted them on the slopes of the plateau outside the western gate, ordering them to pile up underwood and trunks of trees in the sunken road, to keep behind on the banks, and not use their bows and slings till they saw the enemy near the barricade; and if they attempted an assault on this point in a considerable body, to retire within and occupy the ramparts, helping those intrusted with their defence. in reality, however, the brenn did not anticipate any serious attack on that side, which was difficult of approach. he thought the enemy would not attempt an assault with a river at their back, even should they succeed in crossing it. his attention was once more directed to the north. on this side, in fact, the camp is separated only by a slight hollow from the adjacent plateau, which widens and affords space for the gathering of a large number of troops, and a secure retreat in case of failure. he had also ascertained that the enemy already occupied the wide, forest-covered plateau. sigild again rode through the whole length of the camp at a walking pace, uttering here and there words of encouragement whenever he encountered looks of alarm. his calmness, his frank and agreeable expression, reassured the most timid. night fell by the time he reached the ramparts on the northern side. silence still reigned in the woods. when it was quite dark, some boys were let down by his orders over the parapet, loaded with bundles of straw and dry grass; their instructions were to untie these bundles in the ditch sunk at this point at the foot of the escarpment. then with the help of poles held down to them the children climbed back again. sigild allowed only a few small fires to be lighted, screened by the height of the rampart, and all awaited the issue. the brenn walked about conversing in a low voice with some of his trusty men, and the warriors standing around the smouldering fires, which threw a red glare upon them, exchanged only a few low and hurried words. now and then a laugh escaped, but it was immediately stifled. the guard of the rampart had orders to keep a good look out, and if they perceived the enemy, to raise no cry. they were to give the alarm only by throwing clods of turf on the fires. they were not to show their heads above the wattle parapet. the night was clear, but there was no moon. at the middle of the first quarter of the night one of the chiefs came down from the rampart walk and approached the brenn. "the enemy are coming," said he. "what proof hast thou?" "i heard the cracking of dead branches." sigild ascended the rampart surrounded by several warriors. "to your posts!" he said, in a low voice. that very moment some clods of earth fell upon the fires, scattering a shower of sparks. sigild and the watchmen had observed certain forms of a whitish appearance that seemed to be creeping towards the counterscarp. some of them let themselves down into the ditch, and pushing one another up scaled the escarpment; they succeeded in reaching the wattling. hearing no sound inside, they turned round and helped up others. when about fifty were at the top of the escarpment, poles were handed to them furnished with hooks, which they fixed into the wattling: then those who had remained on the counterscarp pulled the poles with all their force. the wattling gave way, and the assailants rushed on to the rampart walk. thrust back by the swords of the defenders, the greater number rolled down to the bottom of the fosse. then, in accordance with the orders of the brenn, flaming brands were thrown among the straw placed at the bottom of the ditch; it took fire, and, spreading a bright light, brought into view a broad front of enemies. from the summits of the towers the slings and bows discharged a shower of stones and arrows upon them. many of the defenders were preparing to cross the debris of the wattling and get down the escarpment to throw themselves upon the enemy, but the brenn stopped them, threatening with death any who should quit the rampart. the surprise had failed, and the ranks of the enemy wavered and retired out of range of the missiles. the brenn, however, caused the wattling to be repaired as far as circumstances allowed, and doubled the ranks of the defenders on the rampart, as well to present a firm front to the assailants as to hold back the men of the foremost rank whom the enemy should seek to pull down into the ditch. besides this, he formed between each tower small bodies of twenty men, who were to hasten to the weak points and to hurl down any of the assailants who should gain a footing on the rampart. then he sent some of his trusty men on horseback to the eastern and western fronts, to convey intelligence, or to give warning in the event of attacks being made on several points at once. scarcely were these measures taken when the enemy were seen returning in considerable strength to the ditch; with loud cries they rushed up the escarpment. they were warmly received, and the ditch was being filled with the dead and wounded, facilitating the passage of those who followed, especially as many bore fascines. after two attempts the assailants gained a footing on one of the ramparts; but the reserve bodies attacked them in front, while the men from the towers issuing right and left took them in flank. whether the lighted straw had not been quite extinguished, or the besieged had thrown more burning brands into the ditch, some fascines took fire, burning the wounded, who uttered the most dreadful cries. the attack languished, and at length the leaders of the besieging host gave the signal for retreat. a certain number of the assailants had remained alive in the power of the besieged, and sigild gave orders that they should be guarded and not put to death. as to the wounded lying within the ramparts, they were killed. towards the middle of the night fires were seen to be lighted in the woods, about a thousand paces from the camp. the besieged had lost a few men only, but the ditch was filled with the enemy's dead and wounded. the groans of the latter were the only interruption to the quiet of the night. sigild slept not; he kept half the warriors on vigorous guard during the third quarter of the night, and the other half during the last quarter. those who were not on guard slept around the fires. the brenn, when the assault was over, had sent messengers to the chiefs of the eight tribes to acquaint them with the happy result of this first engagement. at break of day the brenn had the prisoners brought before him. two or three of them spoke the language of the valley, but with a foreign accent. clothed in drawers laced around, and a tunic of undyed wool, with a broad strap which served them for a girdle, they looked not unlike some of those merchants who occasionally came into the valley to barter yellow amber and bronze for corn, cheese, tanned hides, and wool. "why do you come to attack us?" said sigild. "we have been driven from the lands we have inhabited from the most ancient times, by hordes from the north. these men have killed many of us, taken away our wives, and murdered our children: the stronger among us have combined together, and crossing a wide river on rafts, we have travelled onwards towards the setting sun, seeking a home. two days' journey from this spot we were told that this country is good and can afford sustenance to many; so we have come hither. "when our chiefs saw that you shut yourselves up in this place, regarding us as enemies, they told us we must first make ourselves masters of the camp. we obeyed. we are only doing to you what has been done to us." "why not have sent some of your number to ask of us what you required?" "i do not know." "you have come as enemies, and as enemies we have received you. how many are you?" "a great many." "go seek your chiefs and tell them that if by nightfall their entire host have not quitted the land of avon, the captives we have made here shall suffer." "i will not go." "why?" "because our chiefs will not leave this land. put us to death; for if any of your party have fallen into the hands of our men, they are doomed to death to avenge our comrades killed this night." "good." sigild ordered that the captives should be fettered till he had decided on their fate. the brenn was very anxious that the enemy should take up a position towards the north, opposite to the weak point of the oppidum. accordingly he was continually reconnoitring on the eastern and western fronts as far as the river and the other side of the rivulet, to prevent the besiegers from establishing themselves in either quarter. upon the steep sides of the plateau, opposite the burnt bridge, sigild had placed a small camp guarded by two hundred men. the reconnoitring parties, which he sent out in large numbers, had orders to bring back into the camp all the fodder and strayed cattle they could find, engaging the enemy only when they encountered them in small bodies. but the invaders did not seem to be contemplating another assault. they took up their quarters in the woods to the north and on the slopes of the hills, right and left, leaving between them and the camp the river and the rivulet; marauding parties might also be seen in the valley, foraging, and pillaging the deserted dwellings. on the other side of the destroyed bridge they formed a wide palisading strengthened by barricading of timber; and two days afterwards they had constructed a floating bridge on the river, formed with trunks of trees fastened together and kept in place by a kind of dam made with piles of timber fixed in the bed of the river and inclined up the stream. it was evident that the besiegers were in no hurry; that they were living upon the provisions left in the valley; and that it was their intention to reduce the besieged by famine. in fact the inhabitants of the val d'avon had been able to carry with them only a small quantity of provisions. they had their cattle, but these being badly fed and crowded together were dying in great numbers; the cows ceased to give milk, and the store of forage was rapidly diminishing. on the sixth day of the investment, the chiefs of the tribes proposed to the brenn to cut their way through the enemy's lines while their men still preserved their strength entire, and not to wait till the utter failure of provisions should place them at the mercy of the invaders. of course the brenn opposed this proposition, declaring that the day of deliverance would come, and that they must have patience. nevertheless it was of great consequence to him that the enemy should concentrate his forces on the northern side. accordingly, one evening at nightfall, he collected two bodies of men, one at the eastern, the other at the western gate. he had observed that the enemy used to prepare their morning meal just before noon, and that of the evening at sunset. after the evening repast they were heard singing and shouting. when the opportune moment arrived he divided each of his bodies into two. the first two halves were to march along the ramparts parallel to one another till they reached the woods; there they were to rush on the two flanks of the besiegers' outposts; they were not to prolong the attack, but to fall back with all speed to the northern salient of the oppidum. an issue would be open at this point. in the meantime, the two other halves would unite, provided with stakes, before this salient, where, with the aid of palisading, they would make an advanced work (fig. ) and then fall back one hundred paces to the right and left. [illustration: fig. .] the men who guarded the north front had orders to cut an opening in the rampart twenty paces wide, and to throw fascines and clods of turf into the ditch, and have wattles ready to close the opening instantly. the first two detachments, therefore, set out in silence; that on the western side left a little before the one on the east, so as to arrive at the same time on the enemy's flank. the two other detachments preceded them, and stationing themselves at the northern extremity of the oppidum, drove in their stakes according to the instructions given, and then fell back to right and left. a fine autumnal rain was falling, and the ground was slippery. some time elapsed before the two detachments found themselves in sight of the enemy's camp. the besiegers had no outposts; but their army encamped in front of the oppidum, and at a distance of about six hundred paces from it, was intrenched behind barricades of timber; the intrenchment presented an extended front. their men might be seen around the fires, talking loudly, singing, and drinking cider and mead, of which they had found abundance in the houses of the valley. an attack on this front was not to be thought of; they must get round it. so the two detachments separated farther and farther from each other, and advanced with the greatest difficulty along the bogs and under the woods in momentary fear of being seen by the enemy. at length the one which was manoeuvring on the right reached the end of the front, got under cover, and awaited the signal, which was to be given by the one on the left by the blowing of a horn; for the brenn had calculated that the former would reach the extremity of the front before the latter. the time, however, was getting on, and sigild, who had advanced with several warriors on horseback along the verge of the wood, still heard nothing. he sent two of his warriors to ascertain where the two detachments were; they had great difficulty in making their way through the wood, while the enemy's fires, which they saw in the distance through the trees, only added to their difficulties, by preventing them from seeing the ground they were riding over. the right front of the enemy towards the river formed a lengthened curve, and the left detachment kept advancing parallel with the front without finding a point of attack. midnight had passed when this detachment found itself at last before an opening left in the barricade, but this opening formed an interior angle, which rendered the attack very hazardous. the detachment waited until all was silent in the camp. the fires, fed only at irregular intervals, cast here and there a fluctuating light, and fewer shadows were passing before the braziers. one of the warriors sent by sigild was approaching; he considered that the attack on this point should not be deferred, and that the enemy must be surprised during his first sleep. one of the men gave the signal agreed upon, and the troops rushed through the opening, slaying all before them with terrific shouts, scattering the fires and forming in triangle, so as to prevent the enemy from getting round them. they did not proceed very far, for at the cries of the assailants and of the wounded, men were seen to rise up on every side and hasten towards the point of attack. the little troop then closed, and ceasing to advance, turned and fled back towards the oppidum, following the verge of the wood along the steep banks of the river. a long-continued shout was then heard on the enemy's left; the attack had begun on that side also. whether the enemy, which had started in pursuit of the left detachment, had succeeded in getting round it, or whether the detachment itself lost its way in the darkness, it was unable to regain the plateau in time, and continued to follow the course of the river. as to the troop detached on the right, being less distant from the oppidum, directly it found itself pressed by a numerous body of the enemy, it retired in good order, and went direct to the angle of the intrenchments, as had been arranged, hotly pursued by the crowd of besiegers. at the same time most of the enemy's forces that had started in pursuit of the left detachment were coming on the ground. the brenn had anticipated the contingency of the attack which he had arranged not succeeding in every point. despite the darkness, he saw that his people were not in advance, as they ought to have been, of the hostile warriors who were making their appearance on his left; he therefore quickly retired within the outwork of stakes which had been formed by his orders, and commanded the straw fires to be lighted. the two detachments in ambuscade to the right and left outside the rampart had orders to refrain from attack till a signal agreed upon had been given. at the barrier of stakes, then, there arrived at the same time the right detachment in flight, that portion of the enemy who were in close pursuit of them, and those who were looking for the errant left detachment. a great number entered pell-mell into the triangular space formed by the stakes. it became the scene of an indescribable _mêlée_; those who were defending the wattling which closed the breach dared not make any openings for their brethren-in-arms whom they saw engaged with the enemy. the brenn struck into the midst of the crowd trying to rally his men. he succeeded in cutting his way up to the wattling, against which he leaned his back; and the warriors of the right detachment being encouraged by his example, presented a head to the enemy, whose numbers, however, continually augmented. a few minutes more and they would have been swept down by the multitude of the assailants; the last comers were urging on those in front of them, and the wattling and the warriors who defended it would have been borne down by the tide. the brenn, with his long sword, was making a circle of dead and wounded around him. then shouting over the parapet to give the signal, the sound of trumpets arose above the yells of the combatants. the enemy seemed to hesitate for a moment; then, closing into a compact body, they rushed upon the barricade, which gave way as if swept by a torrent. at the same instant loud shouts were heard on each of the enemy's flanks; the two troops in ambuscade attacked the confused column outside the rampart.... the combat did not cease until daybreak. those of the enemies who had succeeded in penetrating into the oppidum were killed or captured. the triangle of broken stakes was strewn in every direction with the dead. the enemy, disconcerted by the two simultaneous flank attacks, and finding himself cut in two, was no longer able in the darkness to concert an assault, and retired. nevertheless, those who had been taken in the outwork and at the gap of the oppidum fought obstinately to the last, and the captives who were driven before the brenn were all more less severely wounded. sigild was covered with blood and dirt; his great black horse had been killed in the last _mêlée_, and he himself had been trampled on. he ascended the nearest tower, and saw that the enemy remained not far off; they were forming a contravallation of barricading three hundred paces from the oppidum. their attitude was threatening, and it was to be feared that they meditated another attack. the brenn, therefore, had the gap immediately repaired and the parapet strengthened with strong stakes about two feet apart. besides this, he sunk a second ditch with intrenchment in a concave line, within the northern salient of the oppidum. this intrenchment could not be seen from without. he contrived an egress at either end against a tower. the object was attained; the enemy was concentrating himself in front of the weak salient of the oppidum, and was drawing nearer. the defenders, however, ignorant of the motives which had induced the brenn to attempt the hazardous sortie of the previous night, shook their heads and appeared anxious. if two or three hundred of the enemy had been killed, they had lost nearly as many. the women whose husbands were dead were filling the camp with their lamentations. yet it was essential that sigild should possess the confidence of his brethren in arms till the _dénoûment_ he had prepared should arrive. he called together the chiefs of the tribes. "you see plainly," said he, "that we cannot break through the lines which inclose the camp. the enemy are very numerous and daring, and not to be disconcerted. besides, can we think of leaving here the aged, the women, and the children to become their prey! it is very certain that even if a troop of brave warriors could cut their way through such a host of enemies, the women, the aged, and the children could not follow them. "my object in the sortie of last night was to force the enemy to concentrate all his forces towards the north; which he will be all the more disposed to do, as it is the weakest point of the oppidum. when we have thus drawn him to that side, obliging him to withdraw from the hill-sides, we will go down on a dark night into the valley, cross the river by a bridge which i shall have in readiness and which fifty men will be able to put in place, and fly towards the river. when we find that we have no more provisions left than we are able to take with us, friends with whom i am in communication will guide us to some neighbouring tribes of our race, and who will give us a hearty welcome, because they want help in cultivating the broad lands they possess. you may therefore bid the tribes and the warriors take courage: every contingency is provided for. but if the plan is to succeed, we must not allow the enemy a moment's peace while we remain here." having nothing better to suggest, the chiefs of the tribes appeared to put faith in sigild's words. his confident air, his good looks, the energy he displayed, and the care he took to make himself acquainted with everything, continued to secure for him the sympathy of the unfortunate refugees. in the little camp above the burnt bridge he had, in accordance with the plan stated, some light rafts made which could be readily fastened together. he went frequently to see the work, and appeared to attach great importance to it. he ordered that the captives who were badly wounded should be killed; the others taken in the last engagement were supplied with food in abundance. confined in a sort of pit surrounded by stakes, they could not observe what was going on in the camp. well guarded in the daytime, they were by sigild's orders scarcely watched during the night, on the supposition that some would contrive to escape and would make the enemy believe that there was no scarcity of provisions, which was exactly what happened. one night, three of the stoutest captives succeeded in getting out of the pit, and gliding along the ramparts, regained the besieger's camp. then sigild had the others killed. of the warriors not engaged in guarding the ramparts, the brenn had formed four corps of three to five hundred men each; and at certain times of the day and night he sent them down by one or other of the gates to harass the enemy on one side of his camp, or at both sides at once. neither party suffered much loss in these skirmishes, whose only result was to keep the besiegers in constant suspense, to weary them and oblige them to concentrate their forces. it was also evident that the enemy were preparing for a general assault. they were seen accumulating faggots, cutting long poles, and making wicker screens. on the morning of the fourteenth day of the siege only a few scattered parties were seen on the surrounding hills, while in the valley the palisading formed opposite to the ruined bridge and the raft bridge were alone still occupied by a considerable number of troops. "it is certain," said sigild, to the chiefs of the tribes, "that the enemy is preparing to attack us. we must resist this assault with vigour, and then we will take advantage of his exhaustion and disorder to carry out our plan of flight." the besieger's preparations appeared formidable, and the camp opposite the northern salient of the oppidum presented a busy scene. sigild on his part neglected no means of resistance, though he calculated on the arrival of the troops summoned to their relief in the evening. he had the towers well supplied with stones and darts: on the ramparts he strengthened the wattle parapet, and increased the number of inclines for reaching it easily. both sides were preparing for a decisive conflict. the intrenchment made behind the salient was well manned, and the brenn trained his men to pass out in a body through the two egresses formed at the extremities of the intrenchment, so as to take the assailants in flank. that day however, passed without fighting. at sunset the brenn ascended one of the towers, and attentively examined the horizon. his attendants thought he was watching the movements of the enemy; he was, in fact, waiting for tomar's signal. the night passed, and no signal appeared. repressing all signs of the serious anxiety that had oppressed him through this tedious night, the sun had no sooner arisen than the brenn disposed his men at the points he thought likely to be attacked. the enemy had formed in two large bodies three hundred paces from the oppidum; they had accumulated in front of them an immense quantity of faggots, beams, and wattles. the sun was already high above the horizon when they began to move. first came a line of warriors under cover of wicker shields, which protected them from darts and stones. in this way they reached the counterscarp of the ditch, despite of missiles from the towers. there they fixed the wicker shields, and behind these a great number of the enemy bearing faggots gradually posted themselves. then over this screen they threw a great quantity of these faggots into the ditch. when they judged that there were enough of them, they threw flaming brands upon them. the besieged had no means of counteracting this kind of attack. they showered darts and stones in abundance upon the assailants, but only wounded a few of them; nor did they seem to mind these missiles. the wind blew from the north-west. the faggots were soon kindled, and the smoke and sparks blinded the defenders. three of the towers took fire, as well as the wattling of the ramparts. sigild, calm and unmoved, had withdrawn his men behind the second intrenchment. "the enemy," said he, "will not be able to pass till all is consumed; that will take time; let him mount the rampart and cry victory. then will be our time for action." in fact, the green wood burned badly, and produced much smoke; the besieged threw bushes and chips on the red-hot faggots to feed the fire, and it continued burning. the enemy were becoming impatient; the besieged looked on cheerfully. about the middle of the afternoon, however, the fire went out at some points; the besiegers threw earth and trunks of trees into the ditch, and, perceiving no defenders, thought that the ramparts being intenable were abandoned. with shouts they rushed on to the slopes, leaped the half-consumed wattling, and meeting with no resistance, descended in a close body into the camp (fig. ). there they were greeted by a sudden shower of darts and stones; but they unhesitatingly rushed upon the intrenchment, which presented only a slight elevation and a shallow ditch, thinking to carry it easily. [illustration: fig. .] but the intrenchment was strong, and furnished with thick pointed stakes. the assailants, urging forward and aiding each other, gained its ridge; they were received with swords and pikes, and fell back dying upon their comrades; others filled their places. the bodies of the wounded, which in some places gradually filled up the ditch, afforded them a passage. many of the enemy had succeeded in throwing themselves into the midst of the defenders, and in opening deep passages among them which were instantly occupied by the most daring. the deep front which the brenn had formed behind the intrenchment was broken. then it was that he unmasked the two egresses at the extremities, sending out from both the troops of chosen warriors, who, keeping close along the deserted rampart, fell upon the dense stream of assailants. so compact was the crowd, and so great the pressure against the intrenchment, that they had scarcely room to move. the two detachments above mentioned were mowing away before them to enable them to advance. but the enemy kept pouring in, and the space regained was immediately filled with fresh assailants, who, disregarding the attacks on their flanks, pushed furiously on to the centre. the bodies of the slain and the faggots had filled the ditch for the length of a hundred paces, and the loosened stakes formed but a slight protection to the defenders. the noise of the attack brought a great number of women hurrying to the spot. they might be seen with bare arms, raising stones above their heads, and hurling them with shrill cries against the breasts of the assailants, or despatching the wounded that had fallen inside the intrenchment with the culinary wooden pestles used for pounding herbs and flesh in hollow stones. a shout was raised, the crowd of assailants opened, and a hundred men were seen steadily advancing, bearing on their shoulders an enormous trunk of a tree, and surrounded by warriors armed with axes. this column overthrowing all in its passage, whether friend or foe, made a wide lane in the intrenchment, strewn with dead and wounded. the beam was already more than half way through on the inside of the defences when the women ran in, and rushing like she-wolves on the flanks of the column, passed between the warriors, and clung to the legs of the bearers. the enormous beam swayed, toppled over, and bore down in its fall both assailants and defenders by its vast weight. sigild profiting by the confusion, then dashed into the breach, followed by a troop of warriors which he had not without difficulty kept in reserve. in his return he cut himself a passage through the crowd of assailants. seeing this movement, the warriors who had issued from the two ends of the inner intrenchment redoubled their efforts. others rushed on to the rampart-walk by the side issues of the intrenchment, and fell upon the enemies within or without the rampart. the latter, cramped within this narrow space, and with their centre broken through, were unable to use their arms. some fell and were suffocated. those who were on the projecting part of the rampart began to turn and fly into the midst of their advancing comrades, who not seeing what was taking place behind the rampart, were for compelling them to return to the battle. the crowd fell into confusion, and disregarding the voice of the chiefs, accumulated in such masses in the ditch, the escarpments and the rampart-walk, that it could act only by its weight, and offered itself to attack without power of defence. most threw down their bucklers which hampered their movements. sigild kept advancing, and all the warriors not engaged in defending the intrenchment formed behind him in a column which became denser each moment. as soon as they were outside the intrenchment, these warriors turned about and threw themselves on the bulk of the assailants, who were separated into two masses. caught as in a pair of pincers by sigild's band, and by those coming from the terminal egresses of the intrenchment, they were slaughtered without resistance. in vain did the chiefs of the enemy sound a retreat. the bulk of assailants, who were massed between the rampart and the intrenchment, could neither advance nor recede. very few succeeded in rejoining their companions. fatigue alone stayed the defenders; it was no longer a combat but a massacre. although the warriors of the val d'avon had suffered considerable loss, the success of the defence had intoxicated them, and they were eager to take advantage of the disorder of the enemy to sally forth from the oppidum and fall upon them. sigild was obliged to swear to them by the most terrible of oaths, that their vengeance would be more effective by delay. he told them, moreover, that the enemy were very numerous, and that the losses they had suffered had not weakened them to such a degree as to render them contemptible; that they were burning for revenge, and that to attack them in their camp was to give them the very opportunity they desired. the authority of the chiefs of the tribes of the druids had, however, to be appealed to, to keep the warriors within the oppidum. night fell on the narrow battle-field covered with the dead and wounded. the brenn took re-possession of the ramparts, had the wattle parapet hastily repaired, the enemy's wounded put to death, and his own carried into the middle of the camp, where they were consigned to the care of the women; then he ascended one of the unburnt towers of that front, hoping to perceive tomar's signal. but the night was hazy, and the fires of the enemy three or four hundred paces distant were scarcely visible. it was evident that tomar could not have lighted his fire, or if he had lighted it, it was impossible to see it through the haze. the warriors after the laborious day, chilled by the autumn fog, were sleeping around their fires. the cries of victory had been exchanged for a death-like silence, broken only by the groans of some of the wounded who had been forgotten. the brenn was considering whether it would not be wise to follow the plan which he had indicated to the chiefs of the tribes--to leave the camp before daybreak by crossing the river on a line of rafts, before the enemy had time to effect a fresh assault. provisions would certainly fail them soon. but how move this multitude! the warriors needed rest. "one more day," he said to himself; "and if i have no news of tomar, i still must consider it." then he went out and ordered to the point attacked a body of warriors some hundreds strong, who, having guarded the unbroken part of the ramparts during the assault, and having taken no part in the conflict, were fresh and vigorous. some women even mounted the towers. he enjoined all of them to give the alarm vigorously if they saw the enemy approaching the ramparts, so as to rouse the sleeping warriors. he despatched several of his trusty friends to the other fronts of the camp, with injunctions to watch the approaches, and to send out scouts through the gates to ascertain any movements outside, and to light fires a little way from the ramparts, so as to illuminate the immediate vicinity. he proceeded towards the southern extremity of the oppidum, and saw that the little camp above the bridge that had been destroyed was guarded; but also perceived through the mist the fires of the enemy in the valley opposite this point. it was midnight, and sigild, exhausted by fatigue, returned to the northern side and retired to rest beneath one of the towers. some of his friends kept watch outside around a large fire. the brenn was sleeping, when a hand placed on his shoulder awaked him. by the light of a resin torch he saw tomar standing by him. "is it really thou, tomar?" said he, thinking he was dreaming. "it is i." "alone?" "alone here; the warriors are down there; the fog rendered the signal useless: i am come." "hast thou been seen?" "thy warriors sleep, no one has recognised me; a woman told me thou wert here." "why a day late?" "ditovix has assembled a thousand warriors." "ah, ditovix is with them." a cloud passed over the brow of the brenn. "he is a noble fellow," said he, after a pause. "thou knowest that we were attacked yesterday?" "i know it; i saw the field of the slain. the enemy are numerous; they cannot turn back, to-morrow they will make another attack--they are resolved to succeed." "and then?" "then ditovix is to fall upon them before midday, when he knows the conflict is begun." "well?" "if i do not go back to ditovix, or if he hears nothing from you, he will make the attack." "remain with us, then; thou art sure that we shall be assailed in the morning?" "i passed along the enemy's camp--they are preparing for a fresh assault; and there are warriors following the course of the river to attack the west side also." there was not a moment to lose. sigild called his friends together, and informed them that a final effort must be made--that the enemy, harassed on their rear by neighbouring tribes, must either get possession of the oppidum that very day or perish. tomar was represented as having passed the previous day in the besiegers' camp, and become acquainted with the position of affairs. no one doubted the veracity of tomar, who, so far from exaggerating, never told a quarter of what he knew. sigild scarcely had at his disposal, after the various assaults that had taken place, three thousand men in a condition to fight, deducting the troop stationed opposite the burnt bridge. he divided his forces into three bodies, one of about twelve hundred men to defend the northern ramparts, the second of eight hundred posted on the western rampart, and the third of a thousand men which he kept in the centre of the oppidum under his own direct command. at the other posts around the oppidum he placed men unaccustomed to fight and unprovided with arms, but who were yet able to offer some resistance if the enemy should present themselves. women were posted in the towers away from the points of expected attack. their only duty was to hurl stones at the assailants. the day broke slowly owing to the thick vapours obscuring the sky; nevertheless the warriors, encouraged by the words of the brenn and by their success the day before, awaited the enemy full of ardour. the druids, informed by sigild of the arrival of help, traversed the camp announcing that the hour of deliverance had come, and that the souls of those who should fall were secure of the most glorious future. the druidesses, with dishevelled hair, fastened sacred boughs to the wattling of the ramparts. a body of the enemy about two thousand strong now became distinctly visible opposite the western front of the oppidum, with the river at its back. towards the end of the first quarter of the day, this troop climbed the escarpment and stopped an arrow's flight off. it then divided itself into eight parties, each of which, provided with faggots, proceeded towards one of the towers. the assailants were received with a shower of arrows and stones. they advanced nevertheless without wavering, and heaped up the faggots at the foot of the towers, not without considerable loss on their side; for the besieged hurled on them over the parapets large pebbles and trunks of trees. the assailants tried several times to set fire to the faggots, but the wood was damp, and the defenders threw baskets of wet earth on the incipient flames. the assault on the western side had continued for some time, when a vast number of the enemy threw themselves on the northern salient, whose towers were partly destroyed. as on the previous day, they rushed in such a compact mass upon the salient, that they were not long in effecting a breach. sigild then sent out five hundred men by the western gate to take the assaulting column in flank, whilst he proceeded with the five hundred of the reserve body straight to the salient. by the time he had reached this point the enemy was already within the rampart, and his forces were sheltered behind the intrenchment. on seeing the heaps of the slain with which this quarter was strewed, the fury of the enemy appeared to be redoubled, and they swept along like a flood through a wide breach. thinking themselves at last masters of the oppidum, they fell in disorder upon the troops led by sigild. this body, disposed crescent-wise, formed as it were a second intrenchment, which the assailants vainly endeavoured to break through. the five hundred men who had gone out by the eastern gate had reached the left flank of the throng of besiegers, when a tremendous shout arose from the enemy's camp. horsemen came galloping at the top of their speed towards the oppidum. the attacking host wavered. assailed on their flank they made scarcely any resistance, and a movement of disorderly retreat became more and more clearly manifest. those who had gained a footing within the rampart, seeing themselves no longer supported, or rather forced on by new-comers, turned and fled with all haste towards the wood. sigild perceived that ditovix was making his attack; then, collecting his warriors and summoning all the men from the various parts of the defences, he formed a dense column, and overthrowing the assailants who were betwixt him and the rampart, passed it and rejoined the warriors already outside: "now," cried he, "forward! the enemy is ours; let not one escape." the wretched besiegers, hemmed in between the warriors of ditovix and those led by sigild, although twice as numerous as the forces of their opponents united, became utterly disorganized, no longer thought of defending themselves, and rushing now to one side, now to the other, met death everywhere. many attempted to fly towards the river or the rivulet; but at an intimation from sigild, tomar, who had remained in the oppidum, sent the warriors posted on the ramparts in pursuit of them. the assailants on the western front, seeing the disorder into which their party had been thrown on the plateau, had got down towards the banks. on that side the warriors poured forth by the western gate, broke the bridge of rafts, and fell upon the enemy hemmed in by the river. those of the besiegers who did not meet their death that day, perished of cold or hunger in the endeavour to escape pursuit. a thousand, however, were taken; among others those who guarded the palisade in the valley. they were slain in the némède in presence of the druids and druidesses. most of the bodies were thrown into the river, and for several days the dwellers on the banks of the river found corpses entangled among the reeds. chapter iv. _the cost of defenders._ ditovix and his warriors had done their duty bravely; the tribes of the val d'avon regarded them as saviours, and when the unfortunate besieged went back to their devastated homes, they cheerfully divided the little that remained to them with the new-comers. in the enemy's camp were found provisions, the fruits of pillage, and upon the bodies of the slain a little gold, and arms; and all this was equally distributed. but winter was approaching, the fodder that had been collected was dispersed, the animals lost or consumed, the stores of grain destroyed. the means of subsistence had to be procured from the merchants, and the allies to be fed. scarcity prevailed in this valley, so prosperous a month before. its saviours were exacting, and began to ask where was that wealth and plenty which had been promised them. quartered in the oppidum with the warriors of sigild, the followers of ditovix assumed a domineering air on the strength of the service rendered to the inhabitants of the val d'avon, and whose importance they were incessantly magnifying. quarrels arose continually, and it needed all the influence which sigild had acquired among his people to moderate their angry feelings. ditovix abstained from interference in these disputes. when assistance had been asked--he would say to sigild,--his men had been promised wealth of all kinds; how could he remonstrate with them if they were left to die of want? ditovix had brought a thousand warriors to aid the inhabitants of the val d'avon; and, in spite of the losses suffered during the action, a month after the dispersion of the enemy's army the number of these auxiliaries was found to have unaccountably increased. the druids then interfered; they represented to ditovix that though he and his warriors had saved the families of the valley from total destruction, they were reduced to poverty; that if they died of hunger the same fate would befal his men, since there was nothing left to give them; and that in the common interest it was necessary to come to some understanding. then ditovix adopted a different attitude. "i should be willing to take my warriors back," said he, "but i cannot. they would refuse to follow me, and would give themselves up to excesses of all kinds. i can scarcely prevent their proceeding from murmurs to violence. i had to promise much to induce them to come, and they must be satisfied. fighting has been their constant occupation--for the most part in the countries beyond the mountains. they are not fitted for tilling the soil or tending cattle. what do you propose?"--"what do you ask?" said the druids. "i will call together the leading men among them, and explain the state of things; and will let you know what they want." ditovix and sigild consulted together, for both saw the necessity of securing the same advantages for the warriors of the valley and the auxiliaries, if they would avoid a collision. the two chiefs called in some of the principal merchants who frequented the valley, to induce them to furnish supplies in consideration of certain guarantees very advantageous to them. matters being thus concluded between sigild and ditovix, they called their adherents together, and had no difficulty in getting them to accept the conditions on which they themselves had agreed. these conditions were as follows:--the oppidum was to be placed under the guard of the warriors of the vale and the followers of ditovix exclusively of all others. their number amounted to nearly three thousand. the inhabitants of the valley were to give them one day in four to help them in executing the works necessary for defence or for building their dwellings. a fourth part of their crops and of their cattle was to be contributed by every family of the vale for the maintenance of the three thousand warriors. as sigild and ditovix took upon themselves to supply the wants of the people during the scarcity, all the merchandise was to be deposited beneath the promontory near the bridge; and the inhabitants were to receive and exchange it there, being forbidden under the severest penalties to treat directly with the merchants. harsh as these fiscal arrangements were, they were obliged to accept them. ditovix, loaded with valuable presents, quitted the oppidum, leaving his followers, who accepted sigild for their brenn. the bridge was quickly restored, and there arose at either end dwellings and storehouses for the merchants and their merchandise. the chiefs of the warriors levied a toll on all the exchanges; they had the monopoly of the market, as they bought up all the produce that was exchanged. notwithstanding the pressure of fiscal burdens, nay, even as a result of it, the inhabitants of the val d'avon secured a larger return from their land than formerly, and they had a greater number of cattle. their commerce became more extensive, and the population increased. many merchants came to live in the town built at the two extremities of the bridge. thirty years therefore after the siege we have just described, the valley had become highly prosperous; though the inhabitants smarted under the domination of the warrior caste, and considered a quarter of their substance and of their labour a great deal too much to give to men who lived in idleness, and whose chiefs displayed an ostentatious luxury. often, it is true, these warriors would undertake some expedition, from which all did not return to the valley; but those who came back safe and sound took care to enforce the payment of past dues, and would then spend days in eating and drinking, and were more exacting than ever. they recruited from among the youth of the valley, and even from among foreigners, for it was of importance to them that their numbers should not diminish. gradually the remembrance of the events which had led to this state of things faded from the minds of the population. the grandchildren of the followers of sigild and ditovix regarded the privileges accorded to their ancestors as a birthright; while the tillers of the soil, and the shepherds and craftsmen of the vale, became accustomed to submission, and finally adopted the conviction that they had come into the world to serve and support the men who inhabited the oppidum. chapter v. _the second siege._ two centuries and a half had elapsed, and the val d'avon had become the centre of a numerous and wealthy district of the lingones. at the base of the oppidum, extending on both sides of the river, was a town-a mercantile _depôt_ of some importance; for as the river is navigable below the promontory, many boats coming from the sequani ascended thus far, laden with merchandise brought from the south, and returned freighted with horses, tanned hides, ironwork, smoked and salted meat, timber, grains, cheese, &c. &c. the oppidum was then partly covered with habitations and gardens belonging to the descendants of sigild and ditovix's warriors. its ramparts, oftentimes repaired, were in imperfect condition; earthworks were to be seen there, with a few towers of dry stone walling--principally on the north side. the part of the town on the right bank was uninclosed, but that which stood on the southern slopes of the promontory was surrounded by dry stone walls which reached the ramparts of the oppidum. a _tête de pont_, built of the same materials, appeared on the right bank nearly contiguous to the houses of the part of the town built on that side (fig. ). [illustration: fig. --the town and cite d'avon (war of the gauls).] it must not be supposed that this town presented the aspect of our modern cities. it consisted of a series of inclosures of wood or dry stone walls, surrounding gardens, in the middle of which were built the houses--wooden buildings thatched with straw or reeds. on the southern point of the oppidum, however--behind the némède and commanding the valley--there rose a structure of wood and stone, which was conspicuous above the rampart (at a). it was the dwelling of the chief of the warriors and his ambactes,[ ] who were numerous. his name was catognatus: rich by inheritance, he also farmed the tolls and taxes over a wide district of the lingones, having thus greatly increased his wealth. by his liberality he had gained numerous partisans, and was always surrounded by a troop of cavaliers equipped and fed at his expense. by family alliances he had acquired considerable influence, extending even among the Ædui, and took part in the wars which that people were waging against the arverni. he was able to muster five or six thousand warriors among his own adherents and those of his ambactes. when cæsar set out in pursuit of the helvetian emigrants who persisted in passing through the roman province to spread themselves in gaul, the Ædui had promised to supply his troops with corn. the helvetians, and close upon their track the romans, had already passed the avar,[ ] and the promised grain had not arrived. the fact was, that certain persons of influence among the Ædui were opposed to the romans, and, fearing that if once they got a footing in gaul they would aim at subjugating it, were using every effort to prevent the fulfilment of the promises made by the magistrates of the principal city of the Ædui. catognatus was one of the chiefs most actively opposed to the romans, and had friends among cæsar's auxiliaries who informed him of all that was going on in the roman camp. on his side he communicated to the helvetii whatever information he received respecting the movements or position of the roman army. cæsar having become acquainted with these manoeuvres through liscus, took his measures accordingly; and after having in great part annihilated the emigrant horde of the helvetii, when the scattered remnant sought refuge among the lingones, he first sent couriers to prohibit the latter from aiding or sheltering the fugitives: then, after allowing his troops three days to recruit themselves, he pushed on again in pursuit of the helvetii. these quickly submitted; but cæsar had not forgotten the share which catognatus had had in the matter of supplies promised by the Ædui, and while he was treating with the latter with a view to relieve part of gaul from the tyranny of ariovistus, he despatched a legion and some auxiliary troops to assure himself of the disposition of the lingones, to seize catognatus and the helvetii whom he had harboured, and, if necessary, to chastise the inhabitants of the val d'avon--_i.e._, if they persisted in holding to their chief. catognatus, who had his informants in cæsar's army, was soon warned of the danger that threatened him. he had, in fact, given an asylum to some helvetian fugitives, thereby raising the number of his men to nearly six thousand, supposing the warriors of the val d'avon willing to make a stand against the roman troops. assembling his ambactes, therefore, and their principal retainers, he urged on their consideration the inconsiderable size of the roman army; the fact that it was already distant from the frontiers of the province, and had been weakened by preceding conflicts; that though it had defeated the helvetii in the open field, the issue would have been different if the enemy had been posted behind intrenchments; that they ought not to suffer the romans to busy themselves with their affairs or differences, since they, the gauls, did not interfere with the affairs of the provinces; that the romans might justly prohibit the helvetii from passing through roman territory, but that they infringed the independence of their neighbours and allies when they presumed to keep order among them without being formally requested to do so; that he knew, moreover, that the Ædui, devoted though they seemed to the romans, were only waiting for an opportunity to chastise their presumption; that cæsar was going to divide his forces, and that if the men of the val d'avon resisted the troops sent against them, this would be the signal for a general rising which would be fatal to the roman armies. he told them also that they ought to remember that their ancestors made the romans tremble even in rome, and that it was disgraceful to submit to the dictation of those whom they had formerly conquered. catognatus also adopted the stratagem of sending emissaries to the houses of the people under the guise of travellers. they professed to have seen cæsar's troops, and to have found them half-starved and utterly destitute; they affirmed that the best of them had been obliged frequently to retreat before the helvetii; that they were reduced by three-fourths, and that the remainder of their army was composed of raw recruits and of auxiliaries, who were only waiting for an opportunity to return home. these reports, spread through the valley, were still more efficacious than catognatus's discourse; for the gauls have always been inclined to lend a willing ear to representations that flatter their desires, without inquiring whether they are true or false. if any of the older men shook their heads and said that it would be as well to know what was asked of them before assuming a hostile attitude, they were treated with contempt. catognatus, seeing all the people inclined to resist, had trunks of trees mingled with earth and pebbles heaped up before the weaker points of the oppidum. they re-dug the ditch before the walls of the left bank and surrounded with palisades the part of the city that had remained unprotected on the right bank. in addition to this, catognatus had a cutting dug at a hundred paces from the oppidum between its northern salient and the plateau. these works, hastily undertaken, were still unfinished when the arrival of the roman troops was announced. the infantry were advancing in good order in the valley on the left bank, while the cavalry followed the hills on the same side. not a man quitted the ranks to go and pillage the houses, and neither songs nor shouts were heard. the helmets of polished bronze worn by the legionaries were shining in the sun, and, seen from a distance, the troop resembled a long fiery serpent uncoiling in the meadows. from the elevated tower occupied by catognatus the slightest movements of the romans were visible. they soon deployed along the rivulet, their left being against the river and their right protected by the cavalry on the hills. the lieutenant, titurius, then sent an envoy into the city. he was commissioned to announce to the magistrates that the romans appeared as friends, but that since catognatus had given an asylum to some of the helvetii, and had notoriously exercised his power to prevent the Ædui from furnishing the supplies promised to the army commanded by cæsar, and which had come into gaul with the sole purpose of hindering the helvetii from devastating,--that is, strictly in the character of allies,--they must deliver up the said catognatus and the helvetian refugees to the lieutenant titurius without delay: that if this was done the romans would only demand provisions for ten days,--a reasonable requirement, as between allies; after which they would return to the Ædui. catognatus, surrounded by his principal ambactes, was present in the assembly of the magistrates when the envoy delivered his commission. seeing them hesitating, he replied to the summons as follows: "here is the object of your search. i am catognatus; i have afforded an asylum to certain of the helvetii, who are my friends, and whose hospitality i myself have shared; i am allied with the helvetii as i am allied with the romans. if the romans had been beaten by the helvetii, and any of them escaped from massacre had taken refuge here, would they consider it honourable for me to give them up to their enemies, had they come here in arms to demand them? if such was the usual conduct of the romans, i should blush to be their ally. to the vague accusation respecting the influence i am alleged to have exercised over the policy of the Ædui, i have nothing to reply. the Ædui act according to their own good pleasure, and it is not for me to interfere with them. the romans should demand satisfaction of the Ædui if they have not fulfilled their engagements. as to myself, the romans have asked nothing of me, and i have promised them nothing: what business have they here? if they had a message to send me, was it necessary that the bearer should be escorted by a legion? is this how allies should treat each other? go and tell the legate that we are at home here; that if he comes as a friend we shall treat him as a friend; but that if he presumes to dictate to us and treat us as children, we shall answer him as men who know how to act for themselves." "he is right! he is right!" was the unanimous exclamation of the ambactes; and overwhelming the envoy with insults, they thrust him out. catognatus had to interpose to prevent the crowd from tearing him to pieces. titurius was instructed to show the greatest possible consideration for the inhabitants, that the neighbouring peoples might not be irritated; and to adhere scrupulously to the terms of the demand transmitted by the envoy--simply to require the surrender of the helvetii and catognatus. on the other hand, his orders were to accomplish the expedition with all possible despatch, as cæsar had but a few legions with him. the legate, therefore, refrained from investing the city and the oppidum, and, as he had no reason to fear the immediate arrival of help to the enemy, he judged it best to direct all his efforts to the plateau, hoping to take the fortress by a vigorous effort. it was, however, to be feared that if the oppidum was taken by assault, catognatus and a part of the helvetii might succeed in escaping. at night, therefore, the legate was devising a plan by which, with the eight thousand men or thereabouts of which his force consisted, he might at the same time prevent all means of escape from within, and make a vigorous attack upon the oppidum, when a centurion came to tell him that some of the inhabitants requested a private interview with him. the inhabitants in question were magistrates of the lower town.... falling at titurius's feet, they told him with tears that it was with no good will they submitted to the dominion of catognatus and his warriors; that the demands presented that day to the assembly by the envoy were nothing but reasonable, since the helvetii had entered gaul only as marauders, and that catognatus had used his influence to embarrass the march of the romans their allies, who had come to destroy the helvetii; that they the magistrates had no authority over the warriors, and very little over the populace, enthralled as they were, and deceived by the agents of catognatus; that this chief and his men had taken refuge in the oppidum, and the part of the town situated at the extremity of the promontory, abandoning the part built on the right bank; that, in fact, they entreated the legate to occupy that part of the city with his troops, who would be well received, and who, they hoped, would not give themselves up to any excesses, since they were treated as friends. titurius raised them, and, speaking kindly to them, promised to do what they asked; but, fearing treachery, stated that he must keep them as hostages. the magistrates surrendered themselves to his disposal, declaring that his troops would find the gates open, the posts unoccupied, and the inhabitants in great excitement, but by no means hostile, if they were well treated. on their arrival, the romans had instituted a ferry on the river below the town. a reconnoitring party despatched immediately reported that the egresses were in fact free, and that no one appeared behind the walls. titurius therefore invested all the egresses, and towards midnight a thousand men selected from among the auxiliaries were in possession of the lower town, without any sound of disturbance or sign of disorder. in the morning the gallic warriors posted at the head of the bridge saw the romans before them, and were vehement in their abuse of the inhabitants, threatening to burn the town as soon as they had driven away the roman troops. meantime, the romans demolished several houses adjoining the head of the bridge, and made use of the _débris_ to form a semi-circular intrenchment of contravallation, ending against the river at its two extremities. titurius established some posts along the rivulet; and on the larger stream above the city he constructed a bridge of boats guarded by two posts at either end. this accomplished, he removed with the bulk of his troops to the northern part of the plateau. next day he examined the position, after having filled up a part of the intrenchment; but catognatus had done away with the egresses of the northern front, and completed the rampart at this point. the assault was vigorously repulsed. this success emboldened the besieged, and they began to overwhelm the legate with sarcasms. seeing that he could not take the oppidum by storm, in presence of a determined and numerous body of men, he resolved upon a regular siege. although the cutting dug by the defenders between the oppidum and the plateau was only a bowshot from the rampart, in a few hours it was almost entirely filled up, consolidated, and levelled. then titurius had a great number of trees felled in the woods extending along the northern plateau, and brought in front of the camp. this wood being duly prepared, an _agger_ was commenced fifteen paces from the ramparts, in spite of the darts and stones hurled by the besieged. this _agger_ consisted of a terrace about a hundred paces long, ten feet high and twenty deep, with a gap in the middle twelve paces wide. from the two sides of this interval extended at right angles two galleries (_vineæ_), solidly constructed with trunks of trees and covered in; these galleries were about a hundred paces long. the _agger_ was made of trunks of trees piled up, mingled with earth, with inclines for reaching the summit. this was a work of some days; and as during that time the romans made no attack, and thought only of protecting those engaged in it from the missiles thrown from the ramparts, the besieged did not cease to ridicule them (for they were within hearing), asking them if they were intending to build a city and pass the winter there. but one morning the warriors of the oppidum saw a wooden tower rising at the extremity of the two galleries. this tower, the woodwork of which had been prepared beforehand, was set up within the day; its summit rose more than ten feet above the top of the towers of the rampart (fig. ). [illustration: fig. .] the gauls contemplated this structure with uneasiness, although they did not comprehend its importance; so catognatus resolved to set fire to the works during the night. with this view he had placed on the ramparts, behind the wattling, barrels filled with pitch, grease, and dry sticks; then he placed two bodies in readiness to go out by the eastern and western gates, provided with vessels full of resin, tow, and grease. these troops were to make their way along the outside of the defences, and simultaneously attack the flanks of the besiegers, while the men posted on the ramparts were to remove a portion of the wattling, and to roll the barrels, after setting them on fire, against the _agger_ whose front was raised on the counterscarp of the ditch. [illustration: fig. .] the romans had been able to see these preparations from the summit of the tower; moreover, they stationed a strong guard on the flanks of the plateau every evening. the legate at nightfall had these points protected by stakes, and had a quantity of _stimuli_ (fig. ) driven into the ground outside. about the third hour of the night the besieged issued noiselessly from the two gates and came within half a bowshot of the roman posts. at a signal given from the interior, the two bodies rushed at once on the besiegers' flanks. but even before they could reach the palisades, many of them, wounded by the _stimuli_, fell uttering cries of pain. those who reached the besiegers' posts, thinned by the darts showered upon them, and hesitating on seeing so many of their party fall, were more inclined to fly than to continue the attack when they saw themselves in their turn taken in flank and rear by the besiegers. the defenders on the ramparts, whom the darkness of the night prevented from seeing clearly what was taking place, and not knowing whether the confusion arose from the flight of the romans or of their own men, dared not discharge stones and arrows. meanwhile the lighted barrels were being rolled in front of the galleries, which had already begun to take fire. by the glare of the flames they could see the roman soldiers mount on the terrace carrying baskets full of wet earth, which they threw on the barrels; and the defenders killed or wounded many of them. at this moment some of the fugitives who had taken part in the two sorties, re-entered the camp calling out that they were pursued by the romans. catognatus had barely time to send troops to defend the two egresses and to protect the retreat of his men. he himself took up a position in the centre of the oppidum with a chosen band, that he might be able to assist the quarter that should be most closely pressed. aided by this diversion the romans, less harassed by darts from the rampart, were able to extinguish the fire. they took advantage of the last hours of the night to advance the tower along the galleries by means of rollers, as far as the edge of the _agger_, and in the morning the warriors of the val d'avon were not a little surprised to see this ponderous wooden structure commanding the whole rampart and the towers of the defences. at dawn, showers of stones and arrows hurled from the top of the besiegers' tower prevented them from approaching the defences, and two catapults swept the part of the oppidum in front of it with enormous missiles, which, hissing through the air, killed or shattered to fragments all they encountered. two _onagri_ overwhelmed with stones the scaffolding set up by the defenders on their front to attack the _agger_, and smashed it in pieces. [illustration: fig. .] a bridge was soon let down on the rampart from the face of the tower, and the romans, advancing in good order, took possession of the defences (fig. ). catognatus and his retainers, to the number of five or six hundred, had not expected this turn of events, and had taken refuge in the stronghold built beyond the némède, at the southern part of the oppidum. when the besiegers, whom no one thought any longer of resisting, were drawn up in force on the rampart, and had occupied the towers--killing those who occupied them rather as refugees than as defenders--they separated into three large bodies: the two wings marched along the inner side of the rampart, taking one after another the towers upon it, and entered the enclosures and houses, killing those who endeavoured to resist. the centre troop, drawn up in the form of a wedge, marched right on and swept the plateau. the unfortunate defenders fled, and crowded together along the side of the némède. many endeavoured to gain the stronghold, but the entrances were closed and the bridge destroyed. catognatus was thus abandoning the greater part of his followers and leaving them to the mercy of the enemy. the warriors of the val d'avon threw away their arms, and with out-stretched hands implored quarter of the romans. titurius then stayed the slaughter, and told the defenders that if they gave up catognatus and the helvetii who had taken refuge among them, their lives should be spared. pointing to the lofty fort, beyond the némède, the besieged replied that it was not in their power to surrender catognatus, who had taken refuge there with a small number of his followers, but that they would immediately deliver up the helvetii still among them. the legate wishing to act with mildness, according to cæsar's instructions, contented himself with this assurance. the helvetii were immediately delivered up, and the people of avon, disarmed and stripped of their warlike accoutrements, were sent back to the valley, with the exception of a hundred hostages. the few chiefs, however, who had remained among them, having been put in fetters, were to be kept, with a view to being placed at cæsar's disposal. as to the helvetii, who numbered five or six hundred, titurius kept some as hostages; the rest, having been disarmed, were ordered to return to their country by the most direct route: provisions for the journey were distributed among them. the buildings of the némède and its grove prevented catognatus from seeing what was going on beneath its walls, but as he no longer heard war-cries nor the clash of arms, he concluded that his men had surrendered. as for himself and his retainers, knowing that they had no mercy to hope for, they prepared themselves for defence, and resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible. a deep ditch partly cut in the rock separated the stronghold from the némède. the defences consisted of an enclosure, made in gallic fashion, of trunks of trees alternating with layers of stone surmounted by wattling. a large quadrangular tower, constructed in the same way, enclosing four stories, and terminated by a roof of reeds covering a crenelation, served as a place of retreat. within the enclosure were wooden huts for the garrison; as the tower, which was only twenty paces wide by twenty deep, and whose walls were thick (about three paces), could barely contain a hundred men. titurius reconnoitred the approaches. the ditch interrupted all communication with the oppidum, and ended against its ramparts. towards the south, the stronghold rose immediately over the escarpment, which on this side was so steep that no ditch had been required. but a palisade on the outside, fixed in a mound, prevented approach to the base of the stronghold. as stated before, the walls of the upper town occupying the southern slopes extended to the rampart of the oppidum. but these walls had been abandoned by the warriors of catognatus who had taken refuge in the stronghold. on quitting the upper town they had set fire to the bridge, seeing which, the romans posted opposite the head of the bridge had passed this latter without meeting any resistance, and had succeeded in extinguishing the flames. the bridge was promptly repaired. the legate, therefore, effected a communication with his troops in the northern quarter, who were then occupying the upper town, and completely invested the stronghold. time pressed, and as he had already lost twelve days before the oppidum, haste was necessary. in the first place, he sent one of the gallic prisoners to hold a parley with the defenders of the stronghold. he promised to spare their lives if they would give up their chief, and the helvetii that might be among them. if, on the other hand, the attack was once commenced, they must expect to be all put to the sword. the messenger was received by a shower of stones, and returned bleeding to the legate, who could no longer hesitate. the order was given to fill up the ditch, and to speed the work; the centurions, employing threats and blows at need, compelled a good many of the vanquished to carry faggots and earth. protecting themselves with mantelets, the romans suffered only trifling loss, for the besieged had but few missiles. besides, titurius had brought up the engines of war, demolished those parts of the wall of the némède which might embarrass the operations, and posted the best slingers and archers on the flanks, so that the rampart of the stronghold, riddled with projectiles, was scarcely tenable. at night the filling-in of the fosse was consolidated by timberwork, on which were spread brushwood and turf. at the first hour of the day a cohort advanced in slow march on the ground thus made, forming the _testudo_ (fig. ). [illustration: fig. ] some of the defenders endeavoured to resist; but they were few in number, and exposed to the projectiles which the auxiliary troops of slingers and archers incessantly discharged upon them in an oblique direction. the rampart was soon taken; but darts, stones, and flaming balls of pitch and tow were hurled upon the assailants from the tower, and if they attempted to approach it, planks and pots filled with gravel. it was necessary, therefore, to set up screens on the rampart even; for to abandon that would have revived the courage of the defenders. here the romans lost several men, and many were wounded. to set fire to the tower was scarcely possible; for constructions of timber mingled with stone do not readily take fire titurius, however, placed one of his catapults so that the projectiles thrown by it should reach the roof of the tower; and when satisfied that this object was attained (it was towards sunset), kept up a continuous discharge of burning missiles--consisting of darts wrapped in tow saturated with oil and tar--on the roof, which soon caught fire. the legate made sure that as the floors of the tower were of timber, the roof when it fell in would communicate the fire to the ground story; and in fact, the roof had not long fallen in when a dense column of smoke, accompanied by sparks which appeared as if issuing from a vast chimney, shot forth from the summit of the tower. catognatus, and those of his followers who had crowded into the stronghold, despairing of maintaining it, then opened a concealed aperture, which gave egress on the sides of the upper town; and without bucklers, a sword in one hand, a flaming brand in the other, rushed with terrible cries on the romans, who were keeping guard outside the palisading on that side, and who, surprised by this column of warriors, opposed but a feeble resistance, and made an attempt to rally and fall upon the flanks of the fugitives. it was night, and the slopes were steep, occupied here and there by houses and palisading enclosing gardens. the romans were ill-acquainted with the ground, and often got into places whence there was no exit. catognatus and his followers, reduced to about two hundred men, rapidly descended the paths with which they were familiar; and in passing threw their brands upon the thatched roofs, or into the barns filled with hay and straw. the inhabitants rushed out in bewilderment, not knowing whence the attack came. seeing parties of romans passing by seeking egress, entering the gardens and the houses, and breaking through the gates and barricades to reach catognatus and his men, they cried "treachery!" and threw stones at them, thinking their object was to burn and massacre. the women, with dishevelled hair, threw themselves in their path, covering them with abuse; others hurled furniture and whatever came to hand upon them from the windows. rendered furious by these obstacles, by the failure of their pursuit, and the attacks of the inhabitants, and seeing it was useless to reason with these terror-stricken people, the romans killed all they encountered. hearing this outcry, and seeing the sky lit up by the flames, the legate guessed what had happened, and sent two cohorts over the ramparts on the town side, with injunctions to march with orderly pace down the paths, rallying the roman troops, and driving the inhabitants before them. at the same time, he sent a centurion, by the bridge of boats which he had formed across the river above the town, to warn the roman detachments that could be got together in the lower town and at the gateway of the bridge, not to let any one pass out from the upper town. catognatus, with most of his warriors, had in fact got as far as the bridge; but he found it guarded by a body of romans. he attempted to cut his way through them; but as the bridge was somewhat long, the enterprise was hazardous. the commander of the guard, an old soldier, had marshalled his men at the first alarm, seeing that this passage must be defended at any cost. barricading the entrance with all the materials they could collect, they awaited the fugitives behind their bucklers. when catognatus presented himself and--uttering the war-cry--sought to force his way through, he was met at close quarters with a shower of darts. the whole foremost rank of the fugitives fell right and left: the others, rendered frantic by despair, passed over their bodies and threw themselves upon the front of the romans, who had now taken to their swords. a fearful struggle commenced, lighted only by the gleam of the conflagration. the romans, having the glare in their faces, aimed badly, while the gallic warriors knew where to strike. the column of fugitives began to melt before the roman front, whose gaps were immediately filled up. then came up the centurion, with fifty men whom he had rallied. seeing themselves supported, the roman guard took the offensive, and pressed on to the platform of the bridge, hewing down the remnant of the defenders of the oppidum like bushes in a thicket. not one of these warriors drew back; all met their death in the pass through which they had thought to make their way. it was with great difficulty that order was restored in the upper town, and only when they saw the romans extinguishing the fires did the inhabitants begin to understand what had happened. next morning the body of catognatus was found lying on the bridge; his head was sent to cæsar, and the expedition being terminated, titurius led back the legion and the auxiliaries to their quarters among the Ædui. footnotes: [footnote : _fideles_--warriors devoted to the chief.] [footnote : the saône.] chapter vi. _the permanent camp--foundation of a citÉ._ six years after the events just related, the siege of alesia being terminated, cæsar gave orders for the establishment of a permanent camp on the plateau of avon--the site of the gallic oppidum. as the plateau was near the road connecting châlons-sur-saône with langres, cæsar judged it desirable to have at this point, which was naturally favourable for defence, a safe retreat for a numerous body of troops, more especially as the road passed through somewhat disturbed countries. the camp was to be sufficient in case of need for two legions and some auxiliaries--about twenty thousand men. now, as the site of the oppidum was much more extensive than was needed for a force of that strength, it was determined that the camp should be placed on the southern part of the plateau, whose level was elevated some few feet above the northern point, and which was separated from this extremity by a wide ditch. [illustration: fig. .--the roman permanent camp.] fig. gives a plan of the arrangement. a ditch thirty feet wide and seven feet deep divided the plateau obliquely from w.n.w. to e.s.e. at a was placed the prætorian gate, and at b the prætorium. at d was the decuman gate. the two lateral gates, f, e, fronted east and west respectively. the sunken roadways of the gauls had to be altered and made into metalled roads; they started right and left of the bridge, c, and followed the acclivities of the plateau, rising till they branched off at o into the road from châlons to langres. from these two lateral military roads there was an ascent to the gates e, d, f, the _place d'armes_, h, and the two side entrances of the small advanced camp, i, on the south point of the plateau. thus the outer circuit could be traversed without difficulty. the ramparts of the town occupying the southern declivities of the promontory were destroyed, and the inhabitants obliged to settle on the other side of the river, either to the south-east or to the south. the head of the bridge, c, was repaired. the gates of the camp had good _claviculæ_, each with two towers constructed of dry walling, earth, and timber work (fig. ). at regular intervals along the _vallum_--which, except the front on the n.n.e., exactly followed the edge of the plateau--were erected towers, or rather watch-towers, of timber. in addition to the supply from the wells within the limits of the camp, the romans collected the water of the springs on the northern plateau, by means of pipes made of trunks of trees bored lengthwise and joined end to end. this channel followed the roadway g, and conducted the water into six good cisterns, hollowed out in the rock and lined with cement. there was a cistern under the prætorium, and two for each of the legions. on the western side palisades connected the smaller camp with the ditch sunk near the angle of the prætorium; while on the eastern side of the plateau its escarpment rendered this precaution unnecessary. the engineer entrusted with the setting out had disposed the fosse in an oblique direction, as shown in fig. , so as to present a larger front to assailants who, having taken the smaller camp, should present themselves on the _place d'armes_, h. the projecting angle was well defended by the prætorium, and the obliquity of the _vallum_ enabled the defenders making a sortie by the prætorian gate, and by that marked f, to take the enemy almost in rear, and to drive them over the eastern declivity of the plateau. [illustration: fig. .] the rampart walk of the _vallum_ was raised three feet above the level of the camp, and was furnished with a cresting of stakes with wattling to retain the earth on the parapet (see fig. ). the fosse was twelve feet wide and seven deep, and was continued all round the camp, even on the sides where the declivities were steep. the némède was demolished. the druids had it re-erected on the plateau in front of the camp, to the south, at the entrance of the wood. the inhabitants of the val d'avon were enjoined, under penalty of seeing their town destroyed, to abstain from injuring these intrenchments while unoccupied; they were even charged to keep them in repair, and to supply provisions to the troops who should be quartered there to protect the country against the invasions of the barbarians; for as gaul was then tranquilized internally, and brought under the roman sway, there was nothing to fear, except the attacks of the germans, who were continually threatening the north-eastern provinces. the camp was in fact occupied several times by roman troops, and new works were successively planned and executed there. the country was fertile, and the position excellent, viz., between the large towns châlons-sur-saône (cabillonum), langres (andrematunnum), and autun (bibracte). the camp received the name of _aboniæ castrum_, the town being thenceforth called abonia--a name which it retained until the fourth century. it was from abonia that vindex set out with a party of troops, which he assembled in the plains of the saône, to rouse gaul in revolt against nero, and to give the empire to galba. after the death of the gallic hero, galba wished to testify his gratitude to the towns and countries that had declared in his favour: and abonia then acquired the title and rights of _civitas_, and enjoyed a long peace. from the reign of titus onwards, the camp was no longer appropriated exclusively to the troops. at the time when the oppidum had been converted into a permanent camp, the whole of the plateau, its slopes, and part of the ground situated to the north, had been considered as _ager romanus_. it was what we should now call "crown land,"--_ager publicus_. the inhabitants, therefore, could not possess or build upon this land, or, if permitted to occupy a part, it was as usufructuaries, not as freeholders. this roman law, which dated from the time of the republic, and which at first affected all provincial soil, was never rigorously applied. its enforcement would have been difficult, and the populations of the provinces, as well as those of italy, solicited and easily obtained the _jus italicum_, which consisted in the full possession of the soil, with liberty to use, to sell, and to transmit it by way of inheritance. when the imperial government was definitively established, the emperors favoured the development of the principle of private property; because the great landholders were then the only persons who could be considered as forming an aristocratic class, privileged, it is true, but, on the other hand, bearing the burden of special functions--such, for instance, as that of urban magistrature, then very onerous. it must be observed that the civic rights accorded by rome extended not only to a town, but to the whole of the territory pertaining to it. as the vale of abonia possessed the _jus civitatis_, and the site of the camp remained unoccupied, the inhabitants petitioned that ground so well adapted to habitations should be restored to civil uses. it was then determined by the emperor vespasian that the _ager publicus_ of abonia should be colonized. colonization under the roman empire meant the division solemnly made by the _agrimensores_, according to certain religious prescriptions, of a part of the _ager publicus_ into shares. these shares were unequal, and, although apportioned by lot among the colonists--that is to say, among the native inhabitants and the foreigners who presented themselves as applicants for their possession, it always happened--by what means we are unable to say--that the allotments fell according to the rank or fortune of the individual. the ancient oppidum was therefore colonized. the remains of its ramparts soon disappeared; the wide fosse, which separated the large camp from the smaller one, became a road terminating by sloping paths in the level of the plateau; a theatre rose on the eastern declivity; water was brought in abundance, by a fine aqueduct of masonry, to baths constructed at the southern point, and to all the new habitations which soon arose on every side, surrounded by gardens. a temple, dedicated to augustus, was erected on the site of the ancient prætorium, on the very spot where stood the shrine of former days, and a second sacred edifice dedicated, say some, to hercules--which is doubtful--took the place of the ancient southern stronghold. a forum and a basilica occupied the middle of the plateau. the _villæ_ spread beyond the circumvallation, and extended over the two declivities, east and west. the lower town continued to be occupied by the merchants, craftsmen, boatmen, and the poorer class; it extended along the two shores down the river. the bridge previously mentioned was rebuilt with stone, and a second bridge of timber was thrown across half a mile further up the stream, at the continuation of the sunken way by which the plateau was divided. chapter vii. _the fortified citÉ._ three centuries of peace had caused the disappearance of the last vestiges of the ancient ramparts which surrounded the permanent camp of the romans, then occupied by the cité of abonia. but for many years the incursions of the germans had disquieted some of the neighbouring countries. they had made their appearance among the remi several times, and although they habitually presented themselves as defenders of the empire, or were actually called in by one party or the other during the civil discords by which gaul was then rent, their conduct was that of enemies, not of allies. finding the country attractive, they spread gradually among the eastern provinces, robbing, pillaging, and burning among the friends who invited their aid, as well as among the enemies they were going to attack. at their approach the rural districts were deserted, and the uninclosed towns hastily fortified. reims, langres, and autun had repaired their defences. sens had walled itself round with the materials of its chief public buildings. the vale of abonia, which at that time contained about twenty thousand inhabitants, followed their example; and pulling down their public edifices and the deserted temples of the city, the urban population formed ramparts around the plateau and a fence around the lower towns. the works, however, undertaken in haste, were of no great account, and fortunately the germans did not think of assailing them; but in the year , julian, having assumed the purple, betook himself to gaul to drive out the barbarians. the siege of autun raised, he passed through abonia, found its situation excellent, and arranged the plan of a fortress, which after the battle of strasburg and the defeat of chnodomar, was carried into execution. abonia thus fortified formed part of the second line of strong places established by julian between reims and lyons, in anticipation of fresh invasions by the germans. gaul, although her sons had furnished the roman army with its best soldiers for three centuries, had become unaccustomed to war at home. the roman legions no longer consisted of troops such as those commanded by the vespasians, the tituses, and the trajans. composed principally of barbarians, they wanted cohesion, were not sustained by patriotism, and deposed their chiefs on the slightest pretext. the latter, moreover, too often appointed by a court governed by intrigue, were for the most part incapable, or eager to enrich themselves rather than to conquer the enemy. for these troops, composed of heterogeneous elements, and having no faith in the valour of the chiefs placed over them--for these populations, accustomed to peace and the well-being it secures--ramparts were necessary, behind which the defence of the territory might be organized; for in the open field, such was the terror inspired by the germans that a prolonged resistance could not be reckoned upon. julian, however, had shown that the troops in the pay of the empire, if well commanded, were still in a condition to fight the barbarians; but julian was a philosopher; he understood his times, and could not shut his eyes to the unsound state of the imperial government, or at least believed the evil to lie so deep that he attempted to stay its progress by a return to paganism, hoping perhaps in this way to restore youth to the worn-out body. [illustration: fig. . the gallo-roman town citÉ juliana.] julian had then about him byzantine engineers who were very skilful in the art of fortifying places. this branch of knowledge is often developed among nations in proportion to the decay of military organization in the field. the conqueror of the germans had caused the fortifications of autun to be repaired and completed. those of abonia, which were less extensive, were carried out with completeness according to an entirely new plan, since there existed no traces of the ancient fortifications: the engineer philostratus sent by julian was therefore left to his own discretion. he began by clearing away the slopes of the ancient oppidum along the verge of the plateau, thus removing some of the villæ that had not been destroyed at the time when the arrival of the germans was expected (see fig. ). after having carefully studied the conformation of the ground, he perceived that the front of the city towards the north was weak, inasmuch as this front was most accessible to attack on account of the neighbouring plateau, whose level was but little below that of the site. he determined, therefore, to fall back, so as to get a more extended front. the front thus adopted was three hundred and fifty paces long.[ ] outside of this front he had a fosse sunk twenty feet wide in the bottom,[ ] so as entirely to divide the tongue of land which connected the promontory with the northern plateau. this fosse terminated at the two declivities east and west. at each end the bottom of the fosse was furnished with palisades, and there was a descent into the fosse by means of a flight of steps contrived in one of the towers, as will presently be shown. outside the fosse he formed a _vallum_ about four hundred paces in length, with an outwork containing a guardhouse and a watch-tower. the roman road to langres came to this point. on the eastern side, the aqueduct which brought water to the city followed the _vallum_, and was crenelated (_vide_ a). a gate was opened in the north front, flanked on the outside by two cylindrical towers. at the north-west angle arose a square tower high enough to afford a distant view of the valley at the bottom of which runs the river, and of the plateau; another square tower was built at the north-east angle, and between these two towers and the gate two other towers; so that between each tower there remained a space of about eighty feet. philostratus remarked that a daring besieger might run in towards the west, between the river and the city, and attempt an assault towards the salient of the west front, which commanded a rather gentle escarpment. from the square tower, b, to the river, and set back a little, so as to be flanked by the western face of this tower, he formed a _vallum_, with a square tower at its extreme end, commanding the water-course. further back was constructed a wooden bridge, connecting the two banks, and passing over the island of sand, c. along the two escarpments the engineer followed almost exactly the sinuosities of the edge of the plateau, but placing the gates in the re-entering angles. two gates were disposed on the western front, and one on the eastern, very near the situation of the ancient entrance to the _oppidum_ on that side. these three gates were each flanked by two towers, like those on the north. the inclosure of the city, formed of a rampart rising twenty feet above the level of the ground, including the battlement, and nine feet thick, was thus strengthened by thirty-six towers, without reckoning those of the gates. at the southern extremity, on the site of the ancient retreat of catognatus, was erected a _castellum_, or stronghold, separated from the city by a battlemented wall, and about one hundred and eighty feet away from the ramparts. at the southern extremity of the rampart, a square tower had to be built of greater height than the others, to overlook the vale of abonia. beneath this tower an egress was contrived, abutting on a massive wall, following the declivity of the ground, and crenelated on both sides; from the summit of which a descent could be made into the work, e, commanding the junction of the rivulet with the river, and the stone bridge constructed there. upon the other bank was built a vast _tête de pont_. the eastern gate was furnished with an outwork commanding the road, g; on the northern flank of the north-west entrance a guardhouse commanded the vicinity of the gate. the approaches were improved, and a wooden bridge was thrown across at h, with a _tête de pont_ and work commanding the confluence of roads at that point. building was prohibited on the western declivities--once occupied by houses and gardens--within a distance of one hundred and ten paces from the ramparts, or the military road, i; that is, habitations were allowed to remain or to be built outside the military bounds.[ ] inside the city, through the confusedly-grouped clusters of ancient houses, philostratus had new roads cut,[ ] with a view to establish a communication between the gates, and to facilitate the defence. at f was placed a forum, with a temple to apollo at i (for julian had caused a little christian church, previously built in the city, to be demolished). a basilica was built at m, a _curia_ at n; and at t baths were erected. in the lower town, quay-walls, q, kept the river within bounds; a vast market was disposed at r, and an emporium for merchandise at s. the town, or rather its suburbs, extended on the right bank, east as far as the middle of the island of sand, c, and south, to the lower side of the large _tête de pont_. these suburbs were simply inclosed by a _vallum_, as a safeguard against a sudden attack; for being commanded by higher ground they did not admit of defences adapted to resist a long siege. these works occupied several years, and were executed with resources drawn partly from the imperial treasury but chiefly from municipal imposts. abonia was wealthy; but it suffered long from the burdens imposed upon it to render it secure against the incursions of the barbarians. philostratus, moreover, had authority to make requisitions and levy dues, and he largely availed himself of it. the undertaking completed, this cité, thus transformed by the order of the emperor who had saved gaul, received the name of juliana. the valley alone preserved the name of abonia. it may be desirable to give a few details explanatory of the defences. fig. gives the section of the rampart between the towers. [illustration: fig. .] its terrace, raised to an average height of fourteen feet above the ground-level of the plateau, had a flight of steps between the towers five feet wide. the merlons were six feet high, and the sill of the embrasures was three feet above the footway. [illustration: fig. .] the rampart was constructed with two faces, of courses of small square stones, with courses of brick at intervals. the masonry between the two faces was of coarse rubble concrete. outside, along the verge of the plateau, a fosse ten or twelve feet wide protected the base of the rampart and followed the projections of the towers. a narrow covered way was led along the counterscarp to facilitate surveillance and allow the patrol to go their rounds. fig. gives the plans of the northern gate with its two towers, at a on the ground level, at b on the level of the curtain battlements. in one of these towers was constructed a stair, c, leading down to a postern, d, and in each of them other flights of stairs, e, which afforded easy access to the higher stories. the gate, divided into two archways for entrance and exit, was surmounted by a gallery, g, at the level of the rampart-walk, forming a crenelation. the road crossed the fosse, f, over an arch, _a_, and a wooden platform, _b_, which could be easily removed in time of siege; and then upon the platform, h, a screen of woodwork was to be erected, completely masking the two archways. outside the bridge, the stonework of which was battlemented, two small uncovered posts, i, defended the approaches, and a palisade, p, obliged all comers to make a circuit in order to cross the bridge. fig. shows this gate in perspective. below the roofing was the crenelation, which constituted the effective defence of the towers. moreover, at the level of the first story three openings were made, which in time of war were furnished with screens, and which afforded front and side views. munitions of war were hoisted to the higher stories by means of pulleys suspended in the round-arched openings, k (_vide_ plan of the first story). the other gates were constructed on the same model, the outworks alone being different, according to the disposition of the ground. [illustration: fig. ] fig. gives a general view of the great _tête de pont_ on the south, the _place d'armes_ and the battlemented wall ascending to the square tower on the south angle of the cité, and the _castellum_. the square towers were not covered by roofs but by platforms, so as to allow catapults or _onagri_ to be placed upon them.[ ] [illustration: fig. .] with this design quadrangular towers of the kind described were raised at the salient angles of the defences, which were weak points, but which, on the other hand, facilitated the discharge of missiles over a more extensive field. in case a front was attacked, propulsive machines were set up behind the curtains on earthworks or wooden platforms. the city thus strongly fortified was in a position to resist and defy the attacks of the barbarians, who, at that period of their history, were unable to undertake the siege of a stronghold well planned and defended. footnotes: [footnote : a pace was equivalent to three feet.] [footnote : the gallic foot was the _pied du roi_ (thirteen inches).] [footnote : the dark line indicates the habitations preserved, the red line the tenements rebuilt on the sites left unoccupied after the clearing necessary for the fortifications and their approaches.] [footnote : these new roads are indicated by red lines.] [footnote : the catapults could discharge bolts six feet long and very heavy. the _onagri_ hurled stones of sixty pounds weight to a maximum distance of two hundred and fifty paces.] chapter viii. _third siege._ whether the burgundians crossed the rhine at the solicitation of the gauls, or to find more fertile settlements, or because the emperor honorius had granted them a territory on the left bank of the river, certain it is that about the year they were occupying the banks of the saône, and had pushed their way northwards to the neighbourhood of langres and besançon, westwards as far as autun, and southwards beyond lyons. having entered gaul as allies--as auxiliaries of the tottering empire--they treated the inhabitants with a degree of consideration which was not shown by the franks and other tribes that were gradually invading the west. they had indeed gained concessions of lands and gifts of herds but they were living on a footing of equality with the gauls, and their presence resulted in a partition of property with the new comers rather than subjection to their sway. the establishment of the burgundians on gallic soil may be compared with that of those colonies of veterans whom rome sent out formerly to various territories, whose position was similar to that of the original inhabitants, and who in the second generation were confounded with them. gondebald, the third king of the burgundians since their entrance on gallic soil, was sovereign in the year . at that time the territory of this kingdom extended from basle to lorraine and champagne, included the district round macon, reached as far as the frontiers of auvergne, and skirting the high alps, followed the course of the rhône to the shores of the mediterranean. juliana, including the city and fortress, with the district appertaining to it, was therefore clearly in burgundian ground. the war undertaken by clovis against gondebald, and the defeat of the latter near dijon, had indeed resulted in reducing the extent of burgundy on the north-west; but autun and even dijon and langres still remained in the hands of gondomar, the second son of gondebald since childebert and clotaire came and besieged him in the first of these three cities. gondomar had been elected king of the burgundians, after his eldest brother sigismund had been deposed and condemned to monastic seclusion at orleans by the sons of clovis. gondomar put his tenable places in a state of defence, collected an army, and after a battle with the franks in dauphiny, and in which clodomir perished, resumed peaceable possession of his kingdom. ten years later clotaire and childebert made a fresh attempt to destroy the menacing power of gondomar. they wished to associate theodoric with them; but as he was occupied with a war in auvergne, he refused to accompany them. the two sons of clovis therefore directed their forces in towards burgundy, and sat down before autun, in which the king of the burgundians had shut himself up. the cité was on the point of being taken; gondomar succeeded in escaping with some of his troops, and took refuge in the cité juliana, as one of the best munitioned strongholds of his kingdom, and the key to all the mountainous and wooded part of burgundy. he was hoping to keep the troops of the franks there till winter, and then to take advantage of the rigour of the season in that district to assume the offensive, with the aid of auxiliaries promised from the east. in fact, clotaire and childebert having taken autun about the middle of the summer, led their army before the cité juliana; for they could not think of pursuing their conquest while leaving this place on their flanks or behind them. gondomar, having entered it about a fortnight before the arrival of the franks, had caused the defences to be repaired and provided with all that was needed to sustain a long siege. the lower town, the cité, and the vale, contained at that time a population of about forty thousand souls, among whom might be reckoned at least ten thousand persons capable of bearing arms. many had even become practically acquainted with war. for since the time of julian gaul had been the theatre of incessant struggles; and though the country surrounding juliana had remained comparatively tranquil, its inhabitants, both gauls and burgundians, had been present at more than one engagement, especially since the definitive invasion of the men of the north. these barbarians, long the auxiliaries of the empire, had themselves learned the profession of war in the roman school, and were making use of the military engines adopted by the imperial armies. among the franks, however, as among the burgundians, the roman standard of discipline was not attained, and these troops had not the firmness and tenacity which still distinguished the best soldiers commanded by the generals of the empire. on the other hand they were often brave even to temerity. the cité juliana was well stored with provisions and munitions of every sort when the army of the franks presented itself. gondomar had not thought it possible to defend that part of the town situated on the right bank of the river of abonia; for it was open, the habitations having been built beyond the line of roman intrenchments, and the latter being commanded on the western front. he had contented himself with keeping the two _têtes de pont_; one, the smallest, up the stream, covering a wooden bridge; the other, the largest, a stone bridge. as soon as the enemy's approach was announced, gondomar set fire to the foot-bridges spanning the river across the islet of sand.[ ] the troops of childebert and clotaire debouched by the northern road and the western plateau, above the part of the town that had been abandoned. these troops therefore formed two bodies, separated by the river. gondomar was a man of astuteness rather than a soldier; but he had with him a certain clodoald, a veteran of long experience in arms, and who knew how to inspire confidence in the soldiers, as much by his bravery as by his rude and simple manners. severe towards himself as well as towards others, and gifted with herculean strength, he used to punish every act of disobedience with his own hand, inflicting one unvarying penalty--death. in spite of, perhaps on account of this inflexibility, clodoald soon became the idol of the city; while he was among them they could not doubt of success. he confounded the franks with the germans in the implacable hatred which he had vowed to the latter. gondomar placed all the forces at his disposal under his command. the defences of the cité juliana were just as philostratus had left them; intact and massive, they defied all attack by main force. to take them a regular siege was necessary. the army of the frank kings consisted of about forty thousand men when they had laid siege to autun, and, deducting losses and desertions, it counted scarcely more than thirty-five thousand men on arriving before the city. it was, however, expecting to be reinforced. the body which presented itself on the northern plateau consisted of twenty thousand men, and that which appeared above the lower town of fifteen thousand. the lower town was nearly deserted; all the able-bodied men had taken refuge in the city, and had sent the women, children, and old men to the eastern hills. the main body of the franks was therefore able to enter the lower town without striking a blow, and naturally enough, began to pillage it. clodoald observed from the ramparts the disorder thus occasioned. at nightfall he despatched a thousand men to the _place d'armes_ at the south of the plateau, and reinforced the post that defended the _tête de pont_ on the right bank. the franks engaged in plundering the town had scarcely taken notice of the large _tête de pont_ placed on the extreme right, but had given special attention to the smaller one opposite the wooden bridge. towards the third hour of the night clodoald had the gates opened, and led forth his men in silence. the franks had scarcely kept a guard at this point. surprised by clodoald's attack, they went up again to the lower town, uttering cries of alarm. many had encamped between the _emporium_[ ] and the _tête de pont_; the burgundians passed round them, and attacking them unawares, drove into the river those who were not massacred. at the same time clodoald set fire to the whole quarter. the wind was blowing from the south, and the habitations situated on the banks of the river soon presented a mass of flames. when, the franks having rallied, their forces were on the point of taking the offensive, the burgundians had already re-entered the _tête de pont_, and were re-ascending the plateau. the franks had lost from four to five hundred men in this skirmish, while of the besieged not more than twenty men had been put _hors de combat_. this commencement brought joy to the city, and those who from the top of the ramparts saw their houses in flames, endured their ill-fortune patiently, thinking of the vengeance they might reasonably anticipate. experienced in war as he was, clodoald would not allow this ardour to cool. on the morning which followed this night so fatal to the franks, he formed two bodies of two thousand men each, well armed with _angons_, _francisques_, and _scamasaxes_ (for throughout gaul at that time these weapons were common to the franks, the gauls, and the burgundians, with some slight variations). he ordered a body of about five hundred men to issue by the eastern gate of the southern _place d'armes_, to cross the rivulet, and make a show of intending to pass the river below the stone bridge of the valley, by means of light boats which four men could carry on their shoulders. these boats had been stowed away in the _place d'armes_. at the same time, one of the two bodies was to assemble in the northern outpost, which had not yet been attacked, and make a vigorous sortie. clodoald himself, with a body of a thousand men, was to pass the eastern gate of the city, skirt the ramparts and the outpost, and come to sustain the attack and take the enemy in flank. the five hundred men furnished with boats were to limit themselves to such a pretence of crossing over as would be sufficient to attract the franks to the spot; then the second troop was to pass the great _tête de pont_ and act as the occasion might suggest, either attacking the enemy on the march, if he followed the descent of the river, or keeping back the franks coming from the lower town. a body of a thousand men were to fall upon the troop presenting itself on the banks of the river, and cut them to pieces or drown them.[ ] this plan well explained to his lieutenants, the movement commenced about the fourth hour of the day. the two frank kings had taken the command: childebert of the troops encamped on the north, clotaire of the body encamped on the west in the lower town. a bridge of rafts had been early constructed five hundred paces above the isle of sand, to establish a communication between the two bodies. it must be observed that after taking autun, the two chiefs did not expect any serious resistance in the rest of burgundy. on the strength of the reports that had reached them, they were persuaded that gondomar had been killed, that the garrison of autun constituted his best soldiers, and that the other strong towns would be defended, if at all, only by inexperienced men. the event of the preceding night, however, caused them to reconsider their judgment; and at the moment when the sortie on the north was taking place, the two chiefs were planning to take the _tête de pont_ by a vigorous effort, and at the same time to attack the northern outpost. the franks are inclined, even more than the gauls, to take for truth what they desire to find so; and the two kings were under the persuasion that the garrison within the city was small in number, and would be disconcerted by these two simultaneous attacks. things were in this position when the frank chiefs received the news that the line of investment on the north was attacked. by the term "line of investment" must not be understood a disposition of their forces presenting a complete analogy with the strategic arrangements of modern times. this line consisted of a body of men, one thousand strong, grouped somewhat confusedly behind a barricade of trees and brushwood, four hundred paces from the northern salient. a second body followed, consisting in great part of cavalry, dispersed in the woods at a hundred paces from the first line, and masking the encampment of childebert, surrounded by the bulk of his troops. at the first alarm the two kings mounted their horses, and, hurrying along with them those who were equipped for fight, hastened to the field of action. the cavalry of the second line dashed forwards to aid the first, separating into two squadrons to attack the enemy on his flanks. recovering from their first surprise, the franks, protected to some extent by the barricades, were keeping their ground against the attack. a hand-to-hand conflict was commenced, but the burgundians, as the more numerous, were beginning to outflank the enemy's line, when the frank cavalry came up, and in their turn fell upon the two wings of the attack. the burgundians were compelled to give ground, and were obliged to avail themselves of the barricades of branches and brushwood not to be outflanked. their position, however, was becoming untenable, when clodoald came up on the enemy's left flank. the franks were panic-struck, for the troop conducted by clodoald was marching in good order after the roman fashion, in echelons, so as not to allow the cavalry to outflank their right wing. the left of the franks took to flight, and their example was followed in turn by every part of the line. the burgundians dashed forward in pursuit of them, but clodoald, advancing to the front, brought his whole force to a stand, though not without difficulty. the fugitives, on the other hand, found themselves confronted with the main body of childebert's army. full of wrath, and upbraiding them with their cowardice, he compelled them to go back; and a body of ten thousand men soon presented themselves in sight of the burgundians through the woods. the order for retreat was given; and they returned in good order, not re-entering by the outpost, but marching along the east front, under the protection of the ramparts. childebert's irritation was such that he immediately sent a thousand men to seize upon the outpost, thinking it would be feebly guarded, since the defenders were outside the city; but the attack had been foreseen, and the franks lost a hundred men in this fruitless attempt. on the southern side, the sortie of the burgundians had been more decisively successful. the state of affairs was such as clodoald had foreseen. the franks, expecting the enemy to cross the river so as to outflank them on the right, had sent a thousand men to meet the burgundians. the lieutenant of clodoald had then sallied out from the great _tête de pont_ with his two thousand warriors. drawing up half his force in a square, on the river side, with his front towards the lower town and his right supported by the _tête de pont_, he had dispatched the other half in all haste against the frank troops on their way to oppose the passage. this troop, taken in flank and thinned by the darts hurled at them by the burgundians in their boats, was broken up, and fled in utter confusion. the franks remaining in the lower town, now learning that childebert's army was attacked on the north, were uncertain whether they should march towards the southern side to support the troop lower down the river on the right bank, or betake themselves to the bridge of rafts to assist childebert's army. this indecision rendered the attack on the burgundians drawn up in square near the great _tête de pont_ inefficient, and permitted the two thousand men who made the sortie to return without serious loss. the sortie on the north encountered more trying fortunes; it had left in the woods more than two hundred dead, and brought home as many wounded. the franks had lost in these two conflicts more than six hundred men, without reckoning the wounded. far from yielding to despondency, however, both chiefs and soldiers were full of rage, believing they should take the city in a few days, and that they had before them a garrison quite disposed to capitulate, so depressed did they suppose the burgundians to have become by the capture of autun: in twenty-four hours they had lost more than a thousand men, without having even approached the ramparts. the wounded burgundians remaining in their hands were decapitated; and their heads, stuck on long poles, were ranged in a line at a hundred paces from the advanced work. this, however, did not constitute a countervallation sufficient to protect them from the sorties of the besieged. it was therefore decided that the army on the north side should dig a ditch at two hundred paces from the advanced work, which should extend from the river valley to that of the rivulet; the ditch to be about two thousand paces long, and behind this ditch, with the earth dug out and barricades (of branches), an intrenchment was to be raised. they could thus in the first place obviate any attack of the besieged at this point. in the second place, it was resolved to seize the great _tête de pont_. the only communication with the outside then left to the besieged would be the valley of the rivulet; but this valley was almost impracticable, full as it was of bogs and marshes; so that the inhabitants of the city could attempt nothing on this side. as to assistance from without, it was deemed out of the question then to expect any; in any case, to prevent the besieged from issuing by the eastern gate, a well-guarded work should be raised in front of it; next, to prevent the besieged from getting provisions, the country on the left bank of the river should be devastated. as regarded the aqueduct, it was discovered and cut off. these measures resolved upon, the besiegers set to work without loss of time. but clodoald, who had been present at more than one siege, knew by experience that a garrison which had no expectation of help from without, has but one means of safety, viz. to allow the besieger no respite, especially at the commencement of the investment, when the enemy had not yet been able to complete his works and effect a close siege. without knowing exactly what the army of the franks had in contemplation, he knew its numerical force, and did not doubt that it commanded the services of some latin engineers, as such was the case at the siege of autun. clodoald therefore divided his troops into eight bodies. the inclosure[ ] being defended by forty-four towers, eleven hundred and eighty men were required to guard them, reckoning twenty-five men for each of the thirty-six towers of this inclosure, and thirty-five for each of the eight towers of the gates, or seventy men for each gate and its works. the post of each tower, it must be understood, was, in conformity with the military usages of the time, intrusted with the guard of the neighbouring curtain. the guard of the northern outwork required two hundred men; for the _place d'armes_ on the south, and the _têtes de pont_, five hundred men; to garrison the stronghold (_castellum_) one hundred men; to watch the rampart on the north descending from the angle of the city to the river, and to guard its banks, six hundred men. total for the ordinary guard of the defences, two thousand five hundred and eighty men. he distributed this first body so that the best troops occupied the _place d'armes_, the _têtes de pont_ and the advanced guard, as well as the front on this side. clodoald constituted a second body of a thousand men, held in reserve in the middle of the city, to hasten at need to one or several of the points attacked. he had about six thousand men left, which he divided into six bodies of a thousand men each, thus distributed: two in the part of the town situated between the cité and the river, two in the neighbourhood of the northern gate, and two near the eastern gate. these six bodies were to be ready to make a sortie whenever the order was given. clodoald retained under his own direct command the thousand men in reserve lodged in the middle of the cité. then he provided for the wants of the garrison and the inhabitants living within the walls. a great quantity of provisions had been brought into the town by means of requisitions and according to roman usage. these provisions were stored in the stronghold. the flocks and herds were driven to graze on the slopes of the plateau on the south and east. timber in considerable quantity had also been laid in store. it was ranged along the interior of the curtain walls. in addition to its walls the town had vast cisterns, supplied by the aqueduct. this being cut off, clodoald had the rain-water from the roofs collected in channels which led into these cisterns. moreover, in the part of the town situated between the ramparts and the river there was a fine spring capable of supplying all the upper part of this quarter. clodoald looked carefully to the lodging of his troops. many of the soldiers had their families in the town; he would not allow the defenders to lodge in their houses. he had the public buildings arranged to receive the seven thousand men who did not habitually occupy the ramparts. those who were charged with the guard were well lodged in the towers, the public buildings of the quarter, or outside the ramparts. clodoald, as has been said, enjoyed the full confidence of his troops before the arrival of the franks; but after the successful affairs of the first day, his men considered him as a kind of providence, and blindly obeyed him. accordingly, these arrangements were readily accepted and carried into execution. in details he had adopted the composition of the roman cohort, and every chief of a corps was responsible for the execution of the orders he received under pain of death. as for the inhabitants, they were obliged to lend assistance whenever required; a refusal was capitally punished. gondomar, whom we have scarcely had occasion to mention hitherto, inhabited the _castellum_; and clodoald manifested the greatest respect for him, acting as he said only according to his instructions; but for the garrison, the veritable chief was clodoald. having provided for what was most pressing, namely the organization of his force, he had two _onagri_ placed in the outwork the day following the engagements, and these _onagri_ began to hurl stones of sixty pounds weight on the frank workmen engaged in the contravallation, two hundred paces from the salient, with such effect that the besiegers were forced to put back their fosse fifty paces out of range. the following night, clodoald sent out a thousand men by the eastern gate, who, defiling by the road along the rampart, went and destroyed the first works of the franks, and re-entered immediately; at the same time another sortie, effected through the south gate of the great _tête de pont_, surprised several men of the frankish outposts. their heads, fixed on stakes, were placed at the extremity of the northern outwork, as a response to the proceedings of the franks. that very night, the enemy attempted to cross the river, aided by the islet of sand, in order to attack the ramping curtain on the north from behind; but they were unable to land, the quays being well lined with troops. many of them were drowned. things were proceeding rather unfavourably for the army of the frank kings; it was accompanied, however, by an able latin engineer, who had given proofs of his skill, especially at the siege of autun. childebert, exasperated by the success of the besieged, poured forth menaces against his own men as well as the enemy. he had not deigned to listen to the advice of his engineer, who since the arrival of the army before juliana had been urging him to encamp on the north, and not to invest the town till he had reconnoitred its approaches. consulted after the preliminary checks, secondinus--that was the name of the latin engineer--admitted that it was difficult to withdraw, since the army was engaged around the place; that the first thing to be done was to make it impossible for the besieged to make a sortie; and to effect this result--the latter being unable to issue without danger except by the eastern gate, and the _têtes de pont_--it was necessary to raise works in front of these points of egress, so as to close them completely; that it was hazardous and of little advantage to try to seize the great _tête de pont_ by a direct attack; but that it was necessary to occupy the western quarter below the ramparts, and therefore to cross the river; that then, by the same blow, the _têtes de pont_ and the ramping wall on the north would be lost to the besieged, and the southern _place d'armes_ endangered. thereupon, trees were felled in the forest on the plateau, and the timberwork of the houses of the lower town brought away. a moat, filled from the river, surrounded the works of the great _tête de pont_; but those of the smaller one no longer possessed any; the fosse had long been filled up, and the besieged had neglected to sink it afresh. the south wall of the _emporium_, which joined the northern shoulder of that smaller _tête de pont_, was crenelated, and in the hands of the defenders, including the square return on the road coming from the west. thus half the area of the emporium was commanded in its length by this wall.[ ] astride on this western road, secondinus erected an _agger_ which rested against the river, fifty paces from the square return, and on this agger he fixed up a work of framed timber, which commanded the enemy's rampart (fig. ). around the great _tête de pont_, he contented himself with raising a contravallation, which cut off the two roads. before the eastern gate of the city, the operation presented great difficulties, because of the steepness of the slope of the plateau. every night, the besiegers' works were thrown down by the defenders, who had the advantage of the dominant position. secondinus, after several unsuccessful attempts, was obliged to confine himself to forming beneath the ascent of the plateau a work of earth and timber, forming an arc of a circle, as in the accompanying sketch (fig. ). the besiegers could reach this work, which was out of range of the plateau, by a road descending gently towards the western arm of the rivulet. these works had not been executed without attempts on the part of the besieged to destroy them, nor without considerable loss on the part of the franks. a fortnight, however, after the enemy's arrival, they were completed, and strongly guarded. [illustration: fig. .] the enemy's troops were thus disposed around the cité:--the large encampment on the north plateau was occupied by twelve thousand men; the defenders of the great contravallation on the same side numbered two thousand. the body lodged in the lower town consisted of six thousand men; the guard of the work opposite the small _tête de pont_, five hundred; that of the contravallation around the great _tête de pont_, one thousand two hundred; the work raised at the bottom of the plateau facing the east gate contained one thousand two hundred men. total: twenty-two thousand nine hundred men. there remained, deducting for losses since the commencement of the siege, about ten thousand soldiers, who scoured and devastated the country, collected provisions and forage, and formed a reserve corps, ready to make a fresh attempt when the propitious moment arrived. [illustration: fig. .] these preparations rendered it clear to clodoald that the enemy since his first checks was acting with method, and preparing for a decisive action. he had quickly perceived that his attack would be directed to the weak points of the fortress,--that is to say, the northern salient and the banks of the river opposite the western bend of the cité; he had therefore strongly barricaded all the roads of the town leading to the quay, and had strengthened the latter with a _vallum_. [illustration: fig. ] in addition to this, two hundred paces behind the square tower on the river, to the north, he had run another vallum, _a_, _b_, through the houses and gardens, following the slopes of the plateau in an oblique direction, and joining the south-west gate (fig. ). the habitations had been left as a mask in front of this entrenchment; a few houses and fences only had been cleared away to give a free space outside. [illustration: fig. .] clodoald could not attempt anything before the northern salient, the enemy being there in front of him in force; but within the salient itself he sunk ditches with retrenchments of earth and stakes, as shown in fig. . these works being low and masked were invisible to the enemy outside. every night he sent out of the city, by the postern which led to the bottom of the wide fosse on the northern front, spies who rendered him an account of the operations of the enemy. at the end of the third week from the beginning of the siege, his spies reported a considerable degree of activity in the large camp; that faggots were being got ready, that the soldiers were preparing their arms, and that war-engines were being mounted. one of these spies, who crossed the river below the town and observed the attitude of the enemy encamped on the west, brought a similar report. clodoald judged, therefore, that the besiegers were on the point of attempting a grand effort on the west and the north. on the morning of the twenty-third day of the siege, in fact, four _onagri_ planted on the work opposite the small _tête de pont_ swept the latter with stones so effectually that the defenders were scarcely sheltered behind the parapets, and could not work the engines placed at that point. at the same time, boats laden with inflammable materials were launched in the river above the wooden bridge. these boats, impelled in the direction required, were arrested by the piles of the bridge, and were not long in setting it on fire (fig. ). the defenders of the small _tête de pont_, seeing that their retreat was going to be cut off, abandoned the work, which was soon occupied by the franks. retired within the _place d'armes_ behind the bridge, the besieged could do nothing but watch the fire. [illustration: fig .] at the same time, shielded by wicker mantelets, a numerous troop of the enemy were advancing boldly against the north-east and north-west flanks of the northern salient. filling up the fosse with faggots, the assailants rushed in a dense column against the rampart. the conflict was furious. thanks to the stonework of the aqueduct the enemy were unable to break through the north-east flank; but they succeeded in gaining a footing[ ] on the opposite one. the besieged were obliged to abandon the salient, retiring from one retrenchment to another, and with but slight loss, whereas the assailants had more than two hundred men killed on the rampart and in the ditches. at nightfall clodoald with the three thousand men of his reserve corps issued suddenly by the central gate--the bridge of which, strongly barricaded, had remained in his possession--and fell upon the enemy: he killed a hundred more, but was unable to retake the work. moreover, he anticipated another attack, and was not mistaken. towards midnight the franks took possession of the island of sand with the help of rafts, and there entrenched themselves in front of the quay. they were within bowshot, and arrows were discharged on both sides, but with little result. the loss of the advanced work had only the effect of animating the besieged, who were for immediately re-taking it. clodoald had to calm their ardour by promising them to do better than retake it; adding, that just then he had another enterprise in view, and that the enemy was going to give them a fine opportunity of beating him. clodoald strengthened the defences of the northern front, which could not be taken by storm; placed a strong body in the outwork of the eastern gate, with orders to defend it to the last man; and sent down as large a number of troops as they would hold into the two _places d`armes_ south and south-west. he strongly manned the oblique entrenchment descending to the edge of the water, and placed there a chief on whom he could depend, with special instructions. the next day passed without fighting. the franks were engaged in intrenching themselves within the outwork against the north front, and destroying the _vallum_. they were bringing to the island timbers, fascines, earth, and stones, and were beginning to fill up the small arm with these materials. sheltering themselves with wicker mantelets, they threw stones into the water, then fascines, in which large pebbles were inclosed to make them sink between the stones, then when these materials began to rise above the surface; they laid trunks of trees upon them across the stream, and between these fascines and clods of turf. the besieged could scarcely do anything to hinder these operations. two _onagri_ sometimes hurled stones at the workmen; but they, well shielded and always in motion, were seldom struck. towards evening the embankment was barely twenty feet from the quay wall, and the water--rather low at that season--ran through the sunken fascines without endangering the stability of the dam. the franks continued all night working at the consolidation and enlargement of the causeway; then they brought timbers and ladders, and raised on its extremity about fifteen feet from the quay wall a stage of timberwork prepared beforehand. at daybreak the besieged perceived on the stage the end of a kind of bridge, furnished with a wicker mantelet, moving slowly forwards towards the edge of the quay (fig. ). secondinus had the platform of a bridge framed ten feet wide: this platform, laid on rollers which rested on the inclined beams, was propelled by soldiers, aided by levers, and drawn by two cables wound on capstans fixed in advance. the men with the levers were screened by sheets of thick canvas stretched before them, which stopped the darts. all this time two catapults and two _onagri_ showered long darts and stones on the _vallum_ of the quay; while slingers and archers rendered it impossible for the defenders to show themselves. [illustration: fig. .--the attack--the movable bridge intended for crossing the small arm of the river of abonia.] the chief who commanded the latter, following the instructions of clodoald, drew his men gradually away in the direction of the houses; and when the rolling bridge attained the ridge of the _vallum_ of the quay, not a single burgundian remained behind this defence. the franks rushed with loud shouts on the platform, threw down the wicker parapet, and spread themselves in great numbers over the deserted and silent quay. dreading some ambuscade, they were in no hurry to ascend the slopes of the plateau, gentle though they were at this point, or to venture along the roads whose barricades appeared not to be guarded. they drew up along the quay in good order until they numbered about four thousand men. this did not take long; for as soon as the first few had passed from the stage to the _vallum_, the besiegers had placed beams across on which they laid logs, brushwood, and turf, and the bridge had thus attained a width of nearly thirty feet. a second body of considerable strength ready to sustain the first was assembled on the island, and a third body was approaching on the opposite bank. secondinus was one of the first to reach the left bank, and he augured no good from the apparent inaction of the besieged. he desired that any advance should be made with caution, and not until a _tête de pont_ had been erected with stakes and _débris_ taken from the neighbouring houses. an exploring party sent into these houses found that they were deserted, while behind the barricades erected where the roads opened on the quay there were no defenders. he therefore ordered these barricades to be cleared away. all this took up time, and the franks began to murmur loudly, asking if they had been sent across the river merely to guard the shores. their chiefs insisted that the besieged had abandoned this part of the cité, as they had the lower town, that they had retired behind their walls, and that if advantage was not taken of their retreat, they would regain courage and come and attack the franks in the night; that it was essential to occupy the ground vacated by them without loss of time, and take up a position beneath the walls, seizing in its rear the smaller _place d'armes_. secondinus shook his head, and persevered in ordering measures of safety. towards midday one of the frank chiefs, still more impatient than the rest, called his men together and declared that there had been too long a delay, and that the slopes must be occupied. "let the brave follow me, and those who are afraid remain here and find themselves sheltering-places!" and he and his followers made for the summit of the plateau. his example was quickly followed, and by various paths through the houses and gardens more than two thousand men ascended the slopes. arrived at the _vallum_ formed on the slant, they were received by a shower of stones and darts. but soon recovering the surprise, and urged on by their chiefs, the franks sprang up the escarpment. their position, commanded as it was by the besieged, was unfavourable, and the first assault failed. they had to rally in the shelter afforded by the habitations and hedges left by clodoald outside the _vallum_. hearing the shouts of the onslaught, the troops left near the passage hurried in their turn up the hill. secondinus then judged it expedient to get over a thousand men from among those who had remained in the island, giving excellent reasons for keeping them at that point. seeing the reinforcement ascending the hill, the first assailants separated into three large parties, and at the word of command advanced anew against the _vallum_. the fall of the foremost did not arrest the new comers, who passed over their bodies. there were moments when the intrenchment seemed to be carried, for its ridge was crowned by frank soldiers; but the defenders--independently of those who guarded the _vallum_--had also divided into compact bodies, which, in readiness behind, fell on the assaulting columns when their heads appealed above the ridge. thus the conflict presented a series of captures and recaptures of the _vallum_, and it appeared as if the same turns of fortune would be repeated as long as the assailants and defenders were able to form bodies of soldiers. many fell on both sides, for they fought hand to hand. then it was that clodoald, who held the smaller _place d'armes_ on the south-west, led forth a thousand men in good order, keeping along the river; he ordered those who occupied the large _place d'armes_ to pass on between him and the _vallum_, and to fall on the assailants in flank. from the right shore the franks perceived this movement of clodoald, and hurried towards the island to attack him and support those of their party who were on the left shore. but clodoald had the start, and advanced by a direct road, whereas the enemy had to make a détour. in a few minutes, therefore, he came upon the body of franks which, at the instance of secondinus, was guarding the passage. he attacked it most vigorously, and cut down the first he met with. the franks resisted, however, and, covering the embankment, formed in a square, with their right against the river. fresh assailants passed over to the embankment, and took up such a position on the left that clodoald's troop was on the point of being surrounded, and to free itself was obliged to make a movement in retreat, not without much loss--abandoning the left shore in order to reach the slopes and choose more advantageous ground. the second troop of burgundians was then advancing on the flank of the besiegers, who were furiously storming the _vallum_. the assailants, attacked in flank, almost in rear--by reason of the direction of the _vallum_--gave way and ran down towards the passage, pursued by the burgundians. seeing himself thus supported, clodoald assailed the foe with renewed energy. at that juncture came gondomar sallying out from the western gate, with fresh troops to reinforce the defenders of the _vallum_. seeing the enemy flying in all haste towards the passage, he concluded that his force was strong enough to press them vigorously, and, following the southern ramping wall, and then turning to the left, he attacked the enemy on the shore opposite the island. the franks, thus attacked in front and on both flanks, with a narrow passage behind, offered a desperate resistance; but their very numbers were unfavourable to success, and they were overwhelmed with missiles hurled by burgundian slingers posted in the houses on the slope. when night came not an enemy remained alive on the left shore; many had sought to reach the island by swimming, and a considerable number had also effected their escape by the embankment; but more than two thousand five hundred bodies remained along the _vallum_ and about the entrance of the passage. clodoald had faggots and straw heaped on the movable bridge, which soon caught fire as well as the stage. the besieged lost a thousand, and clodoald was wounded. the burgundians had kept the western portion of the town, but they could not take the offensive in that quarter, since dense masses of the enemy presented themselves there. during the same day the frank kings had made a feint of attacking the north front of the city; but the ramparts and the towers erected on this front could only be taken by a regular siege, and the burgundian troops assigned to that quarter were more than sufficient to defy a serious attack. retired within their tent, childebert and his brother accused one another of the failure of their operations, but ultimately agreed in throwing on secondinus the blame of their defeat. the latter, summoned into their presence, had to undergo the bitterest reproaches. "if," replied the engineer, "your troops were disciplined--if they had not persisted in attacking the quarter, on which we had fortunately gained a footing, at haphazard--we should still be on that shore, and should have been able to-morrow to seize the whole of that region; not that i think it necessary to attack the cité on that front, but because we could thus have prevented any sortie, and might without risk attack the northern front and take it--which would only be an affair of time. "not being in possession of the western quarter, all our siege works may be destroyed in a vigorous sortie; for the besieged are audacious--they have shown themselves so; and the ramping wall which descends to the river from the west corner will always put our attack on the north front of the cité at the mercy of a vigorous effort. "this ramping wall has no visible gates, but it will be easy for the besieged to make outlets if there are not already some hidden ones; and then under favour of night he can fall on the right flank of the attack, burn our works, and render the siege much longer and more uncertain in its issue. each of our chiefs insists on commanding; and, brave though they all are, before a cité so well fortified and defended, blind bravery only involves you in useless perils. obtain from them, therefore, an implicit obedience to your commands, and remember that your illustrious father owed his victories to the rigorous discipline which he succeeded in maintaining." this firm language did not fail to make an impression on the two kings, who, repressing their anger, began to deliberate coolly on the situation. it was decided to seize the great _tête de pont_, still in the hands of the besieged; to keep a strict watch on the shores of the river; and to attack the place along the whole extent of the northern front, comprising the ramping wall. the two kings decided that the chiefs of the various corps should obey secondinus, whom they intrusted with the direction of their operations. the chiefs were assembled, and received from childebert's own mouth the order not to engage in any enterprise except such as secondinus should sanction. but these franks had no liking for the roman, as they called him, and received the admonition with a bad grace. many raised objections, declaring that the slow proceedings of the roman were the cause of their failures, and that if they might have their way the cité would soon be in their power. childebert and his brother began to feel their resolution failing at these representations, and looked to secondinus to reply. addressing himself then to the chiefs who had accused him, he said: "let those of you who have a plan of attack to offer, speak; let them explain by what methods they propose to force walls defended by men inured to war and well commanded; and if they can exhibit a plan superior to mine, i am ready to follow them like the humblest of their soldiers. but the kings and the whole army, before being called upon to advance, have a right to demand that their lives be not risked in an enterprise without definite purpose, and not presenting any chance of success." to this speech there was no response. "you, who spoke," said childebert then to one of the chiefs, "what do you propose?"--"we took autun by main strength; we invested the cité, made a breach in the wall, and entered it."--"yes," replied secondinus; "but autun is not a cité built on the summit of escarpments like this; we were able to attack it from the level on two of its fronts, without having a river in the rear. its walls, good though they were, were but ill defended, and our simultaneous attacks on two opposite points disconcerted the besieged. here there is but a single front that can be attacked from the level; all the others crown escarpments, that could be easily defended, even without walls. only two courses, then, are possible: either to invest the place so closely as to force it to surrender through want of provisions--which may be a tedious process, for the besieged are well provisioned, and the frank army, which dislikes inaction, will melt away during such a blockade--or to attack the only vulnerable side, and concentrate all our forces on that point. "by proceeding regularly, this front will be in our power in three weeks. then we shall be able to invest the _castellum_ closely, leaving a numerous body to prevent any sortie. it must surrender eventually, and in the meantime the kings will subdue the rest of burgundy, without being delayed here." many of the chiefs responded, proposing irrational plans of attack--appearing such, indeed, to the assembly; for though all agreed in blaming the conduct of the siege hitherto, no one could suggest a consistent plan of operation. every proposition was therefore received with murmurs or ironical laughter. seeing this, childebert made a formal declaration that he and his brother were determined that secondinus should be obeyed in all points, since no one had a desirable plan to propose; and the assembly separated. the two kings, remaining alone with the engineer, urged him to contrive for securing an immediate success that might cause the recent failures to be forgotten and restore confidence to the army. "the difficulty," replied secondinus, "is to obtain such a success, without risk, with troops that do not strictly follow orders. what secures success in siege warfare is patience, assiduous labour, and rigid discipline; but your men are not patient, are not fond of digging, and are undisciplined. they prefer getting killed in an assault under unfavourable conditions to the safe, though painful, labour which in the course of some days would secure the capture of the place without much loss." meantime the frank army was reinforced by a body of about two thousand men, sent by theodoric, who, having terminated his expedition into auvergne, was reckoning on gaining some advantage from the war going on in burgundy. these two thousand men were robust, but ill-armed, and little fitted for active war; but they were able to render great services in siege works. they were placed directly under the orders of secondinus, who set them to work immediately, promising them a large share of the booty when the cité was taken. [illustration: fig. .] we have seen that the northern salient had remained in the power of the franks. secondinus raised an _agger_ at this point, in front of the gate of the cité; and on the declivity of the plateau another _agger_ opposite and on the counterscarp of the fosse of the ramping wall (fig. ). the ridge of these works did not reach the level of the footway of the cité walls, but yet rose high enough to allow great stones to be discharged on the battlements by means of onagers, and to render the situation perilous to the defenders. the especial object of this was to occupy the besieged. under shelter of these two earthworks, secondinus had two mines commenced, one at the point a, the other at b, which, carried under the bottom of the dry ditches, were to penetrate beneath the walls. clodoald, who had been rather severely wounded, was obliged to confide the superintendence of the defence to his lieutenants, who informed him of the besiegers' operations, and who believed that the franks were going to raise timber works to command the walls, destroy the battlements, and throw bridges across. nothing, however, favoured the supposition that such was the intention of the franks, who limited themselves to furnishing the earthworks with screens to protect their engines. this apparent inactivity was a constant source of anxiety to clodoald, who knew, through his spies, that the besiegers had received reinforcements. as he was unable to take the lead, he dared not direct his lieutenants to undertake any fresh sorties, and was obliged to content himself with recommending the most scrupulous vigilance. trusting, moreover, to the solidity of the roman walls and the rocky site of the plateau, he scarcely believed that mining could be rendered efficient; yet, in anticipation of such a contingency, he ordered that trusty men should be set to listen in the lower stories of the towers, and at the base of the walls opposite the face of attack; then he had platforms prepared behind the rampart to receive six machines, which discharged stones in abundance on the earthworks of the besiegers (fig. ). [illustration: fig. .] the franks, on their side, were working vigorously at their two mining galleries, not without great difficulty, for they had at several points very hard rock to pierce. the excavated earth was heaped up within the earthwork, and could not be seen by the besieged. till they reached the fosse the noise of the work could not be heard from the cité; but when the miners had arrived below the fosse, the men on guard in the town heard the sound of pickaxes dully reverberating through the night. clodoald, informed of this, immediately gave orders to countermine, starting from the interior base of the rampart, and in the direction of the sound. on both sides, therefore, the miners were at work; but this did not prevent the projectile engines from being worked all day by both parties. in a fortnight the besiegers' tunnels were near enough for the workmen to hear the blows of the pickaxes in the rock. clodoald was then in a condition to leave his dwelling; he examined what had been done, stopped the work, and listened attentively. he judged that the enemy's miners were digging obliquely under the wall, near the north gate (fig. ), while the countermine of the besieged followed the direction a b. [illustration: fig. .] he thought he also perceived that the enemy's tunnel was on a higher level than his own. this seemed favourable to the plan he was intending to adopt, and with a view to greater safety, he sunk the floor of the countermine-tunnel still lower. on visiting the base of the ramping wall he heard no noise at this point, although his lieutenants said they had heard mining towards the upper third of the wall during the preceding days. the countermine-tunnel was also commenced opposite to the place where they thought they had heard the enemy's miners. clodoald ordered a suspension of the work till the besiegers' operations were clearly understood. next day, on the north front, it became evident that the countermine-tunnel was crossing that of the enemy, for the steps of the pioneers were heard above the ceiling. clodoald then had the ceiling shored up along the sides of the tunnel, and ordered that the layers of stone forming the ceiling should be noiselessly removed by levers and crowbars, so as to render it as thin as possible below the point where footsteps had been heard. when this had been done to the extent of leaving only a very thin layer of rock, clodoald had dry faggots, resin, tar, and all the inflammable materials that could be got, heaped up in the countermine tunnel; then, promising the most skilful of his miners a large reward on succeeding, he told him to break down this crust, and as soon as he perceived an opening, however small, to set fire to the faggots, retiring towards the entrance. in fact, a few minutes after the order had been given, the miner appeared at the entrance of the shaft, followed by a thick smoke. he reascended quickly, and this opening was stopped with planks and earth. from the hole made below the floor of the besiegers' gallery the smoke was rising into the tunnel, and suffocating the miners. they tried to stop up this orifice, but the necessary materials were not at hand; and the flame soon mounted high, as the hole produced a draft. the heat burst the stone to pieces, and the opening was becoming larger. the mining gallery was soon so filled with smoke that it was no longer possible to stay there and some of the miners fell suffocated before they could gain the somewhat distant mouth of the tunnel. the stir caused among the besiegers beyond the earthwork proved to clodoald that the operations had been frustrated, and the mine rendered untenable. he then stopped up the entrance to the countermine, and when the smoke was dissipated, he resolved on examining the state of things for himself. the faggots were burning rapidly by reason of the draft, and the flame was roaring through the hole, which was becoming larger and larger. fresh faggots were thrown on the fire with pitchforks, the limestone was cracking incessantly and falling in large slabs. secondinus had heard the counterminers at work, but had not been able to ascertain the direction they were following, as they were excavating under the limestone bed in a clayey sand. he thought the galleries would meet some time or other, and that then there would be a struggle in the tunnel. anticipating this, he had screens in readiness, hoping thus to remain master of his own gallery, and even to gain possession of the countermine. the event disconcerted his projects; no further progress was possible there. along the ramping wall, secondinus's miners had reached the sand, and were consequently no longer heard. he sent all his workmen, therefore, to this quarter, and had his galleries deeply excavated according to the plan (fig. ). thanks to the yielding nature of the soil, this operation was completed the following night. the galleries were well propped and shored with dry wood taken from the houses of the lower town. faggots smeared with tar were placed among these props, and at dawn were set fire to. [illustration: fig. .] clodoald's anxiety had brought him once more to this front of the defence, when a cracking noise was heard.... a wide piece of the wall, above the oblique intrenchment made by the besieged, immediately split, bent forward, and fell _en masse_ outside into the fosse. clouds of smoke and dust arose, and the exulting cries of the franks were heard from the cité. there was not a moment to lose: weak as he still was from his wound, clodoald assembled all his men within call, and sent for a reinforcement. with the soldiers--about two hundred in number--who had hastened together at his first summons, he mounted to the summit of the crumbling wall (fig. ) to meet the assault. [illustration: fig. .] when the dust and smoke were somewhat dispersed, he could see the franks, about two thousand in number, drawn up on the earthwork, prepared to scale the ruins. happily for the defenders, an engine mounted on the platform of the square tower at the angle of the cité[ ] was quickly turned by those serving it, so as to discharge heavy stones on the van of the attack, killing or wounding many men at every volley; which forced the franks to retreat until mantelets were brought up. this delay enabled the besieged to assemble on the breach, and to heap up fascines there--for the besiegers on their side were discharging a quantity of stones on this point--and to place planks so as to ascend to the summit of the crumbling wall more readily. all this occupied but a quarter of an hour, when the franks ascended the _agger_ once more, protected by the mantelets, threw fascines into the space between the head of the wall and the slope of the _agger_, and rushed forward resolutely to the assault. the position of the besieged was disadvantageous, for they had behind them the escarpment produced by the thickness of the fallen wall, and a ground deeply creviced by the fall of the masonry; while this fallen wall gave the besiegers a slope of slight inclination, and of easy access. [illustration: fig. .] the assault was vigorous and vigorously met, but the people of the cité had only a thin front to oppose to a compact assaulting column; and towards midday the franks remained decidedly masters of the breach (fig. .) clodoald had died in the fight, and with him more than a thousand burgundians. the franks on their side had sustained heavy loss, and the breach was literally covered with dead bodies. either from fatigue, or because they feared some surprise, the besiegers allowed the remainder of the enemy's forces to re-enter the cité without pursuing them. they now possessed all the western part of the town lying between the river and the slopes of the plateau. outside the cité the burgundians occupied only the southern _place d'armes_ and the great _tête de pont_: the smaller _place d'armes_ of the bridge previously burned, being uninclosed on the side of its access, and not united with the ramparts, was evacuated. the franks had no personal knowledge of clodoald, and learned only from prisoners that this brave captain had been killed in the assault. they had his body sought for, and his head, fixed on a long pole, was placed before the north gate. this time the prisoners were spared, and sent as slaves to the royal domains. the cité juliana was now shut in on all sides and reduced to its walls, which were able long to defy the attacks of the franks. but clodoald's death thoroughly disheartened the besiegers, and the burgundian king was not energetic enough to replace his skilful lieutenant. on the evening of this unfortunate day, he assembled the chiefs of the defending forces to deliberate on the measures to be adopted. accustomed to the bold enterprises of clodoald, they thought themselves sufficiently numerous to attempt a sortie at two points--the southern _place d'armes_ and the eastern gate; they believed that the cité would be destitute of provisions in a few weeks, since they could get no more supplies from without, and they considered that this extremity and the disgraceful surrender that must follow should not be waited for. the sortie from the southern _place d'armes_ was to be supported by a body issuing through the south-west gate. thus they could drive back the franks as far as the wall which they had just passed. the sortie from the eastern gate would occupy them during this time, on the left side of the plateau. but while they were engaged in these deliberations, secondinus understood well how to avail himself of the advantage so dearly bought. during the night he had an intrenchment made at some distance from the gate of the _place d'armes_, caused the road to be intercepted and the slopes of the cité covered with abatis of trees, and thereupon commenced without delay a mining tunnel under the descent from the castle to this _place d`armes_ to destroy the fortified wall. in the morning, therefore, when the burgundians were preparing to pass the north gate from the great _place d'armes_, they saw before them a well-guarded intrenchment, bristling with pointed stakes and intertwined branches of trees. reckoning, however, on the attack to be made by the body that was to issue by the south-west gate, they advanced resolutely against the intrenchment, whose defenders might thus be taken in the rear. but this contingency had been foreseen by secondinus; another intrenchment at right angles was already raised before this gate, and the road cut off; the approaches being furnished with barricades. after losing a hundred men, therefore, the two bodies re-entered without having been able to execute their design. originating power and promptness in execution were henceforth wanting to these brave people, who were, however, determined not to capitulate. three days afterwards the descent to the _place d'armes_ was undermined, and part of it fell. the defenders of the post and of the _tête de pont_ were surprised, and had only time to retire in haste by the road ascending to the eastern gate: and some of them fell into the hands of the franks. the cité was then completely surrounded within bowshot distance. no sortie could be of any serious use to the besieged; for secondinus had established posts supported by intrenchments around the ramparts. seeing the success of his last efforts, the frank chiefs began to place more confidence in the latin engineer, and were obedient to his orders. then secondinus resumed his attack on the north front, and began four mining galleries, making use of that which he had been forced to abandon. three were led under the square tower of the north-west corner[ ] (fig. ). the besieged soon heard the strokes of the miners' pickaxes, and attempted a countermine, starting from the tower itself, at a; but clodoald was no longer there to direct the workmen, who, wishing to repeat the manoeuvre previously adopted, dug too deep, crossed the enemy's galleries underneath them, and had no clear perception what direction their sapping should take. the sounds they heard were diffused, and seemed to issue from several points; and, in fact, the franks were working in more than one direction, and, as secondinus ordered, immediately under the foundation; sometimes they were digging in the sand, and all noise ceased; sometimes they would meet with rock, and then the blows of the pioneers again became audible. [illustration: fig. .] the countermine gallery, therefore, was winding about, and only weakened the basis on which the tower rested; and four days after the commencement of the work, it was supported only by dry props, greased and smeared with pitch. these being set on fire, the tower fell in, bringing down with it a large piece of the north wall. anticipating this result, king gondomar, who, after clodoald's death, took the command in the cité, had ordered an interior retrenchment to be raised, with a strong wooden tower in the middle of the curve, projectile engines being placed behind. he had sufficient time to complete these works after the fall of the tower; for the breach was scarcely practicable, and was stoutly defended. the franks were two days in getting possession of it and occupying the corner of the cité in front of the retrenchment, not without having lost two or three hundred men. secondinus interdicted the advance of the troops, who were eager to storm the retrenchment and take it by main force; and this time he was listened to. he had timber and mantelets brought, and gave orders for the erection, on the very ruins of the angle, of a tower of green wood, which he took care to protect with woollen blankets and fresh hides. the engines of the defenders did not cease to discharge large stones at the workmen, which greatly hindered them and killed many; but the franks had acquired confidence, and worked incessantly night and day with enthusiastic ardour. twice the defenders of the cité endeavoured to sally forth from their retrenchments to drive off the assailants and destroy their works; they met with a warm reception, especially as the franks could avail themselves of the ruins as a rampart. on their side projectile engines were hurling stones and darts on the rampart walks of the extremities of the curtains that remained standing, and made it impossible for the defenders to remain there. as soon as anyone showed himself, showers of arrows were aimed at him. these rampart walks were repeatedly furnished with mantelets, which were soon thrown down by the stones from the engines. the wooden tower of the besiegers was rising rapidly, and at the end of the second day overtopped that of the retrenchment. an engine was planted at the top, which incessantly discharged heavy stones on the works of the burgundians. the latter kept the old countermine gallery on the north front; but they had not been able to extend it, because blocks of stone had been thrown by the besiegers into the connecting opening, and were replaced by others when the besieged ventured to remove them. the enemy's miners were no longer heard on this side. the reason was that secondinus, having become better acquainted with the nature of the soil, had perceived that by digging deeper he found a stratum of sand easy to work in and carry away. from the old abortive gallery, however, which the besieged could not speedily enter, he had conducted two oblique tunnels, in an inverse direction and at a deep level, descending into the sand, under the foundations of the curtain; one of them, a, gradually rose again obliquely as far as the inner side of the ramparts (fig. ). he expected in this way to make an entrance into the cité in any case. [illustration: fig. .] but a thick bed of limestone prevented the ceiling from being speedily penetrated. the gallery was far enough from that marked b, intended to undermine the curtain wall, not to be destroyed by its fall, and he reckoned on making use of it on occasion. five days had been spent in these labours, and on the fifth day--that is to say, the next day after the fall of the square tower of the corner--the curtain near the north gate was undermined for a length of thirty paces. the stays and props were set on fire during the night, and in the morning the curtain sank down into the fosse, separating into two masses. the franks immediately threw a quantity of fascines into the fosse, brought ladders, and rushed in great numbers on the ruined wall, which still rose about six feet above the interior level of the cité. the burgundians, taken by surprise, could scarcely offer any resistance to this escalade, and their efforts were at most confined to hindering the assailants from crossing the breach. the position of the defenders was one of the most unfavourable that can be imagined, especially as they had raised no retrenchment at this point. they barricaded themselves, however--making use of the houses, and hurling a quantity of projectiles from the top of the neighbouring tower upon the assailants; and the struggle was prolonged. then it was that secondinus sent workmen to destroy the ceiling of the mine gallery, a, which terminated on the inside of the wall. in four hours this was effected, and the besieged saw a large hole on their left. in a few seconds this gaping orifice poured forth a stream of enemies, who spread themselves along the wall, outflanked the defenders, and hurried towards the gate to burst it open. the guard that defended this gate were massacred, and the doors being smashed with axes and battering-rams, fresh troops were enabled to get into the city. the town was taken, but the conflict was being kept up in the streets and houses. night came on, and the defenders of the retrenchment, perceiving that the enemy had got round them, had retired in haste towards the interior of the cité. the franks no longer gave ear to the orders of their chief, but rushed in small bands into every opening that presented itself, burning, killing, and pillaging; many of them fell in with numerous bodies of the besieged and met their death. the women, mad with fury, threw tiles, furniture, logs of wood, and stones upon the franks dispersed in the streets. as most of the houses were of timber, the fire, fanned by a wind from the west, spread rapidly in every direction. besiegers and besieged fought till they were surrounded with flames. it was a series of isolated struggles, in which the voices of the chiefs on either side were unable to make themselves heard. gondomar, with about a thousand men, had taken refuge in the castle; and from the summit of its towers the burgundian king could see his faithful cité burning, and hear the shouts of the victors and the vanquished approaching nearer and nearer the walls of this last retreat. he had been unwilling to close the gates, that he might gather in the unfortunate defenders; and towards the end of the night these, driven into the southern extremity of the cité by the enemy and the fire, began then to arrive in crowds, many being wounded, and among them women and children. the castle was being filled, and the enemy was approaching; so the bridge was thrown into the fosse and the gates were shut. engrossed with pillage, the franks allowed the day which succeeded this disastrous night to pass by without attempting anything against the castle; and not before evening could the frank king restore any degree of order in the burning cité. there were not enough provisions in the castle to feed its numerous occupants for forty hours. this was just what secondinus anticipated; accordingly he had no difficulty in persuading the frank king to rest content with investing the stronghold. gondomar, overwhelmed with grief, and seeing his helplessness, sought death by throwing himself from the top of one of the towers. the fugitives were forced to surrender at discretion, and most of them were carried away into slavery. the frank kings destroyed the most important of the defensive works, so as to render the cité juliana incapable of sustaining a siege. but those roman works were massive; and two centuries afterwards the remains of the towers and ramparts still presented an imposing mass of ruins. the plateau was then a waste, and the ruins were overgrown with a luxuriant vegetation; only a few shepherds' huts were to be seen in this desolated region. on the western declivity, between the river and the ancient ramparts, extended a poor little town, whose population did not amount to more than twelve or fifteen hundred souls. footnotes: [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see the plan, fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see b, fig. .] [footnote : see b, fig. .] chapter ix. _the feudal castle._ in the year , the valley had again become a fertile and prosperous district. several villages had arisen along the course of the river; and a town of some importance covered, as in former times, the western slopes of the old cité juliana, and extended on the opposite shore. this town was then called saint julien. how was it that the cité founded by the emperor julian the apostate had changed its appellation of juliana for that of saint julien? we shall not attempt to explain the fact. it will suffice to say, that about the eighth century a legend arose respecting a companion of lucian, bishop of beauvais, named julian, a native of the val d'abonia, who had been martyred with maximian a short time before his holy bishop. his body, transferred to the place of his birth, had there wrought numerous miracles, and was then resting in the crypt of the church placed under his invocation, and which was the appanage of a rich abbey, situated at the northern extremity of the plateau. on the site in question, therefore, was to be found the city and abbey of saint julien, and the castle of roche-pont, occupied by the lords of roche-pont. as for the valley, it had preserved pretty nearly its old name; it was the val d'abonia. ever since the ninth century the lords of roche-pont had been possessors of the vale, the town, the lands contiguous, and the forests stretching northwards on the plateaux; they claimed descent by the female side from the ancient kings of burgundy, and were rich and powerful. one of their ancestors engaged in a war against king robert, in the year , and had contributed greatly to the failure of that prince's expedition into burgundy. on the submission of this province at a later date to the king, the lord of roche-pont had made conditions that had notably improved his domain. this lord was the founder of the clunisian abbey which stood on the north of the plateau; he had endowed it with the uncultivated lands of the rivulet valley. the monks soon made a capital domain of this valley, by taking advantage of the little water-course, which never failed. with the aid of dams they secured very productive pools; waterfalls turned mills, worked forges, and irrigated fair meadows for flocks and herds, and, on the slope of southern aspect, vineyards renowned for their fine produce. there were occasional misunderstandings between the abbots of saint julien and the lords of roche-pont. according to their foundation charter, they claimed to be perfectly independent of the lordship of roche-pont--indeed, of all superiority but that of rome--and to have complete suzerainty over the lands they possessed; they refused to render feudal dues to the castle, and on several occasions disputes resulted in acts of violence. then the abbots appealed to the duke of burgundy; men of war interfered in the contest; and, as a matter of course, the vassals had to pay the costs. one of the abbots, a restless and ambitious man, had presumed to commence fortifying the abbey, and had persisted in doing so in spite of the opposition of the lord of roche-pont. the lord had consequently laid waste the abbey domain. the fraternity then appealed to the king of france, who had intervened in the dispute. after much litigation and cost to both sides, it had been decided that the abbey might be surrounded by a wall without towers, and that in the event of a war in which the interests of the suzerain were concerned, the lord of roche-pont should garrison the abbey at the expense of the latter. the retainers of the abbey and those of the lord continued, nevertheless, in a permanent state of antagonism; and not a year passed in which there were not differences to be settled on this score at the court of the duke. the castle of the lords of roche-pont was built on the remains of the _castellum_ of the cité juliana, and about the year it was very old and dilapidated. anseric de la roche-pont was at that time its owner. he was a young man of ardent temperament and ambitious disposition, married to a niece of the count of nevers, deceased in --an alliance which had increased his possessions. he bore with impatience his subjection to the duke of burgundy, and in endeavouring to shake it off, his first step was to rebuild his old castle, and put it in a condition to defy every attack. anseric de la roche-pont was encouraged in these ideas of independence by one of his uncles, an old seigneur, who, having spent fifteen years of fighting in syria, had returned, worn out and impoverished, to burgundy. anseric had given him an asylum in his declining years, and he soon acquired an influence over the mind of his nephew, and even of his niece. during the long winter evenings, the recital of adventures beyond seas, to which the baron guy knew how to give a life-like interest, would inflame the breast of the young lord. often on such occasions the latter would rise and pace the hall, with sparkling eyes and clenched hands, stung with shame at his own inactivity, and consumed by the desire of some nobler occupation than killing boars, and disputing with monks concerning mill or fishery rights. at such moments the old baron, far from seeking to calm his nephew's ardour, would seek to direct it to a more attainable end than the conquest of towns in syria. the baron guy was a personage of remarkable idiosyncrasy--physically an elderly man, tall and angular, and somewhat bent by the weight of arms: his head, still covered with rough grey locks, square in the crown, exhibiting projecting cheek-bones, and--beneath shaggy eyebrows--eyes of sombre green, deeply sunk in their orbits. his wide mouth with its thin lips showed, when he laughed--which rarely happened--rows of sharp white teeth. when he was relating long stories, seated, his hands on his knees and his head bent down, the light of the wax tapers fell only on his bushy hair, his high cheek-bones, and nose. sometimes, at exciting passages in the recital, his head would slowly rise and, still in shade, his eyes would send forth flashes which reminded one of distant lightning. morally, the baron guy is not so easily described. he hated monks--but that is neither here nor there--and adored children; which is proof of a happily constituted disposition. but the baron had seen so much of men and things that it is not to be wondered at that there existed in his mind a shade of scepticism, if such a term can be applied to the _désenchantement_ of a noble at the end of the twelfth century. the baron had, we say, acquired a marked influence over the mind of his nephew; but to anseric's two children their great-uncle was as indulgent as possible. he was no less complaisant to his niece; she alone could succeed in lighting up that stern visage with a ray of cheerfulness. the very high and noble dame jeanne eleanor de la roche-pont was a woman of middle height. when animated, her somewhat oval face reflected a lively intelligence; her eyes of light azure then assumed the hue of the _lapis-lazuli_, and her complexion, habitually pale, was suffused with a rosy flush. she had a bewitching smile, though her mouth was slightly drooping; her swan-like neck, and the exquisite contour of her figure, lent to all her movements a perfect grace, rendered still more charming by an address and vivacity which was the delight of the old baron. the baron, therefore, would pass whole hours with his eyes fixed on his niece, as if he wished to study the least gestures of the lady de la roche-pont, and discover the marvellous mechanism in which their grace and beauty originated. high-spirited on occasions, eleanor was capable of the greatest devotion and absolute self-sacrifice for those dear to her. her vassals loved her, and used to call her _la gentil-dame_. it has seemed necessary to describe at some length persons who will play an important part in the course of this narrative. events were, in fact, more ruled by the individual in feudal times than during any other period. the personal character of a noble exercised a preponderating influence around him for good or evil. the baron guy, worn out, impoverished, and childless, was essentially one of those sensitive spirits, bruised by contact with men and events, which, having lost all elasticity where their own interests are concerned, direct their entire energy and their need of something to which to attach themselves, towards an object apparently distant or fragile. the baron had certainly an affection for his nephew; but as far as he alone was concerned, he would, have contented himself with leaving him to hunt peacefully on his domains, and helping him at need; but for his niece and her two children--handsome boys of five and eight years old respectively--he had a love amounting to adoration, and which formed the chief interest of his life. to him it seemed that for beings so dear in his eyes the castle de la roche-pont and its domain were a very pitiful heritage; and we may question whether even the duchy of burgundy would have appeared to him worthy of their acceptance. ambitions of this _indirect_ character, as they may be called, are the most insatiable and tenacious; they are of the kind stimulating to the most daring enterprises, because they are disinterested and irresponsible. when the baron guy spoke of the fortresses built by the franks in palestine and syria, he never failed to enumerate their towers, to describe their lofty walls, their fair and strong defences; and, invariably instituting a comparison between the wonderful fortresses of margat, krak, antarseus, laodicea, antioch, ascalon, giblet, and many others, and the castle de la roche-pont, he exhibited the latter as a mere hovel fit only for serfs to hide their heads in. when the baron's discourse took this turn--and it frequently did--anseric's face clouded over. eleanor looked down, blushed, and went to look for the children. one evening, as the baron had been complaisantly expatiating on the advantageous site and solid construction of the castle of krak, which he had seen commenced shortly before his departure from syria, and which was to exceed in extent and strength the other christian fortresses, anseric suddenly interrupted the recital. "uncle," said he, "the position of the castle de la roche-pont appears to me as good as that of the knights beyond sea; and if it is only a question of making more solid towers and higher walls than ours are, the thing is easy:--what do you say to it?" the baron did not raise his head. "yes," he replied, "but you must resolve upon it." "well, if i did resolve upon it?" "perhaps you might, my good nephew; but he who builds a strong castle must expect to see it attacked." "well, what then?" "why, you will have to defend it, my good nephew." "and have we not men and ourselves?" "yes, we shall indeed want men--men accustomed to fighting; and we shall want arms and mangonels; moreover, the work must be done quickly if you would avoid an attack before it is finished; and remember the duke's court is not far off, and he will perhaps be curious to come and see for himself what the sire de la roche-pont is about." "the duke! the duke! what business has the duke to inquire whether i am rebuilding my castle? it is my affair, not his!" "the monks of the abbey, too, they will go and complain to my lord duke (though he shows no great deference for these white, black, or grey habits), and will persuade him that in building a stronger castle your object is to lay hands more readily on the wealth of the church; whereas the duke prefers to keep the convent treasures for himself." "as to the monks," said eleanor, "you need be under no anxiety about them; leave the matter in my hands, and i engage that they shall give you no trouble." "eh! what what will you do, _belle amie_?" replied anseric. "will you let me act as i think best?" "by all means; as you please, _belle amie_." it must be observed that eleanor--as a wife and a lady of high descent--entered into the baron's views, though without letting it appear that she did so; and her most cherished desire was to leave to her firstborn the finest domain in the province. as allied to the house of nevers, she had no liking for the duke; and the feudal bonds which connected her domain with the duchy of burgundy were perhaps a greater annoyance to her than to her husband. next day eleanor sent for the abbot, under the pretext of having something of importance to communicate to him. the abbot was a little man of pale complexion, with sharp black eyes, and always elegantly attired, as far as was permitted by the order of cluny, which in point of costume was then very tolerant. he came to the castle on a handsome mule, richly caparisoned, followed by two monks, also mounted. wine and sweetmeats were offered them on their arrival, and when the abbot was in eleanor's presence, she spoke thus to him: "sir abbot, you are aware in what veneration i hold your sacred abbey, and how much i desire to add something to its splendour; if my lord and myself have not done so hitherto, it is because we have been waiting for a favourable opportunity. my lord and myself are happy that such an opportunity presents itself while you are ruling the abbey, because we have a particular and profound esteem for you personally. while, then, what we propose to do has for its object the securing to ourselves the more especial protection of the holy apostles, peter and paul, it is also prompted by consideration for your own virtues and wise administration. "our castle is very old and ruinous; my lord is intending to have it repaired; and to draw down upon its walls the benediction of heaven, he thinks of building within its inclosure a handsome chapel, which will be served by your fraternity as you shall direct, and which will consequently be dependent on the abbey. an annual revenue of a hundred livres will be devoted to the maintenance of the chapel, to be raised from our estate of try. moreover, your dependency of vieil-bois is unsightly and dilapidated; my lord wishes to have it rebuilt, and to assign for its support, which is at present insufficient, twenty-five days' labour in such vineyards of our domain as are near that dependency." at each of these announcements the abbot bent his head in courteous submission. "lady," replied he, "the abbey of saint julien, founded by one of my lord's ancestors, will be delighted by the new donations you graciously promise. though it has witnessed with sorrow the differences that have sometimes arisen between the lords of roche-pont and its abbots, it has never ceased to address prayers to god, to the blessed virgin, and the holy apostles peter and paul, for the illustrious house of its founders; and in the words that have proceeded to-day from your gracious mouth, what it will appreciate beyond the announcement of your intended gifts, is the assurance that its privileges and its independence will receive fresh guarantees of that protection which was accorded to it in the past." "assuredly," replied eleanor; "we shall take care that no harm is done you or your vassals; and, the charter we shall give you will expressly mention our desire to respect the immunities of the abbey, and if need be, to enforce that respect on others. moreover, sir abbot, you are not ignorant that in these unhappy times the property of the church is not always respected, even by those who ought to defend them. you know the trials the abbey of vezelay has experienced: it is our intention to shelter the cloister of saint julien from these insults; and there is no surer means of protecting your abbey than putting the castle in a state of defence." on his way back, the abbot asked himself what could be the cause of this new turn in affairs. he re-entered the monastery, however, none the less gratified; and after vespers a _te deum_ was sung. "to-morrow, my dear lord," said eleanor to her husband, when all met at supper, "you may set about rebuilding your castle; the abbot of saint julien will not feel himself aggrieved." "a good fairy has intervened, no doubt," said the baron guy; "we are bound to proceed." "by the bodies of the saints!" said anseric, when he learned the conditions by which the abbot's acquiescence was to be secured, "you propose to build so much for the church, _belle amie_, that there will remain nothing for the castle!" "in good sooth," replied the baron, "i am not so very well pleased that these monks should get a footing among us." "pshaw! we will put the chapel in the bailey;[ ] and if we have to defend the castle, the monks will remain outside." "but why, sir uncle, are you always so severe upon the good monks?" "ah! gentle fairy, if you had seen them, as i have, in lands beyond the sea, you would agree with me that it is the worst breed----" "come, do not blaspheme, sir uncle; here we are in a christian land--not among the saracens." a few days afterwards, in fact, anseric set the labourers to work. the burgh and the villages of the domain had to furnish their contingent in men, and in draught cattle and carts; materials were not wanting in the vicinity. kilns were erected for burning lime, and the forest supplied timber in abundance. baron guy, in virtue of his military knowledge, undertook the office of director. he sent secretly for a master of the works--a native of troyes, whom he had known in palestine. this person was kindly received at the castle, was well provided for and newly clothed, but carefully watched, lest he should take it into his head to run away. the plans of the new castle were devised by himself and the baron. use was made of a part of the roman fortifications which still existed. but the reader must know the position of the buildings then occupying the plateau (fig. ) to understand what is to follow. [illustration: fig. .--the old castle de la roche-pont.] at a was the castle of la roche-pont, erected on the roman remains, and composed of irregular buildings out of repair; at b the cloister of the abbey; and at c its church: at d the abbot's building. the monastery was bounded on the west by the ruins of the ancient roman enclosure, and on the other three sides by battlemented walls, with a few turrets. at e was the pleasance of the abbey; at f that of the castle.[ ] two fine mills, dependencies of the castle, stood at g; and at h was the pond, filled by the pent water of the stream. the upper town, built on the western incline of the plateau, contained two parish churches, i and k. a wooden bridge, with mills belonging to the castle, existed at l, another wooden bridge at m, and the roman stone bridge at n. on the right bank were several houses with gardens. at o the road along the plateau branched into two--one leading to the entrance of the abbey, the other to that of the castle. at p was a breadth of cultivated land, and at r the forest, which extended in a northerly direction more than two thousand paces. of the ancient ramping wall of the romans, s, and of the enclosure, t, there existed only heaps of _débris_. these remains, overgrown with vegetation, formed, nevertheless, an elevation which it was possible to defend. this sketch of the general topography premised, we proceed to explain the dispositions adopted in the building of the new castle (fig. ).[ ] at o existed a fosse, which was re-excavated. a barbican stood at a, entered on the left side. [illustration: fig. the castle of la roche pont. th century.] the main entrance of the castle, with its drawbridge, was necessarily placed at b. this gate had to be protected by two towers. upon a part of the ancient roman north front, five towers were planned, whose curtains were to join the two ancient towers, y, which were repaired and re-crowned. a wide space, c, therefore necessarily remained behind this foremost defence. it was the _bailey_, a fore-court or outer-court, in which were laid out the chapel, e, promised to the abbot; stables, d; and outbuildings, f, upon a roman ruin. at p was sunk a second fosse for the protection of the castle, whose gateway was disposed at g. a postern gave egress at h. the ancient roman wall, m, received a new crowning, and three new towers were to add to its strength. at i were laid the foundations of the donjon--partly on ancient masonry--a donjon defended by a chemise and ditch. the buildings designed for habitation were situated at k, with a chapel at i. at the extremities of the ditch, p, cuttings were contrived in the two roman curtains, to intercept, if necessary, all communication between the defences of the bailey and those of the castle. this contrivance was also adopted for the two curtains abutting on the donjon. the baron spent his whole time, ever since the decision come to by his nephew, with the master of the works, alain of troyes; while the workmen first called in cleared the ground and levelled the roman ruins, and quantities of stone, sand, gravel, and timber were brought in, and the ditches and trenches for the foundations were excavated by the forced labour of the tenants. the baron designed to erect opposite the plateau (the point of attack) a great front, slightly convex, to screen the projections, w. he wished to have a wide barbican in the middle of this front, in which to collect the troops intended for sorties, and to shelter them in case of retreat. he had observed that in all the good defences erected by the christians in syria the entrances were so disposed that the assailant was obliged to present his right flank to the defender--with good reason, since the left is protected by the shield or buckler. the position of the gate, c, of the castle had been the subject of considerable study and discussion on the part of the baron and his master of works. the latter wanted to place it parallel with the front, but the baron insisted on its forming a decided angle with the entrance of the bailey. the master of the works urged that the left-hand tower of this gate, g, would then form a projection insufficiently defended, and open to attack; but the baron maintained that if the besiegers endeavoured to attack or mine this tower, they would be commanded obliquely by the tower, r; that by giving sinuosities to this front of the castle all points of the bailey would be commanded; that the principal gate was thus well masked; that nothing more would be needed than to give a considerable thickness to the walls and a greater diameter to the entrance towers; and lastly, if the enemy succeeded in reducing the projecting tower on the right hand, a barricade might still be raised from s to t, and the defence prolonged, with the favourable consideration that if this tower of the salient were thrown down, the other would remain intact and would command the breach. the postern, h, was also the subject of lengthened consideration on both sides. this postern was necessary to secure the provisioning of the castle without encumbering the main entrance. placed near the angle tower, u, which the enemy could not attack because of the steep escarpment of the plateau, the postern was well protected by that tower; moreover it was to be surmounted by a quadrangular work with double portcullis and double doors; lastly, a _braie_,[ ] x, defended its approach. it was agreed, moreover, that the great central habitable part of the castle, erected on the remains of the square roman towers, should be crenelated, and should command the curtain, and consequently the two entrances. wells existed or were sunk at _p_. every part having been thus carefully determined, the works were vigorously prosecuted. the baron was always at hand, and persisted in seeing everything for himself. the north front of the bailey, and the chapel, e, were first begun. this exterior work did not greatly alter the appearance of things; but the donjon was next commenced. and when this tower, whose diameter was ninety feet, had reached an elevation of thirty, its aspect had become formidable. the townspeople viewed from a distance this huge mass rising on the point of the plateau, and began to wonder what their lord was intending to do with such an enormous tower. the abbot was somewhat disquieted; but he was so handsomely entertained at the castle that he gave no sign of dissatisfaction, especially as the great chapel of the bailey promised to be very beautiful. fortunately for anseric, the duke of burgundy had at that time some rather important matters in hand--a misunderstanding with the king of france. philip augustus gave him considerable uneasiness, and at such a time he did not wish to alienate his nobility. more than two years thus passed without anything of serious consequence occurring to the lord of the castle. by that time the building was very nearly finished. we give a bird's-eye view of it (fig. ), taken from the north-east angle. [illustration: fig. .--bird's-eye view of the castle of la roche-pont.] nothing was talked of throughout the province but the beauty and strength of the new castle of roche-pont, and there were men of family in the neighbourhood, envious of the wealth and connections of anseric, who did their best to represent him to the duke as an ambitious person, impatient of the feudal ties which bound him to his suzerain. it was even insinuated that the sieur de la roche-pont, on the strength of his descent, aimed at nothing less than supplanting the duke; and that he had already begun to intrigue for that object with the king of france and with pierre de courtenai, who had married agnes, sister of the last count of nevers and aunt of eleanor; that his tenants were crushed under the burden of forced labours; and that the duke ought not to allow one of his vassals to oppress the poor people thus, in order to erect a castle surpassed in strength by none in burgundy. as only too frequently happens, malevolence was thus suggesting to anseric the course he should pursue to fulfil his ambitious designs. the duke of burgundy (hugh iii.) was anything but a protector of ecclesiastical property. the abbot of saint julien knew this; so that, although he was troubled in mind by the defensive preparations of the lord of roche-pont, and augured no good to the abbey from the vicinity of so strong a castle, he did not dare to manifest his fears, or endeavour to communicate them to the ducal court; for he was perhaps more afraid of the duke's intervention than of the power of his immediate neighbour. at length hugh was moved, and lent an ear to all that was reported concerning the character and intentions of his vassal. an opportunity soon offered of revealing his real intentions. while anseric had enemies and enviers at the ducal court, he had also some friends; and they did not fail to inform him of the sinister impressions produced in the duke's mind respecting him, and which he took no trouble to conceal. he had been heard to say that he would soon go and try whether the fortress of la roche-pont was as strong as was asserted. prudence was not the duke's forte, any more than reticence. he had sent a body of his men-at-arms to examine matters closely. now, the duke's men-at-arms had acquired the habits of their master; they were great robbers and plunderers. whether they acquitted themselves of their mission i cannot say; but certain it is that they plundered some hamlets and set fire to several granges belonging to the abbey of saint julien. the monks were greatly disquieted, and did not fail to complain to the lord of roche-pont. the fief of roche-pont lay under the obligation to send every year to the duke of burgundy, as its feudal dues, six war horses caparisoned. it was the custom of the lord of roche-pont on this occasion to present himself at the ducal court after easter. the current year was . anseric did not appear at court, and did not send the six horses. hugh demanded them; anseric replied that the duke's men, plunderers and brigands as they were, had themselves taken off the horses that were destined for him; and that it was their place to give them up to their master; that as for himself and the abbot of saint julien, they claimed compensation for damages, and demanded that the plunderers should be hanged on the public gallows. moreover, that he, anseric, was aware that the duke of burgundy lent an ear to the malevolent insinuations of the enemies of roche-pont, and he would choose his own time for giving them the lie. at this haughty answer hugh's anger was roused, and he swore that he would take no rest till the castle of roche-pont was razed to the ground, should it cost him a fourth of his dukedom. baron guy had observed the storm increasing not without a secret joy; but though he liked fighting, and cherished an unbounded ambition, he was a prudent man, and one who--like all who had long sojourned in the east--knew how to intrigue and to secure the favour of circumstances. most of those old knights of syria joined the character of the diplomatist to that of soldier, in consequence of their relations with the court of constantinople and the saracens. after anseric's reply, there was no alternative but to prepare for war, and war _à outrance_. but, however strong the place might be, baron guy knew well that every besieged fortress must, in the end, fall into the besieger's hands, if it is not relieved. anseric had no army to bring into the open field against the duke's; he could assemble two hundred and fifty men-at-arms--which would imply a total of about twelve hundred fighting men, as each man-at-arms was accompanied by three or four fighting men. adding to this body the men in the town who owed service to the lord, a garrison of fifteen to eighteen hundred men might be reckoned upon. baron guy had therefore a long conference with eleanor and anseric the evening after the answer had been sent to the duke; when it was resolved that the lady de la roche-pont, with a sufficient retinue, should repair to the court of the king of france, promising him liege-homage for the lordship of roche-pont; and asking help from him against the duke of burgundy, who was devastating the lands of his vassal, and plundering the estates of the abbey of saint julien without cause or reason. baron guy had some motives for believing that these overtures would be favourably received; but he refrained from saying all he knew about the matter. he advised his niece to take the abbot in her train, if possible, or, at any rate, some of the fraternity, authorised by him. dame eleanor undertook the commission without making the least objection, and, with apparent calmness, though her heart was ready to burst under her slender corset. she employed the night with her women in making preparations for her journey, and early in the morning sent for the abbot. the abbot, who foresaw but too clearly--whatever might happen--the devastation of the abbey domains, gave vent to repeated sighs, protested, and denounced the barbarity of the times, but came to no resolution. "sir abbot," said eleanor to him, at length, "with or without you or your monks i am going to set out this morning; would you rather plead your cause yourself, or have it pleaded by a woman?" "ah! most gracious lady," replied the abbot, "can i quit my flock when the wolf is preparing to devour it?" "well, then, give me three of your monks." "yes, you are right--it must be--it must be." "let them be here on horseback in an hour." "yes, noble lady, they shall be here, under the protection of god and the holy virgin!" "but, before all things, sir abbot, not a word about this journey, and do not let the brotherhood know where i am taking them." "yes, certainly; the fraternity are to understand that they are sent to some dependency or some neighbouring abbey." "very good, but make haste!" dame eleanor, weeping, embraced her children, her husband and uncle; but, drying her tears as she mounted her palfrey, she presented herself to her small retinue with a calm countenance. "fair niece," said baron guy to her, just as she was waiting on the horse-block, "the duke will certainly do his utmost to be here as quickly as he can. he might possibly arrive before your return. if it should be so, proceed with caution, conceal yourself and your train at the vavasor's,--pierre landry's--two leagues hence, in the valley; he will be informed of your intention, look out for your return, and give me news of you. then we shall see what can be done." the lady de la roche-pont's train consisted of a dozen trusty men, retainers of the castle, commanded by a veteran knight of prudence and experience, with two women and the three monks. the party was supposed by the servants at the castle, to be making a visit to the lady de courtenai, eleanor's aunt. footnotes: [footnote : outer court.] [footnote : "the pleasance" was a garden, planted with fruit trees and groves, which served for a place of promenade, and for divers outdoor pastimes.] [footnote : in this figure the black tint indicates the roman substructions preserved and surmounted by new works; the yellow the roman buildings entirely razed; the red the defences added by the lord of la roche-pont; and the grey the domestic buildings rebuilt or repaired.] [footnote : an outer wall of no great height.] chapter x. _the fourth siege._ the duke of burgundy was making all speed to reduce his vassal. in the space of a fortnight he had gathered six or seven thousand men, and was beginning his march. anseric and baron guy had not failed to make the most of this respite. they provisioned the castle for three months at least. they fabricated four large trebuchets and half-a-dozen catapults. timber in sufficient quantity had been cut in the forest for making hoardings, palisades, and wooden defences. thirty stone-cutters were constantly at work making projectiles of sixty and a hundred pounds weight for the mangonels. each workman could produce ten in a day, and at the end of a fortnight they had amassed a store of four thousand five hundred. in the town, cross-bows and quarrels were being made; for the townsmen who had to render service were bound to come armed, equipped, and provided with missiles in sufficient quantity. there were archers also, for whom arrows of ashwood, bows of yew, and cords of long-fibred hemp were being made. although the lord of roche-pont could not, as stated above, assemble more than eighteen hundred men, and therefore could not contemplate defending the whole plateau--that is to say, the castle and the abbey--baron guy, who had reasons for it, urged him not to allow the enemy to occupy the monastery without defending it, even were it feebly. "you ought to defend the monastery," he would say to his nephew, "whenever the interests of the suzerain are involved; and since henceforth you are going to do homage for your fief to the king of france, he is your suzerain; his interests, therefore, are involved, and it is your duty to defend the abbey." to this specious reasoning anseric could find nothing to answer. the northern wall of the abbey was therefore put in a state of defence; they connected its north-east angle with the _débris_ of the roman wall still existing on the edge of the plateau by a strong palisade and ditch, and barricaded the western brow above the town, between the abbey and the bailey of the castle. the abbot had made a show of opposing these works, asserting with reason that the abbey was not at war with the duke of burgundy, and did not refuse its customary homage. but baron guy, as an old crusader, was a casuist of the first order, and, relying on the letter of the charter, maintained that the lord of roche-pont was fighting for the cause of his suzerain, and that consequently he must be faithful to the stipulations respecting the abbey. these debates did not stop the workmen; and although the abbot had sent for his vassals with a view to guard the monastery, they were in no hurry to obey his summons, believing that they were not in a condition to resist anseric's vassals, and preferring to await the result of what was being done before taking any side. the baron also had a trench dug from the south-east angle of the abbey wall to the eastern ridge of the plateau; then he had the trench covered with timbers and faggots, and the turf replaced above it, so as to leave no external sign of its existence. outside the barbican of the castle and the ditch was raised a strong palisade which protected its circumference, leaving between it and the wall a space of twenty paces, and which gave lists thirty paces wide in front of the counterscarp of the ditch. the twenty-second day after anseric's answer (the th of may), the duke's troops appeared on the plateau before the abbey. the first comers spread themselves in the town, and were beginning to plunder it, when the duke interposed, and, contrary to his wont, gave orders that the inhabitants and their property should be respected. listening to wise counsels for once, he was intending to separate the interests of anseric's vassals from those of their lord, to isolate the latter, and thus subdue him more easily. so that very evening he issued a proclamation by sound of trumpet through the whole town, to the effect that he was attacking the lord of roche-pont only, who had been declared a felon for having broken his fealty to the duke of burgundy; that the inhabitants of the town and of the valley would be respected as long as they did not take part with the lord of roche-pont; that from this day forwards they were free of all dues and services towards the said lord; but that those who should be convicted of taking part with him should be hanged as traitors to their lawful lord, the duke of burgundy. a herald presented himself before the walls of the abbey, and in a loud voice uttered the same proclamation.[ ] but the baron had foreseen this contingency, and all the townsmen who had come in arms at anseric's summons were shut up in the castle. he had appointed for the defence of the abbey, only men on whom he could rely--men who were directly dependent on anseric, and attached to his fortunes--with some of those adventurers whose services were enlisted in any wars that might arise, and who, having no ties of family or country, used to fight for those who paid them best. these defenders of the abbey were scarcely more than one hundred resolute men. they received the herald's proclamation with derisive shouts, answering that they knew no other lord but the king of france; and that if it came to hanging, they could play at that game quite as well as the duke's people. during the night two mangonels were mounted opposite the north wall of the monastery, and had soon dismantled the defences; but anseric's men had retrenched themselves in the building behind that wall; and when the burgundians advanced with ladders to scale the wall, they received them with a shower of darts, which killed some of the assailants. nevertheless, the besiegers mounted the wall and descended into the long narrow court enclosed by the building. there they were exposed to the stones and _débris_ of timber which the defenders threw at them out of the windows. the east court was barricaded, and anseric, with about twenty men, was guarding the barricades. he defended it bravely for a good hour, and the burgundians, fighting in a narrow space, sustained some losses. they succeeded, however, in breaking open a door of the building, and rushed into the cloister. there they were still exposed to the darts and stones hurled at them by some of the defenders posted on the north side of the church. a body of burgundians began to attack the south-east barricade, outside the enclosure, to take the abbey in the rear. it was there that the baron was posted, with about fifty men. the combat was severe and sanguinary, and before withdrawing, seeing that the defenders were gradually abandoning the abbey, he had the faggots in the trench behind set on fire. already anseric and his men were on the road to the _château_, and were sheltered by the defences of the barbican. guy rejoined them, pursued by a large body of burgundians. but a thick smoke soon began to issue from the trench, and the assailants who were coming up, seeing the ground undermined beneath them, dared not advance. on this guy and anseric fell upon those who had ventured within bowshot of the barbican, and killed a good number of them. excited by the struggle, and exasperated by the resistance they met with, the duke's men entered the various buildings of the abbey, killing the wounded, and plundering. fire, kindled by the defenders or the burgundians, soon reached the cloister and the roof of the church. the poor monks, assembled in the choir during the struggle, were soon forced to quit this retreat; for burning brands were falling on the pavement through the holes in the vaulted ceiling. it was already night, and many were massacred by the drunken soldiery. most of them had cowered down trembling in a vaulted chamber on the ground floor. it was there that the duke found them when he entered the burning abbey. the abbot threw himself on his knees; but the irritated duke repulsed him harshly, saying: "sir abbot, it ill becomes ecclesiastics to fight against their lord; and if i do not have you and your monks hanged, you may thank your habit. begone, and tell your brethren of your _forfeitures_!" vainly did the abbot protest his innocence, and asseverate that if the abbey had been defended, it was against his will; and the duke, whose anger seemed to gather warmth at every word the father spoke, ended by ordering his men to drive out all the monks. the unhappy fraternity, perishing of hunger, betook themselves to the town, where some kindly-disposed persons took them in; but the duke would not allow this, and proclaimed next day that every inhabitant who should give shelter to a monk should be hanged. collecting some provisions, therefore, they started for cluny on foot. the duke had given orders to extinguish the flames, for he was intending to reside in the abbey during the siege of the castle; but there remained no part of it fit for habitation except the abbot's dwelling, situated north of the church.[ ] retired within the castle, after having lost a fourth of their men who had been engaged in the struggle, anseric and the baron were making their final arrangements. the troops who had re-entered with them were in high spirits, for they had inflicted sensible losses on the enemy; and thought of nothing but defending themselves to the uttermost. guy was delighted, and his sombre visage was lighted up with an air of gaiety. "we are getting on bravely," said he to his nephew, when they were alone, "bravely, i say: now that the abbey is burned we are sure to be aided by the king of france; we have made a capital commencement." "but these poor monks; what has become of them? ah! my worthy uncle, it would have been better to leave them alone; we should now have some thirty brave fellows more here, and should not have to reproach ourselves with having caused the convent to be burned and the monks massacred, perhaps." "stay, stay, my good nephew; monks always get out of their difficulties, and they are sure to be able to restore their abbey. besides, it is the duke's men who have burned it! besides, was it not our duty to defend it? say no more about it. jean otté will get out to-night by the donjon postern. he is a rough sort of fellow, but a cunning blade; in five days he will be with our gentle eleanor, and tell how that the noble duke has sacked the abbey, and burned all the monkery! it's capital! capital!" on either side about a dozen prisoners had been taken. the next morning, may th, the people of the castle saw three of these unhappy men hanging up, by the duke's orders, on the trees of the pleasance. immediately three burgundian prisoners were hanged on the battlements of the barbican. [illustration: fig. .] none of the bridges had been destroyed by the besieged. they were occupied by the duke's men, and defended each by a good _bretèche_ (fig. ), to hinder any communication from one bank to the other. the south wall of the abbey was strengthened by palisades joining the two ridges west and east of the plateau. a guard was posted in the two mills belonging to the monastery,[ ] and a wooden tower built by the side of the rivulet, below the south-east part of the castle. these first measures adopted, the duke had a ditch dug, with a mound crossing the pleasance of the castle within bowshot, and connecting the two ridges. this intrenchment of contravallation was strengthened by two wooden towers, one at each end, with an outlet near each of them, and one in the middle (fig. ). the castle was thus completely invested (may th). [illustration: fig. .] while these works were being executed, there were trifling skirmishes every day between the defenders and the besiegers. they were trying each other's strength, but nothing serious was attempted. the duke bent his whole strength towards preventing the lord of roche-pont and his men from escaping: he was taking his time. baron guy was often closeted with a certain individual whom he called his chaplain, and who had accompanied him from palestine. in the castle, this so-called chaplain never went by any other name than the _saracen_. he was a tall, thin personage, with dark brown skin, black eyes and hair, always dressed in a coarse grey surtout. he spoke little, and drank nothing but water; but never failed to be present at mass in the chapel of the castle, and would remain long hours in prayer. the baron asserted that he was a monk of the order of bethlehem. whatever he was, he had charge of the sick, and possessed remedies for wounds of all kinds. he was gentle in manner, never looked a woman in the face, was a scholar, and would read aloud so as to charm the most delicate ears. his official name was brother jerome. now, during the leisure which the enemy left the besieged (who were not sufficiently numerous to offer any hindrance to the siege works of the burgundians, and could do nothing but keep a careful look-out), it was remarked at the castle that the baron and brother jerome passed whole hours together, in the lower apartment of one of the towers, of which they alone had the key. their clothes were often observed to be blackened when they came out. it was the eighth day of the investment, which appeared now to be complete (may nd). the baron had a secret conference with his nephew and brother jerome in the evening, and about six o'clock, orders were given to prepare one of the largest trebuchets, whose framing had been transported thither during the preceding night, at the western end of the lists, outside the ditch. about two o'clock in the morning, the engine was mounted, the night being still completely dark, as it would be at that season. they then tried its range against the right-hand tower of the besiegers' contravallation, with stones; and when the proper range had been secured--a point ascertained by the noise of the projectiles that fell on the woodwork--brother jerome placed in the lowered pouch of the stone-propeller a barrel provided with a match, and giving orders to let go the beam of the engine, set fire to the match with a brand taken from a brasier kindled for the purpose. with a whizzing sound, the end of the beam traced a bow of fire, and the barrel was shot forth, leaving a long and luminous trail behind it; it struck the wooden tower, and in bursting spread a sheaf of white flames which seemed to cling to the woodwork. the engine, lowered anew, sent a second barrel and a third. the wooden tower then resembled a furnace (fig. ). [illustration: fig. .--night sortie of the garrison of the castle.] great was the agitation among the guard of the besiegers, and the defenders could hear their shouts from the ramparts. taking advantage of their confusion, anseric had the barrier of the lists opened, and followed by two hundred men, went at full speed to the contravallation, passed through the central gate, which was but slightly guarded, and turned to the left, passing along the interior of the enemy's earthwork. the burgundians had betaken themselves to the tower to try to extinguish the flames. the besieged rushed upon the disorderly mass, most of them being unarmed. the baron had also gone out with a second body to protect his nephew's retreat. the duke heard the shouting from the abbey, saw the fire, and immediately gave orders to march forward. but during the last hours of night, men are not very active. before help arrived, anseric had had time to kill or put to flight all who were guarding the contravallation. he could therefore re-enter the lists at his leisure, and without having lost a single man; some few being wounded. daylight revealed to the duke the smoking remains of one of his towers. this sally raised the courage of the besieged; none of them, except those who had been in the wars of the crusaders, knew the effects of the greek fire. they deemed themselves, thenceforth, invincible. this was the baron's object in planning this attack, whose result was otherwise of little value to the besieged. in place of the wooden tower that had been burned, the duke had a platform raised, consisting of wicker-work and turf, on which was placed a substantial floor of beams to receive a _trebuchet_ which swept the lists, and almost reached the barbican. then he raised a second platform, in the very centre of the front of the contravallation, with a mangonel, whose projectiles fell right into the barbican. to these engines the besieged opposed the first trebuchet, and another mounted in the barbican. but on neither side was any great damage effected by them during a whole day's working, for as soon as the soldiers saw the beam of the enemy's engine lowered, they got out of the way. the besiegers enlarged the central platform, and were then able to mount the mangonels upon it, which succeeded in utterly destroying the trebuchet set up in the barbican, and the palisades in front, and in dismantling the battlements. the garrison of the castle were obliged to cower down against the walls, if they would avoid abandoning the works. when the besiegers deemed the palisades indefensible, and the battlements sufficiently broken down, the signal was given for the assault (may th). in the first place, protected by mantelets or by their bucklers, the archers and crossbowmen advanced to about sixty paces from the barbican, forming an arc of a circle around it--the archers in the front rank, the crossbowmen behind. immediately one of the defenders showed himself on the rampart, he was hit. the garrison, sheltered as far as possible by the remains of the merlons, and by their bucklers, replied as best they could, but ineffectually, for their situation was a very trying one. not wishing to risk his men's lives uselessly, anseric made them lie flat on their faces on the rampart, so as to be ready at the moment of assault. two bodies of burgundians then advanced, provided with ladders having hooks, and with planks, which they threw over the little ditch of the palisade. some resolute men defended the palisade, but it was so broken by the projectiles that these defenders had to abandon it. then about thirty ladders were set up against the barbican, and strings of men climbed their rounds; but the garrison succeeded in unhooking the ladders and throwing down the assailants; others, making use of the _débris_ of the merlons, crushed them. those of the assailants who reached the summit were received with blows of bills, boarspears, and crowbars. the foot of the barbican was already covered with dead and wounded, with the _débris_ of ladders, and stones. from the towers of the bailey gate skilful crossbowmen, well protected, hit most of those assailants who succeeded in mounting on the remains of the parapet. the assault, three times renewed, was as often repelled, with considerable loss to the burgundians. the assailants had burst in the gate of the barbican; but the baron, seeing that the lists could not be defended, had caused the gate to be barricaded, leaving only a narrow egress to allow the last defenders of the palisades to re-enter. as soon as these had got in, beams and barrels were heaped up against this gate. on this side the assailants were exposed to the projectiles hurled from the towers and curtains of the bailey. they succeeded, however, in setting up mantelets to protect them, and throwing sulphur and resin on these remains of the gate, set it on fire. the flames were communicated to the barricade, but the defenders incessantly brought up fresh pieces of wood, and night came without the enemy having been able to occupy the work. he nevertheless maintained his position around the barbican, sheltered behind fascines and mantelets, and piling against its walls trunks of trees, clods of turf, and mattresses taken from the scattered houses; while a trebuchet was incessantly discharging stones on the area of the defence. the besieged had abandoned it since midnight, and had thrown down the bridge giving entrance to the bailey. at sunrise, therefore (may th), the burgundians were able to get within the walls of the barbican without opposition, but they found themselves directly exposed to the projectiles thrown from the defences of the bailey, which were provided with hoarding. it was not without loss that the besiegers got a lodgment within the barbican, a considerable length of whose wall they threw down. then, having cleared the breach, they set to work to bring forward a _cat_ which had been framed together beforehand out of range, at some distance from the contravallation, while two terraces were being raised outside the walls of the barbican, and abutting against them (fig. ). [illustration: fig. .--the besiegers get possession of the barbican.] the burgundians could not undertake a new attack before these works were completed. baron guy determined to avail himself of this respite. behind the left-hand curtain of the bailey gate, he set up the two remaining trebuchets on a wooden platform, and then connected the corner of the chapel and the corner of the building d, belonging to the stables, by a good palisading with a ditch.[ ] the trebuchets were mounted within this palisading, forming an interior retrenchment. the timbers of the hoarding were thoroughly wetted and smeared with mud--as far as the enemy's attacks permitted. this precaution was not useless, for the burgundians soon discharged on these hoardings, with their catapults, darts furnished with tow dipped in pitch and lighted. the besieged, armed with poles to which were fastened pieces of wet blanket, extinguished these missiles without much trouble; for the flame had not the intensity of the greek fire, and did not cling to the wood. in fact the tow would sometimes be extinguished in its passage. in twelve hours the trebuchets of the besieged were mounted, and began to hurl stones of sixty and a hundred pounds weight on the barbican occupied by the enemy, and even beyond, which annoyed them excessively; for not seeing the engines, they were unable to aim in return--except by guess--with the mangonels they had set up on the terraces; and all the projectiles passed over the heads of the defenders. during three days no change occurred in the situation on either side. the burgundians, however, had succeeded in filling up the fosse on the right of the bailey gate; and they had thrown so many stones with their mangonels against the hoarding of the neighbouring towers, that these timber defences fell to pieces; but the stone battlement behind remained intact, and the defenders were still perfectly sheltered behind their merlons, whence they sent showers of quarrels and arrows. the fosse having been filled up (may th), the _cat_ advanced, rolling on planks between the two terraces, through the breach of the barbican. then as the filling in of the fosse had an inclination towards the curtain, the _cat_ of itself went striking its iron muzzle against the wall (fig. ). thereupon the besieged threw down on its double-sloped roof huge stones, beams, and small barrels of greek fire. but the roof was solidly plated with iron; its slopes greatly inclined, and covered with earth and wetted mattresses, allowed the stones, beams, and barrels to slip off right and left. men placed within the _cat_ thrust away the inflammable projectiles with long forks, so that they might not set fire to the sides of the gallery. this latter was preserved, therefore, despite the efforts of the besieged, and the miners, protected by its roof, set to work at the base of the wall. [illustration: fig. .--the cat.] the following night baron guy determined to make a last effort to set the _cat_ on fire. the working of the miners could be heard. beneath the gate b[ ] of the bailey, there was a drain which discharged the rain-water of the court into the ditch. this mouth had been in great part walled up when the enemy presented themselves before the place. the floor of the bridge, in falling, had moreover hidden it from the besiegers. the baron had the walling removed noiselessly with crowbars, and when the opening was large enough to allow a man to pass, he chose three determined fellows who, with brother jerome, slid down into the ditch. crawling up the mound which supported the _cat_, they slipped beneath its gallery two small barrels of greek fire. lighting the match with the aid of a preparation which the brother brought in a box, they went back as they had come, and the mouth of the drain was again walled up. from the summit of the neighbouring towers the besieged had then the pleasure of seeing the barrels spread streams of white flames, which, clinging to the timbers of the gallery, set it on fire. the more water the besiegers threw on the flames the more intense they became, so they began to try turf and mould. the defenders then recommenced throwing beams and stones on the roof of the _cat_; then more barrels of greek fire, bundles of straw, and faggots. in spite of the efforts of the burgundians, the gallery being quite filled with suffocating smoke, was no longer tenable. they were forced to abandon it; and it was with great difficulty that they were able to preserve from the fire about eighteen feet by cutting it away with axes. the besieged on their side had not been able to prevent part of the remains of the hoardings above the _cat_ from catching fire; but these hoardings were already past service, and their efforts were confined to preventing the fire from extending right and left. the entire head of the _cat_ against the wall and twenty feet of its length was burned. the operations of the miners were not much advanced, still they had already removed enough material to give shelter to two men from the projectiles falling from the ramparts. under favour of night, therefore, some pioneers returned to the mine-hole by creeping under the _débris_ of the _cat_. the darkness was great and the defenders did not observe them. but brother jerome was on the watch for suspicious sounds, and soon came to inform the baron that they were mining again. "well," said the latter, "let us repeat yesterday's manoeuvre; send men out through the mouth of the drain which these burgundians are so stupid as not to have looked for; and let some good thrusts of the knife relieve us of these burrowers; but let there be no noise!" the mouth of the drain was once more unwalled, and brother jerome with his three companions in the previous exploit, armed with long knives and gliding along the wall, reached the hole of the mine. three pioneers, intent on their work, were noiselessly killed; a fourth, who was outside hidden in the _débris_ of the _cat_ to watch, slept, heard nothing, and remained there unperceived by brother jerome and his companions. waking up soon afterwards he called in a low voice to his comrades ... there was no answer; he felt with his hand, touched a dead body--then a second, then a third. terrified and not daring to return to the burgundians from fear (a very reasonable one) of being hanged, he followed the wall, came to the _débris_ of the bridge, and found himself in front of the mouth of the drain, which was being silently walled up for the third time. only a dark lantern threw its faint light on the workmen who were visible through the small opening which remained to be closed. the burgundian comprehended, and immediately determined what to do. "a deserter!" said he in a low voice at the orifice. "thy hand!" replied brother jerome. the hand appeared at the entrance of the hole, and the whole body was forcibly dragged through, not without excoriations, by the friar and one of his companions. the new comer was disarmed and conducted before anseric and the baron as soon as the mouth of the drain had been securely closed. the poor wretch remained trembling before the two seigneurs and naïvely recounted what had happened to him. he was a young man from sémur, in auxois, who, like most of his countrymen, was not wanting in intelligence. he gave all the information demanded of him concerning the duke's army: "listen attentively to what i say," said the baron: "if the castle is taken, thou wilt be hanged by us before the first burgundian enters. if the duke's men take the castle, thou wilt be hanged by them, to a certainty. if thou servest us faithfully and the duke's troops are obliged to raise the siege, the lord of roche-pont will take thee into his service: what is thy calling?" "a harness-maker" "well then! thou shalt be attached to his stables--shall he not, my worthy nephew?" "certainly; and if he aids us efficiently, and if events show us that he speaks the truth, he shall have two pounds of silver on the raising of the siege." [illustration: fig. .--the bosson.] these last words completely loosened the harness-maker's tongue; and he told all that he knew as to the number of the engines, the arrangements of the besiegers, the posts they guarded, and the towers of the contravallation; after which he was sent to the servants' hall, where he soon made friends with anseric's dependants. friar jerome, however, was ordered not to lose sight of him. it was not before the time when the miners were to be relieved (by another set) that the burgundians discovered what had happened. the vanished harness-maker was strongly suspected of having assassinated his comrades while at work; they sought for him--to no purpose, of course. before sunrise the baron commenced a countermine at the point indicated by the deserter, inside the bailey wall. "if thou mistakest by so much as a yard," said the baron to the harness-maker, "thou shalt be hanged." the work was carried on by both parties, and towards the close of the day the miners and counterminers met and attacked each other in their close quarters with crowbars and pickaxes. the burgundians and the lord of roche-pont each sent men to seize the mines. a barrel of greek fire dislodged the duke's men; but the masonry of the wall, whose mortar had not thoroughly set, cracked above the mine. seeing this, the burgundians next night, making use of the rescued portion of the _cat_, set up a kind of front-work, formed of pieces of timber; and in the morning brought a _bosson_, or battering-ram on wheels (fig. ), with which they set to work to batter the base of the wall. at each blow the masonry was shaken, and stones fell down within and without. the besieged tried to break the _bosson_, by letting fall great pieces of timber on its head, and to set fire to the timber; but these had been wetted, covered with mud, and filled round with manure at the bottom: the parapet was so well swept by the duke's mangonels and by the crossbow men that it was scarcely possible to retain a footing on it. besides the men upon this wall, shaken as it was and vibrating at every blow of the ram, lost their self-possession and did not do their best; while the _bosson_ held out, especially as the assailants had put large pieces of timber in an inclined position against the wall, which caused the beams thrown by the besieged to slide off. at the end of three hours of continued effort, the wall gave way, and a piece about twelve feet long fell on the bosson. the burgundians immediately bringing up planks and ladders rushed to the assault through the narrow breach. the struggle was severe, and the garrison themselves, mounted on the ruins of the wall, fought bravely and maintained their front unbroken. from the parts of curtains that remained intact and from the towers the defenders showered darts and stones on the assaulting column. the trebuchets within the rampart continued to send stones which, passing over the heads of the defenders and assailants on the breach, struck those who were gathered around the remains of the _cat_, and made wide lanes among them. by the evening, the burgundians were masters of the breach; but seeing the interior rampart before them they did not venture to descend, but took up a position on the breach, protected by mantelets and fascines. the same evening they set miners to work between the tower of the north-west angle and its neighbour; reckoning on thus getting round the retrenchment by passing through a second breach.[ ] they likewise took possession of the two rampart walks of the curtain in which the breach had been made; but the tower of the gate and that on the left were still holding out at eight o'clock in the evening. [illustration: fig. .] an hour later, the assailants being masters of the rampart walk in that quarter, set fire to the roofs of these towers (fig. ), which the defenders were forced to abandon. in the morning, therefore, the gate was in the power of the enemy. the defenders still held the rampart walk to the east and west of the towers that had been burned, had raised barricades, and were determined to contest the position inch by inch. the assailants as well as the defenders needed rest. notwithstanding their progress, the burgundians were suffering considerable losses, while of the force in the castle there were only a hundred killed and wounded. by a kind of tacit agreement the day following the assault passed without fighting. the duke, alarmed at the losses he had already sustained, determined not to continue the attack without taking every precaution; for his men were complaining that they were always made to fight unprotected against soldiers carefully shielded, and asserting that even if they got as far as the donjon, there would not be a man left in the duke's army to enter it. that day was spent by the burgundians in thoroughly protecting their quarters on the breach, in placing a catapult, then in crenelating the back walls of the towers, of which they had got possession, and in constructing a kind of wooden tower provided with a second catapult at the interior opening of the gateway. the defenders, on the other hand, made a second retrenchment from the angle of the building d of the stabling to the western curtain, and a strong barricade from the angle of the chapel choir e, to the neighbouring tower. next, in front of the main gateway of the castle, a _bretèche_, or outwork with palisading to protect the men in case of retreat. it was evident that next day, the th of june, a decisive action would render the burgundians masters of the bailey, even if they did not exert themselves to the utmost; but the defenders were resolved that they should pay dearly for their success. anseric, firmly resolved to resist to the last extremity, and to perish under the ruins of his donjon, congratulated himself on eleanor's absence, and regretted that his children were not with her. the noble lady was, however, not far off. the evening of the day that had been entirely employed in preparations for attacking and defending the bailey, she and her escort had arrived at the dwelling of the vavassor, pierre landry, who had immediately despatched a trusty messenger to the castle. at the base of the donjon was pierced a slanting aperture one foot six inches square, which, opening into the lower hall, ended in the rampart walk left between the great tower and its outer inclosure. from this rampart walk a subterranean passage made along the foundations of the roman wall, descended the slope of the plateau for a length of sixty feet, and opened out in an old quarry overgrown with brambles. two strong iron gratings closed this tunnel. watchmen were posted night and day in this passage; they were let down and hoisted up through the inclined shaft of the donjon by means of a carriage worked by a windlass. by this passage anseric had often sent out and brought in spies, who at night made their way furtively among the burgundian posts. now in the dead of night, pierre landry's messenger presented himself at the entrance of the subterranean passage, gave the signal agreed upon, and handed to the watchman a little box, saying that he was awaiting the answer hidden in the quarry. the box was immediately transmitted to anseric. eleanor informed him of her return, and said that she would contrive to re-enter the castle with her train the following night by the donjon postern. anseric hardly knew whether to rejoice or grieve at this return. but the baron called his attention to a flower which eleanor had attached to the end of the vellum on which the letter was written, and which was a token of good news. on the morning of the th of june the burgundians were in no hurry to attack; they contented themselves with sending darts inside the retrenchment, with their catapults and quarrels and arrows in great numbers from the top of the abandoned towers; they were replied to from the top of the church, the stabling, and the great towers of the castle gateway. about three o'clock in the afternoon, the miners engaged (as above mentioned) at the north-west curtain, threw down a part of it. the duke had thus three openings into the bailey; this last breach, the one effected two days before, and the gateway. baron guy advised that time and men should not be lost in defending this second breach, since they were intrenched behind; but, thanks to the corner tower, he was able to resist the immediate capture of the rampart of the curtains on that side. the defenders occupying the tower y[ ] were thus cut off. anseric sent them a note by means of an arrow, urging them to hold out as long as possible. fortunately this tower had no doors opening on the bailey, and no perceptible communication except with the ramparts. now those adjacent to this tower still remained in the power of the occupants of the castle; as the burgundians only possessed the defences of the middle part of the front. about five o'clock the signal for the assault was given. three columns entered in good order by the two breaches and the gateway, and rushed, protected by their shields and bucklers, against the palisading, resolutely throwing themselves into the little ditch, in spite of the missiles which the defenders, who still possessed the tower y and its curtains, hurled upon them from behind. an egress had been left in the strong barricade which connected the angle of the chapel choir with the adjacent tower. anseric and a party of his best men issued by this outlet and fell upon the flank of the attack, which fell back in disorder. then other egresses well masked were opened on the front of the retrenchment, and the defenders resumed the offensive. they very nearly regained possession of these breaches and of the gateway; but the duke, on seeing his force in disorder, brought up his reserves, and the three bodies of assailants, four times more numerous than the defenders, obliged the latter to retire again behind their retrenchments. then about seven o'clock in the evening--for the combat was prolonged without decisive success on either side, and the days are long at this period of the year--the two catapults discharged a quantity of darts furnished with burning tow on the roof of the stabling and of the chapel. the men of the castle exclusively occupied with the defence of the retrenchment, had no time to think of extinguishing the fire, more especially as the crossbowmen stationed on the defences of the bailey, now in the hands of the burgundians, struck every defender showing himself on these buildings. the fire, therefore, soon gained the roofs. during the attack on the retrenchment, the duke resolved to get rid of the defenders remaining in his rear in the tower y, and who annoyed the assailants. he called to them by a herald, that they could no longer hope for relief, that if they did not instantly surrender they should all be put to the sword. these brave men sent, as their only reply to the herald, a crossbow bolt, which wounded him. then the duke, much irritated, ordered straw and faggots to be collected within the bailey and in the outside ditch, and all the wood they might have at hand, and set fire to, in order to smoke out the rebels. very soon, in fact, the tower was licked by curls of flame, and communicated the fire to the hoarding and roof. not one man cried "quarter!" for all seeing the fire gaining them, and blinded by the smoke, had retreated by a subterranean passage which from this tower communicated with the gateway of the castle--it was a roman work preserved beneath the ancient curtain.[ ] in withdrawing, they had stopped up the outlet of this passage, which, moreover, was soon filled up by the smoking _débris_ of the tower floors. the duke was persuaded that they had perished in the flames rather than surrender, and that set him gravely thinking. to the last glimmering of daylight succeeded, for the combatants, the illumination of these three fires. it seemed as if the heavens were bent on adding to the horror of the scene. the day had been fiercely hot; a storm soon arose accompanied by gusts of wind from the south-west, which blew down the smoke and strewed burning brands over the combatants. at one time anseric began to resume the offensive with his best soldiers by the barricade of the chapel; then transporting himself to the opposite palisade, he debouched along the western rampart upon the assailants, who on this side tried to get round the stable building. the direction of the wind was most unfavourable to the burgundians; they received full in their faces both the smoke and the sparks from the western building. the attack languished, despite the efforts of the duke to obtain a decided advantage, and to bring his united force to bear on one point. a pouring rain and fatigue stopped the combatants about nine o'clock in the evening. they almost touched one another, being only separated by the retrenchment. the rain fell so heavily that, in every direction, assailants and defenders sought shelter, until there remained none but the watchmen within and without the palisading. at nightfall, eleanor and her escort, habited as burgundian soldiers, departed on horseback from the house of the vavassor, pierre landry, and under his guidance. they ascended the valley in silence, and saw before them the outline of the castle in dark relief before the sky, lit up by the fires. with hearts full of anxiety, none dared to express their fears.... what was burning? was the enemy already within the bailey? had he succeeded in setting fire to the northern defences of the castle? having got to within two bowshots of the wooden tower, erected by the duke, at the junction of the river with the stream, they kept along the latter, forded it below the mill, left their horses there under the care of the vavassor's men, and ascended a-foot the slope of the plateau in the direction of the quarry. but at some distance from the opening, pierre landry, who was walking in front, perceived through the rain some men occupying the point of the plateau beneath the outer wall of the donjon. the duke had in fact sent some parties to watch the environs of the castle during the combat, and especially the base of the donjon, supposing, with reason, that this defence possessed a postern, as was usual, and fearing, that if the assault turned in his favour, the garrison, in despair of maintaining the defence any longer, after the taking of the bailey, might attempt to escape by some secret outlets. pierre landry turned back towards eleanor's escort and communicated to it this disagreeable discovery. to enter the quarry was not to be thought of. what was to be done?... the vavassor concealed eleanor, her two women, the three monks, and the twelve men-at-arms, as well as their captain, in the best way he could, and made his way along the escarpment by creeping through the underwood. flashes of distant lightning enabled him from time to time to make out the eastern walls of the castle. no troop appeared on that side; he advanced therefore gradually as far as the foot of the rampart. after the combat, anseric, full of anxiety, and without stopping to change his martial accoutrements, covered with mud and blood, had hastened towards the postern of the donjon. there he had learned from his watchmen that the environs of the outer wall were occupied by the burgundians about bowshot distant, that they were numerous, well shielded, and communicated with another post established beneath the western rampart, and with a third on the eastern side. anseric felt a cold sweat cover his face; but he said to himself that the vavassor was cautious, and certainly would not come and throw himself blindly into the snare. he thought for the moment of sallying with his bravest men by the postern to fall on the troop; but to what purpose? the latter would quickly be supported, the post of the wooden tower would take to their arms, and all chance of getting eleanor and her party in would be compromised. it would be better to send away his wife and to await events.... but how communicate with her? it was impossible to send her a message. he then remounted the steps of the postern in anxious thought. the baron came that way, and anseric related everything to him. "nothing is lost, dear nephew; we will get eleanor in, for it is necessary that we should know from herself the result of her mission; that must influence, one way or the other, the sequel of our defence..... leave me to act.... brother jerome is an intelligent fellow; we will consult together.... "in the meanwhile, go and watch without from the top of the eastern ramparts; for, whether pierre landry comes alone or with our party, it can only be by that side, since he cannot cross the river whose bridges are guarded. he must have crossed the rivulet in order to get to the outlet of the postern. go, look and listen attentively!".... anseric, ascending the eastern defences, enjoined on his men the greatest silence, and put his ear to the listening places--first in one tower then in the next; but he only heard the dripping of the rain on the roofs, and the sighing of the wind. in a little while the baron and brother jerome, provided with a long rope, came to seek him. "make yourself easy, dear nephew; brother jerome is first going to reconnoitre.... but call four men to help us." a board was fastened transversely to one end of the cord; this end was thrown over the outside through one of the embrasures, while the cord was held by the four men. brother jerome, with his grey dress tucked up, a large knife at his belt, put his feet on the board, grasped the cord with both hands, and he was gently let down. when the rope was slack, the brother was at the foot of the rampart, and they waited. at the end of half-an-hour, which seemed an age to anseric, a slight movement given to the cord intimated that brother jerome was returning. the cord tightened, and the four men had soon hoisted the brother up to the merlons. "well?" said anseric. "the vavassor is there; i was very nearly killing him, taking him for a burgundian, for he has the dress of one; it was he who recognised me and called me by my name." "well! well! eleanor?"--"all are there concealed, for the burgundians are not far off; in this diabolical weather they are earthed like rabbits; no time must be lost. let down a _barquette_ at the end of the cord; we will hoist up the lady eleanor, and the others afterwards, if the burgundians let us." the _barquette_ was quickly brought, and firmly attached to the cord, then let down; a shake of the rope intimated that pierre landry was below: soon after, a second shake intimated that the _barquette_ was loaded. they hoisted, and dame eleanor very soon showed her face at the battlement; all hands lifted her to the arms of her husband. the two women, the captain, the eleven men-at-arms, and the three monks were thus hoisted, without mishap, but were wetted to the skin. in spite of the loss of the bailey, and the death of a good number on their side, anseric's men were full of joy when at dawn the defenders were told that an army of the king of france was coming to their relief, and that it was only a question of continuing the defence a few days longer. eleanor's mission had perfectly succeeded. the king, philip augustus, who appeared to hesitate at first, had quickly determined when the messenger jean otté came to tell eleanor of the burning of the abbey. the king had desired to see this messenger, and the latter, who knew whom he had to deal with, had recounted how the duke's men, without warning, without any provocation, had taken possession of the monastery, had set it on fire, had massacred some of the monks, and driven out those who remained. soon after, a letter from the abbot of cluny came to confirm the fact, imploring the justice of the king. eleanor, as a woman who knew what she was about, had not failed to make known to the suzerain that the dearest wish of her husband and herself for a long while had been to put the fief of la roche-pont into the hands of the king: that they should not, however, have declined the homage rendered to the duke for the fief, if that noble had not, by his violence and the plundering of his men, provoked this decision on their part; that far from being the protector of his vassals, the said duke was bent upon ruining them: and that if he (the king of france) presented himself on the domain of roche-pont, he would be received there as the sole and puissant justiciary, alone worthy to govern. the opportunity was too tempting for philip augustus not to be eager to avail himself of it. to lessen the power of a great vassal under so plausible a pretext, and with the rights of the case in his favour, accorded too completely with his general policy to allow him to display less than the full measure of that vigour and firmness for which he was so distinguished. eleanor quitted the court with the assurance that, a few days after her return to roche-pont, the royal army would confront the forces of the duke of burgundy. the grand point, therefore, was to sustain the enemy's attacks with firmness. the defenders numbered no more than a thousand men capable of offering an effective resistance; but the perimeter of the defence was sensibly diminished, for it was impossible to recover the inclosure of the bailey. they must limit themselves to the castle walls, arresting the progress of the burgundians as far as possible. the baron made no great account of the retrenchment raised between the stables and the chapel; but he considered it of the greatest importance to preserve the west part of the bailey as long as possible, for the north flank of the castle gate evidently presented a weak point, although it was defended by three towers. the baron, convinced that the duke was not sparing of the lives of his men, had no doubt that by sacrificing a thousand soldiers, this front might be broken into in forty-eight hours; the works designed to bear upon this point must therefore be interrupted at all risks. the building, d,[ ] of the stabling had been burned; but fortunately the lateral wall of the building looking eastward was part of the roman curtain, of thick and solid construction. between this building and the castle ditch the enemy could not pass. he could only attack by the breach made on the side of the tower, y, or by the interval left between this tower and the building, d, that had been burned. the tower, v, of the western angle had remained in the hands of the defenders. it was wide and solidly built, resting on the roman substruction, and covered by a platform on vaulting. towards daybreak the baron had caused two trebuchets remaining within the palisade to be dismounted with all speed. their timbers were carried into the court of the castle, for, as he foresaw that the palisaded retrenchment would not hold out long, he did not wish these engines to be taken possession of by the burgundians. a strong catapult had been reserved in the western corner tower v. the baron had it mounted on the platform by daylight, not without difficulty.[ ] but that a clear idea may be formed of what follows, we must give a plan indicating the position of the enemy, and the state of the defences (fig. ).[ ] [illustration: fig the taking of the bailey] on the morning of the th of june the defenders were still in possession of the retrenchment c, of that marked a a, and of the barricade b; at h a strong palisade, with a _bretèche_, had been erected before the entrance at the very commencement of the siege. at d' another palisade arose in front of the ditch; at e was a second retrenchment, before the postern entrance; and at g a strong barricade. the building, f, part of the old roman construction, crenelated at the top, might hold out for some time. the towers, v, m, _m_, _m'_, and v' were still in the hands of the defenders, and could take the assailants in the rear, should they attempt to enter the chapel, i, and the stables, d, that had been burned. anseric and his uncle came to the determination to abandon the retrenchment, a a. to defend it was only to lose men, since the enemy could not venture into the return formed by the two towers of the gate and the building f. it was preferable to direct all their efforts to c, for this was evidently the point of attack. about five o'clock in the morning, therefore, the retrenchment, a a, was abandoned; and in fact the burgundians contented themselves with making gaps in it without advancing further. in the early morning the duke had directed a quantity of burning darts on the roof of the tower, m; but the catapult planted by the defenders on that of the angle, v, greatly annoyed the assailants grouped outside, who were preparing to make a vigorous attack through the breach c. it was about noon that the duke gave orders for a simultaneous attack on two points; the roof of the tower, m, was already on fire. the first attack was vigorously directed to the retrenchment c. the second made a gap in the crenelated walls of the chapel, the intention being to get possession of the palisade e. at the same time, two catapults planted outside were showering burning darts upon the roofs of the towers _m_, _n'_ and v, while a trebuchet was destroying the hoarding and battlements with volleys of stones. the defenders posted on the summit of the tower, v, by discharging stones and quarrels on the flanks of the assailants, who were impetuously assaulting the retrenchment, c, did them much damage, their bucklers not availing to protect them in front and flank; and from the narrow front of the castle, skilful archers discharged arrows in abundance over the heads of their own party on the assailants who presented themselves at the breach, c; for they were within bowshot. [illustration: fig. .] seeing they could make no impression, the duke withdrew his men, and had mantelets brought forward and placed perpendicularly to the wall, and fronting the tower in the angle, and then a small bosson on wheels--its head strongly armed with a solid iron point. the wheels of this bosson were screened (fig. ), to shelter those engaged in working it. twenty men under shelter, with heavy crowbars, were awaiting the effect of the bosson. the fourth time it encountered the palisade a dozen stakes were greatly shaken, and the cross-rails broken. then the pioneers, armed with crowbars, set about bringing down the shaken stakes, or at least turning them aside. the assaulting column threw itself upon the openings. there was a hand-to-hand fight, and so densely were they pressed together, that the men posted in the tower at the corner dared not shoot for fear of wounding their comrades. on the opposite side the burgundians had succeeded in making a wide gap in the wall south of the chapel; and screened by its ruins, they attacked the angle of the retrenchment e.[ ] from the east curtain, however, the garrison discharged stones and arrows on their rear; and this assault was but feeble, as the duke was entirely occupied with directing the others. anseric defended this point by the desire of the baron, who had urged him to resume the offensive, supported by the building f, however difficult the undertaking might be. one of the men posted at the defences of the gate hurried down, and, passing the postern, came and told him that the retrenchment, c, was forced and his people in great danger at this point. anseric, therefore, taking two hundred and fifty men whom he had with him, issued from the retrenchment by its eastern extremity, rushed furiously on the assailants, threw them into disorder, and leaving forty brave soldiers to defend the gap in the chapel, and the barricade, b, that had remained almost intact, traversed the area of the bailey in an oblique direction, crossed the retrenchment, a, which was partly destroyed, and fell on the left flank of the assailants, uttering the war-cry: "roche-pont! roche-pont!" ... the burgundians, surprised by this unforeseen attack and not knowing whence these soldiers came, abandoned the retrenchment, the bosson, and even the breach, c. the baron's troops, seeing this, plucked up courage, and killing all that had remained within the bailey, occupied the breach, _c_, once more, while anseric was occupying the barricade, c. the bosson was destroyed with hatchets, and the mantelets left by the enemy were put in readiness for repairing the broken-down palisades. the duke was furious, and had broken his sword on the backs of the runaways. but no further attempt could be made that day, and the advantages he had gained with so much trouble were jeopardized. the defenders were seen barricading the breaches, and he could hear the cries of the unfortunate men who had remained in the bailey, and were being pitilessly massacred. the burgundians had lost more than two thousand men since the commencement of the siege; and on the th of june the duke's army amounted to no more than four thousand five hundred or five thousand men at most. the besieged were reduced to about a thousand; but they were full of hope, and assured of success, while the besiegers were losing confidence. their advantages had been gained only by enormous sacrifices, and this last affair threatened altogether to "demoralize" them. the duke had reckoned on taking the place in a month at most; and now at the end of thirty-two days he found that he had lost the third of his army without being much more advanced than the second day after his arrival. order and method had been wanting in the various phases of the siege; this he could see when it was rather too late. if, instead of pursuing their advantages in the centre of the front of the bailey, the besiegers had contented themselves with taking the barbican, so as to hinder any sortie from that side, and if with good earthworks they had advanced under cover against the western end of this front towards the tower, m,[ ] directing all their efforts to this point and raising a movable tower, they would be in possession of the western court, would destroy in succession the works on their right, would be able to protect themselves against offensive re-action on their left, and would attack the castle on its weak side; that is, between the gate towers and that marked q. thus they might take in the rear all the eastern defences, moving along the western curtain by successive breaches. the duke, it is true, was not acquainted with the place, and believed that in making a wide breach in its centre he was striking at its heart. these reflections occurred to him too late; he could not draw back, and it was necessary to act with decision. assembling his chief captains, therefore, in the evening, he announced that a decisive effort must be made; representing it as evident--in spite of the check just experienced--that if they could gain a permanent footing in the western court of the bailey, they could soon break into the castle on the flank of the gateway defence, and this flank once seized the castle would be theirs. the soldiers, rather ashamed of the panic that had lost them the advantages they had acquired, cast the blame of the failure upon each other; and those who had been the first to run away were bent upon vindicating their bravery. so that when, on the morning of the th of june, the order was given for attacking the lost breach, _c_, and every preparation had been made for protecting their position within the bailey, the burgundians were eager to advance. a vigorous return to the charge was expected by the garrison, and the baron concluded that the breach, _c_, would be attacked. part of the night, therefore, had been occupied in strongly barricading this breach. two burgundian catapults and a trebuchet covered the breach with darts and stones, so that the defenders had to shelter themselves to the right and left behind the remains of the curtains; and about ten o'clock the barricade was destroyed and only a heap of rubbish remained. the palisade of the retrenchment in the rear was also damaged, and the projectiles that were showered upon this point precluded the defenders from repairing it. then the first attacking column advanced, passed through the breach, and reached the palisades. anseric, posted behind the building, d (belonging to the stables), was on the point of taking this column in flank, as on the previous day, but a second troop rushed through the breach, and the lord of roche-pont was all but taken. with great difficulty he and his men retreated to the outwork of the gate, and brought aid to the defenders of the western court. the surging host of the burgundians was continually increasing, the palisade was taken, and the second palisade, d, was the scene of a desperate struggle between assailants and defenders. the garrison could not bring their forces to bear on this point, and anseric feared they might be cut off, and not be able to retire into the outwork of the gate, h; he therefore ordered a retreat in the evening, while from the three towers and the curtain of the castle, quarrels and arrows were showered on the assailants confined in the court. the tower, v, which still remained in the hands of the besieged, took the burgundians in the rear; and the latter employed all the rest of the day in securing themselves in front and in flank, while the duke had the tower, m, undermined. the door of the tower, v, opening into the bailey, had been broken in; but the stairs were so well barricaded with stones and _débris_ that it was impossible to clear it; and even should this be done the assailants would be easily overpowered by the defenders. a wooden bridge connected the curtain of the bailey on this side with the corner tower of the castle. by means of a catapult the burgundians succeeded in throwing combustibles on it, which obliged the defenders to abandon the tower, v, in haste. they were seen re-entering the castle just when the flames were beginning to consume the bridge. the roof of the tower, q, was all but set on fire; and the defenders had great difficulty in arresting the progress of the flames. if anseric had had five hundred more men he might from the central court have resumed the offensive at the moment when the burgundians were trying to gain a lodgment in the western court. but he had lost a hundred men in the last engagement, and had no more soldiers than were absolutely necessary for the defence of the castle. in the evening the central part of the bailey was occupied by the burgundians, who took up their quarters there, and intrenched themselves securely this time. next morning, the th of june, the tower, m, being undermined, fell, and the breach, _c_, was proportionately widened. the ditch was filled up, and the tower, v, occupied by the burgundians. the defenders, before they abandoned it, had set fire to the catapult mounted on the platform. the crown of the tower, q, in the corner of the castle, rose more than twenty feet above the curtain, and thus hindered the burgundians from moving at will on the rampart-walk of this curtain, which was not furnished with covered hoarding. the whole of the th of june was employed by the burgundians in completing their works in the western court of the bailey, clearing the breach, _c_, and working at a wooden movable tower, designed to attack and command the rampart between the gate and the corner tower, q, of the castle; for this rampart, raised on the rock, could not be undermined. the duke, aware by this time of the strength of the place, and supposing the defenders to be more numerous than they really were, was unwilling henceforth to run any hazards. as far as was possible he manned the tops of the ramparts of that part of the bailey which was in his possession, succeeded in setting fire to the roofs and floors of the towers _m_ and _m'_, and commenced a mining attack on the tower _v'_. it was no longer the interest of the defenders to guard these works, which weakened them to no purpose. they therefore evacuated them, threw down the bridge uniting the eastern rampart of the bailey with the corner tower, and retired permanently within the castle. meantime the burgundians were working at their movable tower outside the old palisade, c, that had been destroyed, and covered the outside with fresh hides to preserve it from the greek fire. they filled up the ditch in front of the tower _p_,[ ] not without difficulty protecting themselves with fascines and mantelets. on the th of june the tower was completed, and the road for it constructed of strong planks firmly fastened as far as the filling up of the ditch. for the few last days the enemy had been incessantly working the catapults and two trebuchets against the crest of the defences of the castle between the gate and the tower, q, and had tried to set fire to the hoarding and roofs; but these ramparts were higher than those of the bailey, and the baron had covered all the timbers with hides and blankets always kept wet, so that the flaming darts of the burgundians were ineffectual against them. the roofs, too, were carefully watched. the hoarding, however, was almost entirely destroyed by the projectiles, and its _débris_ had been removed by the garrison, as only embarrassing the defence. the whole of the crown of the tower, p, was greatly damaged, especially as it did not rise above the crest of the curtain. seeing the enemy's preparations, the baron mounted a strong mantelet of thick wood and a catapult on the platform of this tower, p, which had no roof. then, to meet every contingency, he had a strong retrenchment made from the angle, _t_, to the opposite tower, behind the tower, q. in the evening of this day, the th of june, the wooden tower began to be moved, borne along on huge rollers. as soon as it was about thirty yards from the rampart, the baron had the catapult directed upon it, and sent against it cases of greek fire fixed near the iron points of the darts. the fresh hides protected it well, and the points did not stick in the wood; so the fire fell on the ground, and the burgundians, under cover of the base-work of the tower, flung off the flaming cases by means of forks. this gave them plenty to do, and the tower advanced but slowly, while the further it proceeded the greater was the chance of its taking fire. the baron, who had but a small quantity of greek fire remaining, was afraid to waste it. already five cases had been thrown without effect; so he resolved to wait till the tower was close to the ramparts. at this time of the year (june ) the nights are not completely dark, and day breaks early. at two o'clock in the morning the wooden tower was on the counterscarp of the ditch. the mound that filled it presented a slope towards the ramparts, and was covered with planks. at a signal, the tower, urged on from behind by means of twenty powerful levers, rolled quickly along its inclined plane and came into collision with the summit of the tower p, above which it rose ten feet. the shock made the walls tremble, and a shower of stones and darts was poured upon the defenders from the top of the wooden tower. then a bridge fell noisily on the head of the tower above-mentioned, shattered the mantelets and the catapult; and the assailants, uttering formidable shouts, leaped on the platform. anseric was at the top of the tower, q, and baron guy was posted on the battlements of the gate. both of them, rushing towards the curtains, attacked in their turn the assaulting column on this narrow rampart; many on both sides fell within the court, and were killed or had their limbs broken. numbers conferred no advantage, since it was impossible to deploy; so that the crowd of assailants that continued to pour forth from the wooden tower had to fight on the right and the left in a space six feet wide. the staircase of the tower, p, having been blocked up, the enemy could not get down through it; so that, driven into a corner on the platform of the tower, they had to make their way along one curtain or the other. anseric, at the head of his troop, was cutting an ensanguined road before him with a long-handled axe. at his side, his men, armed with pikes and hooks, stabbed or grappled with and threw down the wall those who attempted to approach their lord. these unfortunate men fell from a height of twenty-five feet on the _débris_ of hoarding which the garrison had thrown down within, to clear the rampart walk. the crossbowmen, posted at the top of the wooden tower, discharged quarrels on the two bands; but the men were well protected with armour, and the quarrels rebounded from their helmets or were arrested by their hauberks. friar jerome, armed with an enormous mace, mounted on a merlon, felled all who came within his reach. the duke, remaining at the bottom of the wooden tower, and supposing the rampart taken, was urging on his men-at-arms that they might follow up with overwhelming numbers those who had first reached the rampart. thanks to anseric's efforts and those of the baron, there was some amount of delay at the top of the tower, and the exit from the bridge could not be readily effected. the assailants who were coming up behind the front of the assault were pressing upon those before them, and this pressure only increased the confusion. by dint of numbers, however, the burgundians succeeded in gaining a footing on the tower; and the two bands of defenders were not sufficiently numerous to thrust them back. seeing that they were going to be absolutely overwhelmed, the baron called father jerome, who, leaping from merlon to merlon, succeeded in reaching him. a word spoken in the friar's ear made him run towards the neighbouring tower belonging to the gate. a moment afterwards and a strong crossbow mounted on the upper story of the work, behind the hoarding, shot quarrels, to which cases of greek fire were fastened, against the sides of the wooden tower, which was not so well protected by skins as its front. the friar took a cool aim at the exposed part of the timbers, chiefly about seven or eight feet above the base of the tower. he had ten of these cases left, and all were aimed with a sure hand, being attached to strong quarrels, whose points were well sharpened. four of the quarrels failed to stick, but the six others were fixed firmly in the timber, and the cases they bore spread a tenacious and burning lava over the wood. at the first moment the burgundians, absorbed in the attack, did not perceive the danger. those who had reached the top of the tower could not be aware of it. the duke was one of the first to see the thick smoke issuing from the kindled wood. immediately he gave orders for the extinction in all haste of the fire with the aid of small hand-ladders; but as soon as anyone mounted one of these ladders, a dozen archers and crossbowmen posted in the gate tower made him their mark. four or five men had been killed or wounded before the level of the flame was reached. inside, the soldiers who, like a rising flood, were ascending to the top of the tower, soon found themselves surrounded by the suffocating smoke produced by the greek fire. some were the more eager to mount, others hesitated and were for going down. "now! to the rescue! arde le beffroi!" cried friar jerome, coming to rejoin the baron's troop, which was almost driven into a corner close to the tower; and with his long mace he took the lead, breaking heads and arms. "arde le beffroi!" he shouted at every blow. "roche-pont! roche-pont! arde le beffroi!" shouted, in its turn, the baron's small troop (fig. ). anseric's men, who were crowded up in the corner tower, re-echoed this cry. [illustration: fig. .--the movable tower.] the burgundians, however, did not retreat; in fact, if they had wished to do so, they could not. they tried to place ladders to get down into the court, but they were too short. "burgundy! burgundy!" shouted the assailants, in their turn. "place prise! place prise!" the grey light of dawn faintly illumined this scene of carnage, and its pale, cold gleams mingled with the ruddy glow of the fire. the smoke, driven by a breeze from the north-east, beat down upon the combatants, and sometimes hindered them from seeing each other; but the struggle raged on. heaps of the dead and wounded--the latter being speedily dispatched by menials posted in the court to resist any who should try to get down into it--lay at the interior base of the curtains. although anseric and the baron had ordered those who remained in the two neighbouring towers (that of the angle and that of the gate) not to quit their post under any pretext, and not to unbar the gates till the two troops were absolutely driven back upon those defences, these brave men, seeing so fine an opportunity of routing the burgundians, and observing the weakness of the two bands of the defenders compared with the host of assailants, opened the gates and sallied forth to help their comrades. eleanor and her waiting-women, with some of the wounded, perceiving the critical state of affairs (for the combat took place in front of the western inhabited part of the castle), had proceeded along the western curtain and had reached the corner tower, q,[ ] behind the troop commanded by anseric. the lady of the castle was the first to encourage the men on guard there to go out, saying that she knew well enough how to bar the doors. as to the wounded who were with her, they posted themselves as best they could at the hoarding, to shoot at the enemy outside and the compact mass of burgundians engaged on the platform of the tower. these two reinforcements arrived very opportunely. the new comers, fresh and vigorous, made their way, some on the tops of the merlons, others on the _débris_ of the hoarding, and relieved their comrades exhausted by the struggle. the fire was catching the framework of the tower, and the burgundians soon found their retreat cut off. those who had gained the rampart, however, sold their lives dearly, and the struggle did not cease till the flames of the burning tower curled round the platform and the rampart walk. nearly five hundred burgundians were killed, wounded, taken prisoners, or burned. the sparks of fire, driven by the wind, were borne down upon the roof and the hoarding of the tower at the angle, and it caught fire about six o'clock in the morning. the day was a fortunate one for the defenders, but they had lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. anseric had been struck by several quarrels that pierced his hauberk, and was covered with blood. the baron, that he might be more at his ease in fighting, feeling himself oppressed by his helmet, had taken it off during the struggle, and had a large wound in his head. they hastened to throw over the battlements the bodies of the slain burgundians upon the last blazing timbers of the tower, and to bury in the court the dead that had fallen there. all in the castle were exhausted with fatigue. eleanor and her attendants were engaged in dressing wounds and in bringing food and drink to the various posts. the lady of the castle preserved her tranquil countenance and gentle look amid these sanguinary scenes, and during the whole day and through the following night she did not cease to render aid to all who needed it. "fair niece," said the baron to her, while she was dressing his wound, "if the king's army does not make haste it will find no more defenders to deliver; but we have given the duke some trouble, and if he goes on he, too, may have to return to his court alone." the nd of june passed without fighting. the duke had a _cat_ constructed with a view to sapping the rampart at its base--which seemed the more feasible, since the destruction of its hoarding and the burning of the tower in the angle deprived the defenders of the means of opposing the sapping effectually. the garrison could see the enemy engaged in this work in the bailey behind the mantelets, and they accumulated within the rampart all the materials they could procure, with a view to blocking up the mouth of the mine at the moment it reached the court. on the morning of the th of june, the watch posted on the gateway tower were much surprised at seeing not a single burgundian in the bailey. they went immediately to inform anseric and the baron. "it is either a ruse, or the king's army is coming," said the latter; "let there be a sharp look-out in every quarter." they ascended the donjon. the posts on the south were abandoned. the _cat_ and the mantelets remained in the bailey as well as the trebuchets. about noon the baron sent out ten men with the deserter, who was to conduct them to the various points occupied by the burgundian captains. in three hours' time they returned, saying that they had met only some laggards, who had fled at their approach, and some wounded; that the encampment was utterly deserted, but there were some waggons and military engines left. the duke having been informed of the advance of the king's army, which was only a day's march from the castle, had decamped in the night, abandoning his material of war. great was the joy at la roche-pont. the inhabitants of the town soon came and confirmed the news. the last of the burgundians had departed about noon, not without leaving many of their men on the field; for, in spite of the injunctions of the duke, the inhabitants of the lower town of saint-julien had been considerably plundered and had driven out the last of the soldiers with stones and pike thrusts. soon afterwards the sieur de la roche-pont did homage for his fief to king philip augustus; and the monks re-entered their abbey, for the repair of which the king gave five hundred livres. footnotes: [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see g, fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see the general bird's-eye view, fig. .] [footnote : the parts of the castle marked red are those taken by the burgundians; those marked black are still retained by the defenders. at _a_ is marked the breach in the barbican; at _b_ the filling up of the fosse and the first breach made in the curtain; at _c_ the second breach. at _o o_ are seen the burgundian posts established on the night of the th and th of june; at _x_ the outline of the subterranean passage of the refuge postern of the donjon; at _z_ the quarry; at p the route traversed by pierre landry and eleanor's escort; at r their place of concealment, and at s the point where they were got into the castle by means of a rope.] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] chapter xi. _the first defences against fire artillery._ king john had possessed himself of the duchy of burgundy and united it with the crown; he resigned it in favour of his son philip, who, as is well known, had distinguished himself on the fatal day of poictiers. from that epoch till the time of charles the bold, the duchy had remained in the hands of the descendants of king john; and although the dukes of burgundy were very warlike, and had formed a league with the english against the crown of france, in consequence of the quarrel that arose in between philip and the duke louis d'orleans, brother of charles vi., the duchy was relatively at peace, while the north of france, as far as the loire, was in the power of foreigners. after the death of charles the bold before nancy, king louis xi. lost no time in despatching to the province of burgundy la trémoille, baron of craon, who, acting in concert with the prince of orange, soon reduced the whole province into subjection to the king of france; this was in . the town of la roche-pont (at that time the abbey alone preserved the name of saint-julien, and the town had adopted that of the castle) had been deemed by charles the bold worthy of special attention. recognising the advantageous site of the place and the importance of its strategic position, this prince had adapted the ancient defences to the new mode of attack. the old castle of la roche-pont, several times repaired, still showed some of its defences dating from the end of the twelfth century, the donjon being particularly well preserved; but the abbey and the entire plateau had been surrounded by a new wall by philip, about , and the town had been rebuilt within this enclosure, the right bank of the larger stream being completely abandoned. at the end of the fourteenth century there existed only a suburb on the slopes of the plateau along the left bank, and this suburb had no other defence than a wall of inconsiderable strength on the north. the great-grandson of anseric, sieur de la roche-pont, having died without male heirs, the fief of la roche-pont had reverted to the duke philip, who, as well as his successors, appointed the governors of the town and castle, henceforth a ducal domain. the enclosure of the town had been rebuilt in great part on the roman foundations. it consisted of a substantial wall rising about twenty-four feet above the outside ground level, without machicoulis, strengthened with cylindrical towers thirty-six feet in height surrounded by machicoulis and covered with conical roofs. machicoulis formed also the upper defence of the curtains and towers of the castle, whose plan had not been changed. this place had not suffered any attack since the date of these new works, and it was intact under charles the bold. during his struggle in the north with the people of ghent and hainault, and as a precaution against the intrigues of louis xi., he had thought it needful to put the town of la roche-pont in a good state of defence. now, limited though its efficiency was, the artillery of the king of france already played a sufficiently important part in sieges to render it necessary to provide against its effects. the duke therefore raised several boulevards to replace the walls and receive artillery. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. .--the town of la roche-pont is fortified by charles the bold.] as shown in our plan, the bailey of the castle no longer existed. it was replaced by a wide ditch, a, of little depth; its bottom was on a level with the two boulevards, b and c. a third boulevard surrounded the base of the donjon externally, in the place of the ancient _chemise_. this boulevard commanded the stone bridge rebuilt in the fourteenth century on the roman piers. before the north front was raised an isolated boulevard of earth, d, of slight elevation, but commanding the road of the plateau. at the angles of the north front two large towers, e, f, adapted to receive cannon, flanked the angles and were in a position to sweep the boulevard, d. set back on the eastern side, a similar tower, g, commanded the valley of the rivulet. two boulevards, h and i, forming projections beneath the defences of the fourteenth century, commanded the course of the river, and could cross their fire with the boulevard b, and the tower e. a boulevard was also raised on the eastern salient at k. the faubourg had preserved its two parish churches, and a convent of jacobins had been built at l, on lands bought by saint louis while the fief of la roche-pont was still directly dependent on the crown of france. the abbey of saint-julien, o, had diminished its enclosure, and yielded a part of its estates. houses arose in its ancient pleasance, whose perimeter had been somewhat altered. these habitations were within its liberties and belonged to the abbey, which granted them on lease. at m, a parish church under the invocation of our lady had been built towards the end of the thirteenth century, when the lord of la roche-pont, wanting money, sold some lands--formerly belonging to the castle--for building. at n was the market-place. three gates gave admission to the _cité_: one on the north, called saint-julien's gate; one on the east, mill-gate; and the third on the south-east, called castle-gate. we must enter into some details respecting the new defences raised under charles the bold. figure presents a bird's-eye view of the northern boulevard, d, with the _cité_ front in the background, its gate of the fourteenth century, and the two great corner towers. [illustration: fig. .] fig. a gives the plan of one of these towers at the level of the lower battery, and b its section through _a_, _b_. these towers were forty yards in diameter on the outside, and consisted of a low battery, whose floor was six feet beneath the upper level of the plateau. the descent to this low battery was by a slope ending in an octagonal hall whose vaults rested on four great cylindrical pillars. three chambers with embrasures for three large cannons opened into this hall. by the galleries, c, there was a communication between two of these chambers and two other smaller ones pierced with embrasures for culverins. from the descent d, two passages, e, gave access to two chambers, f, likewise arranged with embrasures to receive two large guns. [illustration: fig. .--masonry tower for artillery.] the barrel vaults of these rooms had openings to allow the smoke to escape. small powder magazines, g, opened near each of the chambers, and five large lunettes pierced in the vaults of the central hall gave air and light to the interior. at h, a well was connected with a cistern constructed under the central hall, as indicated in section b. this cistern was supplied by rain-water falling on the platform and discharged by four pipes passing down through the inner walls. two winding staircases connected the lower battery with the platform and the curtains of the fourteenth century, i i, and allowed of a descent through two posterns, k, into the braie, l, defended by an epaulement, a palisade, and narrow ditch. flanks, _l_, raked the salient of this braie. the curtain, whose rampart walk rose six feet above the level of the platform, closed the gorge of the tower, as shown in section b at n. two watch-towers, p, were built in the thickness of the parapet, pierced with nineteen embrasures for small pieces. this parapet was not too high for arbalisters to shoot over its slope. a wide incline, r, facilitated the getting up of guns and the ascent of men to the platform. fig. presents a bird's-eye view of boulevard _i_,[ ] with the ramparts of the fourteenth century. these boulevards were earthworks, and their interior surface was four yards below the level of the plateau. the boulevards, b and c, raised at the western angles of the castle, had their platforms on a level with the bottom of the ditch, as mentioned above. having thus described the general plan and the details, we proceed to narrate the events of which the town of la roche-pont was the theatre in and . [illustration: fig. .] with a view to securing the aid of the prince of orange, after the death of duke charles, louis xi. had been most liberal to him in promises, one of which was that he would place in his hands all the strong towns of burgundy that belonged to the estate of the prince of orange, his grandfather, and which duke charles had forestalled. but when the seigneur de craon had taken possession of these places he would not give them up, notwithstanding the demands made upon him by the prince, and the apparent orders of king louis xi. the marriage between the daughter of charles the bold, sole heiress of his domains, and maximilian, duke of austria, took place in the meantime. the latter proceeded to recover possession of the duchy of burgundy, and had a conference with the prince of orange, exasperated at the non-fulfilment of the promises made him; while the province was soon to a large extent roused against the french, whom the seigneur de craon, eager for gain, and by no means faithful in accomplishing his engagements, rendered detestable. the seigneur de craon had left in the town of la roche-pont only a somewhat feeble garrison. at the instigation of the agents of maximilian, who was filling the country with emissaries, the inhabitants barricaded themselves one evening in the streets, and attacked the french posts. the latter, small in number, and indifferently commanded, took refuge in the castle after having lost some soldiers. the castle was ill supplied with provisions and munitions. surrounded by the townspeople, the garrison could not hold their position long; so that one night it escaped on the south side, passing right through the burgundian posts to join the seigneur de craon's army near dijon. the inhabitants immediately hoisted the cross of burgundy on the keep, and hastened to maximilian to inform him of the success of the rising, and to ask assistance against a return of the king's armies; for they were scarcely in a condition to defend themselves. maximilian sent them a body of twelve hundred germans, swiss, and brabançons, with cannon, munitions, and engineers. the first thing these troops did on arriving was to commit some depredations in the environs and the western faubourg, after which they set about the defence of the place. the sire de montcler had been invested with the command of the foreign troops and of those he was able to collect together in the town and neighbourhood. he was an active, enterprising, and rather shrewd man, of noble bearing and handsome countenance, in the prime of life, capable of enforcing obedience, and trusting to himself alone in getting his orders executed. he had soon decided on his plans. the able-bodied population of the town amounted to about two thousand men, half of whom were in a condition to render effective service, and were accustomed to war. some days after the arrival of the foreign troops, some burgundian lords who favoured the young duchess, and were much incensed against the seigneur de craon--who, for no other reason than to get money, had plundered their estates and taken away their most valuable property--assembled at la roche-pont. they brought with them two hundred lances and some convoys of provisions. the effective garrison might therefore be said to amount to three thousand fighting men, of whom five hundred were horse--each lance being followed by an esquire. the place was not in a good state of defence; the braies were much dilapidated, the earthen boulevards crumbling away, while the ditches wanted clearing out. no piece was mounted. there were neither gabions nor fascines nor stakes for palisades. the sire de montcler made the following arrangement:--all, whether captains, soldiers, pioneers, inhabitants of the town, men or women, were to go every morning before daybreak to the posts assigned them beforehand, on pain of death. and with a view to impressing this order on all, gallows were set up in the various wards, which bore the following names: tower ward (on the north); saint-julien's ward (including the abbey and the eastern part of the _cité_ opposite the monastery); saint-louis's ward (situated between the abbey and the castle, on the west); the mill ward, looking towards the east. the tenants of the abbey had claimed exemption from the service, but the sire de montcler had paid no attention to their claims any more than to those of the abbot, whose gardens and buildings served as a central arsenal. two or three obstinate burgesses had been hanged, and since then none had failed in his duty. at noon all went to dinner, and returned at two o'clock to work till nightfall. the women and the children from eleven to sixteen years of age carried earth in baskets and traies; and the soldiers, pioneers, and townsmen, under the direction of the engineers, began to restore the parapets of the boulevards, cleared out the ditches and restored the braies again. a sawing machine was established at the mill and cut wood to make palisades. in a few days the inhabitants, who had at first thought this very hard work and regretted having driven away the french garrison, had become habituated to this life of fatigue, and endured it quite cheerfully. singing and laughing were heard in every quarter while the work was going on. it might have been supposed that they were engaged in a _fête_. the governor had not overlooked the supply of provisions. it was the end of the summer. all the harvest produce of the neighbourhood had been ordered to be brought into the town. a pair of millstones, which were still available after the establishment of the saw-mill, was at work night and day. all the provisions stored in the houses were to be deposited in the abbey or the castle, on pain of death, and the inhabitants received their several rations like the soldiers. a large store of grain and vegetables laid up in the abbey considerably increased the supplies of provisions. the sire de montcler had of course laid hands on these provisions. [illustration: fig. .] the old men and young children were occupied in making gabions and cutting turf for the taluses of the boulevards. behind the north front the governor had a good trench dug, demolishing some houses, with retrenchment and good gabionades on the flanks for artillery. the north wall of the abbey was terraced and united to the east curtain by a retrenchment with a ditch. the sire de montcler was a good-humoured man, familiar with all, present everywhere and talking to everybody; and, thanks to his jocular and pleasant ways, the good people saw their houses demolished and the soil of their gardens taken away to make ditches and epaulements without being greatly distressed. when everything was well prepared for the defence, however, the governor sent away all useless mouths. women, children, and old men had to seek an asylum in the environs. after this, the western faubourg was burned to prevent its being occupied by the troops of louis xi. a _tête du pont_ had been formed on the right bank outside the drawbridge (fig. ), with a large cavalier on the left bank; the two other bridges were destroyed. on the plateau towards the north arose, in front of the boulevard d,[ ] an intrenchment of earth, with barricades of trees and large gabions screening two culverins. the boulevards and towers on the north were armed with bombards. every night the governor took care to reconnoitre the environs. footnotes: [footnote : see the general plan, fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] chapter xii. _the fifth siege._ the th of september, , the army of king louis xi. was reported by a company of horsemen to be half a day's march from the town. this army, consisting of five hundred lances and infantry, forming a total of about six thousand men, was commanded by messire charles d'amboise, lord of chaumont, a sage and moderate man, no plunderer as his predecessor had been, and as valiant a man of war as he was a clever politician. messire charles d'amboise was expecting a reinforcement of twelve hundred swiss; for he had been able to push his interests so ably with some of the gentry of the cantons by offering them attractive advantages, that they had resolved to furnish him with troops. besides the four florins and a half a month which he gave to each man, messire charles d'amboise paid for this service twenty thousand francs to the cities of berne, lucerne, zurich, solerne, and twenty thousand to the private individuals who undertook the recruiting. for which consideration, a body of swiss troops for the service of the king was to be raised, amounting to six thousand infantry. the king's army took with it a good and powerful artillery, consisting of twelve large bombards, twenty-four spiroles, veuglaires and ribeaudequins, without reckoning fire-arms and the munitions for this ordnance. thus accompanied it marched slowly and in good order, well guarded on its flanks. some of the burgundian lords, with about forty lances, having wished to try the strength of the french previous to their arrival before the city, suffered for their adventurous spirit; for they left half their number on the field. the governor, therefore, commanded that no one should go out without his orders. the first troops of messire charles d'amboise showed themselves at nightfall on the northern side of the plateau, just beyond the range of boulevard d[ ], and began to install themselves, setting up between them and the town, mantelets brought on carts, and fixed with the help of stakes driven in the ground. when it became quite dark, the sire de montcler tried to attack them; but perceiving that this vanguard was efficiently sustained by a large body posted in the rear, he retired after a slight skirmish. next day, the th of september, messire charles d'amboise sent some scouts into the lower town, and on the eastern side towards the mills, which he took without striking a blow, for they were not guarded. immediately, some bombs were discharged at these mills, and the besiegers were obliged to abandon them for the moment, for at the second discharge one of the roofs fell in. the sire de montcler organized his troops as follows:-- in each of the four wards mentioned above, armed men from the town were intrusted with the guard and defence of the ramparts there remained burgundian foot soldiers, among whom there were bombardiers and culverineers skilled javelin men, archers, and arbalisters pioneers the germans who were not on friendly terms with the inhabitants were posted in reserve in the abbey, amounting to and in the castle, amounting to the men-at-arms, partly in the abbey partly in the castle partly in the neighbourhood of the gates ----- total of force , ----- it was evident that the garrison was not numerous enough to attempt sorties; it had already enough to do to guard its defences in presence of a besieging army amounting to nearly six thousand men; an army moreover which might receive reinforcements. the governor was clearly awake to the facts, and felt that he must economise his strength. he resolved, therefore, to limit himself at least for the moment to an energetic defence; but this did not prevent him from sending messengers to maximilian before the complete investment, to ask him to intervene and send a corps of relief, if he did not wish to see the place fall into the hands of the king of france, which would certainly happen if it were left to itself. but he added it would resist to the last, and he could answer for the disposition of the garrison. on his side, messire charles d'amboise seemed not to wish to precipitate matters; he hanged several soldiers who had been guilty of acts of pillage in the neighbourhood, and ordered that the dwellers in the suburbs should be considerately treated. by the evening of the th of september the town was completely invested. a body, consisting of three thousand two hundred men, remained encamped on the northern plateau, acting in conjunction with five hundred men posted among the ruins of the lower town and three hundred men behind the walls on the lower slopes of the hills on the east.[ ] most of the cavalry occupied the right shore of the larger stream and the valley on the south. a body of about five hundred men blockaded the _tête du pont_, and had orders to seize it when a favourable occasion offered. that night some pieces of artillery were brought into position on the lower slopes of the eastern hills to command all the eastern declivity of the _cité_. some were assigned to the body of troops blockading the _tête du pont_. the besiegers' artillery was thus disposed:-- veuglaires, bombards. spiroles. attack on the northern boulevard battery on the slopes of the eastern hills before the _tête du pont_ on the western slopes of the plateau commanding the lower town park of reserve -- -- total -- -- the artillery of the besieged consisted of:-- bombards. culverins. on the platforms of the three great northern towers in the casemated batteries of these towers on the earthwork in front of the northern boulevard on the northern boulevard on the boulevards b, c, h, i, k on the cavalier commanding the bridge reserve in the abbey and the castle -- -- totals -- -- on the th of september the besiegers began a cavalier in form of a horseshoe, three hundred paces from the boulevard, e, towards the north-east, to rake its gorge at a (fig. ). this cavalier was armed with two bombards and a spirole. northwards, on the side of the road, a second cavalier, b, was also provided with two bombards. next was commenced an earthwork, running obliquely with traverses, to reach from this cavalier in a south-west direction as far as the edge of the plateau near the defenders' intrenchment c, d. the great boulevard, e, of the defence was armed with a bombard and two culverins, and two other culverins flanked the intrenchment c, d. on the morning of the th of september, the four bombards of the besiegers sent into the boulevard stone balls two hundred pounds weight, which very much damaged the gorge, and about noon dismounted the bombard and one of the culverins. the besieged had answered their fire as well as they could, both from the boulevard and the two great towers g, h. but it was only the balls of the bombard mounted on the platform of the tower h, that reached the cavalier a. those of the tower g only rolled as far as the slope of the cavalier b. the governor might have mounted other bombards on the boulevard e; but he was afraid of losing the pieces, and preferred reserving them for the defence at close quarters. on the th the besieger had terminated his earthwork as far as the point i, and there he brought up a veuglaire to dismount the flank culverin c. at this point some men were lost on both sides; for the besiegers sent among those engaged in the works large balls of stone and leaden bullets, fired from the bombards of the tower g, and from small cannon. [illustration: fig. .] on the th of september, at daybreak, the bombards of the cavaliers, a and b, redoubled their fire on the boulevard; then messire charles d'amboise, having massed a body of four hundred men at the point, i, sheltered by gabions and fascines put up during the night; at the word of command this body fell upon the flank, c, which was vigorously defended for an hour. after this the sire de montcler, observing that the besiegers were continually sending reinforcements to this point, withdrew his troops into the barbican, k, and the boulevard, e, which enabled the artillerymen posted in the tower, g, to keep up a brisk fire from their bombard and their small cannon upon the assailants. from the boulevard, e, the besieged, in spite of the projectiles they received in their rear, sheltering themselves as best they could, discharged volleys of stones with their culverins on the point occupied by the enemy. the latter sought to avoid them by descending a short distance below the ridge of the plateau; but they were none the less exposed there to the fire from the tower, g. they brought up gabions and fascines, and endeavoured to gain a footing on this flank, not without some loss, when about three o'clock in the afternoon another attack was contrived against the flank, d. passing round the end of the intrenchment, and hastening with all speed along the slopes, the enemy attempted to take the defenders in the rear. this attack was unsuccessful. those who served the bombards and culverins of the tower, h, seized the right moment for discharging volleys against this column of assailants, which made deep lanes in the battalions. these, moreover, who were retired within the barbican, precipitated down the slopes those of the enemy who had already passed beyond the intrenchment; and the struggle ceased towards evening, the besieger occupying the point c alone, without being able to advance. he was endeavouring to find shelter there, both against the projectiles and against any attack in retaliation. the citizens had lost only a few men and a culverin. the enemy reckoned one hundred and fifty dead, and a large number of wounded. during the night the sire de montcler brought up fascines, casks, and timber _débris_ with which he raised a barricade connecting the barbican with the boulevard along the road, and a second connecting the eastern extremity of the intrenchment, d, with the fausse-braie of the tower, h, along the ridge of the plateau. he brought up one of the reserve culverins, and mounted it in the centre of the first barricade, then, with gabions, he strengthened the shelters and parados of the boulevard. the bombard was remounted as well as it could be, and directed against the point, c, of the intrenchment. and a second bombard was brought from the abbey to the platform of the tower g. on his side, messire charles d'amboise had not remained inactive. at the point, i, an earthwork was raised with gabionades, and two bombards were brought thither. the point captured was strengthened by great gabions, all covered with fascines, and well furnished with small cannon. these works were scarcely terminated when the day broke (september th). it was the besieged who began to direct the fire of their bombard from the boulevard, e, against the point c. immediately one of the bombards from the platform, i, replied, while the other discharged balls on the tower g, whose pieces were not slow in responding. then the bombards of the cavaliers a and b joined in as on the previous day. the fire of these five pieces, converging at once on the boulevard, soon threw down the gabionades, killed most of the artillerymen, and dismounted the bombard a second time. this defence was no longer tenable. however, the governor would not yet abandon the advanced work: protecting his men as best he could along the interior slopes, he sent for five hundred germans held in reserve in the abbey, and when duly marshalled, at a signal agreed upon, all the pieces of the tower g, the culverins of the barricade, and another culverin that had remained in battery on the boulevard, fired at once on the point c; and immediately putting himself at the head of the germans and one hundred volunteers, among whom were most of the burgundian men-at-arms, crossed the barricade and charged the enemy's position, who, surprised by this bold attack, defended themselves but feebly, and were partly driven on the slopes of the plateau. messire charles d'amboise, who was on the platform i, seeing this rebuff, threw two large battalions, held in reserve behind the earthwork, against the intrenchment between the point c and the boulevard. his men crossed the obstacle quickly enough, in spite of the barricade and the defenders posted at this point, and attacked the troop of the besieged in flank and in rear. in the midst of this _mêlée_, the artillerymen on both sides were prevented from firing; it was a combat with sharp weapons only. the sire de montcler found himself much jeopardised when, from the barbican and the boulevard, those who were on the field, although they had orders not to quit their posts, fell in their turn on the troop of besiegers. immediately dividing his forces into two bodies, the governor was able with one to hold his ground against the assailants thrown on the slopes, and with the other to make head against the french, in their turn attacked on both sides. the conflict was sanguinary. the besiegers, driven back against the intrenchment, could neither deploy nor manoeuvre. messire charles d'amboise sent a reinforcement, but the bombardiers of the tower g, at the risk of killing some of their own party, discharged stone balls and leaden bullets over the intrenchment at the fresh troops. some well-aimed shots threw this battalion into confusion, as the soldiers could not see what was taking place in the interior, and were besides exposed to projectiles thrown by defenders mounted on the salient of the intrenchment. in fact the utmost these last comers could do was to facilitate the retreat of their comrades, which had become a very perilous one. the outwork was therefore recovered by the besieged--were they able to keep it? messire charles d'amboise saw that it was not prudent to hurry on an attack, and that in the face of a resolute garrison he must determine to proceed methodically. as the last rays of daylight faded the besiegers had all repassed the intrenchment conquered the day before, and were leaving on the field more than a hundred dead, wounded, and prisoners. they had been obliged to abandon the culverin they had seized. the wounded were transported to the abbey and consigned to the care of the monks, who attended to them as well as to the wounded among the besieged. the prisoners were shut up in the castle, where they were well treated. some swiss were among them. it was painful to the sire de montcler to abandon the outwork after this success; but it was evident that the besiegers would make new efforts to seize it, since the place was accessible only on that side, and many men must be sacrificed in retaining it. now the garrison had suffered in the last struggle losses at least equivalent to those of the enemy; and these losses could not be repaired, while the troops of the king of france would be reinforced, if necessary. the swiss prisoners, when questioned, had not concealed the fact that the enemy might reckon upon a fresh body of their own countrymen, five hundred in number, before long. at nightfall therefore the governor assembled the captains of the various posts and the burgundian lords, and spoke to them as follows:--"gentlemen, our troops have displayed courage and intelligence in this day's struggle; and this assures us success, with the help of god. though inferior to the enemy in numbers, we have defended and recovered the outwork; it would therefore be possible to keep it. yet we cannot do so without directing all our means of resistance to this point, and imposing a severe task on the garrison. we should be rapidly exhausting our strength, while the enemy, which is much more numerous than we, can employ fresh troops every day. it would seem wise, then, to abandon this outwork, exposed to the batteries of the enemy, and to retire behind the ramparts; but besides the disinclination which men of honour must feel for retreating, after a success has been gained, and not trying to avail themselves of the advantages they have secured, there is the consideration that if we abandon the boulevard this defence will be turned against us by the besieger, and will support him in attacking our front. i have, therefore, resolved to unite this boulevard with the extremities of the curtains by two intrenchments, which will be flanked by the towers. this very night we must begin; and if we have not finished the works to-morrow morning we must defend our present intrenchment, that we may secure time to finish the new one. be so good, therefore, as to assemble the townspeople in their various quarters within an hour, and let them be in readiness on the ground to work at the said intrenchments." [illustration: fig. ] the orders of the governor were peremptory, and about nine o'clock four hundred workmen, and even women, issued by the north gate to raise the earthworks marked out on the ground by the engineer (fig. ). this intrenchment consisted of a small ditch with an earthwork surmounted by stakes, rubbish from the demolition of houses in the town, fascines, and barrels filled with earth. on the western side it started from the boulevard at n, and joined the fosse of the curtain at l, leaving a passage of twenty-four feet between its extremity and the ditch. on the eastern side it reached the entrance of the boulevard o, and followed the line o m, with a similar passage at m. at r and p two culverins were mounted, protected by strong gabionades. on the enemy's side an embankment, with platform and gabions, had been raised at s, and the two bombards of the cavalier, b, were mounted on this platform. at t, messire charles d'amboise had placed a culverin, protected by a gabionade. the bombards of the cavalier b were replaced by three veuglaires to crush the battery s, if the besieged, taking the offensive, endeavoured to seize it. on the morning of the th of september the works of the besieged were almost completed, or at any rate were high enough to present an obstacle to the assailant. the boulevard, e, had been well furnished with fascines and gabions that very night. the bombard, remounted, swept the point c, and the two culverins the exterior. the intrenchment, c d, was strongly occupied by the defenders at the break of day with small cannon and powerful catapults. the barricades on the flanks, v and x, were strengthened. the sire de montcler sent two hundred men to the boulevard, e, with orders to keep under cover as far as possible, and to use their weapons only in case of the intrenchment being forced. the attack commenced about six o'clock. the two bombards, s, discharged stone balls on the salient of the intrenchment and on the boulevard; at the same time the two pieces, i and t, directed their fire on the epaulement, c, and the interval, s t, was occupied by arbalisters and men who served the small cannon under cover of mantelets. from the cavalier, a, the bombards continued to discharge balls broadcast on the boulevard e, as on the previous days. from the platform of this cavalier a, messire charles d'amboise had observed the intrenchment which the besieged had raised during the night; he therefore resolved to bring all his efforts to bear on the salient and the boulevard. with this view, about eight o'clock, he brought up two culverins at y, which, protected by gabions, were also made to do duty. the besieged replied only with their small cannon and the two culverins of the epaulements, c and d, and their arbalisters. they were husbanding their fire for the moment of assault. at noon, the salient of the intrenchment was broken down, and the escarpment of the boulevard was greatly damaged. the defenders were driven from their position at z; their culverin, c, was dismounted, and the western epaule rendered untenable. they dispersed or took refuge along the intrenchment from z to d, which was less exposed. the sire de montcler gave orders to return within the second intrenchment. they brought away the culverin d, which was mounted at the extremity l; but they were obliged to leave the piece c after having spiked it. as soon as charles d'amboise saw the besieged abandon his intrenchment he ceased firing, and, having marshalled an assaulting column furnished with ladders, poles, and cutlasses, ordered it to cross the ruined salient and assault the boulevard without giving the enemy breathing time. this was the moment for which the commandant was waiting. as soon as he saw this column begin to move and pass the intrenchment, he directed upon it a simultaneous fire from the pieces of the two towers g and h, the two culverins mounted on the boulevard, and all the small cannon. the assaulting column, thus taken obliquely and in front, hesitated and fell back; when it was greeted by a shower of crossbow bolts from the ramparts of the boulevard. it rallied, however, behind the battery s, which discharged a volley upon the boulevard, and, turning slightly on its right so as at least to shelter itself from the fire of the tower h, it passed the intrenchment once more and threw its scaling ladders on the escarpment of the boulevard. the defenders sustained the assault resolutely. the tower, g, then began to fire on the assailants as well as the culverins brought up at l and p. the besiegers suffered severe losses. on two occasions some of their number reached the parapet, but could not hold their ground. they did not fall back, however; and most of them heated by the fight, not obeying or not hearing the voice of their captains, advanced along the new intrenchment n l, hoping to force it, for it was but weak. in fact, in a few moments this defence was passed, and the assailants then endeavoured to take the boulevard by the gorge. the defenders posted between c and m seeing themselves taken in rear, took refuge, some in the boulevard and others in barbican k. a hand to hand fight began in this triangle. in this _mêlée_ the garrison dared not shoot from the curtain. the sire de montcler, who was in the barbican, then put himself at the head of his men and encouraged them by saying that the enemy was taken in a snare from which he could not escape; he sallied forth in good order, driving the scattered assailants before him as far as the gorge of the boulevard, which was crowded by the defenders, crying "burgundy! burgundy!" (fig. ). the works of this boulevard were commanded by a cool-headed captain, who was able to prevent his men from being disturbed by the struggle going on behind them; and who maintained his ground against the assault--now diminishing in vigour--issued from the gorge, and rallying all the panic-stricken soldiers who were massed together at this point, rushed on the enemy. the french were then obliged to retreat as best they could, not without leaving many of their men on the field. but it was evident that the boulevard p could hold out no longer. surrounded by the enemy's fire, and the outer intrenchment taken, a fresh assault would place it in the power of the enemy. its parapets were ruined, and its three pieces disabled. all night the besiegers occupied both sides of the intrenchments n, l, o, m and kept up an incessant fire to hinder the besieged from reinforcing this defence. the sire de montcler determined, though with regret, and only to avoid a useless sacrifice of life, to give the orders required for bringing back into the town such pieces of ordnance as were still serviceable. he was obliged to abandon the bombard, of which indeed the besiegers could make no use. two of the five culverins were placed on the platforms of the great towers, and the three others on terraces raised behind the curtain, together with three pieces taken from the reserve. [illustration: fig. .--assault on the boulevard.] on the morning of the st of september, the besiegers found the outwork abandoned; but in occupying it themselves they were exposed to the fire of the two great bombards of the towers and of ten culverins, which did not cease to fire on the boulevard and the intrenchment. towards evening, however, they had succeeded in opening a wide breach in the boulevard, opposite the gorge, and inclosing the latter. they were occupied all night in restoring its slopes and parapets in front of the town, and raising platforms and mounting three bombards on the boulevard. [illustration: fig. attack on the old front.] at the two epaulements of the intrenchment c, d they raised two gabioned cavaliers, and placed a bombard and two veuglaires on each of them. on the st of september, these works having been terminated by noon in spite of the fire of the besieged, one of the bombards of the boulevard discharged its stone balls at the gate, the two others at the two towers. at the same time the veuglaires of the cavaliers fired on these towers with iron balls and the bombards with their stone balls. these projectiles left only feeble traces on the masonry, but often threw down the gabionades and the parapets, and dismounted the pieces (fig. ).[ ] this artillery fight lasted till evening; on both sides pieces had been dismounted or were silenced; and the whole of the night was employed both by besieger and besieged in replacing the cannon on their repaired carriages or in bringing up new pieces. messire charles d'amboise was irritated; the affair was advancing but slowly. he had already received pressing letters from the king; for louis xi. was afraid that a prolonged resistance would determine the other parts of burgundy which had remained faithful to the court of france, to declare for the young duchess. he knew that emissaries of maximilian were going through the province and endeavouring to persuade the authorities of the great towns that the king's army was feeble and disheartened; seeing that, in spite of formidable artillery, twenty days had not enabled it to make any impression on the little city of roche-pont. although the besiegers concentrated their fire, the number of pieces mounted by them was inferior to that of the cannon of the besieged. the stone balls of the bombards did no great damage to the defences. messire charles d'amboise, therefore, during the night intervening between the nd and rd, raised a cavalier at a, strongly gabioned and terraced, and armed it with three large culverins. on the morning of the rd of september the corner tower, g, received the fire of five pieces loaded with iron ball and of a bombard discharging stone balls. after two hours' fire all the defences of the platform were knocked down and the three pieces dismounted, the embrasures of the tower battery shattered, and the defenders killed or wounded. then orders were given that the tower should be fired upon only by two pieces from the cavalier c; and the fire of the three culverins of the cavalier a, and the three bombards of the boulevard, concentrated their fire on the gate and its barbican. towards the end of the day this fine gate presented the appearance shown in fig. . in the evening the besieger's pieces that had not been dismounted--that is to say, two culverins of the battery a, a veuglaire of the cavalier, and one of the bombards of the boulevard--concentrated their fire on the terrace p, of the besieged.[ ] by evening the wall was dismantled, the gabionades tumbled down, and only one of the three culverins was available. however there was no breach, and an assault could not be attempted. [illustration: fig. ] the sire de montcler decided that he must at all risks retard the besieger's progress if he could do nothing more. he reckoned that in two days the enemy would be able to effect a breach, either by his cannon or by mining, and that then the _cité_ must be taken; for the garrison could not long hold out behind the interior retrenchments. in the cannonade of the preceding days the sire de montcler had lost but few men, and his reserve force had not been drawn upon. he therefore got them under arms about nine o'clock, summoned a troop of one hundred well-mounted horsemen, and gave the following orders:--the hundred horsemen, accompanied by a hundred _coutilliers_ on foot, were to sally forth by the eastern gate against the post established at the mills, attack the small encampment installed in the meadows below, fall back by the road skirting the plateau on the east side, skirmish on the outskirts of the french camp, or cut down the posts they came upon on their way, and then return at full speed to the east gate. a second body of a hundred foot soldiers was to be at the cross road above the mills to protect their retreat. during these attacks, designed to attract the enemy's attention to the left, a troop of five hundred men on foot would issue from a masked postern giving egress below the front of the abbey on the west, and filing off along the ramparts, vigorously attack the cavalier c, and the battery a, spike the pieces, and do all possible damage. it was to retire by the same way, protected by the western ramparts. messire charles d'amboise was too experienced a warrior to fail in pushing his advantage. he knew that success, especially in sieges, ultimately accrues to him who leaves the enemy no repose, and does not fall asleep when his first advantage has been gained. the north front of the place was rendered powerless; but an energetic governor of a town may, in a single night, accumulate many obstacles, devise a hundred stratagems, and very greatly hinder the efficiency of an attack. charles d'amboise had therefore resolved to have fascines conveyed to the ditch by a body of a thousand men, some yards from the great tower of the corner g, and to attempt an escalade, while the ordnance, firing on this tower at discretion, hindered the defenders from fortifying the platform again. he had observed the embrasure on the flank of this tower raking the ditch, and had summoned a body of twenty men, furnished with mattresses, and pieces of wood to mask it. as regarded the _fausse-braie_, that was ruined, and could not present any serious obstacle. the sire de montcler had some reason to expect a night attack; but he intended to be beforehand with it, and crush it in the bud. "whatever happens," he said to the troops ordered for the sorties, "act according to your instructions: do not allow yourselves to be diverted by any attempt at an assault; on the contrary, execute the orders given you to the letter. we are still numerous enough to sustain an attack." at a quarter past ten the two detachments were in the act of issuing forth by the eastern gate and by the abbey postern. the governor then mounted the _débris_ of the defences of the tower at the corner c, and attentively examined the attitude of the enemy. the fires they had lighted were no longer to be seen; but, on listening, he heard indistinct sounds along the works of the besieger. the sky was overcast, and drops of rain were in falling. the sire de montcler descended to the lower battery; all the embrasures fronting the exterior were in ruins, and all the pieces of ordnance covered with rubbish. the embrasure of the flank was intact, and the small piece with which it was furnished was in good condition. he had it loaded in his presence with nails and old iron, and gave orders to those serving it not to fire till they saw the enemy a few paces off; behind this piece he had a second placed similarly loaded, so that two volleys might be discharged one after the other. then he went up again to the rampart walk of the curtain, and himself drew up his men, who were armed with long bills and good daggers and axes. he next visited the ruined gate. it presented such a pile of rubbish that the enemy would not have been able to pass it in the night; nevertheless in every corner he posted troops, with orders not to use their weapons till they found themselves face to face with the enemy, to observe absolute silence, and not to shout during the fight. this done, he placed a reserve of two hundred men behind the interior retrenchment, and fifty men, furnished with tarred bundles of straw, on the ridge of this retrenchment, with orders to kindle them when they heard the cry "burgundy!" about three-quarters past ten the sire de montcler again ascended the platform of the corner tower, and recognised the presence of the enemy some yards from the ditch. notwithstanding the darkness, he could see a black mass deploying in silence; then he heard the fascines rolling into the fosse and the wood cracking under the men's feet. in a few minutes, about fifty ladders were set up against the curtain, and each of them was covered by the enemy. these ladders were provided with hooks at the top and stays along the sides, so that the defenders could not throw them down: two, however, fell, dragging the assailants with them. at this moment the small pieces of ordnance on the flank of the tower fired, and the cries of the wounded resounded from the ditch, while three more ladders were broken and fell. the hosts of assailants surged over on the rampart walk, and at the cry of "burgundy!" the fires having been kindled, the encounter with keen weapons in this narrow space presented the strangest spectacle. the artillery of the besieged was then directed to the flank of the curtain and the exterior, from the platform of the corner tower; while shouts arose from this battery, and the five hundred burgundians who were ordered to the sortie on the west began an attack, and the troops that were preparing to reinforce the assault turned their backs to the town to fall on this attacking body. the sire de montcler heard shouting in the distance on the north-east side, and saw a bright gleam through the darkness. he then went down to bring his reserves to the curtain. the french, however, succeeded in getting to the top of the rampart, and reached the corner tower. the few men who were on the summit of the dismantled platform struggled bravely until the moment when the reserve sent by the governor, ascending the incline on which the artillery was posted, fell on the french, and drove them back to the rampart walk of the curtain. the assailants then forming in a column on the rampart walk, directed a vigorous attack against the tower. from the interior retrenchment, showers of bolts, arrows, and small-shot were discharged upon them in flank; and although they had bucklers, the french lost a great many. as the rampart walk was narrow, the head of the column could present only three men abreast, and was met by a compact mass of defenders. it was not advancing; the soldiers in the rear, who were exposed to darts in flank, were pressing on those before them in order to force the platform and fight. in this press many fell mutilated within the town. one of the culverineers of the tower, aided by a dozen men, had succeeded during the struggle in getting a culverin out of the rubbish and carrying it without its carriage, loaded, into the midst of the group of burgundians defending the passage. thrusting the mouth of the piece between their legs, he fired it: the ball, and the stones with which the bore of the culverin had been filled, made a frightful lane in the compact body of the french: some leaped down into the town, others ran towards the towers of the gateway, and several climbed the parapet to regain their ladders. the burgundians made another rush along the rampart, killing all who resisted. but at that juncture a large body of the french issued forth through the gate of the lower battery. by aid of pickaxes and crowbars they had succeeded, after filling up the ditch with fascines, in enlarging the openings of two of the embrasures, already broken down by the cannon; then, throwing into these openings lighted bundles of straw and tar mixed with gunpowder so as to drive away the defenders, they had made their way into the interior at the risk of being themselves suffocated by the smoke, and rushing towards the gate, killing the few that had remained in the battery, they had forced the doors and made an entrance for their comrades by the same road. issuing forth into the town they ascended the incline at full speed.[ ] the cry of victory on the part of the burgundians was answered by cries of "france! d'amboise!" these shouts revived the courage of the french who had remained on the rampart, and they renewed the attack. the sire de montcler despatched his last reserves against the new comers, but they continued to pour out on level ground and fought valiantly. their number was increasing every moment, and they succeeded in driving back the reserves to the retrenchment. the burgundians, cooped up on the platform of the tower, surrendered after having lost half their men. messire charles d'amboise ordered that they should be honourably treated. the tower of the north-west salient was in the power of the enemy, as well as the whole of the curtain stretching from this tower to the north gate. day was breaking when the combat ceased, and some hours' repose were needed on both sides. the corner tower was lost to the besieged; the governor strongly barricaded the adjoining tower opening on to the curtain, and placed a number of small cannon in the upper story of this tower. he had done the same on the broken summit of the western tower of the gate. he wished to hinder the enemy from gaining ground on the curtains, and outflanking--particularly on his right--the retrenchment connected with the old wall surrounding the abbey, and meeting the tower on the north-east corner.[ ] a short time before the end of the struggle, the two bodies destined for the sorties were on their return, the foot soldiers through the abbey postern, and the men-at-arms, not through the east gate, but through that near the castle on the west. the foot soldiers brought in a hundred prisoners; the horse had lost a third of their party. the fortune of these two bodies had been as follows:--the foot soldiers, operating on the left, had come upon the enemy unawares, making their way through the brushwood of the western slope of the plateau as far as the gorge of the enemy's battery, c,[ ] had fallen on the guard, spiked the guns, and, taking advantage of the confusion, had taken the attacking column in flank, had entered the battery, a, whose pieces they had also spiked, but, seeing themselves too far advanced, had beat a retreat, descending the slopes straight towards the west. as they were not vigorously pursued, they had entered the lower town, surprised and captured two bodies of guards, set fire to some huts erected by the besiegers, and regained the town. charles d'amboise, at first surprised by the audacity of the attack, but quickly perceiving that it could do him no serious damage, had given the strictest orders that nothing should divert his men from the assault, and had contented himself with sending against the troops of the besieged two or three hundred men to keep them back and compel them to seek the slopes, without troubling to pursue them. the men-at-arms had followed the governor's instructions, had fallen upon the small encampment above the mills, and, leaving the _coutilliers_ there to complete their commission (the latter had re-entered about two o'clock in the morning by the east gate), they had pursued the road indicated as far as the base of the plateau, and had arrived without hindrance at the boundary of the french camp, charging the posts in a direct line at full speed. this attack had thrown confusion into that part of the camp which was occupied by the baggage, the carts, and camp servants. stacks of forage had caught fire amid the disorder thus occasioned. but the assailants had soon observed three or four hundred horsemen close upon them; they had then made straight for the north, and buried themselves in the thick woods upon their right; they next wheeled towards the left, reached the banks of the stream, whose left bank they followed without interruption, but with the loss of a third of their comrades, who had strayed, or been captured or killed. they supposed they had fallen in with a body of the french in the lower town, and were preparing to pass it at a gallop, but they turned out to be the burgundian foot soldiers. charles d'amboise, at the first report of this attack on the rear of the camp, had been much disquieted, supposing that succour had arrived; but being soon correctly informed, had sent out men-at-arms to cut off this body of adventurers, and was only the more eager for the assault. messire charles d'amboise was accustomed (in this respect differing from the warriors of the time) to surround himself with young captains of intelligence and energy, who kept him constantly informed of all that took place in the army, during the march and on the field. when the information furnished was found to be exact, and was reported in cool discretion and without exaggeration, charles d'amboise would praise these young officers in presence of all his captains, and recompense them liberally. if, on the contrary, the reports were false or tainted with exaggeration, or incomplete, he would inflict severe and public censure on the reporters, and assign them some subaltern and humiliating duty, such as guarding the baggage or superintending the camp servants. when charles d'amboise learned next morning the damage caused on the border of the camp by a few burgundian men-at-arms, the loss of his men encamped at the mill and in the lower town, and the spiking of six of his pieces of ordnance, he was much annoyed, but could not refrain from saying to his captains: "we have to do with brave men, who defend themselves valiantly. i beg you, gentlemen, to take care that their wounded and prisoners be treated with all the respect due to soldiers who do their duty." then about the second hour of the day he sent a herald to the retrenchment of the besieged, to ask a parley with the governor. the sire de montcler having ascended the terrace, the herald spoke as follows: "sir governor! monseigneur charles d'amboise, commanding the army of our lord the king of france, sends me to you to require of you to render up the town and castle of roche-pont, which you are withholding contrary to the treaties and defending against their lawful lord. henceforward the said _cité_ is in the power of the army of our lord the king of france, and a longer resistance will only cause the useless loss of a great number of brave men. in consideration of your brave and noble defence, monseigneur charles d'amboise will let you go forth--you and your men--with your lives and property. may god have you in his keeping and guide you to a wise decision." "sir messenger," replied the governor, "messire charles d'amboise is a captain too well acquainted with war to think himself master of the town and castle of roche-pont because he has got possession of a tower and a curtain. he knows what it has cost him to advance even so far; and there is still a considerable space between this retrenchment and the castle, and the castle is good and defensible. i acknowledge no other lawful lords of burgundy, and of this city in particular, than the duchess of burgundy, daughter of the noble and puissant duke charles, and her illustrious husband maximilian. i am here to defend their property against all comers, and i will defend it as long as i have a sword in my hand. nevertheless, tell messire charles d'amboise that if he is willing to exchange prisoners, man for man, i am prepared to do so. if he prefers to leave things as they are, i give him my word of honour that his people are being well treated." "well, then," said charles d'amboise, when the herald had conveyed this answer to him, "this _cité_ will be damaged for a long time to come!" during the th of september, the rain did not cease to fall in torrents. besiegers and besieged were at a hundred paces from each other. they were employed in burying the dead, whose numbers were especially great on the side of the french, and both were preparing for a fresh struggle, though the bad weather greatly impeded the workers. figure shows the position of the besieged and the besiegers.[ ] [illustration: fig. taking of an artillery tower.] after the losses sustained since the commencement of the siege, the garrison scarcely reckoned more than two thousand available men, for typhus was already devastating the town; three-fourths of the wounded crowded together in the abbey were attacked by it. the good monks tended them with their utmost care, but they themselves were largely sacrificed to the contagion; and of a community of a hundred and fifty in number scarcely more than fifty survived. the progress of the besieger, however, seemed only to increase the determination of the inhabitants, and the women worked heartily at the defences. they were the first to cry shame on those of the defenders who manifested despondency. during the night between the th and th, the sire de montcler strengthened the retrenchment. from a to b[ ] he took advantage of the ancient enclosure-wall of the abbot's pleasance, then occupied by dwellings. a culverin was mounted on a terrace at b. the retrenchment leading from c to d, which had been made of earth and the _débris_ of the houses demolished at this point, was armed with three culverins at c, at e, and d. the french on their side had cleared the platform of the conquered tower, g, had well gabioned the parapet, and mounted three pieces pointed at the retrenchment, and a spirole directed against the tower, k, which remained in the power of the burgundians. the women, children, and old men were employed in strengthening also the second retrenchment, i, m, behind the abbey wall, and the junction, m, n. this second retrenchment was armed with three pieces. places of egress were reserved at the extremities and through the gate, o, of the abbey. the rain continued during the th of september, which passed without any serious engagement. the combatants were trying one another's strength. the garrison was not numerous enough to allow of their leaving a post at the _tête du pont_. this work was abandoned on the night between the th and th, and the enemy entered it without striking a blow. but as they were fired on by the bombard of boulevard i,[ ] they did not advance along the ascent, but took shelter behind the cavalier of the left bank. the sire de montcler conjectured, however, that the french were preparing a real or feigned attack on this side. during the night, thirty-six feet of the northern curtain, near the tower, g, fell into the ditch, reaching from _a_ to _b_; the miners had been working for two days to accomplish this. on the morning of the th of september, the besiegers opened fire against the retrenchment. the dominant position of the tower, g, gave them a great advantage; and though the garrison did their best to reply, the culverins, c and d, were dismounted and the gabions thrown down about noon, when orders were given for the assault. a strong column of infantry advanced through the breach, _a b_, cutlasses in hand, and in fine order. but from the platform of the tower, f, which had remained in the power of the burgundians, two culverins fired simultaneously on this column. messire charles d'amboise supposed that the pieces in this tower had been silenced, and so they had been. but during the night, the sire de montcler had hoisted up three of the small pieces of the lower battery through the vault holes, and had masked them under the rubbish of the parapets. this discharge produced disorder in the column of the assailants. fortunately for them, the pieces of the outer boulevard, in the power of the french, began to fire in their turn on the platform of the tower, p, and soon silenced the burgundian spiroles. the assault was vigorous, well directed and well sustained, while from without the french did not cease firing on the gate and tower f, so that those of the garrison who had remained in the upper works of the gate had to abandon them and escape by the curtain and tower f. messire charles d'amboise, standing on the breach, _a b_, was continually sending reinforcements to the assailants, and when he saw his people too fatigued he would replace them by fresh troops. the burgundians had not enough men to do the like, so that about four o'clock they were exhausted, and some were beginning to file off along the ramparts. at length a vigorous effort forced the centre of the retrenchment, and the french pushed forward through the street running along the old wall of the abbey. the sire de montcler, however, retreated in good order in three columns, two along the ramparts, and the third by the road in the middle. when he saw his men sheltered behind the second retrenchment, he discharged the _pierrier_ placed at m, and the culverin mounted at i, so that the assailants fell back in disorder. then, followed by some brave men--his last reserve--he fell on the french coming along by the abbey and the western rampart. from the top of this rampart the assailants were also exposed to a shower of darts. night was advancing: the brave men who had kept close to the governor were urging forward, attempting to recapture the first retrenchment. many of the burgundians who had retired behind the second retrenchment, seeing the enemy fall back, began to issue forth in their turn, filled with fresh ardour. messire charles d'amboise, however, was able to keep his troops at the first retrenchment, and had some small pieces brought up which fired on the groups of burgundians who were still distinguishable in the torchlight. the combat lasted thus for two hours more, in the midst of confusion, and the sire de montcler was obliged to sound the retreat several times to rally his troops. in this engagement he had lost nearly five hundred men taken, killed, or wounded. about ten o'clock at night there was silence on both sides; the sire de montcler, retreating to the second retrenchment, sent back all his men who had remained on the ramparts beyond this retrenchment, and prepared to defend this last line vigorously--the castle being his only refuge should that be taken. but on reviewing his troops, he observed the absence of a body of five hundred germans, whom he had posted in the abbey to protect the retreat of the defenders of the first retrenchment. these germans, seeing the unfavourable position of affairs, and taking advantage of the general confusion during the last struggle, had gone away through the abbey postern. the governor had only a thousand men remaining. he endeavoured to persuade his men that the germans were shut up in the castle by his orders; but few were deceived by this, for it was evident to all that after the taking of the corner tower the germans scarcely cared to fight for a cause which had no great interest for them, and which they regarded as lost. the fate of these runaways was, by the way, miserable enough. to support themselves they took to plundering in the outskirts, were surprised by a corps of french gendarmerie employed as scouts round the camp, and put to the sword or hanged as thieves. the few who succeeded in escaping perished under the blows of the peasants in arms against marauders. it seemed hard to the sire de montcler to abandon his second retrenchment without awaiting an attack; so as he had scarcely any need to economise the provisions in the town, he had a double ration distributed to his men, and encouraged them by cheering words, preserving his animation in mien and gesture when among them. he told them that succour would soon arrive, and that if they resisted a few days longer charles d'amboise would be obliged to raise the siege. having examined the retrenchment, and posted men in the houses behind and in the northern building of the abbey, the sire de montcler was preparing to take some repose, when he was informed that along the slopes, above the bridge, the sentinels posted on the boulevards thought they perceived some movement on the part of the enemy. he went immediately towards that quarter, and saw in effect a black mass that appeared to be advancing up the slope like the rising tide, opposite to the boulevard, b.[ ] to summon the garrison of the castle and to draw them up in this boulevard--they were only two hundred in number--required only a few minutes. the escarpment of this boulevard, whose platform was on the level of the castle ditch, rose but slightly above the acclivities (about twelve feet). before the assailant had placed his ladders, the governor fired on that moving mass, which the darkness of the night did not completely hide from view. the balls from the culverin and the bombards made furrows among them; shouts were heard, and the assailants, separating into two columns, set up their ladders on the two flanks of the boulevard. nearly at the same instant the second retrenchment was vigorously assaulted, and to facilitate this night attack, the assailants set fire to the houses between the first and second retrenchment. thus, having the fire at their back, they could clearly see the defenders, while the latter were blinded by this mass of flame, whence the french seemed to issue like black shades. the sire de montcler was hastening on horseback from one point of attack to another, cheering on his men, and exposing himself to the projectiles; and both the attacks were well sustained. from the abbey building the arbalisters and bearers of small cannon inflicted very serious loss on the assailants, who, despairing of forcing the retrenchment at this point, were moving towards the junction, m n. it was evident to the brave governor that the place was lost, and that nothing was left for him to do but to rally the remains of the garrison in the castle, if he could reach it. but he was determined that this retreat should cost the enemy dear. he therefore sent a reserve which he was keeping in the abbey to reinforce the defenders of the boulevard, b.[ ] this reserve consisted of a hundred men at most; but they were brave fellows; their orders were to defend the boulevard at all cost, and if they were outflanked to return into the castle as soon as possible, to raise the bridge, and not let it down again till they saw him return with the remains of the garrison through the enemy, through whom he would force a passage. then he took up his position resolutely at the head of the _débris_, which still defended the retrenchment, and, availing himself of the houses and the abbey walls, he gave way only step by step, obliging the enemy to besiege every house and every enclosure, and taking advantage of the lanes and passages to resume the offensive, and inflict losses on the french. exasperated by this, the latter set fire to the houses which they could not break open. the abbey resisted for more than two hours after the besieger had taken the retrenchment. the defenders, seeing their retreat cut off, fought with desperation; for the postern was occupied outside by a large body of men. the church and the principal buildings were in flames. the sire de montcler maintained the struggle in the streets and houses of the town till daybreak, and then debouched with four or five hundred men who remained to him in the open space before the castle. he found it almost entirely occupied by the enemy, whom some brave men were still resisting. he rallied this greatly diminished body, and entered the castle, whose bridge was immediately raised. the town was taken, but much damaged, as messire charles d'amboise had predicted. he gave the strictest orders to stay the flames and stop pillage, and to save the lives of the unarmed inhabitants. but there were many victims. the wounded and sick shut up in the abbey had perished in the flames; women, old men, and children, were lying on the pavement and in the houses. the th and th of september were spent by the french in re-establishing order among the troops after the combat of the night, in removing the wounded and burying the dead. messire charles d'amboise, during the two preceding days, had lost a thousand men; he was anxious to end the struggle. during the night of the th, therefore, he had twelve pieces of ordnance brought up in front of the castle, provided them with gabionades, and once more sent a herald to summon the garrison to surrender. the reply was that the garrison would not surrender till it saw itself incapacitated from continuing the struggle. on the morning of the th the twelve pieces began to open fire against the defences of the gate. the besieged could only answer the attack with small pieces mounted on the summit of the towers. but in the evening all these summits were dismantled, the roofs pierced, and the machicolations destroyed. moreover, in the course of the th of september and st of october, four large bombards were mounted in front of the outer tower of the gate. in the evening this tower was falling in ruins into the ditch. messire charles d'amboise, before commencing the assault, again proposed to the governor to capitulate. the latter then appeared on the ruins, and declared that he would surrender the castle on condition of being allowed to quit it with his troops, their lives and baggage being spared, and with colours flying, and to go wherever they chose. charles d'amboise on his side, then came forward on the breach, and gave his word of honour that these conditions should be granted. the two captains then approached and held out their hands to each other. the city and castle of roche-pont were again subjected to king louis xi. the sire de montcler had but five hundred fighting men left; and even of these there were a full third wounded. messire charles d'amboise gave them a safe-conduct, ordered that they should be supplied with provisions, and entertained the sire de montcler and his captains at his table. two days afterwards they took their departure for flanders with the foreign troops that were still with them. footnotes: [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see the topographical map, fig. .] [footnote : in this figure the parts coloured red indicate the works occupied by the besieger and the direction of his fire.] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : the black lines show the part of the defence still occupied by the besieged, the red lines the parts gained by the besiegers.] [footnote : fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] chapter xiii. _the citÉ of la roche-pont is fortified by errard de bar-le-duc, engineer to the most christian king of france and of navarre._ in , henry iv. had succeeded in subjugating the religious and feudal factions that had imperilled france for more than thirty years. he cherished great designs which his skilful policy, his patriotic soul, his military talents and the advantageous alliances he was able to form, promised to render successful. but henry iv. left nothing to chance, and would not embark in any enterprise after his accession to the throne, till he had made every preparation to insure its success. when he saw the moment arriving at which he could effectually intervene in the affairs of germany--a part of which had its eyes directed to france, and was only waiting for a signal from the louvre to escape from the incessant rivalries of the princes and from religious contentions--he took measures not only to facilitate a successful intervention abroad, but to strengthen his frontiers and establish depôts and centres for provisioning his troops. assured of the good-will of the swiss and tranquil as regarded italy--thanks to the alliances he had formed in that peninsula--and wishing to act at once in the east, and on the pyrenean side, he turned his attention to the defences of roussillon and of the line which unites burgundy with champagne. henry iv. had been engaged in partisan warfare; but then he had only his own life at stake. as a sovereign he thought it his duty not to run risks; and before launching into the great enterprises he had in view, and which might change the face of europe, he wished to put fortune on his side as far as possible. for more than six years, in concert with sully, he had lost not a day or an hour in preparing for france, which had been a prey to civil war and invasion at the end of the sixteenth century, a future of the noblest order, and which might have secured to it the most honourable destiny, if the hand of an assassin had not in a single day destroyed hopes founded in a wise policy and the most thoughtful foresight. this prince knew by experience that in war a check is always possible, even when fortune is, or seems to be, entirely on our side, and that the talent of a general consists in his ability to discover new resources after a reverse. success in arms is secure in proportion to the foresight exercised in preventing a first reverse from becoming a disaster. henry iv. therefore set about preparing a good line of retreat and supply in the rear of the army, which he was intending to lead in person towards the east. he put in a state of defence the towns and important strategic points from châlons-sur-saône, passing through beaune, dijon, langres, along the course of the haute-marne, and from langres to chaumont, saint-dizier, châlons, reims, laon, péronne, and amiens. verdun and metz had been visited by him, with a view to examining their defences. at metz he had ordered works of considerable importance. the town of la roche-pont was comprised in that portion of this line of defence which lay between dijon and langres. the engineer errard de bar-le-duc had been entrusted with these operations, beginning with châlons-sur-saône. he had, we may observe, merited the confidence reposed in him by the king, for he had given proofs of considerable ability and ingenuity. errard de bar-le-duc made use of the ancient walls, considering them suitable for defence at close quarters; but he constructed works outside which would command the country, and force the besieger to commence his operations at a distance of one thousand or one thousand two hundred yards. the system of boulevards was still maintained, but these, instead of presenting only an isolated obstacle, defended each other by crossing their fire, and were, in fact, true bastions. [illustration: fig. .--the bastions of errard de bar-le-duc.] the three great round towers on the north of the _cité_ of la roche-pont were then much dilapidated. errard had them terraced, and then surrounded them with earthworks with walled escarpments. towards the plateau fronting the north he had a great tenaille constructed with a double ditch and ravelin. fig. gives the plan of the _cité_ after the operations planned by errard. besides the works just mentioned, indicated at a, b, c and d, the king's engineer raised the bastions, e, f, g, h, and i, which crossed their fires, and whose orillons masked small pieces designed to flank the old ramparts. most of the old towers were lowered and terraced to receive cannon. the ancient castle, of which little more than the donjon and some outbuildings remained, was surrounded by a bastioned enclosure, with a tenaille on the town side. the lower town, towards the west, though reduced to narrow dimensions, continued nearly in the condition already described. as to the upper town, after the conflagration of the last siege, it had been rebuilt in a very indifferent style. under francis i., the abbey had been secularised, and its ancient church was served by a chapter. the old stone bridge near the outflow of the rivulet still existed, and at o was a second wooden bridge connecting the two shores. the bridge, p, had fallen into ruins and had not been rebuilt. [illustration: fig. .] from the bastion, b, to the river, and from the bastion, d, to the pool, errard built two fronts, k and l, _à crémaillères_,[ ] to command the slopes of the plateau on the right and left, and to hinder an assailant from occupying a position on the east and west flanks of the _cité_. for the time, these works appeared strong, and the axiom in fortifications, "what offers itself as a defence ought to be defended," was already pretty generally adhered to. fig. gives the northern work which was destined to sweep the plateau, and to render difficult the approach to the cité on this its very accessible side. this work consisted of a ravelin, a, whose height above the level of the plateau was not more than six feet; next of a first tenaille, b, with orillons, eighteen feet above the plateau, and a second tenaille, c, three feet above the level of the tenaille, b. two bastions, d and f, enveloped the two great towers, g and h, which were terraced. the platforms of the latter rose three feet above the platforms of the bastions. the gate, i, of the fourteenth century, had been preserved and repaired, and the curtains, k, terraced to receive cannon. [illustration: fig. .] the road passed over the right face of the ravelin, and thence at right angles to the centre of the tenailles. a wide fosse, e, protected the exterior works, and a second fosse, l, the curtain of the second tenaille. fig. gives a sketch in perspective of the bastion, f.[ ] no use, however, was made of these defences till about thirty years after their construction. footnotes: [footnote : in plan not straight, but broken by a series of returns each in advance of the other.] [footnote : of the general plan, fig. .] chapter xiv. _the sixth siege._ about the beginning of july, , france, governed by the cardinal de richelieu, saw its northern frontier invaded by the too celebrated jean de weert, with an army of hispano-belgians, to which the empire had added a numerous body of cavalry, composed of poles, hungarians, and croats. these allied troops advanced into picardy, and paris was, for the moment, anticipating a siege; but the enemy were delayed by the siege of corbie, and, having taken this town, in which they left a garrison, they retired for fear of being taken in rear by the dutch. the french army soon came in its turn to besiege and retake corbie. at the same time, an attack on burgundy had been concerted by the imperial troops, while the army of condé was besieging dôle, which was holding out for the spaniards. but the imperialist army having had to wait long for the necessary reinforcements, did not start at the same time as that of the hispano-belgians, and did not cross the frontier till the nd of october; which gave time for the french troops employed at the siege of corbie to pass into burgundy, to assemble the troops of the province, and to receive the reinforcements sent to the prince de condé by the duke of weimar and the cardinal de la valette. being unable to raise the siege of dôle, the imperialists directed their course to the saône, which they passed, and sent a body to seize the little _cité_ of la roche-pont, the capture of which would give them a centre for attacking dijon or langres, and enable them to isolate the prince de condé. the town of la roche-pont was but scantily furnished with artillery, and had a garrison of only a thousand men, when the imperialist forces presented themselves before it on the nd of november. they numbered six thousand men, and brought with them thirty pieces of ordnance, of which twelve were of large calibre. they were commanded by galas, and were expecting to take the place in a few days, for the captains knew by their scouts that the garrison was weak, scantily provisioned and unprepared for an attack. however, count rantzau had been sent by the french generals to re-victual saint-jean-de-losne and la roche-pont, and to place an experienced captain in the latter. the count arrived before la roche-pont two days previous to the germans; he left a thousand men there, with rincourt as governor--ordnance munitions and a convoy of provisions; but having only two or three thousand men left him, he thought himself not in a condition to attack the imperialist army, and therefore marched to saint-jean-de-losne, which he entered on the nd of november, in the teeth of the germans, who were already beginning to invest the town. immediately on his arrival before la roche-pont, galas summoned the place, offering the garrison the most favourable conditions, and the inhabitants respect for their persons and property. the envoy of the imperialist general was sent back as he had come, and attack and defence were respectively prepared for. rincourt's nature was one of those which are apparently nonchalant and cold, fond of repose, and never appearing discomposed; he was of middle height, with a little embonpoint. his pale face, blonde hair, and dull blue eyes, would be deemed no indication of a soul of firm temper, but rather of one quite destitute of elasticity--an _esprit blasé_, or at least an impassive disposition. rincourt had however given proof of his ability on many occasions, and count de rantzau, who knew him well, esteemed him highly. on leaving him in the place, he had given him these simple instructions--"hold out here to the last man: for the rest act as you judge best." to galas's messenger, rincourt had replied: "my instructions are to defend the place, and i shall defend it." rincourt, while making the arrangements necessary for the defence, and enquiring into the stores of provisions, was aware that if he allowed himself to be shut up at once in the town, the enemy would have made a breach in less than a week, and the taking of la roche-pont would be at most an affair of fifteen or twenty days. the stock of provisions scarcely admitted of so long a resistance; and at this time of the year it was difficult to add to them, even if the place were not closely invested. the governor resolved, therefore, to take the initiative and to hinder the enemy's approach-works to such an extent, that however favourable the weather might be, the enemy would have difficulty in maintaining his position. he sent for the mayor and notables of the town, and asked them what they intended to do, and whether the inhabitants would remain at home with their hands folded, while the king's men were fighting to defend the town. they assured him that, on the contrary, the inhabitants were disposed to defend themselves, and that even the women would mount the ramparts if necessary; that all of them knew how the enemy had behaved in picardy, and thought that the worst course was to trust to their promises, and that if they must die, it was better to die fighting. "if it be so," replied the governor, "and if your acts respond to your words, you may be assured that the germans will not enter this place; but, you must be doing. have you any artillerymen among the inhabitants?" "we have some; all our young men are hardy and robust, and many know how to make use of musket and pike." "well, assemble them to-night, and let all the volunteers, armed or unarmed, be with you to-morrow morning, in the open space before the castle. whatever you hear this evening, do not let your attention be diverted from this object, and do not be alarmed." when night arrived (and it comes early on the nd of november), rincourt prepared for the transport of two small pieces of cannon, and ordered two hundred men to mount their horses--for he had some cavalry--accompanied by four hundred foot soldiers; took care that the artillerymen should be at their guns in the works of the tenaille, leaving their captains precise instructions; summoned four hundred men to appear at three o'clock in the morning; and about ten o'clock sallied forth with his six hundred men and two guns through the gate of the outwork. the night was foggy and perfectly dark. the governor had taken the precaution to envelope the wheels of his two guns with pieces of cloth and canvas, and to have the crowbars, powder spoons, and rammers, carried by the servers, to avoid noise. on issuing from the ravelin, he directed the two cannons obliquely right and left, so as to keep them within musket shot from the centre column; the cavalry was escorting them. he himself, with his three or four hundred foot soldiers, marched straight for the enemy's outposts. about a thousand yards from the outwork he met them, making soup in front of their fires. falling suddenly on the sentinels and neighbouring posts, he threw himself into the very heart of the enemy dispersed among the orchards, and killing all who resisted, drove them before him. in conformity with the instructions they had received, the artillerymen then brought their pieces into position, and fired right and left towards the two extremities of the encampment. the imperialists believed themselves attacked along the whole extent of their front, and took some time to concert their defence. as soon as rincourt saw the enemy drawn up in considerable numbers before him, he hastily drew off the right and left of his small band towards the two guns and the cavalry. the germans then advanced in a compact, but not very orderly body, looking for the assailant, and not knowing whether they should go towards the east or west of the plateau in pursuit of him. then, after a renewed discharge of the pieces, the two small french corps, cavalry and infantry, rushed upon the flanks of the column, killed or took about a hundred men, and fell back with all speed to the outwork, protected by volleys discharged with as good aim as circumstances allowed from the bastions of the tenaille. this affray terminated at midnight, without loss. rincourt sent his men to rest, and at three o'clock in the morning sallied forth once more with the four hundred foot soldiers, summoned for that hour; this time without cannon or cavalry. he went along the western edge of the plateau, and when he saw himself within musket shot of the advanced posts, drawing out his musketeers in a long line, he commanded a general discharge; then moving off obliquely, he executed the same movements a few seconds afterwards, on the eastern side, after which he retired. the enemy were completely puzzled by these attacks. they had passed the whole of the night on the look-out, and in the morning determined to establish their first lines about a mile from the tenaille, placing advanced posts behind intrenchments hastily thrown up. they then opened the trench about half a mile distant. throughout the day the heavy guns mounted on the platforms of the tenaille kept up a fire on these advanced posts, killed some men and overthrew the intrenchments. during the night of the rd of november, rincourt, who had observed that a considerable body of the enemy was advancing up the river, perhaps with the view of passing the night there, and attacking the front k[ ] in the rear with cannon, sent out two hundred of his infantry, under efficient command, through the ravelin of the outwork, and made a sortie with three hundred men through the gate of the front, k. he attacked the posts along the river, while the first troop was skirmishing with the advanced posts established along the western slopes of the plateau. when the first troop saw itself too much pressed, it rapidly descended the western slope to rally rincourt's force, who on his side was retreating after having thrown the enemy into confusion. the besiegers, however, being on their guard, went in pursuit of the five hundred men from the town with vigour, and in increasing numbers. but this had been foreseen by the governor; and a second body of four hundred men, which during the action issued in its turn from the ravelin, descended the western slopes at full speed, and fell upon the flank of the imperialists. on this the five hundred men commanded by rincourt faced about. there, also, two or three hundred germans were killed, wounded, or threw themselves into the water. the losses of the french were insignificant. while these continual alarms in some degree fatigued and disconcerted the besiegers, who did not suppose they had before them a garrison numerous enough to dare to act on the offensive, they restored confidence to the besieged, and gave them a high idea of the military talents of the governor. rincourt continued to preserve his cool aspect and nonchalant demeanour, though he was constantly on the alert, and gave his orders with precision. seeing the turn things were taking the _dizainiers_ of the town assured the governor of their entire devotion, and of the good-will of the volunteers, who deemed themselves capable of guarding the ramparts unaided; he might therefore commence operations outside in full confidence, and "amuse" the enemy. this was exactly what rincourt wanted. the imperialists in the meantime continued to advance with their trench. on the evening of the th of november it was fifteen hundred feet from the salient, and in the rear there was a pretty good _place d'armes_, surrounded by an epaulement with cannon at the angles and abatis of trees, at the foot of the bank. every night the governor found means to disquiet the enemy, often at intervals of two or three hours, so as to keep him incessantly in alarm. galas, in the meanwhile, had sent two pieces of ordnance to the right bank of the stream out of sight of the besieged, and on the th of november he mounted them on this bank so as to attack the front _à crémaillère_, k,[ ] in the rear. the wooden bridge had been burned by the besieged, and the stone bridge barricaded and furnished with a cavalier on the left bank, which swept the right bank. behind the houses of the western faubourg, rincourt established a battery armed with three cannons, which had been taken from the arsenal during the night. on the morning of the th of november the houses which masked the three pieces having been thrown down, these guns opened their fire against the besieger's battery, which was soon silenced. [illustration: fig. .] that same day the trench was nine hundred feet from the outwork, and a second _place d'armes_ was commenced at this point (fig. ). the governor resolved to overthrow the enemy's works. at two o'clock in the morning he first sent out a troop of five hundred men to attack the _place d'armes_ on the west, while a second troop of two hundred men was to attack it on the east, and himself going out with four hundred men to continue the offensive, if the former had a chance of succeeding, or to protect its retreat. his men were armed with pikes, cutlasses, grenades, and pistols. the besieger had at this point from twelve to fifteen hundred men to protect the workmen. the first troop of the garrison advanced resolutely against the flank, throwing grenades into the trenches, and destroying the gabions and fascines. they were soon attacked by all the germans posted at this point; but knowing that they were going to be immediately reinforced, they maintained their position in the middle of the _place d'armes_, making use of every obstacle to intrench themselves. this struggle was visible only through some bivouac fires at a considerable distance, and the explosions of the grenades. the townspeople, that they might recognise each other, had put shirts over their buff coats, or their _pourpoints_. the second troop soon arrived from the east, and a part of the besiegers was thus attacked on both sides. the latter retired, and rallying about a hundred paces behind the _place d'armes_, attacked in their turn the people of the town on the two flanks; the struggle recommenced with violence, the french not being willing to abandon the place. they would, however, have been ultimately overwhelmed by numbers, if rincourt had not come up in the midst of the _mêlée_ with his reserve of four hundred men (fig. ). he fell upon one of the flanks of the numerous troop of the germans without uttering a sound. these then fell into confusion, and commenced a speedy retreat. soon, in spite of the officers, the route was complete, and the fugitives went off and alarmed the neighbouring posts, and even the camp, asserting that they had been surprised by a large body that had come to succour the besieged. [illustration: fig. .--night sortie--the attack on one of the besiegers' place d'armes.] galas was not certain whether this was a concerted sortie or whether succour had reached the besieged between his lines and the place. collecting all the troops at his disposal, and ordering two or three hundred men to mount their horses, he betook himself to the abandoned works. rincourt had not waited for him; but having damaged the trench for the length of a hundred paces, scattered the gabions, set fire to heaps of fascines, spiked two guns, which the enemy had abandoned, broken open some casks of munitions, and taken away the tools of the pioneers, retreated with his men. this sortie had cost him about fifty men; he brought back his wounded. when galas came up none but the dead of both parties and some wounded remained in the works. in his anger, he broke his cane on the back of the first soldiers he met with, calling them cowards and traitors, and threatening to decimate the whole troop entrusted with the guard of the trench. the mischief could not be repaired in the few hours of night that were left. they were quite bewildered in the midst of these scattered gabions and trenches filled up at some points; and when day appeared the besieged discharged three or four volleys from the tenaille in the midst of this confused host, which then retreated to the first _place d'armes_. to increase his embarrassment, about ten o'clock in the morning, a message sent from saint-jean-de-losne informed the imperialist general that this insignificant town was holding out, that the continual sorties of the garrison were fatiguing the troops, that the siege would be longer than was supposed at first, and that, in fact, his presence would be necessary to direct the attack and make head against the count de rantzau, who was occupying the town. the possession of saint-jean-de-losne, which he supposed was already in the hands of his troops, was still more important to the imperialists than that of la roche-pont. for saint-jean-de-losne secured to the germans the passage of the saône; but if this town held out they might be cut off by the prince de condé, who, on raising the siege of dôle, or taking that place, would fall upon the rear of the imperial army. galas was therefore much embarrassed. to raise the siege of la roche-pont, and to march with all his forces against the prince de condé, was perhaps the wisest part to take, but this would have interfered with the plan of the campaign on which the imperialists founded the most brilliant hopes; it would have been to abandon that conquest of burgundy which a few days before germany had regarded as certain; it would have been a manifest check at the very commencement of the campaign. galas therefore adopted a middle course, which in war is always the least desirable; he resolved to leave before la roche-pont sufficient troops to invest it closely, knowing that the place had not provisions sufficient to last long, and to finish the siege of saint-jean-de-losne. this place fallen, he might resume his original plan. on the evening of the th of november, after having appointed a commander for the troops remaining before la roche-pont, and leaving his instructions, he quitted the camp to go and rejoin the army before saint-jean-de-losne. these instructions were in substance as follows--the establishment of a line of investment around the place and the continuance of the attack on the northern salient, under good protection and taking the time necessary for the works. he had also a plan made out for a battery of bomb mortars. he had sent for four of these engines to bombard the town.[ ] galas's lieutenant was of italian origin, and was named forcia: he was an impetuous man, serviceable for a bold stroke, a great talker, a fairly skilful engineer, but wanting in persistency and perseverance, and continually changing his plans. by dint of flattery and the admiration he manifested on all occasions for the military talents of galas, forcia had succeeded in persuading him that no one was better fitted than himself to act for the general, to enter into his designs, and put his plans in execution. forcia, we say, had appeared to appreciate the wisdom of galas's designs, and had promised to follow his instructions implicitly and to the letter. but where is the flatterer, however astute, who does not leave in the mind of the person flattered--however wanting in judgment--a feeling of mistrust. accordingly galas in quitting the camp of la roche-pont, had instructed a young lieutenant who acted as his secretary, and whom he left with forcia, to take note of all that transpired and to keep him informed of the minutest details by frequent messages. rincourt allowed his troops the night of the th for repose, as half the garrison had been engaged the night before. on the morning of the th one of the spies whom he was careful to employ in the country, and even in the camp of the enemy, came to inform him that galas had departed the evening before with an inconsiderable escort, and that the imperialist troops were placed under the command of one of his lieutenants. this news set the governor gravely thinking; he knew that saint-jean-de-losne was still holding out, and he gained a glimpse of the real state of affairs. devoted to the count de rantzau, he felt it his duty more than ever to give the enemy so much to do as to render it impossible for him to think of reducing the number of troops assembled around la roche-pont, to reinforce those engaged in the siege of saint-jean-de-losne. the garrison was full of confidence and determination; and the militia of the town asked to share in the sorties. this militia consisted of a body of about twelve hundred men, which rincourt had divided into companies of one hundred men each, commanded by ten subalterns and a captain. he had divided these companies into two battalions of six hundred men each. the first was composed of the robuster men who had had some experience in arms; the second was composed of the householders, men of mature age inexperienced in war. these latter were especially employed as guards of the ramparts, as a daily and nightly patrol, and as a police for the town. with the regular troops, therefore, the governor had at his disposal, even after the losses he had sustained, and after leaving in the town artillerymen enough to man the guns, about two thousand two hundred men. the women of roche-pont had also offered their services. rincourt formed them into brigades of ten; and their duty was to bring ammunition, prepare the provisions, repair military accoutrements, and make fascines and bags. even since the enemy's arrival, the governor had been able to get some cattle, grain, and fodder into the town, affording a supply for sixteen days longer. he had good hopes of getting rid of the germans before the end of this period. the townspeople, moreover, were rationed like the garrison, and the inhabitants were obliged under pain of death to deposit all the provisions they had in the public storehouses. the two churches of the upper town had been converted into hospitals for the wounded. if the spirits of the garrison were kept up and even raised, such was by no means the case with the imperialists. forcia lost no time in announcing to the german troops that he was appointed commander-in-chief; he called the captains together and thought it incumbent upon him to address them in a somewhat long and high-flown discourse, accompanied by theatrical gestures. this had but a slight effect on the minds of the officers, who were for the most part veterans, and who had no great respect for forcia. they returned to their quarters, therefore, somewhat depressed, and auguring no good for the prospects of the siege. following the instructions left him by galas, forcia gave orders for the complete investment of the place. deducting the losses suffered since the beginning of the siege, and the desertions, forcia when entrusted with the command had little more than five thousand men. the object to be secured was to maintain at the point of attack a body of troops numerous enough to prevent the sorties of the garrison from not being formidable to them, and to distribute around the _cité_ posts sufficiently well connected and defended to cut off all communication between the town and the outside; for it was certain that the inhabitants would be reduced to famine before many days elapsed. prudence therefore demanded that a line of contravallation should be established, and provided with artillery, that every point should be efficiently guarded, and that the garrison should be so occupied as to make vigorous sorties impossible. these tactics must infallibly result in the surrender of the town at no distant time. such were in substance the instructions of galas. but forcia had a more ambitious aim; these methods appeared to him tedious and unworthy of him; and he saw himself in imagination master of the place, and sending the news of its capitulation to galas in a message worthy of ancient rome. still he dared not formally disregard his instructions, but he resolved merely to affect compliance with them, eager to show the army how an engineer of first-rate ability can conduct a siege. he believed that three thousand men would be enough to keep the besieged in awe on the north, to prosecute the approach-works vigorously and to take the place. with two thousand men he made sure of intercepting all communication between the inhabitants and the outside. accordingly he established a post of two hundred men along the river on the left bank, two hundred yards from the angle of the curtain k;[ ] a second post of two hundred men on the right bank, in front of the destroyed wooden bridge o; a third post of one hundred men, opposite the ancient bridge p; a fourth post of three hundred men, two hundred yards from the stone bridge; a fifth post of three hundred men along the rivulet to the south-east of the escarpment of the castle; a sixth post of two hundred men behind the embankment of the mills on the east; and a seventh post of three hundred men above the pool to the north-east--in all sixteen hundred men. four hundred men were commissioned to connect these principal posts, or to strengthen them at need. the rampart l[ ], prevented the besieger from making his way between the pool and the town, the fifth, sixth, and seventh posts communicated with headquarters only by a long détour, and could not be supported by the posts of the right bank unless a bridge were thrown across below the stone bridge. this was a serious disadvantage. forcia had no idea of taking possession of the stone bridge by a sudden attack, as this passage was commanded by a cavalier and by the bastions of the castle. he preferred throwing a bridge across below to put his posts in communication with each other. wishing to keep all his artillery to batter the place and to effect a breach quickly, he did not provide any of these posts with guns, but contented himself with ordering them to erect a strong palisading, and to raise epaulements for shelter. the instructions he gave were wanting in precision, but he often cited cæsar and vegetius and frontinus, and some of the great captains who had shed a lustre on italy in the preceding century. while urging vigilance on his captains he merely went with them to reconnoitre the ground, and to determine their posts; but did not trouble himself further to know whether his orders were understood and strictly carried out. the investment was only a concession made to the general-in-chief, and his attention was entirely given to the attack on the north. he could not even avoid observing in presence of his officers that up to that time the works had been feebly conceived and executed; a remark which soon reached the ears of galas. rincourt took advantage of the respite allowed him by the besieger to organize his little garrison more effectually. we have seen that he had six hundred militiamen capable of acting outside the ramparts. he set about equipping these men, who were but imperfectly armed. the castle contained a hundred muskets, which he distributed to those who knew best how to use this weapon, but had not been provided with it. the rest he armed with strong pikes, breach-knives, and partisans. not counting artillerymen, he had remaining sixteen hundred soldiers--three hundred being horsemen--whom he formed into four bodies of four companies of infantry of eighty men each, commanded by a captain, and three companies of horsemen, one hundred strong. the town contained thirty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre. there were sixteen mounted in the north work; two on the cavalier behind the bridge; one in the bastion of the donjon; two in the bastion f[ ] and one in each of the seven other bastions; in all twenty-eight. two were placed in the tenaille of the castle, and two were kept in reserve. the enemy's arrangements were soon made known to the governor, either through spies or the reconnaissances made by his best officers, or himself personally; he took care not to disturb the carrying out of those arrangements, and contented himself with doubling the guard at the bridge, which was raised to two hundred men. [illustration: fig. .] during the night of the th of november, forcia had a second breach opened, and marked out the approach-works, as shown in fig. . besides the two _places d'armes_ a and b, already marked out, he planned a third, c, to be reached by a new trench d, next two batteries at g and f, for two pieces each, and a battery for two mortars h. he had the first trench lengthened at i, with a piece at its extremity sweeping the curtain k. two pieces mounted in the _place d'armes_ b commanded the battery f, and the surroundings; a piece mounted at e commanded the battery g; and a piece mounted in the _place d`armes_ c swept the outside of the western battery. he thought he should thus provide for every contingency. if the besieged determined to attempt some bold stroke, they could not advance far, and if they succeeded in taking either of the batteries g, f, he could crush them. the two batteries g, f were intended to silence the fire of the north-west salient and of the left half of the tenaille. that done, he could--secure against the right-hand fire--advance as far as the counterscarp, set up a breach battery, and take the place by the north-west salient. meanwhile, the mortar battery would render the right of the work untenable, crush the defenders of the ancient terraced walls, damage the gates, and prevent the besieged from attempting anything at this point. the plan was not badly conceived; nothing remained but to execute it. the phlegmatic governor had the gabionades of the work strengthened, and traverses and _paréclats_ raised, especially on the platforms of the two great towers. he had shelter places arranged on the platforms of the earthworks. moreover he kept up a continual fire on the workmen, so that they could scarcely make any advance except during the night. sometimes at ten o'clock at night, sometimes at midnight, at two o'clock in the morning, or shortly before daybreak, rincourt would alarm the enemy's camp by sorties of no importance considered with reference to the final result, but which greatly exhausted the besiegers. these sorties were effected by one or two companies while the others rested. in this way he exercised the militia, and accustomed them to fighting. by the th of november the besieger's works had scarcely made any progress. however the _place d'armes_ c was made, as also the parallel which connected it with the _place d'armes_ b; and the trenches were commenced which were to lead to the two batteries. the bomb-mortars were mounted, and began to fire towards evening. but they produced more noise than damage to the besieged. their fire was badly directed, and most of the bombs burst too soon or too late. the besieged became accustomed to them, and kept out of their way when they saw them coming. for a dozen bombs fired the first evening, two men were wounded, and one gun-carriage damaged. on the morning of the th of november the weather, hitherto fine, suddenly changed. about nine a fine snow fell, and was soon after followed by a deluge of rain, accompanied by squalls. during the night of the th, the men on guard in the trenches were up to their knees in water; it was impossible to work. the rain continued regular and heavy during the whole of the th. rincourt took advantage of this disagreeable state of the weather. the bridge which had been thrown across the river by the imperialists, below the stone bridge, consisted of a floor six feet wide, laid partly on trestles, partly on boats collected in the valley and linked together. this was a clumsy contrivance, for the water on beginning to rise lifted the boats proportionately so that it was extremely difficult to maintain the connexion between the floor resting on the boats and that laid on the trestles. accordingly in spite of the rain the besiegers worked all day on the th to prevent the rupture of this bridge. the governor who passed all that day in examining the environs, had perceived from the top of the platform of the cavalier the precarious condition of the besieger's bridge, and at night he had some large trunks of trees thrown over the parapet of the stone bridge, which struck against the boats and trestles and impeded the current, which kept on rising. at midnight twenty of these trunks had accumulated against the boats, and the river continuing to rise, the bridge was carried away. a light appearing for an instant at a certain point of the valley of abonne apprised rincourt of the destruction of the bridge. the signal was given by one of the spies. secure, therefore, against being cut off on his right by the imperialists, the governor sent out three hundred militiamen and three companies of soldiers, kept under arms after supper, by the western gate, next to the castle; and another three hundred of the militia, and two companies by the eastern gate. this second troop was commissioned to make for the causeway of the pool, attack the enemy's post established beyond the embankment, outflank it on his right and pursue it hotly along the rivulet. rincourt commanded the foremost troop of six hundred men. he descended the slope of the bridge, crossed the rivulet by means of planks and trestles which he had ready prepared behind the cavalier, and attacked the post of three hundred men established at two hundred yards below the stone bridge. finding themselves attacked by a body much more numerous than themselves, they quitted the bivouacs in all haste, and set off along the left bank of the rivulet to join the second post (consisting) of three hundred men established between them and the dam, as the bridge was broken. this was just what rincourt anticipated. at the same time, in an opposite direction the post at the pool embankment was in flight, pursued by the second troop of the besieged,--depending on getting the support of the post at the rivulet and that of the bridge, since they were outflanked on their right. these two posts--that of the bridge and that of the embankment--retreating as fast as the nature of the ground permitted in an inverse direction, to the post at the rivulet, the latter supposed it was an attack, and fired several arquebusades at the two troops of these outposts. they recognised each other with difficulty, and these eight hundred men thus collected, saw themselves attacked on two sides by rincourt and the second troop of the besieged. the combat did not last long, in consequence of the confusion into which they were thrown as much as through the numerical inferiority. few resisted, many sought the marshes, and two or three hundred laid down their arms and begged for quarter. of those who had betaken themselves right and left to the marshes, about a hundred managed to reach the camp in the morning, the others were killed by the peasants. forcia, informed in the middle of the night of the attack on his south-eastern posts, got a thousand men under arms. but the weather continued as bad as ever; the captains obeyed with a very ill grace; they had lost all confidence, and it was not until daylight that galas's lieutenant was able to go down into the valley. his three posts were taken, and he found from two to three hundred men dead or wounded on the banks of the rivulet. rincourt had quietly gone up again into the town with his two troops and his prisoners by the castle gate, about three o'clock in the morning. he had not lost more than fifty men, killed, wounded, or strayed. forcia returned to the camp about ten o'clock in the morning. but from the top of the donjon, at the first glimmering of daylight, the governor had seen the troop of imperialists defiling in the direction of the posts that had been taken. without an instant's delay, placing himself at the head of four companies of foot soldiers, fresh and ready for the struggle, and of his three hundred horsemen, and after having fired several volleys on the besieger's works, he courageously sallied forth by the ravelin and rushed impetuously upon the trenches. the enemy, taken by surprise, without a commander, and out of heart, fled, and rincourt succeeded in spiking the guns of the two foremost _places d'armes_, spiking and throwing down the mortars along the slopes, breaking the gun-carriages, overthrowing the gabionades, and taking a quantity of workmen's tools. when forcia returned, it was to learn this fresh disaster. his captains murmured loudly. he called them cowards and ignoramuses, and they retorted sharply, and abuse was lavished on both sides. happily for forcia a messenger came from galas that evening enjoining him to raise the siege of roche-pont and to fall back upon the saône without an hour's delay. saint-jean-de-losne had held out and had suffered no damage; the imperialists, surprised by the inundations, and fearing to be cut off by the french army, determined on returning home. if that french army had been led by a rantzau and a rincourt, not a german would have repassed the frontier; but the duke of weimar and the cardinal de la valette, who might have destroyed the invaders, were by no means energetic in the pursuit. the imperialists, however, lost in this expedition, by which they hoped to gain the most brilliant advantages, all their baggage, a good part of their artillery, and a third of their force. footnotes: [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : bombs, invented by the dutch in the beginning of the seventeenth century, were already used in sieges.] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] chapter xv. _the town of la roche-pont is fortified by m. de vauban._ born at saint-leger de foucheret, in the middle of burgundy, vauban, who loved and was well acquainted with this beautiful province, had occasion to visit roche-pont several times. the situation of the fortress and its strategical position attracted his notice, and suggested a plan connecting this little town with a line starting with besançon, passing through dôle, auxonne, la roche-pont, langres, neufchâteau, toul, pont-à-mousson, metz, thionville, longwy, montmédy, sedan, mézières, rocroy, avesnes, maubeuge, valenciennes, lille, and ending at dunquerque. the date was ; it was a second line. would to heaven it had always been maintained by works accommodated to the means of attack! but if the french know how to take, they are but remiss in keeping what they have taken. the fortress of la roche-pont was exposed to attack only from the northern plateau, and the artillery of vauban's time could make a serious impression only on that side, as the town was protected on its two sides, east and west, by escarpments and two water-courses. batteries placed on the hills east and west were either dominated by the artillery of the town or must have been placed at a distance of eighteen hundred yards--_i.e._, out of range--to attain the level of the ramparts. vauban decided therefore to construct outside the ancient town a large work on the north, which should command the plateau. at the same time--for he was economical of the money of the state--he thought he might avail himself of part of errard's works, especially the bastions which that engineer had raised on the east and west fronts, and improve the defence of the castle, which would then become a good stronghold. besides this he planned works, only revetted at the base, along the river, to protect the lower town. on the rivulet side, in like manner, he planned a flanked front for musketry, to secure that side from approach, and to keep some land useful either for the cultivation of vegetables in case of siege, or for pasturage. a weir placed at the mouth of the rivulet, with a flood gate, allowed the inhabitants to inundate the meadows situated on the east of the escarpment. [illustration: fig. .--vauban's defences.] fig. presents the general plan of the works laid out by vauban. at first he had thought of making on the north, before the front fortified by errard de bar-le-duc, a horn-work before a demi-lune; but he could not thus effectually sweep the divergent points of the plateau. he determined, therefore, on the plan given in fig. , making use of a part of the northern revetments of errard de bar-le-duc. in advance of the northern front, in lieu of the narrow and contracted defences of errard,[ ] he made a great demi-lune, a (fig. ), with a tenaille behind, and next the bastioned work, b, which swept the whole plateau. as to the rest of the town, making use of the old bastions, he strongly flanked them and disposed the stronghold as shown by the plan, d. the roads of the upper town were widened and improved, and the houses detached from the ramparts. the ancient bridge at c had been destroyed by a swelling of the river, and was not rebuilt; but at p, in , a new stone bridge was built, with a _tête du pont_ of earthwork. at o a foot-bridge still existed in . the town had again extended along the left bank, and the importance of the _cité_ above was diminishing. [illustration: fig. .--vauban's outwork.] fig. presents on a larger scale the plan of the outwork constructed by vauban. before the three fronts of this work, demi-lunes with tenailles behind defended the approaches. four barracks were built at _a_. cavaliers arose on the bastions, and the covered ways, with their _places d'armes_, were furnished with traverses. in the event of this work being taken, the main body of the fortress could still hold out some days. fig. gives the sections of these works, which were cased with masonry, presenting a strong defence which only a regular siege could affect. [illustration: fig. .] but it is desirable to point out the reasons that determined the plan of this work, and the method adopted by the illustrious engineer. vauban fortified according to the nature of the position, and was not one of those _esprits routiniers_ who, when once a certain system has made good its claims, insist on applying it on all occasions. the fortresses, which, like that of la roche-pont, are situated at the extremity of a promontory and present only a narrow front to the besieger, assuredly give certain advantages to the defence, since they have scarcely to fear more than one attack and are accessible only on one side; but this position is not without its drawbacks, especially if, as in the present instance, a fan-shaped plateau spreads outside the fortress; for then the besiegers sweep the defences with converging fires, to which the besieged can oppose only a narrow front unprovided with considerable flankments. on the east side the large bastion, in the middle of which vauban had left standing the fifteenth-century tower, which thus gave him a good revetted cavalier, sufficiently flanked the eastern brow of the outer plateau; but on the western side such a flankment failed entirely, on account of the outward bend caused by the promontory. to obviate these disadvantages vauban inclined his capital some paces eastwards.[ ] he had thought at first of suppressing the south flanks of the two extreme bastions, but in that case the exteriors of the east and west faces of these bastions would have been too slanting to sweep the crests of the plateau effectively, while the two curtains answered this object. besides, the enemy could not then, without risk, commence his trenches on the slopes of the plateau and rapidly approach fronts insufficiently flanked. vauban therefore set out the plan of the great outwork according to the following method (fig. ):--to the outside he gave a length of toises, or , feet. to the western side, _a c_, , feet; to the eastern side, _b d_, , feet--that is, he placed the points _c_ and _d_ according with the edge of the plateau; the two angles _a_ and _b_ being equal to one another. on the centre of the side _a b_ of the polygon he erected the perpendicular, _e f_, having a length equal to one-sixth of _a b_. from this extreme point, _f_, were drawn the lines of defence, _a g_, _b h_, on which the lengths of the faces of the bastion, _a k_, _b i_, were set off equal to two-sevenths of the outer side, _a b_. to find the flanks of the bastion, according to the method usually adopted in these defences, points _k_ and _i_, he described arcs of a circle, _k l_, taking _i k_ as the radius. the point of intersection of this arc with the line _b h_ gave the length and the direction of the flank of the bastion; but, not having been able to trace a regular half-hexagon, and the angles _a_ and _b_ being less obtuse than those of a regular hexagon, by proceeding in this manner, the gorges of the bastion would have been too contracted. therefore, to determine the flank of the bastion, from the points _i_ and _k_, he let fall perpendiculars to the lines of defence, _a g_, _b h_, and the point _h_ gave the re-entering angle in the curtain, _h g_, parallel to the side _a b_. this exposed the flanks a little too much, but enabled them to sweep the outsides more effectively, and in this particular case that was the principal consideration. [illustration: fig. .] the width of the ditch of the main work was fixed at ft. in., to the rounding of the counterscarp; and this was determined by a tangent to this rounding, drawn from the angle of the epaule of the opposite bastion. the ditches being dry, vauban sunk cunettes in the middle, ft. in. wide and ft. in. deep. double caponnières connected the tenailles with the demi-lunes. the demi-lune was set out as follows:--taking _g k_ as radius, the arc _k m_ was drawn. its meeting with the perpendicular, _e f_, prolonged, gave the point of intersection _m_, the salient of the demi-lune. from _m_, the face _m n_ was directed upon a point, _o_, taken on the face of the bastion at ft. in. from the angle of the epaule, _i_. the width of the covered way was fixed at ft. in., and that of the glacis at ft. in. the internal _places d'armes_ were ft. across the demi-gorge and ft. in. along the faces. these _places d'armes_ were closed by traverses. the ditch of the demi-lune was ft. in. in width. the tenailles, _g_, constructed in the direction of the lines of defence, were ft. in. wide at the base. cavaliers were made on the bastions to obtain convenient views over the slopes of the plateau. their faces and sides, parallel to those of the bastions, had to be placed at a considerable distance from the epaulements, in order that the un-cased external foot of the talus might leave the necessary room for the easy working of the pieces of artillery.[ ] the same method was followed for the sides _a c_ and _b d_. the width of the ditch was increased to ft., and the great demi-lune, _t_, was so formed that its faces had a length of ft. and its narrow sides ft. the old bastions restored and enlarged, _u v_, were armed with cavaliers, and the escarp of these bastions was ft. - / in. higher than that of the bastions of the outwork,[ ] which difference, for that matter, was favoured by the conformation of the ground. all the escarps and counterscarps were cased with strong masonry, with counterforts in the terre-plein; as shown in the sections of fig. and fig. . [illustration: fig. .] the works communicated with each other by posterns. as the fortress of la roche-pont was only assailable on one side, the number of cannon necessary for its defence might be, it appeared, in proportion to its extent, inconsiderable. the number amounted to thirty twenty-four pounders, ten twelve-and four-pounders to arm the demi-lunes. at the end of the reign of louis xiv., the efforts of the coalition were directed towards the north-eastern frontiers, and the garrison of la roche-pont did not get a view of the enemy. however, during the course of the eighteenth century, this fortress was kept in passable condition. footnotes: [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. , the section on e, f.] [footnote : see fig. , the sections on g h and i k.] chapter xvi. _the seventh siege._ on the st of december, , the grand army of bohemia, one hundred and eighty thousand men strong, and commanded by prince schwartzenberg, crossed the rhine at bâle, entered switzerland, and penetrated into france. its right bore down on belfort, colmar, and strasburg, its centre marched for langres, its left for dijon. the same day the prussians were crossing the rhine at mayence. the invasion of the eastern frontier had to be met by sixty thousand men, at most, echeloned between epinal and langres; and this force consisted only of dispirited soldiers and of recruits scarcely knowing how to use their arms. prince schwartzenberg's army--which had some reason to fear being attacked on the side of savoy by the forces commanded by prince eugene, and knew that the _débris_ of the army of spain had orders to make for lyons with all speed--wishing to secure its base of operation, left detachments before bésançon, dôle, along the saône and between dijon and langres, with injunctions to occupy the most favourable strategic position. la roche-pont was to be taken; and the generalissimo of the bohemian army imagined that it was not in a condition to hold out eight-and-forty hours, for he knew that it had no garrison, and that the citizens were little disposed to defend themselves. among the inhabitants of la roche-pont were some royalist families, whose emissaries had assured the commander-in-chief of the bohemian army that the whole population were impatiently awaiting the arrival of the allies to declare for the bourbons. prince schwartzenberg was too clear-sighted, and knew too well to what illusions the royalists were ready to yield themselves, to place an unlimited faith in these statements; and he was anxious not to encounter serious obstacles during his first stages, that he might put himself as speedily as possible in communication with his allies on their way from the north-east. he therefore informed the royalists of la roche-pont that it was undesirable to provoke a political manifestation on his march; that the best means of assuring the success of the allies was to remain quiet; that his troops, in conformity with the proclamation issued by the coalition on entering french territory, would respect property; that they were not animated by a spirit of vengeance, and that their glory would consist in concluding peace as quickly as possible, so as to restore to europe the repose it so much needed. in the meantime napoleon, on learning that the german troops had entered france from the south through basle, had sent pressing orders into the bourbonnais, auvergne, and burgundy, to make a levy of conscripts as soon as possible and send them to paris. at the same time the depôts of dauphiny and provence, as also the conscripts in the eastern departments, were to assemble at lyons to close to the enemy the approaches from switzerland and savoy, and if necessary to operate on his rear. the prefects of burgundy, picardy, and normandy, and of touraine and brittany, were to appeal to the communes to form companies of national guards _d'élite_, who were to march to paris, meaux, montereau, and troyes. these arrangements were hardly made in time to present a serious obstacle to the invaders. the civil authorities and the regular troops began to make a hasty retreat before the armies of the coalition, and were leaving the inhabitants to themselves without arms or guidance. it thus happened that some bodies of troops coming from the south found themselves in an isolated position, and uncertain whether they ought to continue their route or fall back. such a case happened on the saône; three battalions of infantry, certain artillerymen called to vincennes to assemble at the great central depôt which the emperor was organising there, and some detachments of various arms making their way for dijon, to push on thence towards troyes--found themselves on the flank of the left column of the army of bohemia. they retraced their steps, and made a rather long détour, hoping to get beyond the enemy's right, and resume the route for troyes through beaune, sémur, montbard, and châtillon-sur-seine; but surprised by bad weather and snow, during a night march in the mountains of the côte-d'or, they lost their way, and found themselves in the morning at saint-seine, which was already occupied by a body of austrian pioneers. the french were much limited in point of munitions, and had no artillery. they could not force the passage, and were obliged to fall back into the valley of suzon, hoping still to find the road from dijon to langres clear. but at thil-le-châtel they came upon another body of the enemy, and had to retire towards the small town of la roche-pont, for it was evident that they were cut off. the colonel who commanded this small column was instructed, should it be impossible to reach langres, to take up a position at auxonne or at la roche-pont, to keep his ground there, and to form a nucleus of defence until the arrival of augereau's force, which was to march from lyons through macon, châlon, and gray, to fall on the rear of prince schwartzenberg. such were the events that had happened at this juncture at la roche-pont. conformably to the last orders transmitted by the prefect, companies of national guards had been promptly organised. the inhabitants of la roche-pont, like their neighbours of auxonne, dôle, and saint-jean-de-losne, preserve military habits; and sieges--not without reason, as we have seen--are a tradition among them. there were always companies of archers and arbalisters at la roche-pont during the middle ages, and at a later date bombardiers and artillerymen. under the consulate la roche-pont had been a depôt for the army concentrated between dijon and the swiss frontier to pass the saint-bernard, and munitions had been stored there; some siege pieces had also been placed there, and still remained. at the approach of prince schwartzenberg's army the population of la roche-pont was in agitation; and even before the prefectoral instructions had arrived, three companies of national guards, one of which was of artillerymen, had been spontaneously formed. all had old muskets of the time of the revolution, or good hunting weapons. the lower town, occupied in great part by rich families, of which several were devoted to the royal cause, did not share in these preparations for war. some indiscreet revelations made the upper town aware of the intrigues of the royalists. the mayor was a man who had been conspicuous for his devotion to the emperor while the empire had been in vigour; but who, seeing its fortunes decline, became daily more and more of a royalist. if he had not actively opposed, he had at least obstructed the formation of a company of national guards _d'élite_, endeavouring to gain time. the little citadel of la roche-pont was occupied by a company of sixty veterans, for the most part invalided, under the orders of an old one-armed captain of engineers, who had served in almost all the campaigns of the empire. when it was known that the enemy had entered france, captain allaud--that was his name--had asked for orders from dijon, but had not received them. however, he employed his men in restoring and replenishing the arsenal. he enjoyed a certain amount of authority in the upper town. the male population of the _cité_, composed in great part of men who had been soldiers--all the youth had left in the first months of --never called captain allaud anything but "the governor," and had applied to him to form companies, only asking for munitions. now the arsenal of la roche-pont contained a good supply of powder and balls, about twenty old bronze pieces of small calibre, six twenty-four pounders, two howitzers, four small mortars, and about a hundred muskets past service. the six gendarmes remaining till then at la roche-pont had been summoned to dijon at the beginning of january. captain allaud asked for co-operation in repairing the arms, making cartouches and cartridges, repairing the parapets, the traverses, and epaulements, and fabricating gabions and fascines; and the women made bags for earth,--as if it had been possible to sustain a siege with the sixty veterans and the three companies of national guards, forming a total of two hundred and sixty men. the prefect of dijon had transmitted the order for these select companies of national guards to fall back upon langres, but the order had not arrived. the royalists shrugged their shoulders on seeing these two hundred and sixty national guards exercising on the platform of the outwork, and went so far as to joke in the places of public resort about captain allaud's _garrison_. he could not put up with raillery, and talked aloud to his men about running their swords through the jokers. high words and even blows were exchanged in the _cafés_. the mayor ventured to interpose his authority; he was insulted and called a traitor, and the captain was informed of the intrigues set on foot by the royalists. at night the captain had the gates of the _cité_ shut, and the antagonism between the upper and lower town was increasing in violence. "if the austrians come," said the captain, "the houses of these royalist traitors will be the first marks for our balls!" both parties became excited, and the mayor had the impudence to ask the captain on whose authority he was acting. "i am the _commandant de place_," replied the veteran, "since there is no other officer here, and la roche-pont is a defensible place.... to prove it to you i arrest you!" and he had the mayor conducted to the citadel. great was the excitement in the town, but the royalists were in a feeble minority, and dared not stir. they cried "vive le gouverneur!" in the taverns. the mob attempted to plunder the mayor's house, which was situated on the _cité_, and the captain had great difficulty in putting down the disturbance. "rascals!" cried he to the fellows who were already breaking in the doors of the house, "i will have you shot like dogs. sacrebleu! you can break open doors; we shall see whether you have so much pluck when the germans come! here," added he, turning to a dozen veterans, who were following him, "clear the place of this _canaille_!" and, setting the example, he dealt blows in abundance with the flat of his sword on the backs of the plunderers. it was the morning following this riot when the french corps above spoken of presented itself before la roche-pont. it was welcomed in the upper town with every demonstration of joy. an army come to their help magnificently accoutred and provided would not have been better received. but this troop, exhausted by fatigue, and having eaten nothing for twenty-four hours, without artillery or munitions, had all the appearance of a band of fugitives. covered with mud, and scantily clothed, these poor soldiers seemed scarcely able even to defend themselves. but in such times of distress, so much do people cling to any semblance of hope, that the sight of a friendly uniform revives every heart. seeing themselves so well received, these brave fellows made their entrance into the city in good order, and presented when defiling through the streets, in spite of their exhaustion, a martial appearance which redoubled the enthusiasm of the inhabitants. a colonel, three chiefs of battalions, and some captains, of whom one belonged to the artillery, composed the staff. two hours after their arrival, these soldiers, most of whom had seen much service, having rested well and brushed themselves up, presented a very different appearance. the news brought by this small corps proved clearly enough that there was no time to lose, if they wanted to put the town of la roche-pont in a condition to defend itself with honour, if not with hope of success. the colonel, of course, took the command; his name was dubois. he had been in the campaign in portugal, then in russia, whence he had returned captain, and having been appointed _chef de bataillon_ in the saxon campaign, he had distinguished himself at dresden, and had been a colonel from the date of the battle of leipzig. he was a man of about thirty, but appeared to be much older. he had scarcely seen anything but the disastrous side of french glory. his countenance, therefore, did not bear that impress of confidence which was exhibited by many of his brethren in arms, who had been less tried than himself by the misfortunes of the times. of the war in spain he had seen only the miseries, the privations, the failure of order, the utter disintegration. with ney on the return from moscow he had learned what the performance of duty is without the prestige of glory. at dresden, the regiment to which he was attached had lost half its men; and the disaster of leipzig had followed. with each grade in his promotion was associated a mournful date. colonel dubois had an appearance of coldness that served to hide his natural timidity and profound distrust of his fellow-men. it must be allowed that there were reasons for his distrust of men and things. entering the service at the age of twenty as a common soldier, though he belonged to an honourable family in poitou and had spent his earliest years in the bosom of his family, he had seen only the sinister side of warfare, and his first companions in arms did not respond to his ideal of the soldier's character. it was still worse when he went to spain. his delicate nature had fallen back on itself, and allowed no sign of pity or even sympathy for anyone to be visible. yet so profoundly does what we call "heart" imprint itself on every action, even when its possessor attempts to conceal its slightest manifestation, that this man, in appearance so cold, and who was not known to have a friend, exercised a moral authority over his soldiers which was very rare at that time. the soldier--an infallible judge in this matter--is able to discover the weak side of the officer; but he only esteems him and confides entirely in him when he recognises besides military talents a soul of energetic vigour and a heart that beats in unison with his own. the soldier's glance can penetrate without difficulty a cold and harsh exterior, and soon discovers whether this appearance conceals insufficiency, stupidity, or pride; or whether it is only the countenance of a man accustomed to command--the exterior of a soul really accessible to all human sentiments. in an action dubois could see his men fall without the slightest show of emotion, and would not permit a soldier to leave his place to help them; but after the battle he was the first and the most attentive in relieving the wounded, and would take no rest till they were carried to the ambulances. of the three battalions (they were not complete) which he commanded, two belonged to his own regiment; the third was composed of fragments drawn from all sides. nevertheless, after two or three days' march, all these men, as well as the companies of various arms which he was to lead to troyes, knew colonel dubois better perhaps than he knew himself. these brave men, after some hours' rest were well satisfied to submit to circumstances and remain under the orders of their colonel de _bois_, as they used to call him--and thought it a fine joke to defend themselves in this _nest_ of la roche-pont, cut off from all help. though in concert with captain allaud he made the most needful preparations for defence--were it only to save his own honour--colonel dubois wished to ascertain whether it was possible to reach langres and troyes without compromising his troops. he therefore instructed a young orderly officer of energy and intelligence, by whom he was accompanied--giving him two attendants and two guides from the town and known to the captain, all mounted--to reconnoitre the route and return as quickly as possible. we have seen that before the colonel's arrival the defenders numbered three hundred and twenty men, of whom sixty were veterans. among these men about fifty were capable of serving the guns, having been artillerymen. the troop brought by the colonel consisted of three battalions, in all one thousand four hundred and fifty men, twenty-five artillerymen, and thirty dismounted horsemen; total, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five men, including officers. provisions were the first question. the colonel, having learned the arrest of the mayor, summoned him into his presence, and soon heard the confession of the municipal magistrate. he gave him to understand that the proofs of his royalist intrigues were sufficient to justify his being shot there and then, and that the only means of avoiding this unpleasant necessity was to set about provisioning the city without a moment's delay. he added that he only commanded the vanguard of a _corps d'armée_, marching from lyons in the rear of the enemy, while the emperor was to take them in front: it was important therefore for the town of la roche-pont to be in a position to resist for some days, and if it were obliged to surrender for want of provisions, the emperor's government would lay blame on the mayor, as having an understanding with the enemy, and then it was all over with him. the poor mayor, more dead than alive, promised everything, and swore by all the saints that he was devoted to the emperor, and that in four-and-twenty hours the fortress should be supplied with all the provisions that could be found in the neighbourhood. "i don't know what there may be in the neighbourhood," replied the colonel; "you probably _do_; but i have to tell you that by four o'clock to-morrow afternoon--it is now a quarter-past six--there must be on this spot, first, rations of meal, meat, and wine for a garrison of two thousand men for twenty-five days at least; secondly, the inhabitants of the town must also be provisioned for thirty days; and that if this is not done, i shall be unfortunately obliged to send you back to your place of confinement, where you will await the decision of the emperor's government; i am going to give you twenty men to accompany you and help you. planton! ask the major to come here!" "but, colonel," said the mayor, "you must be aware that at this time of the year i shall have great difficulty--" "you prefer then to return to prison immediately?" interrupted the colonel. "major!" said he when this officer was introduced, "monsieur le maire de la roche-pont engages to provision the town within twenty-four hours. here is a list of what is required. you will accompany him, and have twenty pressed men with you--thirty if you want them. you must begin at once. i wish you good luck, monsieur le maire." addressing himself to the major, while the mayor was retiring, pale and covered with perspiration, in spite of the cold: "do not suffer this man to go out of your sight, he is a royalist; keep him at work, and bring him back here with the provisions." "i understand, colonel." it was many years since the upper and lower town of la roche-pont had been so animated. the upper town resounded with the noise of arms, of the excavators going to the works, of guns being taken from the arsenal and mounted in the batteries, and of the repairing of the carriages. in another part the carpenters were at work making platforms. as in former times, women mingled with the workmen and brought bundles of willows cut from the side of the pool to make gabions. behind every window some were to be seen sewing bags for earth. wheelwrights were repairing wheels; and all engaged were singing and laughing as if they were preparing for a fête. the meal and forage carts were coming in, while pigs, cows, and sheep were rendering the streets almost impassable. the lower town presented a different aspect: the _cafés_ were full, and all were talking at once and very loud. the mayor, followed by the major, who kept close to his elbow, and by his staff of assistants, was making his visits to the shops and houses. the whole of the population was at the windows or at the door-sills. carts were got ready, and the twenty pressed men filled them in no time; if horses could not be found to draw them, the workmen pushed at the wheels. some large houses, however, remained closely shut. they had to go through the valley and visit the farmers and millers of the neighbourhood. many inhabitants of the upper town went down in search of hams, meal, and grains. the grocers' shops and the pork shops were emptied one after the other; provisions were rising in price, so that the last ham was sold, at three o'clock in the afternoon, for sixty francs. at four o'clock the mayor, followed like his shadow by the major, presented himself before the colonel and gave him the list of all the provisions he had been able to bring into the upper town. the colonel bade him sit down, and examined the account carefully, asking many questions and appealing to the major's testimony respecting the correctness of the statements. the twenty-five days' rations for the two thousand men were found complete, thanks to a good stock of un-ground corn which made up for what was wanting in meal. the colonel expressed himself satisfied, especially as they had found in the castle some few hundred-weight of biscuit in good condition. "thank you, monsieur le maire," said he; "you must be fatigued, and may return home; but as i am not unaware of the ill-feeling of some bad sort of people towards you, you shall have a man on guard posted at your door; and i must beg you not to quit your house except to go to your office, which fortunately is situated in the upper town, which will enable you, when we are invested, to fulfil your functions with the zeal you have just manifested. "i will also beg you to make arrangements without delay for an ambulance with fifty beds duly furnished--suppose we say to-night--and to send me the surgeons of the town, if there are any at la roche-pont, this very evening.... major! accompany monsieur le maire while he attends to this business, so that no harm may befal him...." that same day, at eight o'clock in the evening, the reconnaissance returned and reported what they had seen. the enemy was at gray near champlitte, and was occupying the roads between gray and thil-le-châtel. his force had been seen at bèze, about eighteen miles from la roche-pont. communication between dijon and langres was cut off: and although the enemy had not occupied that town, he was forming a curtain between it and the north to mask his ulterior movements. the circumstantial details given by his orderly officer confirmed the colonel in the idea that the army of bohemia was paying but little attention to what was taking place in his rear, but was pushing on towards the capital by the basin of the seine. "ah!" said the colonel, when he had heard every particular from the young officer, "if we only had twenty thousand of those men who were lost in russia, we could make these german and russian gentlemen pay dearly for their temerity, and few of them would see the other side of the rhine again." colonel dubois therefore determined to follow the second part of his instructions. he sent a reliable man, selected by captain allaud, to auxonne to inform the governor of the place--if the town was not already occupied--that he was holding la roche-pont, that he was in a condition to defend himself there for some time, and that he should wish all isolated detachments and any provisions or munitions that had no particular destination to be sent to him. up to the th of january the town of la roche-pont had not seen a single enemy. the centre column of prince schwartzenberg's army was marching in the direction of gray along the heights of the seine and marne basins, and avoiding the lower saône. this delay had allowed additional munitions to be brought into the town, and the garrison increased by some recruits who, not being able to join their regiments, were wandering about without orders. four pieces of field artillery, whose carriages were out of repair, had also been got into the town. the colonel had put himself in communication with lyons; and marshal augereau, still hoping to commence offensive operations, had confirmed the previous orders that had been given--that is to say, to hold la roche-pont, and to gain all possible information respecting the enemy's movements in the north. towards the end of january the great army of bohemia had some grounds for apprehending an attack on its rear; and prince schwartzenberg knew that from macon along the ascent of the saône, and as far as the countries intersected by hills which form a part of upper burgundy, a nucleus of resistance was being formed which might at any moment take the offensive and embarrass him greatly. after the battle of brienne ( th of january), as the result of which the prussians were thrown back by napoleon on la rothière, the sovereigns assembled in prince schwartzenberg's neighbourhood deliberated as to whether they should stop short at langres or risk advancing alone against the troops commanded by the emperor. this indecision with regard to ulterior operations led to a more effective concentration and the occupation of a circle of wider radius around langres. orders were then given to a body of four thousand of the allied bavarians and austrians to invest la roche-pont, and to guard the route from lyons to langres. it was not till the st of february that the front of this corps showed itself before la roche-pont. colonel dubois had not been wasting time: the garrison was provisioned for more than six weeks, and munitions were not wanting. this superior officer had put everything in order; and his troops, motley in appearance, certainly, but well rested and full of confidence, amounted at that time to more than nineteen hundred men, of whom twelve hundred were experienced soldiers who might be relied upon. the works on the north were well armed and the defences in good condition, duly furnished with palisades, traverses, and appliances for shelter. on the evening of the nd of february, some of the enemy's horse were caracoling at a distance of about two hundred yards from the works; this bravado cost them about a dozen men. the enemy, however, did not seem desirous of undertaking a regular siege, but took up a position about a mile from the northern salient; he sent detachments to occupy the faubourg on the left bank, and raised an encampment on the eastern hills. the colonel had blown up the stone-bridge and destroyed the foot-bridges. on the morning of the th of february an envoy appeared on the glacis and handed on to the governor of the place a summons from general werther, demanding the surrender of la roche-pont to the troops of the allied princes. the garrison would be allowed to retire southwards with arms, baggage, and field artillery. the colonel replied that the place was sufficiently strong and well provided; it would not capitulate till the moment when the breaches were no longer tenable; and he judged that the defence could not be prolonged to any purpose. the following night colonel dubois sent out a hundred men to try the strength of the enemy's outposts and reconnoitre their positions. by the end of the two following days--the th and th--the investment was almost complete, and the communication with the surrounding country interrupted. on the evening of the th there came another summons from the enemy's general, declaring that if the place were not surrendered within twenty-four hours the bombardment would commence. the colonel replied as before. in fact, on the th of february a mortar battery opened fire, first on the northern salient, about eight o'clock in the evening. the bombs produced no effect, and in ten hours' bombardment only eight men had been struck, the roof of one of the barracks broken in, and two gun-carriages damaged. the pieces of large calibre mounted on the cavaliers of the bastions of the work did not begin to fire on the mortar battery until daybreak, and silenced it about noon. the enemy appeared then to limit his efforts to the investment; and it was not till the th of february, probably in consequence of news received from the north, that he appeared to decide on a regular siege. perhaps until this moment he had not the needful appliances. on the night of the th, the first parallel was commenced about six hundred yards from the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_ (fig. ), as also the communications between this parallel and the depôts. about two o'clock in the morning the governor sent out a hundred and fifty men, who charged the advanced posts protecting the workmen on the western side of the plateau, and forced their passage through to the trench; put the sappers to rout, took some of their tools, and then, seeing themselves taken in flank, rushed up the slopes of the plateau, and re-entered by the postern of the lower town, protected by the fires of the demi-bastion. on the th of february those who worked by day finished what their comrades, told off for night work, had commenced; and the engineers fixed in the parallel the prolongations of the works of the place, which they were intending to ricochet, with a view to planting the first batteries. by the method in which the besieger was proceeding, colonel dubois and captain allaud had no difficulty in perceiving that they had to do with a methodical enemy, who would conduct his attack according to the rules of the art, and would employ the acknowledged methods of approach against the main work of la roche-pont. the commander of the bavarian engineers, in fact, had drawn out the plan of siege as exhibited in fig. . on the night of the th of february he commenced the ricochet batteries of the first parallel, and the boyaux of communication that were to lead to the second parallel; the works were continued by day. he was intending to direct the siege in the method we are going to describe. on the third night the batteries of the first parallel were completed so as to fire in concert at daybreak. the fourth night, supposing the artillery of the besieged to be silenced, they would commence the second parallel, and the fifth night the counter-batteries parallel and perpendicular to the faces to be cannonaded. the sixth night would be occupied with the continuation of the counter-batteries and the commencement, by sap, of the zigzags about as far as one hundred and sixty yards from the crest of the salient angles of the covered way. during the seventh night the construction of the counter-batteries would be finished, and they would dig the demi-parallels. on the eighth night they would continue to advance by sap in zigzag, and arm the demi-parallel with howitzers and mortars, to commence their fire at daybreak at the same time as the counter-batteries. on the ninth night the sap-fronts would reach the glacis fifty or sixty yards from the salient angles of the covered way, and the zigzags would enter the third parallel, which they would continue by day. on the tenth night the works would be completed, the third parallel should be finished, and batteries of stone mortars planted there. on the eleventh night they were to drive two saps a length of twenty-six or thirty yards, right and left, of the capital (fig. ). they would dig the circular trenches, and then advance straight on the capital by double sap to within range of hand-grenades; twenty-six to thirty yards from the salient of the _places d'armes_. protected by the fire of the third parallel, this work would be continued by day. the twelfth night would be employed in tracing the trench cavalier by means of two saps; these works were to be terminated by day. the thirteenth night, starting from the extremities of the trench cavaliers near the capitals, by double sap, they would crown the salient angles of the covered way. at daybreak these crownings would be finished, and the construction of the counter-batteries commenced. they would get down by means of two saps (fig. ) to the _place d'armes_, to establish a lodgment parallel to the rounding of the ditches. if necessary, they would drive right and left of the crowning two saps which would meet each other in the middle of this crowning. a fourth parallel would, if necessary, be established, on which they would then place the stone mortars of the third parallel. if this fourth parallel was not needed, they would advance from the third parallel by means of a double sap directly upon the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_. the fourteenth night the crowning was to be extended along the branches of the covered way as far as the first traverse. the construction of the counter-batteries, and that of the fourth parallel, would be continued. if this fourth parallel were not required, the saps would reach to the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_, which they would crown. at daybreak the breach batteries would be commenced. on the fifteenth night these works would be completed; then, if they had been obliged to dig a fourth parallel, they would diverge from that in two saps which would unite to form a strong traverse, under shelter of which these saps would reach as far as the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_, which they would crown by extending that crowning right and left. they would then have to commence the descent of the ditch. during the sixteenth night the breach batteries would be terminated, and would begin firing. they would work at the descent of the ditch. if possible, they would get down into the _place d'armes_ to install themselves and plant a battery of stone mortars there. the seventeenth night would be occupied in finishing the descent to the ditch, and they would commence the epaulement of the passage. during the eighteenth night they would begin to make a breach, and advance the passage of the ditch of the breach, which should be effected in the morning. during the nineteenth night they would reconnoitre the breach, and the sappers would render it practicable. they would terminate the epaulements of the passage of the ditch, that the assault might be made next day. thus, according to the plan of the siege, in nineteen times twenty-four hours the place would be in the power of the enemy. the lines were fixed upon, and general werther did not doubt of success, as he did not imagine that la roche-pont could be succoured, and was aware of the weakness of the garrison and the inefficient character of its artillery. nevertheless, these theoretic calculations were somewhat disconcerted by the energy of the defence. colonel dubois had not men enough to act efficiently at a distance; he did his utmost to economise his strength, and contented himself with impeding the works at the commencement with his artillery. this consisted, as we have seen, of-- guns of various calibre twenty-four pounders howitzers mortars field-pieces -- total of ordnance == a dozen stone mortars and rampart rifles formed the rest of the artillery. the arsenal contained also a certain supply of hand-grenades and fireworks. at length, on the th of february, the batteries of the first parallel, to the number of ten, opened their fire. each of them was armed with three guns; the first on the right (of the besieger), à ricochet, raked the covered way in front of the right face of the left bastion (of the besieged). the second swept the right face of the left demi-lune; the third, the left face of the middle demi-lune; the fourth, à ricochet, raked the covered way in front of the left face of the left bastion; the fifth swept the salient of the demi-lune; the sixth swept the right face of that demi-lune; the seventh, à ricochet, raked the covered way in front of the left face of the right bastion; the eighth, à ricochet, raked the left face of the demi-lune in the centre; the ninth swept the left face of the right demi-lune; and the tenth, à ricochet, raked the covered way before the left face of the right bastion. four mortars were mounted between the batteries and , and . captain allaud did not doubt that the principal attack would be directed to the left bastion; he had the gorge of this bastion therefore retrenched during the night. the six twenty-four pounders were placed in battery on the cavaliers of the bastions of the main defence, and well sheltered by traverses and blindages. these six pieces concentrated their fire on the fourth and fifth batteries of the besieger, and succeeded in silencing their fire about noon. then they fired on battery no. , and before night silenced its three guns also. the guns in battery on the cavaliers of the bastions of the work were sufficiently well sheltered not to be in danger from the enemy's projectiles, to which they responded only feebly. but on the night of the th february the plans of the besieger had to be modified. at midnight the colonel ordered five hundred men to arm, put horses to his four field-pieces, whose wheels had been covered with rags and wool, and going out by the left demi-lune, he had two pieces placed on the right and two on the left of the road, two hundred yards in front of the glacis, and, on the road itself, the two howitzers, a hundred yards behind. then he advanced resolutely towards the communicating boyau, between the third and fourth of the enemy's batteries, whose fire had been silenced. the posts offered but a slight resistance; the sappers fled, abandoning the trench, and were pursued to the batteries at the point of the bayonet. [illustration: fig. . the theoretical attack on vauban's work.] the reinforcements then arrived, and the colonel drew back his men quietly, by echelons, to the guns. these then opened a simultaneous fire on the enemy with grape; and the five hundred men advanced once more, and brought back some prisoners, but seeing themselves again attacked by a superior force, fell back. this time the germans did not go beyond their trenches, but contented themselves with a few volleys of grape at random. this skirmish did not last more than half an hour. at one o'clock a.m. captain allaud placed two hundred workmen at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards in front of the face of the left demi-lune no. , crossed by the road, to commence a trench at this point (fig. ). these workmen were protected by a post of one hundred men, and the two howitzers left on the road. this work consisted of two redans, with massive traverse-shelters (see a). it was sufficiently advanced at daybreak to be able to shelter the workmen. when the enemy, who had begun his work again at the trench boyaux, b and c, in order to commence the second parallel, perceived at early dawn the new work executed by the besieged, he hastened to bring the fire of battery no. upon it, for batteries , , and had not yet been remounted. but from the cavaliers of the bastions no. i. and v., six guns in two hours silenced this battery, no. , in spite of the besieger's batteries, and . the day thus passed in cannonading, and the germans could not continue their boyau of communication, b, which was raked by one of the howitzers which the besieged had placed behind the great traverse of the salient of the redan on the left. they had to modify the direction of the trench, and follow the dotted line, _a b_. [illustration: fig. . the third parallel and crowning of the covered-way.] [illustration: fig. .] during the night of the st of february, captain allaud completed his redans, enlarged the traverses, and set up blindages for seven guns; and in the morning the work presented on the inner side the appearance (fig. ). the gun on the left, a, directed its fire on battery no. ; the two guns on the left return, b c, on battery no. ; the pieces d e, of the right return, on battery no. ; and the two pieces f g, of the right face, on battery no. .[ ] but this did not hinder the bastions v., vi., i., ii., and iii. from firing on these batteries. [illustration: fig. .] that same night, however, the besieger had been able to start his second parallel; but he was evidently embarrassed on his right, and was modifying his plan on this side. he seemed to be giving up an attempt on the place by the salient of bastion no. , and was working actively on his left. during the nd of february, the besiegers could not restore battery no. , because the besieged kept up a constant discharge on this point. they succeeded only at nightfall in remounting their guns in batteries and ; and having determined the range before night, discharged the balls of two guns on the salients of the redans. about midnight colonel dubois sent out five hundred men, who, traversing the western ridge of the plateau, attacked battery no. . a few moments afterwards, a second troop of four hundred men attacked the two batteries, and ; and the besieger having been dislodged from battery no. , the first troop of the besieged came and formed in line of musketry between battery no. and the salient of the redan on the right; while fusiliers posted at the trench, a,[ ] and one of the howitzers, swept the ground as far as battery no. , in order to hinder the enemy from taking the sortie in the rear. this operation was completely successful; not only were the works of battery no. damaged, and the three guns with which it was armed (the carriages belonging to these guns, as stated above, were already broken), but around batteries and there was a very sharp struggle which resulted in the germans being repulsed, the guns rendered useless, the munitions scattered, and the gabions and earth-bags thrown down. a body of a hundred men had also been posted by the colonel on the slopes of the plateau to hinder the enemy from making his way along that escarpment to attack the work a. under favour of this sortie, two hundred workmen had been placed by captain allaud along the western ridge of the plateau, to raise a new work, b c d (fig. ), which consisted of three new redans presenting three batteries each for two guns, traced _en crémaillère_, and separated by strong traverses. by the morning of the rd of february the first battery, b, was sufficiently strong to resist projectiles. moreover, this battery could not be immediately attacked by battery no. , which was abandoned, and whose guns were useless. forty-eight hours at least were required to enable the besieger to restore batteries and . batteries and must change their embrasures to direct their fire on this battery b, and only batteries and could sweep the redans a and b. now these batteries, and , received the fire of the two guns of the right face of the right-hand redan, of the two guns of the right face of the bastion ii., of the two guns of the left face of the bastion iii., and of a gun of the right face of the demi-lune . every moment it was necessary to repair the gabionades, and replace the earth-bags; and since the beginning of the day the enemy had had ten artillerymen killed, and as many more wounded, in these two batteries. the german engineer, who had so methodically traced the successive operations of the siege, was evidently embarrassed by the strategy of the besieged. it was in his opinion barbarous, absolutely contrary to rules, and showed an ignorance of, and contempt for the art of fortification, which must end in disaster. [illustration: fig. .] during the night of the rd of february the germans were finishing their second parallel, except in the north-west side. they gave the eastern branch of this parallel an inclination towards the south,[ ] and commenced the batteries , , , , and . battery , of two guns, was to rake the work a. but that same night captain allaud terminated the second battery, c, started the third, d, had an intrenchment made on the ridge of the plateau, and raised an epaulement, e, to sweep the slopes, with a good parados. if the besieged succeeded in finishing and arming these works, the batteries and of the besieger would be taken obliquely, the boyaux of communication would be for the most part raked, and the siege would have to be recommenced. the german general was in a very bad humour, and blamed the commander of the engineers, who, with his plan on the table, endeavoured to show that his siege had been duly arranged, according to all the rules of the art; that the ignorant temerity of these frenchmen could not be foreseen, and that if the germans acted with vigour, they would be made bitterly to repent of thus advancing wedge-like on the flank of the attack; that such a thing had never been seen, and that if they concentrated three batteries on this salient in the air, they would soon crush it. on the morning of the th of february two twenty-four pounders, placed in battery on the left face of bastion viii., opened fire on batteries , , and of the besieger, which they raked, and damaged greatly before they were completely finished. this time the german general proceeded from ill-humour to passion and even menaces; so that the unfortunate officer of the engineers, repairing to these batteries after a violent scene to raise traverses and rectify the line, which he asserted had not been executed conformably to his instructions, had his head broken by a splinter from a gun-carriage. the direction of the engineering was then given to a young officer, who, after a conference with general werther, modified the plan of the attack. during the th of the month there was scarcely any firing on either side, the besieger firing only at long intervals. the french garrison, which was anxious to economise its munitions, scarcely replied, but worked with ardour at perfecting its advanced works on the west. a sortie effected during the night of the th, to ascertain whether the enemy was re-taking possession of batteries , , and , only encountered advanced posts, which retired after a feeble resistance. these three batteries were in the condition to which they had been reduced by the preceding sortie. captain allaud employed the whole of the night in strengthening the batteries b, c, d. they were armed with six guns, which on the morning of the th swept the boyaux of communication and a whole branch of the second parallel. the germans scarcely replied, and seemed to be abandoning their works. they were probably going to try another attack. the colonel was somewhat disquieted at captain allaud's novel strategy, which, in face of a bold assailant, presented grave perils. the calmness of the enemy made him fear some unexpected design; perhaps a strenuous attack on that salient which, if it were taken, would furnish the besiegers with an excellent position for rapidly establishing breach batteries against demi-lune no. i, and bastion ii. this salient therefore must be defended at any cost, since they had been led to establish it in order to disconcert the systematic attack of the germans. moreover, if they lost it, they would probably lose at the same time most of the guns that armed it; and the defence had only a restricted number. thirteen guns armed the advanced work. the two howitzers were placed in battery, one at the extremity of the salient d, pointed at battery no. , the other in the right re-entering _place d'armes_ of the demi-lune no. . two guns were also placed on the right face of the demi-lune; two guns on the front, between the bastions i. and ii., and two guns on the right and left faces of this bastion, to sweep the advanced works if they were taken. in all, nineteen guns and two howitzers. besides, the ridge of the plateau was well defended by a good trench-shelter with traverses, that the work might not be able to be taken by assault in rear by the escarpment. one of the twenty-four pounders was placed in battery in the bastion v. of the main work, in the direction of its capital, to sweep this slope. on the th of february only a few cannon-shots were exchanged. the mortar batteries of the besieger concentrated their fire on the western redan, without doing much damage; but during the night of the th the fire of the bombs was so incessant that it became difficult to labour at these works. it continued during the th, but the besieged dismounted three of these mortars with the guns left on the bastions ii. and iii. the besieged on his side placed the two mortars in battery on the front between these two bastions, and sent projectiles into the batteries and . during the th of the month (the weather being clear) the enemy was seen to be erecting three batteries on the north-west, evidently directed against the batteries a, b, c, d, to crush them. they could not reply to their fire; the colonel therefore decided that they should bring back into the town temporarily the six guns of the batteries b, c, d. the bombs continued to fall into the works during the whole night of the th; and on the morning of the th the fire of the three batteries of the enemy, erected six hundred and fifty yards behind the abandoned battery no. , was opened against the redans b, c, d; it lasted the whole night of the th, damaged the blindages very severely, and threw down the traverses. on the morning of the th the _crémaillère_ ceased to be tenable, but the work a had not been seriously injured. the howitzer placed at d had been brought back behind the great traverse f surmounted with a banquette. about nine o'clock the enemy resumed possession of the battery no. , installed four field-pieces there in spite of the fire of the bastions i. and ii., and threw an assaulting column against the damaged works d, c, b. this was what the colonel anticipated. the column encountered the fire of the three guns left in the redans a, the howitzer, and a front of fusiliers posted on the great traverse f. bending to the right and defiling below the crest of the plateau, this column was able to seize the work b, c, d, without excessive loss; and, sheltered behind the ruins of the earthworks, it was able to keep its ground there while the field-pieces of the battery no. cleared off the defenders of the great traverse f. the colonel, however, had brought in again the guns left in work a, and gave orders to his men to fall back. but at this juncture, from the demi-lune no. , the bastions i. and ii. and the curtain between these bastions, twenty-two guns and some stone mortars poured a tremendously heavy fire into the abandoned work, inflicting very serious loss on the besieger, who was endeavouring to hold his ground there. this cannonade lasted till noon. the colonel, supposing the enemy to be giving way, sallied forth at the head of eight hundred men and fell on the posts which the germans had begun to fortify. he had his attack sustained by the two howitzers. the work was retaken, but not without the loss of about a hundred men. the great point was to keep it. about two o'clock two field-pieces conveyed behind the ruined epaulements of batteries and , and the four of battery no. , once more overwhelmed the salient with small bombs, balls, and grape. the bastions i., ii., and iii. replied immediately, and dismounted some of the enemy's pieces, which were ill-protected by the battered-down epaulements. the colonel made his men lie down behind the traverses c, b, f, and awaited a second assault; which was in fact attempted about four o'clock, as the enemy believed the outwork was once more abandoned. the assaulting columns passed the first epaulement; but as soon as they found themselves in the last redan, d, they were received by a discharge of muskets almost at arm's length, from behind the traverse c (fig. ), followed by a bayonet charge; this time two hundred germans remained on the field, and the remains of the assaulting column fell back in disorder to the batteries, which recommenced firing and went on till nightfall. the besieged remained masters of the place, but under the converging fire of the enemy they could not maintain this wedge-shaped and badly flanked position. there was no advantage in keeping it, sufficient to compensate for the loss they would suffer in resisting fresh attacks. however, the colonel was unwilling to abandon the redans without cost to the enemy. the evening was employed in charging three powder-mines under the salients a and b, and raising earthworks to protect themselves as well as they could. all this night of the th of february the bombs fell thick on the outwork: the men were still tolerably protected on the _débris_ of the blindages. on the morning of the st of march the german artillery recommenced firing on the redans more briskly than the day before, from the three batteries behind and from battery no. . the colonel withdrew his men into the town, and left only one platoon, well sheltered, with orders to fire the mines only when the enemy thought himself covered by the epaulement of the redan a, and was endeavouring to take up his position there. [illustration: fig. .--attack on the works of counter-approach.] the st of march passed by without a new assault being attempted by the besiegers. "they will try it to-night," thought colonel dubois. he went back about seven o'clock in the evening into the salient, to make certain that the train was well laid; and to encourage his men, he reinforced them with twenty fusiliers, enjoining upon them, when they saw their enemy, to make such a pretence of defending themselves as should be sufficient to draw him on; but to fall back promptly after setting fire to the train. the bombardment was recommenced about eight o'clock, but at ten ceased for a time; and the colonel, who had ascended the cavalier of bastion ii., thought the enemy was about to make a fresh attempt. in fact, notwithstanding the darkness of the night, he saw black masses spreading successively through the works d, c, and b[ ]. on arriving at the traverse f, they were received by a volley of musketry, to which they responded by a well-sustained fire. a mass of the enemy might be seen moving along the traverse f, and halting outside the redans a. at this moment three successive explosions were heard which made the ground tremble, succeeded by loud cries. the order was given: from the demi-lune no. . and bastions i. and ii., all the pieces fired together on the outwork for half an hour; after which two hundred men of the garrison sallied forth and rushed on the enemy. the outwork contained only dead and wounded. captain allaud then went out in his turn with two hundred volunteer workmen, to fill up the trenches and destroy obstacles as far as possible. about midnight the bombs fell once more on the corner of the defence, and orders were given to retire within the fortress, so as to avoid unnecessary loss. the siege had lasted twelve days, and the second parallel, which ought to have been terminated on the sixth day, was not finished. the garrison reckoned about a hundred and fifty men killed and wounded; but they had inflicted more serious losses on the besiegers. general werther found the affair a very tedious one, and was much annoyed. some royalists, who had mansions in the faubourg on the other side of the river abonne, were on very friendly terms with the troops of the coalition, and manifested their impatience and anger against "this handful of _brigands_" who were holding the upper town and prolonging a useless struggle. the german general was very anxious to come to terms with the garrison: four hundred of his men were already _hors de combat_, and he thought this a great expenditure in taking this "nest," which was supposed to be without a garrison or munitions. the news he had lately received from the north was more encouraging, but he was urged to finish the business. one of the most zealous of the royalists, who were constantly in the german camp, proposed therefore to pay a visit to the governor, to inform him that napoleon's armies were retreating at every point, that the capture of paris was imminent, that the bourbons would soon return amid the acclamations of the whole of france, and to urge the uselessness of a longer defence. general werther readily acceded to the proposal, and on the nd of march, baron de x*** presented himself at the outpost with a german envoy. the colonel received the german officer and the baron in a room in one of the ruined barracks. the german envoy first asked for an exchange of prisoners. this was readily granted by the colonel. then the baron de x*** began in his turn to explain the object of his visit. scarcely had he begun when the colonel stopped him: "i do not know, and do not desire to know, sir, whether you come here to speak for yourself alone or as the representative of a certain number of your countrymen; but i will answer you briefly and clearly. i am here on the authority of superior orders to defend the place against the enemies of the country. the political inducements which you urge have not the slightest weight with me. i utterly ignore them. i shall not surrender the place unless compelled by force or ordered to do so by the emperor's government. permit me to add, sir, that the part you are performing to-day is not an honourable one. what do you think of it, _monsieur le capitaine_?" added he, turning to the german officer. the latter merely bowed slightly. "the prisoners shall be exchanged this very day, if you desire it, man for man," said the colonel, rising. "as to you, sir, if you had not come here protected by a flag of truce, i should have you tried, and probably shot before the garrison, ere sunset." and dismissing his two visitors, the governor enjoined on the officer commissioned to accompany them back to the outposts not to allow them to have any communication with anyone. the besieger from this day forwards was but slow in carrying on his approach works; he contented himself with terminating the second parallel and setting up three batteries of six pieces each, which opened fire on the th of march upon the faces right and left of bastions ii. and iii., and on the left face of demi-lune no. , with the evident intention of making a breach at four hundred yards' distance. three mortar batteries covered the works with bombs. the germans were evidently intending to keep the garrison occupied, and put it out of heart; waiting the chance of political events to put the place in their hands. of the four thousand men under general werther's command, and who had been reduced to three thousand four hundred by the losses sustained, it was necessary to send one thousand to troyes; only two thousand five hundred men therefore remained before la roche-pont. besides, the general had received orders to run no risks, but limit himself to a surveillance of the passages from the saône to the marne, and blockading the garrison of la roche-pont, keeping it sufficiently employed to prevent its taking the offensive, but without losing men in the capture of so insignificant a place. on the other hand, the royalists of the lower town were constantly predicting the end of hostilities and the return of the bourbons. on the th of march news was received at headquarters that napoleon had received a check before laon, that marmont's force had been routed, and that the allied troops were in full march on paris. the royalists thought that the moment had come for another application to general werther to induce him to complete the capture. they were anxious to be the first in burgundy to declare for the bourbons, and the cautious deliberation of the general of the allied troops exasperated them. he, too, would have liked to get possession of the place before the anticipated cessation of hostilities. he therefore sent another envoy to colonel dubois, to give him the latest news of the armies of the coalition, to inform him that the allies were just about to enter paris, which was now without defence, and to summon him to surrender in order to avoid a useless effusion of blood; and to say that if he refused to capitulate he must expect rigorous measures, which he, general werther, would rather avoid, and of which the governor alone would have to bear the responsibility. colonel dubois' answer was exactly the same as before. he said he could not capitulate, as his defences remained entire. during the night of the th of march, two mortar batteries were planted on the hill slopes of the right bank, and opened fire in the evening on the faubourg of the left bank. the _flèche_ which served as a _tête du pont_ was broken down by the shells. the german general thought he should thus induce the townspeople to insist on the governor's promptly capitulating. some of the houses in this faubourg caught fire, and the inhabitants took refuge in the upper town. the garrison could not respond to the fire of the mortar batteries, as they had no more guns of large calibre. the six twenty-four pounders were employed to oppose the enemy's batteries on the north, and they could not disarm the bastions on this side. to complete their distress typhus broke out among the wounded in the _cité_. provisions, too, were becoming scarce, and the garrison was placed on half rations. on the plateau the cannonade on both sides was continuing, and the escarpments of the two bastions ii. and iii. were much damaged. as the enemy found nothing more to destroy or burn in the lower town on the right bank, he began his approaches on the th of march, and established a demi-parallel with two fresh batteries during the night (of the th and following day), of four guns each. this was, however, not accomplished without difficulty, for these batteries were only three hundred yards from the faces of bastions ii. and iii., whose cavaliers still preserved three guns of large calibre. but on the th and th of march twenty-six guns were brought to bear against the works, and succeeded in throwing down the parapets and dismounting the guns of the besieged. during the night of the th of march, the colonel endeavoured to mount the cannon that still remained to him; but these pieces of small calibre could effect nothing against the enemy's works. however, the breaches made in the salients of demi-lune no. and of bastion ii., were not practicable; and the colonel, wishing to reserve the little artillery he had left, for the moment of assault, retrenched the gorge of bastion ii., withdrew its cannon within the fortification and waited the issue. not to keep his soldiers idle he occupied them at night in trifling sorties which fatigued the besieger. he kept the covered ways in good repair as far as the enemy's fire allowed, and prepared camouflets and _chicanes_ for the moment when the assailant should try to ascend the counterscarp. on the th of march the third parallel was finished. the place was thenceforth only defended by musketry, and a few stone mortars, and grenades, which small sallying parties threw into the trenches at night. the approaches to crown the covered way and set up breach batteries were advancing but slowly, thanks to the activity of the garrison, whose courage seemed redoubled in seeing the enemy approaching and which defended its glacis foot by foot. on the st of april came the news of the capitulation of paris, the abdication of the emperor, and the order to suspend hostilities. the garrison was allowed to retire to nevers, through auxonne, beaune, autun and château-chinon. on the th of april colonel dubois quitted la roche-pont at the head of seven hundred soldiers of all arms, who were all the able-bodied men left him. footnotes: [footnote : see for the numbers of the enemy's batteries, fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] [footnote : see fig. .] chapter xvii. _conclusion._ notwithstanding its bastioned enclosure and great outwork which was still existing in , exactly as vauban had planned it, the town of la roche-pont could not have held out forty-eight hours before the german artillery. a few batteries to the north, on the plateau, and on the west and east on the sides of the hills placed at nearly two miles distant would have overwhelmed the place with projectiles without a possibility of replying; for in september the small arsenal of la roche-pont contained only six cast iron guns, and four bronze pieces with smooth bore, two thousand pounds of powder and two or three hundred solid balls. it was not attacked, though bodies of the enemy showed themselves not far from its walls. its garrison consisted then of a guard of the engineers and a brigade of gendarmes. the inhabitants of la roche-pont are, however, patriotic, and mention with pride the numerous sieges they have experienced. they had organized their national guard as early as august, including an artillery corps. it is true they had not been able to supply these national guards with more than a hundred flint guns which were lying in the citadel, and about thirty muzzle-loading guns. these brave people were not less determined to defend themselves, and began to cast bullets and make cartridges. they had not the pain of seeing the germans there. in , a french captain of engineers, having been in general bourbaki's army, had entered switzerland with the _débris_ of the corps. captain jean had received a bullet in his breast, not far from the frontier, and had been taken up by some peasants in the environs of pontarlier, and saved by some swiss custom house officers who had conveyed him to lausanne, where he had received the most careful attention. we might give a touching account of that sad period of our disasters; and indeed we must write it if it is to be on record at all, for the swiss are not the people to make a parade of the zealous kindness they displayed on this occasion in saving our harassed, famished, and frozen soldiers. peasants and townspeople set out amid the snows of the jura, to guide and to give shelter to our disbanded and wandering regiments. some sacrificed their lives in this service of humanity, and emulated each other in offering an asylum and giving assistance to our exhausted soldiers. the behaviour of these excellent people has excited universal admiration. captain jean was living at lausanne when monsieur n.... an officer on half pay happened to be there. his medical attendants thought that the climate would contribute to the cure of the wounded man, who had obtained a congé in the hope of regaining health under the clement skies of this part of the lake of geneva. his sister had come to join him and was doing all for his cure that the tenderest affection could suggest. his strength was however not returning and alarming symptoms continued. captain jean was from la roche-pont; he was on intimate terms with monsieur n.... and the conversation often turned on the recent war and the resources which through ignorance or inability had not been employed; and they frequently spoke of this beautiful province of burgundy, placed on the flank of the invasion, and which was so well adapted to mask and protect an offensive movement, if they had had an army of reserve with its right supported by besançon and its left by dijon, and abundantly supplied from the basins of the rhône and the saône. the captain used to employ his leisure in studying the defence of his dear little town whose history he knew so well and which he deemed a strategic position of some importance. monsieur n.... spent nearly a month in the company of this amiable and well-informed man, whose feelings were deeply affected by our disasters; but whose active mind sought in these misfortunes themselves a means of instruction, and an opportunity for developing the resources and advantages peculiar to france. this was an inexhaustible subject of conversation for the two friends, and they would continue talking till the sister interposed her authority as nurse to enjoin silence and rest. in december , monsieur n.... received the following letter at paris, accompanied by a bundle of papers. "lausanne, _december th, _. "sir, "my dearly loved brother died in my arms the day before yesterday, his death being the result of his wound and also perhaps of grief for our late disasters,--deeply affected as he was by the indelible recollection of the sufferings he had witnessed. "he retained his consciousness to the last, and i am fulfilling one of his most urgent requests in sending you these papers. it is the only souvenir he can bequeath to you--as he said to me the day before his death--of the hours you so kindly devoted to a poor invalid. "my brother often spoke to me of you; you were able to appreciate his excellencies and noble character, and will receive his bequest, i doubt not, as a mark of the profound esteem he had for you. "as for myself i cannot quit a neighbourhood where i have lived with my brother, and where we have met with so much sympathy." _extracts from captain jean's papers._ attack implies a shock or onset; defence is a resistance to this onset. whether a piece of ordnance discharges a ball against a plate of iron, or a casing of masonry, or an earthwork; or an assaulting column climbs a breach, the problem is substantially the same; in either case we have to oppose to the impulsive force a resistance that will neutralise its effect. when there were no projectile weapons, or their range was inconsiderable, only a normal resistance had to be opposed to the shock--a man to a man--or if the effect was to be rendered certain, two men to one. but when projectile arms acquired a longer range, the _position_ of the attack and defence became a question of importance. thus were evolved for combatants in open ground the elements of tactics, and for fortification, arrangements of a more and more complicated character. it is evident, for example, that when it came to a close engagement--a hand-to-hand struggle with an adversary; if the latter found himself placed behind a circular enclosure, the obstacle that protected him would give him a considerable advantage--an advantage that could only be compensated for by renewing the attack. [illustration: fig. .] to make this very simple principle intelligible at a glance, suppose (fig. ) a circular enclosure containing forty defenders separated from each other about a yard apart; a hand-to-hand struggle can only be carried on with a number equal to that of the defenders--or nearly so--and these under cover. it is no use for the assailants to assemble as at _a_, they can only present a front equal to that of the defence, and if this is energetic, the triangle _a_, _b_, _c_, will be effective only at _c_. [illustration: fig. .] but let us suppose the attacking body to possess projectile arms (fig. ), and instead of encountering the circular enclosure, the assailants to set up their engines between _a_ and _b_ within fair range. they will overwhelm the segment _d_, _c_, _e_, of the circle with projectiles, while the defenders will be able to oppose only an inferior number of engines to the convergent fire. [illustration: fig. .] to compensate in part for this inferiority the defending party adds appendages to the enclosure (fig. a), which allow an almost equal front of defence to be opposed to the attacking front, as regards the number of projectile weapons, and very superior in point of elevation and protection. but the attacking force will thus naturally arrange its engines as seen at b. thus the projectiles sent from _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, converge upon the salient c. the defence adds the new appendages d d, and if the engines are well protected, it can make the projectiles _g_, _h_, _i_, converge on the engine k and crush it, secondly the projectiles _l_, _g_, _h_, on engine _m_ and destroy it, and so on. besides, these appendages have the further advantage of giving side views over the circumvallation itself and masking its foot. this principle regulates and will always regulate attack and defence; distances alone modify its applications. the more eccentric the defence is, the more distant must be the attack, and the wider the perimeter it must occupy; but it should be observed, that the more widely the defence is extended, the more open its flanks are to attack; these flanks therefore must also be capable of being defended, for every obstacle that offers only its own resisting force, without being protected by the action of a neighbouring obstacle, is soon destroyed. whether fortifications or plans of battle are in question, the same principle comes into play. "every part should defend its neighbour and be defended by it." it is clear that the solution of the problem becomes more and more difficult in proportion to the enlargement of the range of projectile weapons, and the extent of fronts of fortification or lines of battle. vauban, and most of the engineers who were his rivals and successors, had resolved the problem in view of the range of the artillery of the period. suppose a hexagon (fig. ), fortified according to vauban's first method, it is evident that all the parts of the circumference of one thousand, and even one thousand eight hundred yards, are commanded by the curtains, the faces of the bastions and the demi-lunes. if the fortress stands in a level country, the enemy cannot occupy any point in that circumference without being exposed to its fire. to raise his first parallel and first batteries, he would have to begin his works at the limit of the range of the rampart guns; and, as we saw in fig. , he must erect these batteries sufficiently near the place to enable their fire to tell upon the defences--_i.e._, at eight or nine hundred yards. at this distance the curtains could be swept, the faces and flanks raked, and the parapets thrown down. as the projectiles reached either point blank, or under an angle of about ° when the ball rebounded, the besieged could protect himself against it for a very considerable time, and keep his own artillery intact. [illustration: fig. .] but as the range of siege pieces in the present day extends to eight or nine thousand yards, the conditions both for the besieged and the besieger are very different. hence (fig. ) the enemy raises his batteries on two or three fronts of the circumference, taking advantage of the rise in the ground, a wall, or a wood to protect his works, and when all is ready, he unmasks these batteries, and covers a segment of the fortress with a quantity of explosive projectiles, which, reaching it at an angle of ° to ° burst, no matter where--_dans le tas_, to use a common expression--the distance not allowing an aim at flanks or faces in particular--the besieger being in fact unable to distinguish them. supposing the besieged able to maintain his artillery and reply, exposed as he is to the deluge of iron on his face and flanks, he has to aim at eccentric points which may vary, to whose position he has no clue but the smoke of the guns, and at an enemy, who, taking advantage of an indefinite amount of space to make his arrangements and shelter his men, is completely free. but to maintain his artillery and preserve his men and munitions, the besieged has only a space relatively limited to move in; he is soon encumbered with _débris_ of all kinds, every movement is difficult for him, and he has not even room to repair damages. he tires himself out to no great purpose. if the attack has maintained its fire at a long range for several days, it has introduced such confusion into a great part of the defences, that in two or three nights afterwards the first parallel may be commenced at about one thousand yards, it may be well armed and protected by batteries _en retraite_ and trench-shelters, so as to discourage sorties and allow of an advance to crown the covered ways. in what state are the works of the besieged by this time? the flanks of the bastions are as much damaged as their faces, the demi-lunes are untenable, and the ditches partly filled up; disorder and confusion prevail on all sides. no breach is practicable, certainly; but all the works are seriously injured on three or four fronts, and at one thousand yards distance, a breach may be made, and that a wide one. the garrison may sustain the assault to the last, and sell the possession of the _débris_ of its work dearly; but in this case the final result is not doubtful. [illustration: fig. .] in proportion to the length of the trajectory, therefore, the defence must remove its defensive arrangement from the centre of the place. [illustration: fig. .] if each front of vauban's defence was about four hundred yards in length, it ought to be from thirteen to fourteen thousand yards now (fig. ). that is to say, the side of the hexagon which was four hundred yards--_i.e._, from one salient of a bastion to another--should be fourteen hundred yards. let a be the main body of the fortress--on a plain suppose; forts will be erected at b and c, the zone of action of each of these works being eight thousand yards, they will protect each other and cross their fires without the possibility of their projectiles falling into the fortress if any of them should be in the power of the enemy. [illustration: fig. .] fig. presents the block plan of each of those forts b and c, to whose interior arrangements we shall return. but by this excessive lengthening of the _capitals_, the forts b (fig. ), may be swept along the whole extent of the arc of a circle _a b_ (more than the third of the circumference); they occupy the points of a triangle, and if one of them were taken the enemy would be able to batter two of the forts c. it is therefore necessary, with an extended radius, to multiply the defences, and to enable them to protect each other in a more effective manner. this is the method indicated in fig. . here we have a dodecagon. the forts of the outer zone are seven thousand yards apart, and the works, a, flank each other; a second zone of forts b commands the latter, if required, and the zone of action of these second works extends beyond the outer line of forts. railways are required to connect the forts of each zone, and to put them in communication with the body of the place. this extension of the fields of defence may, according to the nature of the ground, be divided into two zones with a central nucleus. [illustration: fig. .] the interior zone would consist of permanent works, forming an _enceinte de préservation_; a line of forts at intervals sufficiently strengthened, in case of war, by field works. the exterior zone would be fixed by occupying strategic points well chosen and considered beforehand, forming small camps protected by temporary works, and affording security to a numerous army, whose manoeuvres the enemy could not espy. the expenditure entailed by such a system of defence is unquestionably enormous. but as respects this question there is to all appearance an unwillingness to realize exactly the new state of things produced by artillery of long range. the expenditure involved in the successive systems of defence from ancient times downwards has been a continually increasing one. the wall built round paris by philippe-augustus, would not cost, the running yard, as much as that of charles v.; the latter, again, must have been less expensive than the bastioned fronts of louis xiii., and these again would be far from necessitating the outlay (_i.e._ estimated by the running yard, and reckoning detached forts) occasioned by the fortification of paris under louis philippe. similarly the mounting of four or five trebuchets, and the movable towers required for attacking a fortified place before fire artillery was employed, cost less than the manufacture of the artillery used at the siege of turin in . the latter again would be far less costly than the french and english artillery at the siege of sebastopol. whereas at the time when smooth-bore guns were used a place might be attacked with about sixty pieces, five times the quantity are needed now; since it is necessary to operate over a much more extensive area. war is therefore a game which tends to become more and more costly, and especially siege warfare. are we then to conclude that nations will become disgusted with warfare on account of the frightful expense it involves? this is not probable. at the present day, as in times past, that which costs most is defeat. with forty millions well laid out in france, before the war of , and from forty to eighty millions spent in the war itself, we probably should not have had to pay the four hundred millions which this war cost us, and we should not have lost two provinces which are certainly worth still more than that sum. parsimony in military preparations, in times of serious change, such as ours, is ruinous. the principles to be followed may be summed up as follows: commit yourself to no superfluous outlay, but spend all that is necessary. besides, is it after all certain that a good system of territorial defence is so costly as some allege? is it a question of building something like a chinese wall on our eastern frontier? is it likely that if a few strong positions rendered impregnable without unnecessary works enabled us to keep an army of observation two hundred thousand strong, secure from any surprise in the elevated valleys bounded by the ranges of hills which stretch from the jura along belfort, remiremont, epinal, langres and dijon, and border the right bank of the saône as far as lyons, the germans would be in a hurry to make their way a second time to paris? if they experienced the slightest check on such a route, if they were obliged even to halt, what would become of them? the essential consideration therefore is a good choice of positions; shelter from the approach of an invasion on the flanks, and the avoidance of enormous expenditure in the attempt to defend all points. let us suppose that metz had been rendered impregnable, or at least so provided with defences that it could have held out for six months; and certainly the thing was possible. in the first place we should not have lost that town, and secondly the war, notwithstanding our deficiencies in soldiers and in artillery, might have taken quite another turn. greater sacrifices on the part of the enemy, more prudence, and a still greater loss of men, would have been required to constrain us to a peace accepted before the cannon's mouth. war is made now a-days with armies a million strong; this is all very well while the invading force meets no very serious obstacle, either in front of it or on its flanks; when the combinations which such a vast display of forces necessitates are not disturbed at any point, and when the strategic operations upon the ground succeed each other with perfect precision, as one might trace them on a map in our studies. but these enormous agglomerations of men could give rise in a single day to appalling perils, after a grave check on one of their flanks. such masses can be advanced, fed, and manoeuvred only by means of a very complicated, and therefore delicate and easily deranged machinery. the germans asserted that by the possession of alsace and a part of lorraine we had a hold upon germany. now their country is almost dove-tailed into france. the future will show whether that will greatly benefit them. in and we saw what could be accomplished by the little fortress of belfort; which was perhaps the only one among our strong places possessing guns of long range, and a garrison well commanded and determined to defend itself. it persisted in maintaining the offensive over a circle of from twelve to sixteen miles, thanks to a few rifled cannon with which the ramparts were furnished, and which protected sorties through a radius of three to four miles. for a month it hindered the planting of siege batteries; and, in spite of a bombardment of seventy-three days, the town had only four of its houses burned. this defence is instructive, and shows that the old defensive system has had its day. during the siege the batteries of the besieged hardly suffered at all, and had recourse to indirect firing--that is, they fired over the barracks from the gorge of the castle without seeing the mark, but regulating by observation. this indirect firing, which took no account of the plan of the crests of the defence, and which thus enabled a powerful fire to be directed to any point, without regarding the faces, produced a great effect on the batteries of the enemy, who, on his side, could not see these guns, and did not know how to regulate his fire. the question, therefore, remains undecided; and, though a long range enables the attack to envelope each work more decidedly with its fires, each battery of the besieger may be subjected to the fire of a greater number of guns by the defence. at paris, the forts which are by no means planned in view of the present long range, enabled a weak and inexperienced garrison, whose _morale_ was none of the firmest, to execute sorties with success to a distance of two miles and a half.[ ] with good troops, then, we might have raised in one night, works which would have enabled us to resume the offensive, and to push further on, to break the line of contravallation, and seriously to embarrass the besieger. it is not therefore proved that long ranges give a greater advantage to the attack than to the defence, while, on the other hand, the long range of rifled cannon may be affirmed to be favourable to the defence; but it would be so only on the condition of the works being planned in view of the new action of artillery, and not according to old traditions, however glorious. the destructive power of explosive projectiles puts obstacles in the way of the besieger's approaches; and, in fact, during the late war we never saw employed that old mode of approach with a view to attacking by breach and crossing the ditch. the germans were not so stupid as to employ these classical methods. they took up their position on favourable and often commanding points, at three thousand eight hundred to four thousand two hundred yards around our fortresses, which adhered to the old defensive system adapted to ranges of two thousand two hundred yards at most; and covered with shells our works and the towns they were supposed to protect, without risk to a single sapper. we thought that odious and unreasonable; like those nobles of the fifteenth century, who thought it an abominable shame that their feudal nests should be breached with bombards, and declared that the trade of war was thereby damaged. but suppose we should some day condescend to practical consideration, when these old flanked fronts fall into disesteem, and the new generation of military engineers determine to admit that we have to do with artillery of long range, and to take advantage of the fact, a certain degree of superiority might be doubtless given to defence over attack. how ought these isolated forts, which are destined to replace the salients of our old fortresses, to be planned? they should afford ample space for a large number of fires--even indirect fires--in case of need; consequently extended faces and short flankings--that is, as shallow as possible, and perfectly open gorges. they should efficiently protect the works of counter-approach, and consider defence at close quarters as a question of only secondary importance; for very seldom would there be occasion for it, if indeed the case ever presented itself, which is doubtful. [illustration: fig. .] referring to the general defensive system shown in fig. , and required the plan of one of the forts, a, the result will be fig. , giving the work at the lower level at c, and at the level of the batteries at d. the counterscarp should be cased up to at least sixteen or seventeen feet above the bottom of the ditch. the escarp should be made with tipped earth. the masonry works should all be covered and secured from being enfiladed; they form casemates inside e. beneath the terracings, powder magazines, f, and the passages communicating with the _oiseaux_ or lower _orillons_, g, protected by the counterscarp and the covered way, and which are used only if the enemy attempts to pass the ditch. the faces and flanks on the outside are planned on angles sufficiently obtuse to cross their fires. the two faces in the plan (fig. ) may be armed with eight guns and the flanks with six guns. this work is separated from that of the gorge by a traverse that efficiently protects this gorge, which possesses its flanks, armed with four guns and its orillons. from the work of the gorge is a communication into the fort by a covered caponnière, forming traverse in the direction of the _capital_ or centre line. the gorge is defended by a curtain for the riflemen, and, at need, for small pieces of artillery. at need also, on the terre-plein of the work of the gorge may be mounted guns of long range, affording an indirect fire in the circumference of a semi-circle, over the great traverse h, if the parapets of the faces are damaged by the fire of the enemy. fausse-braies consisting of palings are fixed in the ditch at ten feet from the base of the escarp, to hinder the fallen _débris_ of the escarp from filling up the ditch, and to enable its passage to be defended. the well-covered internal masonry works prevent the accumulation of earth on the interior platforms, and afford casemates, which enable the garrison to take rest in perfect security; at any rate along the two faces and the great traverse. blindages can be set up on the traverses of the batteries, and can be easily repaired every night, as well as the escarp of tipped earth. it would be difficult to say how many projectiles it would require to render such a work untenable; since we have seen in the siege of paris, that a marine battery erected on tipped earth on the military road between the forts of rosny and de noisy, armed with three guns, had been a mark for the german shells during twenty-four days, without any of its guns having been dismounted, or its escarp suffering more than could be made good each night. permanent works should, however, only be established with the utmost circumspection:-- . because they require a very considerable outlay. . because they are necessarily familiar to, and for a long while studied by the enemy, who takes his measures accordingly. the important point is to possess an accurate acquaintance with the ground to be defended, and only to establish permanent works in second line, and on points incontestably favourable for defence, supposing an artillery of even a still longer range than the present. every centre to be defended should therefore possess works sufficient to prevent a surprise; and in addition at a distance of six to eight thousand yards, a line of forts, crossing their fires if possible, or at any rate connected by strong batteries; and lastly, at a distance of about four thousand yards, positions previously examined and known, suitable for placing very simple works of field fortification, but which at a given moment may offer a resistance sufficient to permit movements on a grand scale--and delay the formation of an enemy's batteries. [illustration: fig. .--defensive system of the great intrenched camp.] in applying these principles to the defence of the town of la roche-pont, whose strategical position is one of major importance, since it connects besançon with dijon, and forms a salient on the flanks of an army which manoeuvres from epinal and from vesoul upon langres and chaumont, it would be necessary to construct around this place, whose old fortifications are no longer of any value (fig. ) eight forts, a, on the brows of the plateaus which surround the town, and thirteen batteries or redoubts, b, a little behind or to command the meeting of the river abonne with the saône and enfilade the valleys. thus the group of roads which from the point c lead to langres and champlitte, from d to dijon and beaune, from e to besançon and dôle, from f to gray and from g to saint-jean-de-losne, would be occupied. a _tête du pont_ h, protected by batteries which would dominate the saône, would enable an army to manoeuvre on both banks. this passive defence would occupy a perimeter of forty miles, and the zone of action of the permanent works, a perimeter of sixty miles. the purely passive defence would require, for the eight forts, four thousand eight hundred men; for the thirteen batteries two thousand men; for the guard of the intermediary trenches and the service of the _enceinte de préservation_, not including the forts and batteries, eighteen thousand men; reserve in the fortress, two thousand five hundred men; total, twenty-seven thousand three hundred men, whilst the effective investment would require an army of one hundred thousand men. but if this great intrenched camp contained an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men in addition to the troops necessary for the passive defence, this army could besides, on a very extended perimeter or on some advantageous points, occupy within the zone of action of the forts, an _enceinte de combat_ defended by field works, which would enable it to assume the offensive at the opportune moment. the armament of the forts would consist of a hundred and sixty guns of large calibre, and that of the batteries of forty-five guns of long range. with the reserve park this would give a total of two hundred and thirty pieces of ordnance. harnessed guns would be also necessary to support the trenches of the passive defence. each fort would cost about £ , . the eight together £ , each battery or redoubt would cost about £ , . the thirteen together , -------- total £ , ======== to make head against an invasion at all points at once has always been a difficult problem to solve; and it is still more so if we confine ourselves to the defensive, for the enemy starts from a base of operation with a view to concentrating himself upon a point unknown to the defenders. the latter has therefore only a line to oppose to the apex of a triangle of action. he must limit himself to preserving the heart of the country and certain districts that are already naturally protected, and which allow him to operate on the flanks of the invading forces; regions behind which lie extensive tracts of country from which supplies may be drawn. let us suppose that on the zone of defence of which la roche-pont forms the centre, an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled, which was able to reach belfort through besançon or by the road from vesoul to langres through gray or châtillon-sur-seine through dijon, these towns of besançon, vesoul, langres, and dijon being themselves in a condition to arrest the enemy's advance: the latter in attempting to make his way to paris would be obliged either to watch this zone with an army of three hundred thousand men, or to move, and that with extreme caution, along the lunéville and nancy routes. if a defensive zone of the same importance is disposed on the north, a point becomes very dangerous, especially if the capital is provided with an _enceinte de préservation_, and an _enceinte de combat_ allowing an army to manoeuvre. three hundred thousand men therefore would be required to watch the defensive zone of burgundy and the same number that of the north, and four hundred thousand men to invest paris; total, one million, without reckoning the troops required for keeping open the communication between the three armies and guarding the base of operations. it follows that the slightest check might entail a serious disaster. as the army of metz under the ramparts of the town was not able to manoeuvre, the two hundred thousand men employed in blockading it were rendered inactive for two months. if the french army had been able to move within a perimeter of miles, with a good supply of provisions, it would have reduced three hundred thousand men to inaction; since the germans, who leave nothing to chance, reckon--and not unreasonably--that on the field it is desirable to be at least two to one. it would seem then that the art of war now-a-days--as far as resistance to an invader is concerned--consists not in endeavouring to defend any extensive lines which may be taken or outflanked, but in establishing a small number of centres of defence, sufficiently remote from each other and connected by a system of railways in the rear; which are capable of holding out long, and which compel the enemy either to divide in order to watch them or to take them, or to expose his flanks to an attack if he leaves them alone, or to see himself cut off from his base of operations if he advances _en masse_ against one of them without covering himself against the others.... but we must confess to a limited confidence in fortifications on this immense scale. it is certain that they are ruinous: it is not certain that they are effective in proportion to the enormous expense they occasion. the men-at-arms of the fifteenth century cased themselves and their horses in iron to resist crossbow bolts, lance-thrusts, and strokes of axe or sword. fire artillery, which at first aimed at nothing more than substituting powder for the mechanism of engines worked by counterpoise or ropes, and like these discharged only stone balls, becomes improved and uses iron balls and leaden bullets; and instead of being ponderous and fixed as formerly, moves on wheels and is rendered easily manageable, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century places pistols and arquebusses in the hands of foot-soldiers and horsemen. what plan do the men-at-arms adopt? they thicken the plates of their armour and line them so thoroughly that they are no longer fit for a charge. this method lasts about fifty years, until it is perceived that the best way to enable cavalry to face artillery, so as not to be crushed by it, is to allow it to move rapidly. cannon are made whose balls pierce through and through the wooden planks of a vessel. immediately these planks are cased with iron. to-day's balls are resisted by the vessel's sides. the plates of iron are doubled ... and forthwith the penetrating force of the projectiles is increased; but those of the next day pierce them. steel is made to take the place of iron: but after thousands upon thousands have been spent the projectile has always the best of it. but it happens in a naval engagement that an admiral steams at full speed right athwart an enemy's ship and sinks it! in fact it is by rapidity of movement and facility in manoeuvring that victories at sea are ensured much more than by increased protective plating. and in the art of fortification we are exactly at the same point as were the men-at-arms of the end of the fifteenth century, who heaped plates on plates to protect themselves from artillery. it is time the art of fortification should be modified. it will be objected that a vessel or a horseman can move about, but that a fortress is immovable, and that consequently passive force cannot here be replaced by active force or agility. this is a mistake. though a fortress cannot be moved, the defensive system of a district can and ought to be studied, in view of various contingencies. in future warfare the plan of temporary fortification ought to play a principal part and may be made to do so. in other terms, an army ought to be able to fortify itself everywhere, and take advantage of every position. it is temporary fortification therefore which it is desirable to render easy, prompt, and efficacious, in order to defeat the combinations studied beforehand by the enemy, to reduce him in certain cases to the defensive, when he was hoping to attack, and to embarrass his movements on the great scale by unforeseen resistance at a point which he expected to pass with ease, and oblige him incessantly to modify his plans by rapidly executed arrangements for defence. vauban's fortresses have had their day; who can conjecture what may be accomplished in a future war by the system of defence of which an example has just been presented? still the most reliable fortress for a country is a good and well-commanded army, and a well-educated, brave, and intelligent population, resolved to make every sacrifice rather than undergo the humiliation of a foreign occupation. captain jean's papers contained many other critical remarks which cannot be recorded here. these documents sufficiently indicate that, whatever may have been said about the matter, there were among our officers some who worked, and many who had anticipated the dangers to which we were exposed by a blind confidence in our valour and an utter ignorance of the progress made by our enemies. indeed among these papers of captain jean's, numerous notes, dated , , , show the inefficiency of the defensive system then recognised in france, and the necessity of providing our strong places with works adapted to the recent progress in artillery. will the town of la roche-pont witness the realisation of captain jean's projects, or is its military history closed for ever? the future will show. in the meantime it is engaged in cultivating its vineyards, and its suburbs are invading once more the slopes of the plateau on the south and the west. the lower part of its donjon of the th century is still visible above the escarpment of the little citadel, and antiquaries can discover roman basements at some points in its wall. when cellars are excavated, gallo-roman coins are sometimes found with broken pieces of red and black pottery, charred wood, and even flint hatchets. these evidences of the antiquity of the cité are deposited in a small museum which also contains sculptures taken from the abbey and the castle. if you go to la roche-pont, ascend the ruins of the donjon. from this elevated point the view on a clear spring morning is very fine; towards the south it extends as far as the saône, showing the little river abonne, winding along the vale through meadows and orchards. on the north spreads the plateau covered with clumps of trees, and bounded only by the blue outlines of the hills of the haute-marne. at your feet the town with its ramparts looks like a vessel moored at the extremity of a promontory. we are reminded then of all the events which this little nook of ground has witnessed, of the ruins that have been accumulated by human passion, and the blood that has been so lavishly shed. we fancy we hear the shouts with which these walls have so often echoed. nature however remains the same; the meadows continue to be enamelled with flowers, and clothe with a mantle of beauty the ruins that have been heaped up by the fury of men. a feeling of deep sadness comes over us, and we say to ourselves: "what use is it all?" "what use!" replies at once a voice in the depth of our our soul. "what is the use of independence? what good is the love of our country? what use is the memory of self-sacrifice?" do not blaspheme, egoistic philosophy; be silent before centuries of struggle--before that layer upon layer of the bones of the dead, and those heaps of successive ruins which have formed our country's soil. though often ravaged, this hill has never been abandoned by its inhabitants; the more affronts it has had to sustain, the more its children have become attached to its side, the more they hold to the soil that has been impregnated with the blood of their ancestors, and the more hatred they feel towards those who would attempt to detach them from this ancestral tomb. this is patriotism; and it is the only human passion that can be dignified with the title of holy. war makes nations, and war raises them again when they sink down under the influence of material interests. war is struggle, and we find struggle everywhere in nature; it secures greatness and duration to the best educated, the most capable, the noblest, the most worthy to survive. and in the present day more than ever, success in war is the result of intelligence and of that which develops intelligence--work. whenever what is called fraternity between nations shall become a reality, the reign of senile barbarism and of shameful decay will not be far distant. before this rock on which so many generations have fought to defend their independence, to resist aggression and to keep the rapacious foreigner at a distance, it is not an expression of regret that is called for--it is rather of homage to the dead which hearts full of gratitude cannot withhold. they do not ask for tears but for imitation. footnotes: [footnote : the battle of champigny had extended our lines to four thousand six hundred and twenty yards from the fort de la faisanderie.] explanation of some of the technical terms used in this book. agger (latin), terrace, or platform, which the romans raised before the fronts attacked, for the purpose of setting up their projectile machines, securing a commanding position, and masking the troops assembled for an assault. bailey, fore-court; court of the outer works, or yard. the stables and the lodgings for the garrison were usually disposed in the bailey of the strong castles of the middle ages (see p. ). balista (latin, _onager_), an engine for propelling stones, worked by means of strongly-twisted cords. barbican, exterior defence protecting an entrance, and allowing a large assemblage of men to prepare for sorties, or to protect a retreat. barbicans were either of masonry or earth, or constructed of a simple palisade. they were always of a circular form (see p. ). bastion, an earthwork, cased externally with masonry, salient beyond the main body of the fortress, and possessing two faces, two flanks, and a gorge, so as to sweep the ground without, to cross the fires, and to flank the curtains. the gorge of bastions is open, closed, or retrenched. bastions are said to be full when their _terre-plein_ is level with the curtains; empty, when their _terre-plein_ is beneath that level; armed with a cavalier, when upon their _terre-plein_ is raised a battery of earth which commands the country without over the parapets (see p. , ). boulevard, an earthwork--in use at the time when fire artillery had attained a certain degree of importance--for placing cannon outside ancient defences still preserved. boulevards were of all forms--square, circular, and triangular (see p. ). braie, an exterior defence of trifling height, protecting the foot of the ramparts, and hindering the enemy's approach. bretÈche, timber construction intended to strengthen and to flank a front or a salient (see p. ). cat, timber gallery, low and long, covered with a longitudinal very pointed and strongly ironed roof. placed on wheels, these galleries were advanced to the foot of the walls, after the ditch was filled up, and enabled the miners to begin working into the masonry under cover. the name _rat_ was given to these galleries in some provinces. catapult, engine for shooting large darts by means of a powerful bow. cavalier, earthwork raised in the middle of a bastion, or upon any point of the defence, to command the exterior. in the sixteenth century the besieging armies erected cavaliers around defences to mount cannon upon them. our siege batteries are the modern analogues of these works (see p. , ). chemise, exterior inclosure of a donjon; the chemise of the donjon consists of a wall which leaves a space of some yards between it and the donjon. a postern with a drawbridge gives a communication between one of the rooms of the donjon and the rampart walk of the chemise (see p. ). clavicula (latin), exterior defence, raised outside the gates of a camp, and which obliged those who endeavoured to enter to present their flank to the defenders of the ramparts (see p. ). covered way, road formed on the counterscarp and protected by the relief of the glacis (see p. ). counterscarp, is the casing of the ditch which is opposite to the defence. demi-lune, low work, disposed before a curtain between two bastions, separated from the main body of the fortress by a ditch, and possessing two faces and two short flanks (see p. ). donjon or keep, chief retreat of the defenders of a strong castle. the donjon was always separated from the defences of the castle, and put in direct communication with the exterior (see p. ). escarp is that part of a revetment of fortifications which fronts the exterior, from the bottom of the ditch to the parapet or crenelation. fausse-braie, palisade or trench, with parapet, defending the bottom of the ditch, low enough to be masked by the relief of the counterscarp. glacis, sloping ground which extends from the counterscarp of the ditch towards the country, and masks the covered ways as well as the escarp. hoarding, wooden gallery which in time of war was put outside crenelations to enable the defenders to see the foot of the ramparts and towers, and to throw stones and materials of all kinds upon assailants attempting to approach. list, interval left between the exterior defences and those of the body of the place (see p. ). machicoulis--the wooden hoarding being easily set on fire, it was replaced in france, about the end of the thirteenth century, by stone corbels carrying a crenelation of masonry, and leaving intervals between them for throwing materials upon the assailants who approached the foot of the walls. in syria, the christians had adopted the machicoulis as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century. mangonel, engine for propelling large stones from a kind of sling attached to the longer arm of a movable beam heavily weighted at its other extremity. merlon, solid space in the parapet between two embrasures. during the middle ages the merlons were usually perforated in the middle by a loop-hole. in time of war the battlements were masked by mantelets of wood, which could be raised at discretion by means of an axle turning in two iron collars let into the upper angles of the merlons. movable tower, timber tower which was mounted on rollers and was advanced to the walls for the purpose of assault. the movable towers were made to command the battlements, and the upper story was furnished with a bridge which fell upon the crest of the ramparts of the towers (see p. ). oiseau, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a small masonry work which, disposed at the salient angles in the ditch, swept the latter and was intended to bar the passage. the _oiseaux_ were masked by the counterscarp. in modern polygonal fortifications this plan has been re-adopted (see p. ). oppidum (latin), a citadel or fortified strategical position, among the gallic populations. many roman camps were formed at the epoch of the conquest of gaul, on the gallic _oppida_, which were only a kind of intrenched camps formed upon elevated plateaux. several of our french towns occupy the sites of ancient _oppida_--langres, laon, béziers, carcassone, uzerche, sainte-reine (alesia), le puy-en-velay, semur-en-auxois, avalon, puy d'issolu, &c. orillon, projecting part of faces of bastions, intended to mask the flanks and to shield the guns which arm these flanks (see p. ). parados, mound of earth disposed behind the guns in battery, to shelter them as well as the servers from reverse firing. parallel, trench parallel to the sides of the polygon of a fortress, supplying a covered communication for planting and serving the siege batteries. formerly these parallels were required for approaching and planting the breach batteries. these parallels communicated with each other by trench boyaux traced in zigzags, so as not to be raked by the fires of the place (see p. ). parÉclat, epaulment of earth, or formed with gabions raised on the ramparts, or in the middle of bastions, to shelter the defenders from the splinters of bombs and shells. place d'armes, space defended by an epaulment, intended to enclose a body of men and to protect it from projectiles (see pp. , ). postern, secondary gate, small gate, generally masked (see p. ). rampart, epaulment raised with the earth taken from the ditch sunk on the outer side; also a wall crowned with a parapet and rampart walk. it signifies a permanent defence. ravelin, name originally given to demi-lunes. a work consisting of two faces, open at the gorge, low, and intended to sweep the exterior between two bastions (see p. ). redan, work presenting a salient angle and a re-entering angle (see p. ). retrenchment, a work made to augment the defensive strength of a place within the permanent fortifications, so as to present a fresh obstacle should the latter fall into the power of the enemy; the retrenchment consists of an epaulment of earth raised with the material from the ditch sunk on the outside. stimulus (latin), barbed iron crook, which, fixed on a short stake stuck in the ground or in the bottom of conical holes, protected the approaches of a defence (see p. ). tenaille, work consisting of a curtain having at each extremity two demi-bastions (see pp. , ). traverse, a mound of earth disposed across covered ways, _terre pleins_, bastions, and curtains, to shield the guns and the defenders against enfilade, oblique, or ricochet fire (see p. ). trebuchet, engine for propelling large stones, very similar to the mangonel, but whose counterpoise was suspended from the beam instead of being fixed to it. trench, road sunk in the ground, the earth being thrown up on one side only, or on both sides, for enabling the approach of places under cover. trench-shelter, temporary defence, consisting of an exterior epaulment made with the earth taken from a trench, in a way to shield the soldiers upon a front, around a camp or a post, and enable them to fire under cover. the trench-shelter is destined to play an important part since fire-arms have acquired a long range and a rapid discharge. the romans, in their day, made use of trench-shelters in the field. vinea (latin), a wooden mantlet, also a timber gallery, set up perpendicularly to the _agger_, and which affords approach to the platform under cover. the wooden towers intended to attack the ramparts of the besieged were rolled forward on these wooden galleries (see p. ). the end. book was produced from images made available by the hathitrust digital library.) _confidential!_ _for official use only_ specimens of british trench orders army war college [illustration] washington government printing office war department, document no. . _office of the adjutant general._ war department, washington, _may , _. the following specimens of british trench orders are published for the information of all concerned. ( , a. g. o.) by order of the secretary of war: h. l. scott, _major general, chief of staff_. official: h. p. mccain, _the adjutant general_. canadian corps trench orders. contents. subject. paragraph. duties sentries rifles, equipment, and ammunition "stand to" bombs and grenades, care of machine guns firing at aeroplanes trench sides, undercutting of sanitation time-tables and organization of work log books and trench store books communications alertness rum arrangements in case of attack working parties on front trench working parties outside the front trench precaution when our mines are exploded ration parties when found from front trenches rations and cooking vermorel sprayers reliefs: general points to be noted by company commanders guides smoking and talking rate of march to trenches procedure on arrival in trenches engineers chilled feet and frostbite, prevention of canadian corps trench orders. = . duties.=--(_a_) one officer per company and one n. c. o. per platoon will always be on duty. (_b_) by night the officer and n. c. o. on duty will frequently patrol the trench line to see that the sentries are alert and to inquire whether they have any information to report about the enemy.[ ] (_c_) the n. c. o. coming on duty will go round and post new sentries with the n. c. o. coming off duty. (_d_) the length of each tour of duty will depend on the number of officers and n. c. o.'s available in the company. _normally_ each tour should be, by night hours, by day hours, day commencing at morning "stand to," and by night commencing at evening "stand to." in inclement weather it may be advisable to reduce the tour to hour. (_e_) n. c. o.'s after posting sentries will report "all correct" or otherwise to the officer on duty. (_f_) the officer on duty will be responsible for sending in the reports required by battalion headquarters, unless there is anything unusual to report, when this duty will be performed by the company commander. (_g_) men will be warned for duty by the platoon n. c. o. on duty. this will be done at evening "stand to." (_h_) on being detailed for duty a man will be informed at which hours he will come on duty. (_i_) when possible to do so, notice boards will be placed in each section's trench, on which will be pinned daily all orders regarding working parties, and a list of the men in the section, giving the times at which they will come on sentry and other duty. (_j_) except under special circumstances, such, for instance, as a sentry being killed or wounded, no sentry will be relieved by another man unless the relief is properly carried out in the presence of a n. c. o. = . sentries=--=by night.=--(_a_) sentries will be posted every hours, except under bad weather conditions, when the length of the tour of sentry duty may be reduced. (_b_) from evening "stand to" till morning "stand to" one sentry to every four men will be posted. if wiring or digging parties are out in front, or listening posts are numerous, this number may be reduced. (_c_) the next relief will remain within reach of the sentry. (_d_) every sentry is to be regularly posted by a n. c. o., who will explain to him his duties and the front to be watched, and ascertain that the sentry and his relief are aware of the position of the section and platoon commanders, the sentries on either side, and whether there are any patrols or working parties out in front. should there be salients in the line, the sentry will be carefully instructed, so as to avoid any possibility of him firing toward his own trenches. (_e_) by night or in places which have the reputation of being dangerous, _i.e._, where enemy are suspected of mining, advanced posts, etc., no man should ever be posted alone. there should either be a double sentry post or the next relief should rest within kicking distance of the sentry. =by day.=--(_f_) the number of sentries required depends on the proximity of the enemy's trench line and whether a good view to the front can be obtained; normally one to every four days is sufficient. (_g_) every sentry will be provided with a periscope. (_h_) well-protected "look-out" posts for sentries will be built along the front trench line. (_i_) _sending out of patrols._--patrols will never be sent out without definite orders as to what is required of them. patrols will go out via a listening post (if such exist). all listening posts will be warned of the strength of the patrol and the approximate hour of departure and return. word will be passed _quietly_ along the line of sentries that a patrol is out in front. (_j_) as little challenging as possible will be done by sentries, and then only in a low tone of voice. = . rifles, equipment, and ammunition.=--(_a_) _carrying and wearing of._--equipment will always be worn by men in front trenches. (_b_) ration and carrying parties, orderlies, etc., will wear bandoliers and carry rifles. (_c_) parties at work between the front-line and reserve trenches may be permitted to "pile" or "ground" arms. wiring and digging parties out in front of the fire trench will sling the rifle. (_d_) _loading of rifles._--except when it is necessary to shoot, a round will _never_ be kept in the chamber. cut-offs will always be "in" and the safety catch "back." (_e_) the magazine will be kept charged with five rounds. (_f_) bayonets will always be fixed in front-line trenches. (_g_) _care of rifles._--rifles and ammunition will be inspected at morning and evening "stand to," and rapid loading will also be practiced. (_h_) covered rifle racks will be constructed in each bay where rifles will be kept. breech covers will be kept on the rifles. (_i_) in very cold weather sentries will occasionally work the bolt of the rifle to prevent the striker becoming frozen. for the same reason, in cold weather men will sleep with their rifles close to the body. (_j_) all loading will be from pouch or bandolier; no ammunition must ever be placed on ground or parapet. (_k_) _disposal of rifles, equipment, and ammunition._--wounded and men going sick will, if able to walk, wear their equipment and carry their rifles. the rifles and equipment of men unable to carry them and also those of dead men will be sent back to the dressing station. all other rifles, however badly damaged, and equipment damaged or not required will be sent back to the quartermaster. damaged cartridges and empty cases will be collected and returned to the quartermaster under company arrangements. (_l_) _ammunition._--every man will have rounds in his possession. (_m_) platoon commanders will report at evening "stand to" whether their ammunition is correct or otherwise. = . "stand to."=--"stand to" will take place hour before daylight and hour before dusk. at this parade every available man will be present. rifles, ammunition, equipment, clothing, etc., will be inspected. rapid loading will be practiced. the firing position of every man will be tested, to see whether he can hit the bottom edge of our wire. gas helmets and respirators will be inspected in accordance with the orders in force. orders will be issued and steps taken to see that the men understand them. after "stand to" in the morning and before "stand to" in the evening rifles will be thoroughly cleaned and oiled. = . care of bombs and grenades.=--(_a_) only a small percentage of bombs will be kept in the front trenches. these will be kept in a well-protected and dry bomb receptacle. (_b_) bomb stores will be built in the end of communication trenches in the support line. (_c_) detonators and fuzes, except in the front lines, will normally be kept in tins and not in the bomb. (_d_) the battalion grenadier officer will make frequent inspection of all bombs and grenades. (_e_) the alarm posts for grenadiers will be close to where the bomb stores are placed. (_f_) no one, other than a grenadier, will interfere with the bombs and grenades. (_g_) ammunition boxes in the trenches will be examined frequently to see if the lids work easily. = . machine guns.=--(_a_) the concealment and protection of machine-gun emplacements is important--for this reason, except in case of emergency, machine guns will not be fired from their regular emplacements. (_b_) unless emplacements are well concealed, guns will not be mounted except between evening and morning "stand to." (_c_) two men per detachment will always be on duty with the gun. (_d_) before dusk, while there is still sufficient light, each gun will be laid on some particular spot either in or behind the enemy's front line. (_e_) range cards will be prepared and kept with each gun. (_f_) _machine guns in the front line should be reduced to a minimum sufficient to cover the front._ = . firing at aeroplanes.=--firing at aeroplanes will not be permitted except by order of an officer. = . undercutting trench sides.=--(_a_) the undercutting of trench sides to make shelters is forbidden. (_b_) when shelters are made the required space from the ground level downward will be cut out and a roof supported on reliable posts will be made. = . sanitation.=--(_a_) the importance of strict attention to sanitation should be impressed on all ranks. (_b_) empty tins or other refuse will be collected in receptacles kept for the purpose in the trenches and buried in a refuse pit. (_c_) latrines will be constructed in trenches leading from communication trenches. where the bucket system is employed, chloride of lime or creosol will be freely used. the soil will be removed at night and buried in a deep pit well away from the trenches; these pits will be filled in when nearly full and labeled. (_d_) the commanding officer is responsible for sanitation in his unit and the medical officer will advise him in sanitary matters, making daily inspections of latrines, refuse pits, and water arrangements. under the medical officer latrines and refuse pits will be attended to by the regimental sanitary men and water duties by the r. a. m. c. details attached. = . time-tables and organization of work.=--(_a_) a time-table will be drawn up by each company commander. in this time-table he will allot hours of work, rest, and meals. (_b_) working parties will be properly organized. definite tasks will be allotted. each commander of a working party should know what work is expected from his party before the hour appointed to commence, so that no time is wasted in getting to work. (_c_) unless it can not be avoided, men should never be taken for sentry duty without having had a reasonable period of rest, and when this becomes necessary a report should be made to the c. o. = . log books and trench store books.=--(_a_) each company commander will keep a log book in which will be entered up daily the work done. this log book will be handed over from one commander to another on relief. (_b_) a trench store book will also be kept in which will be entered up all trench stores issued to the company. on relief, the incoming company commander will give a receipt to the outgoing commander for all trench stores taken over. (_c_) commanding officers are personally responsible that no trench stores, bath mats, etc., are used as firewood. = . communications.=--(_a_) artillery lines will be laid on one side of a trench. infantry lines on the opposite side. (_b_) the infantry brigade signal officer will exercise general supervision over all lines in the brigade area, and will notify the orderly officer of the artillery brigade when any artillery lines require attention or relaying. he will assist the artillery whenever it may be possible to do so. (_c_) lines will be laid as low as possible, preferably not more than inches from the bottom of the trench. they will be picketed into grooves cut into the side of the trench, the pickets being securely driven in at every reentrant bend and at every yards along the straight. (_d_) lines will be clearly labeled at every yards and at every junction with another line. (_e_) all lines will be carefully patrolled at least once daily. (_f_) one telephonist will always be on duty. (_g_) telephone communication to battalion headquarters and the company on each flank will be frequently tested. (_h_) all "dead" lines will be reeled up at once. (_i_) every man is to know the position of his platoon commander's shelter and the company headquarters. (_j_) at least two men per section of the support and reserve companies must be able to act as guides to all the company headquarters of the battalion. (_k_) all officers must know the shortest route from their own headquarters to those of the company on their flanks and to their own battalion headquarters. (_l_) it is the duty of every officer or man to fasten any loose wire that he may see which has become temporarily detached. = . alertness.=--anything seen or heard in connection with the enemy, such as movements of individuals, transport wagons, troops, working parties, etc., is to be reported to the nearest officer. = . rum.=--(_a_) rum will always be kept under the personal charge of the company commander. (_b_) the best time for a rum issue is in the early morning. (_c_) no issue of rum will be made except in the presence of an officer; any rum left over will be handed back to the charge of the company commander. (_d_) men undergoing punishment for drunkenness will receive no issue of rum for days after the offense, unless it is necessary for medical reasons. = . arrangements in case of attack.=--(_a_) company commanders will insure that all ranks know what to do in case of bombardment, gas, or attack by the enemy. they will occasionally test their arrangements by practicing an alarm. (_b_) all officers' servants, grenadiers, orderlies, etc., will have duties allotted to them in case of attack. = . working parties.=--(_a_) all work on a fire trench will be carried out by the garrison of the trench, assisted, if necessary, by the garrison of the support and reserve trenches. (_b_) all work in rear of fire trenches will be carried out by the garrison of the support and reserve trenches. (_c_) if possible, working parties will consist of complete units, i.e., section, platoon, or company. each unit will be commanded by its own commander. (_d_) even when working under engineer supervision, infantry officers in charge of working parties will be responsible that the work done satisfies tactical requirements. = . working parties outside the front trench.=--(_a_) a covering party will always be provided for digging and wiring parties outside the front trenches. = . precaution when one of our mines is exploded.=--in the event of one of our own mines being exploded, a clear space of yards will be kept on either side of the mouth of the mine shaft. = . ration parties when found from front trenches.=--usually, rations and stores will be carried up to the trenches by supports and reserves. if this is not possible and it is necessary that men from the front trenches have to be employed, not more than per cent of the men in the firing line are to be away from the trenches at the same time. = . rations and cooking.=--(_a_) ration parties from the support and reserve trenches will be made up in complete units as in (_c_). (_b_) the company quartermaster sergeant will accompany the ration parties for his company and report his arrival to the company commanders. (_c_) great care is to be taken that ration and carrying parties make as little noise as possible. (_d_) cooking, if possible, will be done behind the front-line trenches and should be concentrated by sections or companies. steps must be taken to ensure that as little smoke as possible is made by the cooks' fires. (_e_) unused rations will be returned to the quartermaster. (_f_) waste in any form will be discouraged. (_g_) arrangements should be made to ensure that soup or some hot drink should be available for the men between midnight and a. m. = . vermorel sprayers.=--(_a_) vermorel sprayers form part of trench stores. they are provided for clearing gas out of trenches and shelters after an attack, and for respraying helmets if necessary during a prolonged gas attack. (_b_) they will be distributed at easily accessible points in the trenches and protected from shell fire. (_c_) they must be kept one-third full of water. six gallons of the following solution to be used in them must be kept in corked rum jars close to each sprayer. it must not be kept in the sprayers owing to its corrosive nature: water, gallons (one large bucket). sodium thiosulphate (hypo), lbs. (two piled mess tins). sodium carbonate (washing soda), lbs. (one mess tin). (_d_) each company will have a squad of men in charge of an n. c. o. trained in the care and use of sprayers. (_e_) on taking over trenches, the n. c. o. in charge of sprayers will take over from the outgoing n. c. o. and will see that each is in order and provided with solution. (_f_) a man will be told off to each sprayer; he will be responsible for testing it every day, and in case of a gas attack he will stand by to use it when ordered. reliefs. = . general.=--(_a_) prior to taking over a new line of trenches the commanding officer, adjutant, machine-gun officer, signaling officer, and company commanders will reconnoiter the trenches. (_b_) machine guns will not be relieved at the same time as the infantry. = . points to be noted by company commanders.=--(_a_) number of men holding line to be taken over and distribution. (_b_) shelter accommodation. (_c_) work being done and proposed. to ensure a continuity of work an officer of the incoming battalion should go over line in daylight. (_d_) condition of the wire and defenses generally. (_e_) information as to the enemy, his habits, snipers, the work he is doing, &c. (_f_) water supply. (_g_) artillery support. (_h_) communications. (_i_) dangerous points. (_j_) lines of advance to be used in a counter attack. (_k_) position of "shell trenches" or "feathers," or other cover from enemy artillery fire. = . guides.=--(_a_) arrangements will be made between the c. o. of relieving and about to be relieved battalions as to places where guides will be provided by the latter to conduct the incoming troops to the trenches. (_b_) one guide per platoon, one for each company headquarters, and one for battalion headquarters will be provided. these guides must know the exact spot where they will meet the relieving troops and the best and safest way to the trenches. = . smoking and talking.=--after leaving the rendezvous there is to be no smoking or talking till arrival in the trenches. = . rate of march to trenches.=--the rate of marching to the trenches from billets will not exceed miles an hour. = . procedure on arrival in trenches.=--(_a_) the troops being relieved will not leave the trenches until all trench stores have been handed over and receipts received, all the relieving troops are in position, and new sentries have been posted and orders to move have been received from the company commander. (_b_) platoon commanders will at once personally examine all firing positions and satisfy themselves that each man can fire on the foot of the nearest part of the wire entanglement. (_c_) they will examine the ammunition and bomb magazines, vermorel and other sprayers, and antigas solution vessels. (_d_) when the relief is completed o. c. companies will report to that effect to battalion headquarters. (_e_) men will not be dismissed till the o. c. company has received reports from all his platoon commanders that everything is in order. = . engineers.=--(_a_) to insure continuity of work a few sappers should live permanently in the trenches. (_b_) daily requisitions for engineering material required will be forwarded by company commanders to battalion headquarters. (_c_) the battalion commander will apply to the field company for the material required through the brigade headquarters and will arrange for carrying parties to take it in. = . prevention of chilled feet and frostbite.=--(_a_) before marching to trenches, feet and legs will be washed and rubbed with antifrostbite grease or whale oil under platoon supervision. boots should be large enough for two pairs of socks, and puttees must be put on loosely. (_b_) the march to the trenches will be in ankle boots, every man will carry two pairs of spare socks, spare grease, and towel. (_c_) on arrival at the trenches, take off ankle boots and wet socks, dry and grease feet, put on dry socks, gum boots (trench stores) or paper stockings and ankle boots. (_d_) during the tour in the trenches, circulation must be kept up by movement; the restriction of the circulation of the lower limbs is the principal cause of chilled feet. (_e_) boots and puttees will be removed at least once in every hours, feet and legs will be dried, rubbed, and greased, and dry socks put on. (_f_) gum boots will be taken off before troops march out on relief and will be handed over as trench stores to the relieving unit. (_g_) on arrival in billets, feet will be washed and rubbed; dry socks, hot drinks, and food will be provided under battalion arrangements. (_h_) warming braziers made from and gallon oil drums will be provided, and a daily allowance of lbs. coke and / lb. charcoal per man in the trenches. an extra pea-soup, tea, and sugar ration will also be issued. (_i_) c. o.'s are responsible that all trench pumps on charge are kept in good repair and made use of to the fullest extent. the drier the trenches are the fewer will be the cases of chilled feet. c. h. harrington, _b. g. g. s., canadian corps_. october , . footnotes: [footnote : the officer should remember that he is in the same position as is the officer on watch on board a ship.] specimen of battalion trench standing orders. . trenches are usually divided up into a certain number of bays; the number of men to defend these bays depends on the length of trench allotted to each company. each section is detailed to guard a certain number of bays. . n. c. os. and men must always wear their equipment by day and night; a man found not complying with this order commits a "crime." . every company will stand to arms daily half an hour before dawn, and half an hour before dusk and will remain so till dismissed by o. c. company. . the enemy's trenches are so close that it is very important for the men to have their rifle sights always at "normal," so that there will be no necessity to alter the sights in case of alarm. . by night all bayonets are to be fixed, and per cent of the men on duty in the trenches are to be sitting on the firing platform with their rifles by their sides. . in case of an attack, especially at night, it should be impressed on the men that they should fire low; for one bullet that goes too low, at least go too high. a bullet that goes too high is wasted, whereas a bullet that goes too low is a ricochet and is often more dangerous than any other kind of bullet. . section commanders are responsible that the men under their command have sufficient standing room for the purpose of firing over the parapet. it is very important to insure that the men have a clear field of fire, and are able not only to see the enemy's trenches but also the ground in the immediate vicinity of their own trench. it is of the greatest importance to arrange that the men can fire comfortably from the parapet and that they can get the butt comfortably into the hollow of the shoulder when the rifle is resting on the parapet. . when making new trenches it should be impressed on the men that the parapet must be at least feet thick at the top in order to be bullet proof. . if any part of the parapet requires repairing or altering, the matter should be reported at once by the section commander to his platoon sergeant, who will in turn report the matter to superior authority. . the general work of repairing the trenches, fatigues, etc., will be carried out either by day or by night according to company arrangements. certain hours will be alloted for these tasks, and no man in the company is to be employed in any kind of work out of these hours, unless permission is obtained from o. c. company. . no man should ever leave his post in the trenches either by day or by night, without the permission of the n. c. o. in charge of that post. . as a general rule, by night there should be at least one sentry post to each ten yards of parapet. . by night double sentries should always be posted, if possible, and no sentry should be kept on duty for a longer period than hour at a time. it should be so arranged that when one of the sentries is doing his last / hour on sentry, his comrade will be doing his first / on duty. . sentries by night should always have their rifles resting on the parapet ready to fire at moment's notice. . as few sentries as possible should be posted by day, so as to give as much rest as possible to the remainder of the men. . by day any existing loop holes may be used by a sentry for observation purposes, but this is strictly prohibited at night, =when the sentry must look over the parapet=. . if a sentry is continually fired at, the section commander will take steps to post him in another position, but not far away from the original position. . by night arrangements must be made in each platoon for a n. c. o.[ ] to be continually on duty for the purpose of visiting the sentries, etc., etc. he will report to his company officer at odd hours and to his platoon officer at even hours. . cases have occurred of men going to sleep on sentry duty. this is the most serious crime a soldier can commit on active service. the g. o. c. has clearly stated that in future, if any man has been convicted by court-martial for this offense and sentenced to be shot, he will confirm the sentence. there is no excuse for a man going to sleep on sentry duty; if he is feeling too ill to perform this duty he should report the fact to the n. c. o. on duty of his platoon, who will in his turn report the matter to superior authority. . if an armed party of the enemy approaches the trench under a flag of truce, they should be ordered to halt at a distance and lay down their arms, and the matter should be reported at once to the o. c. company. if the party fails to halt when ordered to do so, or does not convey a flag of truce, they should immediately be fired upon. an unarmed party should be halted the same way at a distance, and the matter be reported to the o. c. company. . by night it is not necessary to challenge anyone in advance of the trenches, but fire should be opened at once. if, however, the company is sending out listening, working, or covering parties, these orders should be modified, and special instructions issued to meet the case. . men will be specially picked from the company for listening patrols and as sharpshooters. these men will be given special privileges and their work is such that they will be afforded greater opportunities of being mentioned in dispatches. . it is the duty of officers and n. c. os. to check men talking loudly during the night, as this practice makes it impossible for the sentries to hear any movement in front of the trenches. the germans take advantage of this talking by the british soldier during the night to send listening patrols quite near to our trenches, and even build trenches on clear moonlight nights close to our lines without our knowledge. . all working parties must wear their equipment and carry their rifles, but when actually working they can lay these on the ground close to them. . all picks and shovels after use will be returned to the company store. . ration parties and parties carrying material for repairs, etc., need not wear their equipment or carry rifles, but should be accompanied by a fully armed n. c. o. as an escort. . not more than twenty men are to be away from the company at the same time. n. c. o. and men per platoon. . every soldier must remember it is of the utmost importance to keep his rifle clean and in working order whilst in the trenches. his very life may depend upon this, as he is liable to be rushed at any moment, either by day or by night. the dirty rifle means probably a jammed one after the first round. . the first duty of a soldier, therefore, is to clean his rifle every morning as soon as there is sufficient light to enable him to do so; an hour will be appointed by o. c. company for this purpose. the platoon sergeant will be responsible that section commanders superintend this work, and inspect the rifles of their section. any man who is found with a dirty rifle will be made a prisoner. . all rifles by day to be in racks, except those used by the sentries, and arrangements should be made by section commanders to improvise racks if they are not provided. . great care is to be exercised to keep the trenches clean and in a sanitary condition. platoon commanders will be responsible for the latrines in their section of the trenches. any man fouling the trenches will be severely dealt with. no water is to be taken for drinking or cooking purposes except from the water cart or tanks provided for this purpose. disregard of this regulation will probably cause an outbreak of typhoid or dysentery amongst the men of the company. . stretcher bearers will be stationed at a place appointed by the c. o. if a man is wounded, information should be sent at once to these stretcher bearers, whose duty it is to carry wounded to the aid post or dressing station. men should not be taken from the firing line for this purpose. . no soldier is to be buried nearer than yards from the trenches. . in each platoon a n. c. o. will be detailed for duty by day. this n. c. o. will do no night duty, but will get a full night's rest. his duties are to post the day sentries and to see that they are alert and carrying out their duties correctly. he will be generally responsible for the cleanliness of his lines and will frequently visit the latrines. it is part of his duties to see that any loose ammunition lying about is collected. . the platoon sergeant will always send, if possible, a n. c. o.[ ] to draw the rations, and this n. c. o. will be responsible for their safe delivery. this especially applies to the issue of coke. the c. s. m. will, prior to his day of relief from the trenches, always collect the articles of trench equipment supplied for his company and make out a list of the same. these articles will be handed over to the company sergeant major of the relieving company. . the system of passing down messages by word of mouth, man to man, must not be used. if an officer or n. c. o. has anything important to report he should do so in writing. if there is no time to do this, a special messenger should be intrusted with a verbal message which should afterwards be confirmed in writing. . special instructions have been issued as to precautions against gas. these are to be strictly followed. footnotes: [footnote : an acting n. c. o. will not be employed on this duty.] brigade standing orders for the trenches. = . reliefs.=--(_a_) when a battalion is taking over a new line of trenches the company commanders will invariably visit the trenches on the day previous to that on which the relief takes place. they will gain as much information as possible from the company commanders they are relieving. (_b_) an officer of each company should proceed in advance to the trenches on the day of the relief to take over, during daylight, all trench stores, ammunition, etc. mutual receipts for these will be signed. (_c_) machine gunners, bombers, snipers, and signalers will not be relieved on the same day as companies. they should proceed to the trenches hours before their battalions, and take over their posts during daylight. (_d_) the strictest march discipline will be maintained by all parties proceeding to or from the trenches. an officer will march in rear of each company to ensure that it is properly closed up. (_e_) reliefs will be carried out as quietly as possible. no smoking or lights will be allowed after reaching a point to be decided on by battalion commanders. (_f_) guides at the rate of one per platoon, machine gun, or bombing post will invariably be arranged for by brigade headquarters when battalions proceed to the trenches. likewise, when battalions are being relieved, a similar number of guides will be detailed by them to meet relieving units. (_g_) on taking over a line of trenches a company commander will at once get in touch with the companies on his right and left; he will ascertain the position of the nearest supporting troops, of the reserve ammunition, of any machine guns or bombing posts, and of his battalion headquarters; he will ascertain the best and quickest means of obtaining artillery support, and he will have all wires, including the artillery wire, if there is one, tested. when his platoons have taken over, and he is satisfied that all is correct, he will inform his commanding officer by telephone that the relief of his company is complete. (_h_) the actual relief of trenches should be carried out in the following manner: the platoon being relieved gets on the firing step. the relieving platoon files in behind and halts. on the word "pass," which will be given quietly, being passed along, the relieved and relieving platoons will change places. the company commander of the relieving company will then supervise the posting of sentries by his platoon commanders. he will satisfy himself that each post is properly relieved and that the orders for the post are correctly handed over. the greatest care and attention to detail are necessary in this. the exact frontage for which each platoon commander is responsible will be clearly defined. before dismissing his company the company commander will ensure that each man has an alarm post from which he can use his rifle freely and fire at the bottom of our own wire entanglements. each man must also know the position of company headquarters, the reserve ammunition, and latrines. every company commander in the front line will have control of the grenadiers employed on his front. (_i_) within hours of taking over a new line of trenches a company commander will forward a report on his trenches as follows: garrison of trench. field of fire. distance from enemy's trench. general condition of trench. whether every man has a post from which he can fire at the bottom of our own wire entanglements. number of efficient loopholes. whether the parapet is bullet proof throughout. whether sufficient traverses. state of our wire. state of enemy's wire. drainage. number of boxes of reserve ammunition. number of bombing posts and of bombs with each. number of rounds of very pistol ammunition. number of vermorel sprayers. number of gongs. a rough sketch showing the position of bombers' posts, machine guns, grenade stores, and reserve ammunition should accompany the report. (_j_) before handing over trenches, officers commanding companies will draw up a statement containing all available information on the following points: our own trenches and wire. the enemy's trenches and wire. habits of the enemy. any part of trench which receives more than ordinary attention from the enemy's guns. number of bombing posts and bombs at each. number of machine guns on company's front. work in hand or contemplated. what artillery covers the front, and how it is best and quickest obtained. a list of trench stores, ammunition, etc., will also be drawn up ready for handing over. all stores should be carefully stacked in a convenient place. ammunition, very lights, sandbags, etc., sufficient for at least hours consumption, should invariably be handed over to the relieving unit. (_k_) the following constitute trench stores and will be handed over on relief: s. a. a. shovels. picks. loophole plates. balers. fixed rifle batteries. sniperscope rifles. braziers. catapults. grenade throwers. rifle racks. rifle grenade firing stands. hand grenades. rifle grenades. very pistol cartridges. gongs, bells, and alarms. vermorel sprayers. pumps. reserve rations. the following will not be handed over: very pistols. pistols, illuminating, - / inch. telescopic rifles. periscopes. telephones. battalion entrenching tools will not be taken to the trenches. should the existing tools in the trenches be considered insufficient, application should be made to brigade headquarters for a further supply. = . sentries.=--as a general rule, the following numbers of sentries will be posted: _by day._--one sentry for every bays, exclusive of bombers, snipers, and machine gunners. _by night, in a fog or snowstorm._--one double sentry for each bay, exclusive of bombers and machine gunners. sentries will invariably be posted and relieved by a n. c. o. under the orders of the platoon commander. it must be recognized that no fixed rules can be laid down as regards the number of sentries that are necessary and battalion commanders will use their discretion in the matter. the number required will depend on the proximity of the enemy, the tactical situation, and, above all, on the state of our own wire entanglements. = . officer and n. c. os. of the "watch."=--in every company in the firing line the company commander will arrange for his officers to take it in turns to be on "watch" throughout the twenty-four hours. likewise in each platoon the platoon commander will detail a n. c. o. of the watch. the officer and n. c. os. of the watch will visit all sentries, bombing posts, and machine guns within the area of their command once every hour by day and by night. at night the officer of the watch will carry a very pistol. very lights should be used sparingly, as they are often difficult to obtain. the time when lights are most required is when the germans are not sending any up. = . standing to arms.=--troops will always stand to arms one hour before daylight and one hour before dark. they will remain under arms in the first instance until the enemy's lines are visible, and in the second instance until darkness comes on. at these hours company commanders will arrange for the inspection of arms, ammunition, and equipment by platoon commanders. the latter will satisfy themselves that each man is in possession of two smoke helmets; ammunition will be made up to rounds per rifle when troops stand to arms. whenever men stand to arms company commanders will order the parapet to be manned to insure that every man has a post from which he can fire at the bottom of our own wire. at the inspection of rifles at the hours of standing to arms platoon commanders will satisfy themselves that the bolt action is working freely. a thorough inspection of arms will be held at midday, at which hour men will be washed and shaved. = . gas attacks.=--(i) it is to be impressed on all ranks that the smoke helmet issued to them affords complete protection against all forms of gas used by the enemy. (ii) all ranks will invariably carry on their persons smoke helmets. instruction is to be given in the method of adjusting smoke helmets rapidly, condemned helmets being used for this purpose. (iii) smoke helmets will be inspected at morning and evening "stand to." (iv) the direction of the wind will be studied and special precautions taken when it favors a gas attack by the enemy. (v) on the first sign of gas, whether it is detected by sight or smell, the sentries will sound the alarm gongs and bells which are hung up at intervals throughout the trenches. on hearing this alarm every officer and man will at once adjust his smoke helmet and fall in on his alarm post. nobody will remain in dugouts. to make certain of the warning reaching everybody the order "put on smoke helmets" will be passed from man to man throughout the trenches held by the ---- division. (vi) the officers in command of the trenches opposite the section of the enemy's line from which the gas is proceeding will send the s. o. s. call to the artillery, and will order rapid fire to be opened on the enemy trenches. neighboring sectors of defense will be at once warned. (vii) when the gas cloud is sufficiently thick to hide the enemy's front parapets, machine guns and rifles will open fire in short bursts on fixed lines covering the enemy's trenches, in order to inflict casualties, pierce gas tubes, and break up the density of the enemy's gas cloud. (viii) garrisons of trenches on the flanks of the front threatened will be prepared to open a flanking fire on the enemy should he attempt to advance from his front line. (ix) as soon as the s. o. s. call has been sent to the artillery, messages will be sent to brigade h. q. and the artillery "gas trench(es)________________________________." (x) rifle bolts and machine-gun crank handles to be worked backwards and forwards while gas is about, to prevent the gas from impairing the action. (xi) vermorel sprayers to be used in trenches and dugouts in the affected area as soon as the gas has passed over, in order that gas helmets may be taken off. (xii) measures will be taken to prevent stragglers. = . fixing of bayonets.=--bayonets will always be fixed during the hours of darkness, during a snowstorm, or thick mist, or when the proximity of the enemy renders this course advisable. = . counter attacks.=--as soon as possible after taking over a new line battalion commanders will draw up and submit to brigade headquarters their scheme for counter attacking the enemy should he gain possession of any part of their line. in framing this scheme it must be borne in mind that in every line of trenches there are certain points which would be of value to the enemy if captured by him, whereas there are others which would be of little use to him. should the enemy attack and occupy any portion of our trenches he will be immediately counter attacked and driven out by the nearest body of troops. all ranks must clearly understand that counter attacks made at once and without hesitation will usually be sucessful, even if made by small numbers, but that a counter attack, once the enemy has been given time to establish himself, is a very difficult and costly operation. = . mines.=--should the enemy fire a mine in or near our trenches the crater thus formed will be immediately occupied by the nearest troops. this order will be made known to all ranks. = . firing by day and night.=--by day men will only fire when a target offers itself. if the enemy is in the habit of showing himself at any particular point, the attention of the platoon commander should be drawn to it. the latter will inform the battalion sniping officer, who will tell off a sniper's post to watch the spot. by night all firing must be organized. if the enemy is believed to be working on his trenches or wire, the company commander will give directions to his platoon commanders to fire five rounds rapid at certain stated times. he will first ascertain that no patrols from neighboring companies will be out at these hours. a certain number of fixed rifles will be placed in every trench and fired by the sentries. these rifles will be laid on certain selected spots. indiscriminate firing by day or night is forbidden. if the enemy attacks, rapid fire will be opened without waiting for orders. = . company meetings.=--officers commanding companies will hold meetings of their platoon commanders and n. c. os. each evening in the trenches. only a few officers and n. c. os. should be present at each meeting. at these meetings the following points should be discussed: work required to place our trenches in a better state of defense and to improve the comfort of the men. work to be done during the next hours. it is essential that all work which has to be carried out at night is explained to all noncommissioned officers in daylight. any alterations noticed in the enemy's trenches or wire. what steps can be taken to annoy and harass the enemy. action in case of attack. = . work on trenches.=--work on trenches should as far as possible be carried out during daylight. = . garrisons of trenches.=--it is an invariable rule that during daylight the front-line trenches should be held as lightly as is compatible with safety. at night the garrison must be strengthened. the actual strength of garrisons will be governed by the tactical situation and by the number of support and communicating trenches at hand. with proper support and communicating trenches only sentries and snipers should be in the front-line trenches during daylight. to these will be added bombers if there are any old communicating trenches leading to the enemy's lines or if the proximity of the enemy demands their presence. = . discipline.=--(_a_) sleeping in the front line trenches will not be allowed unless there is an absence of support trenches. (_b_) no dugouts will be constructed without the permission of the battalion commander. all dugouts must be made splinter proof. work on them will not be commenced until sufficient material is at hand. if it can be avoided dugouts will not be constructed in the fire trenches. (_c_) no man will leave the trenches without permission from an officer. this order will be made known to all ranks. (_d_) cooking should not take place in the front-line trenches. whenever possible cooking will be done under company arrangements in order that the men may have their meals at regular hours. washing and shaving should be carried out in support trenches when possible. (_e_) all parties moving within the trench area will be correctly marched by an officer or n. c. o. (_f_) orderly room should be held daily in the trenches unless circumstances render this impossible. (_g_) sentries are strictly forbidden to wear any covering over the ears. (_h_) an officer will always be present when an issue of rum takes place. (_i_) equipment will never be taken off in the front-line trenches except in the case of working parties, when equipment may be removed by order of the company commanders. in support trenches equipment may be removed at the discretion of battalion commanders. (_j_) sentries will remain standing at all times unless the height of the parapet renders this impossible. (_k_) all parties, with the exception of stretcher bearers, moving in the trench area will wear their arms and equipment. orderlies may be excused wearing their equipment at the discretion of commanding officers. (_l_) the wearing of cotton bandoliers by working parties and orderlies is forbidden, nor are these bandoliers to be hung up in the trenches. (_m_) ammunition must be kept in a thoroughly clean state. if the ammunition is not clean jambs will occur. ammunition will be frequently inspected. (_n_) the "undercutting" of trenches is strictly forbidden. drains will always be cut down the center of a trench and not at the sides. (_o_) when mining is in progress in any of the trenches occupied by the brigade the sandbags filled with earth from the mine will on no account be used in the front trenches or other points which are visible to the enemy. = . reconnaissance and patrolling.=--the best security against attack is active patrolling and constant observation of the enemy's lines, so that he can not undertake any new work without steps being taken to prevent its continuance. the enemy's wire will be constantly patrolled to insure that he has cut no gaps in it with a view to launching an attack. patrols will also frequently visit our wire to insure that it is efficient. the front of our own fire parapet should be examined nightly. = . information.=--every effort will be made by means of patrols, field glasses, etc., to ascertain information about the enemy, his trenches and wire. any alterations in the enemy's lines must be reported, and if any of the enemy are seen a report will be sent in stating what dress they were wearing. the importance of forwarding all such information will be impressed on all ranks. = . sniping.=--in every battalion a sniping section will be formed, consisting of officer and n. c. o.'s and men. the officer will carry out the duties of intelligence officer to his battalion. he will render a daily report to his commanding officer containing the following information: number of casualties known to have been inflicted on the enemy. number and location of snipers' posts. any alterations in the enemy's trenches or wire. number of telescope rifles in possession. number and location of fixed rifles and rifle batteries in action. any activity by the enemy. battalion sniping officers will get into close touch with artillery observing officers within their sectors, and will give every assistance to them. = . artillery support.=--as a general rule, a forward observing officer of an -pounder battery will be quartered at or near battalion h. q. requests for retaliation should be made to this officer, and brigade h. q. should be warned of the action taken. fire from howitzers and heavy batteries can, except in the case of the s. o. s. signal, only be obtained through brigade h. q. if retaliatory fire is required from howitzers, it must be stated on what point it is wished that the fire should be directed. any trench mortaring by the enemy should be immediately reported to the officer commanding our trench mortars. = . "s. o. s." and "test" signals.=--in the event of an infantry attack by the enemy, a mine being fired, or other emergency, the s. o. s. signal will be sent by the quickest route to the field artillery battery covering the trenches concerned. _the signal will be followed by the number of the trench, e.g., "s. o. s. b ."_ the signal will be repeated to battalion h. q., who will transmit it to brigade h. q. on receipt of the s. o. s. signal all batteries covering the trenches concerned will open a concentrated fire on the enemy's front line. when necessity for fire no longer exists, a message to this effect will be sent to the artillery and to brigade h. q. in order to test the efficient working of the artillery lines, "test" messages will frequently be sent from the trenches to the supporting battery. the number of the trench will always be sent, e.g., "test a ." the test will consist of one round of shrapnel fired on the "night line" of the battery. no target will be given by the officer in the trenches. the time taken from the handing in of the message until the shell bursts will be carefully noted and reported to battalion h. q. the o. c. battalion will enter the result of all tests in his daily report. he will give the exact time at which the test was sent and will state whether it was a "direct" or an "indirect" test. a "direct" test is from trench to battery. an "indirect" test is from trench via battalion h. q. to battery. = . vermorel sprayers.=--one man will be detailed to look after each sprayer. a spare tin of solution will be kept with each sprayer. medical officers will periodically inspect both sprayers and solution. = . hostile artillery fire.=--in reporting activity by the enemy's artillery it is necessary to state: (i) the time at which shelling began and when it ceased. (ii) your own position. (iii) whether howitzer or gun. (iv) direction from which shells arrive. compass bearing should be given if possible. (v) whether shells burst in the air or on "graze." in reporting results of our own fire, state: (i) your own position. (ii) estimate distances short, over, right, or left, in yards. avoid vague statements. (iii) whether gun or howitzer. (iv) whether shrapnel or high explosive. if shrapnel bursts in the air, judge whether range is correct by the splash of the bullets on the ground and not by the burst. = . aircraft.=--on the approach of any of the enemy's aircraft three blasts will be blown on a whistle. this will be the signal for all ranks to keep perfectly still. one blast on a whistle will indicate that the aircraft has moved away. all aircraft belonging to the enemy will be heavily fired on by machine guns and rifles as long as they are within range, but no firing will take place without the order of an officer, who will first satisfy himself that the aircraft is hostile. directions should be given to the men as to how many lengths in front of the aeroplane aim should be taken. if a "zeppelin" is sighted, a "priority" message will be sent to brigade h. q. reporting the fact and stating approximately where the "zeppelin" was seen and in what direction it was proceeding. = . maps.=--maps with our own trenches marked on them will not be taken into the front-line trenches. = . telephone messages.=--no messages regarding the action of our own artillery or other matters of an important nature will be sent by telephone to the fire trenches. such messages will be sent by orderly. this is necessary because it has been found that the enemy has, at times, read our messages by induction. = . signalers.=--the brigade signaling section is responsible for the maintenance of communication between brigade h. q. and battalions. battalion signalers are responsible for communications within the battalion. all wires must be pinned in to the sides of trenches. infantry wires on the s. and e. sides and artillery wires on the n. and w. sides. pins for this purpose can be obtained from brigade headquarters. all wires will be labeled with the name of the battalion at least every yards. officers in charge of battalion signalers are responsible that all disused or unlabeled wires within their areas are reeled up. all wires will be patroled at least once every hours. = . medical officers.=--medical officers attached to battalions will, in addition to looking after the sick and wounded, be responsible for the sanitation of the trenches generally, paying particular attention to the water supply and latrines. battalion sanitary sections will work under the orders of the medical officer. the medical officer will accompany the commanding officer periodically on his visits round the trenches. stretcher bearers are responsible that the rifles and equipment (including field glasses, wire cutters, etc.), of all men who are wounded are taken with them to the dressing station. the medical officer will instruct the n. c. o. i/c stretcher bearers to see that this order is carried out. the arms and equipment of wounded men will be sent to the field ambulance with them, the ammunition having first been removed from pouches and magazines. field glasses, wire cutters, etc., will not be sent to the field ambulance but will be sent to battalion headquarters. the arms and equipment of men who are killed will be collected at battalion headquarters and handed over to the quartermaster for return to the base. = . ration parties.=--parties to carry rations, water, and material to the companies in the front line will be detailed from the companies in reserve. = . empty cartridge cases and rubbish.=--at intervals throughout the trenches sandbags will be hung up as receptacles for empty cartridge cases and chargers. others will be hung up for the collection of rubbish. sandbags to be labeled accordingly. all empty cases and chargers thus collected will be sent each evening to battalion h. q. for transmission to the base. = . dress, etc.=--men must be properly dressed at all times and as smart and clean as circumstances will allow. all men must shave daily. discipline as regards saluting, standing to attention, etc., will receive as much attention in the trenches as in billets. = . prisoners.=--should any prisoners be captured they will be immediately searched, and all documents found on them will be forwarded to brigade h. q. without delay. germans usually carry all documents in the skirt pockets of their tunics. a telephone message will be dispatched to brigade h. q. stating to what regiment the prisoners belong. all ranks will be warned that should they find themselves in the hands of the enemy it is only necessary for them to give their number, name, and regiment. no other information whatever will be given. = . returns.=--the following returns are due at brigade h. q. daily when in the trenches:-- at . a. m.--situation and wind by telephone. at . a. m.--strength and casualty return " daily report on typed form by orderly. artillery intelligence report " at . p. m.--situation and wind by telephone. at . p. m.--intelligence report by orderly or telephone. at . p. m.--return of material required for trench construction to be sent up the following evening by telephone. activity by the enemy's aeroplanes will always be reported. _______, _brigade major, ______ brigade_. th (west lancashire) division trench orders. this book is not to be taken beyond the front trenches. every officer, and every noncommissioned officer in command of any body of troops, is to be in possession of this book and to be thoroughly conversant with its contents. j. k. cochrane, _lieut. colonel, general staff_, _ th (west lancashire) division_. january, . contents. section. duties sentries patrols alertness stand to arrangements in case of attack machine guns cooperation between artillery, etc method of dealing with crater formed by mine explosion reliefs-- (_a_) reconnaissance (_b_) points to be noted by company commander (_c_) guides (_d_) smoking and talking (_e_) rate of march to trenches (_f_) procedure on arrival in trenches wiring organization of work on defenses log books undercutting trench sides communications ration parties from front trenches firing at aeroplanes rifles, equipment, and ammunition precautions against gas attacks action during enemy gas attack action after enemy gas attack action during gas shell bombardment discipline with regard to carrying small box respirators vermorel sprayers sanitation rations and cooking care of grenades steel helmets issue of rum chilled feet and frost bite th (west lancashire) division trench orders. = . duties.=--(_a_) one officer per company and one n. c. o. per platoon will always be on duty. during their tour of duty they will not be in their dugouts. they will frequently visit all trenches occupied by their units. every listening post will be visited, if possible, by an officer once during his tour of duty. (_b_) the officer on duty will, when his tour of duty is finished, inform the officer relieving him and report to him the situation, work in progress, and any other information of use. (_c_) by night the officer and n. c. o. on duty will frequently patrol the trench line, to see that the sentries are alert and to inquire whether they have any information about the enemy to report. (_d_) the n. c. o. coming on duty will go around and post new sentries with the n. c. o. coming off duty. (_e_) the length of each tour of duty will naturally depend on the number of officers and n. c. o.'s available in the company. normally each tour should be, by night hours, by day hours, day commencing at morning "stand to" and night commencing at evening "stand to." in inclement weather the tour of duty must be reduced. (_f_) n. c. o.'s after posting sentries will report "all correct" or otherwise to the officer on duty. (_g_) men will be warned for duty by the platoon sergeant on duty. this will be done at evening "stand to." (_h_) on being detailed for duty a man will be informed at which hours he will come on duty. (_i_) except under special circumstances, such, for instance, as a sentry being killed or wounded, no sentry will be relieved by another man unless the relief is properly carried out in the presence of a n. c. o. (_j_) when possible to do so, notice boards will be placed in each sections' trench, on which will be pinned daily all orders regarding working parties and a list of the men in the section giving the times at which they will come on sentry and other duties. (_k_) the company commander will be responsible for sending in the reports required by battalion h. q. = . sentries.=--(_a_) the number of sentry posts required depends on the propinquity or otherwise of the enemy, the strength of obstacles, the ease with which sentry posts can be reinforced, and other local conditions. there must be sentries enough to insure that the alarm is given promptly in case of attack, and that local resistance is sufficient until support can arrive. brigade commanders are responsible that these requirements are met. (_b_) sentries will be relieved every two hours, except under bad weather conditions, when the length of a tour of sentry duty will be reduced. (_c_) the next relief will remain within arm's length of the sentry. (_d_) every sentry is to be regularly posted by a n. c. o., who will explain to him his duties and ascertain that the sentry and his relief are aware of the position of the section and platoon commanders, and of the sentries on either side, and whether there are any patrols or working parties out in front. (_e_) in important places, i.e., where enemy are suspected of mining, advanced posts, etc., no man should be posted alone. there should be a double sentry. (_f_) no man who has been on work during the day will be placed on sentry till he has had at least hours for rest, unless it is unavoidable. (_g_) when the line is held by small posts at a considerable distance apart, a visiting patrol will also be maintained. this patrol will be responsible for the passing of orders along the line of posts. (_h_) all orders are to be passed along the line by one platoon n. c. o. on duty to the next n. c. o. on duty. (_i_) every sentry is to report when an officer passes his post "all correct" or otherwise. (_j_) during daylight no more sentries should be posted than are actually necessary to insure that the whole front to be watched is kept under efficient observation. (_k_) every sentry by day will be provided with a periscope. = . patrols.=--(_a_) it is the duty of troops holding the front line to establish a command of the ground in front of their parapet up to the enemy's wire. this can only be done by active and constant patrolling by night and reconnaissance by day, so that the ground is thoroughly well known to as large a proportion as possible of officers and other ranks, and so that no enemy can move or remain in it by day or night without fear of death. (_b_) every patrol must have definite orders as to its mission; broadly speaking, patrols may be divided into two classes: ( ) reconnoitering patrols; ( ) fighting patrols. (_c_) the first duty of _reconnoitering patrols_ is to obtain the information for which they are sent out. they fight only in self-defense, or if an especially favorable opportunity presents itself of inflicting loss on the enemy without prejudice to their mission. they usually consist of from to men under an officer. (_d_) fighting patrols are sent out with the express purpose of causing loss or damage to the enemy by such means as engaging enemy patrols or working parties, or by raiding saps, listening posts, or trenches. for identification purposes they should always endeavor to secure at least one prisoner. their strength depends on the nature of the resistance they are likely to meet with. (_e_) battalion commanders are responsible for the orders given to patrols, subject to any instructions which may be issued by higher authority. they are also responsible that all troops whom it concerns are warned when and where patrols will be out, and of the point to which they will return. (_f_) the information gained by patrols is of little value unless transmitted quickly to those whom it concerns. patrol reports will be made out by the commander of the patrol immediately on his return and dispatched at once by way of the battalion h. q. to brigade h. q., unless orders to the contrary have been given. = . alertness.=--anything seen or heard in connection with the enemy, such as movements of individuals, transport wagons, troops, working parties, etc., is to be reported to the nearest officer by anyone who observes it and at any time. = . stand to.=--"stand to" will take place one hour before sunrise and at sunset. at this parade every available man will be present. rifles, ammunition, equipment, clothing, etc., will be inspected. firing steps will be tested as soon as it is dusk to see that each man can fire on the foot of the nearest part of the wire entanglements immediately to his front. they are not to be tested at "stand to" in the morning. rifles, ammunition, and equipment will be inspected after "stand down" in the morning and at "stand to" at night. orders will be issued and steps taken to see that the men understand them. gas helmets and other protective appliances will be inspected in accordance with the orders in force. the time for "stand to" will be fixed weekly by brigade headquarters. = . arrangements in case of attack.=--(_a_) the action to be taken in case of attack is laid down in defense schemes, divisional, brigade, and battalion, with reference to each form of attack which is considerable probable. (_b_) in addition, minor defense schemes will be drawn up for each company front, based on battalion defense schemes, and platoon commanders also will keep up schemes based on that for the company and dealing specially with the action of their respective platoons. (_c_) all the above schemes, divisional, brigade, battalion, company, and platoon, will be handed over at each relief to the relieving formation, unit, etc. they will be made out in consultation by the formations, units, etc., habitually occupying the defenses with which they deal. (_d_) the object of defense schemes is to insure that every officer, n. c. o., and man knows what to do in case of attack, and does it instinctively and promptly. the minor schemes must therefore be detailed and exact, and each officer and man must have his duties thoroughly explained to him by his immediate superior. all defense schemes will be rehearsed once in each relief. (_e_) at each relief of a battalion, company, or platoon the commander of it will report to his immediate commander that he has taken over and understands the defense schemes for the position he is occupying. (_f_) all officers' servants, bombers, orderlies, etc., will have duties allotted to them in case of attack. = . machine guns.=--(_a_) the concealment of machine-gun emplacements is important; consequently it is only in case of attack that machine guns will be fired from their defense emplacements. (_b_) unless emplacements are well concealed guns will not be mounted, except between evening and morning "stand to." (_c_) the guns and their crews will be tactically under the orders of the battalion commander in whose subsector they are located, but no alteration will be made by him in their disposition or arcs of fire; he will, however, bring before his brigade commander any suggestion for improvement in the machine-gun dispositions for defense. (_d_) two men per gun will always be on duty with the gun. (_e_) at dusk, but while there is still sufficient light, each gun will be laid on the center line of the zone alloted to it. (_f_) range cards will be prepared and kept with each gun. (_g_) officers will live in close proximity to their guns. they will daily inspect their guns, emplacements, and ammunition. they are responsible for the cleanliness and maintenance of the emplacements. (_h_) the machine-gun company commander is responsible that his guns are always ready for action, that the emplacements are clear of all material except such as is required for the service of the gun, that embrasures or loopholes are kept clear of all obstructions which may interfere with fire or view, and that the ammunition is in good condition. = . cooperation between artillery, infantry, machine-gun companies, and trench mortar batteries.=--the defense of any line depends largely on the cordial cooperation of all officers responsible for the different means of defense. every opportunity is to be taken by officers of artillery, infantry, machine-gun companies, and trench mortar batteries of becoming personally acquainted with each other and gaining a knowledge of each other's methods. the artillery liaison officer with a battalion is to be looked on as temporarily a member of battalion h. q. = . precautions when one of our mines is exploded.=--(_a_) in the event of one of our own mines being exploded, a clear space of yards will be kept on either side of the mouth of the mine shaft. (_b_) on any front where enemy mining exists, or is suspected, detailed schemes of action will be prepared, under the direction of the brigade commander, to deal with any case of a mine being blown within or without our trench line; and specially organized parties will be kept in immediate readiness for prompt occupation of the crater, where this is advisable (as in the case of a crater within or near our trench line), or for dealing with enemy action. all stores required for consolidation will be kept handy at a special dump in instant readiness and made up into man loads. the orders for action, down to the minutest detail, will be incorporated in the defense scheme and made known to every individual who may have to carry them out. = . reliefs.=--(_a_) =reconnaissance.=--prior to taking over a new line of trenches, the commanding officer, adjutant, and company commanders of battalions, and the commanders of m. g. coys. and trench mortar batteries, will reconnoiter the trenches. (_b_) =points to be noted by company commanders.=--_the following, among others, are points to be specially noted by company commanders before taking over trenches_: (i) number of men holding line to be taken over and distribution. (ii) shelter accommodation. (iii) work being done and proposed. (iv) condition of the wire and defenses generally. (v) information as to the enemy, his habits, snipers, the work he is doing, etc. (vi) water supply. (vii) artillery support. (viii) communications. (_c_) =guides.=--(i) arrangements will be made between the c. o.'s of incoming and outgoing battalions as to the rendezvous where guides will be provided by the latter to conduct the incoming troops to the trenches. (ii) one guide per platoon, one for each company h. q., and one for battalion h. q. will be provided. these guides must know the exact spot where they will meet the relieving troops and the best and safest way to the trenches. (_d_) =smoking and talking.=--after leaving the rendezvous there is to be no smoking or talking till arrival in the trenches. (_e_) =rate of march to trenches.=--the rate of marching to the trenches from billets will not exceed miles an hour. strictest march discipline is to be enforced on the way to and from the trenches. (_f_) =procedure on arrival in trenches.=--(i) the troops being relieved will not leave the trenches until the relieving troops are in position and new sentries have been posted, all trench stores have been handed over and receipts received, and orders to move have been received from the company commander. (ii) platoon commanders will at once personally examine all firing positions and satisfy themselves that each man can fire on the foot of the nearest part of the wire entanglement. (iii) they will examine the ammunition and grenade stores, vermorel sprayers, and antigas solution. (iv) battalion h. q. will report to brigade h. q. as soon as relief is completed. when the relief is completed company commanders will report to that effect to battalion h. q. when shelters are some way behind the fire trench they should not be used during the first night of relief. (v) men will not be dismissed until the company commander has received reports from all his platoon commanders that everything is in order. on taking over trenches the garrison will "stand to" at alarm posts before being dismissed. _the following are some of the many questions a platoon commander should ask himself on taking over a trench and at frequent intervals afterwards_: . i am here for two purposes: to hold this line under all circumstances and to do as much damage as possible to the enemy. am i doing all i can to make this line as strong as possible? am i as _offensive_ as i might be with organized snipers, sniperscopes, rifle grenades, etc., and patrols? . do i connect up all right with the platoons on my right and left? do i know the position of my nearest support? . does every man know his firing position, and can he fire from it, over the parapet, at the foot of the wire? . where are my s. a. a. and bomb stores? are they under cover from the weather? . do all my men know their duties in case of attack--bombers especially? . are all my rifles and ammunition clean and in good order? have all the men got rifle covers? are the magazines kept charged? . is my wire strong enough? . are my parapets and traverses bullet proof everywhere? . where are my sally ports and gaps in my wire? . where are my listening posts? are my listening patrols properly detailed? . what points in front particularly require patrolling at night? . are my sentries in their right places? are they properly posted by n. c. o.'s? have they received proper instructions? . have i got the s. o. s. message in my pocket, and do i know the orders regarding its use? . are the trenches as clean and as sanitary as they might be? are live rounds and cases properly collected? are my bags for refuse and empties in position? . are my trenches as dry as i might make them? . am i doing all i can to prevent my men getting "trench feet"? . how can i prevent my parapets and dugouts from falling in? . have i carefully studied the ground in front and noted all places where germans expose themselves or are likely to do so? have i taken advantage of suitable spots in the ground in front of my parapet or behind my trenches to make "snipers'" lairs, besides making loopholes in the parapet? . have my men always got their box respirators on them, and are they in good order? . are the arrangements, in case of gas attack complete and known to all ranks? . are the orders as to wearing equipment carried out? . are my men using wood from the defenses as firewood? . are my men drinking water from any but authorized sources? are the arrangements for cooking and the care of rations as clean and sanitary as they can be made? are dugouts and shelters kept clean and tidy? . i am here for two purposes: to hold this line under all circumstances, and to do as much damage as possible to the enemy. am i doing all i can to make this line as strong as possible? am i as _offensive_ as i might be with organized snipers, sniperscopes, rifle grenades, etc., and patrols? = . wiring.=--(_a_) each company will have a party of n. c. o. and men who will be specially trained in wiring. they will go out nightly and repair and improve the wire along the company front. the definite duty allotted to trained wirers will not preclude the use of other men to increase the amount of wire along the front. (_b_) the wire defenses of the front must be such as to preclude the enemy from throwing bombs into our trench from the outer edge of our wire. the nearest wire to our parapet should be yards from it, and should be yards at least in depth. = . organization of work on defenses.=--(_a_) the infantry brigade commander is responsible for the maintenance of the front line system of trenches, under direction of the division and with the advice and assistance of the field company commander. (_b_) one field company will usually be allotted to each brigade area for work under the c. r. e. (_c_) the o. c. field company will act as technical adviser to the infantry brigadiers, and with his officers will visit frequently the front line trenches and other trenches in the area, and be responsible for the technical quality of the work done in them; if necessary he will supply r. e. personnel for supervision, but this will be done sparingly, for the infantry should be trained to do all ordinary maintenance and repair work, such as repairing wire, rebuilding of parapets, fixing u frames and revetment hurdles, construction of ordinary dugouts, keeping trenches drained, etc., without r. e. assistance or supervision, leaving the r. e. free for work requiring technical skill, such as-- new works. concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements. main drainage, etc. (_d_) the pioneers will be employed under the c. r. e. on special jobs under their own officers, such as-- construction of new trenches. repair of communication trenches. preparation of camps, etc. (_e_) the battalion commander is responsible for all work done in his subsector, and is, under the brigade commander, responsible for drawing up a time-table allotting hours for work, rest, and meals. time-tables will be submitted in the first instance to brigade h. q. for approval, and will then remain in force till altered, any alteration being submitted in the same way as the original. the following table is an example: _instructions for working party._ [to be used by all officers requiring or detailing a working party.] working party from___________________________________________________ officers__________________________ o. r.______________________________ rendezvous________________________ time______________________________ guide will be furnished by___________________________________________ tools_____________________________ _____________________________ to be drawn from__________________ _____________________________ stores____________________________ ____________________________ to be drawn from__________________ ____________________________ instructions on the work from________________________________________ time party will stop work____________________________________________ whether haversack rations are to be brought__________________________ (_f_) all work on the fire trench should be carried out by the garrison of the trench, assisted, if necessary, by the garrison of the support and the reserve trenches. (_g_) all work in rear of the fire trenches will be carried out by the garrison of the support and reserve trenches. (_h_) efficiency of work depends, firstly, on _organization_, and, secondly, on _supervision_. without these, effort is wasted and work is unsatisfactory. (_i_) _organization_ demands forethought. every officer charged with the execution of any work must-- (i) think out beforehand exactly how it is to be performed, and how many men are necessary to carry it out, including any carrying parties that may be wanted. (ii) appoint a place and time (if this is not already fixed by routine) for the assembly of the party. (iii) ensure that the necessary tools are forthcoming, and that they are either brought by the party to the place of assembly, or are available for them there. (iv) ensure that the necessary materials are at hand or arrange for their conveyance to the place of work by the working party or by a separate carrying party before the working party arrives there. (v) parade the working party at the place of assembly, and tell each individual off to his task, or, in the case of larger parties, tell off their respective tasks, and appoint a n. c. o. or soldier in each squad to be responsible for the work. (_j_) _supervision_ demands energy and watchfulness. the officer charged with the execution of the work will always personally supervise it. working parties will, as far as possible, be detailed by companies, platoons, or sections, and will be accompanied by all officers and n. c. o.'s belonging to them, who will remain with the party and be responsible for the continuance and direction of the work of their own men during its execution. (_k_) unless work has to be performed with equipment on, jackets should be taken off (except in inclement weather) while men are actually working and put on at once when they stop. (_l_) the best work is obtained from men when they are given certain definite tasks, proportionate to the time they are to work, and allowed to fall out when the task is finished. if this can not be done, a fair task must be exacted and men who idle given extra tasks after the rest are dismissed. (_m_) a working party which is too big for the task in hand is worse than one which is too small, since one man who has no job generally makes several others idle. (_n_) all officers and other ranks must be made to understand that working is as useful and important as fighting; that good work deserves as much credit as good fighting, and that bad work brings discredit on himself and his battalion. (_o_) a covering party will be provided for digging and wiring parties outside the front trenches. when such parties are being employed an adequate garrison will be left in the front trench. (_p_) the word "fatigue" will never be employed in connection with work in the trenches or other defences. = . log books.=--each company commander in front line or support trenches will keep a log book (army book ) in which will be entered-- (i) work done; (ii) number of men working; (iii) hours worked; (iv) information obtained from patrols, sentries, or other sources, as to the enemy, his habits, and his trenches. _the above will be entered daily._ (v) work projected or ordered, in order of importance; (vi) a list of trench stores. the log book will be inspected daily by the battalion commander and frequently by the brigade staff. = . undercutting trench sides.=--(_a_) the undercutting of trench sides to make shelters is forbidden. (_b_) when shelters are made the required space from the ground level downwards will be cut out, and a roof, supported on reliable posts, will be made. = . communications.=--(_a_) artillery lines will be laid on the north and west sides of trenches. infantry lines on south and east. (_b_) the infantry brigade signal officer will exercise general supervision over all lines in the brigade area, and will notify artillery brigades when any artillery lines require attention or relaying. he will assist the artillery whenever it may be possible to do so. (_c_) all essential lines should be buried to a depth of at least feet. lines in the communication trenches should be reduced to a minimum. (_d_) lines will be clearly labeled at every hundred yards and at every junction with another line. (_e_) all lines will be carefully patrolled at least once daily. (_f_) one telephonist will always be on duty. (_g_) telephone communication to battalion headquarters and the company on each flank will be frequently tested. (_h_) all "dead" lines will be reeled up at once. (_i_) every man is to know the position of his platoon commander's shelter and of the company headquarters. (_j_) at least two men per section of the support and reserve companies must be able to act as guides to all the company headquarters of the battalion. (_k_) all officers must know the shortest route from their own headquarters to those of the company on their flanks and to their own battalion headquarters. (_l_) it is most important to maintain always visual signaling communications from the front line as far back as brigade headquarters. brigade signal officers will be responsible to brigades that this is done. one message by day and one by night will be sent daily over each visual signaling route. these will be checked by the brigade staff at least once a week to insure that they are transmitted promptly and accurately. (_m_) pigeons when relieved by fresh ones will be flown back, each with a test message to brigade headquarters. times taken from battalion headquarters to brigade headquarters will be checked in each case by the brigade signal officer, and once a week at least by the brigade staff. (_n_) the brigade signal section while with the brigade forms an integral part of brigade headquarters. the brigade commander is responsible to higher authority for the communications within his brigade sector and must have full knowledge of them. he exercises control over his signals through the brigade signal officer. it is the duty of the brigade signal officer to bring to the notice of the brigade commander, as well as of the officer commanding divisional signal company, any defects which exist or any improvements which can be made. = . ration parties found from front trenches.=--usually rations and stores will be carried up to the trenches by supports and reserves. if this is not possible, and it is necessary that men from the front trenches have to be employed, not more than per cent of the men in the firing line are to be away from the trenches at the same time. = . firing at aeroplanes.=--will not be permitted except by order of an officer. = . rifles, equipment, and ammunition (carrying and wearing of).=--(_a_) equipment will always be worn in the front trenches. haversacks, water bottles, packs, and entrenching tools need not be worn. in the support and reserve trenches equipment will be worn at the discretion of the brigade commander. (_b_) ration and carrying parties, orderlies, etc., will wear equipment and carry rifles unless otherwise ordered in special cases by an officer. permission to discard equipment, and particularly to discard arms, should be sparingly given. (_c_) _loading of rifles._--except when it is necessary to shoot, a round will _never_ be kept in the chamber. cut-offs will always be "in" and the safety catch "back." (_d_) the magazine will be kept charged with five rounds. (_e_) in the fire trenches, bayonets will be fixed at night. (_f_) _care of rifles._--all rifles and ammunition will be inspected by an officer at least twice a day, viz, at morning and evening "stand to." they must be kept scrupulously clean at _all_ times, and any mud or grit removed _at once_ without waiting for the next inspection. breech covers will always be kept on rifles, and so fixed that they can be immediately cast loose. each platoon will have its full complement of "breech clearers" in charge of men fully instructed in their use. (_g_) noncommissioned officers and men in firing line and support will at all times be in possession of their rifles and bayonets. the rifles of men in support reserve trenches or dugouts may be placed in protected racks, so that they can be seized quickly. not more than six will be in one rack. (_h_) in very cold weather sentries will occasionally work the bolt of the rifle to prevent the striker becoming frozen. (_i_) on no account is the rifle to be used for the purpose of carrying camp kettles and other loads. (_j_) ammunition boxes in the trenches will be examined frequently to see if the lids work easily. they will not be needlessly broken into. each box will be placed on its side in a recess, protected from the weather, with the lid facing outwards, and with the broader end of the wooden lid uppermost. (_k_) every man will have rounds in his possession. (_l_) platoon commanders will report at "stand to" whether their ammunition is correct or otherwise. (_m_) except in cases of emergency no bandoliers will be issued to men in the trenches. (_n_) _disposal of rifles, equipment, and ammunition._--men wounded and going sick will, if able to walk, wear their equipment and carry their rifles. the rifles and equipment of men unable to carry them, and also those of dead men, will be sent back to the dressing station. all rifles, however, badly damaged, and equipment damaged or not required, will be sent back to the quartermaster. damaged cartridges and empty cases will be collected in sacks hung up in the trenches for the purpose and returned to the quartermaster. = . precautions against gas attack.=--when "_wind dangerous_" is ordered, the following arrangements will be carried out: (i) all small box respirators and p. h. helmets will be carefully inspected; such inspections will be carried out daily during the "_wind dangerous_" period. (ii) within a mile of the front line the small box respirator will be worn in the "_alert_" position on the chest with flap unbuttoned, but protecting the respirator from the wet. (_a_) the small box respirator will be worn in the "_alert_" position outside all clothing. (_b_) nothing will be carried slung across the body in such a way as to interfere with the adjustment of the box respirator. (iii) where for any reason a man is not in possession of a small box respirator, he will wear his p. h. helmet pinned to the shirt in the "_alert_" position. (iv) the chin strap of the steel helmet will on no account be worn under the chin to impede the adjustment of the mask. (v) detached parties of men moving within a mile of the front line will strictly observe the precautions laid down in (ii), (iii), and (iv). commanding officers will be held responsible that this is done. (vi) the duties of sentries are: (_a_) to give warning; (_b_) to adjust immediately the curtains of gas-proof dugouts. (vii) all working parties east of the line poperinghe--bailleul--estaires will have a sentry posted to give instant warning of a gas attack. (viii) a sentry will be posted at each strombos horn or similar alarm and instructed in its use. (ix) a sentry will be posted at every tunnel dugout or other dugout holding more than men. (x) a sentry will be posted to each group of two or three small dugouts. (xi) a sentry will be posted on each headquarters, signal office, and independent body of men east of the line poperinghe--bailleul--estaires. (xii) men sleeping in rearward lines, works, or rest billets where they are allowed to take off their equipment will sleep with their small box respirators round their necks, and must know exactly where their p. h. helmet is to be found. (xiii) company gas n. c. o.'s will report to company headquarters in readiness to assist the company commander should a gas attack occur. (xiv) medical officers will be responsible that a proper proportion of the ammonia capsules issued to them are with stretcher bearers in the front line in readiness for their immediate use after a gas attack. (xv) company gas n. c. o.'s will inspect daily all antigas apparatus--strombos horns, flapper fans, vacuum bulbs, and stores of combustibles for clearing dugouts. they will see that gas-proof dugouts are kept in good order and the curtains sprayed. (xvi) an officer on duty will be detailed from each company in reserve, except resting battalions. (xvii) commanders of units in billets east of the line poperinghe--bailleul--estaires will organize a system of giving the alarm and rousing the men in cellars or houses. = . action during enemy gas attack.=--in the event of an enemy gas attack the following action will be taken: (i) the alarm will at once be given by all means available; by telephone, gongs, strombos horns, and, if necessary, by orderly, and in accordance with paras. (iv) and (v). (ii) there should be as little movement and talking as possible. all ranks will at once adjust their small box respirators. in front lines, and wherever the tactical situation demands, they will stand to arms. in rear lines, where there are large gas-proof dugouts, there is no objection, provided the tactical situation allows it, to men, with the exception of sentries and officers and n. c. o.'s on duty, remaining in the gas-proof dugouts. in any case small box respirators will be adjusted immediately the alarm is given and before the men leave the dugout. (iii) on the alarm being given, all bodies of troops or transport on the move will halt, and all working parties cease work until the gas cloud has passed. (iv) should the gas cloud be unaccompanied by an infantry attack, the message "gas attack, trench ________________," but not the s. o. s. signal, will be sent. (v) should an infantry attack develop, the normal procedure of s. o. s. will be carried out. (vi) troops in the front line not affected by gas must be warned to be prepared to bring a cross fire to bear on the enemy when he attempts to advance against a gassed portion of the trench. (vii) if a relief is in progress, units should stand steady as far as possible until the gas cloud has passed. (viii) supports, and parties bringing up ammunition and grenades, will only be moved up if the tactical situation demands. (ix) the blanket doorways of protected dugouts will be properly adjusted. (x) men in charge of combustibles and fans will prepare to use them as soon as the gas cloud has passed, so as to admit of helmets being removed. (xi) helmets will not be removed after a gas attack until permission has been given by the company commander, who will ascertain from officers and n. c. o.'s trained at the divisional gas school that it is safe to do so. trenches will be fanned clear of gas with fans and sandbags. (xii) in order to guard against the danger of a subsequent gas cloud, all ranks, as soon as the gas is clear and permission has been received to remove their masks, will replace them in the "_alert_" position. a sharp lookout will be maintained as long as the wind continues in a dangerous quarter, and men will sleep on the fire step, within reach of a sentry. a subsequent gas cloud is always likely. (xiii) dugouts will not be entered for at least four hours after a gas attack, and should be ventilated freely. ventilation (natural or by means of fires and antigas fans) is the only sure method of clearing a dugout. if dugouts have to be entered owing to heavy shelling, this should be done with the utmost caution, and gas helmets put on at the slightest trace of gas. the clearing of dugouts should not be carried out by men who have been even slightly affected by gas. dugouts can be efficiently ventilated by means of a small fire burning in the center of a dugout or cellar for minutes. this method has been proved by experiments to be effective, but should be employed with due regard to the danger of smoke being visible to the enemy. dry wood or other combustibles will be kept in readiness for the purpose. (xiv) special arrangements will be made by corps for warning the civil authorities who are responsible for the protection and warning of all civilians within the corps area. = . action after enemy gas attack.=--(i) smoking will be prohibited for a period of three hours after the gas has ceased. (ii) after a gas attack troops in the front trenches will be relieved of all fatigue and carrying work for hours by sending up working parties from companies in rear. horses should not be worked for a similar period if it can be avoided. (iii) no man suffering from effects of gas will be permitted to walk to the dressing station. (iv) rifles and machine guns should be cleaned immediately after a gas attack; oil cleaning will prevent corrosion for hours, but the first available opportunity should be taken to clean all parts in boiling water containing a little soda. = . action during gas shell bombardment.=--(i) small box respirators will be put on in the shelled area. (ii) in the event of a sudden and intense bombardment with gas shell a local alarm will be given in the front-line system of trenches by orderlies; in reserve trenches and battery positions this local alarm may be given by french shunters' horns. in order to avoid false alarms of a gas attack the french shunters' horns should not be used in infantry front-line trenches. (iii) all dugouts in the vicinity will be visited and any sleeping men aroused. = . discipline with regard to carrying small box respirators.=--small box respirators will always be carried within miles of the front line (_i.e._, in advance of the line elverdinghe--vlamertinghe--dickebush--kemmel hill--neuve eglise--nieppe--laventie) whatever the direction of the wind is. p. h. helmets will always be carried in corps areas whatever the direction of the wind is. ="wind-dangerous" period.=--orders as to the position in which the above are worn in "_wind-dangerous_" period are contained in section . ="wind-safe" period.=--when the wind is safe working parties during work and at the discretion of the officer in command may take off their box respirators, provided the latter are placed conveniently at hand for use in case of a sudden gas-shell attack or change of the wind. the p. h. helmet will always be carried. = . vermorel sprayers.=--(_a_) vermorel sprayers form part of trench stores. they are provided for spraying the blankets of gas-proof dugouts and shelters. (_b_) they will be stored in the gas-proof dugout or in a protected position close at hand. (_c_) they must be kept one-third full of water. six gallons of the solution given below to be used in them must be kept in corked jars or petrol tins close to each sprayer. it must not be kept in the sprayer owing to its corrosive nature, and after solution has been used the sprayer must be washed out with water: water.-- gallons (one large bucket); sodium thiosulphate (hypo).-- - / lbs. ( / mess tin); sodium carbonate (washing soda).-- lbs. (one piled mess tin). (_d_) vermorel sprayers will be in charge of company gas n. c. o.'s, who will detail and train men in their care and use and superintend all spraying. the blankets on all gas-protected dugouts will be inspected and sprayed at the commencement of a wind-dangerous period and as often as is necessary to keep them in a moist condition during it. (_e_) company gas n. c. o.'s will take over vermorel sprayers from outgoing n. c. o.'s. (_f_) vermorel sprayers in the line will on no account be used for clearing gas from trenches or dugouts after an attack. against the present gas used by the enemy these chemicals have no effect, and ayrton fans and fires are the means to be used. the sprayers at medical aid posts are provided with a chemical solution which will clear any gas that may have entered their protected posts. = . sanitation.=--(_a_) the importance of strict attention to sanitation will be impressed on all ranks. (_b_) the commanding officer is responsible for sanitation in his unit, and the medical officer will advise him in sanitary matters, making frequent inspection of cook houses, latrines, refuse pits, and water arrangements. under the medical officer latrines and refuse pits will be attended to by the regimental sanitary men and water duties by the r. a. m. c. details attached. (_c_) latrines will be constructed in trenches leading from communication trenches. where the bucket system is employed, chloride of lime or creosol will be freely used. the soil will be removed at night and buried in a deep pit at least yards from the trenches; these pits will be filled in when nearly full and labeled. (_d_) empty tins and other refuse will be collected in receptacles kept for the purpose in the trenches, and returning carrying parties will be used to carry these back to the incinerators in rear. = . rations and cooking.=--(_a_) ration parties from the support and reserve trenches will be made up in complete units. (_b_) the company quartermaster sergeant will accompany the ration parties for his company and report his arrival to the company commander. (_c_) great care is to be taken that ration and carrying parties make as little noise as possible. (_d_) where cooking is done individually, definite times should be allocated for the purpose. (_e_) unused rations will be returned to the quartermaster. (_f_) waste in any form will be discouraged. (_g_) arrangements should be made to insure that soup or some hot drink is available for the men between midnight and a. m. (_h_) all cooking places and appliances will be kept scrupulously clean and inspected daily by an officer. = . care of grenades.=--(_a_) grenades in the trenches will be kept in waterproof boxes placed in recesses in the parapet. (_b_) the brigade bombing officer will frequently inspect all grenades and posts, and will see that the proper number of grenades is kept up in each post and store; that they are protected from weather; that a sufficient number of bombers are present and understand their duties; that the grenades are in good condition; and that waistcoats or carriers are available. = . steel helmets.=--steel helmets will be worn at all times in the trenches (including all communicating trenches). in addition, they will be worn elsewhere than in the trenches as may be ordered from time to time by divisional or brigade headquarters. = . rum.=--(_a_) rum will be issued by an officer, who will see that each individual drinks it in his presence. (_b_) it is not to be issued in the trenches after "stand down" in the evening or before "stand down" in the morning, except with the special permission of the battalion commander. (_c_) men undergoing punishment for drunkenness will receive no issue of rum for fourteen days after the offense unless it is necessary for medical reasons. = . chilled feet and frostbite.=-- . these conditions are caused by-- (_a_) prolonged standing in cold water and mud; (_b_) the continued wearing of wet socks, boots, and puttees; (_c_) constriction of the lower limbs. . they can be prevented or diminished by-- (_a_) the wearing of long gum boots; (_b_) improvements to trenches and provision of dry standings, and warmth; (_c_) reduction of time spent in the trenches as far as the military situation permits; (_d_) good battalion arrangements to insure that men enter the trenches warmly clad with dry boots, socks, and trousers, and with the skin well rubbed with whale oil or antifrostbite grease; (_e_) taking to the trenches a pair of ankle boots, in addition to the long gum boots, and changing from one into the other when possible, at the same time putting on a pair of dry socks. n. b.--the effect from being wet through from perspiration is just as bad as that from water. therefore, change your socks. (_f_) taking exercise. work is the best specific against trench feet. men who are kept moving are kept warm, with their blood circulating properly, and do not get trench feet. (_g_) providing warm food at least once a day in the trenches and shelter. = . commanding officers will be held personally responsible that the following instructions are implicitly carried out under the strictest supervision by officers=: (_a_) previous to a tour of trench duty, men's feet will be well rubbed with oil or grease and dry socks put on. it is not sufficient to apply the oil or grease, it must be _thoroughly rubbed in until the skin is dry_. (_b_) in addition to those worn, another pair of socks will be carried by each man and used as directed in section , paragraph (_e_). (_c_) battalion arrangements will be made for the reissue of one dry pair of socks to each man daily in the trenches. (_d_) puttees are never to be worn with long gum boots. socks can be prevented from creeping down under the sole of the foot by fastening them to the trousers by means of safety pins. on no account will anything in the form of a garter be worn, as it impedes circulation of the blood. (_e_) hot food will be provided at least once a day for men in trenches. hot boxes will be available for carrying this. (_f_) when the feet are affected on no account is hot water to be used, nor are they to be put near a fire. (_g_) regimental rest posts are to be instituted in close proximity to the trenches, where attention can properly be given to men who show signs of exposure. (_h_) on return from the trenches the long gum boots are to be dried inside. = . divisional or brigade arrangements for=: (_a_) provision of the necessary accommodation for the washing and drying of socks in large numbers, and their supply, to battalions in the front line, in exchange for wet ones. (_b_) drying and brushing of clothes. . long gum boots are issued solely for the use of men in the trenches, either in the forward or backward lines. they are not to be issued to or used by men under any other conditions. trancribers note: the following printers errors have been corrected, otherwise spelling is as in the original. sperior/superior certatin/certain sumbitted/submitted words, letters surrounded by equal signs were bold in the original. training for the trenches leslie vickers [illustration: british "tank" in action] training for the trenches a practical handbook based upon personal experience during the first two years of the war in france by captain leslie vickers late lieut. seaforth highlanders lecturer in trench warfare, department of military service, columbia university [illustration] new york george h. doran company copyright, , by george h. doran company printed in the united states of america to lieut. gordon alford of the "anzacs," a very gallant soldier, a boyhood friend, who made the great sacrifice on the somme, august, nineteen-sixteen introduction since the great european war broke out, printing presses have been busy producing text books, handbooks and guides for soldiers. military authorities and civilians alike have come to realise that this war has changed many of our old conceptions of strategy and that it has introduced conditions that are entirely unprecedented. new methods have had to be devised--sometimes on the field itself in the midst of the greatest difficulties--for meeting new and novel methods of warfare. every deadly engine of destruction has called forth some new invention to cope with it. soldiers have had to live and fight under conditions that to the lay mind, or to the mind of the military men of a few years ago, would seem to be impossible. it is reasonable to assume that the inventive genius of the world will be turned more and more in the direction of the problem of how to construct still more terrible machines of destruction. the next war, if there be one, is not likely to be any less fearful than the present, so that the soldier who is called upon to engage in it will require to know the lessons that have been learned in this war. the author hopes that from a fairly long training in england in preparation for work in france, and from some months in the trenches on the western british front, he may be able to offer suggestions that will be of value to men who are training themselves with a view to becoming efficient soldiers. he sends this little book forth, not as a treatise on war, nor yet as a scientific handbook. he merely desires it to serve to bring home lessons that are sometimes too dearly bought. "experientia docet" is the proverb that we used to write in our copy books, and he will feel that he is repaid if, from his experience, others are enabled to learn. while he trusts that there will be many veteran soldiers and instructors who will be glad to have this information in convenient form, he intends this little book primarily for the use of those who are civilians in the process of becoming soldiers. l. v. contents chapter page i. the civilian and the soldier ii. health iii. disease iv. vermin v. health and officers vi. cover and trenches vii. protection of trenches viii. artillery fire ix. gas and liquid fire x. the attack--defence xi. the attack--offence xii. equipment for the field xiii. tricks for the trenches illustrations page british "tank" in action _frontispiece_ figure . showing use of natural cover by soldier lying down . showing use of sandbag and earth for protection . showing position of body behind earth, and direction of fire round right side of cover . trench system showing fire, support and reserve trenches; redoubts; communicating trenches; saps; listening posts, etc. . showing method of cutting trench; parapet and parados; drainage . showing revetting; flooring made of boards and chicken wire; drainage . trench with simple dugout under parapet . finished dugout, 'x 'x ' with deep entrance and shrapnel-proofing . finished trench showing parapet and parados; firing step of earth; flooring; and shelter dugout under parados . machine gun position with heavy overhead cover . simple entanglements made of barbed wire and rough posts . trench periscopes . simple loophole made of steel plate let into parapet . ordinary hand bomb with fuse lighted automatically as lever is released . trench bomb gun firing bomb with stem; and trench mortar firing large bomb . simple gas mask with flutter valve or check valve. ambulance dogs and horses in the gas zone were equipped as shown . british soldier fully equipped with pack, entrenching tool, sandbags and steel helmet training for the trenches training for the trenches chapter i the civilian and the soldier the change from civilian to soldier is one that is not easily accomplished. we soon find that there are many new conditions to be faced, many new and uncongenial tasks to be undertaken, and all sorts of strange and novel regulations to which we must render the strictest obedience. in civilian life we become thoroughly independent. we come and go more or less as we please. we do not usually ask the permission of any one if we wish to depart a little from our customary habits. not since we left school have we answered to roll-calls to any considerable extent, and only in the summertime, "for the fun of it," have we done our own housekeeping and submitted to domestic duties. in civilian life we have been allowed to work out our own salvation, and if we have been part of a machine at all it has been a huge social machine in which we did not figure as a cog but rather as an attachment. in military life things are all changed. we become at once cogs in the great machine. we have a definite work to perform. the smooth running of the plant depends on _us_. we lose much of our independence. we realise that other cogs depend on us, and, further, that there are many bigger cogs who drive us and whose bigness and authority we must thoroughly appreciate and recognise. in my own experience, after some years of being my own master to the degree that only the professional man understands, i found it much to my dislike to be obliged to get permission before i could leave the camp grounds for half an hour. a sentry with a fixed bayonet helped me a little in the appreciation of my new circumstances, and when in a few days' time i was the sentry myself, it did me the world of good and took the edge off my displeasure. again it is not to the liking of the ordinary man to be told that he must rise at a certain hour, and much less is it to his liking to be told that he must be in bed at a certain hour after which talking is considered a misdemeanour and is punishable. _but_ a few weeks of enforced early rising makes one give thanks for the pure fresh air of the small hours of the day; and a few days of hard physical exertion in the process of training makes a man glad to conform to the rule of early to bed, and gives him reason to class as a nuisance the man who talks after "lights out" and thus prevents him from sleeping. in civilian life, too, a man usually chooses with scrupulous care his roommate or mates. in the army one may be placed in a tent or a billet with men who are by no means congenial, unless he is lucky enough to have been able to join a group of companions who form a unit. but even the experience of having uncongenial companions is not altogether without its compensations; for every civilian finds that he has need of rearranging his estimates of men when he enters the army. the sooner our own corners are rubbed off the better, and many of them are inevitably rubbed off when we are ten or thirteen in a tent! the quality that is the salvation of the volunteer is his keenness. we volunteer _because_ we are keen and we would be ashamed to be otherwise. the rules and regulations of army life are liable to try our tempers and our patience. there may come times when we question very seriously the wisdom of having "joined up." there may be occasions when we thoroughly despise our seniors and conclude that everything military was arranged for our oppression. bit by bit we shall lose the conviction that we "know it all" already, and as knowledge increases within us, we shall appreciate more and more the knowledge and experience of those placed over us. regulations and even red tape will be seen to have a wise purpose, though, to the end of our days, we may long for some official scissors to cut it. the change from civilian to soldier is produced in one way only--the learning of obedience. this is the first and last lesson. the civilian is only obedient in certain ways and to a limited extent. the soldier is obedient in every way and to any extent, even to death. it would be wrong of me to indicate that "the habit of implicit obedience" comes easily to the average man. it is difficult to acquire. but it is the "sine qua non" of a good soldier and _must_ be acquired. it is the heart of the system. obedience is given to some one by every rank in the army, from the highest general to the humblest private. when we have learned obedience we need to learn discipline--for the two words do not mean exactly the same thing. discipline may be of two kinds. first of all there is self-discipline. this includes the restraint of selfishness; the cultivation of the spirit of comradeship, generosity and thoughtfulness; the cultivation of habits of moderation in smoking, drinking, etc.; and the elimination of those vices that tend to rob us of our strength or impair the clearness of our thinking. then there is, secondly, army discipline, which includes obedience, thoroughness, common sense and resourcefulness. this question is dealt with at length in military handbooks and needs few words from me. the point to remember is that training for modern war is a serious business, not to be entered upon lightly, nor regarded as a "cinch." a man must first of all be fit in body to be able to withstand the many physical hardships that he will be sure to encounter. then he must be fit in mind to provide him with the imagination and the resourcefulness that he will certainly be called on to show. his heart must be strong not only in the opinion of the surgeon but in the opinion of those who judge his "all-round manhood." he must be trained in such a way that he will be able to stand not only the physical but the nervous strain as well. a visit to the hospitals in england and france will provide the spectacle of row after row of beds containing men who have never been wounded but whose nerves have gone to pieces in the strain of modern warfare. remember to take your training seriously--it pays. chapter ii health benjamin franklin once said, "be sober and temperate and you will be healthy." this is in the main true and is excellent advice for the soldier. but there are ills that are liable to affect the fighting man in spite of his temperance and sobriety and of these we must speak. the health of men in the army is, on the average, much better than that of individuals outside of it. this is due to many causes chief of which is the fact that only healthy men are admitted to the army. then the out-of-door life, regular and wholesome food, sufficient exercise and "early to bed and early to rise" tend to keep him well. if he enters the army fit, he must make it his business to remain fit and it will be well to remember that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." to preserve good health is his duty for only thus can he become an efficient soldier. if the bodily resistance is weakened, man becomes prey to the millions of germs that are to be found in the air and even within his own system. when he is healthy the body is able to keep them in subjection, but once let him permit his system to run down and these armies of microbes will attack him with all their forces. now let us begin first of all with bodily cleanliness. no soldier can come on parade unless his face and hands be clean. shaving, though sometimes a bore, is an excellent method of keeping the face clean and fresh. it tends to smarten a man, and officers are not slow to pick out the careful from the slovenly soldier. we used to reserve the unpleasant tasks of the camp--latrine duties amongst others--for men who would not keep their hands and faces clean. but there are other parts of the body to which it is just as necessary to apply cleansing methods regularly even though no military punishment follows the violation of the rule. first of these that i would mention is the teeth. soldiers, i find, are very careless in this matter till the first thing you know is that someone is absent from parade because of the toothache. on one occasion in the trenches, when we were very short handed, an officer had to leave us for a week to go to the hospital with a badly abscessed tooth due entirely to neglect. cleaning the teeth night and morning freshens the mouth and makes food taste better. an excellent custom is to rinse the mouth after every meal, and while this may often be inconvenient it can be done if a soldier remembers to wash his mouth out with the first sip of water every time he takes a drink. if the teeth are allowed to get very bad a man's digestion suffers and he falls ill. this robs the army of part of its fighting strength, a result which every soldier has an interest in avoiding. [illustration: figure : showing use of natural cover by soldier lying down.] [illustration: figure : showing use of sandbag and earth for protection.] hair. no better advice can be given to the soldier on this subject than "cut it short." the shorter the better, for when it is short it is easy to keep clean both from body dirt and vermin. in this war soldiers have almost invariably had the clippers run completely over their heads. soap and water are as good for the head as for any other part of the body. trunk. it is not always possible for soldiers to get a shower or plunge every day, but a small sponge carried as part of the equipment will help a good deal. in france, where the water was scarce, we had to make it go a long way. when the enemy permitted, i used to get my regular morning bath with the aid of the sponge and about a saucerful of water. i felt like a canary during the process and wanted to chirp and flap my wings. soldiers should be encouraged to go in swimming whenever circumstances permit. to go in swimming was not a military order in my regiment, but we used to take the men to the sea and then ask who wanted to go in. about eighty per cent of the men would volunteer. then we would tell off the remaining twenty per cent for vigorous physical exercises and after ten minutes give them the choice of continuing or taking a plunge in the sea. they all went in! men's objections to water usually come from habit and they soon learn to appreciate its refreshing power. feet. "an army marches on its stomach"--metaphorically, but it marches on its feet, literally, as every poor infantryman knows. and it has to do a good deal of marching in war and in preparation for war. "route marches" and "hikes" are very popular with the training staff as the soldier will find, and they are usually planned by the men who ride horses! so important did we consider the care of the feet that we used to have "toe parades" twice a week with the doctor in attendance. men with neglected feet were considered as candidates for cookhouse garbage duty, and were promptly assigned to this task. in the first place feet must be comparatively clean--soap and water recommended! then they should be free from corns. this is not so easy to accomplish. paring with a knife helps, but if they get too bad the doctor or the chiropodist should be consulted. another frequent source of trouble is neglected toe nails. the best way is to cut them straight across, not too far down, but so as to keep them from tearing the sock or cramping the foot in the boot. blisters sometimes arise on the feet. they should be treated at once, mainly by removing the cause--which may be in the boot itself or the sock--and then by bathing them in a solution of boric acid. if the socks are kept oiled, or even if small pieces of soap are put into the boots, this condition will, in large measure, be avoided. i have seen many a pitiful case of men trailing along the road well in rear of their company, limping and hobbling as best they could, all due to the fact that they had not paid the attention to their feet that they must if the feet are to do the work for which the army calls. a few minutes attention per day given to these points will, i am confident, help to procure and maintain health for the soldier. but all his care will be wasted unless that which he takes _inside_ his body is wholesome--food and drink. in camps the soldier usually has all his food cooked for him, and it is the duty of his officers to see that it is good in quality, sufficient in quantity, and reasonably well cooked. as the soldier does the serving himself, that is entirely his own lookout. in the trenches it is not possible to have things arranged as one has in camp. the regimental cookers were usually stationed about three miles from the firing line--for their safety--and all the food was cooked there and sent up to the lines in boxes or sandbags, and apportioned to the various platoons according to the number of men on the strength. three times a week the cooks were given fresh meat to prepare for us--when the government says it is fresh it is fresh even in summer time and when the flies have been busy--and for the other days we subsisted on canned meats or "bully beef" as it was called. the meat was either baked or boiled, though sometimes we got a stew--in camp we got too many stews! potatoes were boiled, usually in their jackets. this food we could heat in the trenches in our individual cooking apparatus, which also served to cook our ration of bacon for breakfast, while in the upper part of the tin we made tea. of course in the trenches we had to eat whatever we could get, but our lot was relieved considerably by the arrival of delicacies from england by the parcel post. this sometimes subjected us to the temptation that we were under while in training, and that was to eat pastry and suchlike food, which, while very appetising, is not to be recommended as a diet for the soldier. [illustration: figure : showing position of body behind earth, and direction of fire round right side of cover.] on the question of drink my views have become very pronounced since my experience with the army. undoubtedly the best universal drink for the soldier is tea--preferably weak. i should say water were it always possible to get water that is pure. but during a campaign pure water is a luxury. by making the water into tea you make sure that it gets boiled, and by the addition of tea you get a beverage that has not the insipid sickly flavour of boiled or sterilised water. coffee is preferred by americans, i know, but there are dangers to be recognised especially by those whose hearts are inclined to be weak. with regard to alcohol i would most heartily recommend total abstinence. i need scarcely remind american readers that there is not a single front rank baseball manager that allows his men to indulge in alcohol. from my own experience i could tell of many men who were permanently rendered unfit as soldiers through foolish indulgence. of the men who were brought before the colonel for more or less serious crimes, per cent of them owed their humiliation directly to alcohol, and per cent of them to alcohol indirectly. i know that it is possible for some men to take alcohol in moderation. not many continue to do so, and sooner or later there is almost certain to be an overindulgence. in the british army men were sentenced to the extreme penalty--death--for being intoxicated while on active service in france. i say without hesitation that the best men i had were the abstainers and the worst men i had were the drinkers. alcohol weakens the tissues of the body, it lowers its vitality and makes it an easy victim to disease, and worse still, it rapidly obscures the mind. for a war of the kind that is being waged in europe a man needs to have his head very clear, and this he cannot do if he is the victim of the alcohol habit. many total abstainers from alcohol are tempted to take "gassy" drinks, fizzes and so forth. these tend to shorten the wind and should therefore be avoided. if plain water has to be drunk, care should be taken to see that it is reasonably pure, and all vessels such as water bottles should be thoroughly rinsed each time before using. [illustration: figure : trench system showing fire, support and reserve trenches; redoubts; communicating trenches; saps; listening posts, etc.] when these simple rules of eating and drinking are followed many of the dangers incidental to army life will be avoided, and physical fitness established. a kindred subject is that of smoking. this habit has become so universal in the british army that it is almost true to say that every one smokes. from my own experience i have seen very few ill effects from it except in cases of obvious overindulgence. but undoubtedly it is easy to overdo the cigarette business, and on this point i would utter a word of warning. pipes are to be preferred, though i admit it is difficult to get men to smoke anything else than cigarettes in the trenches. in the monotony and strain of trench life, and from the need to do something to keep the stench of decaying bodies from the nostrils, men do smoke to excess. there is some excuse there, but during training at home every man must endeavour to be reasonable in his indulgence. clothing. i have found that men are very apt to load themselves up with all sorts of useless items of apparel. in their endeavour to keep warm they have often badly overdone it with the result that they have found themselves perspiring and exhausted in the midst of an important piece of physical labour. of course the soldier will need to see to it that his underclothes are sufficiently warm to keep out the extreme cold, but it is better to _add_ something to the clothing from time to time--such as a cardigan waistcoat--than to be equipped permanently with the heaviest kind of underclothes. above all, avoid those garments that are being offered extensively to unsuspecting men, and which, while they will undoubtedly keep you warm, will also prevent the proper perspiration of the body. the body _must_ be allowed to perspire and the air must be allowed to carry off the perspiration. woollens are the best for this purpose, and though the initial cost of them is rather great, they are worth it in the long run. boots. in the paragraph on feet i couldn't help mentioning the matter of boots, but it is so important that, at the risk of too great repetition, i want to mention it again. you must have boots that are right, otherwise you will soon be lamed and thus be out of action. and every man out of action "counts two on a division." we found it advisable in france to get boots that were large enough to accommodate the feet and _two_ pairs of socks--one thin and one thick pair. into the boots we poured a small quantity of oil, or between the socks we put small pieces of soap to keep the feet in good condition. you will find that the feet must be oiled if they are to stand the work of a campaign. [illustration: figure : showing method of cutting trench; parapet and parados; drainage.] [illustration: figure : showing riveting; flooring made of boards and chicken wire; drainage.] but sometimes injuries are caused to the feet by other parts of the clothing of a soldier. men frequently laced their puttees or leggins too tight and found that they suffered pains in the feet--the circulation was being stopped. this rendered them very liable to frostbite, than which there is nothing more painful. if there are signs of freezing, remove the boots as soon as possible and restore the circulation. but if the feet are actually frozen the soldier is in for a long and tedious illness, and will be lucky if he does not need to have his feet amputated. i am told that, during the first campaign in the carpathians, the central powers lost , men per day with frozen feet. before leaving this subject to deal with diseases and their avoidance, i would like to say a word or two on the congenial subject of rest. a soldier should get as much of it as he can, consistent, of course, with doing his duty. never stand when you could as well be lying down. throw yourself on the ground whenever you can, to rest, and let the whole body relax. when you are given a rest on the roadside, stretch out on your back and breathe as deeply as you can. give your mind and body alike a vacation and you will feel the benefit of it at the end of the day. don't spend your hours of beauty sleep in talking--get that done during the day. your body will call for rest after the tiring duties of the day and you should give it all the rest you can. [illustration: figure : trench with simple dugout under parapet.] [illustration: figure : finished dugout, ' Ã� ' Ã� ' with deep entrance and shrapnel-proofing.] chapter iii disease if the rules of health set forth in the foregoing chapter are carefully observed, the soldier will be doing the best he can to keep his body fit. he will be building up a reserve of strength that will stand him in good stead should the germs of disease find entrance into his body. but there are times when, in spite of all our precautions, these little microbes get the upper hand, and a long struggle against them begins. the disease that has been responsible for the death of armies of soldiers is enteric or typhoid fever. during the campaign in south africa the british lost more men through the ravages of this disease than through bullets and shells. but during the present war there have been comparatively few cases of enteric, and the number that have proved fatal is very small. for this result we have to thank the medical profession that has given so much study and care to the perfection of a method of combating this disease. the secret has been found to lie in the inoculation of the soldier with small doses of the disease itself till he becomes comparatively immune to it. inoculation was not made compulsory in the first armies that were raised in england after war broke out, but it was made compulsory for men who desired to become members of the british expeditionary force in france. most men gladly accepted this medical boon and subjected themselves to this simple and painless operation. but there were others who objected, sometimes through fear of the pain, and sometimes through what they termed "conscientious objections." anti-inoculation societies got busy and spread their wretched literature throughout the camps and made men thoroughly afraid, both of the operation and of its results. to meet this the war office issued through the papers and by pamphlets, information from the medical authorities as to the wonderful results that had already been achieved. they were able to prove beyond all dispute, that of the men who caught the infection in france, practically all of those who had been inoculated recovered--their cases being light--while those who had not been inoculated became easy victims to the disease. as the war has progressed these figures have been amplified till now there can be no question that the use of "inoculation" has made this dread disease a thing to be feared less than the measles. [illustration: figure : finished trench showing parapet and parados; firing step of earth; flooring; and shelter dugout under parados.] officers adopted different methods in counteracting the teaching of those who tried to keep the soldiers from submitting. some of them argued with the men and told them of the wonderful results that had been achieved. others warned their men that they would be left behind when the battalion went to france. for my own part i adopted the method of sending for the medical men whose business it was to administer the "dose." when they were all prepared i marched in my men from some light fatigue work in which they had been engaged, told them to take off their coats and roll up their sleeves, and three at a time they appeared before the waiting surgeons. the business was over in no time. i marched them off to a place where i could talk to them and then acquainted them with the advantages of inoculation. the announcement of forty-eight hours' freedom from drill for the whole company to let their arms limber up put the few that were disgruntled into good spirits again, and i was able to report to the o. c. that per cent of my men were willing to be inoculated--and had been inoculated! so little did any of them suffer from its effects that they readily lined up in ten days time when they were to receive the second dose. at intervals of two or three months in france the operation was repeated and i never had a single man on the sick list from enteric! now, while inoculation is excellent and should be insisted on in all armies, both for the sake of the individual soldier and of those who associate with him, every possible precaution should be taken by the soldier even after this has been done. all water for drinking should be looked upon with suspicion. never take any chances for the sake of getting a hasty drink. many communities have water supplies that are admirable and when military operations are carried on there, the difficulties disappear. on the other hand many places have the most abominable water supply systems. where we were in france, the country was very flat, and consequently the drainage poor. the buildings that housed the human beings and the cattle and pigs on the farms were as a rule all built around a "midden" into which flowed all the refuse. in many cases the family water supply, a well, was dug within three feet of this cesspool, so that the drainage from the latter was almost sure to reach the former. this is "asking for" enteric, and some men fell victims to it before they could be made to realise the danger. the best rule to follow, as we all soon learned, was to get our drinking water exclusively from the army water wagons, for there the water had been treated and the danger lessened. at times we could not get to the water carts and a certain degree of risk had to be run. [illustration: figure : machine gun position with heavy overhead cover.] not only with water has the greatest care to be taken, but also with food. flies are notorious carriers of disease, and consequently soldiers must see to it that no food is left uncovered. nor should food ever be placed near latrines or any place where there is decaying matter. with universal inoculation, and with a careful following of these simple rules laid down, the ancient scourge of the army loses much of its terror. the task of combating it lies mainly with the medical and sanitary staff, though the common soldier must also play his part of carefulness. some men carried small sterilisers with them. this practice is not to be recommended for it is very difficult to keep these little utensils clean, and then they themselves become harmful. tabloid sterilisers i have found to be effective in an emergency. those who have followed the history of the war will remember how the serbian army was threatened with extinction through the deadly disease called typhus. there is no doubt that the army and most of the civil population would have been wiped out had it not been for the timely assistance that that brave little nation received from medical men and women throughout the world, notably america. many of these brave souls made the final great sacrifice in their endeavour to stamp out this disease. then again its horrors have been more recently brought to our notice through the revelations of the conditions at wittenberg camp in germany. the story that captain vidal and major priestly, officers of the royal army medical corps, had to tell of their living death in that awful internment camp, brought home to the british people and then to the world, the frightfulness of that disease, as well as the inhumanity of certain german medical officials. fortunately, typhus has been little known in western europe, and it is possible that soldiers in this country will never know its ravages. but all the same it is as well to be prepared for it, and to know the methods of preventing its outbreak. it is a disease that is carried by flees and lice and consequently the most that can be said in a work of this kind is to recommend the greatest pains in the removal of these creatures from the body should they ever take up their residence there. i refer the reader to the chapter on "vermin" for methods of combating "lice." dysentery, enteritis, and colitis. these names are applied to various kinds and grades of stomach troubles, between which it is difficult for the common soldier to differentiate, and which show themselves with most distressing effects. they come, usually, from drinking bad water or eating bad food. even with the greatest care that the commissariat could take, there were occasions when food unfit for human consumption was served to the troops. in the trenches it was not to be wondered at that we were stricken with these diseases, for the flies that infested the trenches and lived on the dead bodies there, favoured us with many visits at food time and poisoned the latter for us. there is no way that i know of to prevent it, and the sufferer will be well advised to report to the medical officer for skilled treatment. cases of dysentery were not very frequent in france, but they were in gallipoli where the food supply left much to be desired. tetanus is a disease that is brought about by infection which enters the system through a wound. in the early part of the war it occurred only too frequently till, in this case also, the skill of the medical profession provided us with a serum to combat it. the universal practice now is to inoculate with anti-tetanic serum just as soon as possible after a wound has been received. by this means tetanus, like enteric, is rapidly ceasing to be regarded as a menace. i have no intention of exhausting the whole category of diseases to which man--and therefore the soldier--is heir, but simply to touch upon those that are most likely to occur in a campaign. the foregoing list includes, i believe, all the most likely, but to them i should like to add these two--smallpox and cholera. to deal first with smallpox, we can say, fortunately, that it is rare. this is due in large part to the almost universal provision of vaccination, which should be insisted upon in an army. cholera is of rare occurrence, and nothing can be done to ward it off except to follow carefully the ordinary rules of health and sanitation. should it, unfortunately, break out, the army must place itself unreservedly in the hands of medical authorities who are especially qualified to deal with it. there is one other disease that has made its effects felt on almost every army, and which it has been found impossible to thoroughly eliminate. the hands of those who would lessen its influence are to a great extent tied, because in the past, the only method that has been permissible to eliminate venereal disease has been what i shall call "the moral method"--the appeal to morality and the intelligence of the individual soldier. we have used this excellent and praiseworthy method for generations, but it has never been found capable of eradicating the evil. some other means, from an army point of view, has obviously to be resorted to. but even to discuss the matter, one runs the risk of being ruled out of court by those who will admit none but the aforementioned "moral argument." when the first expeditionary force went to france, the late lord kitchener, then secretary of state for war, issued an appeal to the men, in which he besought them to be on their guard against two of the evils that lessen the efficiency of soldiers--wine and women. the men who fell victims to wine or whiskey or other forms of alcoholic intemperance, were punished, first of all with imprisonment, and then, when it was seen that this penalty did not meet the case, the death penalty was imposed for such as became intoxicated when at their post of duty. obviously the army cannot afford to have as its guardians men who cannot keep sober. those who fell victims to loose women and contracted venereal diseases--and it is beyond a doubt that most of the women who follow an army are diseased--had to be withdrawn from their positions and sent back to the bases to hospitals. every man, therefore, who violated lord kitchener's advice, was playing into the hands of the enemy to this extent that he was taking the risk of contracting a disease which would rob the army of his services. my own colonel used not to mince words on this subject but used to say that such men might just as well go over to the enemy at once. but with every kind of pleading and threat on the part of officers, it was found that there were men who disregarded their advice. a soldier's pay automatically stops under these circumstances, and at first it was the custom to acquaint his family with the fact that he had been sent to such and such a hospital, and the people of england soon got to know the purpose of these hospitals, and many a home suffered shame from the indiscretions of the men who represented them in france. when the australian troops were quartered near cairo--than which there are few more immoral cities in the world--venereal cases were frequent, in spite of the admonitions of the combatant officers and of the medical staff. what was to be done? every effort was made to restrain the men and keep them out of the notorious red light district, but case after case of the disease turned up. eventually some of the medical men hit upon the scheme of establishing at the entrance to the various camps, tents to which men could go on their return from the city. in those tents there was a representative of the army medical corps equipped with all the latest appliances in the form of prophylactics, and these were administered without charge and without question, even as to name, to all who sought this method of protecting themselves after acts of indiscretion. the result was very gratifying from the medical standpoint, for the number of those who contracted the disease rapidly declined and the efficiency of the army was maintained at a correspondingly high standard. of course a protest was immediately entered by those who were particularly interested in the morals of the men, and the charge was made that it was putting a premium on immorality. for my own part, interested in both of these matters, i have come to the conclusion that the old methods have failed, and that i would rather have an army immoral and well than an army immoral and diseased. as human nature is constituted at present i can see no alternative, though i believe it to be our bounden duty to continue to urge the need of self-restraint. i do not fear that these words will be taken to cast a slur upon any army, for those of us who are not blind are perfectly aware that the same kind of immorality exists among civilian populations as in armies. for those men who shall read these words of mine i would with all the force at my command urge the close following of the precepts of lord kitchener. [illustration: figure : simple entanglements made of barbed wire and rough posts.] a kindred problem with which the authorities sometimes have to deal is that of "unnatural men." records of the german army before the war contained many examples of this most revolting form of perversion. in the british armies that were raised at the outbreak of the war, several cases occurred, the offenders being punished with terms of imprisonment varying from seven to fifteen years with hard labour--much too lenient. the whole problem is most difficult to deal with, and any one who attempts to deal with it risks public censure. yet the problem must be faced, nevertheless, and the sooner we apply sane methods to its solution, the better. of course views will differ as to what constitutes sane methods, but i am convinced from my own experience with soldiers that the method outlined above is a good one. we must not, however, fail to emphasise the dangers that men run. they must be taught the folly of it. we must make it plain to them that it is not worth the candle to run the risk of contracting the most horrible diseases that even our advanced medical science can never cure with certainty, for the sake of a brief gratification. a man's whole life may be ruined; his innocent children afflicted with a loathsome disease; his wife made to endure years of physical and mental torment as the price of that foolish act. were this book a moral treatise i should spend time in driving this point home with more force. but as the object i desire to achieve is to show men how they can become soldiers and remain fit, it must suffice to say again that the surest way to lay up misery for yourself, to render yourself unfit to remain at your soldier tasks and thus increase the odds of the enemy against your side is to run the risk of venereal disease through contact with women. chapter iv vermin i feel that no hints on health would be complete without some brief reference to the "terrors of the trenches"--lice. a learned professor of one of the universities of england published a little book whose exact title i have forgotten but which was something like this--"flees, lice and bugs, or, the little brothers of the prussian." that is pretty hard on the enemy--or the lice--but it serves to emphasise one important point and that is, that the ravages of these vermin is so great that they can well be said to be fighting the same cause as the enemy. in spite of all a soldier can do, lice are sure, sooner or later, to overtake him. they make their nests in the straw upon which he throws himself when fatigued, or in the walls of houses, or on other human beings, and contact is almost sure to bring them. they are most interesting little pets whose sole interest in life seems to be to lay eggs and thus make sure that their race shall be perpetuated. the female louse takes up her abode upon the soldier's body and immediately sets herself to an egg laying competition. if she gets five minutes start of her victim she lays up for him weeks of trouble, and the only thing to do is to go after her and her eggs as soon as her presence is made known. i discovered my first louse while i was at luncheon in the trenches. i seized the spot on my arm where i believed her to be, and calling to my orderly hurried off to the fields some distance behind the lines. there we began the hunt which ended, i am happy to be able to say, in her decease. but the eggs had been laid and not for weeks did i succeed in ridding myself of these unwelcome boarders. i was, much against my will, used as a perambulating incubator, and only the greatest vigilance served to rid me of the pests. [illustration: figure : trench periscopes.] it was our custom, as soon as we were relieved from the trenches for a spell of a few days, to turn all the men out into a field and bid them "hunt!" i used then to walk around amongst the men and enquire of them what luck they had had. "two," "seven," "nineteen," etc., were the frequent replies. one of the saddest men i have ever seen replied "none, sir." his unhappiness was due to the fact that he was perfectly well aware that there were some there to be caught, but that he had not yet had the luck to get them. as to means of combating them, the best is constant vigilance. make sure that not only the live lice are killed but that the eggs as well are destroyed, say with the ash of a lighted cigarette. the next thing to remember is that body lice are opposed to cleanliness, and that the oftener you can wash yourself, the more you inconvenience them. gasoline squirted over the body and the clothes also serves to discourage them. some thin cotton shirts covered with a solution of carbolic, had a good effect, and at the least they served as another barrier to the little rascals before they could reach the body. since i returned to this country, a manufacturer of vermin killers told me that the following method will be found effective: take a goose quill and seal up one end. put in half an inch of mercury, and then seal the other end making a little phial of about an inch and a half in length. sew this to the clothes under each armpit and round the belt line. as to whether this will work i do not know, for i am glad to be able to say that i have not needed to test the theory since i returned to america. fleas are not so common, but when they occur, they must be hunted with the same vigilance as lice, and the same methods apply to their extermination. as carriers of typhus, they are particularly to be dreaded. chapter v health and officers so far i have been dealing with disease from the point of view of the individual and i have said nothing of the duties of officers towards their men in this respect. a word on the subject may not be out of place. when the new armies were formed in england at the outbreak of war it was summer time and the new troops were placed in tents in open fields. the lessons of camp life were difficult for many of these men to learn, and some of the experience that was obtained was bought dearly. it will occur to every soldier that the greatest care must be paid to the cleanliness of the lines. men are often too lazy to carry their scraps to the proper garbage pails, and carelessly throw them around in the neighbourhood of the tents. in fine weather they can be easily seen and the culprits, when discovered, can be made to clean up all the lines. when the culprits cannot be discovered, whole companies have to be put to this fatigue work. in wet weather it is worse, for the particles of meat and bread get trodden into the ground and before long there arises a stench from them. sometimes, too, rats and mice are encouraged by this careless method. we used to find that certain men who had an inherent objection to fresh air, would eat all their meals within the tents. this practice must be stopped at all costs. bring the men into the open and let them stay there and they will be all the better for it. it is excusable for them to remain in the tents during rain but at no other time. the inspecting officer would frequently find pieces of bacon and butter and cheese trodden into the ground on which the men had to sleep. the lines _must_ be kept clean. officers will be well advised to assign liberal fatigue work to the men who are guilty of messing up the lines, and littering them with particles of food, papers, cigarette and cigar ends, etc. the regular sanitary squad cannot be expected to do its work unless the soldiers themselves are made to co-operate. it is a good thing to encourage the spirit of rivalry between units, and men can often be jollied on into keeping their lines neat and tidy by pointing out to them lines that are better kept--and sometimes praising them when their lines are up to the required standard. we found that a good many of the men had quite an artistic instinct, and would use up the old bottles and stones from around the camp to execute the most beautiful designs representing the battalion colours or the flags of the allied nations. we also met with considerable difficulty in getting men to thoroughly air the tents. the flaps of round tents should be rolled up just as early as is possible each morning. a good plan is to "strike" individual rows of tents occasionally and give the ground a thorough airing and disinfecting. we followed this plan with tents which contained notoriously lazy men who would not rise at the proper time and developed the habit of leaving the flaps of the tents down. they were awakened by the orderly corporal in the usual course of events and given ten minutes in which to appear outside their tents. promptly at the expiration of this time a squad arrived on the scene and, undoing all their guy ropes, let the tents down very suddenly on their heads. it is very provoking to have a mass of canvas come about your ears in this way, and the slackers soon learned the only way to avoid it. [illustration: figure : simple loophole made of steel plate and let into parapet.] [illustration: figure : ordinary hand bomb with fuse lighted automatically as lever is released.] when an army has to live in tents, a certain amount of dampness is almost certainly inevitable. but if proper drains are dug around them, and every advantage taken of the sunlight, much can be done to avoid what frequently ends in rheumatism or pneumonia. it pays to construct good cinder roads in all the camp lines and to see to it that the approaches to the individual tents are prepared in the same way. when we were first dumped down in a field of clay in the midlands of england and told to prepare it for the horse lines to accommodate the sixteen hundred horses that were due in a few days, we were faced with a colossal task. we were all turned into navvies, and long before we even had shelter for the horses they had arrived. it was a most tedious business to construct lines for them in december in england, and we had to cart many hundreds of tons of cinders and rock to make the place possible. for weeks we worked at it, and there were complaints from the men that they had not joined the army to be navvies. they had joined it to fight, so they said. but when the stables were finished and they could approach the lines over nice smooth dry roads they realised that their labour had not been in vain. there is usually a fitting return in health from all the labour invested in the preparation of a good camp. another place in which officers and non-commissioned officers must be on the alert for filth, is the cook house. this is true in winter as well as in summer time. it has been my experience that the laziest and dirtiest men volunteer for the task of cook. the reason is that they are able to get the choicest portions for themselves, be free from the bore of attending drills and parades, and get a little higher pay, besides what they can get from the soldiers on the side for little favours. in an army such as was formed in england at the beginning of the war it was impossible to get enough trained cooks for the work, and all sorts of men were run in for the job. many of them were thoroughly lazy and incompetent. there was, of course, a rooted objection to calling in the aid of women--though few of us ever think of employing men to do our cooking in private life--and when we suggested it for the purpose of improving the grade of our food in the officers' mess, we were met with the reply that it had never been done. that was the reason for keeping out a good many reforms in dear old england. but by strategy on our part, and by the eventual demands of the stomachs concerned that some change be made, we were able to introduce a woman manager for the mess kitchen. she reformed everything, including the costs of the food. our mess bills were considerably reduced, the food was better cooked, and we got a variety that had never seemed to occur to the late robbers that we had employed. when england began to feel the want of fighting men, it entered the brains of some of the brass hat officials that this was a sphere in which the women could well supplant the men--and woman came into her own again, at least in part. that was a job that women _could_ do well, but it was a long time before we would agree to let them. [illustration: figure : above is trench bomb gun firing bomb with stem; below is trench mortar firing large bomb.] but whether men or women are in charge of this important department of an army, the duty will still devolve upon the officers to see that the cookhouses are kept clean and that the food is up to the proper standard. one case occurred in a camp near london where they were following the principle of allowing outside caterers to supply the food, in which the orderly officer of the day just managed to stop in time, the service to the men of meat that was diseased. the desire to make a little additional profit had blinded these unpatriotic people to the welfare of the troops, and they were punished with a fine and with the loss of their catering contract. that is mild punishment. grafters of every kind, from those who put bad powder into shells or bad leather into boots, to those who risk an outbreak of sickness through supplying improper food, should all be treated the same way that certain other enemies of their country are treated--a court-martial and a firing party. no condemnation is too severe for them. officers will not always find it an easy task to detect these thieves, but they must be very much on their job for this purpose. then again good food sometimes is allowed to become bad food through the careless handling by the cooks and their assistants. covers are left off dishes that contain meat, butter, cheese, etc., and they are ruined by dust or flies. contaminated food is allowed to remain in close proximity to the food that is to be offered to the troops; cooks either use unclean utensils themselves or allow the orderlies from the various units to return dirty utensils to them; or they handle the refuse and then the food without ever a thought to washing their hands. one very knowing old rascal of a cook we had used to have his place in excellent condition at eleven in the morning when the orderly officer used to make his rounds, and one day when i came upon him suddenly it was to find that he was using one of the bread bags as a receptacle for his change of clothes--a filthy collection of shirts, socks, etc. he was fired, and cursed me for many a day as he carried his great weight of avoirdupois round the training field with a rifle over his shoulder like any other infantryman. [illustration: figure : simple gas mask with flutter valve or check valve. ambulance dogs and horses in the gas zone were equipped as shown.] with regard to water, while the regular line officers must also keep an eye to its general purity, it is generally left to the care of the medical staff to test it from time to time to make certain of its fitness for human use. we experienced a good deal of trouble in making the men keep their wash lines clean and in making them refrain from throwing soapy, greasy water on the ground. it is the easiest method--for them--but the costliest in the long run, and they must be made to throw it into the proper drains. then, too, no camp will be complete without a thorough system of garbage disposal. the refuse should be collected into tins that can be closed to keep away the rats, etc., and then taken at certain specified times to the incinerator. the latter can easily be built under any circumstances and there can be no reason for a camp not being well supplied in this matter. latrines, also, must be thoroughly inspected by the officers of every unit. they should be established at some distance from the tent lines, and as far removed as possible from the kitchen. sand and lime should be liberally supplied. the tasks of attending the latrines will normally fall to the sanitary squad who can be assisted by those who are convicted of the crime of failing to keep their lines clean. it is wonderful what a wholesome effect on a lazy man has the imposition of three days latrine duty! in the trenches this was one of the few punishments at our disposal for the slackers, for they welcomed any punishment that would send them away out of the firing line. the same principles that have been laid down for tent life will apply more or less to life in billets. when the winter came all the troops in england and scotland were moved into billets in towns where they could be accommodated. these were usually manufacturing towns that had numerous small homes that could each accommodate a soldier or two. from the point of view of training this is a system far from satisfactory for the men so easily get out of control. but it is the best system that we had at the time. later on, extensive villages of huts were constructed, and the training proceeded normally. sometimes groups of men were assembled in large vacant houses. there was no furniture in them and the troops had to sleep on the floor. cooking facilities were inadequate, but worst of all were the toilet facilities. these houses had been constructed to serve as the homes for average families of five to ten, and when fifty or sixty men were turned into them the result is imaginable. the same problems will probably be presented if ever american soldiers are housed in this way, and those who happen to be officers will have to exercise the greatest vigilance. then again we found that there are some men who have no idea of the risk they run in leaving food lying about a house or hidden away. after a certain group had moved away from bedford, england, it was my business to go round the houses they had occupied to see if they were fit for occupation by the incoming troops. i found to my horror in one of the houses that some of the men, instead of taking surplus meat out to the garbage cans, had put it under a board in the floor! it had been there a few days when i found it, and examination of the other rooms disclosed the fact that all sorts of things from meat and bread and tins to old clothes had been hidden in similar places by these lazy fellows. my reader will soon realise that the officer of to-day has to keep his eyes constantly open to preserve the best conditions for the training of his men. and while i am on this point i would just add this word. not only must the officers see to it that the food and water are good and the camp kept clean, but he must also have the men's health constantly in mind when he is planning their schedule of training. moderation is the word. it is possible to be too enthusiastic and do the men more harm than good with hasty training. exercises should be graduated. it must be remembered that many of the men who will constitute civilian armies are not used to out-of-door life and their training must be gentle. it is not fair for an officer to expect his men to be able to march twelve or twenty miles on a hike while he rides comfortably with them on a horse! it is a good thing for him to share the fatigue of his men that he may be the better able to direct their training. i have found that a good many of these hikes were planned by the higher officers who never walked and never understood when men began to fall out from fatigue. rests during marching should be fairly frequent and the men should be taught the advantages to be gained by loosening their packs and throwing themselves down flat on the ground to relax all their muscles. singing and whistling should be encouraged on the march, for there is nothing like it to make a long road seem short, but smoking should be reserved for the rest periods. the principle of "plenty of rests" should also be followed during physical exercises and a man should never be asked to hold his arm long in any uncomfortable position. a thoughtful officer is soon rewarded by the increased efficiency of his men. "do unto others as you would have them do unto you"--will bring big returns in the army. chapter vi cover and trenches this war is being fought out, not in great open battles, but in successive conflicts from the security of trenches in what "papa joffre" has called the "nibbling process." it is not simple work but such as calls for healthy bodies, trained minds, and steady nerves. quick action is often necessary. independence of thought, ingenuity and personal courage, combined with implicit obedience, make up the ideal soldier. the training through which a civilian must go, then, will be such as to develop these qualities. every syllabus of training must be drawn up with this in view, and all the time the attention of the officers must be kept on the fact that the training must be such as to make soldiers who will be efficient in the kind of war that is being waged. much that has been written in the text books for armies has had to be discarded as out of date. it is no exaggeration to say that the british knew very little about modern warfare when we went to france, in spite of the fact that we had, during this century, waged a war in south africa, not to mention the numerous border engagements in india. we did not know the tremendously important part that artillery was to play; we knew practically nothing of the use of bombs; we had never made gas and did not know its constitution; and in the work of trench construction we were in the kindergarten class. our enemy taught us many of these things and we learned them slowly. now we have reached his standard and gone past him as the tanks testify. but in pure frightfulness we can never compete with him and never intend to. eight hours a day of hard but varied training was our rule with frequent evening lectures. conditions were arranged as much like those on active service as possible, even to the use of "live" bombs. men are very reluctant at first to handle these explosive little instruments of war, and they must be given confidence in themselves long before they reach the firing line. there they are used as freely as a mechanic uses a machine. it is said that one general who was training his men in the midlands of england had a difficulty in getting them to keep their heads down. they could not see the necessity for it and always wanted to see all that was going on. now in actual warfare the individual soldier is able to see very little of what is transpiring round about him, and he has to be content to come through with a whole head. accordingly the general served out to a few trustworthy men a number of live, ball cartridges. during the manoeuvres the men who would put their heads up heard some of these missiles singing round their ears, and soon learned that it was unwise to be too curious. i am not sure that i would recommend this method--for were an accident to happen it would bring disgrace and dismissal to the officer who had employed it--but it is certainly an effective means. one of the first things to be insisted upon in training a man is that he learn the use of cover. he must learn not only that cover is necessary, but also what constitutes effective cover of various materials. the most common form of cover is that afforded by piled up earth. a rifle bullet fired at short range will pierce about forty inches of earth so that nothing less than thirty-six inches can be considered as giving protection from ordinary bullets. where sand can be obtained ten inches less will suffice. ordinary turf is not nearly so good and nothing less than five feet in thickness is sufficient. bricks are effective. if they are placed end on giving a thickness of nine inches this will be found sufficient so that a man can feel fairly secure from rifle bullets standing behind an ordinary brick wall. where wood is used much depends on its degree of hardness; thirty inches for hardwood and forty-five for softwood can be taken as affording complete protection. any of the harder substances such as iron and steel, etc., are preferable, but they can seldom be obtained. of ordinary iron plate three-fourths inch is necessary and less for the different varieties of steel. usually several of these media must be used. boards can be arranged with stones and sand or litter, etc., between them. the point to be remembered is that the required thickness must be obtained, not at the base of the cover but at the top, to support which a much larger base will usually be required. when a man has learnt what thickness of materials he needs to have to protect his life, it will be a good thing to take him out and let him see how far bullets are able to pierce these media by actually firing at them from point blank range. that will give him a respect for bullets and impress the lesson on him. but he must also be told that cover that protects is only half what is required. it must be such as to allow him to become offensive while giving him defence. the problem is a simple one in actual trenches, where he has no alternative but to build them continuously and then fire over the top or through loopholes of steel. but when more open fighting develops he must learn that his business is not only to get reasonable protection for his own body but to be able to bring his rifle to bear on the enemy. this necessitates a certain amount of exposure. certain devices have been developed during this war to allow a man to fire his rifle from beneath the parapet of the trench by means of specially adapted periscopes. these are of great use for snipers but cannot be used by all the men. in open fighting men often make the mistake of seeking cover in what is obviously the most protected place from rifle bullets, but equally obvious to those of experience as the most likely place for the enemy to choose as marks for his artillery. orchards, woods, houses, etc., come within this category, and it is only experience that will teach a man what places to choose and what places to avoid. wherever the enemy can view the approaches to these shelters, either by direct vision from their positions or by means of aeroplanes or observation balloons, they become dangerous as cover. modern trenches are intended to give cover from fire and from view. they are seldom roofed over, so that, as a matter of fact, they can be seen from the air, but it is not by any means an easy task either for an aeroplane to drop bombs there (a ditch three feet wide) nor yet for the artillery to hit them. but we seldom are able to inherit trenches--they usually have to be dug under cover of darkness while the enemy is sniping. for this purpose each man in the british army carries a small entrenching tool on his back, as well as two sandbags. every man is trained in the use of this valuable little tool, and soon learns never to be without it. when, during an advance, he needs to provide cover for himself, he throws himself down on the ground placing his rifle at his left side, and begins to dig away the earth at his right side, throwing the loose earth up in front of him. just as soon as he can he takes the sandbags from his back and fills them, placing them in front of him. under this imperfect cover he proceeds to deepen the hole till he can roll his body into it. this miniature trench should be two feet wide and three feet long. then if time permits he should add small comforts such as a recess for his feet, drainage for water, etc. he will find that he needs to dig down to about two feet, all the time throwing the earth out in front and occasionally pushing it out a little so as to make it of sufficient width, for, of course, he will be seeking to get a parapet of about a yard in thickness at the top. if he has an opportunity of firing he should do so, not over the top of his cover but round the right side of it. to fire over it is to ask for trouble. the body and legs should be placed in such a position that they are covered as much as possible by the earth thrown up in front. if an advance has to be made from this position, the small trench will have served its purpose in giving temporary shelter. but there are times when troops have to consolidate positions won in this way, and on the site of these primitive trenches, more elaborate ones have to be made. at the battle of neuve chapelle the troops took up a certain line, dug themselves in in a rough way, and then during the night they set to work to construct the very trenches that still shelter them to this day. but it was due to the entrenching tools and the few sand bags that they were able to hold the line during the hours of daylight, and when the next morning dawned they had a fairly adequate protection. while the question of cover is very important, i do not wish to convey the impression that men should have this subject always in their minds. to use a rock or a tree or a mound of earth as a temporary shelter is one thing; but to continue to hide behind it at the time an advance is needed, is another. the man who hesitates to go forward when he has recovered his wind, but who takes care of his precious skin by remaining under cover, is worse than useless. the object of all troops must be to get into touch with the enemy and drive him out with the bayonet. cover will help to keep a man alive for a little while to be able to do that work. when through adverse circumstances--usually the presence of the enemy in superior force--an army has to go to ground, it sets to work in dead earnest to build its trenches. we have learned that the best fortifications that can be got are those that are constructed in the earth. the guns of verdun have practically never been in operation--indeed at the present time there are no guns in the old forts--and the reason for this is that earth works of such strength were thrown up at a distance from the forts that the germans were never able to get their heavy guns to bear on them. the forts of liége, and namur, and antwerp all fell before the great howitzers, but the earth works of verdun were too much for them. it is doubtful if large forts will ever again be used in inland places, for the earthworks have proved their great superiority. trenches are laid out and dug as shown in the accompanying diagram [figure ]. they do not consist of one long straight line, but what may be described as a succession of little rooms, about twenty feet long, seven feet deep and three feet broad. they are seldom roofed over. each little room is connected to the ones on either side by a trench that runs behind the four-feet-square traverse that is of solid earth and which serves the purpose of localising the effect of shells, bombs, etc. if the trenches were in one straight line, a shell that fell there would be liable to injure a great many men; whereas under the present system the traverse acts as a buffer and limits the radius of its explosive force. the trench itself is dug about three feet deep, care being taken to lift off the top layer of grass and keep it aside to place over the front of the earth on completion of the trenches, to render them less visible. as the earth is lifted out it is thrown to the front and rear, and some of it put into sandbags which are then laid like stones as shown. the front part of the trench is then called the parapet and the rear part the parados. both must be made strong, the parapet for reasons already given, and the parados in order to protect the men from the force of shells that fall just behind the trenches. about a foot from the ground there is placed a board that is called the "firing step," on which the men stand when they are about to fire. i have said that there is seldom any roof over the trenches. it is difficult to cover in the trenches because of the limited supply of materials. then again it is questionable if roofing pays; for, admitting that they may be able to keep out small bombs and rifle bullets, they can never hope to be able to keep out shells. the germans used to roof in a great deal--but then they were there to wage a defensive war and did not propose to move for a good while. in some ground the earth will "hold itself up" at the sides of the trenches, in other ground it will have to be revetted. this is done with chicken wire, or with willows or old staves where they can be had. it is important to have the sides firm, or else in wet weather especially, they will prove a nuisance to the occupants of the trenches. some kind of floor should be provided for the trenches. the simplest and best are made in the following way: take two seven-inch boards about ten feet in length, nail them together to make a fourteen-inch plank, and then cover the whole with fairly fine chicken wire. place these boards on the ground with the side on which the wires are joined downwards. they keep the feet from slipping, are easily cleaned by being upended when they are dry, and allow the space under them to be reached easily to pick up scraps of food, etc. there is nothing more heart breaking than having to pursue your weary course for miles, sometimes, up trenches with slippery sides and sloping, wet, treacherous bottoms. in each trench there must be dugouts for the men to sleep in. the first ones that are made will be very primitive, and will be very much like a fireplace in a room--simply excavations in the back wall of the trench almost on a level with the bottom of it. at first they used to be dug in the front of the trench, but this practice was discontinued as it was found to weaken the power of resistance of the very important parapet. in the course of time more labour can be expended upon the dugouts, and it will be found advisable to construct them of uniform size, six feet long by four feet wide by four feet high. by having them uniform we give the engineers a chance to make frames that can be used to support the roof and the sides and bring them well from the rear to construct the dugouts. these dimensions do not make a very commodious home for four men, but never more than three of a section (of four) are off duty at the same time, and besides there is considerable danger in having large dugouts, as they present a correspondingly larger target for the guns. a direct hit on a large dugout will often bring the whole thing crashing about the ears of the inhabitants. my own adjutant and one of my brother officers were killed by falling beams in large dugouts. the entrance to the dugouts must be kept as small as possible so as to protect the occupants from shells that fall just outside. the germans used to follow the custom of digging many of their "funk holes," as they were called, many feet underground. sometimes they went down twenty and even thirty feet. the idea of this was that they could retreat into these secure places during a bombardment and then emerge with their machine guns as soon as the attacking infantry had started to approach over "no man's land." we never followed that custom, for while it will work at times, yet the attacking infantry may be upon you before you are aware of it and have you at their mercy with bayonets and bombs from the parapet. this the germans have learnt to their cost many times on the somme. many efforts have been made to construct dugouts, reasonably near the surface, that would be shell proof. this is a most difficult matter. it is easy enough to make them shrapnel-proof. a layer of galvanised iron on the roof covered with a foot of loose earth will accomplish this for the velocity of shrapnel is not great. but with high explosive shells it is different. it was seen at liége and namur what terrific effects high explosive shells fired from howitzers could have even on re-enforced concrete. i am told that at port arthur, a russian general was killed in a shelter that was covered with over twelve feet of concrete. the closest we can approach to a shell-proof dugout on the field is as follows: dig an approach trench about ten feet deep, leading into a hole of this depth, by any dimensions you may choose--say six feet square. put in supports for the roof that shall be four feet from the floor. roof in with steel rails, such as are used on railroads, then cover them with two or three layers of bricks that have been broken into small pieces. leave a five-foot air space and then place an exactly similar roof above and cover the whole with earth. small shells will be stopped at the first set of rails, while large ones may possibly pierce them. but the effect of the explosion will mostly be taken up in the airchamber and the dugout itself protected. the reader will readily perceive the difficulty of constructing such dugout on the field and they can certainly not be provided for the accommodation of the common soldier however precious his life may be. as the days go by, every effort must be made to improve the trenches. this can be done in many ways, some of which will be obvious. the front line is, of course, the most important one, and the greatest amount of work has to be done there. but support and reserve lines as well must be constructed and many communicating trenches. support lines were usually dug at a distance of thirty to eighty yards from the firing line. in them we kept a few men to be used in case of emergency. this line was an exact duplicate of the front line and was intended to be used in case we were pushed back. the reserve line was about five to eight hundred yards back from the front line and was not brought to any very great degree of completion. interspersed between these three lines were many redoubts, or especially strong points containing machine guns, etc., whose defenders were expected to hold on to the very last and take advantage of their more secure position to make the attacker pay dearly for his advance. all these lines had to be linked up by communicating trenches, which started about a mile in the rear of the front line and went up in zigzag lines to the latter position, crossing the other trenches on their way. these communicating trenches are used for the purpose of bringing up troops and supplies, etc., and for taking to the rear the men that have been wounded. it is usually arranged to have some of these trenches "up" and some of them "down" roads. each line of trenches (except of course the "communicating") contain dugouts for the use of the troops that hold them. the distance between the communicating trenches varies from twenty-five yards to three or four hundred according to the state of perfection of the trench system. for special weapons such as machine guns and bomb guns, special shelters have to be made. extra strong parapets are provided as well as head cover of railroad ties, and every effort is made to keep the exact position of the machine guns secret from the enemy. we soon learnt that he was very anxious to find our machine guns and would shell us liberally in the hope of being able to locate them. care must be given to the question of drainage. small ditches should be dug at intervals of a few yards to lead the water to pits in the rear. in flanders, where we were very near river level, we installed hand and power pumps to keep the water from taking possession of the trenches. even then, on rainy days we sometimes were in water up to our waists. great care must also be taken in the construction of latrines. the method that was followed was to dig a short "blind alley" trench at right angles to one of the communicating trenches, and at a distance of twelve or fifteen yards from the front line. starting from the end of this blind alley, the trench was gradually filled in with earth as it was used. in other cases biscuit tins were used as receptacles and the ordinary sanitary squads emptied them at specified times into a fairly deep pit. these latrines should be well protected with sandbags to keep the enemy from finding them and training a machine gun on them, in the knowledge that they were very likely to get some of the men who used them during the day. this, i believe, gives the principal points in the construction of the trenches. men should be taught to dig them in broad daylight at first and then when they have learnt the knack, they should be set to dig them at night. from time to time during their training they should be made to return--preferably to the same sections of the trenches--to improve them and maintain them. an excellent scheme is to arrange competitions among the men to spur them on to invent ingenious devices for protecting themselves and their fellows during their occupation of them. at certain times they should also be made to spend a night and then several nights there, going through the regular routine of sentry duty, stand to arms, etc., just as they will have to do in real warfare. another scheme is to choose opposing sides with trenches within easy reach, say, twenty-five yards apart. arrange a three-day tour of the trenches, and let each side attempt to surprise the other. umpires can be stationed in no man's land to decide as to the relative merits of the two sides. at certain times, additional interest can be given to the conflict by some harmless missiles such as sand bags (without the sand!) rolled up and made into a ball the size of a base ball with string. these will also give excellent practice in bomb throwing. [illustration: figure : british soldier fully equipped with pack, entrenching tool, sandbags and steel helmet.] the rules of the trenches can be summed up in a few words: "keep your spirits up and your head down." chapter vii protection of trenches there are two things to be done after the trenches have been dug--one is to keep them in order, and the other is to provide outside protection for them. the elements themselves are enough to play havoc with the sand bags and the walls of trenches, but if you add to this the fact that they will immediately become the marks for the enemy gunners you will see that the cost of upkeep is liable to be high. during the first year of the war the germans were supplied with an amount of shells that enabled them to do what they pleased with our trenches without our being able to reply. indeed, for many months, as is now well known, we were on an allowance of six shells per battery per day, or about one shell per gun per day! gunners will readily appreciate the uselessness of a stock of this kind. the result of this discrepancy in the number of shells was that the enemy could shell us with impunity. he used to set to work to break down our parapets early in the morning, and then, knowing that we should have to repair them during the night, would train machine guns on the breeches that had been made. it is a very disheartening business to have the parapets that you have laboured so hard to construct, knocked down in a few minutes. there would be some consolation in being able to serve him the same way, but that was denied us at that time. indeed, one of the best ways to preserve your trenches is to let him know by experience that every time he breaks them down, you will do the same thing to him. every night there will be something to do in this connection. no effort must be spared to get the trenches into first-class condition and keep them thus. it is very annoying to relieve a battalion that has lain down on their job during their tour of duty in the line, and to find that you have a great deal of work to do--work that could have been avoided if they had taken reasonable care of the work that had already been accomplished when they took over the trenches. as to the outside protection for the trenches, that consists for the most part of barbed wire. sir ian hamilton, in his report on the dardanelles expedition, paid a tribute to the effectiveness of the turkish barbed wire. it was the means of stopping a british advance more than once on the peninsula, just as it was in france. at the battle of aubers ridge, fought on may , , we suffered most heavily from the fact that the wires had not been cut, and therefore we were unable to make progress. we had to retreat, leaving a number of our dead and wounded before the enemy lines. it would be difficult to exaggerate the part that barbed wires have played in this war. wherever they are set up it means that a thorough bombardment must be made before an advance can be risked. the erection of these entanglements is really the work of engineers, but so extensive is the task that infantrymen have to be called in to do the pick and shovel work while the engineers do the directing. stakes are driven deep into the ground, and round them the wire is twisted as it is taken from stake to stake. some wires are laid on a level with the ground, some a few inches above it, then all the way up to ten or fifteen feet into the air, making a regular network. we tried to have our wires extending over a width of ground of at least twenty feet. but not only are barbed wires used, but also electrically charged wires in some cases, though between the lines they will seldom be of much use for a single shell may short circuit the system and it be rendered harmless. an effective method was that of placing trip wires near the ground, and then a little beyond them bayonets with the sharp points uppermost, or pointed sticks, so that when the man tripped over the wire he would fall and impale himself on the spikes. sometimes bombs were attached to the wires in places where it was thought likely that the enemy would attempt to cut them or come through them. as these entanglements have to be erected during the night and under the fire of the enemy it will be seen that it becomes exceedingly dangerous work. but it has to be done, and the risk must be taken for the sake of the additional security it will give to the trenches. it has been suggested that this is work to which the conscientious objectors in england--the pacifists here--might be put. it is necessary work for the preservation of life, and is not specifically military. it is labourer's work. there is no chance of fighting out there nor of taking human life. then it offers an excellent opportunity of winning the martyr's crown because some one is sure to turn a machine gun on you if you remain out there long enough. all of these points should appeal to pacifists. but the greatest reason from our point of view is that it would save the lives of valuable men! the men in the trenches are further protected by men whose business it is to go out into no man's land and remain there hours at a time, lying in some kind of hole, and listening to be able to detect the presence of the enemy. should the enemy make his appearance in small parties, these listening posts can usually take care of them, but when they are in large parties, the listening post men return to the trenches and give warning. the best nerves are needed by the men who go out into the open to do this work, and sooner or later every one has to take a turn at it. these listening posts are sometimes entirely disconnected from the trenches, and out beyond their own barbed wire, through which the men have to make a passage for the time being, and of course keep it secret. but sometimes they are connected with the fire trench by a shallow trench or sap which is dug out into the neutral territory whenever circumstances are favourable. when the troops landed at suvla bay, on the peninsula, they found several excellent water holes that were most inviting to parched and thirsty men. a rush was made for them, when suddenly a terrific explosion was heard, and dozens of men fell flat on the ground, some dead, some wounded. the turks had taken the precaution to place land mines round these wells, and as soon as they were stepped upon, the mines went off. this is a genuine ruse of war and was used also between the lines. the turks never resorted to the treachery that general botha had to overcome in german east africa where he found the wells, not mined, but poisoned. a recent report from france tells us that in the present retreat the germans are employing the same dastardly tactics. it is one thing to protect your trenches or your line of retreat; it is quite another to take the lives of men in this barbarous way. trenches dug in the foregoing manner and protected by barbed wire will give the infantryman a chance to live. but he will increase or decrease the probability of coming out alive according as he is careful or careless during the time he is there. nothing, of course, can save the men if the enemy is determined to thoroughly shell the line, and the orders are to hold it. the sanest thing when a bombardment begins is to withdraw to the next safe line. but the enemy will sometimes be content to allow men to remain in their trenches for a while without shelling them provided they do not wilfully provoke him. a column of smoke arising from the trenches where the men were cooking was usually considered by the enemy as provocation, and over the shells would come. this brings us to the point that i wish to make regarding fires. the men must eat during their tour of duty, and they must have hot food, consequently fires of some kind are needed. but they should be made of very small pieces of wood cut up with a pocket knife so small that they will not give off any smoke. by following this method a safe and very hot fire can be made. at times we were supplied with small quantities of charcoal which was very acceptable. as a matter of fact, more liberties in this connection can usually be taken in the firing trench than in the support or reserve trenches. the enemy knows perfectly well men are in the firing trench. he sees from the rifle fire that that is manned, but it is a good thing to keep him guessing about the other trenches. for the same reason there should never be any unnecessary noise in the trenches. it provokes the enemy to throw bombs and other unwelcome missiles. i have indicated that the present form of trenches, being in a continuous line, makes it necessary either to construct loopholes or to look over the top of the parapet in order to fire. i have indicated too that there are several forms of rifles that can be fired through periscopes, but these must as yet be considered special and are not for the ordinary man to use. no doubt such a rifle will be invented and generally used in the future. but in this war we soon learned that it was "unhealthy" to put our heads above the parapet any more frequently than we had to. therefore, in order to see what the enemy was about, and to wait for sniping opportunities we used periscopes. some of those that were brought to france were huge cumbersome boxes that made a fine mark for the enemy's sharpshooters. but the kind that was most generally used after the first six months of the war was that which consisted of a stick with two slanting grooves in it, one near each end, into which grooves small mirrors could be fitted. we found them quite effective, and should an accident happen and a mirror be broken they were easily replaced from the store we carried with us for that purpose. not having a box of any kind they were very difficult to see from the enemy lines. certain gunners who used to come to the trenches as forward observing officers were equipped with a splendid periscope that had beautiful lenses in it. but it was very costly and could not easily be repaired if once damaged. to make the image in the periscope clearer, binoculars can be applied to the lower glass at the proper angle, and almost as clear a view obtained as by looking over the parapet. one disadvantage of the periscope is that it makes the distance seem greater than it really is, and many a man receives a shock when he places his head above the parapet after looking through a periscope for a while, to see how close the enemy trenches are. trenches are exposed to attack not only from the surface but also from the air and from beneath the surface of the ground. aeroplanes come over and drop steel darts or bombs, and only very strong head cover can give protection against them. but it is very hard to hit a trench from the air with a missile of this kind, and the danger to the men in the trenches is not very great. by far the greater danger comes from mining. men must be on the watch all the time to detect these operations of the enemy and to forestall them where possible. special instruments like giant stethoscopes have been invented and men are told off to hold them to the ground to detect the sounds of digging. but, while these instruments are of use, the best means is a well trained ear. if the enemy is discovered mining towards your position, the only thing to do is to countermine him and try and blow him up before he is ready to touch off the fuse that is intended for your destruction. it is not an easy matter to decide just where the countermine should be sunk or how far to go. many combats have been fought with pick and shovel in the bowels of the earth in cases where one side or the other has broken through the gallery. but any risk must be taken rather than let the enemy enjoy uninterrupted his work of mining you. chapter viii artillery fire it may be desirable to indicate the various kinds of shell fire to which trench men are exposed. (i pass over rifle fire which is harmless so long as men keep their heads down and avoid corners from which they can be enfiladed.) no amount of caution will save a man from shells if they happen to be falling in his neighbourhood. the most frequent visitor of the shell variety is of course the shell from the field gun. the british use an -pounder, the french a millimetre, and the germans a millimetre--all shells of about the same calibre ( inches). of these the best gun is undoubtedly the french, which is a perfectly marvellous piece of mechanism. but all of them are deadly in their effects. they may fire either shrapnel or high explosive--always spoken of in the army as h. e. in the former case, the shell that is fired contains a nose that comes off at the time for which it is set, and liberates hundreds of small round leaden bullets. these go out in cone shape and spray the ground round about. shrapnel is very effective against men in the open but of little use when they are entrenched, for very few of the bullets from any shell will enter the ditch itself. when the british army first took the field they had very little h. e. shrapnel had been used successfully in south africa, and it was thought it would do in france. the proportions used were per cent shrapnel to per cent h. e. we learnt our lessons dearly--as we usually do--and in time we came to realise that for breaking down parapets shrapnel was absolutely useless. the proportion that is now used is about per cent h. e. to per cent of shrapnel. the soldiers used to call the mill. shells of the germans "pip-squeaks." they used to give a "pip" and then a "squeak." if you heard the first and did not hear the second you were dead, while, if you heard them both you could consider yourself still alive. another familiar name for them was that of "cheeky charlies," from the fact that they had the habit of coming in without being announced. in addition to the field guns there are the "mediums" or guns of about inches calibre. the familiar name for the german shell fired from them was "the crump"--by reason of the fact that they sat down alongside you with a terrific "crump" as their greeting. as in the former case, those who could report having heard the "crump" were still alive. then there are various long range guns between five and nine inches in calibre. but long range guns do not play the part that high-angle or howitzer guns do. the germans wasted a good many shells in firing at targets even as far away as twenty-three miles, but nowadays shells are usually kept for targets that there is a fair chance of hitting and not for blind firing. the howitzer that has come to play a very large part in the operations of the british is the gun that is familiarly called "mother"--a gun of . inches calibre and which projects a very weighty shell. the germans have a corresponding gun of a little larger bore. last of all there come the great guns of and inch calibre. these guns need concrete foundations and cannot be set up in a hurry. fortunately--for them--the germans had a number of these foundations already prepared in unsuspecting france and belgium long before the war. our own gun of this size we call "grandmother." the shells that fall from the german guns of the largest size we call by various names--either "bertha krupps" from the name of the proprietress of the great gun works at essen; or "fat berthas" for the same reason; or "jack johnsons" from their hard-hitting capacity; or "coal boxes," "black marias," etc., etc. the effect of these shells was terrific, as may be imagined, but there were many occasions when they pierced so deep into the soft ground that a good deal of the force of their explosion was lost. of course for work against forts there is nothing like them. they opened the eyes of the world from their terrible destructive force shown at liége and namur. akin to shells in their effects are the now familiar bombs. these are of all varieties and sizes. they range from the small hand grenade that is about the size of an ordinary lemon and is simply heaved into the opposing trench by the soldiers, to the immense bombs weighing two hundred and fifty pounds that are thrown from trench mortars, or guns of short barrel and very wide mouths. it was a long time before the british army appreciated the value of bombs and we could not get a supply of them. the "tommies" set to work to manufacture them in the trenches and a good many lives were lost there through premature explosions. practice is absolutely necessary before a man is fit to be allowed to handle a live bomb. he should be trained first of all to throw a tin filled with stones, and learn the trick of letting it go at the correct moment. the first time a man throws a bomb he is simply anxious to get rid of it without any regard for the time the fuse has been burning. most fuses now are five seconds and that time must be calculated to a nicety to get the best results. if a bomb is thrown too soon, the enemy may pick it up and throw it back--this has happened many hundreds of times. it should be retained in the hand during the first and second seconds at least and then thrown so as to explode over the enemy trench on the fifth second. our men were taught to get out of the way of bombs coming into the trenches if they could--there is no use staying to be blown up under ordinary trench conditions--but if they were under such circumstances that they could not get out of the way they were supposed to catch them and throw them away, or throw them back as hastily as possible. men become experts in this just as they do in catching base balls. where a bomb could not be picked up and endangered the lives of men in the trench who could not get away from it, men have often thrown their bodies upon it, and thus, in a most gallant and self-sacrificing way, given their lives for their comrades. of course catching them is out of the question when it comes to the large bombs. absence of body then is better than all the presence of mind. when they actually hit the trench--which is a very difficult thing to do--they do frightful damage. but when they miss their mark they usually open up a lot of earth either before or behind the trench, and perhaps lay out a man or two with concussion. of the same variety are aerial torpedoes which are simply bombs with flanges on their tails to give them direction. sometimes the bombs that were sent over were not h. e. in the sense that they exploded a steel shell that sent its various pieces large and small hurtling through the air, but were simply large oil drums with a quantity of h. e. in them. men were killed right and left, not from being hit with anything, but merely from having been in the neighbourhood when they exploded. rifle grenades are a form of bomb on the end of a stick that fits into the muzzle of the rifle and is then discharged by means of a blank cartridge. they are effective only at short distances. indeed, even with trench mortars, the projectiles can seldom be hurled more than four hundred yards, so that they are almost always used on the fire trenches and are never directed to trenches farther back. chapter ix gas and liquid fire a new and deadly form of warfare is the use of gas. until april, , we knew nothing about it and then we had to face it to our great cost. we had no masks and no apparatus of any kind to help us combat it. having been taken by surprise in an engagement that almost cost us calais, we set to work to devise means to counteract it. the method adopted is the helmet, made of cloth, and very much like a fireman's smoke helmet. it has large goggles similar to the ones that motorists wear. the cloth is kept saturated with a solution of ammonia which acts as a neutraliser of the chlorine gas. a tube passes through the cloth into the mouth, and through this tube the air from the lungs is breathed out. it is, of course, fatal to inhale air through it, and all the air that is breathed in has to be inhaled through the cloth of the helmet. the importance of training the soldier to be able to meet gas cannot be overemphasised. he should be drilled frequently with the helmet on to accustom him to the feeling of it, and alarms should be sounded from time to time to teach him to don the helmet as rapidly as possible. in some of the military schools in france the men were actually taken without helmets into chambers where there was just enough gas to make them realise it was there, and were then sent into other chambers with a "deadly" mixture of gas with their helmets on. this training makes them realise the importance of helmets. many forms of helmets have been used from time to time, and in this matter as in many others we have learnt from our enemies. for the most recent british mask contains the "nosebox" or "beak" which conforms to the german model. as in most other things, simplicity is to be desired where it can be combined with effectiveness, and it is the simplicity of the cloth helmet with the tube that even to-day commends it to many critics above the "box" forms--those that require an independent supply of oxygen. where men such as gunners are liable to be exposed to fumes for some considerable length of time, either from cylinder gas or from shells or even from tear shells, or must continue at their posts at any costs, an independent fresh air supply is necessary. detailed instruction also should be given as to what men are to do during and after the gas attacks; for there are some forms of gas that do not appear to affect the individual at all, and then all of a sudden, when he begins to use his limbs, he drops dead from heart failure. instruction on this subject must come from the medical and chemical experts who have made a close study of the effects of gas. allied to gas is liquid fire. this fire is projected in long streams from the nozzles of pipes that come from a high pressure cylinder, sometimes placed in the bottom of the trench, and sometimes carried on the backs of special men. these globules of burning oil that are sent forth reach a distance of thirty or forty feet from the nozzle of the pipe. the effect of liquid fire is more terrible than words can tell, and it requires great bravery on the part of troops to have them advance in the face of these streams. clouds of smoke as well as gas are used. one of the ruses that was adopted at the battle of loos was to project smoke forward for a few minutes until the enemy should become quite used to it, and then send out streams and waves of gas to take him unawares. these are frightful methods of warfare which the allies have had to turn to in order not to allow the enemy, from his violation of his pledged word, and contrary to the rules of warfare, to gain an unfair advantage. but there are many of us who believe that no other enemy than the germans would have descended to these depths of infamy. chapter x the attack--defence sooner or later in the course of his trench experience the soldier will be subjected to an infantry attack. artillery shelling, aeroplane attacks, mining, etc., are part of everyday's programme, but infantry attacks come only now and then. they _may_ come at any time and the enemy is not in the habit of announcing them beforehand. it is not likely that they will occur in broad daylight without any warning. if they are to be made then, they will be preceded always by a concentrated artillery preparation. night is the danger time. there are two periods of special danger--one, the hour before sunrise, and the other the hour after sunset. at these times there is sufficient light for men to be able to see their way to advance over almost any ground, and not sufficient light for the defending force to be able to take careful sight with their rifles and machine guns, etc. consequently these hours are the most favourable for making an attack, and every one must be on the alert to ward them off. these times are called "stand tos" or properly "stand to arms." while they last, every officer and every man of the front and support line is on duty. rifles are cleaned, inspected and loaded, bombs, gas-masks, revolvers, bayonets, etc., are got ready, and every one remains at his post of duty. in the blackness of night and in the broad light of day the danger is much less and consequently some of the force can be relieved for other tasks, during the night, or for rest during the day. should an attack be made, it becomes the business of the men in the trench to hold the enemy off just as long as they can, at whatever cost to themselves, while some one telegraphs back for the supports and reserves, and possibly for the assistance of the artillery. trenches must never be surrendered without giving these fresh men a chance to regain the advantage, and should the trench be lost, a counter attack must be immediately arranged before the enemy has had time to reverse the trenches and connect them up by saps and communicating trenches with his own system. no time must be lost, for the longer the delay, the greater the difficulty of making the counter attack successful. as to the methods of holding the trench against an infantry attack, it will be evident that the men must take up their position on the firing step and fire as rapidly and as steadily as they can. bombs should be kept and thrown only when the enemy has got well within range for them. machine guns can do effective work of course and the artillery should be communicated with and they will open fire with shrapnel. where ammunition permits, a barrage or curtain of fire should then be established behind the enemy's front line to prevent him bringing up reserves to take the place of those that have fallen, and also to weaken him for the time when a counter attack on him has to be made. star shells, that illuminate the ground, will of course have been fired to give the machine gunners and the rifle marksmen a better chance to find their targets. obedience, steadiness and tenacity are required of the men, and only training and experience will develop these excellent soldierly qualities. the poor type of soldier will either forget to use his weapon altogether or else fire wildly and uselessly. an infantry attack is not a pleasant experience, but soldiers must be taught to expect it, and that it will probably give them the opportunity of using the final and greatest weapon of the infantryman--the bayonet. chapter xi the attack--offence trenches can only be considered as devices for affording temporary protection during the time that preparations are being made for delivering an attack. no one wants to remain in trenches for ever. at the best it is a miserable kind of life, and from a military point of view, it gets nowhere. nor is it capable of being maintained without great loss in men. so costly did it become to us, and so great was the monotony and the feeling of helplessness, that we welcomed the word when it came to us to deliver an attack. at least that would bring us action, and give a variety to life. during the first year of the war, attacks had almost always to be made without sufficient artillery preparation. even at the battle of neuve chapelle, where we assembled over guns on a little more than a mile of front--a greater collection than had ever been got together in history--we had not sufficient artillery preparation for the attack that was to be made. there were enough guns but not enough shells to fire from them. the result was that much of the enemy's wire was still intact when the infantry rushed over, and the advance was held up in certain important points where we could be enfiladed. we have learnt that the only method of delivering an infantry attack against prepared positions is to give them a thorough hammering with shells. every particle of wire should be destroyed, so as to eliminate the risk of men being shot down as they attempt to pass through it. at the battle of loos our guns bombarded their lines from monday morning to saturday morning, and kept hammering at them so as not to give them a chance to repair either their wire or their parapets. an effective curtain of fire was established at the same time to render it impossible for them to bring food and supplies up to the line that we were about to attack. for the last ten minutes before the men actually went over the parapet, there was a perfect tornado of shells falling upon and behind their lines. any one who remained at his post alive during the previous days would find it almost impossible to continue there during this deluge. if the artillery preparation is adequate, the battle is half over. general haig's successes on the somme, and the consequent german retreat on a large scale, have been due, in the first place to the excellent work of the gunners. of course the gunners themselves have been dependent on many other branches of the service pre-eminent among which is the aeroplane corps. targets are seldom seen by the gunners who have to depend for their information on the men who can fly ahead and come back with actual photographs of the positions to be bombarded. too great emphasis cannot be placed upon the work of these gallant flying men. during the battles of the somme, they have not only been doing this reconnaissance work for the gunners, but they have been flying very low after they reached the enemy territory and using their machine guns on the advancing or retreating infantry. so low did they fly, indeed, that the enemy did not risk firing upon them with their guns for fear of hitting their own men. they were fairly safe as far as the opposing infantry was concerned for the man in the machine is well protected from below and at the sides from rifle bullets. while the artillery is active, the junior artillery, the bomb gunners must also get to work to throw over as much h. e. as possible to break down the resistance of the enemy. then again there is the gas, which has now come to be used as a definite part of an offensive. gas is conveyed to the trenches in large drums, under pressure, and at the proper moment is liberated in waves against the enemy. it should be in the hands of trained men who can be trusted not to liberate it a moment before the time comes. while gas has proved very effective under certain circumstances--and almost decided the fate of calais early in --yet it is obviously dependent upon the weather and especially the wind. even if the direction of the wind is correct for the use of gas, the kind of wind may not be suitable at the moment. the wind must not be high nor squally, but needs to be low and gentle, just sufficient to carry the gas across to the opposing trenches without dissipating it on the journey. then again it must be remembered that it can seldom reach the gunners who may open up intensive fire on the trenches from which it is being liberated, burst the drums and make the place untenable. of course all the men who are employed in liberating gas should be warned to have their helmets in position to guard against these emergencies, and also against leaks in the drums. gas masks must be tested daily to see that they do not admit any of this deadly poison. in addition to these preparations, a good many reconnaissance parties must be sent night after night out into no man's land to map it thoroughly, place directing boards there, dig small saps to facilitate an advance, and learn the condition of what remains of the enemy wire. this work is difficult and dangerous, and must be given to trustworthy, brave, resourceful men. for it must be remembered that the enemy will probably come out into this neutral territory at night to try and learn the plans of the opposing side, just as they are trying to learn his plans. many bloody conflicts have taken place out there under cover of darkness when the patrol from one side has entered into conflict with the patrol from the other. those in charge of the attack will arrange that at a specified time the bombardment will cease, and the men leap over the parapets. this time is usually arranged for, say, one minute after six, or thirteen minutes after eight--some time which the enemy cannot guess accurately. during the final awful ten minutes, the finishing touches are given to rifles and bombs and revolvers. then exactly at the appointed time the electric buzzers in the trenches sound the signal to advance. the first man over the parapet is always an officer. unlike the germans, we do not drive our men but expect them to follow us, and this accounts in part for the very severe casualties that have been suffered by british officers. where the distance between trenches is short, say, a couple of hundred yards, it is covered as fast as men can run. it is a veritable race with death; for the enemy must not be allowed to recover from the bombardment in time to get his machine guns up into position again before the infantry arrives before his trenches. the attacking infantry must throw themselves down into the trenches and begin work at once with bomb and bayonet. since the enemy has adopted the plan of having his dugouts deep down in the earth, it is a little easier to reach him before he is able to emerge. in this work bombs are most effective. all of the enemy communicating trenches must be effectively barricaded or protected by bombers and riflemen to keep him from bringing up any reserves and thus taking the attacking force from a flank. in an attack of this kind the ground cannot be covered too rapidly, and no thought must be given to cover. but when attacks have to be made over long distances, the plan is either to dig out saps that will reach to within a reasonable charging distance of the enemy, or else have the infantry proceed at a moderate and steady pace, so as not to arrive at their objective winded and useless for bayonet work. the principle of having sectional rushes while neighbouring sections open rapid fire will be found useful. the german method of advance is characterised by the close order formation, the british by the open order formation. the german training is such that he cannot act independently to any very great degree, but needs to feel the support of another strong arm near him, if possible touching him. they attack in waves of men packed so closely together that it is impossible to miss them if you get a shot at them at all, and of course they are ideal marks for machine guns. but in the british and french armies men are trained to be self-reliant and to advance even when they seem to be alone. an interval of three paces is usually maintained between individuals, and that renders them less of a target for marksmen. they are also trained to take command of other men should their officers or non-commissioned officers be put out of action. should any of the enemy wires be still intact, they must be cut by the first comers so as not to hold up the main attack. this is done by ordinary wire cutters--which every man is supposed to carry as part of his equipment--or else by a new device that is attached to certain rifles. by means of this a number of the wires are caught together and then when the rifle is fired the bullet cuts them and a passage through is made. if the trench should be successfully taken and all the enemy disposed of, the first work to be done is to "reverse" it, and connect it up by communicating trenches with the old position. for this work engineers are sent immediately behind the infantry, and they carry with them quantities of sand bags and shovels and picks and wire, etc., with which to complete this task. of course the infantry must also help, and for this purpose it will be as well for each man to take with him a few sandbags on his back--not enough to encumber him, but sufficient to be of service in putting up hasty defences. the test of the success of the action will come as soon as the enemy is able to organise a counter-attack. he will know the range of the trench to a nicety and will not be slow to hurl the weight of his shells against it. then, too, he will try to bring up reserves, who with bayonet and bomb will attack their old position. for many weary hours the infantry may be busy on this task of repelling counter attacks, and consolidating their new position. so many details have to be cared for in an attack that it is well to rehearse it thoroughly beforehand and to see that every individual knows just exactly where he is supposed to be and what he is to do. only in that way will confusion be avoided. it will be necessary also for the attackers to wear distinguishing marks in the form of a white band on the arm or a white piece of cloth on the back if the attack is to be made in the darkness or with poor light. the question of prisoners inevitably comes up. what is to be done with them? how are they to be taken care of? it will be seen that this is a big problem in an attack where men cannot be disengaged from their tasks of taking trenches without greatly weakening the operation. to tell off men to look after prisoners when every man is needed to break down the resistance that is still being offered by others of the enemy, is a procedure obviously surrounded with dangers. and yet, in the interests of humanity it has to be done, for the only other alternative is to take no prisoners. at the battle of loos many of the german prisoners that we took came to us in embarrassing mobs. they were weak and hungry and required little persuasion to lay down their arms. under these conditions we could manage a great many prisoners with a few armed men. where they surrendered in ones and twos we found there was a disposition on the part of some of our troops to disengage themselves from the battle to lead them back. a man is naturally proud of the fact that he has taken a prisoner and wants to deliver him himself. but we insisted that they be turned over at the earliest opportunity to others who were in charge of small numbers of prisoners, and that as soon as possible they be given into the charge of men who were slightly wounded, but who could still be relied on to give a good account of themselves if trouble arose. it is also a good thing to have a quantity of loose telephone wire about--as almost always happens in a battle--and wind this round the prisoners, making sure that they keep their hands in the air. even barbed wire will do, though it is not so comfortable for the prisoners concerned, and it may be necessary to relax the rule about keeping both hands up! raids are attacks on a small scale, and on a definite portion of the enemy's line. they are usually carried out by parties varying in number from twenty to a hundred commanded by one or more officers. almost the same preparation as for an attack is necessary in most cases to break down the barbed wire before the lines. but in some cases they are carried out as surprises and then other means must be relied on to overcome the difficulties of the barbed wire. as in the case of attacks, rehearsals must precede the operation itself so that every man will know exactly what he is supposed to do and where he is supposed to be. in a recent raid during the time that the snow was on the ground, the canadians secured a number of women's nightgowns and put them on over their uniforms. in this remarkable garb they proceeded over no man's land to visit the german lines. if artillery preparation has been given, that must be depended on to have broken the wires and the thing to be done then is to reach the enemy parapets before they have time to recover and bring the machine guns into action. but by far the greater number of raids come as surprises to the enemy. they do not hear the men beyond their parapets lying on their stomachs and busily cutting the wires with their snips. the first they know of it is when a bomb lands in the trench or else the body of one of the attacking infantrymen, as he enters their stronghold to begin his work of destruction. in raiding parties, more than at any other time it is well to remember the adage that "silence is golden," and that the best results can only be obtained if every man is determined to follow his instructions to the very letter. if the party is cut off by superior forces it must make up its mind as to what it is going to do, though most men, i am sure, will prefer to fight to the death rather than surrender. chapter xii equipment for the field the question is often asked by prospective soldiers as to what is the irreducible minimum that a man should take to war, in the way of equipment. i say irreducible, for it is to the interest of the infantryman who has to carry practically all his belongings on his back, to reduce his load as much as possible consistent with efficiency and comfort. the tailors in london who undertook the tasks of equipping young officers for the trenches, having more interest in making sales than anything else, did their best to persuade their victims that the omission of one of dozens of things they proposed would expose them to very grave risks. no one could possibly have carried all the equipment they suggested and no army service corps would ever have been able to handle it as baggage. some of the men who fell victims to these outfitters went to france looking more like "xmas trees" than anything else, for it was only when there was no more room on their bodies to hang anything that these excellent gentlemen were satisfied, and let them depart. in this list that i am now giving, i propose to deal with the equipment of the soldier first and then add to it the items that seem to me to be essential for the officer. first of all there is the rifle, the soldier's best friend. it should be cherished and cared for as though his life depended on it--as it frequently may. we used to inspect the rifles of the men at least twice a day in the trenches, and any sign of neglect was at once dealt with. it must be kept free from all rust and dirt, well oiled and polished, and with every part of the mechanism in first class working condition. any text book on musketry will give the information necessary for the effective care of the rifle. we found that the breech of the rifle was often in danger of becoming fouled through mud or sand. accordingly we advised the men to keep that part covered whenever the rifle was not in action. small khaki cloths with snap buttons were made, but where these were not obtainable, the leg of a sock served quite as well. but it must be easily removable. rifles are sometimes fouled through putting into them cartridges that are rusty or muddy. all cartridges should be cleaned before being inserted. now it is obvious that time cannot be taken for this task during an engagement, and so it must be done before the rifle is to be used. as the cartridges come from the factory they are perfectly clean; but if they are carried about for days and weeks in the carriers on the equipment they get very dirty. officers must inspect them from time to time and see that damaged ones are sent away and not allowed to be fired through the rifles. no care can be too great. it is a pitiful sight to see a man in action with a rifle that has become clogged through carelessness. it is a good thing to give rewards for those who consistently present clean rifles for inspection, and to punish those who do not. when a man realises how much he is dependent on his rifle he will be certain to take care of it. the next thing is the bayonet. i have said that all infantry work leads up to the use of the bayonet, and so, if a man is to be ready for this final test, his bayonet must be in good shape. of course there is not much to get out of order, but there are a few movable parts that must be kept oiled, and the blade itself which must be kept clean. it is a slight courtesy that you can pay your enemy, that you give him clean, instead of rusty, steel. another weapon that has proved itself indispensable in this war is the entrenching tool. it is a small instrument with a detachable handle, and the head itself has a shovel at one end and a pick at the other. it is a wonderful little tool for hasty entrenching and no attack should be made without it. it has been the means of saving many, many lives in this war. unfortunately, the perfidy of the enemy has made necessary another addition to the equipment of every soldier, and that is the gas mask. the best kind consists of heavy khaki cloth, kept wet with a solution to counteract and neutralise the chlorine in the gas, and equipped with goggles very much like what motorists wear, and a tube that enters the mouth. the air to be breathed is drawn in through the cloth itself, and the air that has been used is driven out through the tube. it is not a comfortable process but it is considerably better than imbibing deadly gas. of course a water bottle must be carried and must always be kept clean. on every possible occasion the soldier should wash it out with hot water and some form of disinfectant. men should be discouraged from rushing to their water bottles for drinks at all times, especially when they are on the march. thirst is a thing that we can easily control if we will. we learnt that it was an excellent practice to have strapped about the equipment in a place where they could easily be got at, two sandbags. they are not heavy or bulky to carry, and if hasty cover is needed they will be found invaluable. lists of the clothes necessary are given in every military manual, and it will be well to follow the one for the special army to which you belong. besides, the clothing necessary will vary according to the climate in which the troops have to serve. quite obviously the equipment for the philippines will be different from the equipment for france. but we found that it was a good plan to have warm underclothes for the winter, not the heaviest variety, but reasonably heavy. it is better and more convenient to add to the clothing should occasion warrant it rather than carry heavy underclothes all the time. in summer the underclothing should be light. but whatever the season, a change should be carried in the pack on the back. in the case of socks two or three emergency pairs should be in the pack. these socks should be made of wool, preferably undyed, and should be thick and heavy for all times. i am aware that it is much nicer to have thin silk socks for the summer time, but they are not intended for marching in nor yet for use with heavy military boots. two pairs of boots should be taken, one pair on the feet and one pair in the pack. tennis shoes should also be carried to put on at times to rest the feet. i need scarcely indicate what toilet articles are needed, for they are the same on service as would be taken for a week-end at the seaside. but i would add that it is a good thing to include a cake of strong carbolic soap to discourage the lice. emergency bandages, sewn into the tunic, may be the means of saving your life. some means must be adopted for protecting the ears from the noises of the rifles and bombs and shells. cotton wool will serve, but a much better device is on the market, called "ear defenders." they are small vulcanite cylinders that are inserted into the ears. near the end of the cylinder there is a diaphragm of fine gauze which is pushed up against the wall by the sound waves created by great noises (thus protecting the drum of the ear) while they do not respond at all to the waves from small sounds. consequently it is quite possible to hear the words of a person speaking, and not be affected by the noise of the guns. i have used them myself and can vouch for their efficacy, though it does take a little time to become used to them. then again nearly every soldier will need a wrist watch. these should be luminous, for there is much waste of time involved in striking a match or going to a lamp to see the time. it pays to buy a good watch, and by all means get a removable cover for the glass face, for glasses easily break, and it is difficult to get them repaired on service. i do not intend this list to be exhaustive, but to contain the most important things that a soldier will need to include in this equipment. officers are allowed more baggage, and will need more, but the mistake must not be made of overloading or taking unnecessary things. they will need a canvas valise and a sleeping bag to go with it, and, if possible, a very light mattress, weighing not more than a few pounds. a canvas water bucket and a wash basin, and a change of uniform are very necessary. as to weapons, i found that the colt automatic was very serviceable. swords are of course not carried in france. they are a nuisance for most purposes, though they do make excellent toasting forks. in action we led our men, equipped only with revolver and cane. in raids and trench work a handy instrument is the trench dagger--a knife of about nine inches long, ending in a handle that has openings for the four fingers to go through, thus serving as a "knuckle duster." field glasses are essential and indeed they should be supplied to some of the non-commissioned officers as well. nothing under four nor over eight diameters should be chosen. below that figure they do not magnify enough, and above that figure they magnify too much. six or seven is ideal for the infantryman. some form of collapsible periscope may be carried, but most of us discarded the ones we had bought in england in favour of the simple ones that i have described in another place. i would utter again the warning against loading up with too many things. get few things but get good ones and keep them good is the best advice that i can give. chapter xiii tricks for the trenches a closing word should be said on the subject of trench ruses. as in every other form of warfare, deception must be practised on the enemy. he must be made to believe you are doing things that you are not doing and that you propose doing things that are not in your plans at all. any number of these ruses will occur to the minds of my readers, and i want to mention a few of them that we actually tried. one of the best ruses is to let the enemy get hold of fake orders. these can be placed on bodies immediately after an action and there will be a good chance of the enemy accepting them as genuine. we have reason to believe that some of the prisoners that we took came over for the purpose of letting false orders fall into our hands. it is pretty hard on the individual to make him the goat in this way and i do not recommend it. making elaborate preparations for an attack in one spot, and then actually attacking from another point when his reserves have been drawn to the first point, also used to work well. it is well to learn the calls and signals of the enemy for use during an attack, and thus to throw his men into disorder. there have been germans in this war who carried out the daring ruse of appearing in our lines in the uniforms of staff officers and giving orders to our men. they were brave individuals and scarcely seem to merit the swift punishment that came to them on detection. in the trenches it was sometimes necessary to move about the few men that we had and to keep them firing first in one place and then in another to convey the impression that we were in considerable force. ruses had to be adopted to discover snipers. on one occasion i needed to find a sniper who had just killed three of my men, and was such an excellent shot that he broke my periscope. for this purpose i made a dummy man out of sand bags and had a soldier put him cautiously above the parapet (head only) while i observed from a neighbouring bay. i detected him from the dust that his bullet raised from his parapet, and a few well aimed artillery shots put him and his loop hole out of business. my poor dummy was badly wounded in the process. the turks in gallipoli used to paint some of their snipers a green colour and send them out between the lines among the small bushes. a pretended retreat will sometimes lure the enemy from his trenches to destruction. sending out patrols in one section to draw fire while careful reconnaissance work is being done at another spot will sometimes find him off his guard. dummy guns, of course, have played a large part, and have been responsible for the waste of a great deal of ammunition. they are placed where they can be observed by the aeroplanes, who promptly report their presence. it is said that at the dardanelles the forts once opened fire on the battleship _queen elizabeth_. after a while they sank her--and her guns floated off! it is telling no secret now to say that many of the units in the british navy had duplicates constructed out of old vessels. their business was to draw fire to themselves while other craft did the work. hence the wooden guns. they served another purpose as well, for it was very difficult for spies to inform germany where the real fighting ships were at any time. in short, the whole business is to "get the enemy's goat." keep him guessing. wear him down with worrying. break his nerve and spoil his sleep, that his physical resistance may be weakened. on the other hand, learn to estimate the intention on the enemy. do not underrate him. in all cases and under all circumstances follow out the excellent motto of the boy scouts-- be prepared. transcriber's notes hyphen removed: "dugout" (p. xii, figures - ), "loopholes" (p. ). p. : "and" changed to "an" (the only method of delivering an infantry attack). p. : duplicate "to" removed (excellent practice to have strapped). internet archive (https://archive.org) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h.zip) images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/handywarguidefor hang transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). handy war guide for my company handy company commander's guide written at the front by captain hanguillart of the french army translated and edited by louis j. a. mercier, a.m. first lieutenant, harvard r. o. t. c. interpreter with british expeditionary force on the french front - . "_dash under discipline_" copyright, by r. d. cortina company. the cortina academy of languages new york table. preface part i. trench life and trench warfare taking over the trenches care and improvement of the trenches the watch from the trenches patrolling interrogating prisoners devices to draw the enemy's fire an attack, the repulse the counter-attack precautions against enemy's artillery use of trench artillery field artillery cooperation daily schedule turning over the trenches out of the trenches topical questions on part i part ii. french infantry combat principles. open warfare the approach precautions against silent artillery crossing a bombarded zone use of woods as shelter to cross a crest the fire attack precautions against cavalry the termination of the approach use of machine guns the company supports the companies in support the charge and the pursuit attack of a wood attack of a village attack of a defile night attacks defense of woods defense of a village defense of a defile night defense of a position the counter attack topical questions on part ii appendix a division front in trench warfare. the trench system the back areas printed in the united states of america by the international press lafayette street new york city preface. the first part of captain hanguillart's little book "_petit guide pratique de guerre pour ma compagnie_" has been incorporated in the new manuals of instruction published for the young recruits of the french army by the official military publishing house "librairie militaire berger-levrault," the editors of the "annuaire officiel de l'armée."[a] its special value comes from the fact that it was written at the front and is wholly based on the orders which captain hanguillart drew up for the instruction of his own company and tested repeatedly through actual experience. thus its very omissions are significant. the text as it stands represents essentials. its every paragraph is a unit of tried advice. =it embodies the practical data that has secured results.= =it sums up the cautions that have saved lives.= in the second part, captain hanguillart has merely reproduced the french infantry combat principles long published in the official manual for the instruction of platoon leaders. in presenting this little work, no claim is made that it is adequate to the complete instruction of company commanders. its obvious supplements are such works as: colonel paul azan--_the war of position_. _the army war college_--translation of the french manual for commanders of infantry platoons. cole and schoonmaker--_military instructors manual_. major j. a. moss--_manual of military training_. _u. s. a. infantry drill regulations._ captain hanguillart's book should be carefully compared with these. but because of its peculiar origin it has for the officer a value not possessed by other books on this subject. it gives what a company commander =actually found essential=. furthermore, it corresponds to the booklets published in france which are placed in the hands of every recruit. every officer should have full knowledge of his specialty, but =every private= should understand the essential concerns of his officers so as to appreciate orders the more readily. the army of democracy should be an intelligent thinking army. such little books have helped to give the french poilu his famed self-reliance and resourcefulness. it is the hope of the publishers that this translation may help to do the same for his american comrades. the publishers also believe that the book offers just the information needed by civilians to follow intelligently reports of military operations and of life at the front. the editor has felt it his duty in rearranging the loose notes of captain hanguillart to respect scrupulously the text, though, at times, the best way to do so was through a free translation. the paragraphs have been numbered and questions and diagrams added to facilitate assimilation. cambridge, mass. l.j.a.m. footnote: [a] cf chapuis. _instruction théorique et générale du soldat pour la période de guerre._ e édition, january . part i. trench life and trench warfare. trench life and trench warfare. taking over the trenches. .--leaving billets. the battalions of a brigade occupying a given sector of the front are billeted when out of the trenches, in the villages closest to their sector. cf. appendix. when their turn comes to relieve the battalions in the trenches, the officers in charge should have the following instructions carried out: .--on the day before the relief make sure: that the rifles, bayonets, etc., are in good condition. that the ammunition and reserve rations are supplied. that the equipment of every man is complete. that all officers and n.c.o.'s watches are set to division time. .--on the day of the relief, one hour before departure: have rifles stacked and equipment laid out outside the billets. make sure that nothing is left behind, that premises are cleaned, all rubbish burnt, and latrines filled. have rifles loaded and with the safety lock turned to the safe. assign an energetic n. c. o. to act as file closer of each platoon to prevent straggling. call the roll and have it duly forwarded to the company commander. .--on the way to the trenches: if under fire, have units march at proper intervals (cf. par. ff.) adopt marching order best suitable to avoid blocking the road. at night do not allow smoking. exact silence when nearing the trenches. take special precaution at all times to maintain constant communication between units, especially at night and when crossing woods. if enemy aeroplanes appear, stop and keep out of sight as much as possible. (cf. par. .) .--on reaching the trenches: the relief should be completed in silence--without hurry. carefully ascertain the orders of the battalion relieved. check up and assign to each unit the supplies taken over. requisition at once additional supplies and ammunition wanted. each platoon should be assigned its special duties, the duty roster drawn up for all sentry and patrol duties, details, etc. have all the men locate the enemy trench as they come on duty and give them the range. inspect the dugouts and assign them. forbid all digging under the parapet. inspect the latrines. give strict order that small amount of dirt be thrown in after use and that lime be sprinkled in daily. see that the men are provided with ammunition. communication should be insured between the various units to the right and left and with the rear. care and improvement of the trenches. .--improvements: investigate the work under way for the improvement of defense and prepare plans for further work if necessary. obvious improvements are: making additional communication trenches, repairing or completing shelters, listening posts, mining tunnels, wire entanglements. .--ammunition shelters: see that there are a sufficient number of shelters for rifle ammunition, grenades, rockets and other supplies. .--loopholes and parapet: ascertain the conditions of all the loopholes and have them repaired if need be. (they should cut the parapet diagonally and be concealed in every way possible with vegetation, branches, and the opening blocked when not in use.) have all damages to the parapet and to the ground underneath quickly attended to. see that in each section there are small ladders to permit of easy access to the top of the parapet. see that means are provided to fire above the parapet in case of an attack. .--drainage: attend carefully to the drainage. have the trench bottom kept convex with small gutters on either side running into pits lined with gabions. if trench bottom is lined with board walks, keep it in repair. have water pits emptied if necessary. .--sanitation: have latrines kept in perfect sanitary order. have them filled up and others dug =if need be=. have all rubbish collected and carried out. .--precautions against capture of fire-trench. prepare for the obstruction of the communicating trenches in case the enemy should capture the fire trench: have piles of sand bags above the entrance of each trench ready to be dumped into it. have chevaux de frise lined up on one parapet of the trench and all held up in such a way by a single wire that when the wire is cut they will fall into the trench. mines can also be prepared to blow up the trench when invaded. the communicating trench between the fire trench and the listening post should be covered with barbed wire screens or be tunnelled. the watch from the trenches. .--trench warfare an outpost duty. trench warfare, the inevitable form of modern warfare, is a continuous series of outpost duty. hence it is based wholly on eternal vigilance. the patrols correspond to the scouts; the listening posts to the sentinels; the firing trench to the outguards; the cover trench to the supports. the safety of the sector depends entirely on the vigilance of the advanced elements and the rapidity with which supports and the reserves can be summoned. watching is thus the fundamental duty in trench warfare. the following points should be kept in mind: at all times .--number of men in the fire trench. there must be as many sentinels in each section as is necessary to cover completely the sector to be watched, no more, no less, each sentinel being given the exact limits (such as tree, copse, post, etc.) at each end of the line he should watch. .--fix bayonets. the men on duty should have bayonets fixed as, in case of a possible surprise, they are needed for defense. otherwise too, fixing bayonets would be an indication to the enemy of an impending raid. during the day. .--observation of open terrain. when the terrain opposite is open country, the necessary observation may be done by the smallest possible number of men. fire only, if any of the enemy are sighted. then, have two rounds fired, then three. but keep fire under strict control. (if enemy continues to approach. cf. par. ff.) .--observation of covered terrain. when the terrain is covered (high brush wood, copses, trees, etc.) a sharpshooter in each section should fire occasionally into the trees, etc., which may be observation or sharpshooters' posts but this should not be overdone. at night. .--double sentinels. post double sentinels in each section, each man watching in turn, the other resting but within call. .--silence. they should refrain from making the least noise so as to hear and not be heard. .--no firing when fired upon. there should be no firing when the enemy fires since when the enemy fires, he does not advance. .--look and listen. they should keep a sharp lookout but listen even more attentively. .--in the listening posts. sentinels in the listening posts should listen especially for the noise of crushed branches, stirring leaves, slight noise of arms or utensils. if enemy is detected, these sentinels should hasten back to fire trench to give the alarm quietly so that the enemy may be surprised. they should fire only if they are themselves caught unawares. listening posts should not be too numerous, about two per battalion. if there are no listening posts, patrols should be sent out to favorable spots especially at sundown and before sunrise. .--enemy sighted or heard, fire. if the night is clear and the terrain is open, proceed as during the day: if the enemy is sighted or heard, fire in short volleys. in case of doubt throw grenades with the first volley. .--otherwise no firing. otherwise, absolute silence should be observed. no firing whatever. .--unless night is dark. if the night is dark, to avoid surprise, keep up firing: one man per section should fire in turn, from time to time varying the direction. .--digging by enemy. if digging by the enemy is reported, cease firing. have it located, throw bombs followed by volleys. notify sappers for counter mining. .--watch for light of enemy's fire. if enemy fires, note where light appears. .--posting of sharpshooters. locate sharpshooters in advantageous posts behind the trenches (trees, etc.). have them fire into the enemy's listening posts and into the enemy's trench, especially wherever light appears. these posts should not be occupied during the day. .--patrols. send out patrols, stationary or mobile. patrolling. .--functions of patrols. the aim: to supplement the work of the listening posts and of the sentinels through more forward observation. to discover the movements and the operations of the enemy. to locate his emplacements. to keep in close touch with the enemy so as to take advantage of his possible weaknesses: lack of watchfulness, of ammunition, of sufficient troops. to verify, repair and complete advance defences. to get the exact range of enemy's positions. to bring back prisoners. .--time to patrol. patrols should be on duty through the night but be specially watchful before sunrise. .--assignment of patrol duty. n. c. o. and men should be assigned to patrol duty by roster or as volunteers. in the former case, if there is reason to think that a patrol has not done its best to secure information, the same men should be sent out again. .--sentinels should know about patrols. neighboring companies should be notified of the departure, route and probable time of return of patrols. if several patrols are sent out at the same time they should know one another's itinerary. .--dress and equipment of patrols. the men ( to commanded by n. c. o.) should carry no impediments and their dress should not interfere with ease of movements: sweaters should be worn instead of overcoats. the woolen cap or comforter should be worn as they cover most of the face. slits should be cut for the ears that hearing be not interfered with. the helmet should always be worn over comforter. also dark gloves to hide the hands. no equipment save the rifle, the bayonet fixed or carried in the hand, (no bayonet scabbard), a few hand grenades. .--method of advance. patrols should crawl forward or advance by short dashes, silently, stop often and for long periods, listen intently. .--under flare light. if the enemy sends up lighting rockets (flares) or fires volleys, lie flat on the ground until he stops. .--against an hostile patrol. if a small hostile patrol approaches, do the same, throw a stone or two so as to turn its attention away and take advantage of this to surprise it. if men of enemy's patrol give the alarm, kill them--lie flat on ground during enemy's volleys which will follow. then strip bodies of distinctive uniform badges, and search for papers, etc. otherwise bring men back as prisoners. .--need of initiative. patrols should exercise initiative, take advantage of circumstances, in devising ways of bringing back the greatest possible amount of useful information. interrogating prisoners. .--information from prisoners. one of the chief aims of patrolling is to bring back prisoners from whom information may be gathered. .--its use by general staff. the general staff is interested to know the nationality, the division, the age, etc. of prisoners captured in a given sector. .--its use by company commander. but these are of little value to the battalion or company commander. hence, when possible, they should ask the prisoners questions more pertinent to the organization of the enemy sector opposite: .--questions to ask. how strongly are your various lines held? where are the c. o. post and the officers' dugouts? when and by what routes are the reliefs made, how often and on what days and at what time. ask the same questions for the fatigues. at what time are rations brought or served? what is the actual muster of the company? how many regular army officers, how many reserve officers? what do the men think of their officers? how many advanced posts? how many men in each, by day and by night? do they have grenades and how are they relieved? how many men are sent out on patrol, how often, at what time, by what route coming and going? how are they dressed and armed? what are their instructions? what does the enemy know about our own patrols? are snipers placed in trees during the day and at night? if so, what trees are used. what parts of our sectors can they see? are they planning any raids? do they anticipate raids by us? what work are they carrying on during the day and at night? have they any idea of our own activities? what is the nature and the location of their accessory defences? what is the location of their machine guns, trench mortars? have they any asphyxiating gas or liquid fire apparatus? have they abundant supplies of hand grenades, etc., etc. devices to draw the enemy's fire. .--to make enemy waste ammunition. any devices which lead the enemy to waste ammunition or to expose themselves is a clear gain. many may be readily devised and officers and men should be encouraged to do so. the following have often proved successful: .--pretend abandoning trench. remain absolutely quiescent during several days. this may lead the enemy to send out patrols or raiding parties which may be the more surely destroyed. they should be allowed to approach to the wire entanglements before a shot is fired. .--pretend a raid. on dark nights, have all firing stop. throw stones by hand or with slings, a dozen at a time toward the enemy's trench. this will lead him to fire repeated volleys and waste ammunition in his fear of an attack, especially if the trenches are in wooded terrain and there are leaves on the ground. repeat several times during the night. patrols may also tie strings to the enemy's barb wire. on dark nights pulling on the string may lead the enemy to fire. .--use decoys. decoys may be arranged in trees or stuck up momentarily over the parapet. they will draw the enemy's fire. .--pretend a fire attack. if the enemy's trenches are near enough for the sound to carry, whistles may be blown all along the line before a volley. they may be blown again after the command to omit the volley. the enemy may continue to fire indefinitely. .--watch out for enemy's ruses. let the aim of all these devices be to make the enemy waste ammunition and to save your own. on the other hand, the enemy is likely to attempt like ruses and many others which are not permissible such as the use of white flags or raising hands to indicate pretended surrender. .--his use of blank cartridges. a legitimate ruse, of which the enemy is fond and which should be guarded against, consists in their firing blank cartridges to mask an advance of their men. it is clear that men do not advance while bullets are fired from their own trenches. nor does one fire in retaliation until the enemy's fire ceases. a little attention will be sufficient to spoil this plan as, when only blank cartridges are fired, no bullets will whiz by. as long as the enemy fires blank cartridges, withhold your own fire, be on guard against the appearance of patrols and be ready to receive them when they draw near. .--his use of flares. in case the enemy sends up flares, patrols should lie flat and motionless till after the volley which often follows. the sentinels in the fire trench should note spot where flare was sent up and abstain from firing unless enemy is sighted out of his trenches. .--his machine guns. if a machine gun opens fire from the trench opposite, try to locate it through the light and sound at night, through sound and actual sight during the day. fire a converging volley of two rounds in its direction, and repeat, but not over six rounds if unsuccessful. at the same time let trench mortars fire bombs in the same direction. .--his field and trench artillery fire. if enemy's artillery fires upon trenches (cf. par. ff.) an attack. the repulse. .--a threatened raid. as has been stated (par. and ) in case enemy patrols approach, volleys of two, then of three rounds should be fired. keep cool. do not fire prematurely. .--fire above parapet. the firing should be done over the parapet and not through the loopholes. .--when alarm is given. if the sentinels report that an attack is developing, every one on duty takes his post. .--flares. flares are sent up from each section. .--trench mortars. trench mortars fire bombs with the first volley. .--how to repulse an attack. if the attack materializes, repeat volleys and trench mortar discharge and open fire with the machine guns. (on dark nights, in covered terrain, the machine guns should be fired with the first volley.) .--use of hand grenades. hand grenades should be thrown as soon as the enemy is within yards. the grenadiers of the odd number squads should aim to throw their grenades upon the assailants while those of the even number squads should try to establish a barrage by throwing behind the assailants. .--use of trench mortars. the trench mortars are aimed at the enemy's trench. .--use of the machine guns. the machine guns fire directly at the assailants, with slight differences in height of aim, (knee high, waist high, etc.) according to the directions previously given to each man. .--fire control. carefully keep fire rifle under control and avoid wasting ammunition. never fire without aiming. if the ground ahead is flat, aim waist-high; if it slopes down, aim close to the soil; if it slopes up, aim at height of chest. .--repulse with the bayonet. if some of the enemy reach the trench, dispose of them with the bayonet. .--save ammunition. cease firing and abstain from further firing as soon as the attack is repulsed. the counter attack. .--immediate. it should follow immediately upon the successful repulse of the attack. .--counter attack formation. it should be developed in the following formation: st. grenadiers armed only with a bayonet, a bowie knife, a revolver and a full stock of grenades. with them a few men with pliers for wire cutting. nd. next a skirmish line of riflemen with a full supply of ammunition. rd. lastly, a line of men with entrenching tools.[b] .--method of advance. proceed by short leaps making use of available protection and crawl flat on the ground in approaching the enemy's trench. .--capture of the enemy's fire trench. after the defenders in the fire trench are killed, jump in, throw bombs into the dugouts, pursue the enemy into the support and communication trenches. .--organize it against the enemy. let then the engineers block up to the right and left the captured trench and organize it rapidly against the enemy, making it face about (through changing the parados into a parapet). the enemy is pursued as far as possible and kept away while fatigue parties from the rear bring up all necessary ammunition, sand bags, barbed wire, etc., carrying back all the captured enemy material. other fatigue parties start at once to connect the former fire trench with the captured trench by communication trenches. footnote: [b] modifications of this formation have since been adopted. cf. works cited in preface. concerning artillery. precautions against enemy's artillery. .--artillery bombardment. whether preliminary to, in connection with, or independent of an infantry attack, the enemy may make use of his artillery. this bombardment may be directed against the fire trench or back of the fire-trench. .--case i.--bombardment of the fire trench. .--all in shelter except sentinels. leave in the fire trench the necessary sentinels. station all the other men in the shelters of the support trench, or along the communication trench, if there are no shelters, but fully equipped and ready to jump to their places in the fire trench as soon as the enemy's artillery fire will stop or lengthen to allow his infantry to advance. .--fire to impede observation. all through the bombardment, the sentinels should fire at all objects in the distance which may be used as observation posts. the machine guns should cooperate with a slow sweeping fire. .--case ii.--bombardment back of fire trench. .--watch for infantry attack. all should stand to in the fire trench watching for a possible infantry attack and for a possible shortening of the enemy's bombardment. if it occurs, proceed as in case i. .--prevent observation. fire against possible observation posts as in case i. use of trench artillery. .--use with a purpose. whatever trench artillery appliances are provided, bomb-throwers, trench mortars, catapults, etc., they should never be used hap-hazard, but always with great deliberation and forethought. have a distinct end in view and watch for the best opportunity to attain it. such definite aims may be: to interfere with a relief, a fatigue, a trench construction or repair, to destroy accessory defences, etc. .--keep it ready. let the mortars, etc., be kept loaded and trained on the target selected, ready to be fired instantly. the crews should be near at hand and a sentinel posted to watch for a favorable opportunity. .--save ammunition. until this opportunity occurs, do not fire. .--have several emplacements. several emplacements should be provided so that mortars, etc., may be removed as soon as they have obtained desired results or been located by the enemy. the trench mortar commander should make it his business to study carefully all possibilities for effective emplacements and should inspire his men to be alert and quick to improve opportunities. .--use of machine guns. the machine guns should likewise be handled as a mobile weapon and not be used merely from elaborate carefully concealed emplacements commanding otherwise uncovered ground or enfilading communication trenches, etc.[c] .--use of hand grenades. hand grenades may be listed as trench artillery. the temptation is to use them too freely. like other ammunition they should never be wasted and always used with a definite aim. footnote: [c] captain hanguillart treats this important subject very summarily. cf. cole & schoonmaker's military instructor's manual p. . he also barely mentions gas attacks. cf. very complete treatment in same work, p. to . field artillery cooperation. .--communications with the artillery. should be permanent so that it may cooperate whether to repulse an enemy's attack, to silence his artillery, to damage his defences or to prepare and protect an attack or a counter attack. .--observations posts. to avoid a waste of ammunition, and attain the desired result as well as to prevent the artillery fire from falling short upon one's own trenches, artillery observation posts should be provided in the fire trench or at one of the outposts. .--artillery fire falling short. in case artillery fire does fall short upon one's own trenches, communicate at once with artillery commander and proceed as when bombarded by enemy. (cf. ff.) .--artillery preparation of infantry attack. special caution should be exercised in the case of a raid against the enemy's trench. make sure that the artillery preparation has secured the desired result. synchronize carefully the infantry advance and the lengthening of the artillery fire. daily schedule. .--rosters and schedules. throughout the stay in the trenches, the various fatigues should be assigned by roster and carried out according to schedule. the following schedule has been found practical: a.m. ( a.m. in summer). .--cleaning of trenches. have trenches cleaned of all rubbish, latrines disinfected, drinking water supplied. .--collecting of broken equipment. all cartridge shells, broken tools, etc. should be collected. .--requisition report. a list of the supplies and ammunition needed should be drawn up. .--report on night activities. full report should be brought to the company commander, covering the work of the patrols and of the fatigue parties, and giving full details of all that has happened during the night. .--report on casualties. also the list of casualties in the last twelve hours with full names and nature of wound if possible. .--disposal of property of dead and wounded. the arms and complete equipment of the wounded should be sent out with them. the arms and equipment of the killed should be sent to the battalion commander. their personal effects; money, papers, letters, etc., should be carefully collected, listed, and sent to the sergeant-major. a.m. .--sick parade. the men able to walk are taken to the doctor's dugout by an n.c.o. p.m. .--assignment of patrols. assign night patrols from roster. point out itinerary while light permits. have neighbouring sectors advised of same. ( . p.m.) .--inspections. inspection of sentinels in fire trench. inspection of ammunition supplies. turning over the trenches. the relief. .--in the afternoon and in each section: have all the tools and supplies collected and list drawn up ready to hand over to successor against receipt for same. inspect equipment of men that they may be taken out completely. check up exact itinerary of relief in and out. .--at the time of relief: have rifles inspected and emptied. give strict orders for silence. follow same marching order as when coming in. have officer march in rear. .--on reaching billets. have the roll called and sent to the officer of the day. have rifles inspected. the day after the relief. .--replace equipment. have all arms cleaned and oiled. have broken arms turned in and others issued. inspect shoes, clothes, equipment, tools, and replace when needed. have special inspection of gas-masks and replace if needed. .--sanitation. have underwear washed, and personal cleanliness attended to, baths, hair-cuts, etc. have premises kept clean and latrines disinfected daily. out of the trenches. .--specialists' instruction. while in rest billets: have all specialists' instruction continued: sharpshooters, bomb-throwers, signallers, etc. .--bayonet exercises. should be given special attention. .--close and extended order drill and marching give the men needed exercise. .--relaxation. should also be provided: in the form of games, contests, entertainments, etc. they help to keep the men "fit." .--efficiency. the company commander should make it is his constant concern that his men be kept at the highest possible point of efficiency. questions. the following questions are topical. supplements to the answers found in this book should be looked for in the larger works referred to in the preface. trench life and trench warfare. .--what inspections should be made on the day before the relief? .--state orders to be issued one hour before departure. .--what may be the marching orders, on the way to the trenches? .--describe precautions to be taken against enemy's fire, against aeroplanes. .--what other precautions should be taken? .--what should the company commander attend to on reaching the trenches? .--what possible improvements of trenches are obviously called for? .--what special attention should be given the parapet? .--give rules for drainage and sanitation. .--what precautions may be taken against capture of fire-trench? .--what does trench warfare correspond to in open warfare? .--what does the safety of a sector depend on? .--what is the fundamental duty in trench warfare? .--what rule determines the number of men to be posted in the fire-trench? .--sum up their orders about firing before open terrain, before covered terrain. .--what is meant by double sentinels? .--why is listening attentively even more important than keeping a sharp look out? .--why should the sentinels refrain from answering the enemy's fire? .--what is expected of the men in the listening posts? .--when should the sentinels fire on a clear night? when, on a dark night? .--what should the sentinels do, if they hear the enemy's digging? .--when and where are sharpshooters posted and what is their duty? .--what information may patrols bring back? .--when should patrols be sent out and how should they be assigned? .--what should the sentinels along a sector know about the patrols, and the several possible patrols know about one another? .--describe dress and equipment of men on patrols. .--describe their method of advance. .--what should they do on encountering a hostile patrol? .--what should be the motto of men on patrol? .--what are some of the most useful informations about the enemy, you should try to obtain? .--what motto should you have about ammunition? .--describe several ways of leading enemy to waste ammunition. .--what is the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate ruses? .--on what principle is the enemy's ruse of the use of blank cartridges based? .--how may this ruse be foiled? .--what should the sentinels, and what should the men on patrol do, when the enemy sends up flares? .--how should the enemy's machine gun fire be answered? an enemy's attack. .--describe procedure when enemy's patrols are sighted by sentinels and when an attack develops. .--when are the trench mortars and the machine guns fired? .--how are hand grenades thrown? .--where should the rifle fire be aimed? .--when are bayonets used? .--is it sufficient to repulse an attack? .--what formation should be adopted for the counter attack? .--how is the advance made and the counter attack carried out? .--describe what is meant by organization of a newly conquered trench. .--what should be done, if the enemy bombards the fire-trench? .--what should the sentinels do? .--what should be done if the bombardment is back of the fire-trench? .--what general rule applies to the use of all trench artillery? .--what are its ordinary objectives? .--how are trench mortars handled? .--what is meant by calling trench-artillery mobile weapons? .--give a general caution for the use of all ammunition. .--what is essential to secure effective artillery fire? .--what should be done if one's own artillery fire falls short upon one's own trenches? .--how is coordination between artillery and infantry secured in case of a raid? .--what are the principal items of the morning schedule, of the afternoon schedule? .--describe the preparations for leaving the trenches. .--what orders are given at the time of relief? .--what is done before the men are dismissed to their billets? .--how should the days in rest billets be utilized? .--describe a typical day in the trenches. .--describe a typical day in rest billets. .--what should be the supreme aim alike of men and officers? part ii. french infantry combat principles. french infantry combat principles. open warfare. .--is open warfare probable? it is improbable that in this war trench warfare will definitely give place on all sectors of the front to open warfare. but the tactics that have forced several retirements will force others. if sufficient troops are available, tried and fit and resolute, with the necessary quantities of ammunition and improved artillery, we shall see german arrogance and brutality in victory become again cringing fear and demoralization in defeat; the experience of the marne will be repeated and the invaders will be driven out of the territory they swarmed over through treacherous breaking of treaties. .--the need of training in infantry combat principles. that day the infantry will come again unto its own and its dash and resolution will insure victory. to achieve it, it must be a well trained infantry, in the old sense of the word. officers, non-commissioned officers and men must have a thorough and practical knowledge of infantry combat principles. these should be practiced in the intervals of trench service when the battalion is in rest billets. their theory should be thoroughly mastered by all on whom may devolve responsibility. .--the two phases of the combat. we shall study here the two principal phases of the combat: the approach and the attack, from the point of view of the company commander. .--the defense. we shall also consider the combat from the standpoint of the defense. the approach. .--all maneuvering at close range impossible. in the attack, the infantry can proceed only straight ahead. under infantry fire all maneuvering is impossible. therefore by "approach" is meant all maneuvering preparatory to the attack: it brings the troops directly in front of and as near as possible to the objective. preliminary dispositions to start the approach. .--the orders to attack. the company commander will receive his orders from the battalion commander. .--equipment and liaison. in the meanwhile let the lieutenants: a) make sure that the men are fully equipped and provided with full allotment of ammunition; b) appoint and parade connecting files (runners) to await orders. .--distribution of orders. the company commander having received his orders from the battalion commander, will then call his subordinates and issue his own orders accordingly, including the formation to be adopted. .--combat patrols. he will make sure that there are combat patrols on the exposed flank or flanks and to the front and rear if need be. it is well to have combat patrols detach automatically. it may be understood, once for all, that, without further orders, the first squad will cover in front, the second to the right, the third to the left, the fourth to the rear, whenever needed. still, the officer in charge should make sure that this arrangement is carried out. a combat patrol, if not a full advance guard, will thus always precede a unit and be the first to take contact with the enemy. .--officers as guides. the officers serve as guides to their units, until deployment, a mounted officer in liaison with the advance guard or advanced combat patrol checking up the itinerary. .--keep close order as long as possible. the advance of a company into an engagement is conducted in close order, preferably columns of squads, until possible observation by the enemy or encountering of hostile fire makes it advisable to deploy. deployment should not be premature and should always follow upon the conditions arising during the progress of the advance. precautions against hostile artillery. against silent artillery. .--nearing artillery which may open fire. about two or three miles from the positions liable to be occupied by the enemy's field artillery, precautions should be taken against the possibility of its opening fire. .--deployment. deployments should be adopted best suited to escape observation: .--to escape direct observation: march in single or double file, the whole section[d] keeping closed up so as to diminish the number of files seen from the front. .--under aeroplane observation: avoid especially the center of roads as they show white, utilize on the contrary the spaces between cultivated fields of different colors, make use of all possible cover, trees, shrubs, ditches, embankments. always walk in the shade when possible. if hostile aeroplanes are flying low, halt and lie down on left side, hiding face in elbow. footnote: [d] the french "section" comprises men. it is thus equivalent to squads, and may be considered as platoons. crossing a bombarded zone. .--case i. artillery opening fire to register. a registering fire is easily recognized as the german artillery registers either with a single percussion shell at a time, or with two time-shells at three seconds interval. in the german field gun, the setting of the angle of sight[e] and of the elevation[f] involves two operations. .--oblique to right then to left. therefore infantry under registering fire should oblique forward rapidly. .--case ii: artillery opening fire for effect. the zone has necessarily been previously registered. such a zone is easily recognized by the presence of shell holes. .--avoid zone if possible. it should be avoided and the advance made on its outskirts. .--the five cases of fire for effect. if this cannot be done and the fire for effect materializes five cases are to be distinguished as the shells may be: . shrapnel shells bursting at right height; . shrapnel shells bursting high; . time-fuse high explosive shells bursting at right height; . time-fuse high explosive shells bursting high; . percussion high explosive shells. .--case . burst area of shrapnel shells bursting at right height. the area of burst is about to yards in length and yards in width, half the bullets falling on the first yards of the beaten zone. .--protective formation against shrapnel. advance in line of section, in single or double file keeping as closed up as possible with yards intervals between sections. the second line should be to yards behind the first. .--case . shrapnel shells bursting high. much less dangerous than when bursting at right height as initial speed of bullets is spent. same formation as for case . .--case . burst area of time-fuse high explosive shells bursting at right height. the area of burst is opposite to that of shrapnel: short depth, large width, only to yards depths as opposed to to yards in width. .--protective formation against time-fuse high explosives. advance in line of section, single or double file, keeping as closed up as possible with to yards intervals between sections. the second line may be yards behind the first. .--case . high explosive shells bursting high. the depth of the area of burst is longer than when shells burst at the right height; therefore widen interval between the lines. .--case . burst area of percussion high explosive shells. the radius of the explosion is only about yards but the local effect is intense and the displacement is effective in more than double the radius. .--protective formation against percussion high explosive shells. advance in line of section in double file, keeping as closed up as possible, with about yards intervals between sections. the second line may be about yards behind the first. footnotes: [e] inclination of the line of sight to the horizontal. [f] the vertical inclination of the gun. general recommendations against all types of effective fire. .--dangerous to stop, useless to run. do not stop in a zone under fire for effect as lying down only provides a larger target. if absolutely obliged to stop, remain standing and packed together like sardines, maintaining above formations and intervals. it is useless to run, but, as much as possible, advance steadily. .--protective formation against all types of shells. as may appear from the study of the above the following formation and intervals will afford the best protection against all types and combinations of types of shells, as a shell will never affect more than one section. advance in lines of sections in double file, keeping as closed up as possible, with to yards intervals[g] between sections. the second line should be to yards behind the first. footnote: [g] all through this chapter, maximum intervals are given. they may have to be shortened to secure closer order at the expense of greater safety. special features of the approach. use of woods as shelter on the advance. .--avoid if small. they should be used to advance or halt only if they are of considerable size. then, they hide movements and provide some shelter from fire. on the contrary, when they are small, they are to be avoided as they draw artillery fire and do not offer sufficient protection. .--liaison difficult. when advancing in woods, special care should be taken to keep all fractions connected. .--exit quickly at one time. to exit from wood, take all necessary dispositions under cover so that, on the signal of the commander, all fractions may be ready to spring out together. they should continue to advance forward, as rapidly as possible, to avoid the enemy's likely shelling of the outskirts. .--otherwise exit in different places. if the exit cannot be made by all fractions at one time, the elements of the second line should avoid coming out at the same point as those of the first line. to cross a crest. .--cross altogether and rapidly. let the line of sections assemble at top of crest, crouching carefully below the sky line. then, upon concerted signal, all should leap quickly across and down the descending slope, making as extended bounds as possible. this makes crossing fairly safe as even the infantry will have to modify both its elevation and angle of sight for every new position of this quickly moving target. precautions against cavalry. .--cavalry patrols. during the whole "approach" watch should be kept for possible cavalry patrols. the elements acting as advance guard and flank guards or as combat patrols have as part of their special mission to keep the cavalry away from the main body. .--face and fire. to repulse cavalry, the infantry must be able to face quickly toward the charging horsemen and furnish a heavy fire. .--protective formations. if cavalry patrols are expected ahead, deployment as skirmishers will secure this, if on the flanks, deploy in columns of squads marching in double file. a formation in echelon is effective at all times. .--repulsing the charge. if cavalry appears, stop, face the charge quickly, fix bayonets and fire at will, the section leaders controlling the fire. .--in case of surprise. if surprised, deploy quickly and lie down. the attack. the termination of the approach. .--the objective. the standard objective of a battalion is a maximum front of yards. .--determination of the objective. on nearing the objective the battalion commander reconnoiters rapidly to determine the number of companies to put in the front line and the part of the objective to be assigned to each. .--horses sent back. mounted officers now send back their horses to reserve battalion. .--assignment of position to companies. the battalion commander assigns to each company its part of the objective and the position from which it is to start the attack. .--getting into position for the attack. the orders are given verbally by the battalion commander to the captains and by the captains to the company usually through the platoon leaders as the company is not in close order. .--deployment before infantry fire. as soon as the zone swept by the infantry fire of the enemy is reached (about yards) deployment as skirmishers becomes imperative. .--methods of advance. keep on advancing toward positions for the attack by fractions, varying method according to the terrain; short rushes, crawling, making use of all possible cover. .--position of officers. the battalion commander and the captains march with the supports, the battalion commander controlling the despatch of reinforcements. as soon as the supports are all sent forward they march with the fraction nearest the enemy. .--liaison. a connecting file (runner) accompanies the battalion commander and each of the captains. the fire attack. .--the time to fire. it is determined by the casualties. .--the order to fire. it is given by the captains; (only in case of extreme emergency by a subaltern.) .--fire control. the section leaders, under the direction of the captain; control the fire: classes of firing, volley firing, firing at will; the target (the nearest hostile troops within the sector of the objective being the usual target); the range, the opening and cessation of fire in volley fire. .--fire observation. the section leaders are helped in their observation of the fire effect by observers standing besides them. the fire is usually directed independently by section or half section. .--verification of range. in principle, the corporals do not take part in the fire but verify the range and direction of the fire of their respective squads. advancing the firing line. .--methods of advance. to advance the firing line in attack, all means are good: by section, half-section, squad, the only condition being that it be by commanded fractions. .--closing in to replace casualties. as men fall, the rest close in toward the section leader, the sections rectifying intervals on the sections furthest advanced (the captain is with this section, all sections being now in line.) .--closing in on the battalion front. the several companies rectify intervals in the same way on the furthest advanced company (the battalion commander being with this company). .--seize every opportunity to advance. every propitious occasion to advance should be seized at once by the various elements of the line: greater effectiveness of the neighboring section's fire, slackening fire of the enemy, effects of artillery, etc. .--each fraction protects advance of neighbor. the movement forward of each fraction of the line should be protected by the fire of the neighboring fraction. .--keep fit to fire accurately. the fraction leader, after each rush forward, should give time to the men to get back their breath so that they may fire with careful aim. .--liaison with the captain. the captain should be kept informed by a conventional signal as to the need of ammunition, etc. use of machine guns in the attack. .--during the approach. use them judiciously but boldly. they should advance as first units. .--during the fire attack. strive to keep abreast or ahead of the most advanced elements especially on the flanks. .--during the charge. try to have them reach the objective with the firing line and contribute to the pursuit. the company supports. .--in liaison with the captain. the sections kept in support are at the disposition of the captain. .--method of advance. under the command of the section leader, they advance, in double file, at proper intervals or deployed, according to their proximity to the enemy and according to the terrain (covered or uncovered). .--distance from the firing line. they should be about yards behind the firing line to whose movements they conform. .--supplying the firing line. the section leaders keep in sight of the captain and upon his signaled command advance into the firing line either to fill up a gap or to reinforce a section. .--when filling a gap. they advance as far as possible ahead of the line. .--reinforcing. they come up with a rush and shout to rehearten the line. the companies in support. .--position. they are kept out of range of the enemy's fire upon the firing line but near enough to interfere as soon as called upon. .--liaison with battalion commander. the captains keep in touch with the battalion commander. .--advance into action. these companies advance into the fire zone with the necessary precautions, either by fractions or entire, taking advantage of favorable conditions: inefficiency of the enemy's fire, effectiveness of the firing line, etc. the charge. .--the final aim. the charge is the final aim of the whole attack. its success means the defeat of the enemy. .--caution. it should not be launched too soon. .--by whom ordered. the order may come directly from the commander of the attacking line or be solicited by any of his subordinates. .--method of advance. fix bayonets, advance, stop to fire, advance again, but always so as to arrive on the enemy's position without being out of breath. the pursuit. .--one essential rule. it should be vigorously pressed. .--organize new position. in the meanwhile the conquered position should be organized. special features of the attack. attack of a wood. .--first objective. in the attack of a wood, the first objective should be the outskirts. concentrate the first effort on the salients. .--method of advance. as soon as the wood is penetrated, advance quickly forward, utilizing all roads, paths and trails. the company advances by sections or half sections, in single or double file, preceded by strong patrols. every effort should be made to close in with the bayonet. .--outflanking. the companies or fractions on the flank strive to outflank the enemy so as to attack him on the flank or from behind. .--frontal attack. the companies or fractions in the center try to get across the wood as quickly as possible, or, at least, to reach a clearing. attack of a village. .--first objective. in the attack of a village, the first objective should be the nearest outskirt. .--organize. consolidate this first position as soon as conquered. signal to the artillery to lengthen the range. .--frontal attack. then try to gain as rapidly as possible the opposite end. .--outflanking. the flanking units endeavor to encircle the objective. .--against interior defense. if the defense has been strongly organized inside the village, fight forward step by step. blow up the obstacles with explosives. .--cooperation of artillery. have artillery bring up a few guns within close range. attack of a defile. .--when defended in front. if it is defended in front, try to advance rapidly by one or both flanks, small fractions only attacking on the valley bottom, while the greater part of the attacking force progresses on the heights on either side, the flanks striving to keep forward so as to reach the other end before the defenders and encircle them. .--when defended in rear. if the defile is defended at the farther end, as in the case of a bridge, echelon units (properly covered) for heavy concentrated fire from the bank held and cross the bridge on the run and in small groups. night attacks. .--of limited scope. they must be confined to simple movements over easy ground. .--orders to be given. they must be carefully prepared secretly beforehand in every detail. the orders must include detailed particulars on the role of each unit or fraction of units, precise data on the rallying points and on the signals to be used. .--small units used. for many reasons, chief among which is the difficulty of handling large units at night and maintaining contact, small units should be used. .--a battalion the maximum. the fire of the adversary being negligible at night, there is seldom any advantage in putting more than a battalion in line against a given objective, the quality, discipline and cohesion of the troops making up for the number. .--special precaution. before beginning the approach, carefully secure all arms and utensils so as to prevent noise. fix bayonets. .--method of advance. walk in double files on sides of roads, never in the center. otherwise as long as practicable, in columns of squads. .--liaison. commands are to be transmitted in a low voice by connecting files. .--to secure surprise. keep absolute silence. forbid all lights. no smoking allowed. .--reconnaissance. the itinerary should be reconnoitered beforehand, if possible, and index stakes planted; otherwise an officer should precede with a luminous compass and men to plant the stakes. .--no fire before charge. do not answer the enemy's fire until the charge. .--quickness essential. success depends above all on the rapidity and continuity of the advance. get there as quickly as possible. the defense. defense of points d'appuis: woods, villages, defiles. defense of woods. .--distribution of troops. the commander should distribute his command so as to provide a defense of the outskirts, an interior defense and reserves for a counter attack. .--the outskirt defense. the outskirts defense troops should organize their positions and remain hidden near the combat emplacements until the attack is announced as impending by their sentinels. .--the interior defense. the interior defense troops should organize their positions (abatis, barb-wire) on the edges of clearings and other open spaces so as to secure convergent fire. .--the reserves. the counter-attack reserves should be placed in the rear and on the outside of the flank best suited for launching a counter attack. they should proceed to organize the ground so as to prevent the enemy from issuing from the wood, and should strive to keep on. defense of a village. .--distribution of troops. the same as for the defense of a wood. .--the exits. the outskirts defense organization should include trenches and accessory defences before all the exits. these should be strongly barricaded. .--interior strong point. the interior defense should be organized about the houses most strongly built and least visible to the enemy's artillery. it should include hidden communications between these strong points, thus facilitating a prolonged defense. .--special precautions. the streets should be barricaded and loopholes provided in the walls of the houses. precautions should be taken against fire: pails of water, boxes of sand provided in the houses. defense of a defile. .--to keep the exits open for an advance. if the aim is to keep the exits open so as to permit the advance of troops, the defense should be organized at some distance in front of the defile: far enough to permit the unimpeded progress of the advance. .--to keep exits open for a retreat. if the aim is to keep the exits open so as to cover the retreat of troops, the roads at the bottom of the defile should be left free and the defense troops so placed as to draw the enemy's fire on other points. .--to block the defile. if the aim is to block the defile, the defense should be organized in the interior of the defile on both sides of the place of greatest width, so as to secure convergence of fire. echelon detachments all along the defile to act as a rear guard in case a retreat is necessary. keep the flanks well protected. night defense of a position .--precautions against attack. attack should be guarded against by accumulating obstacles and the defense further prepared by previous reconnoitering of the best ground for counter-attacks. .--receive with violent fire and immediate counterattacks. the enemy's charge should be met with a violent fire at the shortest possible range, followed immediately by counter-attacks with the bayonet, especially on the flanks. the counter attack. .--confine to definite objective. indicate the objective very definitely including the position to be reached but not gone beyond. its direction should not interfere with the fire of neighboring troops. .--necessary reconnaissance. the counter attack should be prepared cautiously and the itinerary carefully, even if rapidly, reconnoitered. (this may have been done as part of the preparation of the defense. it should be done with special care if the counter-attack is to take place at night.) .--watch for opportunity. it may be decided upon independently of the incidents of the defense or to take advantage of the mistakes or weakness of the adversary. .--counter from short distance. the most favorable moment is when the enemy is within a short distance and its artillery consequently obliged to stop or to lengthen its fire. .--sudden and intense fire. it should be launched suddenly so as to surprise the enemy and pushed vigorously, the fire being increased to great intensity along the whole front. .--rapid and continuous advance. rapidity and continuity of advance is essential. .--bayonet charge. its culmination is the bayonet charge against the prescribed definite objective. .--stop! hold this objective once conquered but do not go beyond. .--dash under discipline. let the motto be always, but here especially: "dash under discipline." questions. the following questions cover the principles of combat in open warfare. these principles have been supplemented rather than changed in the light of experience since . in their original form, as given in this book, they still may be considered as fundamental. compare them carefully with the treatment of the same topics in the larger works recommended. the questions are shaped to cover the topics supplemented. .--what is the difference between "trench warfare" and "open warfare"? .--what is meant by the "combat"? .--what are the two phases of the combat? .--what is the distinction between "the approach" and the "attack"? .--why is maneuvering impossible under infantry fire? .--what is the purpose of the approach? .--how are orders issued? .--how is liaison secured? .--what were the original functions of combat patrols? .--when should close order be abandoned for deployment? .--at what distance from the enemy does deployment become imperative? .--what is the last formation to escape direct observation? .--what precautions may be taken against aeroplane observations? .--what is the difference between a registering fire and fire for effect? .--how may the german registering fire be recognized? .--what precaution may be taken against it and why is it effective? .--what preliminaries are necessary to open fire for effect? .--what is an easy way to recognize whether fire for effect may be expected? .--what five cases of fire may be distinguished? .--what is the burst area of a shrapnel shell? .--what is the safest protective formation against shrapnel? .--what is the difference between a shrapnel shell, a time-fuse high explosive shell and a percussion high explosive shell? .--what is the burst area of a time-fuse high explosive shell? .--what is the safest protective formation against it? .--what is the burst area of percussion high explosive shells, and what precautions can be taken against them? .--what is the safest protective formation against all types of shells? .--what objections may it be open to? .--what is the safest way and direction to go when under artillery fire? .--why should small woods be avoided? .--in large woods, what precautions must be taken to secure a steady advance? .--how should the exit from a wood be made? .--describe method of crossing a crest. .--what are good protective formations against cavalry and how is it repulsed? .--what elements have the mission to deal with cavalry patrols? .--what is meant by "the objective" in attack? .--what is the distinction between determining the objective and the position from which to start the attack? .--what is the distinction between "the approach" and getting into position for the attack? .--at what distance from the enemy does deployment as skirmishers become imperative? .--describe method of advance toward positions for the attack. .--where should the officers be during this advance? .--how is liaison (communication) secured between the various commands? .--what is meant by the fire attack? .--how is the time to fire determined? .--how are fire control and fire effect secured? .--how is the firing line advanced? .--how is it rectified? .--why should care be taken not to have men out of breath? .--how should machine guns be made to contribute to the approach, the fire attack, the charge? .--how far should the company supports be from the firing line? .--who commands them? .--how is the firing line reinforced? .--describe the company supports going into the line to fill up a gap, to reinforce a section. .--describe position and behavior of companies in support. .--what is the final stage of the whole attack? .--who orders the charge and how is it made? .--what is the difference between the charge and the pursuit? .--what should be done with a newly conquered position? .--what is the first objective in attacking a wood? .--how does the aim of the troops on the wings differ from that of those in the center? .--distinguish the different objectives in the attack of a village. .--describe the attack to proceed through a defile in which the enemy is located. .--describe the attack of a bridge. .--why should night attacks be of limited scope? .--what special precautions should be taken? .--what is the largest unit advisable? .--how is surprise secured? .--describe the methods of reconnaissance, advance and liaison for a night attack. .--should the enemy's fire be answered in a night attack? .--what does the success of a night attack chiefly depend on? .--how should troops be distributed for the defense of woods and what is the function of each? .--describe the distribution of troops for the defense of a village. .--how should the outskirts defense be organized? .--describe the interior defense. .--how can a defile be kept open for an advance? .--how can a defile be safeguarded for a retreat? .--give necessary orders for the blocking of a defile. .--why should reconnoitering for counter attacks always be part of the organization for defense. .--describe repulse of a night attack. .--is an attack ever advisable without previous reconnaissance? .--explain the importance of understanding the exact objective in a counterattack. .--what is the best time to launch a counter attack? .--what precautions must be taken to secure the success of a counter attack? .--what is a good motto under all conditions, but especially in the attack? appendix. a division front in trench warfare. explanation of plate i. the following may be considered a standard scheme of distribution of troops, for trench warfare, in a fully developed trench system. an infantry division is composed of two brigades, each brigade of two regiments, each regiment of three battalions. each brigade thus has six battalions, each battalion numbering officers and men, normally divided into four companies. one battalion occupies about yards in ordinary trench warfare. as reliefs must be frequent, three battalions of each brigade will be on duty, while the other three are in rest-billets, at least two miles back of the trenches. two of the battalions on duty occupy the trenches, the third is stationed about a mile back, in reserve. a brigade can therefore hold about yards of trenches: two battalions in front line trenches, one battalion in reserve, and three battalions in rest billets. hence a division (two brigades) will hold a front of about yards. within each yards front, the distribution may be as follows: three platoons of companies a, b, and c occupy the dugouts of the cover trench and of the support trench and post sentinels by roster in the fire trench. platoon no. of each company occupy the dugouts of the reserve trench, together with the entire company d. platoons and companies then relieve one another according to roster, a platoon of each company and an entire company, in turn, enjoying comparative rest in the reserve trench even during the stay of the battalion in the trenches. explanation of plate ii. the following is a description of the back areas of a divisional sector in which there has been no great changes since . there are still several hundred miles of such sectors. the line at the top marks the beginning of the trench-system described in plate i. being the entrance to the communication trenches. road a, b, with the river c, d, run at the bottom of a small valley surrounded by hills of about ft. elevation. a branch of the river runs from c. to e. and a railroad beside it, along road h, i, and crossing road j, k. a good size village is at d, a smaller one at c, hamlets at a and b. the latter are about one mile back of the trenches, village c. about two miles and village d. between three and four. hamlets a and b have probably been heavily bombarded at the time line was established and have been evacuated by the civilians. village c. has received shells, but, if there has been no big attack in the sector, is in fair shape and some of the inhabitants remain. village d. may also have suffered from shells but probably most of the inhabitants remain. such villages may be clusters of farms or of cottages, depending upon the region. if village is made up of cottages, farm houses will be found along the roads at frequent intervals. the fields are likely to be under cultivation almost as far as road k, l. villages a, b, c are used to billet the battalion in reserve of each brigade. village d. and the nearest villages further back are used as rest-billets by the battalions of the brigades who will relieve those in the trenches. near or in villages a, b and c or near hill e and g are located the transports of the infantry battalions in the trenches. supplies are sent daily to the trenches from this headquarters of the quartermaster and transport officer. somewhere along road k, l, or about hills e and g are hidden in gun pits the batteries of field artillery attached to the division. the men live in dugouts alongside. the camps for the horses, wagons and supply headquarters of these batteries are hidden in the woods or on the further slopes of hills e, f, g. in village d are very likely located the brigades' headquarters and such services as the field ambulance and the divisional supply departments. the y. m. c. a. recreation centers, divisional theatre, football fields, army canteens etc., are also located in village d or just back of it. if the houses in the villages do not provide enough billets, huts and tents are erected. otherwise the officers are billeted in the houses of the inhabitants and the men in the barns. the divisional headquarters, the ammunition column, the artillery brigade headquarters, the engineers, the ammunition dumps, etc., are strung out in the villages and along the roads just back of village d. the heavier artillery is also posted back of this line. in sectors that have been the scenes of offensives the several elements remain in the same relation, but as the villages have been obliterated, shelters must be provided. [the editor.] [illustration: plate i--division front-- yards (trench system)] [illustration: plate ii--division front (back areas)] * * * * * transcriber's note: varied hyphenation was retained, for example as fire trench and fire-trench, and counter attack, counterattack and counter-attack. obvious punctuation errors were corrected. page , table of contents, " " changed to " " to reflect the heading of "the charge." page , table of contents, " " changed to " " to reflect the heading of "night attacks." page , table of contents, " " changed to " " to reflect the heading of "the counter attack." page , "resourcefulnes" changed to "resourcefulness" (and resourcefulness) page , final item under " .--on the day of the relief" was formatted to match the rest of the items. in the original it was typeset as a paragraph instead of as an item with a hanging indent. page , "offlcers" changed to "officers" (many reserve officers) page , "preceed" changed to "precede" (always precede a unit) page , a footnote marker was added to the text ( yards intervals[g] between) page , "controling" changed to "controlling" (the section leaders controlling) page , "controling" changed to "controlling" (commander controlling the) page , "or" changed to "of" (files on sides of) page , "shapnel" changed to "shrapnel" (shrapnel shell, a time-fuse) page , there is no question on the list. this was retained as printed. transcriber's note italic text is denoted by _underscores_. a superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example g^ or ^{st}. some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. confidential for official use only not to be taken into front line trenches use of mines in trench warfare (from the french school of st. cyr) translated and edited at the army war college july, [illustration: (seal of the 'united states of america war office')] washington government printing office war department. document no. . _office of the adjutant general._ war department, washington, _july , _. the following notes on use of mines in trench warfare are published for the information of all concerned. [ . , a. g. o.] by order of the secretary of war: tasker h. bliss, _major general, acting chief of staff_. official: h. p. mccain, _the adjutant general_. war department, the adjutant general's office, _washington, june , _. _to all officers of the army_: you are advised that this and all subsequent documents of a similar character which may be furnished to you from this office are to be regarded as strictly confidential. they are to be kept at all times in your personal possession, and are not to be copied, nor are any parts of their contents to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the press, nor to any person not in the military or naval service of the united states. in europe these documents are not to be carried into the front-line trenches, nor farther to the front than the usual post of the officers to whom issued. strict compliance with this injunction is enjoined upon every officer into whose hands any of these confidential documents may come. by order of the secretary of war: h. p. mccain, _the adjutant general_. contents. page. use of mines specially menaced points surface observations indications revealing enemy galleries listening for underground noise position of listening posts hours and precautions what is heard distance at which noise can be heard direction from which noise comes useful information on mines defensive systems interval between galleries start, depth, and progress of work barrage trench for miners camouflet offensive galleries superimposed galleries mine chamber launching an attack craters craters to be occupied craters that the enemy occupies craters not occupied diagrams , , , use of mines in trench warfare. [from the french st. cyr school.] (secret and confidential. for official use only. not to be taken into first-line trenches.) use of mines. in sectors where the distance between the two lines is below meters, mine warfare must be used. when the trenches are farther apart, underground warfare is seldom employed. in special cases, however, when there are strong ventilators and the line is stable enough to permit of it, advance may be made underground. specially menaced points. the most vulnerable points evidently are the following: the outposts in advance of the line, machine-gun positions approximately located by the enemy, and the junction points of the communicating trenches with the first line. surface observation. underground activity, either offensive or defensive, is first observed from those points in our lines nearest to it. all enemy trenches facing a salient of our lines will be the object of particular attention and closest daily observation. this observation of the first-line trenches should disclose the presence of enemy underground works and their approximate location. one of the difficult questions in mining is the removal of the earth. expert miners sometimes remove the earth as far as to meters from the entrance to the gallery. they throw it on old ruined shelters, in shell holes, on the reverse of the trenches. but these precautions are not always rigidly observed. when the noncommissioned officer is absent, or the enemy bombards a little strongly, some one in the working party not wanting to work overtime throws several clods of earth on the parapet. indications revealing the enemy galleries. freshly placed earth coming from underground is white and less dull in color than that of the parapets, which have been washed by the rain and blackened by explosives. the difference in color for the first day or so is striking. in chalk, large white spots are seen on the reverse of the german trench, daily growing larger. without doubt they are working near by, and should be watched. a communication trench comes out at a salient, and runs back from to meters. patches of chalk, freshly moved and increasing daily, are observed. these are indications of underground work starting from the salient. four or five meters of enemy trench without loopholes, but with loopholes close together to the left and right, may mark a gallery entrance. a miner's working relief reaches the gallery, each man carrying a piece of the frame or a lining plank over his shoulder, the ends of which can be seen over the parapet or through the loopholes. these are indications of a gallery position, especially if the men all move in the same direction and are lost to view at the same place. from a raised point on the second or third line we see, with field glasses, an abnormal accumulation of sandbags in a well-known area. these sacks may indicate an underground gallery. patrols sent out in front of the enemy trenches sometimes bring back valuable information. they may hear the rumble of ventilators, the noise of a truck moving on the rails, men working near a gallery entrance, etc. the enemy fire with heavy calibers on portions of the first line. often the same corner is bombarded. this may indicate that the enemy artillery is seeking to facilitate the miner's work by overthrowing the entrances to troublesome galleries in the trench attacked. _listening for underground noise._--the observation of hostile trenches may give indications which will limit the zone necessary to be watched; but for accurate results we must listen for underground noises. _positions of listening posts._--the listening post is placed at the head of a gallery, in an angle of a gallery, in a deep dug-out, in a niche under the parapet, or on the bottom of the trench. the points nearest to the enemy trench are selected for the listening posts. below the outposts there is always a niche, allowing a man to place his ear to the ground (hence the name listening posts). _hours and precautions._--the most favorable hours are morning about or o'clock, at p. m., and at midnight. all the occupants of that part of the trench must keep still, and all work in the trench and the mine must cease for a given time. _what is heard._--the inexperienced ear hears too many things, and is easily mistaken in the noises heard. a relief passing in the enemy trench or in his own trench at meters sounds strangely like the noise of a pick. a man hitting a ground sill or striking it with his heel gives the idea that work is being done. the impact of bullets on the parapet at night, when a fusillade is uninterrupted, also gives the idea of underground work. a man filing a fuse at the foot of his loophole suggests the presence of an enemy revolving borer. a man who snores beside the gallery entrance imitates the noise of a ventilator and may be mistaken for it. however, to even a partially trained ear the noise of the pickax is characteristic. it is not a harsh sound, like that of a heel striking on chalk ground, nor is it like the shock of bullets piercing the parapet. it is a low, rhythmic sound, with regular cadence. in a gallery the miner works kneeling. when he has struck five or six blows with the pickax, he takes a breath. he repeats this process about times. he stops two or three minutes, and the second miner clears away the earth and fills the truck with sacks. the first miner resumes his work. it is easy to distinguish this regular cadence peculiar to the miner. in an infantry company there are always several miners by occupation, or several men familiar with engineering. these men are selected specially for the listening service. they can give accurate information to the officers and noncommissioned officers of a sapper company. it is also a good thing for a platoon commander to descend into a gallery and train his ear by exchanging pickax signals with the miner in the adjoining gallery. _distance at which noise can be heard._--the following indications help in determining the distance of underground work: four men work in a gallery. they start the work, then stop. the ear is placed against the side of the wall, the other ear being covered by the hand. if the work is heard under these conditions, it is at a distance of to meters. if all noise is avoided, and the work is heard without placing the ear against the wall, the distance is to meters. if there is talking or working going on, and still the underground work is heard in spite of it, the distance is to meters. at six meters a man can hear all the sounds of the pickax, the chalk crumbling, the pieces rolling down on one another, the sliding and stacking of cases. these noises sound as if they were immediately below. at four meters a man can hear talking, the scraping of buttons against the wall, the miner turning around. the humming of a ventilator can be heard at meters without taking precautions to hear it. an automatic borer can be heard all through the sector. _directions from which noise comes._--it is easier to determine the direction of noise than the distance. there is always a chance of making observations in the galleries--one on the right, the other on the left of the noise. the exact location of the enemy underground work can be determined by intersections. the engineer companies have an apparatus for intensifying the sound (strong microphones). they reinforce the sound when the apparatus is in the direction of the source of the sound. their greatest defect is that they magnify sound too much and too many things are heard. why hear for a distance of meters when the enemy trench is only meters away? everything is heard in a mine gallery. it is difficult to distinguish among the many noises that of the enemy miner's pick. the ear is amply sufficient. the beginner has a tendency to exaggerate the proximity of sounds. he thinks he is close to the enemy when he is still at a distance, and he takes steps to catch the enemy by exploding a camouflet, whose only effect is to retard his own work. useful information on mines. _defensive system._--two arrangements can be adopted: fan-shaped arrangement (fig. a) or arrangement of independent parallel galleries (fig. b). the second arrangement is preferable. _interval between galleries._--arrangement being adopted, calculate the interval between two neighboring galleries in such manner as to prevent the enemy working underground. at the head of each gallery two elbows of meters, with boring chambers, are made. a -meter boring is made from each chamber. at the bottom of the boring a camouflet is placed, effective for radius of meters (not more heavily charged or the gallery will be demolished). the camouflet of the neighboring gallery forms a tangent to the first. the interval between the two galleries can not, therefore, be greater than meters. in practice we would take meters. _start, depth, and progress of work._--start from first line. start at meters, with a slope of per cent to per cent down to a depth of meters. then horizontal. length to gallery and return without ventilation can cover meters. [illustration: fig. a. fig. b.] _barrage trench for miners._--if the enemy passes in spite of everything, the explosion should at least have been foreseen. the enemy's attack must be limited or stopped, and this is always possible after the explosion of the charge, which may explode well in advance of our lines and act only as a strong means of launching his attack. the barrage trench is established at from to meters in rear of the salient t (fig. b). in front of the parapet t, wire entanglement r, and two machine-gun positions m^ and m^ are placed. when the enemy's explosion is near, only a few men are left to occupy the salient. the german explosion does not bury anyone, and when the attack is launched it breaks down at the entanglement r. _camouflet._--the sector commander is warned when the defense is about to explode a camouflet. about meters on each side of the gallery are evacuated as a precaution. the only danger is in having several sandbags fall on the sides of the gallery entrance. warn the working party charged with the relief, in order that they may not block the passage of men in the first line. do not fire or make any changes in that part of the trench, in order that the enemy may not locate the position. do not fire rockets before a given time. the camouflet sometimes shakes the ground and dust is visible. nine times out of ten the camouflet is used at night. when the enemy explodes a camouflet, fire a quantity of rockets to locate the positions. fire grenades and throw bombs at the presumable position of the gallery. send several men in front of the parapet to listen to what is going on in the enemy trench. _offensive galleries._--these are intended to pass under the adversary's defenses. depth.--start at first line when it is far enough away from the enemy. start at second line, or at special communication trench about meters in the rear of the first line, when the enemy trench is too near. (see preceding.) a depth of to meters should be attained. the work is done as in ordinary galleries. [illustration: fig. c.] _superimposed galleries._--this procedure gives splendid results in deceiving the enemy, who thinks he is protecting himself. the defensive gallery starts at the first line and the offensive gallery starts in rear of it. both galleries are on the same vertical plane, the second being more advanced in the direction of the enemy than the first. an enemy listener easily confuses one with the other, and the offensive gallery passes under him. (see fig. c.) distances d and d^ are the same. the miner, m, confuses the two sounds, and the offensive gallery passes under him. _mine chambers._--they are of special interest to the engineer corps from a technical point of view. the best hours for exploding them are a. m. and p. m. when an attack is launched at a great distance, or when there is to be no attack, the explosion is preceded by several minutes of noise in the trenches. we commence firing and show several bayonets over the parapet. the enemy believes an attack is coming, comes out of his shelter, and mans his trenches. after the explosion we fire on the mine crater for four hours with artillery, grenades, and bombs. this fire should cover all the area exploded by the mine chamber and should prevent any help to the wounded or buried. _launching an attack by means of mining._--the mine is an irresistible means of launching an attack. in a mined sector the best troops completely lose their bearings for several seconds after an explosion. these several seconds prevent the machine gun from firing, and the assailant gains a foothold in the first line and often in the second. a mine attack should be prepared in the following manner: several days beforehand the attacking troops are sent to the rest camp. the plan of the jumping-off trenches, the trenches to be attacked, the ground trace of the crater, and the zone of the searchlights are drawn on the ground with chalk. each attacking fraction is placed in position, with the matériel to be carried. each fraction's line of advance is marked out in chalk, as well as the section of the enemy's trench to be occupied and the position of the barrage. every detail is studied thoroughly, and the exercise repeated a dozen times. the attack is then carried out as planned. _craters._--the question of the occupation of craters must be decided by an authority higher than the platoon commander. in certain cases it is well to occupy them; in others, inadvisable. we will discuss only the practical work to be done in each case. _craters to be occupied._--crown the rim on the enemy side with a continuous trench, joined to the lines by (at least) two communicating trenches. run out galleries in three directions, first for protection and later for use in the attack. construct bombproofs on the half cone on the enemy side. a crater is a position advantageous for the construction of auxiliary defenses, for the removal of earth from the galleries, for massing troops for an attack, and for flanking the lines. _craters that the enemy occupies._--they should be hampered with bombs and grenades. we should head off the enemy by means of two well-placed mine chambers, which are always possible to fire rapidly when the scheme of defense is by independent galleries. _craters not occupied._--it is well to see what goes on at the bottom. an outpost of several men or a sentinel may be posted for this purpose in a communicating trench on the friendly rim. two communicating trenches may also be used to crown the friendly rim with a trench with slight counterslope. the outposts place a dozen loopholes permitting fire on the bottom. we may also fill up the bottom with chevaux de frise and other auxiliary obstacles that can be thrown in. if the craters are in the way, we can always turn them by mining. (see figures for different examples:) [illustration: fig. i. --example of mine craters-- mine crater to be occupied t first line trench e crater b b^ b^ communicating trench t trench crowning rim on enemy side m m^ machine gun on flanks e e^ e^ new galleries r wire entanglement] [illustration: fig. ii. --mine crater occupied by the enemy-- e mine crater t ^{st} line trench g^ gallery destroyed by explosion g g^ intact galleries allowing explosions to be placed f f^ which fill up enemy crater] [illustration: fig. iii. --mine crater not to be occupied-- t jumping off trench t trench crowning friendly rim loopholes overlooking the bottom and enemy rim m m^ flanking automatic rifle r wire entanglement] [illustration: fig. iv. mine crater between two lines aim:-- create an elevated earth position for placing machine guns or throwing bombs at m and m^ which enfilade the portion t & t^ of enemy trench.] [illustration: fig. v. mine crater for flanking purposes, see fig. i & iii. fig. vi. destroying a portion of enemy trench by means of two mine craters. b b^ communicating german trenches cut off by explosion. s s^ salient under which e.e are exploded. all flanking machine guns between s & s^ cut off by rims of craters.] transcriber's note obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. pg : '(fig. a)' replaced by '(fig. a)'. pg : '(fig. b)' replaced by '(fig. b)'. pg : '(fig. )' replaced by '(fig. b)'. pg : 'positions m and' replaced by 'positions m^ and'. pg : '(see figure.)' replaced by '(see fig. c.)'. english coast defences [illustration: dover castle, kent from an engraving by s. and n. buck] english coast defences from roman times to the early years of the nineteenth century [illustration: printer's logo] by george clinch london g. bell and sons, ltd. chiswick press: charles whittingham and co. tooks court, chancery lane, london. to the right honourable arthur james balfour, m.p. first lord of the admiralty these pages are inscribed [illustration: printer's logo] preface the intricate coast-line of england, so difficult for an enemy to blockade, so difficult at every point for combined naval and military forces to defend against raiders, presents to the student of history an extremely interesting subject. it is to its insularity that england owes something of its greatness, and to the great length of its coast-line that its vulnerability is due. the present book represents the results of a study of the methods and means by which england, from roman times down to the early years of the nineteenth century, has defended her shores against various over-sea enemies, who have attempted, sometimes successfully, to invade and conquer. the author wishes to return thanks for the loan of blocks used in illustration of this volume, particularly to the society of antiquaries for figs. , , , , , ; the royal archaeological institute for figs. , , , , ; the kent archaeological society for figs. , , , , , ; the proprietors of the "victoria history" and professor haverfield for fig. ; and the technical journals, limited, and mr. a. w. clapham, f.s.a., for fig. . the corrected proof-sheets of the book have been submitted to the proper authorities at the war office, and that department has sanctioned the publication of the volume. contents page preface vii list of illustrations xi part i prehistoric camps the roman invasion of britain the count of the saxon shore roman coast fortresses part ii the saxon settlement of england danish incursions and camps the norman invasion of england norman coast castles part iii mediaeval castles and walled towns on the coast part iv coast defences under henry viii and later on the east coasts of kent and sussex of the estuaries of the thames, the medway, etc. of the south coast part v miscellaneous defences the navy the cinque ports defensive chains, etc. the coastguard index list of illustrations fig. page dover castle. buck's engraving _frontispiece_ . gariannonum (burgh castle). plan . gariannonum (burgh castle). plan published in . west mersea. plan of roman building . regulbium (reculver). plan . regulbium (reculver). roman masonry . reculver. the ruins of the church . rutupiae (richborough). plan . reculver. from a print published in . richborough. roman masonry of north wall . dover, roman pharos. elevation of north side . dover, roman pharos. section . lymne. roman walls . lymne. plan . pevensey. bastion . porchester. plan . porchester. water-gate . porchester. exterior of west wall . shoebury. plan of danish camp . yarmouth. north gate, . yarmouth. south gate, . ipswich. st. matthew's gate, . orford castle, suffolk, . cowling castle, kent, . queenborough castle, kent. plan . queenborough castle, kent. view in . canterbury castle in the eighteenth century . sandwich, kent. fisher gate . sandwich, kent. barbican . dover. bird's-eye view of town and harbour, _temp._ queen elizabeth . saltwood castle, kent. the gate house . portsmouth harbour, _temp._ king henry viii . southsea castle, _temp._ king henry viii . southampton. plan . deal castle, kent . tilbury fort in the year . tilbury fort in the year . general plan of henry viii's blockhouses on kent and sussex coasts . sandown castle. plan . deal castle. plan . walmer castle. plan . walmer castle from the north . sandgate castle. plan . camber castle. plan . upnor castle, kent . hurst castle, hants part i prehistoric camps the roman invasion of britain the count of the saxon shore roman coast fortresses english coast defences prehistoric camps round the coast of england there are many prehistoric earthworks of great extent and strength. these fall generally under the heads of hill-top fortresses and promontory camps. the works comprised under the former head are so arranged as to take the greatest possible advantage of natural hill-tops, often of large size. on the line where the comparatively level top developed into a more or less precipitous slope a deep ditch was dug, and the earth so removed was in most cases thrown outwards so as to form a rampart which increased the original difficulties of the sloping hill-side. the latter type of earthwork, called promontory camps from their natural conformation, were strengthened by the digging of a deep ditch, so as to cut off the promontory from the main table-land from which it projected, and in some cases the sides of the camp were made more precipitous by artificial scarping. an examination of these types of earthworks leads to the conclusion that they were probably tribal enclosures for the safe-guarding of cattle, etc.; that, strictly speaking, they were not military works at all, and, in any case, had no relation to national defence against enemies coming over-sea. one finds in different parts of the country a prevalent tradition that the romans occupied the more ancient british hill-top strongholds, and the name "caesar's camp" is popularly applied to many of them. if such an occupation really took place it was, in all probability, only of a temporary character. these fortifications were not suitable to the roman method of military operations and encampment, and such archaeological evidences of roman occupation as have been found point to the presence of domestic buildings, such as at chanctonbury ring and wolstanbury camp (sussex) rather than military works. however, the question must not be dismissed as entirely without some foundation in fact, because it was only natural that the roman invaders who dispossessed the britons of their fastnesses should themselves have taken temporary possession of the works from which the britons were driven out. the roman invasion of britain there is hardly a single detail of the first invasion of britain by the romans which has not been the subject of dispute or discussion among historians and antiquaries, but, briefly, it may be stated as highly probable that caesar left portus itius (boulogne) on august b.c., and landed at or near what is now deal on the following day. when caesar found a convenient time for the invasion of britain, he got together about eighty transports, which he considered would be sufficient for carrying two legions across the channel. those galleys which he had left he distributed to the questor, lieutenants, and officers of the cavalry. in addition to these ships there were eighteen transports, detained by contrary winds at a port about eight miles off, and these were appointed to carry over the cavalry. a favourable breeze sprang up, and anchor was weighed about one in the morning. the cavalry in the eighteen other transports embarked at the other port. it was ten o'clock when caesar reached the coast of britain, where he saw the cliffs covered with the enemy's forces. he speaks of the place as being bounded by steep mountains in a way which clearly describes dover and the eminences in its neighbourhood, comprising shakespeare's cliff, the western and eastern heights, and all the magnificent cliff of precipitous chalk rock which extends to kingsdown, near walmer. on such a coast as this, apart from the presence of the enemy, landing was impossible, and caesar wisely determined to sail eight miles further on, where he found, probably at deal, a plain and open shore. caesar's description is most interesting, and may be quoted: "but the barbarians perceiving our design, sent their cavalry and chariots before, which they frequently make use of in battle, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to oppose our landing: and indeed we found the difficulty very great on many accounts; for our ships being large, required a great depth of water; and the soldiers, who were wholly unacquainted with the places, and had their hands embarrassed and loaden with a weight of armour, were at the same time to leap from the ships, stand breast high against the waves, and encounter the enemy, while they, fighting upon dry ground, or advancing only a little way into the water, having the free use of all their limbs, and in places which they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their darts, and spur on their horses, well inured to that kind of service. all these circumstances serving to spread a terror among our men, who were wholly strangers to this way of fighting, they pushed not the enemy with the same vigour and spirit as was usual for them in combats upon dry ground. "caesar, observing this, ordered some galleys, a kind of shipping less common with the barbarians, and more easily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the transports towards the shore, in order to set upon the enemy in flank, and by means of their engines, slings, and arrows, drive them to some distance. this proved of considerable service to our men, for what with the surprise occasioned by the make of our galleys, the motion of the oars, and the playing of the engines, the enemy were forced to halt, and in a little time began to give back. but our men still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly because of the depth of the water in those parts, the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having first invoked the gods for success, cried out aloud: 'follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you will betray the roman eagle into the hands of the enemy; for my part, i am resolved to discharge my duty to caesar and the common-wealth.' upon this he jumped into the sea, and advanced with the eagle against the enemy: whereat, our men exhorted one another to prevent so signal a disgrace, all that were in the ship followed him, which being perceived by those in the nearest vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the enemy. "the battle was obstinate on both sides; but our men, as being neither able to keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their respective standards, because leaping promiscuously from their ships, every one joined the first ensign he met, were thereby thrown into great confusion. the enemy, on the other hand, being well acquainted with the shallows, when they saw our men advancing singly from the ships, spurred on their horses, and attacked them in that perplexity. in one place great numbers would gather round a handful of romans; others falling upon them in flank, galled them mightily with their darts, which caesar observing, ordered some small boats to be manned, and ply about with recruits. by this means the foremost ranks of our men having got footing, were followed by all the rest, when falling upon the enemy briskly, they were soon put to the rout. but as the cavalry were not yet arrived, we could not pursue or advance far into the island, which was the only thing wanting to render the victory complete."[ ] sea-fighting was not unknown to the romans, but as far as the invasion of britain was concerned, caesar's fleet may be regarded as a collection of ships for transport purposes rather than a fighting naval force. the main object of caesar was to land his soldiers so that they might encounter and vanquish the enemy on dry land. this, as the graphic words of the "commentaries" clearly tell, was quickly accomplished. the british method of fighting, in which chariots were employed for the attack, is described by caesar,[ ] who was evidently impressed by their skilful combination of rapid and awe-inspiring attack with the freedom and mobility of light infantry. it is noteworthy that caesar says nothing about coast defences in the form of earthworks, or indeed in any other form, and it is on other grounds improbable that the britons possessed any provision of that kind against invading enemies, although they themselves lived in stockaded enclosures. the romans were the first people to introduce anything like general coast defence in britain, and in this, as in all other branches of their military enterprises, they displayed great skill, intelligence, and thoroughness. for the defence of the coast of the eastern and southern parts of britain they erected a chain of castra or fortresses extending from brancaster, on the north-west coast of norfolk, to porchester, situated on the extreme north-west shore of portsmouth harbour. the position of the various fortresses shows that it was not necessary, according to the roman plan of defence, that one fort should command views of its neighbours. reculver and richborough, richborough and dover, dover and lymne, lymne and pevensey, were in no case visible from each other, although the distance which separated them was not great in every case. under these circumstances it is not remarkable to find evidences, as will presently be explained, of special provision for signalling between the fortresses. the count of the saxon shore during the early part of the roman occupation of britain the chief mode of defence adopted against piratical incursions was the navy, _classis britannica_. this, for the most part, moved in those waters which lay between the british and gaulish coasts, answering to what we now know as the straits of dover and the southern part of the north sea. for a time the navy was able to keep the seas free from pirates, but towards the end of the third century the trouble became greater than ever. raiders came in large numbers both to our own coasts and also to the continental coasts opposite, to both of which the name of the saxon shore was given. the romans decided to take strong measures to put an end to the trouble. for this purpose they appointed a special officer, one marcus aurelius valerius carausius, commonly known by his last name. the appearance of carausius on the stage of history brings into prominence a man of strong but unscrupulous character. he is believed to have allowed the pirates to carry on their work of plunder at their pleasure, and then, having waited for the proper moment, he relieved them of their booty on the return journey. in this way he acquired great riches, and in due course he employed the fleet, not against the enemy of rome, but against rome, and in such a way as to render britain independent. after several ineffectual attempts to break his power, diocletian and maximianus found it necessary to recognize him as their colleague in the empire, a triumph which carausius commemorated by striking a medal bearing as a device three busts with appropriate emblems the legend: (_ob._) caravsivs . et . fratres . svi (_rev._) pax avggg. carausius was murdered by his chief official, allectus, in the year . shortly after his death, and when the british province had ceased to be independent of rome, an official was appointed called the count of the saxon shore. this officer, whose title was _comes littoris saxonici_, was a high official whose duty it was to command the defensive forces and supervise the fortresses erected on the east, south-east, and south coasts of england against the piratical raids of the various tribes of saxons and others during the latter part of the roman occupation of britain. the precise nature of his duties and the full extent of his authority are equally unknown, but they probably comprised the general oversight and command both of the fortresses on the british coast from the northern coast of norfolk to a point near portsmouth, and the navy which guarded our shores. opinions are divided on the question as to what was precisely meant by the phrase "the saxon shore." was it, as some think, those parts of the shore of britain and gaul on which, being specially subject to saxon raiders, defences were erected or employed for repelling the invaders? or was it, as others have supposed, perhaps with less probability, a strip of territory following the line of coast nearest the sea on which the saxons were allowed to settle in late roman times? roman coast fortresses a careful examination of the fortresses which protected the line of coast to which reference has been made, is likely, we think, to afford some light upon the above-mentioned point. if we pay attention to the plans of these fortresses, it will be obvious that at least two, reculver and brancaster, belong to a type of roman fortress which is associated with a period much earlier than the time, as far as we know, when saxon or other raiders began to molest the coasts of britain and gaul. perhaps it is significant that these two castra command the entrance to two of the great water ways on our east coast, the thames and the wash. the other seven fortresses, judging from their plans, belong to a later stage of development in roman military architecture. from this and other features already described we may infer that the whole series of fortresses was built at different periods, and probably in the following order: reculver. | richborough. brancaster. | lymne. porchester. | pevensey. unfortunately, the architectural remains of the remaining castra are not sufficiently perfect to allow of classification. one or two of the coast fortresses, such as pevensey and lymne, may well have been erected towards the close of the roman occupation. it is significant that tiles bearing the impressed name of honorius have been found built into the walls of pevensey, pointing to the lateness of the building of at least some of the masonry at that castrum.[ ] at lymne early inscriptions, etc. have been found built into the walls, indicating a period if not late in the roman period, at least a considerable time after the date of the inscribed stones which were enclosed, as mere building material, in the walls. this is corroborated by indications of adhering barnacles, from which we may fairly conclude that there was a period of submergence between the time of the carving and the subsequent use as building material. it seems probable, therefore, that although the earlier fortresses may have been intended to serve as centres for the roman army, they may have been supplemented at a later period by other castra, forming altogether a chain of defences intended to protect the shores of britain against saxon invaders. the late mr. g. e. fox, f.s.a., who made a special study of the subject, writes as follows:[ ] "by the last quarter of the third century the romano-british fleet, on which no doubt dependence had been placed for the protection of the east and south coasts from raids by plundering bands of rovers from over the seas, had evidently failed to afford that protection. whether it was that the fleet was not numerous enough, or for whatever reason, the roman government determined to supplement its first line of defence by a second, and this was achieved by the erection of forts capable of holding from to , men each, on points of the coast-line extending from the mouth of the wash to pevensey on the coast of sussex. the coast-line indicated received the name of _litus saxonicum_, and the nine fortresses which guarded it are called 'the forts of the saxon shore.'" the following were the nine fortresses referred to with the modern place-names: . branodunum. brancaster. . gariannonum. burgh castle (near yarmouth). . othona. bradwell-on-sea. . regulbium. reculver. . rutupiae. richborough. . dubris. dover. . portus lemanus. lymne. . anderida. pevensey. . portus magnus. ? porchester. it will be observed that the various fortresses in this chain of defensive works occur at irregular distances on or near the coast-line, and on examination it will be found that in most cases good reason exists for the selection of the various sites. . branodunum there is sufficient evidence to identify the roman fort of branodunum with some ruins lying to the east of brancaster, a village situated near the north-western corner of norfolk, on the shores of the wash. the only early mention of the place is found in the "notitia imperii," a catalogue of the distribution of the imperial military, naval, and civilian officers throughout the roman world. from this remarkable work, a compilation which has come down to us from a very early period, it appears that the "comes littoris saxonici" (the count of the saxon shore) had under him nine subordinate officers, called praepositi, distributed round the coasts of norfolk, essex, kent, sussex, and hampshire. the fortress at brancaster is now in a very much ruined state, and but little can be gathered of its original form from a casual or superficial examination. excavations and careful searches made about the middle of the nineteenth century brought to light many facts about its plan.[ ] the fortress was a square of yards and the angles were irregularly rounded. exclusive of ashlar, the walls were found to be feet thick, and bounded with large blocks of white sandstone. at one of the roughly rounded angles the ashlar facing remained intact. it consisted of blocks of sandstone firmly set in mortar with joints of three inches minimum thickness. traces were found within the walls of small apartments adjoining the main walls into which the smaller walls were regularly bonded, pointing to contemporaneity of the work. two facts of some importance are proved by the excavations, viz. ( ) the strength of the fortress as a defensive work, and ( ) the simple and early character of the plan. traces of gates were observed in the eastern and western walls. . gariannonum [illustration: fig. . gariannonum (burgh castle)] now known as burgh castle, is situated in suffolk near the point where the rivers yare and waveney fall into breydon water. the lines of its walls enclose a space, roughly speaking, feet by feet, over four acres. it is generally considered to be one of the most perfect roman buildings remaining in the kingdom. the walls in places remain to a height of feet, and their foundations are no less than feet in thickness. the bastions, or perhaps more correctly, towers, which flank the gates and support the rounded angles of the walls are of peculiar, pear-shaped plan. they are solid, and to the height of about feet are not tied into the walls. above that height, however, they are bonded into the walls with which, curious as it may appear, they are undoubtedly coeval. it is noteworthy that there are two bastions on the east side and one each on the north and south sides, and that they, six in all, are provided with a hole in the top, feet wide and feet deep, indicating in all probability that they once mounted turntables upon which ballistae were placed for the defence of the fortress. [illustration: fig. . plan of roman walls, etc., at gariannonum (burgh castle) (from an engraving published in )] the masonry is of the kind which is usually found in roman buildings, namely, a rubble core with courses of bonding tiles, and an outer facing of flints chipped to a flat surface. gariannonum was a place of great importance in roman times. here was stationed the captain of the stablesian horse, styled gariannonensis, under the command of _comes littoris saxonici_. _walton._--near felixstow, situated on what is now the fore-shore, but which originally was a cliff feet high, and commanding extensive views of the surrounding country, are the ruins of what was an important roman station. although possibly not ranking as one of the nine great coast fortresses, it occupied a most important site for the defence of this part of the east coast of britain, and commanded not only the entrance to the river deben, but also all the adjacent coast to the south of it. almost every trace of the station has now been obliterated by the waves, but from plans which have been preserved it appears that its plan was that of an oblong with towers or bastions at each angle.[ ] . othona or ithanchester, near bradwell-on-sea, in essex, was another important member of the roman coast defences of britain. it commanded the entrances of the rivers blackwater and colne. little now remains of othona, although it is on record that the fortress enclosed an area of acres, and that its walls possessed foundations no less than feet in thickness. the defence of such a point as this against the incursions of foes was a matter of much importance, because this was a point on the coast of britain specially susceptible to attack by marauders, and, as we shall see, special precautions were taken against attacks of this kind. [illustration: fig. . plan of roman building, west mersea, essex] at a distance of about four miles to the north of othona, across the estuary of the river blackwater, lies the island of mersea. in the year some roman foundations were accidentally discovered in the western part of the island which, upon examination, appear to have an important bearing on the roman scheme of coast defence in this part of britain. the foundations were circular, feet in diameter, and closely resembling in gigantic form the steering-wheel of a ship. the foundations were of kentish rag and chalk lime mortar, and above this the low walling was almost entirely composed of roman bricks set in red mortar. dr. henry laver, f.s.a., who communicated the discovery to the society of antiquaries of london,[ ] modestly abstains from giving any explanation or theory as to the purpose of the building which stood on this site, but in the opinion of the present writer there seems to be little doubt that the foundations were intended to carry a lofty pharos, or perhaps signalling tower of timber by means of which messages might have been transmitted to othona and colchester. . regulbium [illustration: fig. . reculver, kent] now known as reculver, is situated about three miles to the east of herne bay. the site, although originally some distance inland, is now, owing to the encroachment of the sea, quite close to the shore. indeed, about half of its area has been destroyed by the waves, and is now covered at high water. its area when complete was over seven acres, and its walls which, in the eighteenth century, stood feet high, and still remain to a height of feet in some places, are no less than feet in thickness with two sets-off inside. it seems doubtful whether there was ever a ditch round the castrum. owing to the ruinous condition of the main part of the masonry, and the complete destruction which has overtaken the northern part of the foundations, it is impossible to ascertain any particulars as to the gates or internal arrangements. [illustration: fig. . roman masonry, reculver, kent showing facing stones (squared), rubble core, and pebbly foundations] as will be seen from the accompanying ground-plan the form of the castrum at reculver was quadrangular. the angles were rounded, but there are no indications of towers or bastions. these features are considered characteristic of roman fortresses of early date. another feature pointing to the same conclusion is the absence of tile courses in the walls. the only recorded facts about this fortress is a mention in the "notitia," from which we learn that it was garrisoned by the first cohort of the vetasians commanded by a tribune. [illustration: fig. . reculver: the ruins of the church] at a comparatively early stage in the art of roman masonry in britain the idea was conceived of protecting the enclosing wall of the fortress by means of projecting bastions and towers. in an early type represented in the romano-british coast fortresses, of which this of reculver is an excellent illustration, there were, as we have seen, no projections whether of walls, bastions, towers, or gates. reliance was placed in the strength and solidity of the walls themselves, which were feet in thickness. but the desirability of having some points from which the enemy could be attacked in flank whilst battering the wall soon became evident, and in other cases such as richborough, lymne, pevensey, etc., we find that the fortress was furnished not only with massive walls, but also with strong angle-towers and bastions or towers at intervals by which the wall could be commanded and protected. these various works furnish an interesting series of illustrations of the progress made in the military architecture of the period. . rutupiae [illustration: fig. . rutupiae (richborough)] now known as richborough, situated about two miles north-north-west of sandwich, was a station of great importance in the roman period, being then, as sandwich was subsequently for many years, the chief british port for travellers and traffic to and from the continent. in shape rutupiae was a rectangular parallelogram, with the greater length from east to west. its walls, which were lofty and massive, enclosed an area of somewhat less than acres. at each angle is, or was, a circular bastion feet inches in diameter, and square towers or bastions at intervals projected beyond the general face of the walls. a considerable part of the south-east corner, and the whole of the east wall have been destroyed by the falling of the cliff in the direction of the river stour. the theory formerly propounded that the castrum had no eastern wall has been disproved by the careful examinations of mr. g. e. fox and other eminent antiquaries. these examinations have definitely shown that large fragments of the east wall have fallen down the cliff. it is certain that the castrum of rutupiae as also those of regulbium and portus lemanis, in spite of the doubt which has been expressed in each instance, had four walls. the chief peculiarity of rutupiae is the presence of a solid mass of masonry underground, a little to the east rather than in the middle of the enclosed space. many different theories have been put forward to account for its purpose, but it is now generally agreed that it was intended to serve as the foundation for a lofty structure, perhaps of timber, the purpose of which was for signalling between this station and that at reculver, and possibly also answering to the pharos at dover. it is not improbable that it also served as a lighthouse for ships entering the estuary of the stour from the sea. if lights or signals could be seen as far as dover they might from that point be communicated easily to and fro from the coast of france from the high ground on which the pharos of dover stands. in order to understand the functions and relative positions of regulbium and rutupiae as coast fortresses during the roman period, it is necessary to reconstruct the ancient geography of the north-eastern part of kent. the small stream now falling into the sea near reculver was at the period under consideration a river sufficiently broad and deep to afford a convenient channel for shipping. it was known as the wantsum. boats and ships voyaging from the french coast as well as from the british coast near dover to london, usually took their course through the channel formed by the stour and the wantsum, thus avoiding the strong currents and tempestuous seas often raging off the north foreland. [illustration: fig. . reculver from a print published in ] it will be seen, therefore, that a lofty tower or lighthouse at rutupiae would have been of the greatest value both for the guidance of friendly shipping and as a means of giving warning of the approach of the enemy. the north wall of the castrum at richborough is a remarkably perfect and interesting specimen of roman masonry. it is noteworthy, too, as furnishing proof of the great care and thoroughness with which the romans carried out their building works. at the base of the wall, on the outside, one sees four courses of flint in their natural form, and above them the following succession of materials, in ascending order: three courses of dressed flint; two courses of bonding tile; seven courses of ashlar and two of tile; seven courses of ashlar and two of tile; seven courses of ashlar and two of tile; seven courses of ashlar and two of tile; eight courses of ashlar and two of tile; nine courses of ashlar. the wall is feet inches high, and feet inches thick. there is one aspect of some of the roman coast fortresses which shows that their builders were not influenced entirely by utilitarian ideas. this is the methodical and tasteful use of stones of different colours in such a way as to produce a pleasing species of colour decoration. the aim obviously was to break up the monotony of broad spaces of masonry, and possibly, also, to enhance their apparent size by multiplication of detail. the north wall of richborough, although to some extent marred by rebuilding of some part of it, affords an illustration of this. here we find dark brownish-red ironstone built into the wall in a way which reminds one of bands of chequer work. a pevensey again, where the stones are cut with the regularity and precision of brickwork, large blocks of similar sandstone are employed in regular order at different heights in the walls and bastions. to the latter in addition to their decorative use they serve to tie in the outer skin of masonry to the inner rubble. [illustration: fig. . richborough, kent. exterior of north wall] . dubris, dover a paper by rev. canon puckle on vestiges of roman dover was published some years ago in "archaeologia cantiana."[ ] it was accompanied by a plan in which are set out the outlines of what are supposed to have been the limits of the roman town or fortress of dover. although the outline is merely tentative and hypothetical, there is a certain plausibility about the suggested site and size of the castrum. it was situated, as is pointed out, quite away from the pharos, in the lowest part of the town, the present market square being approximately in the middle of the enclosure. the plan is roughly a parallelogram with certain irregularities on the north-west angle. on the top of the eastern and western heights of dover a lighthouse was erected by the romans for the guidance of ships into the narrow mouth of the river. traces of that on the western heights still remain, or remained recently: whilst that on the eastern heights stands intact, one of the most remarkable and interesting pieces of roman architecture now remaining in the kingdom. the roman pharos at dover consists of a strong and massive tower, hollow within, which rises to a height of feet, having walls whose thickness varies from feet at the base to about feet at the top. the structure is not entirely of roman workmanship, because in the thirteenth century certain additions were made to its outer walls. doubtless its massive masonry was calculated to withstand the severe storms to which its exposed position on the lofty cliff subjected it. whether employed for signalling purposes or as a lighthouse, this building was doubtless in such a position as to communicate with similar buildings on the coast of france, and with the lighthouse or signalling tower (it may have served in both capacities) at richborough. the pharos on the western heights of dover, of which little now remains, must have formed an extremely valuable auxiliary to that on the eastern heights, affording a guide for ships making at night for the haven of dover. it is not at all improbable that both structures combined the purposes of lighthouses at night with those of signalling stations in the daytime. [illustration: fig. . pharos, dover] the precise details of the existing pharos, although of the greatest interest from architectural and archaeological points of view, are not necessary to our present purpose, but a few facts are worthy of notice. the masonry throughout is of tufa with the exception of two or three courses of roman tiles at intervals of about feet, and the foundations, which again consist of several courses of tiles arranged in three sets-off, and with an octagonal plan. the tower is of octagonal plan externally, and square within, where each of the four walls measures about feet. the structure is believed to have been repaired and cased with flint in the year , when richard de codnore was constable of dover castle. his arms, barry of six, argent and azure, are carved in stone on the north side of the pharos. the octagonal chamber in the top story of the tower appears to have been restored or rebuilt in tudor times. it is interesting and instructive to compare the dover lighthouses in their relation to the french coast and richborough, with the signalling tower or lighthouse of west mersea, by means of which communications were kept up with the sea-coast station and castrum of othona. bearing in mind the defensive character of the forts with which the lighthouses were associated, it seems probable that their purpose had a close relation to the work of watching the coast, and obtaining early information of the approach of invaders. there is a strong probability that more of such buildings for observing the approach of enemies once existed, traces of which have now perished. [illustration: fig. . pharos, dover] . portus lemanis situated originally on the side of a spur of high ground at lymne, near hythe, and overlooking the flat ground of romney marsh, was a fortified station of sufficient importance to rank as a town. its distance from dover, and its situation on the south coast, suggest that it cannot have formed a part of the group of contemporary fortresses which defended the east coast of kent. owing to a landslip on a large scale, which happened possibly before the norman conquest, the whole of the site upon which this town stood slipped downwards towards romney marsh, and the massive walls and towers by which it was once encompassed were disturbed, shattered, and overturned. the form, as far as can be gathered from the disturbed foundations, was somewhat irregular. the east and west walls were parallel, and the south wall ran at right angles with them, but the north wall had an outward bow-like projection. the walls, when the place was intact, enclosed a space of about acres, and were from feet to feet thick, whilst the height of both walls and mural towers was somewhat more than feet. the purpose of placing a strongly fortified town at this place was partly in order to command a view over the surrounding country, and partly to defend the roman port which was situated on a branch of the river limene,[ ] or rather, just at the foot of the hill on the side of which it stood. [illustration: fig. . roman walls, lymne, kent] among the discoveries made at portus lemanis there were two of remarkable and significant character. the first consisted of a mutilated altar-stone, bearing a much-worn inscription indicating the dedication of the altar by a praefect of the british fleet, named aufidius pantera, probably to neptune. the stone was found built into the masonry of the principal gate, and from its worn condition, and the remains of barnacles which it still bore when found, it was justly inferred that it belonged to an earlier period than that of the building of the gate. the second discovery, of quite equal interest with the first, was that of a number of broken roof and other tiles, inscribed clbr, which has been read _classiarii britannici_, marines of the british fleet. [illustration: fig. . portus lemanis (lympne)] from these discoveries one may gather that at some period, probably before that of constantine, a division of the british fleet was situated at portus lemanis, and that some of the buildings there were erected by the crew from the fleet. the principal gate, which may have been battered down during a siege, and required rebuilding, was evidently the work of a late date in the roman period. this view is supported by a comparison of the whole building with the work at anderida (pevensey). the general arrangement of the walls, the disposition of the mural towers, or bastions, and the facing of regularly cut limestone blocks present points of very considerable similarity. it will be observed from a comparison of portus lemanis with anderida (about to be described) that there is reason to think that both works belong to a date somewhat late in the roman period. . anderida (pevensey) the castrum at pevensey retains so much of its enclosing walls and bastions that it is particularly worthy of study if one would learn, by direct observation, what splendid specimens of architecture the romans erected in this country. although a mediaeval castle has been built within the boundary of the roman castrum, the walls of the latter may be traced for almost the whole of the circuit, and on the north, east, and west sides they stand to a considerable height. at the south-western extremity is the main gateway, its two flanking towers forming perhaps the most prominent features. proceeding to the north of this gate we find three good specimens of bastions of somewhat horse-shoe form on plan. a series of six similarly planned bastions remain at the opposite side of the fortress, the general plan of which may be said to be elliptical. [illustration: fig. . bastion on south-western wall, pevensey] the character of the facing masonry, especially on the south-west side, is quite remarkable. the facing consists of carefully squared blocks of limestone laid with the regularity and precision of brickwork. two characteristics stand out prominently in comparing this with other roman castra on the coast of britain. one is the irregularity of plan, the other is the presence of numerous projecting bastions. both point to the lateness of the work, and some valuable evidence, confirming this view, has been brought to light in recent years. in mr. charles dawson, f.s.a., communicated to the society of antiquaries[ ] some notes on tiles found here bearing the stamp hon aug andria the first line apparently refers to the emperor honorius ( - ), whilst the second may be regarded as indicating with somewhat less certainty the name anderida. . portus magnus (porchester) this remarkably fine castrum, which stands on the edge of the most northern creek forming a part of portsmouth harbour, consists of a square enclosure containing a space of about acres. its walls, feet in thickness, are constructed of flint rubble with courses of bonding-tiles. originally each angle was furnished with a hollow bastion, or tower, and similar bastions, hollow within, were placed along the walls at intervals of from feet to feet. some of these bastions have been destroyed, but fourteen examples, in a more or less perfect condition, remain. the water-gate, on the eastern side, still survives in a peculiarly perfect state. it is remarkable from the fact that the blocks of stone forming its semicircular arch are of light and dark colour, and are arranged alternately, so as to impart a picturesque and decorative effect. [illustration: fig. . plan of porchester roman castrum] the identification of porchester with the portus magnus of the romans has been questioned by professor haverfield, and there can be no doubt that it rests upon insufficient evidence. conceivably it may be the portus adurni of the romans: but this is not certain. a norman castle, with remarkably fine keep, still practically intact, was built in the north-west corner, and the parish church, also of norman architecture, was constructed near the south-east angle, within the walls of the castrum. _clausentum_, an important roman station, now known as bitterne, is situated a little to the north of southampton, on the banks of the tidal estuary of the river itchen. practically nothing in the shape of architectural traces now remain, but from accounts written before their complete destruction we know that it was enclosed with walls feet thick, and constructed of flint bonded with large flat tiles and roughly faced with small square stones. it has been supposed that the outer defences when perfect measured yards in length. the station was three-sided, the walls each having an outward curve. the outer defences are believed to have enclosed an area of acres: the inner defences, acres. [illustration: fig. . the water-gate, porchester] _cardiff._--although not situated near the continent, it is probable that cardiff took its part in the defence of our coast during the roman period. whether the roman fortress at this point formed part of the defences which were placed under the control of the count of the saxon shore may be doubted, but in size and general plan it certainly resembled the coast fortresses of the south-eastern shores. [illustration: fig. . porchester. exterior of west wall] in the course of recent excavations in and near cardiff castle the nearly complete ground-plan of this castrum was found. its form was nearly quadrangular, the only irregularity being in the western wall, which was inclined eastward at its southern end. gates were situated about the middle of the northern and southern walls, whilst semicircular bastions were placed along the walls at intervals, roughly, of about feet. at the angles were built towers of irregular form and of somewhat unusual interest, from the fact that they were obviously additions to the original work. the area enclosed by the walls was roughly a square of feet. the question of angle-towers or bastions is one of considerable importance. their presence in a roman castrum may generally be taken as evidence of late date; but it is necessary to bear in mind that in some cases they have certainly been added to give strength to fortresses of early type, which, as we have seen in the cases of reculver and brancaster, were furnished with rounded angles, without any such projecting features as angle-towers or bastions. at cardiff[ ] it is perfectly clear that the original building had rounded angles against which towers of irregularly circular plan were subsequently built. as at pevensey and porchester, a norman castle was ingeniously constructed within this castrum by placing the mound towards the north-western corner. two walls thrown out from this, one towards the western wall and the other to about the middle of the southern wall, enclosed practically a quarter of the whole area in the south-western angle, and formed the inner court, whilst the whole of the rest of the area of the castrum formed the outer court. it is obvious that at the period when this norman castle was built the roman walls were sufficiently perfect to afford an effective barrier of defence. other roman coast defences the coast to the north of brancaster, the most northern of the nine regular roman coast castra, is provided in certain places with defences of roman date, either in the form of watch-houses, or lighthouses, or fortresses. professor haverfield, in a recent lecture on the subject,[ ] suggests that such structures once existed at ( ) huntcliffe (near saltburn); ( ) at a point near staithes; ( ) on the high promontory of peak, near robin hood bay; and ( ) on another high headland, called carrnase, to the north of filey bay. generally speaking, the altitude of the sites of these works suggests their use for watching or lighting purposes rather than for purely military defence. to a certain extent the roman walled towns of canterbury, rochester, chichester, colchester, and london, must be regarded as having exercised a share in the coast defence of england, because they were situated on rivers now or formerly navigable, and not too far from the sea-coast to be absolutely without value in repelling invaders. the fact that they were constructed specially for defensive purposes, not only against near neighbours, but also against those unwelcome visitors who, from the remote past, and all through the middle ages, have been attracted by the wealth of england, brings them within the scope of the present essay. for obvious reasons, however, and mainly because of the question of space, it is unnecessary to describe in detail every defensive work which was partially available for english coast defence. part ii the saxon settlement of england danish incursions and camps the norman invasion of england norman coast castles the saxon settlement of england with the settlement of the saxons, the angles, and the jutes in england, this book has no immediate concern, but it is worthy of note that having driven the british people westward into wales and south-westward into cornwall, they quickly spread over the greater part of england. their weapons, their costumes, their jewellery, and, indeed, their general standard of civilization, are clearly reflected and illustrated by the contents of numerous cemeteries, which have been scientifically explored and examined. we know little of their houses or other buildings until the eleventh century, when we are aided by the actual remains of churches, the evidence of illuminated manuscripts and the "anglo-saxon chronicle." there is, however, one fact which stands out quite clearly in an age which is remarkable for the obscurity of its historical evidence. this is that the saxons, as a general rule, did not immediately occupy the ruins of romano-british towns or houses. on the contrary, they seem to have avoided them, even to the extent of diverting the roads which originally passed through the towns. this is so marked that we can only infer that it was due to a superstitious dread of sites which had once been inhabited by the romans. the site of the important romano-british town of silchester, although full of evidences of roman occupation, and of intercourse with contemporary british population, has furnished absolutely no trace of saxon habitation. what was true of cities and towns and houses, was probably true of the coast fortresses upon which the romans, particularly in the latter part of their occupation of britain, had expended so much time and labour. it is extremely doubtful whether the saxons ever garrisoned the coast fortresses abandoned when the roman legions were withdrawn from britain. numismatic evidence shows that there was an anglo-saxon mint at lymne, the portus lemanus of the romans, and possessing an important harbour. the coins minted there range from king edgar's time to that of edward the confessor, but there is reason to believe that the roman site was deserted at an early period in the saxon occupation, the neighbouring town of hythe taking its place. certain saxon coins bearing the legend ric, have been attributed to a mint at richborough, but there is a good deal of doubt as to this identification. coins of middle and late saxon kings, as we might have expected, were minted at canterbury, rochester, sandwich, and dover, but generally speaking the evidence of saxon coinage does not support the view that the purely coast fortresses of the romans were ever used to any great extent by the saxons. the saxons built burhs, or towns fortified with earthen ramparts, probably palisaded, in many parts of the kingdom, and the evidence for them will be found in the "anglo-saxon chronicle," but they were not castle-builders. they were a people with tribal instincts and traditions. they did not construct defensive dwellings for a single lord and his family and retainers; they expended their efforts rather on fortified towns for the protection of all their people. wareham, in dorset, is generally believed to be an example of the fortified towns of the anglo-saxons. sandwich, again, which retains considerable traces of mediaeval earthern ramparts, and was a port of great consequence in early times, was also probably fortified by the anglo-saxons. it is impossible to say whether any part of its earthwork defences are of that early period. dover, canterbury, rochester, chichester, colchester, and some other walled towns of roman origin, appear, from archaeological evidence, to have had anglo-saxon populations, possibly of late date, when the roman houses had disappeared and the dread of the romans had become forgotten. it may be doubted whether the saxons took advantage of the roman walled defences. as we have already pointed out, there are very few remains of purely defensive works belonging to the anglo-saxon period. for this reason the quadrangular moated site at bayford, near sittingbourne, in kent, is of peculiar interest, because as mr. harold sands, f.s.a.,[ ] has pointed out, the "anglo-saxon chronicle" mentions that king alfred here threw up a "geweorc" in in order to repel the inroads of the danes under bjorn-laernside, who had formed an encampment at a place called milton, in kemsley downs on the opposite side of milton creek, a mile and a half north of bayford castle. the incursions of the danes and other raiders provided the saxons with excellent opportunities for displaying their skill in defensive warfare, and brought into prominence a great man whose name must ever be held in honour as one of the bravest and most enlightened defenders of our shores. to king alfred, commonly known in recent years as alfred the great, belongs the credit of having conceived the idea of destroying the enemy's power at sea in order to secure the safety of our shores. he seems to have been the first man in our history to have grasped this great principle. he led this navy to action in person and so acquired the epithet of "the first english admiral." early in his reign, king alfred devoted his attention to the important question of his navy, and he brought it to such a condition of strength and proficiency as to defeat the danish raiders, one of the greatest pests by which our shores were ever troubled. danish incursions and camps the coast-line of england is of curious complexity, and is long out of all proportion to that of any other great european nation, perhaps not even excepting norway. consequently its defence presents and always has presented problems of great difficulty. much of the coast-line is rocky and dangerous even for friendly shipping. in other places, where cliffs are absent, shoals and sand-banks make navigation and landing difficult and dangerous. in looking back to the days when there were no artificial harbours and landing-places, one sees quite clearly that estuaries of rivers would have afforded the safest and most convenient places for landing. that such spots were selected is abundantly proved by tradition, history, and actual contemporary remains. the danes were quick to seize upon such favourable landing-places. they were provided with boats of great length and slight draught, and their operations were not limited, therefore, to the deeper rivers. during the latter years of the eighth century, and practically throughout the tenth, the danish raids on britain were numerous. in due course they established themselves on river-banks, and built permanent camps. according to the "anglo-saxon chronicle," hasting constructed and occupied a camp at shoebury for a short period in the year . the camp, or such part of it as now exists, has been described by mr. spurrell[ ] as a danish work. the place has been much destroyed by the inroads of the sea and the building of various military works, such as barracks, etc., but the plan can be made out, and as restored by mr. spurrell, may be described as an irregular quadrangle with rounded corners, and containing an area of about one third part of a square mile. another danish camp was constructed the same year at appledore, the danes sailing or rowing up the river rother. according to somner[ ] they discovered at appledore a half-built fortress, but finding it insufficient for their needs they built a larger entrenchment on the same site. [illustration: fig. . plan of danish camp, shoebury, essex] other places where the danes settled were benfleet, probably swanscombe (although the existing remains of the camp belong probably to the norman period); bramber, sussex; an earthwork surrounding east mersea church, essex; and many other places. here they constructed their camps and established their forces for long periods, using the adjacent rivers as channels for quickly putting to sea in their swiftly-moving boats when embarking on raiding excursions to the neighbouring coasts. they raided sheppey in , kent, canterbury and london in . in they took wareham, where are interesting earthen town-walls, perhaps of saxon origin. during one or more of their raids in the medway they penetrated as far as rochester, which they pillaged. sandwich and canterbury suffered much from their visits in the eleventh century. it may be noted that the favourite methods of the danes when invading england was to enter the rivers so as to reach by that means populous towns and districts where they could seize valuable possessions. the monastic houses were their favourite prey, and few in england escaped injury or pillage at their hands. the following extract from the "anglo-saxon chronicle" gives a vivid picture of the doings of the danes at the end of the tenth century: "a.d. . in this year the army again came about into the thames, and then went up along the medway, and to rochester. and then the kentish force came against them, and they stoutly engaged together, but alas! that they too quickly gave way and fled; because they had not the support which they should have had. and the danish had possession of the place of carnage; and then took horses and rode whithersoever they themselves would, and ruined and plundered almost all the west kentish. then the king with his 'witan' resolved that they should be opposed with a naval force, and also with a land force. but when the ships were ready, then they delayed from day to day, and harassed the poor people who lay in the ships; and ever as it should be forwarder, so was it later, from one time to another: and ever they let their foes' army increase, and ever they receded from the sea, and ever they went forth after them. and then in the end neither the naval force nor the land force was productive of anything but the people's distress, and a waste of money, and the emboldening of their foes." the norman invasion of england it is a remarkable fact that the greatest event in the whole history of foreign attack upon england, namely, the invasion under the leadership of william, duke of normandy, in , excited less interest, and provoked less effective opposition than many other incidents of infinitely minor importance. the invasion was not unexpected by any means. when tidings of the projected invasion reached england, the largest fleet and army ever seen in this country were being mobilized at sandwich. yet, when the norman invaders actually arrived the english made practically no opposition at all. it appears that the crews of the navy were tired of being under arms so long, and went home; whilst the king was bound to go northward to put down the troubles in yorkshire. nothing was ready. the norman fleet consisted, according to various accounts, of from to , vessels. it can hardly be described as a navy, because the ships were too small to carry much more than the men and their arms: there was no room for provisions, and when on the september , the invaders landed in pevensey bay they encountered no opposition. in the battle of hastings the english forces were protected within palisaded entrenchments, but the result of the conflict was a decisive defeat. the normans having secured a foot-hold in the country, commenced at once to make their tenure secure, and to establish their power. this they accomplished with wonderful skill and success. norman coast castles the castles first built in england by the normans consisted of palisaded earthworks, the main feature being a lofty but truncated mound encircled by a deep ditch, and closely related to it were generally two courts or baileys. they were built in such situations as would command rivers and important roads, and so dominate the english people. usually the castles of this period were built just within the boundaries of walled towns. the relation of the tower to the city of london affords an excellent example of this arrangement. primarily the purpose of the norman castle was to complete the work begun at the battle of hastings of subjugating the native population of england, and it is believed that castles of this type were employed for this purpose, because of the ease and rapidity with which they could be thrown up. castles of this type were erected in england, not only after the norman conquest but also before it, and at one time the idea was generally held that they represented the usual and normal species of defence employed in saxon times. the late g. t. clark, who was a pioneer in the scientific study of english and welsh castles, considered that these works were the actual burhs of the anglo-saxons, so often mentioned in the "anglo-saxon chronicle." the theory was generally accepted for some years, but in due course doubts were cast upon it by the researches of dr. j. horace round, mrs. e. s. armitage and others. it is now generally held that those examples of this type of defence which are known to have been constructed before the conquest were built under the influence of edward the confessor's norman friends. england at that time was following the fashions of normandy; but the great majority of defences of this type were built, probably, very soon after the norman conquest, and under the direct influence of the norman conquerors. it is worthy of note that numerous examples exist to this day in normandy, and some, with the characteristic palisaded mound, are represented in the bayeux tapestry. in many cases the earthwork castles as first built were, in due course, rebuilt in stone, the top of the mound being capped by a shell-keep and the other eminences being surmounted and reinforced by walls. another type of keep, generally square in plan and of great strength and size, was built, as at dover, rochester, canterbury, london, etc.; but such massive structures required firm foundations, and they were always built on undisturbed sites. these two kinds of keeps practically determine the two types into which the norman castles built in england naturally fall. a fairly large proportion of those norman castles which may be considered to have been built for coast defence, have been constructed in such a way as to take advantage of pre-existing roman castra. porchester is an admirable specimen. here the north-western portion of the roman enclosure has been cut off by norman walls so as to form the inner bailey, whilst the remainder has been converted into the outer bailey. pevensey, london, rochester, colchester, cardiff and lancaster are other excellent examples. in passing, it may be noted, that at reculver and porchester, the parish church has been built, doubtless for safety, within the walls of the castrum; whilst at pevensey two parish churches have been erected sufficiently near the castrum to suggest that the sites were selected with a view to securing protection. the regular castles of masonry erected during the reign of henry ii, a great castle-building period, although very important as military works, were not in the main built for the defence of the coast. but it is necessary to bear in mind that in ancient times river-courses, even far from the sea-coast, were subject in a peculiar degree to the incursions of the enemy, and the great norman keeps of canterbury, rochester, and the white tower of london, although situated far from the sea-coast, played an important part in the defence of the coast. at porchester, pevensey, hastings, folkestone and dover, the relation between the norman castles and the coast defences was much more intimate. part iii mediaeval castles and walled towns on the coast mediaeval castles and walled towns on the coast in the following account of the more important of the castles which in mediaeval times guarded the coast, it has been found convenient to include a notice of those walled towns with which, in many cases, they were closely associated. the mediaeval castle, generally speaking, represents an effort to maintain the power of the feudal lord, and, in a lesser and secondary degree, provision for resisting raids and invasion by foreign enemies. walled towns, on the other hand, when situated on or near the coasts, or on navigable rivers, were primarily designed for coast defence. the mediaeval castles which were built in situations remote from the coast were the fastnesses and strongholds of nobles fighting amongst themselves or against the king. in the following accounts of the more important examples of castles and walled towns wholly or partially designed for the defence of the coast, occasion will be taken to point out the interesting series of developments through which these mediaeval fortifications passed as time went on. for example: the massive keep of the norman castles was able to resist fire and battering-ram when the besieging force came near enough to apply them. its strength consisted in its thick walls, its height, and its massive masonry. the edwardian castle, on the other hand, presents certain structural improvements which mark a great advance in military construction. the walls, gates, and towers are so built as to present curved surfaces to the engines of the enemy, with the result that missiles hurled against them would glance off at various angles according to the direction of the curve at the point of impact. the extent to which this development of the curve is carried in the walls of many of the edwardian castles is quite remarkable and instructive. it shows that mere weight and bulk were no longer relied upon, but constructive skill and the judicious use of materials were guiding principles in the military architecture of the period. the following list does not include the sixteenth century blockhouses and other fortifications erected by henry viii, and in subsequent years. the defences on the eastern coast of england consist of an extremely interesting and important series of fortresses. in the extreme north is-- _berwick-upon-tweed_, a town which, from its position on the english and scottish border, has always been a place of strategic moment, and which queen elizabeth spoke of as "the chief key of the realm." in the time of edward i ( - ) it was encompassed by a great moat, or ditch, feet wide and feet deep. a crenelated wall from to feet high, with towers at intervals, was constructed during the reign of edward ii ( - ). a castle had been erected at berwick during the reign of henry ii, and together with the edwardian wall and ditch must have formed an extremely formidable defence. the mediaeval fortifications included a large area, and in the time of elizabeth a portion within this area was enclosed and strengthened by works of more modern character, the main features of which comprised five examples of the orillon type of bastion. the orillon was an enclosure of flattened triangular form, projecting beyond the curtain. the middle angle was obtuse, and the passage from the opening in the curtain into the bastion was somewhat restricted. it is obvious that such a bastion as this, which was introduced into england in the latter half of the sixteenth century, would give the maximum range for defensive fire, whilst affording most valuable means of protecting the flanks. the fortifications of berwick-upon-tweed were primarily intended for defence against the scottish border raiders and incursions coming overland, but they also served to protect the town against the enemy approaching by sea. _bamborough._--the site of this castle must have been a place of great natural strength, and probably a fortress, from prehistoric times downwards. it would not be inaccurate to describe it as one of the important and historic spots in the kingdom. the castle dates from a period before the norman conquest. here the danish raiders were successfully repelled in . the castle was maintained in a good state of defence under henry i, and the keep is of the twelfth century. structural repairs were made at frequent intervals, viz., in , , , , and . a new gatehouse was built here in consequence of the invasions of the scots in - . on several occasions bamborough castle has served as a prison, and it was brought into considerable prominence during the wars of the roses. the part it played in the various wars between england and scotland must have been important.[ ] _dunstanburgh._--situated on a bold, rugged headland, this fine castle reminds one of such great fortresses on the east coast as scarborough and tynemouth. its share in the border troubles was perhaps less than that of bamborough. dunstanburgh is the largest castle in northumberland, is built on a remarkable plan, and comprises an area of ten acres, the main part of which was occupied by the outer bailey. its history is associated with simon de montfort and thomas of lancaster. the castle was mainly erected in - . the great gatehouse of the latter part of the fourteenth century, was planned and built on a colossal scale, and still forms a striking object, even in its ruin. by the sixteenth century the place had fallen into ruin.[ ] _warkworth._--this castle, remarkable for its eccentric plan, was built about the middle of the twelfth century. _tynemouth._--the priory and castle of tynemouth (for it was a combination of both) occupied a prominent position among the mediaeval coast defences of england. the office of prior of tynemouth was one of great importance. the person who held it was possessed of vast spiritual and worldly influence. he maintained his own armed force, just as the bishop of durham did, and the gatehouse[ ] of the priory was in reality a military fortress, a building of great solidity and strength. it was approached by a barbican, the passage-way being vaulted and furnished with a gate at each end.[ ] _scarborough._--this place was defended by walls or earthworks and a fosse before the time of henry iii. its castle was built as early as the time of stephen, and rebuilt or enlarged in the reign of henry ii. during the civil war scarborough castle was besieged. it was surrendered in , and has long been in ruins. it enclosed nineteen acres of land and occupied a romantic site feet above sea-level. _hull._--from an early period this seaport has been defended by fortifications. in the seventeenth century these comprised a moat and a complete system of walls, fortified gates, and drawbridges. it possessed five gates, called hessle gate, myton gate, beverley gate, low gate, and north gate, and two sally-ports. the whole fortified walls were , yards, or slightly less than one-and-a-half miles in circuit. in front of the principal gates were drawbridges and half-moon shaped batteries. in the year the eastern side of the town was defended by two blockhouses, erected by henry viii. these were known as the north blockhouse and the south blockhouse, and both mounted guns when the town was besieged during the civil war. a castle was also built on the eastern side of the town by henry viii. _king's lynn._--the eastern side of this important town was in former times defended by a wall strengthened by nine bastions, and by a broad and deep fosse over which were three drawbridges leading to the principal gates. one of the latter and fragments of the wall remain. from the statement of stow in his "chronicle," and from certain illustrations of the walls as they existed in , we may infer that the walls at any rate belonged to the first half of the thirteenth century. the east gate and the west gate were rebuilt on the sites of earlier gates in the fifteenth century. [illustration: fig. . north gate, yarmouth, ] _yarmouth._--the town-wall, of which some traces remain, measured between six and seven thousand feet in compass, and possessed ten gates and sixteen towers. swinden,[ ] the historian of yarmouth, states that the building of the wall "was begun on the east side, and very probably at the north-east tower in st. nicholas's churchyard, and so proceeded southward: for in the th of edward iii we find them at work at the black friars, at the south end of the town; and afterwards we trace them to the north end, which, i presume, was the last part that was finished. "and there is a tradition, that the north gate was built by the person or persons who had amassed considerable sums of money by being employed in burying the dead in the time of the plague. "as soon as the walls were finished, there was made a moat or ditch round the town, with bridges at each gate: the whole so complete that boats could pass with their lading to any part of the town, for the conveniency of trade and commerce. and so careful were the magistrates to preserve the said moat from being filled or stopped with earth, rubbish, stones, etc., that in the rolls of the leets, there appear several fines, levied on different persons for offending in that behalf. thus the tower being fortified with a wall and moat, towers, gates, and bars, was deemed a sufficient defence against all assailants with bows and arrows, slings, battering-rams, and all other missive engines of those times. but afterwards, when great guns of various denominations were employed in sieges, the aforesaid fortification, it was adjudged, would make but little resistance against them, without several additional works, as mounts, ravelins, etc." [illustration: fig. . south gate, yarmouth, ] in the th year of henry viii the fortifications of yarmouth were strengthened by rampiring, or backing up the walls by earthwork mounds. additional works were constructed by queen mary in , and by queen elizabeth, the complete process of rampiring not having been finished until , the year before the coming of the spanish armada. in the following year it was considered desirable to secure the haven against any sudden attacks of the enemy, and it was accordingly decided to construct jetties of timber on either side of the entrance, whilst across the actual entrance was placed a boom of massive timbers furnished with iron spikes, and this was so constructed that it could be opened or closed at pleasure. this work, including probably the two jetties and the boom, cost £ . traces of the wall of yarmouth and its towers still remain, whilst other evidence of the wall is the extraordinary way in which the houses are crowded together, leaving only narrow alleys, or "rows," for the traffic. a plan of yarmouth in , published as a frontispiece to john preston's "picture of yarmouth," shows in an admirable way the congested state of the buildings within the walls. [illustration: fig. . st. matthew's gate, ipswich from a print published in ] _ipswich._--there is a tradition that ipswich was defended by a wall and fortified gates soon after the time of the norman conquest, but unfortunately no traces of either remain. westgate street preserves the memory of the picturesque west gate. the interesting old engraving shows st. matthew's gate, now demolished. there appears to have been a castle at ipswich built by william the conqueror, and roger bigot, one of the conqueror's powerful nobles, held it. with the exception of certain earthworks all traces of the castle have perished. the form of the town in mediaeval times has been made out by john wodderspoon in his "memorials of ipswich," . _orford._--this castle, situated half a mile from the river ore, in suffolk (hence its name), commands a view of the sea, two miles distant, owing to the fact that it is built on a mound partly natural and partly artificial. all round is swampy ground. [illustration: fig. . orford castle, suffolk, ] the building of orford castle was begun in . strictly speaking, perhaps, it should not be called a castle: it was essentially a keep, and its purpose primarily was to serve as an outpost for observation and for the protection of the coast. the plan of the actual keep, if so we may term it, was peculiar, being circular within, and so much modified by the buttresses without as to present the appearance of a large number of angles. _harwich._--this ancient seaport situated on the extreme north-eastern point of essex has always been a place of some strategic importance. it formerly was encompassed by a wall which had four gates and three posterns. in addition harwich once possessed a small castle and other fortifications, but owing to the inroads of the sea these have for many years been submerged. traces of the walls or foundations of the castle were seen, however, in , when an unusually low tide laid bare more than usual of the sea-bottom. on the south side of the town are some ancient earthworks locally ascribed to the romans, although upon slender evidence. _colchester_, which is situated on the river colne, and perhaps not too far from the shore to take some part in the defence of the coast, has been in its time a place of great importance and of formidable strength. its walls, of which considerable parts remain, are of roman workmanship, and its castle, built largely of roman materials, and therefore by some regarded as roman in date, is almost unquestionably of norman construction. it must be admitted, however, that the castle presents several features which differentiate it from the normal castles of the norman period. originally the walls were furnished with four principal gates, viz.: head gate, north gate, east gate, and st. botolph's or south gate, and three posterns, viz.: west postern in st. mary's street, schere gate or south postern, and rye gate or river postern, but these have been demolished. the north and west sides of the town were defended by strong earthworks. the place was besieged for eleven weeks during the civil war. it was held by the royalist party, and on its fall, two of its most gallant defenders, sir charles lucas and sir george lisle, were shot under the castle walls. the weakness of mediaeval castles, built merely for passive resistance, has frequently been noticed, and what is true of them is equally true of the mediaeval walled town. forces shut up within walls are obviously unable to prevent an enemy from over-running a country. it must be borne in mind, however, that the purpose of fortifications behind walls was not, and never has been, merely intended to oppose the ravages of the enemy. in that part of our military history which is subsequent to the use of gunpowder, the uses of walled defence has been varied and manifold. for example: they were intended to check the enemy's advance; to give time for mobilization; to protect the strategical disposition of the army, especially in the early stages of a campaign; to protect important junctions in the lines of communications; and to safeguard magazines and stores against sudden and surprise attack of the enemy. _cowling._--the castle at cowling or cooling, situated about seven miles to the east of gravesend, and just two from the sea-shore, was built between and by john de cobham. the gatehouse, built in the regular form in vogue during the latter end of the fourteenth century, and comparable with that at saltwood castle and the west gate of canterbury, still remains in good preservation, as well as a good deal of the walls and angle-towers enclosing the inner ward, and certain parts of the walling enclosing the outer ward. the gatehouse just referred to is on the south side of the outer ward, to which it gives access. [illustration: fig. . cowling castle, kent, ] perhaps one of the most interesting things about cowling castle is the fact that it was built expressly for the defence of the coast against the french and the spanish. this fact is rather pointedly referred to in the following contemporary inscription enamelled on copper plates attached to the eastern side of the gatehouse: knouweyth that beth and schul be that i am mad in help of the cuntre in knowyng of whych thyng this is chartre and wytnessyng. the inscription is set out in the form of a regular charter, to which is attached a seal bearing the cobham arms, gules, on a chevron or, three lions rampant sable. the situation of cowling castle on low-lying ground near the coast is a circumstance which confirms the idea that the fortress was built for coast defence purposes. on the other hand, however, inscriptions of this kind are of great rarity, and it has been suggested with great show of reason, that whilst the purpose was partly for the defence of the coast and partly to keep the people of kent in order in what were peculiarly troubled times, the inscription was so worded as to divert attention from the latter. the suggestion is worthy of consideration, but the fact remains that towards the end of the fourteenth century this part of kent was overrun by frenchmen and spaniards, who burned and destroyed all the houses they came across, and cobham's intention in building cowling castle was to check these incursions. _rochester._--it is clear that rochester has in its time been an important part of our coast defences. it still retains many fragments of its roman wall, whilst its norman castle is represented mainly by a stately keep feet square in plan, and feet in height, which forms an impressive object, and is in fact a remarkably fine example of castle-building. the norman keep was built between the years and . the city wall, which was built in places on the site of the roman wall, dates from the year . _queenborough._--there is a tradition, possibly it is little more, that a residence of the anglo-saxon kings of kent was situated here near the north-western mouth of the swale, the building being afterwards known as the castle of sheppey, in which island it is situated. the whole fortress was rebuilt by edward iii about the year according to plans made by william of wykeham. edward iii in due course visited the place and gave it the name of queenborough in honour of his queen philippa. as a coast defence a fortress on this site must have been of great value, commanding as it did the north-western mouth of the swale, and protecting the water which divides the isle of sheppey from the mainland. henry viii recognized the value of this point, and repaired it so as to make it suitable for use as one of his coast castles. the plan of the mediaeval fortress, as might be expected when one remembers who designed it, is ingenious and remarkable. [illustration: fig. . plan of queenborough castle, kent] the main interest of this castle consists in its plan, which proves it to have been perhaps the earliest example of a fort as distinct from a typical castle of the middle ages, in which there was always a certain amount of accommodation for dwelling-house purposes. queenborough castle contained, mainly in its six lofty circular towers, more than fifty rooms, but these were of small size. the building of the castle was commenced in and finished about the year . the plan was curiously symmetrical, and not unlike that of camber castle, built in the time of henry viii, but the elevations of the two fortresses display great differences. the lofty towers of queenborough, serviceable enough in the fourteenth century when artillery attacks offered no serious menace, are wanting in camber castle, built in the sixteenth century, and their place is taken by low squat towers which offered little surface for cannon-shot. [illustration: fig. . queenborough castle, from a drawing by hollar] _canterbury._--there were really two castles at canterbury in quite early times. the first, largely perhaps of earthwork, was the work of duke william of normandy, and was constructed on and near what is now the most southern point of the city wall. the purpose of the first castle was to dominate and overawe the inhabitants of the city, and also to furnish a convenient post for observing the surrounding country. the castle was provided with a lofty moated mound for this particular purpose. the hill called the dane john has sometimes been confounded with the original mound of the castle, but as a matter of fact the two were not related in any way, the castle mound having been destroyed many years ago, whilst that known as the dane john was erected in the eighteenth century. the masonry castle, the ruined keep of which stands to the north-west of the earlier castle, was built by henry ii between and . the keep measures in plan feet by feet, and, owing to the upper storey having been pulled down in , measures now only feet in height. the castle was originally enclosed by a rampart and wall with several towers, and had its own gate to the city, and a barbican on its eastern side. [illustration: fig. . canterbury castle in the eighteenth century] the city of canterbury was enclosed by a wall built about the same time as the castle ( - ). there were seven gates in the wall giving access to the city, viz.: ( ) newingate, or st. george's gate; ( ) ridingate; ( ) worthgate; ( ) westgate; ( ) northgate; ( ) burgate; and ( ) queeningate. from the evidence of various old engravings it is apparent that several of the gates had been rebuilt at different times. westgate, the only one of the group which now survives, was erected in the reign of richard ii, and is an unusually good example of the mediaeval town-gate furnished, as it once was, with portcullis, machicolations, and other apparatus for defence. it is also a building of great beauty both of masonry and proportion. _broadstairs._--this small town on the north-east coast of kent, which in former times did a good deal of trade in connection with the north sea fishing, still retains considerable traces of a gate, probably of the fifteenth century, which commanded the only means of access from the harbour to the town through a cutting in the chalk cliff. it is known as york gate, and although altered and repaired, still possesses the massive lower part of the original gateway of flint and stone, and the grooves for the portcullis. [illustration: fig. . the fisher gate, sandwich, kent] _sandwich._--the chief traces of the fortifications of this ancient and once important town are an earthern rampart or wall of considerable extent, a deep fosse, and two interesting and picturesque gates. we know that sandwich once possessed a castle, and this probably in anglo-saxon times, but its site is a matter of uncertainty. it must be borne in mind that for many centuries sandwich was the principal port for traffic and merchandise to and from the continent. it possessed a mint in the anglo-saxon period, doubtless in the castle, and times out of number it has taken an important part in repelling invading enemies and in preserving the peace and liberty of our shores. the fisher gate, although buried to some depth in an accumulation of soil, retains several interesting features. one can still see the grooves for its portcullis and the recessed space in its outer wall into which the drawbridge fitted when drawn up. the gate is constructed of flints and stone, a certain proportion of which are squared blocks of sandstone, which from their size and shape may well have been derived from the walls of the ruined castrum of richborough, less than two miles distant. [illustration: fig. . the barbican gate, sandwich, kent] the barbican is a peculiarly picturesque structure commanding the entrance to the town on the south-east side by the ancient ferry across the river stour, which at this point is tidal and often rapid and deep. there is a modern bridge. the gateway, which is flanked by two towers presenting externally semicircular walls, is largely of tudor masonry, arranged in chess-board fashion in black flint and grey stone, and long flat bricks. on the southern side of the gateway a modern door has been made into the south tower. splayed embrasures commanding the approach are visible within the tower. according to local tradition these were intended for cannon. the upper part of the gate is a modern restoration in woodwork. sandwich originally possessed five gates, but those described are the only two which have survived. _dover castle._--for the last seven and a half centuries dover castle has been justly considered a fortress of paramount importance in the defence of england. its site is remarkable for more than one reason. the steepness of the chalk cliffs towards the sea, and the abruptness of the other slopes, natural and artificial, which encircle it on the land side, give a peculiarly difficult, indeed, impregnable character to the fortress. the height of the hill on which the castle stands close to the narrowest part of the channel which separates our shores from those of the continent renders it a spot of unusual importance for the purposes of observing the approach of an enemy coming across the straits of dover. although there are no certain traces of defensive works on the eastern heights of dover before the time of the norman conquest, the natural advantages of the site, and caesar's own words make it probable that some kind of camp or look-out post was established at dover in prehistoric times. however, this is a matter of conjecture which lacks the confirmation of actual archaeological evidence. one of the first acts of the norman conqueror was to establish his power over the english by building earthwork castles, and such a work was thrown up on the eastern heights of dover. its form and extent are unknown, but it may, with reasonable probability, be conjectured that its central eminence was that upon which the keep was subsequently erected in the reign of henry ii. dover castle, as it exists to-day, presents a good example of the amalgamated defences of several different architectural periods. its important position as the "clavis et repagulum angliae," gives it a national rather than local importance, and every part of it is of historical interest. as a fortress which from norman times, almost without intermission to the present day, has retained its garrison and maintained a foremost place in the defence of the realm, dover castle deserves more than a passing notice in these pages. during the reign of henry i ( - ) masonry began to take the place of earthwork defences, but in due time the need of stronger defences became apparent, and during the reign of henry ii ( - ) the keep, citadel, and defensive works to the north were carried out at the enormous expense of nearly £ , . the keep, one of the most important of the new works, forms a striking feature of the castle. in plan it is practically square, measuring feet by feet, exclusive of the fore-building, with walls at the lowest stage no less than feet in thickness. this is amongst the largest buildings of its class in this country. each of its three floors, basement, and first and second storeys, is occupied by two large apartments, those on the second floor being the chief or state apartments and possessing two tiers of windows. dover castle suffered a siege in , and again in . the latter occurred under the second constableship of hubert de burgh at the hands of the dauphin louis of france. (see the section on the cinque ports, pp. - .) after this siege dover castle was strengthened by the construction of an additional defensive work, commanding the plateau to the north of the castle, and other works, including a subterranean passage, excavated in the solid chalk, which still exists. these works were carried out between and . in a series of important repairs was effected, and during the reign of edward iv the clopton tower was rebuilt, and a sum of £ , was expended in placing dover castle in a state of thorough repair. [illustration: fig. . bird's-eye view of dover town and harbour, _temp._ queen elizabeth] further important works were carried out by henry viii in connection with his great scheme of coast defence. in addition to the strengthening of the actual works of the castle, it appears that "bulwarks under dover castle," probably near the level of the sea-shore, and a "bulwark in the cliff" were constructed at this period. an interesting plan of dover, made in the time of queen elizabeth, shows not only the arckcliffe bulwark and the black bulwark, but also the walls and its towers inclosing the town of dover. the plan was published in the sixth volume of "archaeologia," and is here reproduced in much reduced size by permission of the society of antiquaries. in june , and again in july , an invasion of dover by the dutch fleet was expected. the invasion of this particular part of the sea-coast was never carried out, but the castle was provisioned for a siege, and it is probable that the actual fortifications were improved and augmented. in the earlier part of the eighteenth century dover castle appears to have been much neglected, and an engraved view by buck, published in or about the year , indicates that certain parts of it had become almost ruinous; but in , owing to the war with our colonies, as well as france and spain, dover castle was hastily placed in a state of extra defence in order to resist the threatened invasion by our enemies. the period of the napoleonic menace saw great improvements at dover castle. much of the underground work on the north side of the castle, as well as in other parts, belongs to this period. of these and later works it is not necessary to speak in this volume. they belong to defences which are still effective, and at the present moment dover castle may be regarded as a fortress of enormous importance in the safe-guarding of our shores. _folkestone._--no traces remain here of defensive work, but a castle was built in quite early times, by william de arcis, for the protection of the town. owing to the fall of the cliffs and the inroads of the sea, this has long since been destroyed. it is probable that there was some kind of protective work near the mouth of the little river which here runs into the sea, but no traces seem to remain. _saltwood._--situated about two miles inland from hythe, this castle can hardly be described as a purely coast fortress, but it is such a valuable example of the mediaeval castles of its time that it deserves special attention. it must be remembered that the typical mediaeval castle, with its elaborate defences, possessed a moral influence out of all proportion to its strategic value. as soon as effective charges of gunpowder were employed the weakness of mere walls of masonry became at once apparent. explosives were far more effective and disconcerting than battering-rams. experience extending over many centuries teaches, what has been so thoroughly proved by recent events on the continent, that offensive tactics are almost invariably preferable to those of a defensive character, even when practised under the protection of the strongest and most elaborate fortifications. still, as long as the only dangers were starvation and battering-rams, the mediaeval castle was as nearly as possible a perfect form of defence. saltwood castle furnishes an excellent example of this. [illustration: fig. . the gate-house, saltwood castle, kent] its main structure is of late fourteenth century date. elaborate and complicated defences guarded the main entrance to the mediaeval castle. before the unwelcome visitor could enter, the following obstacles had to be surmounted. first was the gateway in the outer wall of defence, access to which was by means of a drawbridge spanning a deep but perhaps dry moat. this first gateway was furnished with portcullis, and heavy timber doors capable of offering formidable resistance. the outer gateway passed, the invaders would proceed across the outer bailey towards the inner and far stronger gatehouse, exposed all the while to such missiles, arrows, cross-bow bolts, etc., as might be projected from the battlements and loop-holes of the castle. here, at the entrance to the great gatehouse, the moat was generally wide, deep, and filled with water. supposing that the drawbridge was down (a most unlikely circumstance), the enemy on approaching the gates was confronted by the massive portcullis, and at least two pairs of double timber gates beyond it, and whilst forcing the former he would be within the range of heavy stones and every kind of dangerous and unpleasant missile dropped or thrown from the machicolations situated between the flanking towers almost on a level with the battlements above. the massive and studded oak doors were constructed of a material which was not easily fired, and they were barred with oak beams of the strength and almost the consistency of steel. even when these were burnt or battered down the invaders would encounter a flanking fusilade from the lateral passages. on the other hand, if the drawbridge was up, it formed in itself an extremely formidable barrier, because by means of chains passing through holes in the wall it was drawn close to the gatehouse tower and within the recess specially made to receive it, leaving the under side of the bridge flush with the surface of the gatehouse wall. it may be doubted whether anything in the whole range of military architecture furnishes a more perfect system of defence than the gateway, walls, ditches, moats, and drawbridges of a mediaeval castle; and it seems probable that it would have proved invulnerable against a direct attack from without had not the discovery of gunpowder put a new and terrible weapon in the hands of the attacking force. elaborate precautions were taken to secure the walls of mediaeval castles from attack. experience proved that the massive masonry of norman times was inadequate. a new principle was universally adopted. the plan of the castle was so arranged that every part of the enclosing wall was commanded by means of mural towers. these additions not only added to the passive strength of the work, but also when placed within a bow-shot distance enabled the defenders, themselves protected, to enfilade the intermediate curtain. again, the use of curved walls and mural towers gave free scope for constructive skill and favoured the economical use of building materials. _rye._--wall and gates were built by edward iii. of these the landgate remains. the ypres tower, a work of the time of king stephen, also survives. the first wall was built in the time of richard i, and of this there are no traces, whilst of the wall built by edward iii one finds very few traces. _winchelsea._--this town also was formerly walled and defended by strong gates. of the latter three still survive, viz., strand gate, new gate, and land gate. _hastings._--this was the first castle built in england by the normans after the norman conquest, and, in accordance with the plan of other fortresses of the period, consisted of a mound (shown in the bayeux tapestry) and two, if not three, attached baileys. one of the baileys, called "ladies parlour," is of rather small size, comprising little more than one acre, a circumstance which has led mr. harold sands, f.s.a., an eminent authority on castles, to infer that it could not have been the outer bailey. his inference was confirmed by the discovery of the traces of another, and much larger, bailey, containing about five acres, situated on the eastern and northern sides. the masonry part of the castle was probably erected in the years and . further important parts of the castle were subsequently built, notably in - , etc. the fall of the sandstone cliff, due to the inroads of the sea, has destroyed a very large part of these works, and what remains is a comparatively small part of the area of the castle. the castle at hastings mentioned in the "anglo-saxon chronicle" as having been built by the order of robert, earl of mortain, is not to be confounded with that fortress whose ruins crown the hill overlooking hastings. it was probably situated on the shore of the western, or priory valley at a point near the site of the present railway station. it may not be generally known that in former times hastings was protected on the sea side by a wall. this wall, which had a gateway and portcullis, extended from the castle hill to the east hill, and was so arranged as to cut off the valley of the bourne from the shore. a portion of the wall is figured as being in existence in , when "the history and antiquities of hastings" was published by w. g. moss. slight traces of the wall may still be seen. the steep character of the hills of the bourne valley rendered walls unnecessary on either side. this wall at hastings is in some ways comparable with the defensive gate at broadstairs already described. a little to the west of this wall, situated on the very edge of the shore, was formerly a fort, the memory of which is preserved in local names. _pevensey._--the roman castrum here, with its very interesting masonry, has been described in the earlier part of this volume. reference has also been made to the construction of a mediaeval castle within its area. it has long been supposed that there had been a norman keep, and this has been confirmed by recent excavation and examination of the site. _bramber._--an early earthwork, possibly a danish camp, at bramber, has already been mentioned. the site was granted by william the conqueror to william de broase, and a massive castle, of which certain ruins remain, was erected by him. it is now, owing to modifications of our river systems, somewhat remote from the main stream of the shoreham river (incorrectly called the adur), but there is every reason to believe that at the time of the danes, and probably long after, it had a direct communication by water with the sea. shoreham itself, it may be added, in , furnished no less than twenty-six ships for edward iii's invasion of france. _portsmouth._--the existence of remains of the roman castrum at porchester, situated on the upper waters of portsmouth harbour, goes to show that in those early times the value of this part of the coast as a great harbour was recognized. it is curious, therefore, that no town of any importance was built at portsmouth until the twelfth century. the actual building of the town was commenced in the reign of richard i, and a charter was granted in the year . confirmation of this charter was made at various dates by successive sovereigns, and important additions to the privileges were made in by charles i. the town itself was defended by a wall with towers and gates, the date of which is not clear; but from the position of the place on the south coast, and open in a peculiar degree to invasion by the french, it is reasonable to infer that the defences were made at an early period in the history of the town, probably in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. [illustration: fig. . entrance to portsmouth harbour, _temp._ king henry viii] leland in his "itinerary" describes the defences as consisting of a "mudde waulle armid with tymbre, whereon be great peaces both of yron and brassen ordinaunces." the circuit of the town was a mile, and a ditch was constructed outside the wall. leland records that he heard in the town that the defences of the entrance to the harbour ("the tourres in the hauen mouth") were commenced in the reign of edward iv, continued in the time of richard ii, and finished in that of henry vii. in the time of edward vi two towers of stone were built, one on either side, at the mouth of portsmouth harbour, and a chain of immense weight and strength was placed between them in such a way as to form a defence against the advance of the ships of the enemy. the actual chain, with large long links, is shown on a plan of portsmouth of the time of queen elizabeth.[ ] the approaches to portsmouth, east and west, were commanded by several forts and the two blockhouses, popularly known as southsea castle and hurst castle, both works being of the time of henry viii. [illustration: fig. . southsea castle, _temp._ king henry viii] an extremely interesting picture, in the nature of a bird's-eye view, of the defences of portsmouth and the adjacent coast-line, extending as far as the northern shores of the isle of wight, is given in the engraving showing the encampment of the english forces near portsmouth, , published many years ago by the society of antiquaries of london. the original of this picture perished in the fire which destroyed cowdray house, the mansion of viscount montague, at midhurst, sussex, but fortunately the society of antiquaries has preserved for us the copy of a picture which is full of interest, as illustrating the mediaeval walls of portsmouth and the castles, forts, and other works as well as the guns, ammunition, and methods of working them, in vogue for the defence of the coast about the middle of the sixteenth century. one can see, too, the two towers built at the mouth of the harbour for carrying the chain which once protected it. the picture also comprises a bird's-eye view of the naval forces of england and france drawn up in battle order at the commencement of the action between the two navies on july . _southampton._--for many years southampton took such a prominent part as a seaport, and was such a favourite town for landing and embarking during the middle ages, that it would indeed be remarkable if it had been left undefended. as a matter of fact its mediaeval walls and towers and gates were peculiarly strong. the walls varied from feet to feet in height, nearly , yards in length, and was strengthened by towers. there were seven principal gates, and four of them, as well as large portions of the walls, remain. the gates which remain are ( ) the north, or bar-gate; ( ) god's house, or south castle-gate; ( ) westgate, and ( ) the postern, now known as blue anchor-gate. the following have been destroyed: ( ) east-gate; ( ) biddle's-gate; and ( ) the south, or water-gate. there were also formerly a castle water-gate (now walled up) and a postern near the friary and god's house: the site of the latter is lost. the mural towers were chiefly drums, or of half-round form. the masonry of the wall, to a large extent, is of norman work, and in some parts the walls are rampired, or backed with earth to the summit. [illustration: fig. . ground plan of southampton] the castle at southampton occupied not only nearly the whole of the north-western corner of the area within the town-walls, but also the highest ground. although some authorities have regarded it as a saxon or danish castle, the weight of evidence seems to be very much in favour of the view that it was built very soon after the norman conquest. it also seems probable that in the first instance it was mainly composed of an artificially-heightened mound and other earthworks, crowned, perhaps, by palisades. in due course, perhaps in the time of henry i, a shell-keep of masonry was built on the mound, and its wall-footings were carried on massive piers of masonry, feet square, and sunk feet into the earth so as to have the benefit of the original hard surface. the other parts of the castle were built in masonry at about the same time or perhaps within the next fifty years. southampton suffered much from repeated ravages of the danes, and from various other enemies at different times in the middle ages. _wareham._--the early earthwork defences of this ancient town still exist on the east, north, and west sides. they consist of a rampart of some size with ditch on the outside and another ditch of smaller dimensions on the inside. in plan, the earthworks take a roughly quadrangular form, except that there is no earthwork along the south front facing the river frome. a norman castle, of which the mound still remains, was formerly part of the protection of wareham. it stood within the south-western corner of the town. _bristol._--bristol has been a considerable seaport from quite early times, having been engaged in trading from about the year . the defences also date from an early period, as might be imagined where great wealth and interests were at stake. the date of the first castle is unknown, but it is said to have been rebuilt in the reign of king stephen, and in it he himself was imprisoned for nine years. it seems probable that the earlier castle was one of the regular norman defences mainly of earthwork, whilst that subsequently built was a masonry castle erected to take the place of or to strengthen the earthworks. the keep was square and built very strong and massive. the castle was situated on the eastern side of the town, and on ground rising considerably above the level of the river. the town-wall, commencing near the west corner of the castle, partially enclosed the town, following the main course of the river frome, and then taking an almost right-angle turn to the north-east as far as the bank of the river avon. of the numerous castles and walled towns of wales it is not, perhaps, necessary to speak in these pages, because it is obvious that their function was not so much to defend the coast against foreign invaders as to establish the power of the english, and to assist in the complete conquest of wales. _lancaster._--an interesting and important norman castle[ ] was built partly without and partly within the southern angle of the roman castrum which was built here long before. the keep is of fairly early norman workmanship. the whole work is perhaps somewhat remote from the coast--a little over four miles, in fact--but being situated on the river lune, it may well have taken its share in coast defence. _liverpool._--the castle here is believed to have been built in the year by roger de poictiers. during the civil wars in the time of charles i it was dismantled, and its ruined walls were finally pulled down about the year . one or two forts for the protection of liverpool have been subsequently built on the north shore, but they have been demolished to make way for new buildings connected with the gigantic shipping trade done here. _carlisle._--the defences of carlisle are said to date from roman times. the present castle is well situated on the highest point of ground within the city, about feet above the river. its walls enclose a roughly triangular space of an extent of about three acres. the keep, rectangular in plan, measures feet by feet and is at present feet in height. it rose to a greater height originally. as one would infer from the dimensions of the keep, it is of norman workmanship, but it has received a good many strengthening additions in comparatively recent times. the keep is situated in the inner ward which occupies the eastern end of the castle enclosure. it is approached by means of two gatehouses, one near the middle of the southern wall, leading into the outer ward, and the other about the middle of the wall which separates the outer and inner ward. the south wall of the castle is of norman date: the other walls are of both norman and edwardian construction. the castle (doubtless as a fortress comprising mostly earthworks and palisading), is attributed to william ii. the work was doubtless continued (probably in masonry), by henry i, and completed in by david, king of scotland, who also heightened the city walls. carlisle was, perhaps, only in a very minor sense of any importance as one of the coast defences of england. its castle, its walls, and other defences were doubtless intended, primarily, to keep the scottish border raiders in check, and to serve as a military base against scotland. the general principle of defending the coast by means of strong castles erected near the shore was in due course extended in accordance with local requirements. thus, tynemouth priory, situated on the coast of northumberland, was provided as we have seen, with a gatehouse closely resembling in form and massive strength the gatehouse of a mediaeval castle. it is certain that its builders contemplated and provided for military defence. houses of great personages, and of wealthy institutions such as monastic houses were also built on a defensive or semi-defensive scale. part iv coast defences under henry viii and later on the east coasts of kent and sussex of the estuaries of the thames, medway, etc. of the south coast defences on the east coasts of kent and sussex during the reign of henry viii an interesting group of castles, or more properly blockhouses, intended entirely for coast defence, was erected on the coasts of kent and sussex. the particular circumstances which gave occasion for these defensive works at this period are quaintly set forth by william lambard in his "perambulation of kent."[ ] "king henrie the eight, have shaken of the intollerable yoke of the popish tyrannie, and espying that the emperour was offended, for the divorce of queen katherine his wife, and that the frenche king had coupled the dolphine his sonne to the popes niece, and married his daughter to the king of scots, so that he might more justly suspect them all, then safely trust any one: determined by the aide of god to stand upon his owne gardes and defence, and therefore with all speede, and without sparing any cost, he builded castles, platfourmes, and blocke-houses in all needful places of the realme: and amongest other, fearing least the ease, and advantage of descending on land at this part, should give occasion and hardinesse to the enemies to invade him, he erected (neare together) three fortifications, which might at all times keepe and beate the landing place, that is to say, sandowne, dele, and wamere." it appears that on easter-day three strange ships appeared in the downs, and as their origin and purpose were alike unknown and suspicious, all the able men of kent rose, and mustered in armour without delay. invasion of the kingdom was feared at any moment, and steps were at once taken to put all the havens and possible landing-places in a state of defence. as lambard mentions, the most prominent of these blockhouses, as being more immediately opposite the enemy's coast, were sandown (now demolished), deal, and walmer. the two latter, whilst retaining many of the original features, have been considerably modified by alterations and modern additions. on a coast such as this, extending from pegwell bay to kingsdown, and directly facing the nearest shores of the continent, it would be remarkable if no traces were found of defensive works raised to oppose the incursions of the enemy. the need of such defences for the protection of the coast must have been apparent during a considerable part of the middle ages, and means were doubtless taken to meet it. before the building of the three castles in the reign of henry viii, which are about to be described, an interesting chain of earthworks of a defensive character was thrown up along the coast. the most important were the great, or black bulwark, and the little, or white bulwark, both in the parish of walmer. there were also two other earthwork forts situated between the castles of deal and sandown. in addition to these there was a similar fort on the site of each of the three blockhouses or castles built on this coast. there must have been many raids by the french and others at various mediaeval periods, and it can hardly be doubted that these forts took some part in resisting them. against such an incursion as that feeble attempt by perkin warbeck in , when the men of kent in this part of the county, and particularly those from sandwich, beat back the intruders, such earthworks as these must have been a valuable means of defence. among the state papers preserved in the record office are several which give interesting information generally as to the defences set up by henry viii in . [illustration: fig. . deal castle, from the south] from them we gather that the following castles and blockhouses were at that time newly built in the downs (_i.e._, sandown, deal, and walmer) and at the following places: dover(?), folston (folkestone), rye, calshotispoynt (calshot), the cowe (cowes) under the wight, two bulwarks above gravesend, and bulwarks at higham, tilbury, and over against gravesend, at plymouth, dartmouth, falmouth, fowey, torre bay, portland, etc. [illustration: fig. . tilbury fort in the year ] christopher morres, master of the ordnance in , drew up a book of "rates for captains, constables, deputies, soldiers, porters, and gunners, for the safe-keeping of the king's castles and bulwarks, of late new devised by his majesty's commandment," in which are the following details: "_the bulwark at gravesend._ crane, captain _d._ a day; deputy _d._; porter _d._; soldiers and gunners _d._ _mr. cobham's bulwark_, mr. cobham, captain, and others. _th'ermitaige_,[ ] johne's bulwark in essex side over against gravesend. francis grant, captain, and others. _the bulwarks at tilbury._ boyfield, captain, and others. _the bulwark of hiegham_, jarley, one of the guard, captain. "at the downes. _the great castle_, thos. wynkfelde, of sandewyke, captain, and others. _four bulwarks of earth in the downs_, captains and others. _the bulwarks under dover castle_, a captain and others. _the bulwark in the cliff_, a captain and others. _the bulwark of earth upon the hill beyond the pier at dover_, edmond moody, captain, and others. _the castle at folston_, kayse, captain, and others. _the castle at rye_, ph. chutt, captain, and others. _the town of portsmouth_ john chaterton, captain, and others. _the wyndemyll and mr. chaterton's bulwarks._ one gunner to each. _the tower of portsmouth_ john rydley, captain, and others. _the bulwark of mr. sperte's making at gosport side, and the blockhouse there_, slymbye, captain, and others. _the castle at calste point_, william shirlande, and others. total men; £ . _s._ per annum. "besides the above, each head house is to have a trumpeter or drum, and the great castle both. crane's bulwark, th'ermitaige bulwark, the bulwark at heigham, and the castle and three bulwarks at dover are furnished with ordnance and artillery. to know the king's pleasure whether the garrison at dover castle shall be augmented or no." [illustration: fig. . tilbury fort, ] in the year an act of parliament ( hen. viii, cap. ), entitled, "the castell of dover," was passed in which reference is made to the fact that "the king by his exceeding greate costis and charges hath lately buylded and made nye unto the sees divers castellis blockhouses bullwarkes and other houses and places of greate defence, within the lymittes of the fyve portis and their membres or betwene the same, in the shires of kent and sussex for the saufegard and suerty of this his realme and subjectis of the same...." [illustration: fig. . general plan of henry viii's blockhouses on kent and sussex coasts] the act is really framed to give power and authority to the warden of the cinque ports and the constable of dover castle, "which now is and comunely heretofore hath ben one personne" over the newly built blockhouses. the act was passed in the year when the building of the castles was completed. [illustration: fig. . sandown castle] in making a careful examination of these buildings one is struck with the fact that we find a certain unity of idea running through the designs and plans. deal, the largest and most complicated of the series on the east coast of kent, has a central circular tower with a diameter of feet, and from it project six small inner lunettes and six much larger outer lunettes. the walls are no less than feet thick at the foundations, and about feet thick at the summit. the whole building is surrounded by a moat and was originally approached by a drawbridge. the circular central tower and the surrounding lunettes, or bastions, are roofed with very thick arched masonry work, and are pierced with port-holes below for scouring the moat, and funnels, or chimneys, were conveniently arranged for carrying away the smoke of the fire-arms. larger embrasures were provided for cannon. it is believed that these chimney-like openings were intended to be used as machicolations by means of which the invaders could be harassed should they obtain admission to the fortress. [illustration: fig. . deal castle] at walmer, where the plan resembles that of the destroyed blockhouse of sandown (the lunettes being four in number), the embrasures for cannon are still left in their original condition, although certain modern buildings have been erected for residential purposes. both deal and walmer retain the chief part of their original encircling moats. this is a feature of some interest as pointing to a new stage of development in the art of defensive architecture. hitherto, we have seen that the castles which in norman times presented flat surfaces to the invaders' engines and battering-rams, were superseded by walls having curved surfaces. curved walls were still built in tudor times, and for precisely the same reason as those which were constructed in edwardian days, but the whole structure of the castle was now depressed within a moated enclosure, the aim being to avoid presenting much surface to the enemy's fire, cannon by this time having become destructive and gunners proficient. [illustration: fig. . walmer castle] sandown castle was once the prison of col. john hutchinson, the regicide, whose life contains a good deal of information as to the dampness and darkness of the place. it stood quite close to the sea-shore about a mile to the north of deal, and, after being much damaged by the waves, was finally destroyed in . a few indications of its massive strength now survive in a chalky mound. [illustration: fig. . walmer castle, from the north] sandgate was another of this series of blockhouses, its plan being of somewhat triangular form owing to the disposition of three towers in reference to the central tower. it has been much altered in comparatively recent times ( ), and now stands so close to the sea-shore as to be in great danger of being destroyed in due course by the waves. [illustration: fig. . sandgate castle] _camber._--beyond the castles opposite the downs there was one, namely camber castle, situated a short distance south-east of rye, sussex, which belongs to the same period and was built for the same purpose as the others. many years ago, however, it had become decayed and useless for coast defence. in the castle was finally dismantled and abandoned, and the guns were removed. in plan it resembled none of the others of the group, having a central tower and four nearly completely circular towers placed at regular distances around it. although abandoned for so many years camber is an excellent example of the kind of blockhouse which was erected by henry viii, retaining most of the features unaltered by rebuilding. [illustration: fig. . camber castle] defences of the estuaries of the thames, the medway, etc. another group of defences erected at about this period was designed for the defence of the river thames, the river medway, and what in later times came to be known as the port of london. these included blockhouses at gravesend, tilbury, higham, etc. in henry viii repaired queenborough castle and brought its equipment up to date, so as to make it a useful part of the coast defence in this part of england. chatham dockyard was founded by queen elizabeth, and for its protection she built upnor castle. _upnor castle._--this is a rather late form of castle, having been built in by queen elizabeth for the defence of the reach of the river medway almost opposite the dockyard at chatham. the engraving of it, here reproduced, shows it to have been a castellated building three stories in height, and furnished with towers at each end. a platform for guns, defended by a stockade, was made in front of the castle close to the edge of the river. the forts at sheerness and gillingham were built during the reign of charles i. [illustration: fig. . upnor castle] _landguard fort_, situated on the extreme south-eastern corner of suffolk, was erected about the beginning of the reign of charles i, in order to command the mouth of the combined estuaries of the rivers orwell and stour. the first fort having been demolished, new works were built in , and eight small towers, each mounting three guns, were erected on the adjacent coast in . owing to undermining by the sea some of these towers were destroyed twenty or thirty years after they were built. _brighton._--in the year , in consequence of the frequent incursions and depredations of the french, the people of brighton determined to erect fortifications for the defence of the place. a site was selected on the low cliff between black lion street and ship street, and about yards westward of east street. upon this was erected a circular blockhouse, as it was called, containing in the main storage for arms and ammunition. beyond it, towards the sea, was a small battery comprising four pieces of large ordnance. it is somewhat surprising to learn that in addition to these fortifications against enemies, brighton possessed three gates, viz., ( ) the east gate and portal at the south end of east street, ( ) the middle gate, opposite the end of middle street, and ( ) the west gate, opposite the end of west street. defences of the south coast along the south coast, particularly in the neighbourhood of portsmouth, another group of coast defences specially designed to protect the extremely important naval base of portsmouth harbour, was built by henry viii. they comprised the blockhouses or castles of southsea, hurst, calshot, and in the isle of wight, cowes, sandown, and yarmouth. [illustration: fig. . hurst castle] _southsea castle_, situated about three-quarters of a mile to the south or south-east of portsmouth, was built by henry viii in . the original castle consisted of a blockhouse with a dome-like top. additions to it in the form of a star-fort were made in the time of charles i. it was repaired and enlarged on the accession of the house of hanover. the castle was situated on the level ground quite near the sea-shore and was apparently selected with a view to commanding the approach of ships from the east in the direction of portsmouth. _fort cumberland_ is a more modern defence, having been built in and enlarged in . _hurst castle_, a fortress of considerably larger size than those on the east coast, is situated on the solent, and was built specially to defend the approach to southampton harbour against the french. its building was commenced in and finished in . the fortress was of some importance during the civil war, and served for some days as the prison of charles i. towards the end of the seventeenth century it mounted nearly thirty guns. several alterations have been made to it from time to time. both hurst castle and cowes castle were built with materials derived from the fabric of beaulieu abbey. _calshot castle_ was a small fort built in the time of henry viii with stones taken from the ruins of beaulieu abbey. its special function was to defend southampton water. certain additions were made during the reign of queen elizabeth, but the site chosen for the castle was most unsuitable, owing to proximity to the sea-shore. _cowes_ (_west_).--the fortress here, built in , possessed a semicircular battery and mounted eight pieces of heavy ordnance. its situation was excellently chosen for defensive purposes. _sandown._--the blockhouse here, erected between and , was built on a site close by the sea, and received much damage in consequence. it appears to have possessed a landing-stage, as in the year timber was supplied for mending the pier and planking the platform. sandown fort was built on a site a little more remote from the sea in - . _yarmouth_ (_little_).--this castle, which was built somewhat later than other members of the group to which it belongs, was finished in . the need for it seems to have been suggested by a raid by the french in the isle of wight in . in , and again in , it was strengthened by the addition of earthwork defences. _weymouth or sandsfort castle._--this castle is situated on an eminence to the south of weymouth, and commands extensive views over portland bay or road. it was erected by henry viii in or . _portland castle._--as early as the reign of william rufus a castle is supposed to have existed here. it has long been known by the name of bow-and-arrow castle, although locally it is sometimes called rufus's castle. its origin and date are not quite clearly known, but it is evidently a work of considerable antiquity, and was probably intended for the defence of the coast. henry viii built a new castle here in , on his return from the interview with francis i, usually called "the field of the cloth of gold." its purpose was to protect the coast here in connection with sandsfort or sandsfoot castle. in the fortress was garrisoned in expectation of a landing by the spanish armada. it figured, too, in the civil wars of the time of charles i. _holy island._--of the two castles on holy island, one, known as the fort of beblowe, was erected in or soon after the year , and doubtless belongs to the great series of coast defences set up by henry viii. the other castle belonged to a subsequent period, and is believed to have been built in . it is a remarkable fact, that of all the blockhouses built on the coast, or even in the estuaries of rivers, by henry viii, built, as we know from documentary evidence, at enormous cost, there is absolutely no record of any of them having been of real value in destroying the enemies' shipping. from some not a single shot was ever fired, except, perhaps, during the civil war, when king and parliament were at variance, and also upon the occasions of public rejoicings, such as royal birthdays, proclamations of peace, etc. it says much for the intimate knowledge of the distribution of our defences that the dutch, when they invaded our shores in , steered clear of these castles, and made straight for the medway, rather than for portsmouth or dover, or the east coast of kent, where there were castles of the henry viii period, and later, guarding the shores. one point in the construction of these blockhouses which must arrest the notice of every one who pays any attention to the subject, is the excellent illustrations they afford as to modification of military architecture due to the introduction of gunpowder. this explosive substance which revolutionized military tactics as soon as the art of using it and of making suitable fire-arms had reached perfection, was probably invented or discovered in the thirteenth century. for many years, however, its possibilities were imperfectly understood, and its employment was more dangerous to those who used it than to those against whom it was used. the castle-building towards the end of the fourteenth century--say the reign of richard ii--was distinctly influenced by the new force employed in attack and sieges. curves become the fashion instead of flat walls, and by the sixteenth century, when henry viii erected this great series of blockhouses, we find that every means was taken to avoid presenting much surface to the action of cannon-shot. the walls were all curved to ensure the shot glancing off, and the whole structure was sunk in a moat, and built in very strong masonry, and with no more height than was necessary. _martello towers._--one of the last types of masonry fortifications to be erected, as distinguished from structures which are known as forts and redoubts, was also in idea one of the most ancient. martello towers, of which so many were built on the coast of essex, kent, and sussex, were based on the model of a tower on cape martello, on the gulf of san fiorenzo, in corsica. they are built of solid masonry, but contain vaulted rooms for the garrisons. they are furnished with a flat platform on top for two or three guns, and access to them is by means of a ladder leading to a side doorway, about twenty feet above the level of the ground. in some cases a deep ditch was cut round the towers. many of these coast defences were erected on the south-eastern shores of england as a protection against the expected naval invasion under napoleon i. the whole coast in the neighbourhood of folkestone, sandgate, and hythe, and at other points, was defended in this way by martello towers, forts, and earthworks, with a view of resisting napoleon's invasion. at the same period a great military canal was constructed from hythe, extending inland to appledore, and then on to rye in sussex. part v miscellaneous defences the navy the cinque ports defensive chains, etc. the coastguard the navy the scope of the present volume is to review the defensive works which have been carried out in various ages for the protection of our shores against incursions of enemies: the story of our naval exploits does not primarily come within it. the first duty of our english navy is, and always has been, offensive, as well as defensive. in times of peace we have been accustomed to regard our navy as our first line of defence, and this is a perfectly accurate description of its functions. but it is obvious that these functions have always been different from, and in most periods independent of, what is generally understood by the term coast defences. yet, again and again, the coast fortresses have assisted the operations of our war-ships when resisting the enemy, and to a certain extent the two forces have always been, and possibly always will be closely connected. reference to the story of the roman fleet for the defence of the shore of britain, and also to the english navy under king alfred, has already been made, but the beginning of the english navy may be traced to a somewhat later period. it had its origin in the cinque ports. the cinque ports the association of certain towns on the south-east shores of england for the purpose of coast defence is of great antiquity. in the oldest cinque ports charter on record, granted in the sixth year of edward i, reference is made to documents of the time of edward the confessor, indicating an origin before the norman conquest. in early times there were, as the name implies, five ports included in this confederation, viz.: hastings, sandwich, dover, romney and hythe. almost immediately after the norman conquest, winchelsea and rye were added with status equal to the original towns. thereafter the precise title of the corporation was "the five cinque ports and two ancient towns." in addition to these seven head ports, there were eight corporate members, viz.: deal, faversham, folkestone, fordwich, lydd, pevensey, seaford and tenterden, and no less than twenty-four non-corporate members. the jurisdiction of the cinque ports extended from reculver on the north coast of kent to seaford on the south coast of sussex. it will be noticed that at least three of the corporate members are situated at some little distance from the sea coast. faversham, fordwich, and in a greater degree tenterden are inland towns, although two are placed on river-courses which afford access to the sea. as will presently be seen, men as well as ships were contributed by the cinque ports for the defence of the realm, and tenterden received its charter in , in order that it might assist rye to discharge its obligations. hence it is that we find a corporate member situated so far from the coast. the cinque ports were established primarily for the defence of the sea-board on the south-east of england, but in the course of time their purpose was extended. in these early times, when england possessed no regular navy, it was the men of the cinque ports who guarded our seas. they provided, in return for many privileges they received from the crown, almost the only form of naval defence which england possessed until the reign of henry vii. until that period nearly all the men and ships which guarded our shores from the enemy were furnished by the cinque ports, and even after the time of henry vii they rendered important assistance to the regular navy. the men of the cinque ports seem to have carried on a certain amount of privateering at various times, but there have been times when their skill in seafaring and their undoubted courage have been employed in work of the utmost value in the defence of england. a celebrated occasion occurred in the year , when hubert de burgh, having selected the best seamen of the cinque ports, set out with about sixteen large ships and twenty small ones to attack the approaching fleet of louis the dauphin of france, the numbers of which were no less than eighty large and many smaller vessels. hubert de burgh had grasped the important principle of naval strategy that in order to free his country from the danger of invasion, it was above all things necessary to attack and destroy the enemy's force at sea. although opposed by such unequal numbers the englishmen skilfully secured a windward position, bore down upon the enemy as they shaped their course for the english coast, threw quicklime in their eyes, poured into the enemy a volley of arrows from the long bows for which the english were famous, and scattered and destroyed the enemy's ships, so that only about seventeen escaped; fifty-five were captured, and the rest were sunk. the credit of this signal victory in an engagement at sea which may rank as almost the first in english history, certainly the first subsequently to the time of king alfred, belongs to the men of the cinque ports. the strength of the cinque port forces in the fourteenth century may be gathered from the fact that at the siege of calais ( ), when the fleet was called out to assist in the blockade and to defend the channel, the following ships and men were furnished by the cinque ports: ships men hastings sandwich dover romney hythe winchelsea rye seaford faversham margate among the privileges of the cinque ports to which reference has been made there are one or two which point unmistakably to an early origin. one is the right of open-air assembling in portmote or parliament at shepway cross, and afterwards at dover, where by-laws were made for the governance of the confederation, the regulation of the yarmouth fisheries, and to give decisions in all cases of treason, sedition, illegal coining, and concealment of treasure-trove. the ordinary business was transacted in two courts, named respectively the court of brotherhood, and the court of brotherhood and guestling. the formal installation of a newly appointed lord warden took place at the breding-stone at dover, also in open-air assembly. it is an interesting fact that these moots or open-air assemblies were summoned by the sound of a horn. the lord warden, who is the chief officer of the cinque ports, combining therewith the governorship of dover castle and maritime jurisdiction as admiral of the ports, may be regarded as representing to some extent the ancient office of count of the saxon shore, although the changes of time and the paramount importance of the royal navy in more recent times in the work of defending our shores, have tended to rob the office of much of its former importance. at the present time the actual duties of the post are confined to presiding as chairman of the dover harbour board. the freemen or "barons" of the cinque ports are often mentioned in connection with this subject, and it may be useful to put on record the following precise account of the subject, written by mr. charles dawson, f.s.a. "a note on the titular rank of the barons of the cinque ports "the freemen of each of the cinque ports have from ancient times been termed 'barons,' because they held their lands and privileges as joint tenants-in-chief of the crown, by fealty and special military (naval) service. their title was almost unique, in this sense, that as joint tenants of their baronies they were not like the individual barons of the realm, but barons-corporate. "when summoned to the king's councils, the barons were addressed collectively by writ, a copy of which was forwarded to each cinque port. "simon de montfort's general summons to parliament was addressed to 'the earls and barons of the whole of the kingdom and of the cinque ports,' and in the year the barons of the cinque ports claimed of king edward i to be tried for their alleged delinquencies by 'their peers, earls and barons.' "the title of baron did not, of course, apply to every freeman of the cinque ports in an individual sense, except so far as individuals represented, by election, the whole of their combarons at each respective cinque port. "in the earlier parliaments the order of nomination ranked the barons of the cinque ports above the commoners, and with the barons of the realm, the scale of their fines for non-attendance being identical with that of the bishops and barons of the realm. "there yet remains one ancient custom which identifies the rank of the barons of the cinque ports with the peers of the realm, namely:--that when their representatives perform their services to the sovereign at the coronation, within the abbey church of westminster, they are entitled to assume their head dress at the same moment as do the peers of the realm, and immediately after the crown has been placed on the sovereign's head." defensive chains, etc. _the chain at chatham._--when, early in the seventeenth century, chatham had grown to considerable importance as a naval centre, a curious method of defence was devised. a long and stout iron chain was placed across the medway at the western end of gillingham reach, near upnor castle, with the idea of effectually stopping the progress of alien ships up the river beyond this point. when the chain was originally placed here is not exactly known, but it was repaired in , and soon after abandoned. in the chain was superseded by a boom made up of masts, iron, and cordage. a few years later, in , either a new boom or a new chain was placed across gillingham reach. the chain came into great prominence when the dutch invaded the thames estuary and the medway in . it was fixed up at gillingham either on april or soon afterwards. the published accounts are not quite clear or consistent. the claws for fastening and heaving it up were expected to arrive but apparently were not forthcoming on the date mentioned. although there had been a great chain here before it does not appear to have been stretched properly across the river. this was now attended to under the direction of the duke of albemarle, who went down to chatham posthaste to complete the defensive works. the chain, consisting of links made of iron bars, six inches in circumference, was strained probably in such a way that it would not be visible above water, and it was perhaps buoyed at intervals. a small battery of guns was placed on shore at each end of the chain in order to protect it from injury by the dutch. the _unity_, a warship, was stationed to the east of the chain, whilst on the west side a dutch prize was sunk, and several ships were on guard. the dutch ships, which had been observed off the english coast april , and off harwich june, now approached. a letter amongst the state papers in the record office, dated june , tells us that the dutch fleet was seen off harwich on the june, but the only result was that a few fishermen were frightened, and that some of the dutchmen landed and drove off some cattle. on the th the navy came within shot of sheerness, and after some hours took the guns. on the th, by degrees, twenty or twenty-two dutch ships were brought up to the narrow part of the river medway, where ships had been sunk. two and a half hours fighting on the following day made the dutch masters of the chain. one guard ship after another was fired and blown up. the chain was broken by captain brackel by order of van ghent. fire-ships were sent to destroy the english ships. the first hung on the chain, but the weight of the second snapped it. the dutch ships went forward carrying destruction with them. the batteries on the banks of the river and the guns from. upnor castle were now brought into action, with the result that the enemy soon retired, leaving two ships stranded. the exploits of the dutch in the thames and the medway caused considerable alarm in london. pepys, on hearing of the failure of the chain of chatham, writes of it as a very serious piece of news, "which," he says, "struck me to the heart." another and rather more precise account of the occurrence is as follows: on june the dutch sent up towards gillingham a division consisting of four men-of-war, three armed yachts, and two fire-ships. several of the ships charging at the same time, broke the chain, entered the waters beyond and set fire to the mathias. the dutch next dealt with the batteries at either end of the chain, and by means of their guns quickly silenced them. great damage was done to the shipping in the medway, many vessels being burnt and destroyed. it seems probable that at least one purpose of the chain was to hinder the progress of fire-ships which the enemy set in motion against our shipping. in order to defend the government works nearer london, batteries mounting sixty pieces of ordnance were erected at woolwich, whilst the defensive works at gravesend and dover were strengthened. about the middle of the following september workmen were employed in clearing away the moorings of the chain at gillingham reach. _chains at portsmouth, great yarmouth, etc._--the chain of chatham furnishes a curious example of coast defence, wholly ineffective against powerful shipping; but it was not a novelty. portsmouth harbour had been at an earlier period provided with a similar form of defence. edward vi, on the occasion of a visit to southsea castle, determined to strengthen portsmouth against invasion by the enemy. he therefore directed the building of two massive towers at the entrance to the harbour. to these an immense iron chain was fixed in such a way that it could be raised and tightened or lowered at pleasure when the approach of the enemy made this desirable. the fortifications of portsmouth were strengthened during the reign of elizabeth (see p. ). _great yarmouth._--in addition to a boom and two timber jetties at the entrance to the haven, yarmouth possessed a chain for the protection of its shipping. _hull_ possessed a chain, and an actual picture of it is preserved in one of the cotton mss. _cowes_ also was defended by a chain. _fowey._--for the protection of this town edward iv erected two towers to carry a chain which was suspended, doubtless under the level of the water, across the haven, or mouth of the river fowey. subsequently the people of fowey incurred the royal disapproval when they attacked the french during a truce, and accordingly edward iv had the chain removed and sent to dartmouth. it does not seem quite clear whether this chain, when removed to dartmouth, was used for the protection of shipping, but there certainly was a chain bridge at this place in which, conceivably, the old chain may have been utilized. there is reason to think that chains for the protection of important centres of shipping were more common than might be supposed from the few definite particulars of them which have survived. as an effective defence against the approach of the war-ships of an enemy, however, it would perhaps be impossible to find a more feeble type of protection. _booms._--as we have already observed in dealing with chains, the necessity must have been felt of supporting such very heavy barriers, even under water and by means of buoys. the boom, although introduced quite early, must have been an improvement upon the simple iron chain, because it contained, to some extent, its own means of support. this contrivance, a chain of linked up massive timbers reinforced with iron, and armed with iron spikes was employed, as early as the time of queen elizabeth at great yarmouth, and subsequently at many other ports. like the chain it, of course, provided an obstruction to navigation, especially at the mouths of rivers and harbours; but its massive iron spikes, calculated to pierce and damage shipping, gave it a distinct advantage over the chain. _fire-ships_.--these were ships filled with combustibles and explosives sent to drift among the shipping of the enemy. in the action off gravelines, fire-ships were used with considerable moral effect against the remains of the spanish armada, and they materially assisted in breaking up the sea-power of the spaniards. seven vessels were charged with combustibles and primed with gunpowder. as they neared the spanish ships their appearance created panic. the spaniards, in order to avoid the danger of fire, cut their ships adrift, and serious damage was caused by the collisions which ensued. in , again, fire-ships were employed in the daring raid made by the dutch in the thames and medway. this time they were used by the dutch near the chain at gillingham reach. _catamarans._--another method of firing an enemy's shipping was by means of a kind of raft charged with combustibles. the idea of the catamaran, as regards both its name and construction, was borrowed from the coasts of india and ceylon where a raft made of three long timbers lashed together, the middle timber being the longest, is used for fishing purpose. as adapted for destroying shipping the catamaran may be described as a kind of floating mine. catamarans were much favoured by mr. pitt, and in they were employed by the english against the french fleet, but they proved unsuccessful. the coastguard the coastguard force is of great antiquity, although it is not known at what period it was instituted. in - ( henry iv, c. ) it was enacted by statute "that the watch to be made upon the sea coast through the realm shall be made by the number of the people, in the places, and in manner and form, as they were wont to be made in times past and that in the same case the statute of winchester[ ] be observed and kept." there is every reason to believe that there was a properly organized coastguard force at a much earlier period, although precise information on the subject is not available. certain manuscripts relating to the defence of the coast of norfolk, however, indicate the existence of a coastguard in that county as, early as the thirteenth century.[ ] in more recent times the duties of the coastguards included the suppression of smuggling and the aiding of shipwrecked vessels. another purpose was to serve as a reserve to the navy: but in earlier times the prevention and suppression of smuggling was the main work of the coastguards. early in the nineteenth century a coast blockade was established on the coasts of kent and sussex, and detachments of men and boats were stationed at the martello towers on the sea-coast. it is time, perhaps, to bring these pages on the coast defences of england to a conclusion, and to review very briefly the chief features of the subject. there are one or two points which stand out with peculiar prominence. firstly we are struck by the origin, development, deterioration, and final degradation in the methods of coast defence. in the middle and later periods of the roman occupation of britain the fortresses for coast defence were built in massive masonry. in the earliest examples reliance was placed alone in mass and weight, and no attempt was made to protect the wall by enfilading. in the works built later on this defect was made good. protecting bastions gave opportunity of attacking the invaders in flank, and so protecting the wall. in the norman period, again, and particularly in its earlier part massive keeps of great strength and height were erected for the dual purpose of resisting the enemy by passive force, and of keeping a good look-out over the surrounding country or sea, by means of which movements of the enemy could be discovered. in the periods which followed, notably from the reign of henry ii to that of richard ii, the art of building castles was constantly being improved and developed. defensive works were adapted to the new forms and methods of offence. from that time downward to the first few years of the nineteenth century there is every indication of decadence. the defences became more and more feeble. the "chain," as a serious bar to the progress of unwelcome shipping, reached its most absurd and ridiculous stage during the time of the dutch invasion of the medway in , when the "chain of chatham" was snapped without the slightest difficulty by the dutch ships. as a matter of fact, as we have seen, the coast blockhouses erected by henry viii have never taken any important part in the defence of our coasts. this is mainly due, not to their inefficiency, but to the absence of opportunity. the same is true of the martello towers erected along our south-eastern coast when invasion from france, under napoleon i, was anticipated. history is full of accounts of attempted invasions of england. up to the period of the norman conquest, wellnigh every attempt to land on our shores was eventually, although not always immediately, successful. but from the norman conquest downward england has always been strong enough to protect herself from enemies who have attempted to make a permanent settlement. this is due to the fact that whilst we have not neglected our coast defences, we have not relied on castles, forts, and other forms of land defence. we have maintained a powerful fleet of war vessels as our first line of defence. experience has made it abundantly clear that coast defence without the aid of a powerful navy would be inadequate to protect our shores. our navy is, and always must be, the first and most important of our defences, and its special business is not to act as a simple coastguard force, but to seek out the enemy's naval force where-ever it may be, and destroy it. index alfred, king, - . anderida, , - . angles, the, . anglo-saxon buildings, - . anglo-saxon burhs, - . anglo-saxon chronicle, , - . anglo-saxon defensive works, . anglo-saxon mints, . appledore, . arckcliffe bulwark, . armitage, mrs. e. s., . avon, river (bristol), . bamborough castle, - . barbican (gate), sandwich, - . bayeux tapestry, . beblowe fort (holy island), . benfleet, danish settlement at, . berwick-upon-tweed, - . black bulwark, , . booms, - . boulogne, . bradwell-on-sea, - . bramber castle, - . bramber, danish settlement at, . brancaster, , - . branodunum, , - . breding-stone, dover, . brighton, defences and gates of, - . british fastnesses, . broadstairs, . burgh castle, , - . caesar, . caesar's camp, - . calshot ("calste point") castle, - . camber castle, , - . camps, prehistoric, - . canterbury, . canterbury, anglo-saxon coins, . canterbury castle, - . carausius, . cardiff castle, - . carlisle castle, - . carrnase, . castles. _see_ bamborough, bramber, burgh, calshot, camber, canterbury, cardiff, carlisle, colchester, cowling, deal, dover, dunstanburgh, folkestone, hastings, hurst, lancaster, liverpool, orford, pevensey, porchester, portland, queenborough, rochester, saltwood, sandgate, sandown, sandsfort, sandwich, scarborough, southampton, southsea, tynemouth, walmer, walton, wareham, weymouth, yarmouth (little). catamarans, . chains (defensive). _see_ chatham, cowes, fowey, gillingham reach, hull, portsmouth, yarmouth (great). chanctonbury ring, sussex, . chatham, chain at, - . chichester, . cinque ports, barons of the, - . cinque ports, courts of, . cinque ports, lord warden of the, - . cinque ports, origin and jurisdiction, - . cinque ports, privileges of, - . cinque ports and the siege of calais, . cinque ports, the, - . coast castles and walled towns, - . coastguard, the, - . colchester, . colchester castle, - . count of the saxon shore, - . court of brotherhood, . court of brotherhood and guestling, . cowling castle, - . cowes, chain at, . cowes (west), defences at, . cumberland (fort), . danish incursions, - . danish raids at canterbury, london, rochester, sandwich, etc., . danish raiders, . dartmouth, bulwark at, . dawson, mr. charles, . deal, . deal castle, , - . defensive chains, - , . dover, , - . dover, anglo-saxon coins, . dover, bulwarks at, . dover castle, - , . dover, straits of, . dubris, - . dunstanburgh castle, - . earthworks, - . east mersea, danish settlement at, . edward the confessor, . edwardian castles, - . england, attempted invasions, - . england, saxon settlement of, - . english coast defences, general conclusions, - . falmouth, bulwark at, . fire-ships, - . fisher gate, sandwich, - . folkestone castle, , . fort cumberland, . fowey, bulwark at, ; chain at, - . frome, river, . gariannonum, , - . gillingham reach, chain at, - . gravelines, fire-ships off, . gravesend, bulwark at, . "great castle," the, in the downs, . gosport, bulwark at, . harwich, . hasting, . hastings, - . hastings, battle of, . hastings castle, - . haverfield, professor, , . henry viii's blockhouses, inactivity in coast defence, - , - . henry viii's blockhouses, influence of gunpowder shown in their plans, - . henry viii, coast defences constructed by, - . higham, bulwark at, . holy island, defences of, . honorius, the emperor, , . hull, - . hull, chain at, . huntcliffe, . hurst castle, , . hythe military canal, . ipswich, - . jutes, the, . king's lynn, - . lambard, w., on coast defences of henry viii, - . lancaster castle, - . landguard fort, - . lisle, sir george, . liverpool castle, . lucas, sir charles, . lymne, , - , . martello towers, - . medway estuary, defences of, - . mersea, west, - . navy, origin and province of, - , - . navy, the english, . navy, "the first line of defence," - . navy, under hubert de burgh, , - . navy, under king alfred, , . norman castles built within roman defences, - . norman castles, types of, - . norman coast castles in england, - , . norman fleet, . norman invasion of england, - . orford castle, - . othona, - . peak, near robin hood bay, . pevensey, , - . pevensey (mediaeval) castle, . pharos, at dover, - . pharos, at richborough, - . pharos, at west mersea, - . plymouth, bulwark at, . porchester, , - , . portland, bulwark at, . portland castle, - . portsmouth, - , . portsmouth, chain at, , - . portsmouth, tower of, . portus itius, . portus lemanus, , - , . portus magnus, - . prehistoric camps, - . queenborough castle, - . reculver, , , , - . regulbium, , , , - . richborough, , - . rochester, . rochester, anglo-saxon coins, . roman forts, , - . roman invasion, - . round, dr. j. h., . rutupiae, , - . rye, , . rye castle, . saltwood castle, - . sandgate castle, - . sandown (i. w.) blockhouse, . sandown (kent) castle, , , . sandsfort castle (weymouth), . sandwich, - . sandwich, anglo-saxon coins, . sandwich, anglo-saxon defences at, . saxon shore, count of the, - . saxon settlement of england, - . scarborough castle, . scottish invasions, . shoebury, danish camp, - . silchester, . southampton, - . southampton castle, . south coast, defences of, - . southsea castle, , - . staithes, . straits of dover, . swale, river, . swanscombe, danish settlement at, . thames estuary, defences of, - . tilbury, bulwark at, . torne bay, bulwark at, . tynemouth priory and castle, - . upnor castle, - . walled towns: berwick-upon-tweed, - . bristol, - . canterbury, - . carlisle, - . colchester, - . dover, . harwich, . hastings, - . hull, - . ipswich, - . king's lynn, - . lancaster, - . portsmouth, - . rochester, . rye, . sandwich, - . southampton, - . wareham, - . winchester, . yarmouth (great), - . walmer castle, . walmer, early defences of, . walton, . wareham castle, etc., , - . warkworth castle, . welsh castles and walled towns, . weymouth, or sandsfort castle, . white bulwark, . william, duke of normandy, . winchelsea, . wolstanbury camp, sussex, . wykeham, william of, . yarmouth (great), - . yarmouth (great), boom at, . yarmouth (great), chain at, . yarmouth (little) castle, - . footnotes: [ ] "commentaries on the gallic war" [ ] "their way of fighting-with their chariots is this: first they drive their chariots on all sides, and throw their darts, insomuch that by the very terror of the horses, and noise of the wheels, they often break the ranks of the enemy. when they have forced their way into the midst of the cavalry, they quit their chariots and fight on foot: meanwhile the drivers retire a little from the combat, and place themselves in such a manner as to favour the retreat of their countrymen, should they be overpowered by the enemy. thus in action they perform the part both of nimble horsemen and stable infantry; and by continual exercise and use have arrived at that expertness, that in the most steep and difficult places they can stop their horses upon a full stretch, turn them which way they please, run along the pole, rest on the harness, and throw themselves back into their chariots with incredible dexterity." ("comm. on the gallic war," iv, xxix). [ ] see below, page . [ ] "victoria history of suffolk," i, . [ ] archaeological institute, norwich volume, , pp. - . [ ] "victoria history of suffolk," i, . [ ] proceedings, xvi, - . [ ] vol. xx, pp. - . [ ] now occupied by the royal military canal constructed as part of the defence against napoleon's threatened invasion. [ ] proceedings, xxi, . [ ] "archaeologia," lvii, - . [ ] "notes on the roman coast defences of britain, especially in yorkshire" ("journal of roman studies," ii, - ). [ ] "memorials of old kent," p. . [ ] "archaeological journal," xlvii, - . [ ] "roman ports," p. . [ ] "northumberland county history," i, , etc. [ ] "northumberland county history," ii, . [ ] built in . [ ] "northumberland county history," viii, ; "archaeological journal," lxvii, - . [ ] "the history and antiquities of the ancient burgh of great yarmouth," by henry swinden, , pp. , etc. [ ] "victoria history, hampshire," iii (plate _op._), . [ ] a good account of the castle, with plans, will be found in "transactions of the historic society of lancashire and cheshire" ( th series), xii, - , from the pen of mr. edward w. cox. [ ] edition, pp. - . [ ] the hermitage bulwark, near tilbury, essex. [ ] the statute of winchester was passed in . [ ] rev. william hudson, in "norfolk archaeology," xvii, . [illustration: coat of arms] chiswick press: charles whittingham and co. tooks court, chancery lane, london. standard architectural books the architecture of ancient egypt. a historical outline. by edward bell, m.a., f.s.a. with illustrations, maps, and plans. _post vo._ = _s._= _net_. a short history of renaissance architecture in england (a.d. - ). by reginald blomfield, m.a. with illustrations. _post vo._ = _s._ _d._= _net_. 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"dr. west is apparently one of those rare individuals who can regard this complex subject from the many necessary points of view, and can treat it as a whole.... this thoughtful and illuminating little book."--_westminster gazette._ a history of gothic art in england. by e. s. prior. with illustrations, mostly drawn by g. c. horsley. _imperial vo._ = _s._ _d._= _net_. a history of renaissance architecture in england (a.d. - ). by reginald blomfield. with illustrations drawn by the author and plates from photographs and old prints and drawings. _imperial vo. vols._ =£ _s._= _net_. a history of french architecture from the reign of charles viii to the death of mazarin. by reginald blomfield, a.r.a., f.s.a. _with upwards of illustrations._ _vols. imperial vo._ =£ _s._= _net_. domestic architecture in england in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. a selection of examples drawn and photographed for the use of architects. by horace field and michael bunney. with introductions and notes. _royal to._ = _s._= _net_. irish ecclesiastical architecture of the middle ages. by a. c. champneys. _imperial vo. profusely illustrated_. = _s._ _d._= _net_. the antiquities of athens and other monuments of greece as measured and delineated by james stuart, f.r.s., f.s.a., and nicholas revett. _with many illustrations engraved on steel. small post vo._ = _s._= messrs. bell's illustrated list of architectural books will be sent on application. * * * * * g. bell and sons, ltd., york house, portugal st. london, w.c. transcriber's notes: words surrounded by _ are italicized. words surrounded by = are bold. hyphenation has been standardised. some illustrations were relocated to correspond to their references in the text. caption added to captionless illustrations. aeroplanes and dirigibles of war by frederick a. talbot preface ever since the earliest days of the great conquest of the air, first by the dirigible balloon and then by the aeroplane, their use in time of war has been a fruitful theme for discussion. but their arrival was of too recent a date, their many utilities too unexplored to provide anything other than theories, many obviously untenable, others avowedly problematical. yet the part airships have played in the greatest war has come as a surprise even to their most convinced advocates. for every expectation shattered, they have shown a more than compensating possibility of usefulness. in this volume an endeavour has been made to record their achievements, under the stern test of trial, as an axiom of war, and to explain, in untechnical language, the many services to which they have been and may be applied. in the preparation of the work i have received assistance from many sources--british, french, russian and german--from official reports and from men who have played a part in the war in the air. the information concerning german military aircraft has been obtained from government documents, most of which were placed at my disposal before the outbreak of war. the use of aircraft has changed the whole art and science of warfare. with its disabilities well in hand, with its strength but half revealed, the aerial service has revolutionised strategy and shorn the unexpected attack of half its terrors. the fourth arm is now an invaluable part of the complex military machine. f. a. talbot. contents chapter i. the introduction of aircraft into military operations ii. the military uses of the captive balloon iii. germany's rise to military airship supremacy iv. airships of war v. germany's aerial dreadnought fleet vi. the military value of germany's aerial fleet vii. aeroplanes of war viii. scouting from the skies ix. the airman and artillery x. bomb-throwing from air-craft xi. armoured aeroplanes xii. battles in the air xiii. tricks and ruses to baffle the airman xiv. anti-aircraft guns. mobile weapons xv. anti-aircraft guns. immobile weapons xvi. mining the air xvii. wireless in aviation xviii. aircraft and naval operations xix. the navies of the air chapter i. the introduction of aircraft into military operations it is a curious circumstance that an invention, which is hailed as being one of the greatest achievements ever recorded in the march of civilisation, should be devoted essentially to the maiming of humanity and the destruction of property. in no other trend of human endeavour is this factor so potently demonstrated as in connection with man's conquest of the air. the dogged struggle against the blind forces of nature was waged tenaciously and perseveringly for centuries. but the measure of success recorded from time to time was so disappointing as to convey the impression, except in a limited circle, that the problem was impossible of solution. in the meantime wondrous changes had taken place in the methods of transportation by land and sea. the steam and electric railway, steam propulsion of vessels, and mechanical movement along the highroads had been evolved and advanced to a high standard of perfection, to the untold advantage of the community. consequently it was argued, if only a system of travel along the aerial highways could be established, then all other methods of mechanical transportation would be rendered, if not entirely obsolete, at least antiquated. at last man triumphed over nature--at least to such a degree as to inspire the confidence of the world at large, and to bring aerial travel and transportation within range of realisation. but what has been the result? the discovery is not devoted to the interests of peace and economic development, but to extermination and destruction. at the same time this development may be explained. the airship and aeroplane in the present stage of evolution possess no economic value. true, cross-country cruises by airship have been inaugurated, and, up to a point, have proved popularly, if not commercially, successful, while tentative efforts have been made to utilise the aeroplane as a mail-carrier. still, from the view-point of the community at large aerial travel is as remote as it was centuries ago. it is somewhat interesting to observe how history is repeating itself. when the montgolfiers succeeded in lifting themselves into the air by means of a vessel inflated with hot air, the new vehicle was hailed not so much as one possessed of commercial possibilities, but as an engine of war! when the indomitable courage and perseverance of count von zeppelin in the face of discouraging disasters and flagrant failures, at last commanded the attention of the german emperor, the latter regarded the zeppelin craft, not from the interests of peace, but as a military weapon, and the whole of the subsequent efforts of the imperial admirer were devoted to the perfection of the airship in this one direction. other nations, when they embarked on an identical line of development, considered the airship from a similar point of view. in fact, outside germany, there was very little private initiative in this field. experiments and developments were undertaken by the military or naval, and in some instances by both branches, of the respective powers. consequently the aerial craft, whether it be a dirigible airship, or an aeroplane, can only be regarded from the military point of view. despite the achievements which have been recorded by human endeavour in the field of aerial travel, the balloon per se has by no means been superseded. it still remains an invaluable adjunct to the fighting machine. in great britain its value in this direction has never been ignored: of late, indeed, it has rather been developed. the captive balloon is regarded as an indispensable unit to both field and sea operations. this fact was emphasised very strongly in connection with the british naval attacks upon the german forces in flanders, and it contributed to the discomfiture of the german hordes in a very emphatic manner. the captive balloon may be operated from any spot where facilities exist for anchoring the paying out cable together with winding facilities for the latter. consequently, if exigencies demand, it maybe operated from the deck of a warship so long as the latter is stationary, or even from an automobile. it is of small cubic capacity, inasmuch as it is only necessary for the bag to contain sufficient gas to lift one or two men to a height of about or feet. when used in the field the balloon is generally inflated at the base, to be towed or carried forward by a squad of men while floating in the air, perhaps at a height of feet. a dozen men will suffice for this duty as a rule, and in calm weather little difficulty is encountered in moving from point to point. this method possesses many advantages. the balloon can be inflated with greater ease at the base, where it is immune from interference by hostile fire. moreover, the facilities for obtaining the requisite inflating agent--hydrogen or coal gas--are more convenient at such a point. if the base be far removed from the spot at which it is desired to operate the balloon, the latter is inflated at a convenient point nearer the requisite position, advantage being taken of the protective covering offered by a copse or other natural obstacle. as is well known, balloons played an important part during the siege of paris in - , not only in connection with daring attempts to communicate with the outer world, but in reconnoitring the german positions around the beleaguered city. but this was not the first military application of the aerial vessel; it was used by the french against the austrians in the battle of fleurus, and also during the american civil war. these operations, however, were of a sporadic character; they were not part and parcel of an organised military section. it is not generally known that the british war office virtually pioneered the military use of balloons, and subsequently the methods perfected in britain became recognised as a kind of "standard" and were adopted generally by the powers with such modifications as local exigencies seemed to demand. the british military balloon department was inaugurated at chatham under captain templer in . it was devoted essentially to the employment of captive balloons in war, and in a company of the royal engineers was detailed to the care of this work in the field. six years previously the french military department had adopted the captive balloon under colonel laussedat, who was assisted among others by the well-known captain renard. germany was somewhat later in the field; the military value of captive balloons was not appreciated and taken into serious consideration here until . but although british efforts were preceded by the french the latter did not develop the idea upon accepted military lines. the british authorities were confronted with many searching problems. one of the earliest and greatest difficulties encountered was in connection with the gas for inflation. coal gas was not always readily available, so that hydrogen had to be depended upon for the most part. but then another difficulty arose. this was the manufacture of the requisite gas. various methods were tested, such as the electrolytic decomposition of water, the decomposition of sulphuric acid by means of iron, the reaction between slaked lime and zinc, and so forth. but the drawbacks to every process, especially upon the field of battle, when operations have to be conducted under extreme difficulties and at high pressure, were speedily recognised. while other nations concentrated their energies upon the simplification of hydrogen-manufacturing apparatus for use upon the battle-field, great britain abandoned all such processes in toto. our military organisation preferred to carry out the production of the necessary gas at a convenient manufacturing centre and to transport it, stored in steel cylinders under pressure, to the actual scene of operations. the method proved a great success, and in this way it was found possible to inflate a military balloon in the short space of minutes, whereas, under the conditions of making gas upon the spot, a period of four hours or more was necessary, owing to the fact that the manufacturing process is relatively slow and intricate. the practicability of the british idea and its perfection served to establish the captive balloon as a military unit. the british military ballooning department has always ranked as the foremost of its type among the powers, although its work has been carried out so unostentatiously that the outside world has gleaned very little information concerning its operations. captain templer was an indefatigable worker and he brought the ballooning section to a high degree of efficiency from the military point of view. but the british government was peculiarly favoured, if such a term may be used. our little wars in various parts of the world contributed valuable information and experience which was fully turned to account. captive balloons for reconnoitring purposes were used by the british army for the first time at suakim in , and the section established its value very convincingly. the french military balloon department gained its first experience in this field in the previous year, a balloon detachment having been dispatched to tonkin in . in both the tonkin and soudan campaigns, invaluable work was accomplished by the balloon sections, with the result that this aerial vehicle has come to be regarded as an indispensable military adjunct. indeed the activity of the german military ballooning section was directly attributable to the anglo-french achievements therewith. in this work, however, the british force speedily displayed its superiority and initiative. the use of compressed hydrogen was adopted, and within the course of a few years the other powers, realising the advantages which the british department had thus obtained, decided to follow its example. the gas is stored in cylinders under a pressure varying from six to ten or more atmospheres; in other words from about to or more pounds per square inch. special military wagons have been designed for the transport of these cylinders, and they are attached to the balloon train. the balloon itself is light, and made of such materials as to reduce the weight thereof to the minimum. the british balloons are probably the smallest used by any of the powers, but at the same time they are the most expensive. they are made of goldbeater's skin, and range in capacity from , to , cubic feet, the majority being of the former capacity. the french balloon on the other hand has a capacity exceeding , cubic feet, although a smaller vessel of , cubic feet capacity, known as an auxiliary, and carrying a single observer, is used. the germans, on the other hand, with their teutonic love of the immense, favour far larger vessels. at the same time the military balloon section of the german army eclipses that of any other nations is attached to the intelligence department, and is under the direct control of the general staff. balloon stations are dotted all over the country, including heligoland and kiel, while regular sections are attached to the navy for operating captive balloons from warships. although the zeppelin and aeroplane forces have come to the front in germany, and have relegated the captive balloon somewhat to the limbo of things that were, the latter section has never been disbanded; in fact, during the present campaign it has undergone a somewhat spirited revival. the south african campaign emphasised the value of the british balloon section of the army, and revealed services to which it was specially adapted, but which had previously more or less been ignored. the british army possessed indifferent maps of the orange free state and the transvaal. this lamentable deficiency was remedied in great measure by recourse to topographical photographs taken from the captive balloons. the guides thus obtained were found to be of extreme value. during the early stages of the war the hydrogen was shipped in cylinders from the homeland, but subsequently a manufacturing plant of such capacity as to meet all requirements was established in south africa. the cylinders were charged at this point and dispatched to the scene of action, so that it became unnecessary to transport the commodity from britain. the captive balloon revealed the impregnability of spion kop, enabled lord roberts to ascertain the position of the boer guns at the battle of paardeburg, and proved of invaluable assistance to the forces of general white during the siege of ladysmith. chapter ii. the military uses of the captive balloon although the captive balloon is recognised as indispensable in military operations, its uses are somewhat limited. it can be employed only in comparatively still weather. the reason is obvious. it is essential that the balloon should assume a vertical line in relation to its winding plant upon the ground beneath, so that it may attain the maximum elevation possible: in other words, the balloon should be directly above the station below, so that if yards of cable are paid out the aerostat may be yards above the ground. if a wind is blowing, the helpless craft is certain to be caught thereby and driven forwards or backwards, so that it assumes an angle to its station. if this become acute the vessel will be tilted, rendering the position of the observers somewhat precarious, and at the same time observing efficiency will be impaired. this point may be appreciated more easily by reference to the accompanying diagram. a represents the ground station and b the position of the captive balloon when sent aloft in calm weather, feet of cable being paid out. a wind arises and blows the vessel forward to the position c. at this point the height of the craft in relation to the ground has been reduced, and the reduction must increase proportionately as the strength of the wind increases and forces the balloon still more towards the ground. at the same time, owing to the tilt given to the car, observation is rendered more difficult and eventually becomes extremely dangerous. a wind, if of appreciable strength, develops another and graver danger. greater strain will be imposed upon the cable, while if the wind be gusty, there is the risk that the vessel will be torn away from its anchoring rope and possibly lost. thus it will be seen that the effective utilisation of a captive balloon is completely governed by meteorological conditions, and often it is impossible to use it in weather which exercises but little influence upon dirigibles or aeroplanes. the captive balloon equipment comprises the balloon, together with the observer's basket, the wire-cable whereby it is anchored and controlled, and the winding apparatus. formerly a steam engine was necessary for the paying in and out of the cable, but nowadays this is accomplished by means of a petrol-driven motor, an oil-engine, or even by the engine of an automobile. the length of cable varies according to the capacity of the balloon and the maximum operating height. the average british balloon is able to lift about or pounds, which may be taken to represent the weight of two observers. on the other hand, the french and german balloons are able to carry four times this weight, with the exception of the french auxiliaries, which are designed to lift one observer only. the balloons of the two latter powers have also a greater maximum altitude; it is possible to ascend to a height of some , feet in one of these. the observing station is connected with the winding crew below either by a telephone, or some other signalling system, the method practised varying according to circumstances. in turn the winding station is connected with the officer in charge of the artillery, the fire of which the captive balloon is directing. the balloon observer is generally equipped with various instruments, such as telescope, photographic cameras, and so forth, so as to be able, if necessary, to prepare a topographical survey of the country below. by this means the absence of reliable maps may be remedied, or if not regarded, as sufficiently correct they may be checked and counter-checked by the data gained aloft. seeing that the gas has to be transported in cylinders, which are weighty, it is incumbent that the waste of this commodity should be reduced to the minimum. the balloon cannot be deflated at night and re-inflated in the morning--it must be maintained in the inflated condition the whole time it is required for operation. there are various methods of consummating this end. one method is to haul in the balloon and to peg it down on all sides, completing the anchorage by the attachment of bags filled with earth to the network. while this process is satisfactory in calm weather, it is impracticable in heavy winds, which are likely to spring up suddenly. consequently a second method is practised. this is to dig a pit into the ground of sufficient size to receive the balloon. when the latter is hauled in it is lowered into this pit and there pegged down and anchored. thus it is perfectly safe during the roughest weather, as none of its bulk is exposed above the ground level. furthermore it is not a conspicuous object for the concentration of hostile fire. in some instances, and where the military department is possessed of an elaborate equipment such as characterises the german army, when reconnaissance is completed and the balloon is to be removed to another point, the gas is pumped back into the cylinders for further use. such an economical proceeding is pretty and well adapted to manoeuvres, but it is scarcely feasible in actual warfare, for the simple reason that the pumping takes time. consequently the general procedure, when the balloon has completed its work, is to permit the gas to escape into the air in the usual manner, and to draw a fresh supply of gas from further cylinders when the occasion arises for re-inflation. although the familiar spherical balloon has proved perfectly adequate for reconnoitring in the british and french armies, the german authorities maintained that it was not satisfactory in anything but calm weather. accordingly scientific initiative was stimulated with a view to the evolution of a superior vessel. these endeavours culminated in the parseval-siegsfeld captive balloon, which has a quaint appearance. it has the form of a bulky cylinder with hemispherical extremities. at one end of the balloon there is a surrounding outer bag, reminiscent of a cancerous growth. the lower end of this is open. this attachment serves the purpose of a ballonet. the wind blowing against the opening, which faces it, charges the ballonet with air. this action, it is claimed, serves to steady the main vessel, somewhat in the manner of the tail of a kite, thereby enabling observations to be made as easily and correctly in rough as in calm weather. the appearance of the balloon while aloft is certainly curious. it appears to be rearing up on end, as if the extremity saddled with the ballonet were weighted. british and french captive balloon authorities are disposed to discount the steadying effect of this attachment, and, indeed, to maintain that it is a distinct disadvantage. it may hold the vessel steadier for the purpose of observation, but at the same time it renders the balloon a steadier target for hostile fire. on the other hand, the swaying of a spherical balloon with the wind materially contributes to its safety. a moving object, particularly when its oscillations are irregular and incalculable, is an extremely difficult object at which to take effective aim. seeing that even a small captive balloon is of appreciable dimensions--from to feet or more in diameter--one might consider it an easy object to hit. but experience has proved otherwise. in the first place the colour of the balloon is distinctly protective. the golden or yellowish tinge harmonises well with the daylight, even in gloomy weather, while at night-time it blends excellently with the moonlight. for effective observations a high altitude is undesirable. at a height of feet the horizon is about miles from the observer, as compared with the miles constituting the range of vision from the ground over perfectly flat country. thus it will be seen that the "spotter" up aloft has the command of a considerable tract. various ways and means of finding the range of a captive balloon have been prepared, and tables innumerable are available for committal to memory, while those weapons especially designed for aerial targets are fitted with excellent range-finders and other instruments. the germans, with characteristic thoroughness, have devoted considerable attention to this subject, but from the results which they have achieved up to the present this guiding knowledge appears to be more spectacular and impressive than effective. to put a captive balloon out of action one must either riddle the envelope, causing it to leak like a sieve, blow the vessel to pieces, or ignite the highly inflammable gas with which it is inflated. individual rifle fire will inflict no tangible damage. a bullet, if it finds its billet, will merely pass through the envelope and leave two small punctures. true, these vents will allow the gas to escape, but this action will proceed so slowly as to permit the vessel to remain aloft long enough to enable the observer to complete his work. a lucky rifle volley, or the stream of bullets from a machine gun may riddle the envelope, precipitating a hurried descent, owing to the greater number of perforations through which the gas is able to escape, but as a rule the observer will be able to land safely. consequently the general practice is to shatter the aerostat, and to this end either shrapnel, high explosive, or incendiary shells will be used. the former must explode quite close to the balloon in order to achieve the desired end, while the incendiary shell must actually strike it, so as to fire the gas. the high explosive shell may explode effectually some feet away from the vessel, inasmuch as in this instance dependence is placed upon the terrific concussion produced by the explosion which, acting upon the fragile fabric of the balloon, brings about a complete collapse of the envelope. if a shrapnel is well placed and explodes immediately above the balloon, the envelope will be torn to shreds and a violent explosion of the gas will be precipitated. but as a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult to place a shrapnel shell so as to consummate this end. the range is not picked up easily, while the timing of the fuse to bring about the explosion of the shell at the critical moment is invariably a complex problem. one favourite method of finding the range of a balloon is shown in the accompanying diagrams. the artillery battery is at b and the captive balloon, c, is anchored at a. on either side of b and at a specified distance, observers o and o respectively are stationed. first a shell is fired at "long" range, possibly the maximum range of the gun. it bursts at d. as it has burst immediately in the line of sight of b, but with the smoke obscured by the figure of the balloon c, it is obvious to b that the explosion has occurred behind the objective, but at what distance he cannot tell. to o and o , however, it is seen to have burst at a considerable distance behind c though to the former it appears to have burst to the left and to the second observer to the right of the target. another shell, at "short" range, is now fired, and it bursts at e. the explosion takes place in the line of sight of b, who knows that he has fired short of the balloon because the latter is eclipsed by the smoke. but the two observers see that it is very short, and here again the explosion appears to o to have occurred to the right of the target, while to o it has evidently burst to the left of the aerostat, as revealed by the relation of the position of the balloon to the bursting of the shell shown in fig. . a third round is fired, and the shell explodes at f. in this instance the explosion takes place below the balloon. both the observers and the artillery man concur in their deductions upon the point at which the shell burst. but the shell must explode above the balloon, and accordingly a fourth round is discharged and the shell bursts at g. this appears to be above the balloon, inasmuch as the lines of sight of the two observers and b converge at this point. but whether the explosion occurs immediately above the vessel as is desired, it is impossible to say definitely, because it may explode too far behind to be effective. consequently, if this shell should prove abortive, the practice is to decrease the range gradually with each succeeding round until the explosion occurs at the critical point, when, of course, the balloon is destroyed. an interesting idea of the difficulty of picking up the range of a captive balloon may be gathered from the fact that some ten minutes are required to complete the operation. but success is due more to luck than judgment. in the foregoing explanation it is premised that the aerial vessel remains stationary, which is an extremely unlikely contingency. while those upon the ground are striving to pick up the range, the observer is equally active in his efforts to baffle his opponents. the observer follows each successive, round with keen interest, and when the shells appear to be bursting at uncomfortably close quarters naturally he intimates to his colleagues below that he desires his position to be changed, either by ascending to a higher point or descending. in fact, he may be content to come to the ground. nor must the fact be overlooked that while the enemy is trying to place the observer hors de combat, he is revealing the position of his artillery, and the observer is equally industrious in picking up the range of the hostile guns for the benefit of his friends below. when the captive balloon is aloft in a wind the chances of the enemy picking up the range thereof are extremely slender, as it is continually swinging to and fro. while there is always the possibility of a shell bursting at such a lucky moment as to demolish the aerial target, it is generally conceded to be impossible to induce a shell to burst within yards of a balloon, no matter how skilfully the hostile battery may be operated. the value of the captive balloon has been demonstrated very strikingly throughout the attack upon the entrenched german positions in flanders. owing to the undulating character of the dunes the "spotters" upon the british monitors and battle ships are unable to obtain a sweeping view of the country. accordingly captive balloons are sent aloft in some cases from the deck of the monitors, and in others from a suitable point upon the beach itself. the aerial observer from his point of vantage is able to pick up the positions of the german forces and artillery with ease and to communicate the data thus gained to the british vessels, although subjected to heavy and continuous hostile fire. the difficulty of hitting a captive balloon has been graphically emphasised, inasmuch as the german artillerists have failed to bring down a solitary balloon. on the other hand the observer in the air is able to signal the results of each salvo fired from the british battleships as they manoeuvre at full speed up and down the coastline, while he keeps the fire of the monitors concentrated upon the german positions until the latter have been rendered untenable or demolished. the accuracy of the british gun-fire has astonished even the germans, but it has been directly attributable to the rangefinder perched in the car of the captive balloon and his rapid transmission of information to the vessels below. the enthusiastic supporters of aerial navigation maintained that the dirigible and the aeroplane would supersede the captive balloon completely. but as a matter of fact the present conflict has established the value of this factor more firmly than ever. there is not the slightest possibility that the captive balloon sections of the belligerents will be disbanded, especially those which have the fruits of experience to guide them. the airship and the aeroplane have accomplished wonders, but despite their achievements the captive balloon has fully substantiated its value as a military unit in its particular field of operations. chapter iii. germany's rise to military airship supremacy two incidents in the history of aviation stand out with exceptional prominence. the one is the evolution of the zeppelin airship--a story teeming with romance and affording striking and illuminating glimpses of dogged perseverance, grim determination in the face of repeated disasters, and the blind courageous faith of the inventor in the creation of his own brain. the second is the remarkable growth of germany's military airship organisation, which has been so rapid and complete as to enable her to assume supremacy in this field, and that within the short span of a single decade. the zeppelin has always aroused the world's attention, although this interest has fluctuated. regarded at first as a wonderful achievement of genius, afterwards as a freak, then as the ready butt for universal ridicule, and finally with awe, if not with absolute terror--such in brief is the history of this craft of the air. count von zeppelin can scarcely be regarded as an ordinary man. he took up the subject of flight at an age which the majority of individuals regard as the opportune moment for retirement from activity, and, knowing nothing about mechanical engineering, he concentrated his energies upon the study of this science to enable him to master the difficulties of a mechanical character incidental to the realisation of his grand idea. his energy and indomitable perseverance are equalled by his ardent patriotism, because, although the fatherland discounted his idea when other powers were ready to consider it, and indeed made him tempting offers for the acquisition of his handiwork, he stoutly declined all such solicitations, declaring that his invention, if such it may be termed, was for his own country and none other. count von zeppelin developed his line of study and thought for one reason only. as an old campaigner and a student of military affairs he realised the shortcomings of the existing methods of scouting and reconnoitring. he appreciated more than any other man of the day perhaps, that if the commander-in-chief of an army were provided with facilities for gazing down upon the scene of operations, and were able to take advantage of all the information accruing to the man above who sees all, he would hold a superior position, and be able to dispose his forces and to arrange his plan of campaign to the most decisive advantage. in other words, zeppelin conceived and developed his airship for one field of application and that alone-military operations. although it has achieved certain successes in other directions these have been subsidiary to the primary intention, and have merely served to emphasise its military value. von zeppelin was handicapped in his line of thought and investigation from the very first. he dreamed big things upon a big scale. the colossal always makes a peculiar and irresistible appeal to the teutonic nature. so he contemplated the perfection of a big dirigible, eclipsing in every respect anything ever attempted or likely to be attempted by rival countries. unfortunately, the realisation of the "colossal" entails an equally colossal financial reserve, and the creator of this form of airship for years suffered from financial cramp in its worst manifestation. probably it was to the benefit of the world at large that fortune played him such sorry tricks. it retarded the growth of german ambitions in one direction very effectively. as is well known zeppelin evolved what may be termed an individual line of thought in connection with his airship activities. he adopted what is known as the indeformable airship: that is to say the rigid, as opposed to the semi-rigid and flexible craft. as a result of patient experiment and continued researches he came to the conclusion that a huge outer envelope taking the form of a polygonal cylinder with hemispherical ends, constructed upon substantial lines with a metallic skeleton encased within an impermeable skin, and charged with a number of smaller balloon-shaped vessels containing the lifting agent--hydrogen gas--would fulfil his requirements to the greatest advantage. model after model was built upon these lines. each was subjected to searching tests with the invariable result attending such work with models. some fulfilled the expectations of the inventor, others resolutely declined to illustrate his reasonings in any direction. the inevitable happened. when a promising model was completed finally the inventor learned to his sorrow what every inventor realises in time. his fortune and the resources of others had been poured down the sink of experiment. to carry the idea from the model to the practical stage required more money, and it was not forthcoming. the inventor sought to enlist the practical sympathy of his country, only to learn that in germany, as in other lands, the axiom concerning the prophet, honour, and country prevails. no exuberant inventor received such a cold douche from a government as did count zeppelin from the prussian authorities. for two years further work was brought practically to a standstill: nothing could be done unless the sinews of war were forthcoming. his friends, who had assisted him financially with his models, now concluded that their aid had been misplaced. the inventor, though disappointed, was by no means cast down. he clung tenaciously to his pet scheme and to such effect that in a german engineering society advanced him some funds to continue his researches. this support sufficed to keep things going for another two years, during which time a full-sized vessel was built. the grand idea began to crystallise rapidly, with the result that when a public company was formed in , sufficient funds were rendered available to enable the first craft to be constructed. it aroused considerable attention, as well it might, seeing that it eclipsed anything which had previously been attempted in connection with dirigibles. it was no less than feet in length, by feet in diameter, and was fitted with two cars, each of which carried a sixteen horse-power motor driving independent propellers rigidly attached to the body of the vessel. the propellers were both vertical and horizontal, for the purpose of driving the ship in the two planes--vertical and horizontal respectively. the vessel was of great scientific interest, owing to the ingenuity of its design and construction. the metallic skeleton was built up from aluminium and over this was stretched the fabric of the envelope, care being observed to reduce skin friction, as well as to achieve impermeability. but it was the internal arrangement of the gas-lifting balloons which provoked the greatest concern. the hull was divided into compartments, each complete in itself, and each containing a small balloon inflated with hydrogen. it was sub-division as practised in connection with vessels ploughing the water applied to aerial craft, the purpose being somewhat the same. as a ship of the seas will keep afloat so long as a certain number of its subdivisions remain watertight, so would the zeppelin keep aloft if a certain number of the gas compartments retained their charges of hydrogen. there were no fewer than seventeen of these gas-balloons arranged in a single line within the envelope. beneath the hull and extending the full length of the latter was a passage which not only served as a corridor for communication between the cars, but also to receive a weight attached to a cable worked by a winch. by the movement of this weight the bow or stem of the vessel could be tilted to assist ascent and descent. the construction of the vessel subsequently proved to be the easiest and most straightforward part of the whole undertaking. there were other and more serious problems to be solved. how would such a monster craft come to earth? how could she be manipulated upon the ground? how could she be docked? upon these three points previous experience was silent. one german inventor who likewise had dreamed big things, and had carried them into execution, paid for his temerity and ambitions with his life, while his craft was reduced to a mass of twisted and torn metal. under these circumstances count zeppelin decided to carry out his flights over the waters of the bodensee and to house his craft within a floating dock. in this manner two uncertain factors might be effectively subjugated. another problem had been ingeniously overcome. the outer envelope presented an immense surface to the atmosphere, while temperature was certain to play an uncertain part in the behaviour of the craft. the question was to reduce to the minimum the radiation of heat and cold to the bags containing the gas. this end was achieved by leaving a slight air space between the inflated gas balloons and the inner surface of the hull. the first ascent was made on july nd, , but was disappointing, several breakdowns of the mechanism occurring while the vessel was in mid-air, which rendered it unmanageable, although a short flight was made which sufficed to show that an independent speed of feet per second could be attained. the vessel descended and was made fast in her dock, the descent being effected safely, while manoeuvring into dock was successful. at least three points about which the inventor had been in doubt appeared to be solved--his airship could be driven through the air and could be steered; it could be brought to earth safely; and it could be docked. the repairs to the mechanism were carried out and on october th and st of the same year further flights were made. by this time certain influential teuton aeronautical experts who had previously ridiculed zeppelin's idea had made a perfect volte-face. they became staunch admirers of the system, while other meteorological savants participated in the trials for the express purpose of ascertaining just what the ship could do. as a result of elaborate trigonometrical calculations it was ascertained that the airship attained an independent speed of feet per second, which exceeded anything previously achieved. the craft proved to be perfectly manageable in the air, and answered her helm, thus complying with the terms of dirigibility. the creator was flushed with his triumph, but at the same time was doomed to experience misfortune. in its descent the airship came to "earth" with such a shock that it was extensively damaged. the cost of repairing the vessel was so heavy that the company declined to shoulder the liability, and as the count was unable to defray the expense the wreck was abandoned. although a certain meed of success had been achieved the outlook seemed very black for the inventor. no one had any faith in his idea. he made imploring appeals for further money, embarked upon lecturing campaigns, wrote aviation articles for the press, and canvassed possible supporters in the effort to raise funds for his next enterprise. two years passed, but the fruits of the propaganda were meagre. it was at this juncture, when everything appeared to be impossible, that count zeppelin discovered his greatest friend. the german emperor, with an eye ever fixed upon new developments, had followed zeppelin's uphill struggle, and at last, in , came to his aid by writing a letter which ran:-- "since your varied flights have been reported to me it is a great pleasure to me to express my acknowledgment of your patience and your labours, and the endurance with which you have pressed on through manifold hindrances till success was near. the advantages of your system have given your ship the greatest attainable speed and dirigibility, and the important results you have obtained have produced an epoch-making step forward in the construction of airships and leave laid down a valuable basis for future experiments." this imperial appreciation of what had been accomplished proved to be the turning point in the inventor's fortunes. it stimulated financial support, and the second airship was taken in hand. but misfortune still pursued him. accidents were of almost daily occurrence. defects were revealed here and weaknesses somewhere else. so soon as one trouble was overcome another made itself manifest. the result was that the whole of the money collected by his hard work was expended before the ship could take to the air. a further crash and blasting of cherished hopes appeared imminent, but at this moment another royal personage came to the inventor's aid. the king of wurtemberg took a personal interest in his subject's uphill struggle, and the wurtemberg government granted him the proceeds of a lottery. with this money, and with what he succeeded in raising by hook and by crook, and by mortgaging his remaining property, a round l , was obtained. with this capital a third ship was taken in hand, and in it was launched. it was a distinct improvement upon its predecessors. the airship was feet in length by feet in diameter, was equipped with gas balloons having an aggregate capacity of , cubic feet of hydrogen, was equipped with two horse-power motors driving four propellers, and displaced tons. all the imperfections incidental to the previous craft had been eliminated, while the ship followed improved lines in its mechanical and structural details. the trials with this vessel commenced on november th, , but ill-luck had not been eluded. the airship was moored upon a raft which was to be towed out into the lake to enable the dirigible to ascend. but something went wrong with the arrangements. a strong wind caught the ungainly airship, she dipped her nose into the water, and as the motor was set going she was driven deeper into the lake, the vessel only being saved by hurried deflation. six weeks were occupied in repairs, but another ascent was made on january th, . the trials were fairly satisfactory, but inconclusive. one of the motors went wrong, and the longitudinal stability was found to be indifferent. the vessel was brought down, and was to be anchored, but the fates ruled otherwise. a strong wind caught her during the night and she was speedily reduced to indistinguishable scrap. despite catastrophe the inventor wrestled gamely with his project. the lessons taught by one disaster were taken to heart, and arrangements to prevent the recurrence thereof incorporated in the succeeding craft. unfortunately, however, as soon as one defect was remedied another asserted itself. it was this persistent revelation of the unexpected which caused another period of indifference towards his invention. probably nothing more would have been heard of the zeppelin after this last accident had it not been for the intervention of the prussian government at the direct instigation of the kaiser, who had now taken count zeppelin under his wing. a state lottery was inaugurated, the proceeds of which were handed over to the indefatigable inventor, together with an assurance that if he could keep aloft hours without coming to earth in the meantime, and could cover miles within this period, the government would repay the whole of the money he had lavished upon his idea, and liquidate all the debts he had incurred in connection therewith. another craft was built, larger than its predecessors, and equipped with two motors developing horse-power. upon completion it was submitted to several preliminary flights, which were so eminently successful that the inventor decided to make a trial trip under conditions closely analogous to those imposed for the government test. on june th, , at : a.m. the craft ascended and remained aloft for hours, during which time it made an encouraging circular tour. flushed with this success, the count considered that the official award was within reach, and that all his previous disasters and misfortunes were on the eve of redemption. the crucial test was essayed on august th, . accompanied by twelve observers the vessel ascended and travelled without incident for eight hours. then a slight mishap demanded attention, but was speedily repaired, and was ignored officially as being too trivial to influence the main issue. victory appeared within measurable distance: the arduous toil of many patient years was about to be rewarded. the airship was within sight of home when it had to descend owing to the development of another motor fault. but as it approached the ground, nature, as if infuriated at the conquest, rose up in rebellion. a sudden squall struck the unwieldy monster. within a few moments it became unmanageable, and through some inscrutable cause, it caught fire, with the result that within a few moments it was reduced to a tangled mass of metallic framework. it was a catastrophe that would have completely vanquished many an inventor, but the count was saved the gall of defeat. his flight, which was remarkable, inasmuch as he had covered miles within hours, including two unavoidable descents, struck the teuton imagination. the seeds so carefully planted by the "most high of prussia" now bore fruit. the german nation sympathised with the indomitable inventor, appreciated his genius, and promptly poured forth a stream of subscriptions to enable him to build another vessel. the intimation that other powers had approached the count for the acquisition of his idea became known far and wide, together with the circumstance that he had unequivocally refused all offers. he was striving for the fatherland, and his unselfish patriotism appealed to one and all. such an attitude deserved hearty national appreciation, and the members of the great german public emptied their pockets to such a degree that within a few weeks a sum of l , or $ , , was voluntarily subscribed. all financial embarrassments and distresses were now completely removed from the count's mind. he could forge ahead untrammelled by anxiety and worry. another zeppelin was built and it created a world's record. it remained aloft for hours, during which time it covered miles, and, although it came to grief upon alighting, by colliding with a tree, the final incident passed unnoticed. germany was in advance of the world. it had an airship which could go anywhere, irrespective of climatic conditions, and in true teuton perspective the craft was viewed from the military standpoint. here was a means of obtaining the mastery of the air: a formidable engine of invasion and aerial attack had been perfected. consequently the grand idea must be supported with unbounded enthusiasm. the count was hailed by his august master as "the greatest german of the twentieth century," and in this appreciation the populace wholeheartedly concurred. whether such a panegyric from such an auspicious quarter is praise indeed or the equivalent of complete condemnation, history alone will be able to judge, but when one reflects, at this moment, upon the achievements of this aircraft during the present conflagration, the unprejudiced will be rather inclined to hazard the opinion that imperial teuton praise is a synonym for damnation. although the zeppelin was accepted as a perfect machine it has never been possible to disperse the atmosphere of disaster with which it has been enveloped from the first. vessel after vessel has gone up in smoke and flame: few craft of this type have enjoyed more than an evanescent existence; and each successive catastrophe has proved more terrible than its predecessor. but the teutonic nation has been induced to pin its whole faith on this airship, notwithstanding that the more levelheaded engineers of other countries have always maintained the craft to be a "mechanical monstrosity" condemned from its design and principles of construction to disaster. unshaken by this adverse criticism, germany rests assured that by means of its zeppelins it will achieve that universal supremacy which it is convinced is its destiny. this blind child-like faith has been responsible for the establishment and development of the zeppelin factories. at friedrichshafen the facilities are adequate to produce two of these vessels per month, while another factory of a similar capacity has been established at berlin. unfortunately such big craft demand large docks to accommodate them, and in turn a large structure of this character constitutes an easy mark for hostile attack, as the raiding airmen of the allies have proved very convincingly. but the zeppelin must not be under-rated. magnificent performances have been recorded by these vessels, such as the round , miles' trip in , and several other equally brilliant feats since that date. it is quite true that each astounding achievement has been attended by an equally stupendous accident, but that is accepted as a mere incidental detail by the faithful teutonic nation. many vivid prophecies of the forthcoming flights by zeppelin have been uttered, and it is quite probable that more than one will be fulfilled, but success will be attributable rather to accident than design. although the zeppelin is the main stake of the german people in matters pertaining to aerial conquest, other types of airships have not been ignored, as related in another chapter. they have been fostered upon a smaller but equally effective scale. the semi-rigid parseval and gross craft have met with whole-hearted support, since they have established their value as vessels of the air, which is tantamount to the acceptance of their military value. the parseval is pronounced by experts to be the finest expression of aeronautical engineering so far as teuton effort is concerned. certainly it has placed many notable flights to its credit. the gross airship is an equally serviceable craft, its lines of design and construction closely following those of the early french supple airships. there are several other craft which have become more or less recognised by the german nation as substantial units of war, such as the ruthemberg, siemens-schukert, and so forth, all of which have proved their serviceability more or less conclusively. but in the somewhat constricted teuton mind the zeppelin and the zeppelin only represents the ultima thule of aerial navigation and the means for asserting the universal character of pan-germanism as well as "kultur." chapter iv. airships of war so much has been said and written concerning the zeppelin airship, particularly in its military aspect, that all other developments in this field have sunk into insignificance so far as the general public is concerned. the zeppelin dirigible has come to be generally regarded as the one and only form of practical lighter-than-air type of aircraft. moreover, the name has been driven home with such effect that it is regarded as the generic term for all german airships. these are grievous fallacies. the zeppelin is merely one of a variety of types, even in germany, although at the moment it probably ranks as the solitary survivor of the rigid system of construction. at one time, owing to the earnestness with which the advantages of this form of design were discussed, and in view of the fact that the zeppelin certainly appeared to triumph when all other designs failed, great britain was tempted to embrace the rigid form of construction. the building of an immense vessel of this class was actively supported and it was aptly christened the "may-fly." opponents of the movement tempered their emphatic condemnatory criticism so far as to remark that it may fly, but as events proved it never did. the colossal craft broke its back before it ever ventured into the air, and this solitary experience proving so disastrous, the rigid form of construction was abandoned once and for all. the venture was not in vain; it brought home to the british authorities more convincingly than anything else that the zeppelin was a mechanical monstrosity. the french never even contemplated the construction of such a craft at that time, estimating it at its true value, and the british failure certainly served to support french antagonism to the idea. subsequently, however, an attempt at rigid construction was made in france with the "spiess" airship, mainly as a concession to public clamour. even in germany itself the defects of the zeppelin were recognised and a decided effort to eliminate them was made by professor schutte in co-operation with a manufacturer of mannheim named lanz. the joint product of their ambitions, the schutte-lanz, is declared to be superior to the zeppelin, but so far it has failed to justify any of the claims of its designers. this vessel, which also favours the colossal, is likewise of the rigid type, but realising the inherent dangers accruing from the employment of metal for the framework, its constructors have used wood, reinforced and strengthened where necessary by metallic angle-iron, plates, and bracing; this utilisation of metal is, however, carried out very sparingly. the first vessel of this class was a huge failure, while subsequent craft have not proved much more successful. in fact, one of the largest german airships ever designed, l , is, or rather was, a schutte-lanz, with a capacity of , cubic feet, but over , pounds lighter than a zeppelin of almost similar dimensions. i say "was" since l is no more. the pride of its creators evinced a stronger preference for davy jones' locker than its designed realm. yet several craft of this type have been built and have been mistaken for zeppelins owing to the similarity of the broad principles of design and their huge dimensions. in one vital respect they are decidedly inferior to their contemporary--they are not so speedy. the most successful of the german lighter-than-air machines are those known respectively as the semi rigid and non-rigid types, the best examples of which are the gross and parseval craft. virtually they are teutonic editions of the successful french craft of identical design by which they were anticipated. the lebaudy is possibly the most famous of the french efforts in this direction. the gas-bag has an asymmetrical shape, and is pointed at both ends, although the prow is blunter or rounder than the stem. the gas-bag comprises a single chamber for the inflating agent, the distended shape of the envelope being sustained by means of an air-ballonet. by varying the contents of the latter through the agency of a pump the tension of the gas in the lifting envelope can be maintained, and the shape of the inflated balloon preserved under all conditions. beneath the gas-bag is a long strengthened girder, and from this in turn the car is suspended. it is the introduction of this rigid girder which is responsible for the descriptive generic term of "semi-rigid." on the other hand the "non-rigid" type may be roughly described as a pisciform balloon fitted with propelling machinery, inasmuch as the car containing the driving machinery is suspended from the balloon in the manner of the car in the ordinary drifting vessel. so far as the french effort is concerned the bayard-clement type is the best example of the non-rigid system; it is represented in germany by the parseval class. the gross airship has been definitely adopted as a military machine by the german authorities, and figures in the "m" class. the "m-iv" completed in is the largest of this type, and differs from its prototypes in that it carries two cars, each fitted with motors, whereas the earlier machines were equipped with a single gondola after the french pattern. this vessel measures feet in length, has a maximum diameter of / feet, displaces tons, and is fitted with motors developing horse-power, which is sufficient to give it a speed of miles per hour. this vessel represents a huge advance upon its predecessors of this design, inasmuch as the latter were about feet in length by / feet in diameter, and displaced only six tons, while the single car was provided with a motor developing only horse-power, the speed being miles per hour. thus it will be seen that a huge development has suddenly taken place, a result due no doubt to the co-operation of the well-known engineer basenach. the "m-iv" is essentially an experiment and great secrecy has been maintained in regard to the trials which have been carried out therewith, the authorities merely vouchsafing the fact that the airship has proved completely successful in every respect; conclusive testimony of this is offered by the inclusion of the vessel in the active aerial fleet of germany. but it is the parseval which is regarded as the finest type of airship flying the german flag. this vessel is the product of slow evolution, for it is admitted to be a power-driven balloon. even the broad lines of the latter are preserved, the shape being that of a cylinder with rounded ends. it is the direct outcome of the "drachen-balloon," perfected by parseval and siegsfeld, the captive balloon which is an indispensable part of the german military equipment. the complete success of the suspension system in this captive balloon prompted parseval to continue his researches and experiments in regard to the application of power to the vessel, so as to induce it to move independently of the wind. the suspension system and the car are the outstanding features of the craft. it is non-rigid in the strictest interpretation of the term, although, owing to the incorporation of the steadying hollow "mattress" (as it is called by its inventor), the strength of the suspension system, and the substantial character of the car, it conveys an impression of great solidity. the thinnest rope, both manilla and steel, in the suspension system is as thick as a man's finger, while the car, measuring feet in length by feet in width, carried out in wood, is a striking example of the maximum of strength with the minimum of weight, being as steady and as solid as a boat's deck. the propellers are collapsible, although in the latest craft of this class they are semi-rigid. the mechanical equipment is also interesting. there are two propellers, and two motors, each nominally driving one propeller. but should one motor break down, or motives of economy, such as husbanding of fuel, render it advisable to run upon one engine, then the two propellers may be driven by either of the motors. the inventor has perfected an ingenious, simple, and highly efficient coupling device to attain this end, but to ensure that the propeller output is of the maximum efficiency in relation to the engine, the pitch of the propellers may be altered and even reversed while the engine is running. when one motor only is being used, the pitch is lowered until the propellers revolve at the speed which they would attain if both engines were in operation. this adjustment of the propeller pitch to the most economical engine revolutions is a distinctive characteristic, and contributes to the efficiency and reliability of the parseval dirigible to a very pronounced degree. steering in the vertical plane is also carried out upon distinctive lines. there are no planes for vertical steering, but movement is accomplished by tilting the craft and thus driving the gas from one end of the balloon to the other. this is effected by the manipulation of the air-ballonets, one of which is placed at the prow and stem of the gas bag respectively. if it is desired to descend the gas is driven from the forward to the after end of the envelope, merely by inflating the bow ballonet with air by means of a pump placed in the car. if ascent is required, the after-ballonet is inflated, thereby driving the gas to the forward end of the balloon, the buoyancy of which is thus increased. the outstanding feature of the "drachen-balloon" is incorporated in the airship. this is the automatic operation of the safety valve on the gas-bag directly by the air ballonets. if these ballonets empty owing to the pressure of the gas within the envelope, a rope system disposed within the balloon and connecting the ballonets and the gas-valve at the top is stretched taut, thereby opening the gas-valve. in this manner the gas-pressure becomes reduced until the ballonets are enabled to exercise their intended function. this is a safety precaution of inestimable value. the parseval is probably the easiest dirigible to handle, inasmuch as it involves no more skill or knowledge than that required for an ordinary free balloon. its movements in the vertical plane are not dissimilar to those of the aeroplane, inasmuch as ascent and descent are normally conducted in a "screwing" manner, the only exception being of course in abrupt descent caused by the ripping of the emergency-valve. on one occasion, it is stated, one of the latest machines of this type, when conducting experimental flights, absolutely refused to descend, producing infinite amusement both among the crowd and those on board. the development of the parseval is directly attributable to the influence and intimate interest of the kaiser, and undoubtedly this represents the wisest step he ever made in the realm of aeronautics. it certainly has enabled the german military machine to become possessed of a significant fleet of what may be described as a really efficient and reliable type of dirigible. the exact number of military parsevals in commission is unknown, but there are several classes thereof, in the nature of aerial cruisers and vedettes. the largest and most powerful class are those known as the b type, measuring about feet in length by feet maximum diameter, of , cubic feet capacity, and fitted with two motorsand two propellers. this vessel carries about passengers, can climb to a maximum height of approximately , feet, and is capable of remaining in the air for twenty hours upon a single fuel charge. while this is the largest and most serviceable type of parseval designed for military duties, there is another, the a class, feet in length with accommodation for six passengers in addition to the crew of three, which is capable of attaining a maximum altitude of , feet, and has an endurance capacity of hours. this class also is fitted with twin propellers and motors. in addition there are the c and e classes, carrying from four to eight passengers, while the vedettes are represented by the d and f classes, which have a maximum altitude of , feet and can remain aloft for only five hours upon a single fuel charge. these smaller vessels, however, have the advantage of requiring only one or two men to handle them. the present military parseval dirigible is made in one of these five standardised classes, experience having established their efficiency for the specified military services for which they are built. in point of speed they compare favourably with the latest types of zeppelin, the speeds of the larger types ranging from to miles per hour with a motor effort of to horse-power. so far as the french airships of war are concerned, the fleet is somewhat heterogeneous, although the non-rigid type prevails. the french aerial navy is represented by the bayard-clement, astra, zodiac, and the government-built machines. although the rigid type never has met with favour in france, there is yet a solitary example of this system of construction--the spiess, which is feet in length by feet in diameter and has a displacement of tons. the semi-rigid craft are represented by the lebaudy type, the largest of which measures feet in length by feet in diameter, and has a displacement of tons. one may feel disposed to wonder why the french should be apparently backward in this form of aerial craft, but this may be explained by the fact that the era of experiment had not been concluded at the time war was declared, with the result that it has been somewhat difficult to determine which type would meet the military requirements of the country to the best advantage. moreover, the french military authorities evinced a certain disposition to relegate the dirigible to a minor position, convinced that it had been superseded by the heavier-than-air machine. taken on the whole, the french airship fleet is inferior to the german in point of speed, if not numerically, but this deficiency is more than counterbalanced by the skill and ability of the men manning their craft, who certainly are superior to their contemporaries in germany, combined with the proved character of such craft as are in service. the same criticism may be said to apply to great britain. that country was backward in matters pertaining to the airship, because its experiments were carried out spasmodically while dependence was reposed somewhat too much upon foreign effort. the british airships are small and of low speed comparatively speaking. here again it was the advance of the aeroplane which was responsible for the manifestation of a somewhat indifferent if not lethargic feeling towards the airship. undoubtedly the experiments carried out in great britain were somewhat disappointing. the one and only attempt to out-zeppelin the zeppelin resulted in disaster to the craft before she took to the air, while the smaller craft carried out upon far less ambitious lines were not inspiritingly successful. latterly the non-rigid system has been embraced exclusively, the craft being virtually mechanically driven balloons. they have proved efficient and reliable so far as they go, but it is the personal element in this instance also which has contributed so materially to any successes achieved with them. but although great britain and france apparently lagged behind the germans, appreciable enterprise was manifested in another direction. the airship was not absolutely abandoned: vigilance was maintained for a superior type of craft. it was an instance of weighing the advantages against the disadvantages of the existing types and then evolving for a design which should possess the former without any of the latter. this end appears to be achieved with the astra type of dirigible, the story of the development of which offers an interesting chapter in the annals of aeronautics. in all lighter-than-air machines the resistance to the air offered by the suspension ropes is considerable, and the reduction of this resistance has proved one of the most perplexing problems in the evolution of the dirigible. the air is broken up in such a manner by the ropes that it is converted into a brake or drag with the inevitable result that the speed undergoes a severe diminution. a full-rigged airship such as the parseval, for instance, may present a picturesque appearance, but it is severely unscientific, inasmuch as if it were possible to eliminateor to reduce the air-resistance offered by the ropes, the speed efficiency might be raised by some sixty per cent and that without any augmentation of the propelling effort. as a matter of fact zeppelin solved this vexatious problem unconsciously. in his monster craft the resistance to the air is reduced to a remarkable degree, which explains why these vessels, despite all their other defects are able to show such a turn of speed. it was this feature of the zeppelin which induced great britain to build the may-fly and which likewise induced the french government to stimulate dirigible design and construction among native manufacturers, at the same time, however, insisting that such craft should be equal at least in speed to the zeppelins. the response to this invitation was the spiess, which with its speed of miles per hour ranked, until , as one of the fastest dirigibles in the french service. in the meantime a spanish engineer, senor torres, had been quietly working out a new idea. he realised the shortcomings of the prevailing types of airships some eleven years ago, and unostentatiously and painstakingly set out to eliminate them by the perfection of a new type of craft. he perfected his idea, which was certainly novel, and then sought the assistance of the spanish government. but his fatherland was not adapted to the prosecution of the project. he strove to induce the authorities to permit even a small vessel to be built, but in vain. he then approached the french astra company. his ambition was to build a vessel as large as the current zeppelin, merely to emphasise the value of his improvement upon a sufficiently large scale, and to enable comparative data concerning the two designs to be obtained. but the bogey of expense at first proved insuperable. however, the french company, decided to give the invention a trial, and to this end a small "vedette" of about , cubic feet displacement was built. although an unpretentious little vessel, it certainly served to emphasise the importance of the torres idea. it was pitted against the "colonel renard," the finest ship at that time in the french aerial service, which had proved the fastest airship in commission, and which also was a product of the astra company. but this fine craft was completely outclassed by the puny astra-torres. the builders and the inventor were now additionally anxious to illustrate more emphatically the features of this design and to build a far larger vessel. the opportunity was offered by the british government, which had been following the experiments with the small astra-torres in france. an order was given for a vessel of , cubic feet displacement; in this instance it was ranged against another formidable rival--the parseval. but the latter also failed to hold its own against the spanish invention, inasmuch as the astra-torres built for the british authorities exceeded a speed of miles per hour in the official tests. this vessel is still doing valuable duty, being attached to the british air-service in france. the achievements of the british vessel were not lost upon the french government, which forthwith placed an order for a huge vessel of , cubic feet capacity, equipped with motors developing , horse-power, which it was confidently expected would enable a speed of miles per hour to be attained. thus france would be able to meet the germans upon fairly level terms, inasmuch as the speed of the latest zeppelins does not exceed miles per hour. so confident were the authorities that a second order for an even larger vessel was placed before the first large craft was completed. this latter vessel is larger than any zeppelin yet built, seeing that it displaces tons, and is fitted with motors developing , horse-power. it has recently been completed, and although the results of the trials, as well as the dimensions of the craft have not been published, it is well known that the speed has exceeded miles per hour, so that france now possesses the speediest dirigible in the world. the torres invention has been described as wonderful, scientifically perfect and extremely simple. the vessel belongs to the non-rigid class, but the whole of the suspension system is placed within the gas-bag, so that the air-resistance offered by ropes is virtually eliminated in its entirety, for the simple reason that practically no ropes are placed outside the envelope. the general principle of design may be gathered from the accompanying diagram. it is as if three sausage-shaped balloons were disposed pyramidally--two lying side by side with one super-imposed, with the bags connected at the points where the circular sections come into contact. thus the external appearance of the envelope is decidedly unusual, comprising three symmetrical ridges. at the points where the three bags come into contact cloth bands are stretched across the arcs, thereby forming a cord. the suspension system is attached to the upper corners of the inverted triangle thus formed, and converges in straight lines through the gas space. the bracing terminates in collecting rings from which a short vertical cable extends downwards through a special accordion sleeve to pass through the lower wall of the envelope. these sleeves are of special design, the idea being to permit the gas to escape under pressure arising from expansion and at the same time to provide ample play for the cable which is necessary in a flexible airship. this cable emerges from the envelope only at the point or points where the car or cars is or are placed. in the british airship of this type there is only one car, but the larger french vessels are equipped with two cars placed tandem-wise. the vertical cable, after extending downwards a certain distance, is divided, one rope being attached to one, and the second to the other side of the car. the two-bladed propellers are disposed on either side of the car, in each of which a horse-power motor is placed. the astra-torres type of dirigible may be said to represent the latest expression in airship design and construction. the invention has given complete satisfaction, and has proved strikingly successful. the french government has completed arrangements for the acquisition of larger and more powerful vessels of this design, being now in the position to contest every step that is made by germany in this field. the type has also been embraced by the russian military authorities. the astra-torres airship has a rakish appearance, and although the lines of the gas-bag are admitted to increase frictional resistance, this is regarded as a minor defect, especially when the many advantages of the invention are taken into consideration. chapter v. germany's aerial dreadnought fleet although germany, as compared with france, was relatively slow to recognise the immense possibilities of aircraft, particularly dirigibles, in the military sense, once the zeppelin had received the well-wishes of the emperor william, teuton activities were so pronounced as to enable the leeway to be made up within a very short while. while the zeppelin commanded the greatest attention owing to the interesting co-operation of the german emperor, the other types met with official and royal recognition and encouragement as already mentioned. france, which had held premier position in regard to the aerial fleet of dirigibles for so long, was completely out-classed, not only in dimensions but also in speed, as well as radius of action and strategical distribution of the aerial forces. the german nation forged ahead at a great pace and was able to establish a distinct supremacy, at least on paper. in the light of recent events it is apparent that the german military authorities realised that the dawn of "the day" was approaching rapidly, and that it behoved them to be as fully prepared in the air as upon the land. it was immaterial that the zeppelin was the synonym for disaster. by standardisation its cost could be reduced while construction could be expedited. furthermore, when the matter was regarded in its broadest aspect, the fact was appreciated that forty zeppelins could be built at the cost of one super-dreadnought, so that adequate allowance could be made for accidents now and then, since a zeppelin catastrophe, no matter how complete it may be, is regarded by the teuton as a mere incident inseparable from progressive development. at the beginning of the year france relied upon being strengthened by a round dozen new dirigibles. seven of these were to be of , cubic metres' capacity and possessed of a speed of miles per hour. while the existing fleet was numerically strong, this strength was more apparent than real, for the simple reason that a large number of craft were in dry-dock undergoing repair or overhaul while many of the units were merely under test and could not be regarded therefore as in the effective fleet. true, there were a certain number of private craft which were liable to be commandeered when the occasion arose, but they could not be considered as decided acquisitions for the simple reason that many were purely experimental units. aerial vessels, like their consorts upon the water, have been divided into distinctive classes. thus there are the aerial cruisers comprising vessels exceeding , cubic feet in capacity; scouts which include those varying between , and , cubic feet capacity; and vedettes, which take in all the small or mosquito craft. at the end of , france possessed only four of the first-named craft in actual commission and thus immediately available for war, these being the adjutant vincenot, adjutant reau, dupuy de lome, and the transaerien. the first three are of , cubic feet. all, however, were privately owned. on the other hand, germany had no fewer than ten huge vessels, ranging from , to , cubic feet capacity, three of which, the victoria luise, suchard, and hansa, though owned privately, were immediately available for war. of these the largest was the zeppelin naval vessel "l- " feet in length, by feet diameter, of , cubic feet capacity, equipped with engines developing horse-power, and with a speed of . miles per hour. at the end of the effective aerial fleet of germany comprised twenty large craft, so far in advance of the french aerial cruisers as to be worthy of the name bestowed upon them--"aerial dreadnoughts." this merely represented the fleet available for immediate use and did not include the four gigantic suchard-schutte craft, each of , cubic feet, which were under construction, and which were being hurried forward to come into commission early in . but the most interesting factor, apart from the possession of such a huge fleet of dirigible air-craft, was their distribution at strategical points throughout the empire as if in readiness for the coming combat. they were literally dotted about the country. adequate harbouring facilities had been provided at konigsberg, berlin, posen, breslau, kiel, hamburg, wilhelmshaven, dusseldorf, cologne, frankfort, metz, mannheim, strasburg, and other places, with elaborate headquarters, of course, at friedrichshafen upon lake constance. the zeppelin workshops, harbouring facilities, and testing grounds at the latter point had undergone complete remodelling, while tools of the latest type had been provided to facilitate the rapid construction and overhaul of the monster zeppelin dirigibles. nothing had been left to chance; not an item was perfunctorily completed. the whole organisation was perfect, both in equipment and operation. each of the above stations possessed provision for an aerial dreadnought as well as one or more aerial cruisers, in addition to scouts or vedettes. upon the outbreak of hostilities germany's dirigible fleet was in a condition of complete preparedness, was better organised, and better equipped than that of any of her rivals. at the same time it constituted more of a paper than a fighting array for reasons which i will explain later. but there was another point which had escaped general observation. standardisation of parts and the installation of the desired machinery had accomplished one greatly desired end--the construction of new craft had been accelerated. before the war an interesting experiment was carried out to determine how speedily a vessel could be built. the result proved that a dirigible of the most powerful type could be completed within eight weeks and forthwith the various constructional establishments were brought into line so as to maintain this rate of building. the growth of the zeppelin, although built upon disaster, has been amazing. the craft of had a capacity of , cubic feet and a speed of miles per hour. in the creator of this type launched a huge craft having a capacity of , cubic feet. in the meantime speed had likewise been augmented by the use of more powerful motors until miles an hour was attained. but this by no means represented the limit. the foregoing vessels had been designed for land service purely and simply, but now the german authorities demanded similar craft for naval use, possessed of high speed and greater radius of action. count zeppelin rose to the occasion, and on october th, , launched at friedrichshafen the monster craft "l-i," feet in length, feet in diameter, of , cubic feet capacity, a displacement of tons and equipped with three sets of motors aggregating more than horse-power, and capable of imparting a speed of miles per hour. the appearance of this craft was hailed with intense delight by the german nation, while the naval department considered her to be a wonderful acquisition, especially after the searching reliability trial. in charge of count zeppelin and manned by a crew of officers and men together with nearly three tons of fuel--the fuel capacity conveys some idea of her possible radius of action--she travelled from friedrichshafen to johannisthal in hours. on this remarkable journey another point was established which was of far-reaching significance. the vessel was equipped with wireless telegraphy and therewith she kept in touch with the earth below throughout the journey, dropping and picking up wireless stations as she progressed with complete facility. this was a distinct achievement, inasmuch as the vessel having been constructed especially for naval operations she would be able to keep in touch with the warships below, guiding them unerringly during their movement. the cross-country trip having proved so completely successful the authorities were induced to believe that travelling over water would be equally satisfactory. accordingly the "l-i" was dispatched to the island of heligoland, the intention being to participate in naval manoeuvres in order to provide some reliable data as to the value of these craft operating in conjunction with warships. but in these tests german ambition and pride received a check. the huge zeppelin was manoeuvring over the north sea within easy reach of heligoland, when she was caught by one of those sudden storms peculiar to that stretch of salt water. in a moment she was stricken helpless; her motive power was overwhelmed by the blind forces of nature. the wind caught her as it would a soap-bubble and hurled her into the sea, precipitating the most disastrous calamity in the annals of aeronautics, since not only was the ship lost, but fifteen of her crew of officers and men were drowned. the catastrophe created consternation in german aeronautical circles. a searching inquiry was held to explain the disaster, but as usual it failed to yield much material information. it is a curious circumstance, but every successive zeppelin disaster, and their number is legion, has been attributable to a new cause. in this instance the accident was additionally disturbing, inasmuch as the ship had been flying across country continuously for about twelve months and had covered more miles than any preceding craft of her type. no scientific explanation for the disaster was forthcoming, but the commander of the vessel, who sank with his ship, had previously ventured his personal opinion that the vessel was over-loaded to meet the calls of ambition, was by no means seaworthy, and that sooner or later she would be caught by a heavy broadside wind and rendered helpless, or that she would make a headlong dive to destruction. it is a significant fact that he never had any faith in the airship, at least for sea duty, though in response to official command he carried out his duties faithfully and with a blind resignation to fate. meantime, owing to the success of the "l-i" in cross-country operations, another and more powerful craft, the "l-ii" had been taken in hand, and this was constructed also for naval use. while shorter than her consort, being only feet over all, this vessel had a greater beam-- feet. this latter increase was decided because it was conceded to be an easier matter to provide for greater beam than enhanced length in the existing air-ship harbours. the "l-ii" displaced tons--five tons in excess of her predecessor. in this vessel many innovations were introduced, such as the provision of the passage-way connecting the cars within the hull, instead of outside the latter as had hitherto been the practice, while the three cars were placed more closely together than formerly. the motors were of an improved type, giving an aggregate output of horse-power, and were divided into four separate units, housed in two engine-rooms, the front car being a replica in every detail of the navigating bridge of a warship. this vessel was regarded as a distinct improvement upon the "l-i," although the latter could boast some great achievements. but her glory was short-lived. in the course of the government trials, while some feet aloft, the huge vessel suddenly exploded and was burned in the air, a mass of broken and twisted metal-work falling to the ground. of the officers and men, including members of the admiralty board who were conducting the official trials, all but one were killed outright, and the solitary exception was so terribly burned as to survive the fall for only a few hours. the accident was remarkable and demonstrated very convincingly that although count zeppelin apparently had made huge strides in aerial navigation through the passage of years, yet in reality he had made no progress at all. he committed the identical error that characterised the effort of severo pax ten years previously, and the disaster was directly attributable to the self-same cause as that which overwhelmed the severo airship. the gas, escaping from the balloons housed in the hull, collected in the confined passage-way communicating with the cars, came into contact with a naked light, possibly the exhaust from the motors, and instantly detonated with terrific force, blowing the airship to fragments and setting fire to all the inflammable materials. in this airship zeppelin committed an unpardonable blunder. he had ignored the factor of "internal safety," and had deliberately flown in the face of the official rule which had been laid down in france after the severo disaster, which absolutely forbade the inclusion of such confined spaces as zeppelin had incorporated. this catastrophe coming so closely as it did upon the preceding disaster to the pride of the german aerial fleet somewhat shook public confidence in these craft, while aeronautical authorities of other countries described the zeppelin more vehemently than ever as a "mechanical monstrosity" and a "scientific curiosity." the zeppelin has come to be feared in a general manner, but this result is due rather to stories sedulously circulated, and which may be easily traced to teutonic sources. very few data of a reliable character have been allowed to filter through official circles. we have been told somewhat verbosely of what it can accomplish and of its high degree of efficiency and speed. but can credence be placed in these statements? when zeppelin iv made its unexpected descent at luneville, and was promptly seized by the french authorities, the german war office evinced distinct signs of uneasiness. the reason was speedily forth coming. the captain of the craft which had been captured forgot to destroy his log and other records of data concerning the vessel which had been scientifically collected during the journey. all this information fell into the hands of the french military department, and it proved a wondrous revelation. it enabled the french to value the zeppelin at its true worth, which was by no means comparable to the estimate based on reports skilfully circulated for the benefit of the world at large. recently the french military department permitted the results of their expert official examination to be made public. from close investigation of the log-book and the diagrams which had been prepared, it was found that the maximum speed attained by zeppelin iv during this momentous flight was only miles per hour! it was ascertained, moreover, that the load was , pounds, and the ascensional effort , pounds. the fuel consumption had averaged pounds per hour, while the fuel tanks carried sufficient for a flight of about seven hours. the airship had attained a maximum height of about , feet, to reach which , pounds of ballast had to be discarded. moreover, it was proved that a zeppelin, if travelling under military conditions with full armament and ammunition aboard, could carry sufficient fuel for only ten hours at the utmost, during which, if the slightest head-wind prevailed, it could not cover more than miles on the one fuel charge. this information has certainly proved a revelation and has contributed to the indifference with which the parisians regard a zeppelin raid. at the outbreak of war the zeppelin station nearest to paris was at metz, but to make the raid from that point the airship was forced to cover a round miles. it is scarcely to be supposed that perfectly calm weather would prevail during the whole period of the flight, so that a raid would be attended by considerable risk. that this handicap was recognised in german military circles is borne out by the fact that a temporary zeppelin hangar was established at a point considerably nearer the french capital, for the purpose of enabling a raid to be carried out with a greater possibility of success. the capture of zeppelin iv revealed another important fact. the critical flying height of the airship is between , and , feet. to attempt a raid at such an altitude would be to court certain disaster, inasmuch as the vessel would have to run the gauntlet of the whole of the french artillery, which it is admitted has a maximum range exceeding the flying altitude of the zeppelin. that the above calculation is within reason is supported by the statements of count zeppelin himself, who has declared that his airships are useless at a height exceeding , feet. confirmatory evidence upon this point is offered by the raid upon the british east coast towns, when it is stated that the aircraft were manoeuvring at a height not exceeding , feet. chapter vi. the military value of germany's aerial fleet although the zeppelin undoubtedly has been over-rated by the forces to which it is attached, at the same time it must not be under-estimated by its detractors. larger and more powerful vessels of this type have been, and still are being, constructed, culminating, so far as is known, in the "l- ," which is stated to have a capacity of about , , cubic feet, and to possess an average speed of miles per hour. while it is generally maintained that the zeppelins will prove formidable in attack, greater reliance is being placed upon the demoralising or terrifying effect which they are able to exercise. owing to the fact that from to tons of fuel--say to , gallons of gasoline or petrol--can be carried aboard, giving them a wide radius of action, it is doubtful whether they could travel from cologne to london and back upon a single fuel charge, since such a raid would entail a journey of about miles. the latest types of this craft are said to possess a high ascensional speed, which offers a distinct protection against aeroplane attack. according to such official information as has been vouchsafed, a zeppelin, when hard pressed, is able to rise vertically , feet in about three minutes. this is far in excess of the ascensional speed of even the speediest aeroplane, of course, the penalty for such a factor has to be paid: the loss of gas is appreciable and may lead to the craft's ultimate undoing. at the same time, however, it is able to maintain the superior position as compared with the aeroplane for a considerable period: the upper reaches of the air are its sanctuary. nor must the nocturnal activities of the zeppelin be overlooked. so far as night operations by these vessels are concerned, little has leaked out, so that the possibilities of the airship in this direction are still somewhat hypothetical. the fact remains, however, that it is night movements which perhaps are the most to be dreaded by the enemy. according to official german sources of information the latest types of zeppelins are engined by "noiseless" motors. there is nothing remarkable in this feature, since the modern motor-car virtually answers to this description, although in this instance quietness is obtained for the most part by recourse to the sleeve-valve engine. still, the ordinary otto-cycle internal combustion engine can be rendered almost silent by the utilisation of adequate muffling devices, which, in the zeppelin, are more possible of incorporation than in the aeroplane, because the extra weight imposed by this acquisition is a minor consideration in comparison with the lifting power of the vessel. night operations, however, have not proved eminently successful. the very darkness which protects the aerial prowler also serves a similar purpose in connection with its prey. but aerial operations under the cover of darkness are guided not so much by the glare of lights from below as betrayal by sound. the difference between villages and cities may be distinguished from aloft, say at , to , feet, by the hum which life and movement emit, and this is the best guide to the aerial scout or battleship. the german authorities have made a special study of this peculiar problem, and have conducted innumerable tests upon the darkest nights, when even the sheen of the moon has been unavailable, for the express purpose of training the aerial navigators to discover their position from the different sounds reaching them from below. in other words, the corsair in the skies depends more upon compass and sound than upon compass and vision when operating after dark. the searchlights with which the zeppelins are equipped are provided merely for illuminating a supposed position. they are not brought into service until the navigator concludes that he has arrived above the desired point: the ray of light which is then projected is merely to assist the crew in the discharge of the missiles of destruction. the zeppelin, however, owing to its speed, both in the horizontal and vertical planes, is essentially a unit for daylight operations. the other airships which germany possesses, and which for the most part are of the non-rigid type, are condemned to daylight operations from the character of their design. owing to their low speeds they may be dismissed as impossible aerial vessels for hazardous work and are not regarded by the german authorities as all-round airships of war. craft of the air are judged in germany from the one standard only. this may be a teutonic failing, but it is quite in keeping with the teutonic spirit of militarism. commercialism is a secondary factor. to the german emperor an airship is much what a new manufacturing process or machine is to the american. whereas the latter asks, "how much will it save me on the dollar?" to the war lord of germany--and an airship notwithstanding its other recommendatory features is judged solely from this standpoint--the question is "what are its military qualifications?" when the semi-rigid airship "v-i" was brought before the notice of the german military department the pressing point concerning its military recommendations arose at once. the inventor had foreseen this issue and was optimistic. thereupon the authorities asked if the inventor were prepared to justify his claims. the retort was positive. forthwith the junkers decided to submit it to the test. this ship is of quite a distinctive type. it is an aerial cruiser, and the inventor claims that it combines all the essential qualifications of the zeppelin and of the competitors of the latter, in addition to the advantage of being capable of dissection, transportation in parts, and rapid re-erection at any desired spot. the length of the vessel is about feet; maximum diameter approximately feet, and capacity about , cubic feet. the outstanding feature is a rigid keel-frame forming a covered passage way below the envelope or gas-bag, combined with easy access to all parts of the craft while under way, together with an artificial stiffening which dispenses with the necessity of attaching any additional cars. the frame is so designed that the load, as well as the ballast and fuel tanks, may be distributed as desired, and at the same time it ensures an advantageous disposition of the steering mechanism, far removed from the centre of rotation at the stern, without any overloading of the latter. the lifting part of the airship comprises a single gas bag fitted with two ballonets provided to ensure the requisite gas-tension in the main envelope, while at the same time permitting, in times of emergency, a rapid change of altitude. self-contained blowers contribute to the preservation of the shape of the envelope, the blowers and the ballonets being under the control of the pilot. planes resembling venetian blinds facilitate vertical steering, while the suspension of the keel is carried out in such a manner as to secure uniformity of weight upon the gas bag. the propelling power comprises two sets of internal combustion engines, each developing horse-power, the transmission being through rubber belting. the propellers, built of wood, make revolutions per minute, and are set as closely as possible to the centre of resistance. but the most salient characteristic of this machine is its portability. it can be dismantled and transported by wagons to any desired spot, the suspension frame being constructed in units, each of which is sufficiently small to be accommodated in an ordinary vehicle. upon arrival the parts may be put together speedily and easily. the authorities submitted the airship to exacting trials and were so impressed by its characteristics and the claims of the inventor that undoubtedly it will be brought into service during the present crisis. at the same time the whole faith of the german military staff so far as airship operations are concerned, is pinned to the zeppelin. notwithstanding its many drawbacks it is the vessel which will be used for the invasion of great britain. even the harbour question, which is admitted to be somewhat acute, has been solved to a certain degree. at strategical points permanent harbours or airship sheds have been established. seeing that the airships demand considerable skill in docking and undocking, and that it is impossible to achieve these operations against the wind, swinging sheds have been adopted. on water the practice is to anchor a floating harbour at one end, leaving the structure to swing round with the wind. but on dry land such a dock is impossible. accordingly turntable sheds have been adopted. the shed is mounted upon a double turn-table, there being two circular tracks the one near the centre of the shed and the other towards its extremities. the shed is mounted upon a centre pivot and wheels engaged with these inner and outer tracks. in this manner the shed may be swung round to the most favourable point of the compass according to the wind. in the field, however, such practices are impossible, and the issue in this connection has been overcome by recourse to what may be termed portable harbours. they resemble the tents of peripatetic circuses and travelling exhibitions. there is a network of vertical steel members which may be set with facility and speed and which are stayed by means of wire guys. at the top of the outer vertical posts pulleys are provided whereby the outer skin or canvas forming the walls may be hauled into position, while at the apex of the roof further pulleys ensure the proper placing of the roofing. the airship is able to enter or leave from either end according to conditions. the material is fireproofed as a precautionary measure, but at the same time the modern aerial bomb is able to penetrate the roofing without any difficulty and to explode against the airship anchored within. the one great objection to the zeppelin harbour is the huge target it offers to hostile attack, which, in the event of a vessel being moored within, is inevitably serious. thus, for instance, upon the occasion of the air raids conducted by lieutenant collet and of squadron commander briggs and his colleagues at dusseldorf and friedrichshafen respectively, little difficulty was experienced in destroying the airships riding at anchor. the target offered by the shed is so extensive that it would be scarcely possible for a flying enemy to miss it. a bomb dropped from a reasonable height, say feet, would be almost certain to strike some part of the building, and a zeppelin is an easy vessel to destroy. the firing of one balloon is sufficient to detonate the whole, for the simple reason that hydrogen gas is continuously oozing through the bags in which it is contained. according to a recent statement the germans are said to be utilising an inert or non-inflammable gas, equal in lifting power to hydrogen, for the inflation of military craft, but scientific thought does not entertain this statement with any degree of seriousness. no gas as light as hydrogen and non-explosive is known to commerce. will germany invade great britain by air? this is the absorbing topic of the moment--one which has created intense interest and a certain feeling of alarm among the timorous. although sporadic raids are considered to be possible and likely to be carried out with a varying measure of success--such as that made upon the british east coast--eminent authorities ridicule an invasion in force. the risk would be enormous, although there is no doubt that germany, which has always maintained that an invasion of this character will be made, will be compelled to essay such a task, in order to satisfy public opinion, and to justify official statements. it is a moot point, however, whether the invaders ever will succeed in making good their escape, unless nature proves exceptionally kind. the situation is best summed up in the unbiassed report of general george p. scriven, chief signal officer of the united states army to the u.s. secretary of war. in this report, which deals exhaustively with the history, construction and achievements of airships, such an invasion is described as fantastic and impracticable. writing on november th, , the officer declares that "he is not prepared to recommend the american army to take up seriously the question of constructing dirigibles, as they are not worth their cost as offensive machines, while for reconnaissance or defence they are of far less value than aeroplanes." in his words, "dirigibles are seemingly useless in defence against the aeroplane or gun-fire." in order to be able to make an invasion in force upon great britain's cities extremely favourable weather must prevail, and the treacherous nature of the weather conditions of the north sea are known fully well both to british and teuton navigators. seeing that the majority of the zeppelin pilots are drawn from the navy and mercantile marine, and thus are conversant with the peculiarities and characteristics of this stretch of salt water, it is only logical to suppose that their knowledge will exert a powerful influence in any such decision, the recommendations of the meteorological savants not withstanding. when the zeppelin pride of the german navy "l- " was hurled to destruction by a typical north sea squall, captain blew of the victoria luise, a zeppelin with many great achievements to her credit, whose navigator was formerly in the navy, and thus is familiar with the whole issue, explained that this atmospheric liveliness of the north sea prevails for the most part in the latitude of norway, but that it frequently extends as far south as the gate of the channel. he related furthermore that the rain squalls are of tropical violence, while the vertical thrusts of air are such that no dirigible as yet constructed could ever hope to live in them. under such conditions, he continued, the gas is certain to cool intensely, and the hull must then become waterlogged, not to mention the downward thrust of the rain. under such conditions buoyancy must be imperilled to such a degree as to demand the jettisoning of every piece of ballast, fuel and other removable weight, including even the steadying and vertical planes. when this has been done, he pointed out, nothing is left with which to combat the upward vertical thrusts of the air. to attempt to run before the wind is to court positive disaster, as the wind is certain to gain the mastery. once the airship loses steering way and is rendered uncontrollable it becomes the sport of the forces of nature, with the result that destruction is merely a matter of minutes, or even seconds. every navigator who knows the north sea will support these conclusions. squalls and blizzards in winter, and thunderstorms in summer, rise with startling suddenness and rage with terrific destructive fury. such conditions must react against the attempt of an aerial invasion in force, unless it be made in the character of the last throw by a desperate gambler, with good fortune favouring the dash to a certain degree. but lesser and more insignificant zeppelin raids are likely to be somewhat frequent, and to be made at every favourable climatic opportunity. chapter vii. aeroplanes of war owing to the fertility of inventors and the resultant multiplicity of designs it is impossible to describe every type of heavier-than-air machine which has been submitted to the exacting requirements of military duty. the variety is infinite and the salient fact has already been established that many of the models which have proved reliable and efficient under normal conditions are unsuited to military operations. the early days of the war enabled those of doubtful value to be eliminated, the result being that those machines which are now in use represent the survival of the fittest. experience has furthermore emphasised the necessity of reducing the number of types to the absolute minimum. this weeding-out process is being continued and there is no doubt that by the time the war is concluded the number of approved types of aeroplanes of military value will have been reduced to a score or less. the inconveniences and disadvantages arising from the utilisation of a wide variety of different types are manifold, the greatest being the necessity of carrying a varied assortment of spare parts, and confusion in the repair and overhauling shops. the methodical teuton was the first to grasp the significance of these drawbacks; he has accordingly carried standardisation to a high degree of efficiency, as is shown in another chapter. at a later date france appreciated the wisdom of the german practice, and within a short time after the outbreak of hostilities promptly ruled out certain types of machines which were regarded as unsuitable. in this instance the process of elimination created considerable surprise, inasmuch as it involved an embargo on the use of certain machines, which under peace conditions had achieved an international reputation, and were held to represent the finest expression of aeronautical science in france as far as aeroplane developments are concerned. possibly the german machine which is most familiar, by name, to the general public is the taube, or, as it is sometimes called, the etrich monoplane, from the circumstance that it was evolved by the austrian engineer igo etrich in collaboration with his colleague wels. these two experimenters embarked on the study of dynamic flight contemporaneously with maxim, langley, kress, and many other well-known pioneers, but it was not until that their first practical machine was completed. its success was instantaneous, many notable flights being placed to its credit, while some idea of the perfection of its design may be gathered from the fact that the machine of to-day is substantially identical with that used seven years ago, the alterations which have been effected meanwhile being merely modifications in minor details. the design of this machine follows very closely the lines of a bird in flight--hence its colloquial description, "taube," or "dove." indeed the analogy to the bird is so close that the ribs of the frame resemble the feathers of a bird. the supporting plane is shaped in the manner of a bird's distended wing, and is tipped up at the rear ends to ensure stability. the tail also resembles that of a bird very closely. this aeroplane, especially the latest type, is very speedy, and it has proved extremely reliable. it is very sharp in turning and extremely sensitive to its rudder, which renders it a first-class craft for reconnoitring duty. the latest machines are fitted with motors developing from to horse-power. the "taube" commanded attention in germany for the reason that it indicated the first departure from the adherence to the french designs which up to that time had been followed somewhat slavishly, owing to the absence of native initiative. the individuality of character revealed in the "taube" appealed to the german instinct, with the result that the machine achieved a greater reputation than might have been the case had it been pitted against other types of essentially teutonic origin. the taube was subsequently tested both in france and great britain, but failed to raise an equal degree of enthusiasm, owing to the manifestation of certain defects which marred its utility. this practical experience tended to prove that the taube, like the zeppelin, possessed a local reputation somewhat of the paper type. the germans, however, were by no means disappointed by such adverse criticism, but promptly set to work to eliminate defects with a view to securing an all-round improvement. the most successful of these endeavours is represented in the taube-rumpler aeroplane, which may be described as an improved edition of etrich's original idea. as a matter of fact the modifications were of so slight, though important, a character that many machines generically described as taubes are in reality rumplers, but the difference is beyond detection by the ordinary and unpractised observer. in the rumpler machine the wings, like those of the taube, assume broadly the form and shape of those of the pigeon or dove in flight. the early rumpler machines suffered from sluggish control, but in the later types this defect has been overcome. in the early models the wings were flexible, but in the present craft they are rigid, although fitted with tips or ailerons. the supporting truss beneath the wings, which was such an outstanding feature of its prototype, has been dispensed with, the usual i-beam longitudinals being used in its stead. the latest machines fitted with - horse-power mercedes motors have a fine turn of speed, possess an enhanced ascensional effort, and are far simpler to control. other german machines which are used in the military service are the gotha and the albatross. the former is a monoplane, and here again the influence of etrich upon german aeroplane developments is strongly manifested, the shape of the bird's wing being retained. in the gotha the truss which etrich introduced is a prominent characteristic. the albatross is a biplane, but this craft has proved to be somewhat slow and may be said to be confined to what might be described as the heavier aerial military duties, where great endurance and reliability are essential. as the war proceeds, doubtless teuton ingenuity will be responsible for the appearance of new types, as well as certain modifications in the detail construction of the existing machines, but there is every indication that the broad lines of etrich's conception will be retained in all monoplanes. there is one point in which germany has excelled. wood is not employed in the construction of these heavier-than-air craft. steel and the lighter tough alloys are exclusively used. in this way the minimum of weight consistent with the maximum of strength policy is carried out. moreover the manufacture of component parts is facilitated and accelerated to a remarkable degree by the use of metal, while the tasks of fitting and repairing are notably expedited by the practice of standardisation. germany is also manifesting commendable enterprise in the perfection of light powerful motors for these dynamic machines. the latest types of explosion-motors range from to horse-power; the advantages of these are obvious. upon the outbreak of hostilities the french possessed an enormous number and variety of aeroplanes and this aerial fleet had been brought to a high standard of organisation. the aerial fleet is sub-divided into squadrons called "escadrilles," each of which comprises six machines and pilots. these units are kept up to strength, wastage being made up from reserves, so as to maintain the requisite homogeneity. but ere the war had been in progress many weeks an official order was issued forbidding the employment of the bleriot, deperdussin, nieuport, and r.e.p. monoplanes. those which received official approval included the caudron, henry, and maurice farman, morane-saulnier, and voisin machines. this drastic order came somewhat as a thunderbolt, and the reason for the decree has not been satisfactorily revealed. suffice to say that in one stroke the efficiency and numerical strength of the french aerial navy were reduced very appreciably. for instance, it is stated that there were thirty escadrilles of bleriot monoplanes together with pilots at the front, in addition to thirty mixed escadrilles of the other prohibited types with their fliers. moreover a round escadrilles of all the various types were in reserve. the effect of the military order was to reduce the effective strength by no fewer than aeroplanes. seeing that the french aerial force was placed at a great disadvantage numerically by this action, there seems to be ample justification for the hostile criticism which the decree of prohibition aroused in certain circles, especially when it is remembered that there was not an equal number of the accepted machines available to take the place of those which had been ruled out of court. one effect of this decree was to throw some expert aviators upon the waiting list for the simple reason that machines were unavailable. some of the best aviation skill and knowledge which france possesses were affected by the order. it is stated that accomplished aviators, such as vedrines, were unable to obtain machines. it will be seen that the ultimate effect of the french military decree was to reduce the number of types to about four, each of which was allotted a specific duty. but whereas three different bi-planes are on the approved list there is only one monoplane--the morane-saulaier. this machine, however, has a great turn of speed, and it is also able to climb at a very fast pace. in these respects it is superior to the crack craft of germany, so that time after time the latter have refused battle in the skies, and have hurried back to their lines. the morane-saulnier is the french mosquito craft of the air and like the insect, it is avowedly aggressive. in fact, its duties are confined to the work of chasing and bringing down the enemy, for which work its high manoeuvring capacity is excellently adapted. its aggressive armament comprises a mitrailleuse. unfortunately, however, the factory responsible for the production of this machine is at present handicapped by the limitations of its manufacturing plant, which when pushed to the utmost extent cannot turn out more than about ten machines per week. no doubt this deficiency will be remedied as the war proceeds by extension of the works or by allotting orders to other establishments, but at the time of the decree the manufacturing capacity was scarcely sufficient to make good the wastage, which was somewhat heavy. as far as biplanes are concerned the caudron is the fastest in flight and is likewise extremely quick in manoeuvring. it is a very small machine and is extremely light, but the fact that it can climb at the rate of over feet per minute is a distinct advantage in its favour. it supplements the morane-saulnier monoplane in the specific duty of the latter, while it is also employed for discovering the enemy's artillery and communicating the range of the latter to the french and british artillery. in this latter work it has played a very prominent part and to it is due in no small measure that deadly accuracy of the artillery of the allies which has now become so famous. this applies especially to those tactics, where the field artillery dashes up to a position, discharges a number of rounds in rapid succession, or indulges in rafale firing, and then limbering up, rushes away before the enemy can reply. as is well known the farman biplanes possess high endurance qualities. they can remain aloft for many hours at a stretch and are remarkably reliable. owing to these qualities they are utilised for prolonged and searching reconnoitring duties such as strategical reconnaissances as distinct from the hurried and tactical reconnaissances carried out by fleeter machines. while they are not so speedy as the monoplanes of the german military establishment, endurance in this instance is preferable to pace. a thorough survey of the enemy's position over the whole of his military zone, which stretches back for a distance of miles or so from the outer line of trenches, is of incalculable value to a commander who is contemplating any decisive movement or who is somewhat in doubt as to the precise character of his antagonist's tactics. the french aerial fleet has been particularly active in its work of raiding hostile positions and submitting them to a fusillade of bombs from the clouds. the machine which is allotted this specific task is the voisin biplane. this is due to the fact that this machine is able to carry a great weight. it was speedily discovered that in bomb-raids it is essential for an aeroplane to be able to carry a somewhat large supply of missiles, owing to the high percentage of misses which attends these operations. a raid by a machine capable of carrying only, say, half-a-dozen projectiles, is virtually a waste of fuel, and the endurance limitations of the fast machines reacts against their profitable use in this work. on the other hand, the fact that the voisin machine is able to carry a large supply of bombs renders it an ideal craft for this purpose; hence the official decision to confine it to this work. so far as the british efforts in aerial work are concerned there is no such display of rigid selection as characterises the practice of the french and german military authorities. britain's position in the air has been extensively due to private enterprise, and this is still being encouraged. moreover at the beginning of the war britain was numerically far inferior both to her antagonist and to her ally. consequently it was a wise move to encourage the private manufacture of machines which had already established their value. the consequence is that a variety of machines figure in the british aerial navy. private initiative is excellently seconded by the government manufacturing aeroplane factory, while the training of pilots is likewise being carried out upon a comprehensive scale. british manufacture may be divided into two broad classes--the production of aeroplanes and of waterplanes respectively. although there is a diversity of types there is a conspicuous homogeneity for the most part, as was evidenced by the british raid carried out on february - , when a fleet of machines raided the various german military centres established along the coast of flanders. considerable secrecy has been displayed by the british government concerning the types of machines that are being utilised, although ample evidence exists from the producing activity of the various establishments that all available types which have demonstrated their reliability and efficiency are being turned to useful purpose. the avro and sopwith warplanes with their very high speeds have proved remarkably successful. so far as manufacturing is concerned the royal aerial factory may be said to constitute the back bone of the british aerial fleet. this factory fulfils various purposes. it is not only engaged in the manufacture of machines, and the development of aeroplanes for specific duties, but also carries out the inspection and testing of machines built by private firms. every machine is submitted to an exacting test before it is passed into the service. three broad types of government machines are manufactured at this establishment. there is that designed essentially for scouting operations, in which speed is the all-important factor and which is of the tractor type. another is the "reconnoitring" machine known officially as the "r.e." to-day, but formerly as the "b.e" (bleriot-experimental), a considerable number of which are in commission. this machine is also of the tractor type, carrying a pilot and an observer, and has a maximum speed of - miles per hour. if required it can further be fitted with an automatic gun for defence and attack. the third craft is essentially a fighting machine. owing to the introduction of the machine-gun which is fixed in the prow, with the marksman immediately behind it, the screw is placed at the rear. the pilot has his seat behind the gunner. the outstanding feature of these machines is the high factor of safety, which attribute has astonished some of the foremost aviation experts in the world. great britain lagged behind her continental rivals in the development of the fourth arm, especially in matters pertaining to motive power. for some time reliance was placed upon foreign light highspeed explosion motors, but private enterprise was encouraged, with the result that british motors comparing favourably in every respect with the best productions upon the continent are now available. development is still proceeding, and there is every evidence that in the near future entire reliance will be placed upon the native motor. undoubtedly, as the war progresses, many valuable lessons will be learned which will exercise an important bearing upon the design and construction of warplanes. the ordeals to which the machines are submitted in military duties are far more severe than any imposed by the conditions of commerce. accordingly there is every indication that the conflict upon the continent will represent a distinctive epoch in aeroplane design and construction. many problems still await solution, such as the capacity to hover over a position, and it is quite possible that these complex and baffling questions will be settled definitely as the result of operations in the field. the aeroplane has reached a certain stage of evolution: further progress is virtually impossible unless something revolutionary is revealed, perfected, and brought to the practical stage. chapter viii. scouting from the skies from the moment when human flight was lifted from the rut of experiment to the field of practical application, many theories, interesting and illuminating, concerning the utility of the fourth arm as a military unit were advanced. the general consensus of expert opinion was that the flying machine would be useful to glean information concerning the movements of an enemy, rather than as a weapon of offence. the war is substantiating this argument very completely. although bomb-dropping is practised somewhat extensively, the results achieved are rather moral than material in their effects. here and there startling successes have been recorded especially upon the british side, but these triumphs are outnumbered by the failures in this direction, and merely serve to emphasise the views of the theorists. the argument was also advanced that, in this particular work, the aeroplane would prove more valuable than the dirigible, but actual campaigning has proved conclusively that the dirigible and the heavier-than-air machines have their respective fields of utility in the capacity of scouts. in fact in the very earliest days of the war, the british airships, though small and slow in movement, proved more serviceable for this duty than their dynamic consorts. this result was probably due to the fact that military strategy and tactics were somewhat nonplussed by the appearance of this new factor. at the time it was an entirely unknown quantity. it is true that aircraft had been employed in the balkan and the italo-ottoman campaigns, but upon such a limited scale as to afford no comprehensive idea of their military value and possibilities. the belligerents, therefore, were caught somewhat at a disadvantage, and an appreciable period of time elapsed before the significance of the aerial force could be appreciated, while means of counter acting or nullifying its influences had to be evolved simultaneously, and according to the exigencies of the moment. at all events, the protagonists were somewhat loth to utilise the dirigible upon an elaborate scale or in an aggressive manner. it was employed more after the fashion of a captive balloon, being sent aloft from a point well behind the front lines of the force to which it was attached, and well out of the range of hostile guns. its manoeuvres were somewhat circumscribed, and were carried out at a safe distance from the enemy, dependence being placed upon the advantages of an elevated position for the gathering of information. but as the campaign progressed, the airships became more daring. their ability to soar to a great height offered them complete protection against gun-fire, and accordingly sallies over the hostile lines were carried out. but even here a certain hesitancy became manifest. this was perfectly excusable, for the simple reason that the dirigible, above all, is a fair-weather craft, and disasters, which had overtaken these vessels time after time, rendered prudence imperative. moreover, but little was known of the range and destructiveness of anti-aircraft guns. in the duty of reconnoitring the dirigible possesses one great advantage over its heavier-than-air rival. it can remain virtually stationary in the air, the propellers revolving at just sufficient speed to off-set the wind and tendencies to drift. in other words, it has the power of hovering over a position, thereby enabling the observers to complete their task carefully and with deliberation. on the other hand, the means of enabling an aeroplane to hover still remain to be discovered. it must travel at a certain speed through the air to maintain its dynamic equilibrium, and this speed is often too high to enable the airman to complete his reconnaissance with sufficient accuracy to be of value to the forces below. all that the aeroplane can do is to circle above a certain position until the observer is satisfied with the data he has collected. but hovering on the part of the dirigible is not without conspicuous drawbacks. the work of observation cannot be conducted with any degree of accuracy at an excessive altitude. experience has proved that the range of the latest types of anti-aircraft weapons is in excess of anticipations. the result is that the airship is useless when hovering beyond the zone of fire. the atmospheric haze, even in the clearest weather, obstructs the observer's vision. the caprices of this obstacle are extraordinary, as anyone who has indulged in ballooning knows fully well. on a clear summer's day i have been able to see the ground beneath with perfect distinctness from a height of , feet, yet when the craft had ascended a further two or three hundred feet, the panorama was blurred. a film of haze lies between the balloon and the ground beneath. and the character of this haze is continually changing, so that the aerial observer's task is rendered additionally difficult. its effects are particularly notice able when one attempts to photograph the view unfolded below. plate after plate may be exposed and nothing will be revealed. yet at a slightly lower altitude the plates may be exposed and perfectly sharp and well-defined images will be obtained. seeing that the photographic eye is keener and more searching than the human organ of sight, it is obvious that this haze constitutes a very formidable obstacle. german military observers, who have accompanied the zeppelins and parsevals on numerous aerial journeys under varying conditions of weather, have repeatedly drawn attention to this factor and its caprices, and have not hesitated to venture the opinion that it would interfere seriously with military aerial reconnaissances, and also that it would tend to render such work extremely hazardous at times. when these conditions prevail the dirigible must carry out its work upon the broad lines of the aeroplane. it must descend to the level where a clear view of the ground may be obtained, and in the interests of safety it has to keep on the move. to attempt to hover within , feet of the ground is to court certain disaster, inasmuch as the vessel offers a magnificent and steady target which the average gunner, equipped with the latest sighting devices and the most recent types of guns, scarcely could fail to hit. but the airman in the aeroplane is able to descend to a comparatively low level in safety. the speed and mobility of his machine constitute his protection. he can vary his altitude, perhaps only thirty or forty feet, with ease and rapidity, and this erratic movement is more than sufficient to perplex the marksmen below, although the airman is endangered if a rafale is fired in such a manner as to cover a wide zone. although the aeroplane may travel rapidly it is not too fleet for a keen observer who is skilled in his peculiar task. he may only gather a rough idea of the disposition of troops, their movements, the lines of communication, and other details which are indispensable to his commander, but in the main the intelligence will be fairly accurate. undulating flight enables him to determine speedily the altitude at which he is able to obtain the clearest views of the country beneath. moreover, owing to his speed he is able to complete his task in far less time than his colleague operating in the dirigible, the result being that the information placed at the disposal of his superior officers is more to the moment, and accordingly of greater value. reconnoitring by aeroplane may be divided into two broad categories, which, though correlated to a certain degree, are distinctive, because each constitutes a specific phase in military operations. they are known respectively as "tactical" and "strategical" movements. the first is somewhat limited in its scope as compared with the latter, and has invariably to be carried out rapidly, whereas the strategical reconnaissance may occupy several hours. the tactical reconnaissance concerns the corps or divisional commander to which the warplane is attached, and consequently its task is confined to the observation of the line immediately facing the particular corps or division. the aviator does not necessarily penetrate beyond the lines of the enemy, but, as a rule limits his flight to some distance from his outermost defences. the airman must possess a quick eye, because his especial duty is to note the disposition of the troops immediately facing him, the placing of the artillery, and any local movements of the forces that may be in progress. consequently the aviator engaged on this service may be absent from his lines for only a few minutes, comparatively speaking; the intelligence he acquires must be speedily communicated to the force to which he is attached, because it may influence a local movement. the strategical reconnaissance, on the other hand, affects the whole plan of campaign. the aviators told off for this duty are attached to the staff of the commander-in-chief, and the work has to be carried out upon a far more comprehensive and elaborate scale, while the airmen are called upon to penetrate well into the hostile territory to a point thirty, forty, or more miles beyond the outposts. the procedure is to instruct the flier either to carry out his observations of the territory generally, or to report at length upon a specified stretch of country. in the latter event he may fly to and fro over the area in question until he has acquired all the data it is possible to collect. his work not only comprises the general disposition of troops, defences, placing of artillery, points where reserves are being held, high-roads, railways, base camps, and so forth, but he is also instructed to bring back as correct an idea as possible of what the enemy proposes to do, so that his commander-in-chief may adjust his moves accordingly. in order to perform this task with the requisite degree of thoroughness it is often necessary for the airman to remain in the air for several hours continuously, not returning, in fact, until he has completed the allotted duty. the airman engaged in strategical aerial reconnaissance must possess, above all things, what is known as a "military" eye concerning the country he traverses. he must form tolerably correct estimates of the forces beneath and their character. he must possess the ability to read a map rapidly as he moves through the air and to note upon it all information which is likely to be of service to the general staff. the ability to prepare military sketches rapidly and intelligibly is a valuable attribute, and skill in aerial photography is a decidedly useful acquisition. such men must be of considerable stamina, inasmuch as great demands are made upon their powers of endurance. being aloft for several hours imposes a severe tax upon the nervous system, while it must also be borne in mind that all sorts and conditions of weather are likely to be encountered, more particularly during the winter. hail, rain, and blizzards may be experienced in turn, while the extreme cold which often prevails in the higher altitudes during the winter season is a fearful enemy to combat. often an airman upon his return from such a reconnaissance has been discovered to be so numbed and dazed as a result of the prolonged exposure, that considerable time has elapsed before he has been sufficiently restored to set forth the results of his observations in a coherent, intelligible manner for the benefit of the general staff. under these circumstances it is not surprising that the most skilful and experienced aviators are generally reserved for this particular work. in addition to the natural accidents to which the strategical aerial observer is exposed, the dangers arising from hostile gun-fire must not be overlooked. he is manoeuvring the whole time over the enemy's firing zone, where anti-aircraft weapons are disposed strategically, and where every effort is made by artillery to bring him down, or compel him to repair to such a height as to render observation with any degree of accuracy well-nigh impossible. the methods practised by the german aerial scout vary widely, and are governed in no small measure by the intrepidity and skill of the airman himself. one practice is to proceed alone upon long flights over the enemy's lines, penetrating just as far into hostile territory as the pilot considers advisable, and keeping, of course, within the limits of the radius of action of the machine, as represented by the fuel supply, the while carefully taking mental stock of all that he observes below. it is a kind of roving commission without any definite aim in view beyond the collection of general intelligence. this work, while productive and valuable to a certain degree, is attended with grave danger, as the german airmen have repeatedly found to their cost. success is influenced very materially by the accuracy of the airman's judgment. a slight miscalculation of the velocity and direction of the wind, or failure to detect any variations in the climatic conditions, is sufficient to prove his undoing. german airmen who essayed journeys of discovery in this manner, often failed to regain their lines because they ventured too far, misjudged the speed of the wind which was following them on the outward run, and ultimately were forced to earth owing to the exhaustion of the fuel supply during the homeward trip; the increased task imposed upon the motor, which had to battle hard to make headway, caused the fuel consumption per mile to exceed calculations. then the venturesome airman cannot neglect another factor which is adverse to his success. hostile airmen lie in wait, and a fleet of aeroplanes is kept ready for instant service. they permit the invader to penetrate well into their territory and then ascend behind him to cut off his retreat. true, the invader has the advantage of being on the wing, while the ether is wide and deep, without any defined channels of communication. but nine times out of ten the adventurous scout is trapped. his chances of escape are slender, because his antagonists dispose themselves strategically in the air. the invader outpaces one, but in so doing comes within range of another. he is so harassed that he either has to give fight, or, finding his retreat hopelessly cut off, he makes a determined dash, trusting to his high speed to carry him to safety. in these driving tactics the french and british airmen have proved themselves adepts, more particularly the latter, as the chase appeals to their sporting instincts. there is nothing so exhilarating as a quarry who displays a determination to run the gauntlet. the roving teuton scout was considerably in evidence in the early days of the war, but two or three weeks' experience emphasised the sad fact that, in aerial strategy, he was hopelessly outmatched by his opponents. his advantage of speed was nullified by the superior tactical and strategical acumen of his antagonists, the result being that the german airman, who has merely been trained along certain lines, who is in many cases nothing more than a cog-wheel in a machine, and who is proverbially slow-witted, has concluded that he is no match for the airmen of the allies. he found from bitter experience that nothing afforded the anglo-french military aviators such keen delight as to lie in wait for a "rover," and then to swoop into the air to round him up. the proportion of these individual scouts who were either brought down, or only just succeeded in reaching safety within their own lines, and who were able to exhibit serious wounds as evidence of the severity of the aerial tussle, or the narrowness of the escape, has unnerved the teuton airmen as a body to a very considerable extent. often, even when an aeroplane descended within the german lines, it was found that the roving airman had paid the penalty for his rashness with his life, so that his journey had proved in vain, because all the intelligence he had gained had died with him, or, if committed to paper, was so unintelligible as to prove useless. it was the success of the british airmen in this particular field of duty which was responsible for the momentous declaration in field-marshal sir john french's famous despatch:--"the british flying corps has succeeded in establishing an individual ascendancy, which is as serviceable to us as it is damaging to the enemy.... the enemy have been less enterprising in their flights. something in the direction of the mastery of the air has already been gained." the methods of the british airmen are in vivid contrast to the practice of the venturesome teuton aerial rovers described above. while individual flights are undertaken they are not of unknown duration or mileage. the man is given a definite duty to perform and he ascends merely to fulfil it, returning with the information at the earliest possible moment. it is aerial scouting with a method. the intelligence is required and obtained for a specific purpose, to govern a contemplated move in the grim game of war. even then the flight is often undertaken by two or more airmen for the purpose of checking and counterchecking information gained, or to ensure such data being brought back to headquarters, since it is quite possible that one of the party may fall a victim to hostile fire. by operating upon these lines there is very little likelihood of the mission proving a complete failure. even when raids upon certain places such as dusseldorf, friedrichshafen or cuxhaven are planned, complete dependence is not placed on one individual. the machine is accompanied, so that the possibility of the appointed task being consummated is transformed almost into a certainty. the french flying men work upon broadly similar lines. their fleet is divided into small squadrons each numbering four, six, or more machines, according to the nature of the contemplated task. each airman is given an area of territory which is to be reconnoitred thoroughly. in this way perhaps one hundred or more miles of the enemy's front are searched for information at one and the same time. the units of the squadron start out, each taking the appointed direction according to the preconceived plan, and each steering by the aid of compass and map. they are urged to complete the work with all speed and to return to a secret rendezvous. later the air is alive with the whirring of motors. the machines are coming back and all converging to one point. they vol-plane to the earth and gracefully settle down within a short distance of each other at the rendezvous. the pilots collect and each relates the intelligence he has gained. the data are collated and in this manner the general staff is able to learn exactly what is transpiring over a long stretch of the hostile lines, and a considerable distance to the rear of his advance works. possibly five hundred square miles have been reconnoitred in this manner. troops have been massed here, lines of communication extend somewhere else, while convoys are moving at a third place. but all has been observed, and the commanding officer is in a position to re-arrange his forces accordingly. it is a remarkable example of method in military tactics and strategy, and conveys a striking idea of the degree to which aerial operations have been organised. after due deliberation it is decided that the convoys shall be raided, or that massed troops shall be thrown into confusion, if not dispersed. the squadron is ordered to prepare for another aerial journey. the roads along which the convoys are moving are indicated upon the map, or the position of the massed troops in bivouac is similarly shown. the airmen load their machines with a full charge of bombs. when all is ready the leader ascends, followed in rapid succession by the other units, and they whirr through the air in single file. it now becomes a grim game of follow-my-leader. the leader detects the convoy, swoops down, suddenly launches his missiles, and re-ascends. he does not deviate a foot from his path to observe the effects of his discharge, as the succeeding aeroplane is close behind him. if the leader has missed then the next airman may correct his error. one after another the machines repeat the manoeuvre, in precisely the same manner as the units of a battleship squadron emulate the leading vessel when attacking the foe. the tactical evolutions have been laid down, and there is rigid adherence thereto, because only thereby may success be achieved. when the last war-plane has completed its work, the leader swings round and repeats the dash upon the foe. a hail of bullets may scream around the men in the air, but one and all follow faithfully in the leader's trail. one or more machines may fail in the attack, and may even meet with disaster, but nothing interferes with the movements of the squadron as a whole. it is the homogeneity of the attacking fleet which tells, and which undermines the moral of the enemy, even if it does not wreak decisive material devastation. the work accomplished to the best of their ability, the airmen speed back to their lines in the same formation. at first sight reconnoitring from aloft may appear a simple operation, but a little reflection will reveal the difficulties and arduousness of the work. the observer, whether he be specially deputed, or whether the work be placed in the hand of the pilot himself--in this event the operation is rendered additionally trying, as he also has to attend to his machine must keep his eyes glued to the ground beneath and at the same time be able to read the configuration of the panorama revealed to him. he must also keep in touch with his map and compass, so as to be positive of his position and direction. he must be a first-class judge of distances and heights. when flying rapidly at a height of , feet or more, the country below appears as a perfect plane, or flat stretch, although as a matter of fact it may be extremely undulating. consequently, it is by no means a simple matter to distinguish eminences and depressions, or to determine the respective and relative heights of hills. if a rough sketch is required, the observer must be rapid in thought, quick in determination, and facile with his pencil, as the machine, no matter how it may be slowed down, is moving at a relatively high speed. he must consult his map and compass frequently, since an airman who loses his bearings is useless to his commander-in-chief. he must have an eagle eye, so as to be able to search the country unfolded below, in order to gather all the information which is likely to be of value to his superior officers. he must be able to judge accurately the numbers of troops arrayed beneath him, the lines of the defensive works, to distinguish the defended from the dummy lines which are thrown up to baffle him, and to detect instantly the movement of the troops and the direction, as well as the roads, along which they are proceeding. reserves and their complement, artillery, railway-lines, roads, and bridges, if any, over streams and railways must be noted--in short he must obtain an eye photograph of the country he observes and grasp exactly what is happening there. in winter, with the thermometer well down, a blood-freezing wind blowing, wreaths of clouds drifting below and obscuring vision for minutes at a time, the rain possibly pelting down as if presaging a second deluge, the plight of the vigilant human eye aloft is far from enviable. upon the return of the machine to its base, the report must be prepared without delay. the picture recorded by the eye has to be set down clearly and intelligibly with the utmost speed. the requisite indications must be made accurately upon the map. nothing of importance must be omitted: the most trivial detail is often of vital importance. a facile pencil is of inestimable value in such operations. while aloft the observer does not trust to his memory or his eye picture, but commits the essential factors to paper in the form of a code, or what may perhaps be described more accurately as a shorthand pictorial interpretation of the things he has witnessed. to the man in the street such a record would be unintelligible, but it is pregnant with meaning, and when worked out for the guidance of the superior officers is a mass of invaluable detail. at times it so happens that the airman has not been able to complete his duty within the time anticipated by those below. but he has gathered certain information which he wishes to communicate without coming to earth. such data may be dropped from the clouds in the form of maps or messages. although wireless telegraphy is available for this purpose, it suffers from certain drawbacks. if the enemy possesses an equipment which is within range of that of the air-craft and the force to which it belongs, communications may be nullified by the enemy throwing out a continuous stream of useless signals which "jamb" the intelligence of their opponents. if a message--written in code--or a map is to be dropped from aloft it is enclosed within a special metallic cylinder, fitted with a vane tail to ensure direction of flight when launched, and with a detonating head. this is dropped overboard. when it strikes the ground the detonator fires a charge which emits a report without damaging the message container, and at the same time fires a combustible charge emitting considerable smoke. the noise attracts anyone in the vicinity of the spot where the message has fallen, while at the same time the clouds of smoke guide one to the point and enable the cylinder to be recovered. this device is extensively used by the german aviators, and has proved highly serviceable; a similar contrivance is adopted by french airmen. there is one phase of aerial activity which remains to be demonstrated. this is the utilisation of aerial craft by the defenders of a besieged position such as a ring of fortifications or fortified city. the utility of the fourth arm in this province has been the subject of considerable speculation. expert opinion maintains that the advantage in this particular connection would rest with the besiegers. the latter would be able to ascertain the character of the defences and the defending gun-force, by means of the aerial scout, who would prove of inestimable value in directing the fire of the besieging forces. on the other hand it is maintained that an aerial fleet would be useless to the beleaguered. in the first place the latter would experience grave difficulties in ascertaining the positions of the attacking and fortress-reducing artillery, inasmuch as this could be masked effectively, and it is thought that the aerial force of the besieged would be speedily reduced to impotence, since it would be subjected to an effective concentrated fire from the ring of besieging anti-aircraft guns and other weapons. in other words, the theory prevails that an aerial fleet, no matter how efficient, would be rendered ineffective for the simple reason that it would be the initial object of the besieger's attack. possibly the stem test of experience will reveal the fallacy of these contentions as emphatically as it has disproved others. but there is one point upon which authorities are unanimous. if the artillery of the investing forces is exposed and readily distinguishable, the aerial forces of the beleaguered will bring about its speedy annihilation, as the defensive artillery will be concentrated upon that of the besiegers. chapter ix. the airman and artillery there is one field in which the airman has achieved distinctive triumphs. this is in the guidance of artillery fire. the modern battle depends first and foremost upon the fierce effectiveness of big-gun assault, but to ensure this reliable direction is imperative. no force has proved so invaluable for this purpose as the man of-the-air, and consequently this is the province in which he has been exceptionally and successfully active. it will be recalled that in the japanese investiture of port arthur during the russo-japanese war, thousands of lives were expended upon the retention and assault of metre hill. it was the most blood-stained spot upon the whole of the eastern asiatic battlefield. general nogi threw thousands after thousands of his warriors against this rampart while the russians defended it no less resolutely. it was captured and re-captured; in fact, the fighting round this eminence was so intense that it appeared to the outsider to be more important to both sides than even port arthur itself. yet if general nogi had been in the possession of a single aeroplane or dirigible it is safe to assert that scarcely one hundred japanese or russian soldiers would have met their fate upon this hill. its value to the japanese lay in one sole factor. the japanese heavy guns shelling the harbour and the fleet it contained were posted upon the further side of this eminence and the fire of these weapons was more or less haphazard. no means of directing the artillery upon the vital points were available; metre hill interrupted the line of sight. the japanese thereupon resolved to capture the hill, while the russians, equally appreciative of the obstruction it offered to their enemy, as valiantly strove to hold it. once the hill was captured and the fire of the japanese guns could be directed, the fate of the fortress was sealed. similar conditions have prevailed during the present campaign, especially in the western theatre of war, where the ruggedness of the country has tended to render artillery fire ineffective and expensive unless efficiently controlled. when the german army attacked the line of the british forces so vehemently and compelled the retreat at mons, the devastating fire of the enemy's artillery was directed almost exclusively by their airmen, who hovered over the british lines, indicating exactly the point where gun-fire could work the maximum of havoc. the instant concentration of massed artillery fire upon the indicated positions speedily rendered one position after another untenable. the germans maintained the upper hand until at last the aerial forces of the british expeditionary army came into action. these airmen attacked the teuton aerial craft without the slightest hesitation, and in a short while rendered cloudland absolutely unhealthy. the sequel was interesting. as if suddenly blinded, the german artillery fire immediately deteriorated. on the other hand, the british artillery, now having the benefit of aerial guidance, was able to repay the german onslaughts with interest, and speedily compelled that elaborate digging-in of the infantry lines which has now become so characteristic of the opposing forces. so far as the british lines are concerned the men in the trenches keep a sharp look-out for hostile aeroplanes. the moment one is observed to be advancing, all the men seclude themselves and maintain their concealment. to do otherwise is to court a raking artillery outburst. the german aeroplane, detecting the tendency of the trenches describes in the air the location of the vulnerable spot and the precise disposition by flying immediately above the line. twice the manoeuvre is repeated, the second movement evidently being in the character of a check upon the first observation, and in accordance with instructions, whereupon the tommies, to quote their own words, "know they are in for it!" ere the aeroplane has completed the second manoeuvre the german guns ring out. the facility with which artillery fire can be concentrated through the medium of the aeroplane is amazing. in one instance, according to the story related to me by an officer, "a number of our men were resting in an open field immediately behind the second line of trenches, being in fact the reserves intended for the relief of the front lines during the following night. an aeroplane hove in sight. the men dropped their kits and got under cover in an adjacent wood. the aeroplane was flying at a great height and evidently laboured under the impression that the kits were men. twice it flew over the field in the usual manner, and then the storm of shrapnel, 'jack johnsons' and other tokens from the kaiser rained upon the confined space. a round four hundred shells were dropped into that field in the short period of ten minutes, and the range was so accurate that no single shell fell outside the space. had the men not hurried to cover not one would have been left alive to tell the tale, because every square foot of the land was searched through and through. we laughed at the short-sightedness of the airman who had contributed to such a waste of valuable shot and shell, but at the same time appreciated the narrowness of our own escape." the above instance is by no means isolated. it has happened time after time. the slightest sign of activity in a trench when a "taube" is overhead suffices to cause the trench to be blown to fragments, and time after time the british soldiers have had to lie prone in their trenches and suffer partial burial as an alternative to being riddled by shrapnel. the method of ascertaining the range of the target from the indications given by the aeroplane are of the simplest character. the german method is for the aerial craft to fly over the position, and when in vertical line therewith to discharge a handful of tinsel, which, in falling, glitters in the sunlight, or to launch a smoking missile which answers the same purpose as a projectile provided with a tracer. this smoke-ball being dropped over the position leaves a trail of black or whitish smoke according to the climatic conditions which prevail, the object being to enable the signal to be picked up with the greatest facility. the height at which the aerial craft is flying being known, a little triangulation upon the part of the observer at the firing point enables him to calculate the range and to have the guns laid accordingly. when the aerial craft has been entrusted with the especial duty of directing artillery-fire, a system of communication between the aerial observer and the officer in charge of the artillery is established, conducted, of course, by code. in the british army, signalling is both visual and audible. in daylight visual signalling is carried out by means of coloured flags or streamers and smoke-signals, while audible communication is effected by means of a powerful horn working upon the siren principle and similar to those used by automobiles. both flags and sound-signals, however, are restricted owing to the comparatively short distances over which they can be read with any degree of accuracy. the smoke-signal therefore appears to be the most satisfactory and reliable, as the german airmen have proved conclusively, for the simple reason that the trail of smoke may be picked up with comparative ease, even at a distance, by means of field glasses. the tinsel too, is readily distinguishable, particularly in bright weather, for the glittering surface, catching the sun-light, acts some what in the manner of a heliograph. the progress of the airman is followed by two officers at the base from which he started. one is equipped with the director, while the second takes the range. directly this has been found as a result of calculation, the guns are laid ready for firing. in those cases where the enemy's artillery is concealed perhaps behind a hill, the airman is of incalculable value, inasmuch as he is able to reveal a position which otherwise would have to be found by considerable haphazard firing, and which, even if followed by a captive balloon anchored above the firing point, might resist correction. the accuracy of the airman's work in communicating the range has been responsible for the high efficiency of the british and french artillery. the latter, with the millimetre quick-firing gun, is particularly adapted to following up the results of the aeroplane's reconnaissance, especially with the system of rafale fire, because the whole position can be searched through and through within a minute or two. according to information which has been given to me by our artillery officers, the british system also has proved disastrous to the enemy. the practice is to get the range as communicated by the aeroplane, to bring the artillery into position speedily, to discharge salvo after salvo with all speed for a few minutes, and then to wheel the artillery away before any hostile fire can be returned. the celerity with which the british artillery comes into, and goes out of, action has astonished even our own authorities. this mobility is of unique value: it is taking advantage of a somewhat slow-witted enemy with interest. by the time the germans have opened fire upon the point whence the british guns were discharged, the latter have disappeared and are ready to let fly from another point, some distance away, so that the hostile fire is abortive. mobility of such a character is decidedly unnerving and baffling even to a quick-witted opponent. in his search for hostile artillery the airman runs grave risks and displays remarkable resource. it is invariably decided, before he sets out, that he shall always return to a certain altitude to communicate signals. time after time the guns of the enemy have been concealed so cunningly from aerial observation as to pass unnoticed. this trait became more pronounced as the campaigns of the aisne progressed. accordingly the airman adopts a daring procedure. he swoops down over suspicious places, where he thinks guns may be lurking, hoping that the enemy will betray its presence. the ruse is invariably successful. the airman makes a sudden dive towards the earth. the soldiers in hiding below, who have become somewhat demoralised by the accuracy of the british aerial bomb-throwers, have an attack of nerves. they open a spirited fusillade in the hope of bringing the airman to earth. but their very excitement contributes to his safety. the shots are fired without careful aim and expend themselves harmlessly. sweeping once more upwards, the airman regains the pre-determined level, performs a certain evolution in the air which warns the observer at his base that he has made a discovery, and promptly drops his guiding signal directly over the point from which he has drawn fire. operations at night are conducted by means of coloured lights or an electrical searchlight system. in the former instance three lights are generally carried--white, red, and green--each of which has a distinctive meaning. if reliance is placed upon the electric light signalling lamp, then communications are in code. but night operations are somewhat difficult and extremely dangerous, except when the elements are propitious. there is the ground mist which blots everything from sight, rendering reconnaissance purely speculative. but on a clear night the airman is more likely to prove successful. he keeps a vigilant eye upon all ground-lights and by close observation is able to determine their significance. it is for this reason that no lights of any description are permitted in the advance trenches. the striking of a match may easily betray a position to the alert eye above. so far as the british army is concerned a complete code is in operation for communicating between aeroplanes and the ground at night. very's lights are used for this purpose, it being possible to distinguish the respective colours at a distance of six miles and from an altitude of , feet. the lights are used both by the aeroplane and the battery of artillery. the code is varied frequently, but the following conveys a rough idea of how communication is carried out by this means under cover of darkness. the aeroplane has located its objective and has returned to the pre-arranged altitude. a red light is thrown by the airman. it indicates that he is directly over the enemy's position. a similarly coloured light is shown by the artillery officer, which intimates to the airman that his signal has been observed and that the range has been taken. in observing the effects of artillery fire a code of signals is employed between the airman and the artillery officer to indicate whether the shot is "long" or "short," to the right or to the left of the mark, while others intimate whether the fuse is correctly timed or otherwise. it is necessary to change the code fairly frequently, not only lest it should fall into the enemy's hands, but also to baffle the hostile forces; otherwise, after a little experience, the latter would be able to divine the significance of the signals, and, in anticipation of being greeted with a warm fusillade, would complete hurried arrangements to mitigate its effects, if not to vacate the position until the bombardment had ceased. sufficient experience has already been gathered, however, to prove the salient fact that the airman is destined to play an important part in the direction and control of artillery-fire. already he has been responsible for a re-arrangement of strategy and tactics. the man aloft holds such a superior position as to defy subjugation; the alternative is to render his work more difficult, if not absolutely impossible. chapter x. bomb-throwing from air-craft during the piping times of peace the utility of aircraft as weapons of offence was discussed freely in an academic manner. it was urged that the usefulness of such vessels in this particular field would be restricted to bomb-throwing. so far these contentions have been substantiated during the present campaign. at the same time it was averred that even as a bomb-thrower the ship of the air would prove an uncertain quantity, and that the results achieved would be quite contrary to expectations. here again theory has been supported by practice, inasmuch as the damage wrought by bombs has been comparatively insignificant. the zeppelin raids upon antwerp and britain were a fiasco in the military sense. the damage inflicted by the bombs was not at all in proportion to the quantity of explosive used. true, in the case of antwerp, it demoralised the civilian population somewhat effectively, which perhaps was the desired end, but the military results were nil. the zeppelin, and indeed all dirigibles of large size, have one advantage over aeroplanes. they are able to throw bombs of larger size and charged with greater quantities of high explosive and shrapnel than those which can be hurled from heavier-than-air machines. thus it has been stated that the largest zeppelins can drop single charges exceeding one ton in weight, but such a statement is not to be credited. the shell generally used by the zeppelin measures about inches in length by / inches in diameter, and varies in weight from to pounds. where destruction pure and simple is desired, the shell is charged with a high explosive such as picric acid or t.n.t., the colloquial abbreviation for the devastating agent scientifically known as "trinitrotoluene," the base of which, in common with all the high explosives used by the different powers and variously known as lyddite, melinite, cheddite, and so forth, is picric acid. such a bomb, if it strikes the objective, a building, for instance, fairly and squarely, may inflict widespread material damage. on the other hand, where it is desired to scatter death, as well as destruction, far and wide, an elaborate form of shrapnel shell is utilised. the shell in addition to a bursting charge, contains bullets, pieces of iron, and other metallic fragments. when the shell bursts, their contents, together with the pieces of the shell which is likewise broken up by the explosion, are hurled in all directions over a radius of some yards or more, according to the bursting charge. these shells are fired upon impact, a detonator exploding the main charge. the detonator, comprising fulminate of mercury, is placed in the head or tail of the missile. to secure perfect detonation and to distribute the death-dealing contents evenly in all directions, it is essential that the bomb should strike the ground almost at right angles: otherwise the contents are hurled irregularly and perhaps in one direction only. one great objection to the percussion system, as the method of impact detonation is called, is that the damage may be localised. a bomb launched from a height of say , feet attains terrific velocity, due to the force of gravity in conjunction with its own weight, in consonance with the law concerning a falling body, by the time it reaches the ground. it buries itself to a certain depth before bursting so that the forces of the explosion become somewhat muffled as it were. a huge deep hole--a miniature volcano crater--is formed, while all the glass in the immediate vicinity of the explosion may be shattered by the concussion, and the walls of adjacent buildings be bespattered with shrapnel. although it is stated that an airship is able to drop a single missile weighing one ton in weight, there has been no attempt to prove the contention by practice. in all probability the heaviest shell launched from a zeppelin has not exceeded pounds. there is one cogent reason for such a belief. a bomb weighing one ton is equivalent to a similar weight of ballast. if this were discarded suddenly the equilibrium of the dirigible would be seriously disturbed--it would exert a tendency to fly upwards at a rapid speed. it is doubtful whether the planes controlling movement in the vertical plane would ever be able to counteract this enormous vertical thrust. something would have to submit to the strain. even if the dirigible displaced say tons, and a bomb weighing one ton were discharged, the weight of the balloon would be decreased suddenly by approximately five per cent, so that it would shoot upwards at an alarming speed, and some seconds would elapse before control was regained. the method of launching bombs from airships varies considerably. some are released from a cradle, being tilted into position ready for firing, while others are discharged from a tube somewhat reminiscent of that used for firing torpedoes, with the exception that little or no initial impetus is imparted to the missile; the velocity it attains is essentially gravitational. the french favour the tube-launching method since thereby it is stated to be possible to take more accurate aim. the objective is sighted and the bomb launched at the critical moment. in some instances the french employ an automatic detonator which corresponds in a certain measure to the time-fuse of a shrapnel shell fired from a gun. the bomb-thrower reads the altitude of his airship as indicated by his barometer or other recording instrument, and by means of a table at his command ascertains in a moment the time which will elapse before the bomb strikes the ground. the automatic detonator is set in motion and the bomb released to explode approximately at the height to which it is set. when it bursts the full force of the explosion is distributed downwards and laterally. owing to the difficulty of ensuring the explosion of the bomb at the exact height desired, it is also made to explode upon impact so as to make doubly sure of its efficacy. firing timed bombs from aloft, however, is not free from excitement and danger, as the experience of a french airman demonstrates. his dirigible had been commanded to make a night-raid upon a railway station which was a strategical junction for the movement of the enemy's troops. although the hostile searchlights were active, the airship contrived to slip between the spokes of light without being observed. by descending to a comparatively low altitude the pilot was able to pick up the objective. three projectiles were discharged in rapid succession and then the searchlights, being concentrated, struck the airship, revealing its presence to the troops below. instantly a spirited fusillade broke out. the airmen, by throwing ballast and other portable articles overboard pell-mell, rose rapidly, pursued by the hostile shells. in the upward travel the bomb-thrower decided to have a parting shot. the airship was steadied momentarily to enable the range to be taken, the automatic detonator was set going and the bomb slipped into the launching tube. but for some reason or other the missile jambed. the situation was desperate. in a few seconds the bomb would burst and shatter the airship. the bomb-thrower grabbed a tool and climbing into the rigging below hacked away at the bomb-throwing tube until the whole equipment was cut adrift and fell clear of the vessel. almost instantly there was a terrific explosion in mid-air. the blast of air caused the vessel to roll and pitch in a disconcerting manner, but as the airman permitted the craft to continue its upward course unchecked, she soon steadied herself and was brought under control once more. the bomb carried by aeroplanes differs consider ably from that used by dirigibles, is smaller and more convenient to handle, though considering its weight and size it is remarkably destructive. in this instance complete reliance is placed upon detonation by impact. the latest types of british war-plane bombs have been made particularly formidable, those employed in the "raids in force" ranging up to pounds in weight. the type of bomb which has proved to be the most successful is pear-shaped. the tail spindle is given an arrow-head shape, the vanes being utilised to steady the downward flight of the missile. in falling the bomb spins round, the rotating speed increasing as the projectile gathers velocity. the vanes act as a guide, keeping the projectile in as vertical a plane as possible, and ensuring that the rounded head shall strike the ground. the earlier types of bombs were not fitted with these vanes, the result being that sometimes they turned over and over as they fell through the air, while more often than not they failed to explode upon striking the ground. the method of launching the bomb also varies considerably, experience not having indicated the most efficient method of consummating this end. in some cases the bombs are carried in a cradle placed beneath the aeroplane and launched merely by tilting them in a kind of sling, one by one, to enable them to drop to the ground, this action being controlled by means of a lever. in another instance they are dropped over the side of the car by the pilot, the tail of the bomb being fitted with a swivel and ring to facilitate the operation. some of the french aviators favour a still simpler method. the bomb is attached to a thread and lowered over the side. at the critical moment it is released simply by severing the thread. such aeroplane bombs, however, constitute a menace to the machine and to the pilot. should the bomb be struck by hostile rifle or shell fire while the machine is aloft, an explosion is probable; while should the aero plane make an abrupt descent the missiles are likely to be detonated. a bomb which circumvents this menace and which in fact will explode only when it strikes the ground is that devised by mr. marten-hale. this projectile follows the usual pear-shape, and has a rotating tail to preserve direction when in flight. the detonator is held away from the main charge by a collar and ball-bearing which are held in place by the projecting end of a screw-releasing spindle. when the bomb is dropped the rotating tail causes the spindle to screw upwards until the projection moves away from the steel balls, thereby allowing them to fall inward when the collar and the detonator are released. in order to bring about this action the bomb must have a fall of at least feet. when the bomb strikes the ground the detonator falls down on the charge, fires the latter, and thus brings about the bursting of the bomb. the projectile is of the shrapnel type. it weighs pounds complete, is charged with some four pounds of t.n.t., and carries steel balls, which represent a weight of / pounds. the firing mechanism is extremely sensitive and the bomb will burst upon impact with the hull of an airship, water, or soft soil. this projectile, when discharged, speedily assumes the vertical position, so that there is every probability that it will strike the ground fairly and squarely, although at the same time such an impact is not imperative, because it will explode even if the angle of incidence be only degrees. it is remarkably steady in its flight, the balancing and the design of the tail frustrating completely any tendency to wobble or to turn turtle while falling. other types of missile may be used. for instance, incendiary bombs have been thrown with success in certain instances. these bombs are similar in shape to the shrapnel projectile, but are charged with petrol or some other equally highly inflammable mixture, and fitted with a detonator. when they strike the objective the bursting charge breaks up the shell, releasing the contents, and simultaneously ignites the combustible. another shell is the smoke-bomb, which, up to the present, has been used only upon a restricted scale. this missile is charged with a certain quantity of explosive to burst the shell, and a substance which, when ignited, emits copious clouds of dense smoke. the scope of such a shell is somewhat restricted, it is used only for the purpose of obstructing hostile artillery fire. the shells are dropped in front of the artillery position and the clouds of smoke which are emitted naturally inter fere with the operations of the gunners. these bombs have also been used with advantage to denote the position of concealed hostile artillery, although their utility in this connection is somewhat uncertain, owing to the difficulty of dropping the bomb so accurately as to enable the range-finders to pick up the range. dropping bombs from aloft appears to be a very simple operation, but as a matter of fact it is an extremely difficult matter to strike the target, especially from a high altitude. so far as the aeroplane is concerned it is somewhat at a disadvantage as compared with the airship, as the latter is able to hover over a position, and, if a spring-gun is employed to impart an initial velocity to the missile, there is a greater probability of the projectile striking the target provided it has been well-aimed. but even then other conditions are likely to arise, such as air-currents, which may swing the missile to one side of the objective. consequently adequate allowance has to be made for windage, which is a very difficult factor to calculate from aloft. bomb-dropping from an aeroplane is even more difficult. if for instance the aeroplane is speeding along at miles an hour, the bomb when released will have a speed in the horizontal plane of miles an hour, because momentarily it is travelling at the speed of the aeroplane. consequently the shell will describe a curved trajectory, somewhat similar to that shown in fig. . on the other hand, if the aeroplane is travelling slowly, say at miles an hour, the curve of the trajectory will be flatter, and if a head wind be prevailing it may even be swept backwards somewhat after it has lost its forward momentum, and describe a trajectory similar to that in fig. . a bomb released from an altitude of feet seldom, if ever, makes a bee-line for the earth, even if dropped from a stationary airship. accordingly, the airman has to release the bomb before he reaches the target below. the determination of the critical moment for the release is not easy, inasmuch as the airman has to take into his calculations the speed of his machine, his altitude, and the direction and velocity of the air-currents. the difficulty of aiming has been demonstrated upon several occasions at aviation meetings and other similar gatherings. monsieur michelin, who has done so much for aviation in france, offered a prize of l , --$ , --in for bomb-dropping from an aeroplane. the target was a rectangular space marked out upon the ground, measuring feet long by feet broad, and the missiles had to be dropped from a height of , feet. the prize was won by the well-known american airman, lieutenant riley e. scott, formerly of the united states army. he dropped his bombs in groups of three. the first round fell clear of the target, but eight of the remaining missiles fell within the area. in the german competition which was held at gotha in september of the same year the results were somewhat disappointing. two targets were provided. the one represented a military bivouac occupying a superficies of square feet, and the other a captive balloon resembling a zeppelin. the prizes offered were l , l , and l --$ , , $ , and $ --respectively, and were awarded to those who made the greatest number of hits. the conditions were by no means so onerous as those imposed in the michelin contest, inasmuch as the altitude limit was set at feet, while no machine was to descend within feet. the first competitor completely failed to hit the balloon. the second competitor flying at feet landed seven bombs within the square, but only one other competitor succeeded in placing one bomb within the space. bomb-dropping under the above conditions, however, is vastly dissimilar from such work under the grim realities of war. the airman has to act quickly, take his enemy by surprise, avail himself of any protective covering which may exist, and incur great risks. the opposing forces are overwhelmingly against him. the modern rifle, if fired vertically into the air, will hurl the bullet to a height of about , feet, while the weapons which have been designed to combat aircraft have a range of , feet or more. at the latter altitude aggressive tactics are useless. the airman is unable to obtain a clear sharp view of the country beneath owing to the interference offered to vision by atmospheric haze, even in the dearest of weather. in order to obtain reasonable accuracy of aim the corsair of the sky must fly at about feet. in this respect, however, the aeroplane is at a decided advantage, as compared with the dirigible. the machine offers a considerably smaller target and moves with much greater speed. experience of the war has shown that to attempt to hurl bombs from an extreme height is merely a waste of ammunition. true, they do a certain amount of damage, but this is due to luck, not judgment. for success in aerial bomb operations the human element is mainly responsible. the daring airman is likely to achieve the greatest results, as events have proved, especially when his raid is sudden and takes the enemy by surprise. the raids carried out by marix, collet, briggs, babington, sippe and many others have established this fact incontrovertibly. in all these operations the airmen succeeded because of their intrepidity and their decision to take advantage of cover, otherwise a prevailing mist or low-lying clouds. flight-lieutenant collet approached the zeppelin shed at dusseldorf at an altitude of , feet. there was a bank of mist below, which he encountered at , feet. he traversed the depth of this layer and emerged therefrom at a height of only feet above the ground. his objective was barely a quarter of a mile ahead. travelling at high speed he launched his bombs with what proved to be deadly precision, and disappeared into cover almost before the enemy had grasped his intentions. lieutenant-commander, now flight-commander, marix was even more daring. apparently he had no mist in which to conceal himself but trusted almost entirely to the speed of his machine, which probably at times notched miles per hour. although his advent was detected and he was greeted with a spirited fusillade he clung to his determined idea. he headed straight for the zeppelin shed, launched two bombs and swung into the higher reaches of the air without a moment's hesitation. his aim was deadly, since both bombs found their mark, and the zeppelin docked within was blown up. the intrepid airman experienced several narrow escapes, for his aeroplane was struck twenty times, and one or two of the control wires were cut by passing bullets. the raid carried out by commanders briggs and babington in company with lieutenant sippe upon the zeppelin workshops at friedrichshafen was even more daring. leaving the allies' lines they ascended to an altitude of , feet, and at this height held to the pre-arranged course until they encountered a mist, which while protecting them from the alert eyes of the enemy below, was responsible for the separation of the raiders, so that each was forced to act independently and to trust to the compass to bring him out of the ordeal successfully. lieutenant sippe sighted lake constance, and taking advantage of the mist lying low upon the water, descended to such an extent that he found himself only a few feet above the roofs of the houses. swinging round to the lake he descended still lower until at last he was practically skimming the surface of the lake, since he flew at the amazingly low height of barely seven feet off the water. there is no doubt that the noise of his motor was heard plainly by the enemy, but the mist completely enveloped him, and owing to the strange pranks that fog plays with sound deceived his antagonists. at last, climbing above the bank of vapour, he found that he had overshot the mark, so he turned quickly and sped backwards. at the same time he discovered that he had been preceded by commander briggs, who was bombarding the shed furiously, and who himself was the object of a concentrated fire. swooping down once more, lieutenant sippe turned, rained his bombs upon the objective beneath, drawing fire upon himself, but co-operating with commander babington, who had now reached the scene, he manoeuvred above the works and continued the bombardment until their ammunition was expended, when they sped home-wards under the cover of the mist. considering the intensity of the hostile fire, it is surprising that the aeroplanes were not smashed to fragments. undoubtedly the high speed of the machines and the zigzagging courses which were followed nonplussed the enemy. commander briggs was not so fortunate as his colleagues; a bullet pierced his petrol tank, compelling a hurried descent. the most amazing feature of these aerial raids has been the remarkably low height at which the airmen have ventured to fly. while such a procedure facilitates marksmanship it increases the hazards. the airmen have to trust implicitly to the fleetness of their craft and to their own nerve. bearing in mind the vulnerability of the average aeroplane, and the general absence of protective armouring against rifle fire at almost point-blank range, it shows the important part which the human element is compelled to play in bomb-dropping operations. another missile which has been introduced by the french airmen, and which is extremely deadly when hurled against dense masses of men, is the steel arrow, or "flechette" as it is called. it is a fiendish projectile consisting in reality of a pencil of solid polished steel, / inches in length. the lower end has a sharp tapering point, / ths of an inch in length. for a distance of / th of an inch above this point the cylindrical form of the pencil is preserved, but for the succeeding three inches to the upper end, the pencil is provided with four equally spaced angle flanges or vanes. this flanging of the upper end or tail ensures the arrow spinning rapidly as it falls through the air, and at the same times preserves its vertical position during its descent. the weight of the arrow is two-thirds of an ounce. the method of launching this fearsome projectile is ingenious. a hundred or even more are packed in a vertical position in a special receptacle, placed upon the floor of the aeroplane, preferably near the foot of the pilot or observer. this receptacle is fitted with a bottom moving in the manner of a trap-door, and is opened by pressing a lever. the aviator has merely to depress this pedal with his foot, when the box is opened and the whole of the contents are released. the fall at first is somewhat erratic, but this is an advantage, as it enables the darts to scatter and to cover a wide area. as the rotary motion of the arrows increases during the fall, the direct line of flight becomes more pronounced until at last they assume a vertical direction free from all wobbling, so that when they alight upon the target they are quite plumb. when launched from a height they strike the objective with terrific force, and will readily penetrate a soldier's helmet and skull. indeed, when released at a height of , feet they have been known to pierce a mounted soldier's head, and pass vertically through his body and that of his horse also. time after time german soldiers have found themselves pinned to the ground through the arrow striking and penetrating their feet. owing to the extremely light weight of the darts they can be launched in batches of hundreds at a time, and in a promiscuous manner when the objective is a massed body of infantry or cavalry, or a transport convoy. they are extremely effective when thrown among horses even from a comparatively low altitude, not so much from the fatalities they produce, as from the fact that they precipitate a stampede among the animals, which is generally sufficiently serious and frantic to throw cavalry or a transport-train into wild confusion. although aerial craft, when skilfully handled, have proved highly successful as weapons of offence, the possibilities of such aggression as yet are scarcely realised; aerial tactics are in their infancy. developments are moving rapidly. great efforts are being centred upon the evolution of more formidable missiles to be launched from the clouds. the airman is destined to inspire far greater awe than at present, to exercise a still more demoralising influence, and to work infinitely more destruction. chapter xi. armoured aeroplanes the stern test of war has served to reveal conclusively the fact that aerial craft can be put out of action readily and effectively, when once the marksman has picked up the range, whether the gunner be conducting his operations with an anti-aircraft gun stationed upon the ground, or from a hostile machine. it will be remembered that flight-commander briggs, on the occasion of the daring british raid upon the zeppelin sheds at friedrichshafen, was brought to the ground by a bullet which penetrated his fuel tank. several other vessels, british, german, french, and russian alike, have been thrown out of action in a similar manner, and invariably the craft which has been disabled suddenly in this way has fallen precipitately to earth in the fatal headlong dive. previous to the outbreak of hostilities there was considerable divergence of opinion upon this subject. the general opinion was that the outspread wings and the stays which constituted the weakest parts of the structure were most susceptible to gun-fire, and thus were likely to fail. but practice has proved that it is the driving mechanism which is the most vulnerable part of the aeroplane. this vulnerability of the essential feature of the flying machine is a decisive weakness, and exposes the aviator to a constant menace. it may be quite true that less than one bullet in a thousand may hit the machine, but when the lucky missile does find its billet its effect is complete. the fact must not be overlooked that the gunners who work the batteries of anti-aircraft guns are becoming more and more expert as a result of practice, so that as time progresses and improved guns for such duty are rendered available, the work of the aviator is likely to become more dangerous and difficult. experience has proved that the high velocity gun of to-day is able to hurl its projectile or shell to an extreme height--far greater than was previously considered possible--so that considerable discretion has to be exercised by the airman, who literally bears his life in his hands. although elaborate trials were carried out upon the testing ranges with the weapons devised especially for firing upon flying machines, captive balloons being employed as targets, the data thus obtained were neither conclusive nor illuminating. the actual experiences of airmen have given us some very instructive facts upon this point for the first time. it was formerly held that the zone of fire that is to be considered as a serious danger was within a height of about , feet. but this estimate was well within the mark. airmen have found that the modern projectiles devised for this phase of operations are able to inflict distinctly serious damage at an altitude of , feet. the shell itself may have but little of its imparted velocity remaining at this altitude, but it must be remembered that when the missile bursts, the contents thereof are given an independent velocity, and a wide cone of dispersion, which is quite sufficient to achieve the desired end, inasmuch as the mechanism of the modern aeroplane and dirigible is somewhat delicate. it was for this reason that the possibility of armouring the airship was discussed seriously, and many interesting experiments in this field were carried out. at the same time it was decided that the armouring should be effected upon lines analogous to that prevailing in warship engineering. the craft should not only be provided with defensive but also with aggressive armament. this decision was not viewed with general approbation. it was pointed out that questions of weight would arise, especially in relation to the speed of the machine. increased weight, unless it were accompanied by a proportionate augmentation of power in the motor, would react against the efficiency and utility of the machine, would appreciably reduce its speed, and would affect its climbing powers very adversely. in some quarters it was maintained that as a result the machine would even prove unsuited to military operations, inasmuch as high speed is the primary factor in these. consequently it was decided by the foremost aviating experts that machines would have to be classified and allotted to particular spheres of work, just as warships are built in accordance with the special duty which they are expected to perform. in reconnaissance, speed is imperative, because such work in the air coincides with that of the torpedo-boat or scout upon the seas. it is designed to acquire information respecting the movements of the enemy, so as to assist the heavier arms in the plan of campaign. on the other hand, the fighting corsair of the skies might be likened to the cruiser or battleship. it need not possess such a high turn of speed, but must be equipped with hard-hitting powers and be protected against attacking fire. one attempt to secure the adequate protection against gun-fire from the ground assumed the installation of bullet-proof steel plating, about one fifth of an inch thick, below the tank and the motor respectively. the disposition of the plating was such as to offer the minimum of resistance to the air and yet to present a plane surface to the ground below. so far as it went this protection was completely effective, but it failed to armour the vital parts against lateral, cross and downward fire while aloft. as the latter is more to be feared than the fire from the ground, seeing that it may be directed at point blank range, this was a decided defect and the armour was subsequently abandoned as useless. the only effective method of achieving the desired end is to armour the whole of the carriage or fuselage of the adroplane, and this was the principle adopted by the vickers company. the vickers military aeroplane is essentially a military machine. it is built of steel throughout. the skeleton of the machine is formed of an alloy which combines the qualities of aluminium and steel to ensure toughness, strength, and lightness. in fact, metal is employed liberally throughout, except in connection with the wings, which follow the usual lines of construction. the body of the car is sheathed with steel plating which is bullet proof against rifle or even shrapnel fire. the car is designed to carry two persons; the seats are therefore disposed tandem-wise, with the observer or gunner occupying the front seat. the defensive armament is adequate for ordinary purposes. being fitted with a horse-power motor, fairly high speeds are attainable, although the velocity is not equal to that of machines constructed upon conventional lines, inasmuch as there is an appreciable increase in weight. the car is short and designed upon excellent stream lines, so that the minimum of resistance to the air is offered, while at the same time the balancing is perfect. the sides of the car are brought up high enough to protect the aviators, only their heads being visible when they are seated. the prow of the car follows the lines generally adopted in high speed torpedo boat design; there is a sharp knife edge stem with an enclosed fo'c's'le, the latter housing the gun. another craft, designed for scouting operations, may be likened to the mosquito craft of the seas. this machine, while a biplane like the military aeroplane, is of lighter construction, everything being sacrificed to speed in this instance. it is fitted with a horse-power motor and is designed to carry an observer if required. there is no offensive armament, however. the fuel tank capacity, moreover, is limited, being only sufficient for a two or three hours' flight. while this is adequate for general reconnoitring, which for the most part entails short high speed flights, there are occasions when the staff demands more prolonged observations conducted over a greater radius. this requisition can be met by eliminating the observer, whose duties in this instance must be assumed by the pilot, and substituting in place of the former, a second fuel tank of sufficient capacity for a flight of four or five hours, thereby bringing the term of action in the air to about / hours. this machine travels at a very high speed and is eminently adapted to its specific duty, but it is of limited service for general purposes. the arming of an aeroplane, to enable it to defend itself against hostile attack or to participate in raiding operations upon the aerial fleet of the enemy, appears to be a simple task, but as a matter of fact it is an undertaking beset with difficulties innumerable. this is especially the case where the aeroplane is of the tractive type, that is to say where the propellers are placed in the forefront of the machine and in their revolution serve to draw the machine forward. all other considerations must necessarily be sacrificed to the mounting of the propeller. consequently it is by no means easy to allot a position for the installation of a gun, or if such should be found there is grave risk of the angle of fire being severely restricted. in fact, in many instances the mounting of a gun is out of the question: it becomes a greater menace to the machine than to the enemy. the french aeronautical section of the military department devoted considerable study to this subject, but found the problem almost insurmount able. monsieur loiseau met with the greatest measure of success, and his system is being practised in the present campaign. this principle is essentially adapted to tractor aeroplanes. forward of the pilot a special position is reserved for the gunner. a special mounting is provided towards the prow, and upon the upper face of the body of the machine. the gun mounting is disposed in such a manner that it is able to command a wide arc of fire in the vertical plane over the nose of the machine and more particularly in the downward direction. the marksman is provided with a special seat, but when he comes into action he has to stand to manipulate his weapon. the lower part of his body is protected by a front shield of steel plate, a fifth of an inch in thickness, while a light railing extending upon either side and behind enables the gunner to maintain his position when the aeroplane is banking and climbing. the machine gun, of the hotchkiss type, is mounted upon a swivel attached to a tripod, while the latter is built into the bracing of the car, so as to ensure a fairly steady gun platform. while the gun in the hands of a trained marksman may be manipulated with destructive effect, the drawbacks to the arrangement are obvious. the gunner occupies a very exposed position, and, although the bullet-proof shield serves to break the effects of wind when travelling at high speed which renders the sighting and training of the weapon extremely difficult, yet he offers a conspicuous target, more particularly when the enemy is able to assume the upper position in the air as a result of superior speed in travelling. the gun, however, may be elevated to about degrees, which elevation may be accentuated by the inclination of the aeroplane when climbing, while the facility with which the weapon may be moved through the horizontal plane is distinctly favourable. but the aerial marksman suffers from one very pronounced defect: he has a severely restricted survey of everything below, since his vision is interrupted by the planes. the result is that an enemy who has lost ascendancy of position is comparatively safe if he is able to fly immediately below his adversary: the mitrailleuse of the latter cannot be trained upon him. on the other hand the enemy, if equipped with repeating rifles or automatic pistols, is able to inflict appreciable damage upon the craft overhead, the difficulties of firing vertically into the air notwithstanding. in the vickers system, where the propeller is mounted behind the car, the aeroplane thus operating upon the pusher principle, the nose of the car is occupied by the arm, which is a rifle calibre machine gun fitted upon a special mounting. the prow is provided with an embrasure for the weapon and the latter is so installed as to command an angle of degrees on all sides of the longitudinal axis of the machine when in flight. in this instance the marksman is provided with complete protection on all sides, inasmuch as his position is in the prow, where the hood of the fo'c's'le shields him from overhead attack. the gun is protected by a special shield which moves with the gun barrel. this shield is provided with mica windows, through which the gunner is able to sight his arm, so that he is not inconvenienced in any way by the wind draught. one shortcoming of such methods of arming an aeroplane will be observed. ahead firing only is possible; the weapon cannot be trained astern, while similarly the line of fire on either broadside is severely limited. this is one reason why the machine-gun armament of aerial craft of the heavier-than-air type has not undergone extensive development. in many instances the pilot and observer have expressed their preference for repeating high velocity rifles over any form of fixed gun mounting, and have recourse to the latter only when the conditions are extremely favourable to its effective employment. efforts are now being made to equip the military type of aeroplane with both forward and astern firing guns. the urgency of astern fire has been brought home very vividly. suppose, for instance, two hostile aeroplanes, a and b, are in the air. a has the advantage at first, but b is speedier and rapidly overhauls a. during the whole period of the overhauling movement the gun of b can be directed upon a, while the latter, owing to the arc of training being limited to c d cannot reply. obviously in the running fight it would be to the advantage of b, although the fleeter machine, to keep behind a (position ), but the latter is making towards its own lines. under these circumstances a must be headed off, so b crowds on speed to consummate this end. but in the overtaking process b renders his gun-fire ineffective, inasmuch as b passes beyond the arc of his gun which is represented by e f. but in so doing b comes within the firing arc of a (position ). to minimise this danger b ascends to a higher level to obtain the paramount position. if, however, b were equipped with an astern gun the aeroplane a would be within the fire of b when the forward gun of the latter could not be used. similarly if a were also fitted with an astern gun it would be able to attack its pursuer the whole time b was to its rear and in this event, if its gun-fire were superior, it would be able to keep the latter to a safe distance, or compel b to manoeuvre into a superior position, which would entail a certain loss of time. an astern firing gun would be valuable to b in another sense. directly it had passed a or brought the latter within the zone of its astern gun it could maintain its fire at the most advantageous range, because owing to its speed it would be able to dictate the distance over which shots should be exchanged and if mounted with a superior weapon would be able to keep beyond the range of a's guns while at the same time it would keep a within range of its own gun and consequently rake the latter. in the interests of self-preservation a would be compelled to change its course; in fact, b would be able to drive it in any direction he desired, as he would command a's movements by gun-fire. the value of combined ahead and astern firing has been appreciated, but there is one difficulty which at the moment appears to be insuperable the clearance of the propeller. at the moment astern-firing, if such it may be called, is maintained by repeating rifles, but this armament is not to be compared with machine-gun firing, as the latter with its capacity to pour to shots a minute, is far more deadly, particularly when the weapon is manipulated by a crack gunner. up to the present the offensive armament of aeroplanes has been confined to light machine guns such as the hotchkiss, berthier, schwartlose, and maxim weapons. so far as the arming of aeroplanes is concerned the indispensable condition is light weight. with airships this factor is not so vital, the result being that some dirigibles are mounted with guns, throwing one pound bursting shells, fitted either with delay action or percussion fuses, the former for preference. these shells are given a wide cone of dispersion. experiments are also being made with a gun similar to the pom-pom which proved so useful in south africa, the gun throwing small shells varying from four to eight ounces in weight at high velocity and in rapid succession. while such missiles would not be likely to inflict appreciable damage upon an armoured aeroplane, they would nevertheless be disconcerting to the aviators subjected to such fire, and in aerial combats the successful undermining of the adversary's moral is of far greater importance than in land operations, since immediately ascendancy in the artillery operations is attained the final issue is a matter of moments. but the most devastating arm which has yet been contrived for aerial operations is the light machine gun which has recently been perfected. the one objective with this weapon is to disable the hostile aircraft's machinery. it fires an armour piercing projectile which, striking the motor of any aircraft, would instantly put the latter out of action. the shell has a diameter of about. inch and weighs about four ounces. the gun is a hybrid of the mitrailleuse and the french "soixante-quinze," combining the firing rapidity of the former with the recoil mechanism of the latter. this missile has established its ability to penetrate the defensive armouring of any aeroplane and the motor of the machine at , yards' range. this offensive arm is now being manufactured, so that it is likely to be seen in the near future as the main armament of aeroplanes. at the moment widespread efforts are being made in the direction of increasing the offensive efficiency of aircraft. it is one of the phases of ingenuity which has been stimulated into activity as a result of the war. chapter xii. battles in the air ever since the days of jules verne no theme has proved so popular in fiction as fighting in the air. it was a subject which lent itself to vivid imagination and spirited picturesque portrayal. discussion might be provoked, but it inevitably proved abortive, inasmuch as there was a complete absence of data based upon actual experience. the novelist was without any theory: he avowedly depended upon the brilliance of his imagination. the critic could only theorise, and no matter how dogmatic his reasonings, they were certainly as unconvincing as those of the object of his attack. but truth has proved stranger than fiction. the imaginative pictures of the novelist have not only been fulfilled but surpassed, while the theorising critic has been utterly confounded. fighting in the air has become so inseparable from the military operations of to-day that it occurs with startling frequency. a contest between hostile aeroplanes, hundreds of feet above the earth, is no longer regarded as a dramatic, thrilling spectacle: it has become as matter-of-fact as a bayonet melee between opposed forces of infantry. a duel in the clouds differs from any other form of encounter. it is fought mercilessly: there can be no question of quarter or surrender. the white flag is no protection, for the simple reason that science and mechanical ingenuity have failed, so far, to devise a means of taking an aeroplane in tow. the victor has no possible method of forcing the vanquished to the ground in his own territory except driving. if such a move be made there is the risk that the latter will take the advantage of a critical opportunity to effect his escape, or to turn the tables. for these reasons the fight is fought to a conclusive finish. to aspire to success in these combats waged in the trackless blue, speed, initiative, and daring are essential. success falls to the swift in every instance. an aeroplane travelling at a high speed, and pursuing an undulating or irregular trajectory is almost impossible to hit from the ground, as sighting is so extremely difficult. sighting from another machine, which likewise is travelling rapidly, and pursuing an irregular path, is far more so. unless the attacker can approach relatively closely to his enemy the possibility of hitting him is extremely remote. rifle or gun-fire must be absolutely point blank. when a marauding aeroplane is espied the attacking corsair immediately struggles for the strategical position, which is above his adversary. to fire upwards from one aeroplane at another is virtually impossible, at least with any degree of accuracy. the marksman is at a hopeless disadvantage. if the pilot be unaccompanied and entirely dependent upon his own resources he cannot hope to fire vertically above him, for the simple reason that in so doing he must relinquish control of his machine. a rifle cannot possibly be sighted under such conditions, inasmuch as it demands that the rifleman shall lean back so as to obtain control of his weapon and to bring it to bear upon his objective. even if a long range mauser or other automatic pistol of the latest type be employed, two hands are necessary for firing purposes, more particularly as, under such conditions, the machine, if not kept under control, is apt to lurch and pitch disconcertingly. even a colleague carried for the express purpose of aggression is handicapped. if he has a machinegun, such as a maxim or a mitrailleuse, it is almost out of the question to train it vertically. its useful vertical training arc is probably limited to about degrees, and at this elevation the gunner has to assume an extremely uncomfortable position, especially upon an aeroplane, where, under the best of circumstances, he is somewhat cramped. on the other hand the man in the aeroplane above holds the dominating position. he is immediately above his adversary and firing may be carried out with facility. the conditions are wholly in his favour. sighting and firing downwards, even if absolutely vertically, imposes the minimum physical effort, with the result that the marksman is able to bring a steadier aim upon his adversary. even if the machine be carrying only the pilot, the latter is able to fire upon his enemy without necessarily releasing control of his motor, even for a moment. if he is a skilled sharpshooter, and the exigencies demand, he can level, sight, and fire his weapon with one hand, while under such circumstances an automatic self-loading pistol can be trained upon the objective with the greatest ease. if the warplane be carrying a second person, acting as a gunner, the latter can maintain an effective rifle fusillade, and, at the same time, manipulate his machine-gun with no great effort, maintaining rifle fire until the pilot, by manoeuvring, can enable the mitrailleuse or maxim to be used to the greatest advantage. hence the wonderful display of tactical operations when two hostile aeroplanes sight one another. the hunted at first endeavours to learn the turn of speed which his antagonist commands. if the latter is inferior, the pursued can either profit from his advantage and race away to safety, or at once begin to manoeuvre for position. if he is made of stern stuff, he attempts the latter feat without delay. the pursuer, if he realises that he is out classed in pace, divines that his quarry will start climbing if he intends to show fight, so he begins to climb also. now success in this tactical move will accrue to the machine which possesses the finest climbing powers, and here again, of course, speed is certain to count. but, on the other hand, the prowess of the aviator--the human element once more--must not be ignored. the war has demonstrated very convincingly that the personal quality of the aviator often becomes the decisive factor. a spirited contest in the air is one of the grimmest and most thrilling spectacles possible to conceive, and it displays the skill of the aviator in a striking manner. daring sweeps, startling wheels, breathless vol-planes, and remarkable climbs are carried out. one wonders how the machine can possibly withstand the racking strains to which it is subjected. the average aeroplane demands space in which to describe a turn, and the wheel has to be manipulated carefully and dexterously, an operation requiring considerable judgment on the part of the helmsman. but in an aerial duel discretion is flung to the winds. the pilot jambs his helm over in his keen struggle to gain the superior position, causing the machine to groan and almost to heel over. the stem stresses of war have served to reveal the perfection of the modern aeroplane together with the remarkable strength of its construction. in one or two instances, when a victor has come to earth, subsequent examination has revealed the enormous strains to which the aeroplane has been subjected. the machine has been distorted; wires have been broken--wires which have succumbed to the enormous stresses which have been imposed and have not been snapped by rifle fire. one well-known british airman, who was formerly a daring automobilist, confided to me that a fight in the air "is the finest reliability trial for an aeroplane that was ever devised!" in these desperate struggles for aerial supremacy the one party endeavours to bring his opponent well within the point-blank range of his armament: the other on his part strives just as valiantly to keep well out of reach. the latter knows fully well that his opponent is at a serious disadvantage when beyond point-blank range, for the simple reason that in sighting the rifle or automatic pistol, it is difficult, if not impossible while aloft, to judge distances accurately, and to make the correct allowances for windage. if, however, the dominating aviator is armed with a machine gun he occupies the superior position, because he can pour a steady hail of lead upon his enemy. the employment of such a weapon when the contest is being waged over friendly territory has many drawbacks. damage is likely to be inflicted among innocent observers on the earth below; the airman is likely to bombard his friends. for this very reason promiscuous firing, in the hope of a lucky shot finding a billet in the hostile machine, is not practised. both parties appear to reserve their fire until they have drawn within what may be described as fighting distance, otherwise point blank range, which may be anything up to yards. some of the battles between the german and the french or british aeroplanes have been waged with a total disregard of the consequences. both realise that one or the other must perish, and each is equally determined to triumph. it is doubtful whether the animosity between the opposing forces is manifested anywhere so acutely as in the air. in some instances the combat has commenced at feet or so above the earth, and has been fought so desperately, the machines climbing and endeavouring to outmanoeuvre each other, that an altitude of over , feet has been attained before they have come to close grips. the french aviator is nimble, and impetuous: the german aviator is daring, but slow in thought: the british airman is a master of strategy, quick in thought, and prepared to risk anything to achieve his end. the german airman is sent aloft to reconnoitre the enemy and to communicate his information to his headquarters. that is his assigned duty and he performs it mechanically, declining to fight, as the welfare of his colleagues below is considered to be of more vital importance than his personal superiority in an aerial contest. but if he is cornered he fights with a terrible and fatalistic desperation. the bravery of the german airmen is appreciated by the allies. the french flying-man, with his traditional love for individual combat, seeks and keenly enjoys a duel. the british airman regards such a contest as a mere incident in the round of duty, but willingly accepts the challenge when it is offered. it is this manifestation of what may be described as acquiescence in any development that enabled the british flying corps, although numerically inferior, to gain its mastery of the air so unostentatiously and yet so completely. all things considered an aeroplane duel is regarded as a fairly equal combat. but what of a duel between an aeroplane and a dirigible? which holds the advantage? this question has not been settled, at any rate conclusively, but it is generally conceded that up to a certain point the dirigible is superior. it certainly offers a huge and attractive target, but rifle fire at its prominent gas-bag is not going to cause much havoc. the punctures of the envelope may represent so many vents through which the gas within may effect a gradual escape, but considerable time must elapse before the effect of such a bombardment becomes pronounced in its result, unless the gas-bag is absolutely riddled with machine gun-fire, when descent must be accelerated. on the other hand, it is to be presumed that the dirigible is armed. in this event it has a distinct advantage. it has a steady gun-platform enabling the weapons of offence to be trained more easily and an enhanced accuracy of fire to be obtained. in order to achieve success it is practically imperative that an aeroplane should obtain a position above the dirigible, but the latter can ascend in a much shorter space of time, because its ascent is vertical, whereas the aeroplane must describe a spiral in climbing. under these circumstances it is relatively easy for the airship to outmanoeuvre the aeroplane in the vertical plane, and to hold the dominating position. but even should the aeroplane obtain the upper position it is not regarded with fear. some of the latest zeppelins have a machine gun mounted upon the upper surface of the envelope, which can be trained through degrees and elevated to about degrees vertical. owing to the steady gun platform offered it holds command in gun-fire, so that the aeroplane, unless the aviator is exceptionally daring, will not venture within the range of the dirigible. it is stated, however, that this upper gun has proved unsatisfactory, owing to the stresses and strains imposed upon the framework of the envelope of the zeppelin during firing, and it has apparently been abandoned. the position, however, is still available for a sniper or sharpshooter. the position in the sky between two such combatants is closely analogous to that of a torpedo boat and a dreadnought. the latter, so long as it can keep the former at arm's, or rather gun's, distance is perfectly safe. the torpedo boat can only aspire to harass its enemy by buzzing around, hoping that a lucky opportunity will develop to enable it to rush in and to launch its torpedo. it is the same with the aeroplane when arrayed against a zeppelin. it is the mosquito craft of the air. how then can a heavier-than-air machine triumph over the unwieldy lighter-than-air antagonist? two solutions are available. if it can get above the dirigible the adroplane may bring about the dirigible's destruction by the successful launch of a bomb. the detonation of the latter would fire the hydrogen within the gas-bag or bags, in which event the airship would fall to earth a tangled wreck. even if the airship were inflated with a non-inflammable gas--the germans claim that their zeppelins now are so inflated--the damage wrought by the bomb would be so severe as to destroy the airship's buoyancy, and it would be forced to the ground. the alternative is very much more desperate. it involves ramming the dirigible. this is undoubtedly possible owing to the speed and facile control of the aeroplane, but whether the operation would be successful remains to be proved. the aeroplane would be faced with such a concentrated hostile fire as to menace its own existence--its forward rush would be frustrated by the dirigible just as a naval vessel parries the ramming tactics of an enemy by sinking the latter before she reaches her target, while if it did crash into the hull of the dirigible, tearing it to shreds, firing its gas, or destroying its equilibrium, both protagonists would perish in the fatal dive to earth. for this reason ramming in mid-air is not likely to be essayed except when the situation is desperate. what happens when two aeroplanes meet in dire combat in mid-air and one is vanquished? does the unfortunate vessel drop to earth like a stone, or does it descend steadily and reach the ground uninjured? so far as actual experience has proved, either one of the foregoing contingencies may happen. in one such duel the german aeroplane was observed to start suddenly upon a vol-plane to the ground. its descending flight carried it beyond the lines of the allies into the territory of its friends. both came to the conclusion that the aviator had effected his escape. but subsequent investigation revealed the fact that a lucky bullet from the allies' aeroplane had lodged in the brain of the german pilot, killing him instantly. at the moment when death over took him the aviator had set his plane for the descent to the ground, and the machine came to earth in the manner of a glider. but in other instances the descent has been far more tragic. the aeroplane, deprived of its motive power, has taken the deadly headlong dive to earth. it has struck the ground with terrific violence, burying its nose in the soil, showing incidentally that a flying machine is an indifferent plough, and has shattered itself, the debris soaked with the escaping fuel becoming ignited. in any event, after such a fall the machine is certain to be a wreck. the motor may escape damage, in which event it is salvaged, the machine subsequently being purposely sacrificed to the flames, thereby rendering it no longer available to the enemy even if captured. in many instances the hostile fire has smashed some of the stays and wires, causing the aeroplane to lose its equilibrium, and sending it to earth in the manner of the proverbial stone, the aviators either being dashed to pieces or burned to death. what are the vulnerable parts of the aeroplane? while the deliberate intention of either combatant is to put his antagonist hors de combat, the disablement of the machine may be achieved without necessarily killing or even seriously wounding the hostile airman. the prevailing type of aeroplane is highly susceptible to derangement: it is like a ship without armour plate protection. the objective of the antagonist is the motor or the fuel-tank, the vital parts of the machine, as much as the aviator seated within. a well-planted shot, which upsets the mechanism of the engine, or a missile which perforates the fuel tank, thereby depriving the motor of its sustenance, will ensure victory as conclusively as the death of the aviator himself. rifle fire can achieve either of these ends with little difficulty. apart from these two nerve-centres, bombardment is not likely to effect the desired disablement, inasmuch as it cannot be rendered completely effective. the wings may be riddled like a sieve, but the equilibrium of the machine is not seriously imperilled thereby. even many of the stays may be shot away, but bearing in mind the slender objective they offer, their destruction is likely to be due more to luck than judgment. on the other hand, the motor and fuel tank of the conventional machine offer attractive targets: both may be put out of action readily, and the disablement of the motive power of an enemy's craft, be it torpedo-boat, battleship, or aeroplane, immediately places the same at the assailant's mercy. nevertheless, of course, the disablement of the airman brings about the desired end very effectively. it deprives the driving force of its controlling hand; the aeroplane becomes like a ship without a rudder: a vessel whose helmsman has been shot down. it is unmanageable, and likely to become the sport of the element in which it moves. it is for this reason that aviators have been urged to direct their fire upon the men and mechanism of a dirigible in the effort to put it out of action. an uncontrolled airship is more likely to meet with its doom than an aeroplane. the latter will inevitably glide to earth, possibly damaging itself seriously in the process, as events in the war have demonstrated, but a helpless airship at once becomes the sport of the wind, and anyone who has assisted, like myself, in the descent of a vessel charged with gas and floating in the air, can appreciate the difficulties experienced in landing. an uncontrolled zeppelin, for instance, would inevitably pile up in a tangled twisted ruin if forced to descend in the manner of an ordinary balloon. consequently the pilot of a dirigible realises to the full the imperative urgency of keeping beyond the point-blank fire of aerial mosquito craft. the assiduity with which british aviators are prepared to swarm to the attack has been responsible for a display of commendable ingenuity on the part of the german airman. nature has provided some of its creatures, such as the octopus, for instance, with the ways and means of baffling its pursuers. it emits dense clouds of inky fluid when disturbed, and is able to effect its escape under cover of this screen. the german aviator has emulated the octopus. he carries not only explosive bombs but smoke balls as well. when he is pursued and he finds himself in danger of being overtaken, the teuton aviator ignites these missiles and throws them overboard. the aeroplane becomes enveloped in a cloud of thick impenetrable smoke. it is useless to fire haphazard at the cloud, inasmuch as it does not necessarily cover the aviator. he probably has dashed out of the cloud in such a way as to put the screen between himself and his pursuer. in such tactics he has merely profited by a method which is practised freely upon the water. the torpedo boat flotilla when in danger of being overwhelmed by superior forces will throw off copious clouds of smoke. under this cover it is able to steal away, trusting to the speed of the craft to carry them well beyond gunshot. the "smoke screen," as it is called, is an accepted and extensively practised ruse in naval strategy, and is now adopted by its mosquito colleagues of the air. chapter xiii. tricks and ruses to baffle the airman the airman has not been allowed to hold his undisputed sway in military operations for long. desperate situations demand drastic remedies and already considerable and illuminating ingenuity is being displayed to baffle and mislead the scout of the skies. it is a somewhat curious and noteworthy fact, that the germans were among the first to realise the scope of the airman's activities, and the significance of their relation to the conveyance of intimate information and the direction of artillery fire. consequently, they now spare no effort to convey illusory information, in the hope that the hostile force may ultimately make a false move which may culminate in disaster. thus, for instance, as much endeavour is bestowed upon the fashioning of dummy trenches as upon the preparation of the actual lines of defence. and every care will be taken to indicate that the former are strongly held. the dug-outs are complete and at places are apparently cunningly masked. if the airman is flying swiftly, he is likely to fail to distinguish the dummy from the real trenches. to him the defences appear to be far more elaborate and more strongly held than is the actual case. the advantage of this delusion is obvious when a retreat is being made. it enables the enemy to withdraw his forces deliberately and in perfect order, and to assume another and stronger position comparatively at leisure. the difficulty of detecting the dummies is emphasised, inasmuch as now, whenever the sound of an aeroplane is heard, or a glimpse thereof is obtained, the men keep well down and out of sight. not a sign of movement is observable. for all the airman may know to the contrary, the trenches may be completely empty, whereas, as a matter of fact, they are throbbing with alert infantry, anxious for a struggle with the enemy. this is one instance where the dirigible is superior to the aeroplane. the latter can only keep circling round and round over the suspicious position; the movement through the air interferes with close continuous observation. on the other hand, the dirigible can maintain a stationary position aloft for hours on end. then the issue is resolved into a contest of patience, with the advantage to the airman. the soldiers in the trenches fret and fume under cover; confined concealment is irksome and is a supreme test of the nerves. unless the soldiers are made of very stern stuff, physical endurance succumbs. some rash act--apparently very trivial--may be committed; it suffices for the vigilant sentinel overhead. he detects the slender sign of life, forms his own conclusions, and returns to his headquarters with the intelligence that the enemy is playing "brer rabbit." it has also become increasingly difficult for the airman to gather absolutely trustworthy data concerning the disposition and movement of troops. small columns are now strung out along the highways to convey the impression that the moving troops are in far greater force than is actually the case, while the main body is under the cover offered by a friendly wood and is safe from detection. the rapidity with which thousands of men are able to disappear when the word "airman" is passed round is astonishing. they vanish as completely and suddenly as if swallowed by the earth or dissolved into thin air. they conceal themselves under bushes, in ditches, lie prone under hedgerows, dart into houses and outbuildings--in short, take every cover which is available, no matter how slender it may seem, with baffling alacrity. the attenuated column, however, is kept moving along the highway for the express purpose of deceiving the airman. advancing troops also are now urged to move forward under the shelter of trees, even if the task entails marching in single or double file, to escape the prying eyes of the man above. by keeping close to the line of trunks, thus taking full advantage of the overhanging branches, and marching in such a manner as to create little dust, it is possible to escape the aerial scout. the concealment of cavalry, however, is somewhat difficult. an animal, especially if he be unaccustomed to the noise of the aeroplane, is likely to become startled, and to give vent to a frightened and vociferous neighing which invariably provokes a hearty response from his equine comrades. the sharp ear of the airman does not fail to distinguish this sound above the music of his motor. again, he has come to regard all copses and stretches of undergrowth with suspicion. such may or may not harbour the enemy, but there is no risk in making an investigation. he swoops down, and when a short distance above the apparently innocent copse, circles round it two or three times. still undecided, he finally hurls a bomb. its detonation invariably proves effective. the horses stampede and the secret is out. even foot soldiers must be severely trained and experienced to resist the natural inclination to break cover when such a missile is hurled into their midst. frequently a force, which has laboured under the impression that it is safe from detection, has revealed its presence unwittingly and upon the spur of the moment. if the men be steeled against the bomb attack, it is almost impossible to resist the inclination to take a shot when the airman, swooping down, ventures so temptingly near as to render him an enticing target almost impossible to miss. as a rule, however, the observer is on the alert for such a betrayal of a force's existence. when the bomb fails to scatter the enemy, or the men are proof against the temptation to fire a volley, a few rounds from the aeroplane's machine gun often proves effective. if the copse indeed be empty no harm is done, beyond the abortive expenditure of a few rounds of ammunition: if it be occupied, the fruits of the manoeuvre are attractive. cunning is matched against cunning, and the struggle for supremacy in the art of craftiness is keen. the french flying corps have had recourse to an ingenious ruse for accomplishing two ends--the one to draw concealed artillery fire, and the other to pre-occupy the airmen. two german aerial scouts observed a french machine flying at a somewhat venturesome height over their masked artillery. divining the reason for the hostile intrepidity they gave chase. circling round the french machine they assailed it with machine-gun fire. the enemy appeared to take no notice but continued his gradual descent in a steady line. presently the german airmen, having drawn sufficiently near, observed that the french aviator was inert. had he been killed? everything pointed to such a conclusion, especially as they had raked the aeroplane fore and aft with bullets. but still suspicious they continued their circling movements, their attention so concentrated upon their quarry that they had not observed another move. it was the crash of guns from their masked artillery which broke in upon their absorption. looking round, they observed three french aeroplanes soaring around and above them at high speed. scarcely had they realised the situation before a spirited mitraireuse fire was rained upon them. one of the german aeroplanes was speedily disabled. its fuel tank was riddled and it sank rapidly, finally crashing to earth in the deadly dive head foremost, and killing both its occupants in the fall. the second aeroplane hurried away with its pilot wounded. in the excitement of the aerial melee the first french aeroplane had been forgotten. it was now scarcely feet above the german artillery. a capture appeared to be imminent, but the germans received a rude surprise. suddenly the aeroplane exploded and a hail of shrapnel burst over the heads of the artillerymen. the circumstance was decidedly uncanny, but after two or three such experiences of exploding aeroplanes the matter was explained. the apparently helpless aeroplane was merely a glider, which, instead of carrying a man, had a booby-trap aboard. it appears that the french airmen have found a use for the aeroplanes which are considered unsafe for further use. the motor and propeller are removed and the dummy of explosives is strapped into position. the laden glider is then taken aloft by means of an airship, and in the concealment of the clouds is released, the rudder being so set as to ensure a gradual vol-plane towards the suspicious position below. the explosive cargo is set with a time fuse, the arrangement being that the contents will be detonated while the machine is near the ground, unless this end is accelerated by a well-planted shell from an anti-aircraft gun. the decoy glider is generally accompanied by one or two aeroplanes under control, which keep under the cover of the clouds until the hostile aviators have been drawn into the air, when they swoop down to the attack. the raiders are fully aware that they are not likely to become the target of fire from the ground, owing to the fact that the enemy's artillery might hit its friends. consequently the antagonistic airmen are left to settle their own account. in the meantime the dummy machine draws nearer to the ground to explode and to scatter its death-dealing fragments of steel, iron, and bullets in all directions. possibly in no other phase of warfare is subterfuge practised so extensively as in the concealment of guns. the branches of trees constitute the most complete protection and guns are placed in position beneath a liberal cover of this character. the branches also offer a screen for the artillerymen, who can lurk beneath this shelter until the aeroplane has passed. to complete the illusion dummy guns fashioned from tree trunks and the wheels of useless limbers are rigged up, and partially hidden under branches, the idea being to convey the impression to the man aloft that they are the actual artillery. the aerial scout observes the dummies beneath the sparse covering of branches. congratulating himself upon his sharp eyesight, he returns to his base with the intelligence that he has found the enemy's guns he indicates their position upon the map, and in some cases returns to notify the position of the weapons by smoke-ball or tinsel, when they are immediately subjected to a severe bombardment. he follows the shell-fire and sees the arms put out of action. he returns to camp satisfied with his exploit, oblivious of the smiles and laughter of the hostile artillerymen, who have their guns safely in position and well masked some distance away. the dummies are imperfectly concealed purposely, so that they may be discovered by the aerial scout, while the real guns are completely masked and ready to belch forth from another point. in one or two cases the dummies have been rigged up in such a manner as to convey the impression, when seen from aloft, that a whole battery has been put out of action, barrels and wheels as well as broken limbers strewing the ground in all directions. moving masses of soldiers are also resorting to cunning in order to mislead the airman or to escape his observation. at the battle of haelen, during which engagement the german warplanes were exceptionally active, the belgian soldiers covered their heads with bundles of wheat snatched from the standing stooks, and under this cover lurked in a field where the corn was still standing. from aloft their forms defied detection: the improvised headgear completely covered them and blended effectively with the surrounding wheat. in another instance the french misled a german airman somewhat effectively. what appeared to be cavalry was seen to be retreating along the country road, and the airman returned hurriedly to report. a german squadron was dispatched in hasty pursuit. but as it rounded a copse skirting the road it received a murderous fire at close quarters, which decimated the ranks and sent the survivors flying for their lives along the road up which they had ridden so confidently. had the aviator been in a position to observe the horses more closely, he would have found that what appeared to be riders on their backs were in reality sacks stuffed with straw, dressed in old uniforms, and that a mere handful of men were driving the animals forward. the cavalrymen had purposely dismounted and secreted themselves in the wood in anticipation of such a pursuit as was made. while the germans do not appear to be so enterprising in this form of ingenuity they have not been idle. a french airman flying over the teuton lines observed the outermost trenches to be alive with men whose helmets were distinctly visible. the airman reported his observations and the trench was subjected to terrific shell fire. subsequently the french made a spirited charge, but to their dismay found that the outermost german trench was occupied by dummies fashioned from all sorts of materials and crowned with helmets! this ruse had enabled the german lines to be withdrawn to another position in safety and comparatively at leisure. before war was declared the german military experts were emphasising the importance of trees for masking troops and guns against aerial observation. one of the foremost authorities upon military aviation only a few months ago urged the german military staff to encourage the planting of orchards, not for the purpose of benefiting agriculture or in the interests of the farmers, but merely for military exigencies. he pointed to the extensive orchards which exist in alsace-lorraine and baden, the military covering value of which he had determined from personal experience, having conducted aerial operations while military were moving to and fro under the cover of the trees. he declared that the cover was efficient and that under the circumstances the laying out of extensive orchards in strategical places should be carried out without any delay. this, he urged, was a national and not a private obligation. he advocated the bestowal of subsidies on the farmers to encourage the planting of fruit trees. he suggested that the trees should be provided by the state, and given to all who were prepared to plant them; that substantial prizes should be awarded to encourage the rapid growth thereof, and that annual prizes should be awarded to the man who would undertake their cultivation and pruning, not from the fruit-yielding point of view, but for facilitating the movement of troops beneath their dense branches. he even urged the military acquisition of suitable land and its determined, skilful, and discreet exploitation by those who loved the fatherland. he emphasised the necessity for keeping such orchards under military control, only vouchsafing sufficient powers to the local authorities to ensure the desired consummation. he maintained that, if the work were prosecuted upon the right lines and sufficient financial assistance were given, the purpose in view could be achieved without saddling the war department with any unremunerative or excessive burden. he admitted that the process of raising fruit trees to the stage when they would afford adequate cover would be tedious and somewhat prolonged, but argued that the military advantages, such as enabling troops to move below the welcome shelter with absolute freedom and without physical fatigue, would be an ample compensation. the utility of such cover to artillery was another factor he did not fail to emphasise. he dwelt seriously upon the difficulty of rendering permanent gun emplacements and heavy artillery invisible to the airman by resort to the usual type of gun shields. the latter may be located with ease by alert airmen, whereas if the guns were under cover of fruit trees they would be able to accomplish their deadly mission without betraying their presence to the aerial scout. moreover, by pruning the trees in such a manner as to ensure free movement beneath, the artillery would be able to advance without betraying the fact to the enemy. this authority vigorously insisted that the work should be carried out without a moment's delay as it was vital to the fatherland. in the light of recent events, and the excellent cover which is offered by the orchards of the territory he cited as an illustration of his contention, such a disclosure is pregnant with meaning. it throws a new light upon the thorough methods with which the germans carried out their military preparations, and incidentally shows that they were fully alive to every possible development. fruit-raising as a complement to military operations may be a new line of discussion, but it serves to reveal the german in his true light, ready for every contingency, and shows how thoroughly he appreciates the danger from the man in the clouds. chapter xiv. anti-aircraft guns. mobile weapons. when the airship and the aeroplane became accepted units of warfare it was only natural that efforts should be concentrated upon the evolution of ways and means to compass their destruction or, at least, to restrict their field of activity. but aircraft appeared to have an immense advantage in combat. they possess virtually unlimited space in which to manoeuvre, and are able to select the elevation from which to hurl their missiles of destruction. there is another and even more important factor in their favour. a projectile fired, or even dropped, from a height, say of , feet, is favourably affected by the force of gravity, with the result that it travels towards the earth with accumulating energy and strikes the ground with decisive force. on the other hand, a missile discharged into space from a weapon on the earth has to combat this action of gravity, which exercises a powerful nullifying influence upon its flight and velocity, far in excess of the mere resistance offered by the air. in other words, whereas the projectile launched from aloft has the downward pull of the earth or gravitational force in its favour, the shell fired from the ground in the reverse direction has to contend against this downward pull and its decelerating effect. at the time when aircraft entered the realms of warfare very little was known concerning the altitudes to which projectiles could be hurled deliberately. certain conclusive information upon this point was available in connection with heavy howitzer fire, based on calculations of the respective angles at which the projectile rose into the air and fell to the ground, and of the time the missile took to complete its flight from the gun to the objective. but howitzer fire against aircraft was a sheer impossibility: it was like using a six-inch gun to kill a fly on a window pane at a thousand yards' range. some years ago certain experiments in aerial firing with a rifle were undertaken in switzerland. the weapon was set vertically muzzle upwards and discharged. from the time which elapsed between the issue of the bullet from the muzzle until it struck the earth it was possible to make certain deductions, from which it was estimated that the bullet reached an altitude of feet or so. but this was merely conjecture. consequently when artillerists entered upon the study of fighting air-craft with small arms and light guns, they were compelled to struggle in the dark to a very pronounced extent, and this darkness was never satisfactorily dispelled until the present war, for the simple reason that there were no means of getting conclusive information. the german armament manufacturers endeavoured to solve the problem by using smoking shells or missiles fitted with what are known as tracers. by following the ascensional path of the projectiles as revealed by the smoke it was possible to draw certain conclusions. but these were by no means convincing or illuminating, as so many factors affected the issue. despite the peculiar and complex difficulties associated with the problem it was attacked some what boldly. in this trying field of artillery research the prominent german armament manufacturers, krupp of essen and ehrhardt of dusseldorf, played a leading part, the result being that before the airship or the aeroplane was received within the military fold, the anti-aircraft gun had been brought into the field of applied science. the sudden levelling-up serves to illustrate the enterprise of the germans in this respect as well as their perspicacity in connection with the military value of aircraft. any gun we can hope to employ against aircraft with some degree of success must fulfil special conditions, for it has to deal with a difficult and elusive foe. both the lighter-than-air and the heavier than-air craft possess distinctive features and varying degrees of mobility. taking the first-named, the facility with which it can vary its altitude is a disconcerting factor, and is perplexing to the most skilful gunner, inasmuch as he is called upon to judge and change the range suddenly. on the other hand, the artilleryman is favoured in certain directions. the range of utility of the airship is severely limited. if its avowed mission is reconnaissance and conclusive information concerning the disposition of forces, artillery and so forth is required, experience has proved that such work cannot be carried out satisfactorily or with any degree of accuracy at a height exceeding , feet, and a distance beyond six miles. but even under these circumstances the climatic conditions must be extremely favourable. if the elements are unpropitious the airship must venture nearer to its objective. these data were not difficult to collect, inasmuch as they were more or less available from the results of military observations with captive balloons, the conditions being somewhat similar. with the ordinary captive balloon it has been found that, in clear weather, a radius of about / miles at the maximum elevation constitutes its range of reliable utility. with the aeroplane, however, the conditions are very dissimilar. in the first place the machine owing to its diminutive size as compared with the airship, offers a small and inconspicuous target. then there is its high independent speed, which is far beyond that of the airship. furthermore its mobility is greater. it can wheel, turn sharply to the right or to the left, and pursue an irregular undulating flight in the horizontal plane, which renders it well nigh impossible for a gunner to pick it up. the machine moves at a higher relative speed than that at which the gun can be trained. it is the rapid and devious variation which so baffles the gunner, who unless he be highly skilled and patient, is apt to commence to fire wildly after striving for a few moments, and in vain, to pick up the range; he trusts to luck or depends upon blind-shooting, which invariably results in a waste of ammunition. a gun, to be of tangible destructive efficiency when directed against aircraft, especially those depending upon the gas-bag for equilibrium, must be of special design. it must be capable of firing at an angle only a few degrees less than the absolute vertical, and in order to follow the rapid and involved movements of its objective, must be so mobile that it can be trained through a complete circle at any angle of inclination less than its maximum. at the same time, if the weapon is being used in field operations it must be mounted upon a carriage of adequate mobility to enable it to follow the airship, and thereby keep pace with the latter, so that the aerial craft may be sorely harassed if not actually hit. the automobile is the obvious vehicle for this duty, and it has accordingly been extensively used in this service. the automobile and the gun mounted thereon follow widely different lines. some vehicles are designed especially for this duty, while others are improvisations, and be it noted, in passing, that many of the latter have proved more serviceable than the former. still, the first-named is to be preferred, inasmuch as necessarily it is designed to meet the all-round requirements imposed, and consequently is better able to stand up to the intended work, whereas the extemporised vehicle is only serviceable under favourable conditions. the krupp company has evolved many designs of anti-aircraft motor-driven guns--"archibalds" the british airmen term them with emphatic levity. they are sturdily-built vehicles fitted with heavy motors, developing from to horse-power, with the chassis not widely dissimilar from that adopted for motor-omnibus traffic. consequently, they are not necessarily condemned to the high-roads, but within certain limits are able to travel across country, i.e., upon fields or other level expanses, where the soil is not unduly soft. but the very character of the problem rendered the evolution of the vehicle a somewhat perplexing matter. there were many factors which had to be taken into consideration, and it was possible to meet the imposed requirements only within certain limits. in the first place, the weight of the gun itself had to be kept down. it was obviously useless to overload the chassis. again, the weight of the projectile and its velocity had to be borne in mind. a high velocity was imperative. accordingly, an initial velocity varying from , to , feet per second, according to the calibre of the gun, was determined. moreover, as mobility was an indispensable condition, the gun had to be so mounted that it could be fired from the motor-car even if the latter were travelling at high speed. this requirement entailed another difficulty. the gun had to be mounted in such a manner as to enable the gunner to train it easily and readily through the complete circle and through its complete range of vertical inclination. as the result of prolonged experiments it was ascertained that the most suitable arrangement was a pedestal mounting, either within a turret or upon an open deck. to meet the weight of the gun, as well as the strains and stresses incidental to firing, the chassis was strengthened, especially over the rear axle near which the mounting is placed. the heaviest gun of this type is the . centimetre ( / -inch) quick-firer, throwing a shell weighing nearly forty pounds, with an initial velocity of , feet per second. this "archibald" is totally unprotected. the gun is mounted centrally upon the carriage over the rear axle, and occupies the centre of the deck between the driver's seat and that of the gun crew behind. the whole of the deck is clear, thereby offering no obstruction to the gunner in training the weapon, while the space may be widened by dropping down the wings of the vehicle. at the rear is a seat to accommodate the gun crew, beneath which the ammunition is stowed. when travelling and out of action, the gun lies horizontally, the muzzle pointing from the rear of the car. to reduce the strains arising from firing, the arm is fitted with what is known as the "differential recoil." above the breach is an air recuperator and a piston, while there is no hydraulic brake such as is generally used. the compressor is kept under compression while the car is travelling with the gun out of action, so that the arm is available for instant firing. this is a departure from the general practice in connection with such weapons. when the gun is loaded the bolt which holds the compressor back is withdrawn, either by the hand for manual firing, or by the action of the automatic closing of the breech when the arm is being used as a quick-firer. in firing the gun is thrown forward under the pressure of the released air which occurs at the moment of discharge. the energy of the recoil brings the gun back and at the same time recharges the compressed air reservoir. the gun is so mounted upon its pedestal as to enable a maximum vertical inclination of degrees to be obtained. the mounting system also enables the weapon to be trained in any desired direction up to the foregoing maximum elevation throughout a complete circle, and it can be handled with ease and celerity. a smaller "archibald" is the . centimetre ( -inch gun) throwing a . pound shell at an initial velocity of about , feet per second. the turret anti-aircraft gun carried upon a motor-car differs from the foregoing very considerably. this is a protected arm. the gun of . centimetres--approximately . inches--is mounted in the same manner upon the car-deck and over the driving axle, but is enclosed within a sheet steel turret, which is proof against rifle and machine-gun fire. this turret resembles the conning-tower of a battleship, and is sufficiently spacious to house the whole of the gun crew, the internal diameter being about seven feet. access to the turret is obtained through a rear door. this gun has a maximum elevation of about degrees, while its operation and mechanism are similar to those of the unprotected weapon. the vehicle itself is practically identical with the armoured motor-car, which has played such an important part during the present campaign, the driver being protected by a bullet-proof steel screen similar in design to the ordinary glass wind-screen fitted to touring automobiles. this is carried sufficiently high to offer complete protection to his head when seated at the wheel, while through a small orifice in this shield he is able to obtain a clear view of the road. the engine and its vital parts are also adequately protected. the ammunition is carried in a cupboard-like recess forming part of the driver's seat, encased in bullet-proof steel sheeting with flap-doors. this device enables the shells to be withdrawn readily from the side of the car and passed to the crew within the turret. the caisson is of sufficient dimensions to receive shells. the ehrhardt airship fighting ordnance is similarly adapted to motor-car operations, one type being especially powerful. the whole of the vehicle is encased in armour-plating impervious to rifle and machine-gun fire. the driver is provided with a small orifice through which he is able to obtain a clear uninterrupted view of the road ahead, while the armouring over the tonneau is carried to a sufficient height to allow head-room to the gun crew when standing at the gun. all four wheels are of the disk type and fashioned from heavy sheet steel. the motor develops - horse-power and, in one type, in order to mitigate the risk of breakdown or disablement, all four wheels are driven. the gun, a small quick-firer, is mounted on a pedestal in a projecting conning-tower. the mounting is placed behind the driver's seat, and is trained and operated from the tonneau. the maximum elevation is degrees, and like the gun carriage bearing the tube guide it can be moved through a complete circle, being free to rotate in the fixed pivot jack to enable this end to be attained. the foregoing may be said to represent the most powerful types of mobile anti-aircraft weapons used by the austro-german forces to-day. arms of similar design, roughly speaking, have also been introduced into the french and russian services. in addition many semi-armoured weapons of this character are in operation, some specially built for the work, while others have been improvised. in the semi-armoured motor-car the carriage follows the usual lines; it has an open top, the armouring comprising the body of the tonneau and the diskwheels, which are made of light bullet-proof steel. here again the prevailing practice is to mount the gun as nearly above the rear axle as possible, and to work it from the tonneau. the maximum elevation is also degrees, with training throughout the entire circle. another type comprises a very light machine gun of rifle calibre, and this is intended for attachment to an ordinary motor car. there is a pedestal mounting which can be set within the tonneau, while the weapon is pivoted in an outrigger, the latter being free to rotate in its pivot jack. this arrangement enables the arm to cover a wide range, while it also admits of training through an extensive angle of elevation. the allied forces improvised travelling anti-aircraft offences by mounting the latest types of vickers, hotchkiss, and other machine guns in armoured motor cars. some of these have the domed turret form, with the gun projecting through the roof, while others are protected against hostile attack from the side only, the carriage being panelled with bullet-proof steel sheeting. while such weapons are useful, inasmuch as they can maintain a hot fire ranging up to shots per minute, they are not to be compared with the "archibalds," which are able to throw heavy shrapnel and incendiary shells, and have a vertical range of about , to , feet. the improvised motor-gun has not proved a complete success, except in those instances when the hostile aircraft has ventured to approach somewhat closely to the ground. the more formidable weapons cannot be mounted upon ordinary vehicles, inasmuch as the increase in weight, which is appreciable, impairs the efficiency of the vehicle, and at the same time enhances the possibility of breakdown at a critical moment. for such arms a special and substantial chassis is imperative, while the motive power and gearing must be adapted to the circumstances. motor-mounted anti-aircraft weapons, however, have not proved an unqualified success. the fact that the vehicles are condemned to the high roads, or at least to comparatively smooth and level ground, constitutes a severe handicap. again, when travelling at high speed, and this is essential when pursuing a fast aeroplane, the accurate laying of the weapon is extremely difficult, owing to the oscillation of the vehicle itself, especially if the road surface is in a bad condition. the sighting arrangements are of a wonderfully complete character, as described elsewhere, but the irregular rolling movement arising from high speed is a nullifying quantity. it is tolerably easy for the aircraft, especially an aeroplane, to evade successful pursuit, either by rising to an elevation beyond the range of the gun, or by carrying out baffling evolutions such as irregular undulating flight, wheeling, and climbing. according to the reports of the british and french airmen the "archibald" has failed to establish the glowing reputation which was anticipated, for the simple reason that, unless it has a clear straight road and can maintain its high speed, it can easily be out-distanced by the fleet human bird. the motor-car suffers from another serious disability. it cannot manoeuvre with sufficient celerity. for instance, if it is necessary to turn round in a narrow lane, valuable time is lost in the process, and this the airman turns to account. in hilly country it is at a still greater disadvantage, the inclines, gradients, and sinuosities of the roads restricting its effectiveness very pronouncedly. it must also be remembered that, relatively speaking, the "archibald" offers a better target to the airman than the aeroplane offers to the man behind the anti-aircraft gun on the motor below. a few well-placed bombs are sufficient to induce the pursuers to cease their activities. even if the missiles fail to strike the motor-car itself they can wreak disaster in directly by rendering the road impassable or dangerous to negotiate at high speed. on the whole therefore, the "archibald" is a greatly exaggerated weapon of offence against aircraft, and, so far as is known, has failed to fulfil expectations. in fact, the germans have practically abandoned the idea of using it in the manner of a pursuing arm; they work the weapon as a fixture, depending upon the car merely as a means of moving it from point to point. thus, in reality, it has been converted into a light field-piece, and may almost be included in the category of fixed weapons for combating aerial operations. chapter xv. anti-aircraft guns. immobile weapons the immobile anti-aircraft gun, as distinct from that attached to a travelling carriage such as a motor-car, may be subdivided into two classes. the one is the fixed arm which cannot be moved readily, mounted upon a permanent emplacement; the other is the field-piece which, while fired from a stationary position, may be moved from point to point upon a suitable carriage. the distinction has its parallel in ordinary artillery, the first-named weapon coinciding with the heavy siege gun, which is built into and forms part and parcel of the defensive or offensive scheme, while the second is analogous to the field artillery, which may be wheeled from position to position. in this phase of artillery the germans led the way, for the simple reason that they recognised the military value of aerial navigation years in advance of their contemporaries. again, in this field the krupp organisation has played a prominent part. it embarked upon actual construction of weapons while its rivals in other countries were content to prepare their drawings, which were filed against "the day." but it must not be thought that because the german manufacturers of armaments were ahead of their contemporaries they dominated the situation. far from it. their competitors in the market of destruction were every whit as keen, as ingenious, and as enterprising. kruppism saw a commercial opportunity to profit from advertisement and seized it: its rivals were content to work in secret upon paper, to keep pace with the trend of thought, and to perfect their organisations so as to be ready for the crisis when it developed. the first krupp anti-aircraft field-piece was a . centimetre ( / inch) arm. it possessed many interesting features, the most salient of which was the design of the axle of the carriage. the rigid axle for the two wheels was replaced by an axle made in two sections, and joined together in the form of a universal coupling, so that each wheel virtually possessed its own axle, or rather half-axle. this was connected with the cradle of the gun in such a manner that the wheels were laterally pivoted thereon. the result is that each axle can be turned forward together with its wheel, and thus the wheels have their rims brought into line to form an arc of a circle, of which the rear end of the spade of the gun carriage constitutes the centre. this acts as a pivot, about which the gun can be turned, the pair of wheels forming the runners for the achievement of this movement. the setting of the weapon in the firing position or its reversion to the travelling position can be easily and speedily effected merely by the rotation of a handwheel and gearing. with this gun a maximum elevation of degrees is possible, owing to the trunnions being carried well behind the breech in combination with the system of long steady recoil. the balancing spring which encloses the elevating screw is contained in a protected box. the recoil brake, together with the spring recuperator, follows the usual krupp practice in connection with ordinary field pieces, as does also the automatic breech-closing and firing mechanism. in fact there is no pronounced deviation from the prevailing krupp system, and only such modifications as are necessary to adapt the arm to its special duty. when the gun is elevated to high angles the shell, after insertion the breech is prevented from slipping out by means of a special device, so that the proper and automatic closing of the breech is not impaired in any way. in such an arm as this, which is designed essentially for high-angle firing, the sighting and training facilities require to be carried out upon special lines, inasmuch as the objective is necessarily at a considerable altitude above the horizon of the gun. in other words, in firing at a high inclination, distance between the gun and the target cannot be utilised directly for the back sight. on the other hand, it is essential that in proportion as the angle from the horizontal increases, the back sight should be lowered progressively in a manner corresponding to the distance. to assist the range-finder in his task of sighting it is necessary that he should be provided with firing tables set out in a convenient form, which, in conjunction with the telemeter, serve to facilitate training for each successive round. in this way it is possible to pick up the range quickly and to keep the objective in the line of fire until it either has been put hors de combat, or has succeeded in retiring beyond the range of the gun. the sighting arrangements of these krupp anti-aircraft guns are carried out upon these lines. beneath the barrel of the back-sight is an observing glass with an eye-piece for the artillerist, while above and behind the observing glass is another eye-piece, to be used in conjunction with the manipulation of the back-sight. the eye-piece of the observation glass is so made that it can be turned through a vertical plane in proportion as the angle of fire increases in relation to the horizontal. the determination of the distance from the objective and from the corresponding back-sight as well as the observation of the altitude is carried out with the aid of the telemeter. this again carries an observation glass fitted with an eye-piece which can be turned in the vertical plane in the same manner as that of the fore-sight. by means of this ingenious sighting device it is possible to ascertain the range and angle of fire very easily and speedily. the weight of the special krupp anti-aircraft field-piece, exclusive of the protecting shield, is approximately identical with that of the ordinary light artillery field-piece. it throws a shell weighing . pounds with an initial velocity of about , feet per second. although the german armament manufacturers were among the first to enter the field with an anti-aircraft gun of this character they were speedily followed by the french, who devised a superior weapon. in fact, the latter represented such a decisive advance that the german artillerists did not hesitate to appropriate their improvements in sundry essential details, and to incorporate them with their own weapons. this applies especially to the differential recoil system which is utilised in the small anti-aircraft guns now mounted upon the roofs of high buildings of cities throughout germany for the express purpose of repelling aerial attack. the french system is admitted by the leading artillery technicians of the world to be the finest which has ever been designed, its remarkable success being due to the fact that it takes advantage of the laws of nature. in this system the gun is drawn back upon its cradle preparatory to firing. in some instances the barrel is compressed against a spring, but in the more modern guns it is forced to rest against a cushion of compressed air contained within a cylinder. when first bringing the gun into action, the barrel is brought into the preliminary position by manually compressing the air or spring by means of a lever. thereafter the gun works automatically. when the gun is fired the barrel is released and it flies forward. at a critical point in its forward travel the charge is fired and the projectile speeds on its way. the kick or recoil serves to arrest the forward movement of the barrel and finally drives it back again against the strong spring or cushion of compressed air within the cylinder to its normal position, when it is ready for the introduction of the next shell. the outstanding feature of this system is that the projectile is given a higher initial velocity than is possible with the barrel held rigid at the moment of discharge, because the shell is already travelling at the moment of firing. the fixed anti-aircraft guns such as are stationed upon eminences and buildings are of the quick firing type, the object being to hurl a steady, continuous stream of missiles upon the swiftly moving aeroplane. some of the weapons throw a one-pound shell and are closely similar to the pom-pom which proved so effective during the south african war. machine guns also have been extensively adopted for this duty by all the combatants, their range of approximately , yards and rapidity of fire being distinctly valuable when hostile aircraft descend to an altitude which brings them within the range of the weapon. the greatest difficulty in connection with this phase of artillery, however, is not so much the evolution of a serviceable and efficient type of gun, as the determination of the type of projectile which is likely to be most effective. while shrapnel is employed somewhat extensively it has not proved completely satisfactory. it is difficult to set the timing fuse even after the range has been found approximately, which in itself is no easy matter when the aircraft is moving rapidly and irregularly, but reliance is placed thereon in the hope that the machine may happen to be within the cone of dispersion when the shell bursts, and that one or more of the pieces of projectile and bullets may chance to penetrate either the body of the airman or a vital part of the mechanism. it is this uncertainty which has led to a preference for a direct missile such as the bullet discharged from a machine gun. a stream of missiles, even of rifle calibre, maintained at the rate of some shots per minute is certain to be more effective, provided range and aim are correct, than shrapnel. but the ordinary rifle-bullet, unless the objective is within very close range, is not likely to cause much harm, at least not to the mechanism of the aerial vessel. it is for this reason that greater attention is being devoted, especially by the french artillerists, to the chevalier anti-aircraft gun, a weapon perfected by a swiss technician resident in great britain. it projects a formidable missile which in fact is an armour-piercing bullet / - to / -inch in diameter. it is designed for use with an automatic machinegun, which the inventor has devised more or less upon the well-known french system. the bullet has a high velocity--about , feet per second--and a maximum range of , to , feet at the maximum elevation. should such a missile strike the motor or other mechanism of the vessel it would wreak widespread havoc, and probably cause the machine to come to earth. this arm has been designed for the express purpose of disabling the aeroplane, and not for the subjugation of the airman, which is a minor consideration, inasmuch as he is condemned to a descent when his craft receives a mortal wound. attempts have been and still are being made to adapt an explosive projectile to this gun, but so far the measure of success achieved has not proved very promising. there are immense difficulties connected with the design of an explosive shell of this class, charged with a high explosive, especially in connection with the timing. so far as dependence upon percussive detonation is concerned there is practically no difficulty. should such a missile strike, say, the motor of an aeroplane, or even the hull of the craft itself, the latter would be practically destroyed. but all things considered, it is concluded that more successful results are likely to be achieved by the armour-piercing bullet striking the mechanism than by an explosive projectile. the krupp company fully realised the difficulties pertaining to the projectile problem in attacks upon aerial craft. so far as dirigibles are concerned shrapnel is practically useless, inasmuch as even should the bag be riddled by the flying fragments, little effective damage would be wrought--the craft would be able to regain its haven. accordingly efforts were concentrated upon the perfection of two new types of projectiles, both of which were directed more particularly against the dirigible. the one is the incendiary shell--obus fumigene--while the other is a shell, the contents of which, upon coming into contact with the gas contained within the gas-bag, set up certain chemical reactions which precipitate an explosion and fire. the incendiary shells are charged with a certain compound which is ignited by means of a fuse during its flight. this fuse arrangement coincides very closely with that attached to ordinary shrapnel, inasmuch as the timing may be set to induce ignition at different periods, such as either at the moment it leaves the gun, before, or when it strikes the envelope of the dirigible. the shell is fitted with a "tracer," that is to say, upon becoming ignited it leaves a trail of smoke, corresponding with the trail of a rocket, so that its passage through the air may be followed with facility. this shell, however, was designed to fulfil a dual. not only will it fire the gaseous contents out of the dirigible, but it has an explosive effect upon striking an incombustible portion of the aircraft, such as the machinery, propellers or car, when it will cause sufficient damage to throw the craft out of action. the elaborate trials which were carried out with the obus fumigene certainly were spectacular so as they went. two small spherical balloons, feet in diameter, and attached to , feet of cable, were sent aloft. the anti-aircraft guns themselves were placed about , feet distant. owing to the inclement weather the balloons were unable to attain a height of more than feet in a direct vertical line above the ground. the guns were trained and fired, but the one balloon was not hit until the second round, while the third escaped injury until the fifth round. when struck they collapsed instantly. though the test was not particularly conclusive, and afforded no reliable data, one point was ascertained--the trail of smoke emitted by the shell enabled its trajectory to be followed with ease. upon the conclusion of these trials, which were the most successful recorded, quick-firing tests in the horizontal plane were carried out. the best performance in this instance was the discharge of five rounds in eight seconds. in this instance the paths of the projectiles were simple and easy to follow, the flight of the shell being observed until it fell some , feet away. but the krupp firm have found that trials upon the testing ground with a captive balloon differ very materially from stern tests in the field of actual warfare. practically nothing has been heard of the two projectiles during this war, as they have proved an absolute failure. some months ago the world was startled by the announcement that the leading german armament firm had acquired the whole of the interest in an aerial torpedo which had been evolved by the swedish artillerist, gustave unge, and it was predicted that in the next war widespread havoc would be wrought therewith. remarkable claims were advanced for this projectile, the foremost being that it would travel for a considerable distance through the air and alight upon the objective with infallible accuracy. the torpedo in question was subjected to exacting tests in great britain, which failed to substantiate all the claims which were advanced, and it is significant to observe that little has been heard of it during the present conflict. it is urged in certain technical quarters, however, that the aerial torpedo will prove to be the most successful projectile that can be used against aircraft. i shall deal with this question in a later chapter. during the early days of the war anti-aircraft artillery appeared to be a much overrated arm. the successes placed to its credit were insignificant. this was due to the artillerymen being unfamiliar with the new arm, and the conditions which prevail when firing into space. since actual practice became possible great advances in marksmanship have been recorded, and the accuracy of such fire to-day is striking. fortunately the airman possesses the advantage. he can manoeuvre beyond the range of the hostile weapons. at the moment , feet represents the extreme altitude to which projectiles can be hurled from the arms of this character which are now in use, and they lack destructiveness at that range, for their velocity is virtually expended. picking up the range is still as difficult as ever. the practice followed by the germans serves to indicate the teuton thoroughness of method in attacking such problems even if success does not ensue. the favourite german principle of disposing anti-aircraft artillery is to divide the territory to be protected into equilateral triangles, the sides of which have a length of about six miles or less, according to the maximum effective range of the pieces at an elevation of / degrees. the guns are disposed at the corners of the triangles as indicated in figs. - . taking the one triangle as an example, the method of picking up the range may be explained as follows. the several guns at the comers of the triangle, each of which can be trained through the degrees in the horizontal plane, are in telephonic touch with an observer o stationed some distance away. the airman a enters the area of the triangle. the observer takes the range and communicates with the gunner b, who fires his weapon. the shell bursts at emitting a red flame and smoke. the observer notes the altitude and relative position of the explosion in regard to the aircraft, while gunner b himself observes whether the shell has burst to the right or to the left of the objective and corrects accordingly. the observer commands c to fire, and another shell is launched which emits a yellow flame and smoke. it bursts at according to the observer, while gunner c also notes whether it is to the right or to the left of the target and corrects accordingly. now gunner d receives the command to fire and the shell which explodes at throws off a white flame and smoke. gunner d likewise observes whether there is any deviation to right or left of the target and corrects in a similar manner. from the sum of the three rounds the observer corrects the altitude, completes his calculations, and communicates his instructions for correction to the three gunners, who now merely train their weapons for altitude. the objective is to induce the shells hurled from the three corners of the triangle to burst at a common point , which is considered to be the most critical spot for the aviator. the fire is then practically concentrated from the three weapons upon the apex of a triangular cone which is held to bring the machine within the danger zone. this method of finding the range is carried out quickly--two or three seconds being occupied in the task. in the early days of the war the german anti-aircraft artillerymen proved sadly deficient in this work, but practice improved their fire to a marvellous degree, with the result that at the moment it is dangerous for an aviator to essay his task within an altitude of , feet, which is the range of the average anti-aircraft gun. the country occupied by a belligerent is divided up in this manner into a series of triangles. for instance, a machine entering hostile territory from the east, enters the triangle a-b-c, and consequently comes within the range of the guns posted at the comers of the triangle. directly he crosses the line b-c and enters the adjacent triangle he passes beyond the range of gun a but comes within the range of the gun posted at d, and while within the triangular area is under fire from the guns b-c-d. he turns and crosses the line a-c, but in so doing enters another triangle a-c-e, and comes range of the gun posted at e. the accompanying diagram represents an area of country divided up into such triangle and the position of the guns, while the circle round the latter indicate the training arc of the weapons, each of which is a complete circle, in the horizontal plane. the dotted line represents the aviator's line of flight, and it will be seen that no matter how he twists and turns he is always within the danger zone while flying over hostile territory. the moment he outdistances one gun he comes within range of another. the safety of the aviator under these circumstances depends upon his maintaining an altitude exceeding the range of the guns below, the most powerful of which have a range of , to , feet, or on speed combined with rapid twisting and turning, or erratic undulating flight, rendering it extremely difficult for the gun-layer to follow his path with sufficient celerity to ensure accurate firing. at altitudes ranging between , and , feet the aeroplane comes within the range of rifle and machine-gun firing. the former, however, unless discharged in volleys with the shots covering a wide area, is not particularly dangerous, inasmuch as the odds are overwhelmingly against the rifleman. he is not accustomed to following and firing upon a rapidly moving objective, the result being that ninety-nine times out of a hundred he fails to register a hit. on the other hand the advantage accruing from machine-gun fire is, that owing to the continuous stream of bullets projected, there is a greater possibility of the gun being trained upon the objective and putting it hors de combat. but, taking all things into consideration, and notwithstanding the achievements of the artillerist, the advantages are overwhelmingly on the side of the aviator. when one reflects upon the total sum of aircraft which have been brought to earth during the present campaign, it will be realised that the number of prizes is insignificant in comparison with the quantity of ammunition expended. chapter xvi. mining the air while the anti-aircraft gun represents the only force which has been brought to the practical stage for repelling aerial attack, and incidentally is the sole offensive weapon which has established its effectiveness, many other schemes have been devised and suggested to consummate these ends. while some of these schemes are wildly fantastic, others are feasible within certain limitations, as for instance when directed against dirigibles. it has been argued that the atmosphere is akin to the salt seas; that an aerial vessel in its particular element is confronted with dangers identical with those prevailing among the waters of the earth. but such an analogy is fallacious: there is no more similarity between the air and the ocean than there is between an airship and a man-of-war. the waters of the earth conceal from sight innumerable obstructions, such as rocks, shoals, sandbanks, and other dangers which cannot by any means be readily detected. but no such impediments are encountered in the ether. the craft of the air is virtually a free age in the three dimensions. it can go whither it will without let or hindrance so long as the mechanical agencies of man are able to cope with the influences of nature. it can ascend to a height which is out of all proportion to the depth to which the submarine can descend in safety. it is a matter of current knowledge that a submarine cannot sink to a depth of more than feet: an aerial vessel is able to ascend to , , , , or even , feet above the earth, and the higher the altitude it attains the greater is its degree of safety. the limit of ascension is governed merely by the physical capacities of those who are responsible for the aerial vessel's movement. it is for this reason that the defensive measures which are practised in the waters of the earth are inapplicable to the atmosphere. movement by, or in, water is governed by the depth of channels, and these may be rendered impassable or dangerous to negotiate by the planting of mines. a passing ship or submarine may circumvent these explosive obstructions, but such a successful manoeuvre is generally a matter of good luck. so far as submarines are concerned the fact must not be over looked that movements in the sea are carried out under blind conditions: the navigator is unable to see where he is going; the optic faculty is rendered nugatory. contrast the disability of the submarine with the privileges of its consort in the air. the latter is able to profit from vision. the aerial navigator is able to see every inch of his way, at least during daylight. when darkness falls he is condemned to the same helplessness as his confrere in the waters below. a well-known british authority upon aviation suggested that advantage should be taken of this disability, and that the air should be mined during periods of darkness and fog to secure protection against aerial invasion. at first sight the proposal appears to be absolutely grotesque, but a little reflection will suffice to demonstrate its possibilities when the area to be defended is comparatively limited. the suggestion merely proposes to profit from one defect of the dirigible. the latter, when bent upon a daring expedition, naturally prefers to make a bee-line towards its objective: fuel considerations as a matter of fact compel it to do so. consequently it is possible, within certain limits, to anticipate the route which an invading craft will follow: the course is practically as obvious as if the vessel were condemned to a narrow lane marked out by sign-posts. moreover, if approaching under cover of night or during thick weather, it will metaphorically "hug the ground." to attempt to complete its task at a great height is to court failure, as the range of vision is necessarily so limited. under these circumstances the mining of the air could be carried out upon the obvious approaches to a threatened area. the mines, comprising large charges of high-explosive and combustible material, would be attached to small captive balloons similar to the "sounding balloons" which are so much used by meteorologists in operations for sounding the upper strata of the atmosphere. these pilot balloons would be captive, their thin wires being wound upon winches planted at close intervals along the coast-line. the balloon-mines themselves would be sent to varying heights, ranging from , to , feet, and with several attached to each cable, the disposition of the mines in the air in such an irregular manner being in fact closely similar to the practice adopted in the mining of a channel for protection against submarines and hostile ships. the suggestion is that these mines should be sent aloft at dusk or upon the approach of thick and foggy weather, and should be wound in at dawn or when the atmosphere cleared, inasmuch as in fine weather the floating aerial menace would be readily detected by the pilot of a dirigible, and would be carefully avoided. if the network were sufficiently intricate it would not be easy for an airship travelling at night or in foggy weather to steer clear of danger, for the wires holding the balloons captive would be difficult to distinguish. the mines would depend upon detonators to complete their work, and here again they would bear a close resemblance to sea-mines. by looping the mines their deadliness could be increased. the unsuspicious airship, advancing under cover of darkness or thick weather, might foul one of the wires, and, driving forward, would tend to pull one or more mines against itself. under the force of the impact, no matter how gentle, or slight, one or more of the detonating levers would be moved, causing the mine to explode, thus bursting the lifting bag of the vessel, and firing its gaseous contents. an alternative method, especially when a cable carried only a single mine, would be to wind in the captive balloon directly the wire was fouled by an invading aerial craft, the process being continued until the mine was brought against the vessel and thereby detonated. another proposed mining method differs materially in its application. in this instance it is suggested that the mines should be sent aloft, but should not be of the contact type, and should not be fired by impact detonators, but that dependence should be placed rather upon the disturbing forces of a severe concussion in the air. the mines would be floating aloft, and the advance of the airship would be detected. the elevation of the mines in the vicinity of the invading craft would be known, while the altitude of the airship in relation thereto could be calculated. then, it is proposed that a mine within d certain radius of the approaching craft, and, of course, below it, should be fired electrically from the ground. it is maintained that if the charge were sufficiently heavy and an adequate sheet of flame were produced as a result of the ignition, an airship within a hundred yards thereof would be imperilled seriously, while the other mines would also be fired, communicating ignition from one to the other. the equilibrium of the airship is so delicate that it can be readily upset, and taking into account the facts that gas is always exuding from the bag, and that hydrogen has a tendency to spread somewhat in the manner of oil upon water, it is argued that the gas would be ignited, and would bring about the explosion of the airship. another method has even been advocated. it is averred in authoritative circles that when the aerial invasion in force of great britain is attempted, the zeppelins will advance under the cover of clouds. also that the craft will make for one objective--london. doubtless advantage will be taken of clouds, inasmuch as they will extend a measure of protection to the craft, and will probably enable the invading fleet to elude the vigilance of the aeroplane scouts and patrols. under these circumstances it is suggested that balloon-mines should be sent aloft and be concealed in the clouds. it would be impossible to detect the wires holding them captive, so that the precise location of the lurking danger would not be divined by the invader. of course, the chances are that the invading airship would unconsciously miss the mines; on the other hand the possibilities are equally great that it would blunder into one of these traps and be blown to atoms. an english airman has recently suggested a means of mining invading zeppelins which differs completely from the foregoing proposals. his idea is that aeroplanes should be equipped with small mines of the contact type, charged with high explosives, and that the latter should be lowered from the aeroplane and be trawled through the atmosphere. as an illustration i will suppose that a hostile aircraft is sighted by a patrolling aeroplane. the pilot's companion in the latter immediately prepares his aerial mine, fixing the detonator, and attaching the mine to the wire. the latter is then dropped overboard, the wire being paid out from a winch until it has descended to the level of the hostile craft. the airman now manoeuvres in the air circling about the airship, dragging his mine behind him, and endeavouring to throw it across or to bring it into contact with the airship below. naturally the latter, directly it observed the airman's object, would endeavour to elude the pursuing trawling mine, either by crowding on speed or by rising to a greater altitude. the aeroplane, however, would have the advantage both in point of speed and powers of climbing, while there is no doubt that the sight of the mine swinging in the air would exert a decisive moral effect upon those in the airship. attempts to render the mine harmless by discharging it prematurely with the aid of rifle and machine-gun fire would, of course, be made by the crew of the airship, but the trawling mine would prove a very difficult target to strike. if such a missile were used against an airship of the proportions of a zeppelin the mine would inevitably be trawled across the vessel sooner or later. once the airship had been fouled, the aviator would merely have to drive ahead, dragging the wire and its charge across the gas-bag until at last one of the contact levers of the mine was moved by being dragged against some part of the vessel, when the mine would be exploded. in such operations the aviator would run a certain risk, as he would be more or less above the airship, and to a certain degree within the zone of the ultimate explosion. but there is no doubt that he would succeed in his "fishing" exploit within a very short time. this ingenious scheme has already been tested upon a small scale and has been found effective, the trawling bomb being drawn across its target and fired by contact within a few minutes. the experiment seems to prove that it would be simpler and more effectual to attack a hostile aircraft such as a zeppelin in this manner than to drop free bombs at random. moreover, we cannot doubt that the sight of a mine containing even ten or twelve pounds of high explosive dangling at the end of a wire would precipitate a retreat on the part of an airship more speedily than any other combative expedient. the advocate of this mine-trawling method, who is a well-known aviator, anticipates no difficulty in manoeuvring a mine weighing pounds at the end of feet of fine wire. success depends in a great measure on the skill of the aviator in maintaining a constant tension upon the line until it falls across its objective. the process calls for a certain manifestation of skill in manoeuvring the aeroplane in relation to the airship, judgment of distance, and ability to operate the aeroplane speedily. the rapid ascensional capability of the airship, as compared with that of the aeroplane, is a disadvantage, but on the other hand, the superior mobility and speed of the aeroplane would tell decisively for success. among the many wonders which the krupp organisation is stated to have perfected, and which it is claimed will create considerable surprise, is the aerial torpedo. many of the krupp claims are wildly chimerical, as events have already proved, but there is no doubt that considerable effort has been expended upon this latest missile, for which the firm is said to have paid the inventor upwards of l , --$ , . curiously enough the projectile was perfected within gunshot of the british aerodrome of hendon and is stated to have been offered to the british government at the time, and to have met with a chilling reception. one fact, however, is well established. the inventor went to germany, and submitted his idea to krupp, by whom it was tested without delay. upon the completion of the purchase, the great armament manufacturers did not fail to publish broadcast the fact that they had acquired a mysterious new terror of the skies. that was some three years ago, and in the interval the cleverest brains of the german firm have been steadily devoting their time and energies to the improvement of the missile, the first appearance of which was recorded, in a somewhat hazy manner, in the closing days of december. while the exact mechanism of this missile is a secret, the governing principles of its design and operation are known to a select few technicians in this country. strange to say, the projectile was designed in the first instance in the interests of peace and humanity, but while engaged upon his experiments the inventor suddenly concluded that it would be a more profitable asset if devoted to the grim game of war. at the time the military significance of the airship and the aeroplane were becoming apparent; hence the sudden diversion of the idea into a destructive channel. this aerial torpedo is a small missile carrying a charge of high explosive, such as trinitrotoluene, and depends for its detonation upon impact or a time fuse. it is launched into the air from a cradle in the manner of the ordinary torpedo, but the initial velocity is low. the torpedo is fitted with its own motive power, which comes automatically into action as the missile climbs into the air. this self-contained energy is so devised that the maximum power is attained before the missile has lost the velocity imparted in the first instance, the result being that it is able to continue its flight in a horizontal direction from the moment it attains the highest point in its trajectory, which is naturally varied according to requirements. but there is no secret about the means of propulsion. the body is charged with a slow-burning combustible, in the manner of the ordinary rocket, whereby it is given a rapid rotary motion. furthermore it is stated to be fitted with a small gyroscope in the manner of the torpedo used in the seas, for the purpose of maintaining direction during flight, but upon this point there is considerable divergence of opinion among technicians, the general idea being that the torpedo depends upon an application of the principle of the ordinary rocket rather than upon a small engine such as is fitted to the ordinary torpedo. the employment of a slow combustible ensures the maintenance of the missile in the air for a period exceeding that of the ordinary shell. it is claimed by the germans that this projectile will keep aloft for half-an-hour or more, but this is a phantasy. its maintenance of flight is merely a matter of minutes. the belated appearance of this much-lauded projectile and its restricted use suggest that it is unreliable, and perhaps no more effective than the aerial torpedo which appeared in the united states during the spanish-american war, and proved a complete failure. an effective and reliable means of combating or frustrating a dirigible attack, other than by gun-fire or resort to the drastic remedy of ramming the enemy, has yet to be devised. chapter xvii. wireless in aviation in a previous chapter the various methods of signalling between the ground and the airman aloft have been described. seeing that wireless telegraphy has made such enormous strides and has advanced to such a degree of perfection, one naturally would conclude that it constitutes an ideal system of communication under such conditions in military operations. but this is not the case. wireless is utilised only to a very limited extent. this is due to two causes. the one is of a technical, the other of a strategical character. the uninitiated, bearing in mind the comparative ease with which wireless installations may be established at a relatively small expense, would not unreasonably think that no serious difficulties of a technical character could arise: at least none which would defy solution. but these difficulties exist in two or three different fields, each of which is peculiarly complex and demands individual treatment. in the first place, there is the weight of the necessary installation. in the case of the dirigible this may be a secondary consideration, but with the aeroplane it is a matter of primary and vital importance. again, under present conditions, the noise of the motor is apt to render the intelligent deciphering of messages while aloft a matter of extreme difficulty, especially as these are communicated in code. the engine noise might be effectively overcome by the use of a muffler such as, is used with automobiles, but then there is the further difficulty of vibration. this problem is being attacked in an ingenious manner. it is proposed to substitute for audible signals visual interpretations, by the aid of an electric lamp, the fluctuations in which would correspond to the dots and dashes of the morse code. thus the airman would read his messages by sight instead of by sound. this method, however, is quite in its infancy, and although attractive in theory and fascinating as a laboratory experiment or when conducted under experimental conditions, it has not proved reliable or effective in aeronautical operations. but at the same time it indicates a promising line of research and development. then there are the problems of weight and the aerial. so far as present knowledge goes, the most satisfactory form of aerial yet exploited is that known as the trailing wire. from to feet of wire are coiled upon a reel, and when aloft this wire is paid out so that it hangs below the aeroplane. as a matter of fact, when the machine is travelling at high speed it trails horizontally astern, but this is immaterial. one investigator, who strongly disapproves of the trailing aerial, has carried out experiments with a network of wires laid upon and attached to the surface of the aeroplane's wings. but the trailing wire is generally preferred, and certainly up to the present has proved more satisfactory. the greatest obstacle, however, is the necessary apparatus. the average aeroplane designed for military duty is already loaded to the maximum. as a rule it carries the pilot and an observer, and invariably includes a light arm for defence against an aerial enemy, together with an adequate supply of ammunition, while unless short sharp flights are to be made, the fuel supply represents an appreciable load. under these circumstances the item of weight is a vital consideration. it must be kept within a limit of pounds, and the less the equipment weighs the more satisfactory it is likely to prove, other things being equal. the two most successful systems yet exploited are the dubilier and the rouget. the former is an american invention, the latter is of french origin. both have been tested by the british military aeronautical department, and the french authorities have subjected the french system to rigorous trials. both systems, within their limitations, have proved satisfactory. the outstanding feature of the dubilier system is the production of sine waves of musical frequency from continuous current, thus dispensing with the rotary converter. the operating principle is the obtaining of a series of unidirectional impulses by a condenser discharge, the pulsating currents following one another at regular intervals at a frequency of impulses per second, which may be augmented up to , impulses per second. the complete weight of such an apparatus is pounds; the electric generator, which is no larger than the motor used for driving the ordinary table ventilating fan, accounts for pounds of this total. under test at sea, upon the deck of a ship, a range of miles has been obtained. the british government carried out a series of experiments with this system, using a small plant weighing about pounds, with which communication was maintained up to about miles. in the french system the reuget transmitter is employed. the apparatus, including the dynamo, which is extremely small, weighs in all pounds. a small alternator of watts and volts is coupled direct to the aeroplane motor, a new clutch coupler being employed for this purpose. by means of a small transformer the voltage is raised to , volts, at which the condenser is charged. in this instance the musical spark method is employed. the whole of the high tension wiring is placed within a small space so as not to endanger the pilot, while the transformer is hermetically sealed in a box with paraffin. the aerial comprises a trailing wire feet in length, which, however, can be wound in upon its reel within seconds. this reeled antenna, moreover, is fitted with a safety device whereby the wire can be cut adrift in the event of an accident befalling the aeroplane and necessitating an abrupt descent. with this apparatus the french authorities have been able to maintain communication over a distance of miles. in maintaining ethereal communication with aeroplanes, however, a portable or mobile station upon the ground is requisite, and this station must be within the radius of the aerial transmitter, if messages are to be received from aloft with any degree of accuracy and reliability. thus it will be recognised that the land station is as important as the aeroplane equipment, and demands similar consideration. a wide variety of systems have been employed to meet these conditions. there is the travelling automobile station, in which the installation is mounted upon a motor-car. in this instance the whole equipment is carried upon a single vehicle, while the antenna is stowed upon the roof and can be raised or lowered within a few seconds. if motor traction is unavailable, then animal haulage may be employed, but in this instance the installation is divided between two vehicles, one carrying the transmitting and receiving apparatus and the generating plant, the other the fuel supplies and the aerial, together with spare parts. the motive power is supplied by a small air cooled petrol or gasoline motor developing eight horse-power, and coupled direct to a -kilo watt alternator. at one end of the shaft of the latter the disk discharger is mounted, its function being to break up the train of waves into groups of waves, so as to impart a musical sound to the note produced in the receiver. a flexible cable transmits the electric current from the generator to the wagon containing the instruments. the aerial is built up of masts carried in sections. the germans employ a mobile apparatus which is very similar, but in this instance the mast is telescopic. when closed it occupies but little space. by turning the winch handle the mast is extended, and can be carried to any height up to a maximum of about feet. the capacity of these mobile stations varies within wide limits, the range of the largest and most powerful installations being about miles. the disadvantage of these systems, however, is that they are condemned to territories where the ground at the utmost is gently undulating, and where there are roads on which four-wheeled vehicles can travel. for operation in hilly districts, where only trails are to be found, the marconi company, has perfected what may be described as "pack" and "knapsack" installations respectively. in the first named the whole of the installation is mounted upon the backs of four horses. the first carries the generator set, the second the transmitting instruments, the third the receiving equipment, and the fourth the detachable mast and stays. the generator is carried upon the horse's saddle, and is fitted with a pair of legs on each side. on one side of the saddle is mounted a small highspeed explosion motor, while on the opposite side, in axial alignment with the motor, is a small dynamo. when it is desired to erect the installation the saddle carrying this set is removed from the horse's back and placed upon the ground, the legs acting as the support. a length of shaft is then slipped into sockets at the inner ends of the motor and dynamo shafts respectively, thus coupling them directly, while the current is transmitted through a short length of flexible cable to the instruments. the mast itself is made in lengths of about four feet, which are slipped together in the manner of the sections of a fishing rod, and erected, being supported by means of wire guys. in this manner an antenna from to feet in height may be obtained. the feature of this set is its compactness, the equal division of the sections of the installation, and the celerity with which the station may be set up and dismantled in extremely mountainous country such as the vosges, where it is even difficult for a pack-horse to climb to commanding or suitable positions, there is still another set which has been perfected by the marconi company. this is the "knapsack" set, in which the whole of the installation, necessarily light, small, and compact, is divided among four men, and carried in the manner of knapsacks upon their backs. although necessarily of limited radius, such an installation is adequate for communication within the restricted range of air-craft. greater difficulties have to be overcome in the mounting of a wireless installation upon a dirigible. when the zeppelin was finally accepted by the german government, the military authorities emphasised the great part which wireless telegraphy was destined to play in connection with such craft. but have these anticipations been fulfilled? by no means, as a little reflection will suffice to prove. in the first place, a wireless outfit is about the most dangerous piece of equipment which could be carried by such a craft as the zeppelin unless it is exceptionally well protected. as is well known the rigidity of this type of airship is dependent upon a large and complicated network of aluminium, which constitutes the frame. such a huge mass of metal constitutes an excellent collector of electricity from the atmosphere; it becomes charged to the maximum with electricity. in this manner a formidable contributory source of danger to the airship is formed. in fact, this was the reason why "z-iv" vanished suddenly in smoke and flame upon falling foul of the branches of trees during its descent. at the time the zeppelin was a highly charged electrical machine or battery as it were, insulated by the surrounding air. directly the airship touched the trees a short circuit was established, and the resultant spark sufficed to fire the gas, which is continuously exuding from the gas bags. after this accident minute calculations were made and it was ascertained that a potential difference of no less than , volts existed between the framework of the dirigible and the trees. this tension sufficed to produce a spark inches in length. it is not surprising that the establishment of the electric equilibrium by contact with the trees, which produced such a spark should fire the hydrogen inflation charge. in fact the heat generated was so intense that the aluminium metallic framework was fused. the measurements which were made proved that the gas was consumed within seconds and the envelope destroyed within seconds. as a result of this disaster endeavours were made to persuade count zeppelin to abandon the use of aluminium for the framework of his balloon but they were fruitless, a result no doubt due to the fact that the inventor of the airship of this name has but a superficial knowledge of the various sciences which bear upon aeronautics, and fully illustrates the truth of the old adage that "a little learning is a dangerous thing." count zeppelin continues to work upon his original lines, but the danger of his system of construction was not lost upon another german investigator, professor schiitte, who forthwith embarked upon the construction of another rigid system, similar to that of zeppelin, at lanz. in this vessel aluminium was completely abandoned in favour of a framework of ash and poplar. the fact that the aluminium constituted a dangerous collector of electricity rendered the installation of wireless upon the zeppelin not only perilous but difficult. very serious disturbances of an electrical nature were set up, with the result that wireless communication between the travelling dirigible and the ground below was rendered extremely uncertain. in fact, it has never yet been possible to communicate over distances exceeding about miles. apart from this defect, the danger of operating the wireless is obvious, and it is generally believed in technical circles that the majority of the zeppelin disasters from fire have been directly attributable to this, especially those disasters which have occurred when the vessel has suddenly exploded before coming into contact with terrestrial obstructions. in the later vessels of this type the wireless installation is housed in a well insulated compartment. this insulation has been carried, to an extreme degree, which indicates that at last the authorities have recognised the serious menace that wireless offers to the safety of the craft, with the result that every protective device to avoid disaster from this cause has been freely adopted. the fact that it is not possible to maintain communication over a distance exceeding some miles is a severe handicap to the progressive development of wireless telegraphy in this field. it is a totally inadequate radius when the operations of the present war are borne in mind. a round journey of , or even more miles is considered a mere jaunt; it is the long distance flight which counts, and which contributes to the value of an airman's observations. the general impression is that the fighting line or zone comprises merely two or three successive stretches of trenches and other defences, representing a belt five miles or so in width, but this is a fallacy. the fighting zone is at least miles in width; that is to say, the occupied territory in which vital movements take place represents a distance of miles from the foremost line of trenches to the extreme rear, and then comes the secondary zone, which may be a further miles or more in depth. consequently the airman must fly at least miles in a bee-line to cover the transverse belt of the enemy's field of operations. upon the german and russian sides this zone is of far greater depth, ranging up to miles or so in width. in these circumstances the difficulties of ethereal communication 'twixt air and earth may be realised under the present limitations of radius from which it is possible to transmit. but there are reasons still more cogent to explain why wireless telegraphy has not been used upon a more extensive scale during the present campaign. wireless communication is not secretive. in other words, its messages may be picked up by friend and foe alike with equal facility. true, the messages are sent in code, which may be unintelligible to the enemy. in this event the opponent endeavours to render the communications undecipherable to one and all by what is known as "jambing." that is to say, he sends out an aimless string of signals for the purpose of confusing senders and receivers, and this is continued without cessation and at a rapid rate. the result is that messages become blurred and undecipherable. but there is another danger attending the use of wireless upon the battlefield. the fact that the stations are of limited range is well known to the opposing forces, and they are equally well aware of the fact that aerial craft cannot communicate over long distances. for instance, a sends his airmen aloft and conversation begins between the clouds and the ground. presently the receivers of b begin to record faint signals. they fluctuate in intensity, but within a few seconds b gathers that an aeroplane is aloft and communicating with its base. by the aid of the field telephone b gets into touch with his whole string of wireless stations and orders a keen look-out and a listening ear to ascertain whether they have heard the same signals. some report that the signals are quite distinct and growing louder, while others declare that the signals are growing fainter and intermittent. in this manner b is able to deduce in which direction the aeroplane is flying. thus if those to the east report that signals are growing stronger, while the stations on the west state that they are diminishing, it is obvious that the aeroplane is flying west to east, and vice versa when the west hears more plainly at the expense of the east. if, however, both should report that signals are growing stronger, then it is obvious that the aircraft is advancing directly towards them. it was this ability to deduce direction from the sound of the signals which led to the location of the zeppelin which came down at luneville some months previous to the war, and which threatened to develop into a diplomatic incident of serious importance. the french wireless stations running south-east to north-west were vigilant, and the outer station on the north-west side picked up the zeppelin's conversation. it maintained a discreet silence, but communicated by telephone to its colleagues behind. presently no. station came within range, followed by nos. , , , , and so on in turn. thus the track of the zeppelin was dogged silently through the air by its wireless conversation as easily and as positively as if its flight had been followed by the naked eye. the zeppelin travellers were quite ignorant of this action upon the part of the french and were surprised when they were rounded-up to learn that they had been tracked so ruthlessly. every message which the wireless of the zeppelin had transmitted had been received and filed by the french. under these circumstances it is doubtful whether wireless telegraphy between aircraft and the forces beneath will be adopted extensively during the present campaign. of course, should some radical improvement be perfected, whereby communication may be rendered absolutely secretive, while no intimation is conveyed to the enemy that ethereal conversation is in progress, then the whole situation will be changed, and there may be remarkable developments. chapter xviii. aircraft and naval operations when once the flying machine had indicated its possibilities in connection with land operations it was only natural that endeavours should be made to adapt it to the more rigorous requirements of the naval service. but the conditions are so vastly dissimilar that only a meagre measure of success has been recorded. bomb-throwing from aloft upon the decks of battleships appeals vividly to the popular imagination, and the widespread destruction which may be caused by dropping such an agent down the funnel of a vessel into the boiler-room is a favourite theme among writers of fiction and artists. but hitting such an objective while it is tearing at high speed through the water, from a height of several thousand feet is a vastly different task from throwing sticks and balls at an aunt sally on terra firma: the target is so small and elusive. practically it is impossible to employ the flying machine, whether it be a dirigible or an aeroplane, in this field. many factors militate against such an application. in the first place there is a very wide difference between dry land and a stretch of water as an area over which to manoeuvre. so far as the land is concerned descent is practicable at any time and almost anywhere. but an attempt to descend upon the open sea even when the latter is as calm as the proverbial mill-pond is fraught with considerable danger. the air-currents immediately above the water differ radically from those prevailing above the surface of the land. solar radiation also plays a very vital part. in fact the dirigible dare not venture to make such a landing even if it be provided with floats. the chances are a thousand to one that the cars will become water-logged, rendering re-ascent a matter of extreme difficulty, if not absolutely impossible. on the other hand, the aeroplane when equipped with floats, is able to alight upon the water, and to rest thereon for a time. it may even take in a new supply of fuel if the elements be propitious, and may be able to re-ascend, but the occasions are rare when such operations can be carried out successfully. in operations over water the airman is confronted with one serious danger--the risk of losing his bearings and his way. for instance, many attempts have been made to cross the north sea by aeroplane, but only one has proved successful so far. the intrepid aviator did succeed in passing from the shore of britain to the coast of scandinavia. many people suppose that because an airman is equipped with a compass he must be able to find his way, but this is a fallacy. the aviator is in the same plight as a mariner who is compelled from circumstances to rely upon his compass alone, and who is debarred by inclement weather from deciding his precise position by taking the sun. a ship ploughing the waters has to contend against the action of cross currents, the speed of which varies considerably, as well as adverse winds. unless absolute correction for these influences can be made the ship will wander considerably from its course. the airman is placed in a worse position. he has no means of determining the direction and velocity of the currents prevailing in the atmosphere, and his compass cannot give him any help in this connection, because it merely indicates direction. unless the airman has some means of determining his position, such as landmarks, he fails to realise the fact that he is drifting, or, even if he becomes aware of this fact, it is by no means a simple straightforward matter for him to make adequate allowance for the factor. side-drift is the aviator's greatest enemy. it cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy. if the compass were an infallible guide the airman would be able to complete a given journey in dense fog just as easily as in clear weather. it is the action of the cross currents and the unconscious drift which render movement in the air during fog as impracticable with safety as manoeuvring through the water under similar conditions. more than one bold and skilful aviator has essayed the crossing of the english channel and, being overtaken by fog, has failed to make the opposite coast. his compass has given him the proper direction, but the side-drift has proved his undoing, with the result that he has missed his objective. the fickle character of the winds over the water, especially over such expanses as the north sea, constitutes another and seriously adverse factor. storms, squalls, gales, and, in winter, blizzards, spring up with magical suddenness, and are so severe that no aircraft could hope to live in them. but such visitations are more to be dreaded by the lighter-than-air than by the heavier-than-air machines. the former offers a considerable area of resistance to the tempest and is caught up by the whirlwind before the pilot fully grasps the significant chance of the natural phenomenon. once a dirigible is swept out of the hands of its pilot its doom is sealed. on the other hand, the speed attainable by the aeroplane constitutes its safety. it can run before the wind, and meantime can climb steadily and rapidly to a higher altitude, until at last it enters a contrary wind or even a tolerably quiescent atmosphere. even if it encounters the tempest head on there is no immediate danger if the aviator keep cool. this fact has been established times out of number and the airman has been sufficiently skilful and quick-witted to succeed in frustrating the destructive tactics of his natural enemy. only a short while ago in france, british airmen who went aloft in a gale found the latter too strong for them. although the machine was driven full speed ahead it was forced backwards at the rate of miles per hour because the independent speed of the aeroplane was less than the velocity of the wind. but a dirigible has never succeeded in weathering a gale; its bulk, area, and weight, combined with its relatively slow movement, are against it, with the result that it is hurled to destruction. all things considered, the dirigible is regarded as an impracticable acquisition to a fleet, except in the eyes of the germans, who have been induced to place implicit reliance upon their monsters. the gullible teuton public confidently believes that their dreadnoughts of the air will complete the destruction of the british fleet, but responsible persons know full well that they will not play such a part, but must be reserved for scouting. hitherto, in naval operations, mosquito water-craft, such as torpedo-boats, have been employed in this service. but these swift vessels suffer from one serious disability. the range of vision is necessarily limited, and a slight mist hanging over the water blinds them; the enemy may even pass within half-a-mile of them and escape detection. the zeppelin from its position , feet or more above the water, in clear weather, has a tremendous range of vision; the horizon is about miles distant, as compared with approximately miles in the case of the torpedo-boat. of course an object, such as a battleship, may be detected at a far greater range. consequently the german naval programme is to send the zeppelin a certain distance ahead of the battleship squadron. the dirigible from its coign of vantage would be able to sight a hostile squadron if it were within visual range and would communicate the fact to the commander of the fleet below. the latter would decide his course according to information received; thus he would be enabled to elude his enemy, or, if the tidings received from the aerial scout should be favourable, to dispose his vessels in the most favourable array for attack. the german code of naval tactics does not foreshadow the use of dirigible aircraft as vessels of attack. scouting is the primary and indeed the only useful duty of the dirigible, although it is quite possible that the aerial craft might participate in a subsequent naval engagement, as, indeed, has been the case. its participation, however, would be governed entirely by climatic conditions. the fact that the dirigible is a weak unit of attack in naval operations is fully appreciated by all the belligerents. the picture of a sky "black with zeppelins" may appeal to the popular imagination, and may induce the uninitiated to cherish the belief that such an array would strike terror into the hearts of the foe, but the naval authorities are well aware that no material advantage would accrue from such a force. in the first place they would constitute an ideal target for the enemy's vessels. they would be compelled to draw within range in order to render their own attack effective, and promiscuous shooting from below would probably achieve the desired end. one or more of the hostile aircraft would be hit within a short while. such disasters would undoubtedly throw the aerial fleet into confusion, and possibly might interfere with the tactical developments of its own friends upon the water below. the shells hurled from the zeppelins would probably inflict but little damage upon the warships beneath. let it be conceded that they weigh about pounds, which is two-thirds of the weight of the projectile hurled from the krupp -centimetre howitzer. such a missile would have but little destructive effect if dropped from a height of , feet. to achieve a result commensurate with that of the -centimetre howitzer the airship would have to launch the missile from a height of about , feet. to take aim from such an altitude is impossible, especially at a rapidly moving target such as a battle-cruiser. the fact must not be forgotten that count zeppelin himself has expressed the opinion, the result of careful and prolonged experiments, that his craft is practically useless at a height exceeding , feet. another point must not be overlooked. in a spirited naval engagement the combatants would speedily be obliterated from the view of those aloft by the thick pall of smoke--the combination of gun-fire and emission from the furnaces and a blind attack would be just as likely to damage friend as foe. even if the aircraft ventured to descend as low as , feet it would be faced with another adverse influence. the discharge of the heavy battleship guns would bring about such an agitation of the air above as to imperil the delicate equilibrium of an airship. nor must one overlook the circumstance that in such an engagement the zeppelins would become the prey of hostile aeroplanes. the latter, being swifter and nimbler, would harry the cumbersome and slow-moving dirigible in the manner of a dog baiting a bear to such a degree that the dirigible would be compelled to sheer off to secure its own safety. desperate bravery and grim determination may be magnificent physical attributes, ut they would have to be superhuman to face the stinging recurrent attacks of mosquito-aeroplanes. the limitations of the zeppelin, and in fact of all dirigible aircraft, were emphasised upon the occasion of the british aerial raid upon cuxhaven. two zeppelins bravely put out to overwhelm the cruisers and torpedo boats which accompanied and supported the british sea-planes, but when confronted with well-placed firing from the guns of the vessels below they quickly decided that discretion was the better part of valour and drew off. in naval operations the aeroplane is a far more formidable foe, although here again there are many limitations. the first and most serious is the severely limited radius of action. the aeroplane motor is a hungry engine, while the fuel capacity of the tank is restricted. the german military authorities speedily realised the significance of this factor and its bearing upon useful operations, and forth with carried out elaborate endurance tests. in numerable flights were made with the express purpose of determining how long a machine could remain in the air upon a single fuel supply. the results of these flights were collated and the achievements of each machine in this direction carefully analysed, a mean average drawn up, and then pigeon-holed. the results were kept secret, only the more sensational records being published to the world. as the policy of standardisation in the construction of aeroplanes was adopted the radius of action of each type became established. it is true that variations of this factor even among vessels exactly similar in every respect are inevitable, but it was possible to establish a reliable mean average for general guidance. the archives of the berlin military department are crowded with facts and figures relating to this particular essential, so that the radius of action, that is the mileage upon a single fuel charge, of any class and type of machine may be ascertained in a moment. the consequence is that the military authorities are able to decide the type of aeroplane which is best suited to a certain projected task. according to the dossier in the pigeon-hole, wherein the results of the type are filed, the aeroplane will be able to go so far, and upon arriving at that point will be able to accomplish so much work, and then be able to return home. consequently it is dispatched upon the especial duty without any feeling of uncertainty. unfortunately, these experimental processes were too methodical to prove reliable. the endurance data were prepared from tests carried out in the aerodrome and from cross-country trials accomplished under ideal or fair-weather conditions. the result is that calculations have been often upset somewhat rudely by weather conditions of a totally unexpected character, which bring home vividly the striking difference between theory and practice. the british and french aviation authorities have not adopted such methodical standardisation or rule of thumb inferences, but rather have fostered individual enterprise and initiative. this stimulation of research has been responsible for the creation of a type of aeroplane specially adapted to naval service, and generically known as the water plane, the outstanding point of difference from the aeroplane being the substitution of canoes or floats for the wheeled chassis peculiar to the land machine. the flier is sturdily built, while the floats are sufficiently substantial to support the craft upon the water in calm weather. perhaps it was the insular situation of the british nation which was responsible for this trend of development, because so far as britain is concerned the sea-going aeroplane is in dispensable. but the salient fact remains that to-day the waterplane service of great britain is the most efficient in the world, the craft being speedy, designed and built to meet the rough weather conditions which are experienced around these islands, and ideal vessels for patrol and raiding duties. so far as the british practice is concerned the waterplane is designed to operate in conjunction with, and not apart from, the navy. it has been made the eyes of the navy in the strictest interpretation of the term. in any such combination the great difficulty is the establishment of what may be termed a mobile base, inasmuch as the waterplane must move with the fleet. this end has been achieved by the evolution of a means of carrying a waterplane upon, and launching it from, a battleship, if necessary. for this purpose a docking cradle or way has been provided aft where the aeroplane may be housed until the moment arrives for its employment. several vessels have been devoted to this nursing duty and are known as parent ships to the waterplane service. all that is requisite when the time arrives for the use of the seaplane is to lift it bodily by derrick or crane from its cradle and to lower it upon the water. it will be remembered that the american naval authorities made an experiment with a scheme for directly launching the warplane from the deck of a battleship in the orthodox, as well as offering it a spot upon which to alight upon returning from a flight, while wing-commander samson, r.n., d.s.o., the famous british airman, repeated the experiment by flying from a similar launching way installed upon h.m.s. hibernia. but this practice has many shortcomings. so far as the british and french navies are concerned, the former process is preferred. again, when the waterplane returns from a flight it is admitted that it is simpler, quicker, and safer for it to settle upon the water near the parent ship and to be lifted on board. as a sea-scout the waterplane is overwhelmingly superior to the dirigible as events have conclusively proved. its greater mobility and speed stand it in excellent stead because it is able to cover a larger area within a shorter space of time than its huge and unwieldy contemporary. furthermore, it is a difficult target to hit and accordingly is not so likely to be brought down by hostile fire. there is another point in its favour. the experience of the war has proved that the numerically inferior enemy prefers to carry out his naval operations under the cover of the mist and haze which settle upon the water, and yet are of sufficient depth to conceal his identity and composition. such mists as a rule comprise a relatively thin bank of low-lying vapour, which while enveloping the surface of the water in an impenetrable pall, yet permits the mast-heads of the vessels to stand out clearly, although they cannot be detected from the water-level or even from the control and fighting tops of a warship. a scouting waterplane, however, is able to observe them and note their movement, and accordingly can collect useful information concerning the apparent composition of the hidden force, the course it is following, its travelling speed, and so forth, which it can convey immediately to its friends. the aeroplane has established its value in another manner. coal-burning vessels when moving at any pronounced speed invariably throw off large quantities of smoke, which may be detected easily from above, even when the vessels themselves are completely hidden in the mist. it was this circumstance which revealed the presence of the british squadron in the affair of the bight of heligoland. the german airman on patrol duty from the adjacent base on the island of heligoland detected the presence of this smoke, above the low-lying bank of fog, although there were no other visible signs of any vessels. fully cognisant of the fact that the german fleet was at anchor in a safe place he naturally divined that the smoke proceeded from a hostile squadron, evidently bent upon a raid. he returned to his headquarters, conveyed the intelligence he had collected to his superior officers, upon receipt of which a german cruiser squadron was sent out and engaged the british vessels to its own discomfiture. but for the airman's vigilance and smartness there is no doubt that the british squadron would have accomplished a great coup. this incident, however, served to reveal that the aerial scout is prone to suffer from over-keenness and to collect only a partial amount of information. upon this occasion the german watchman detected the presence of the british torpedo-boat and light cruiser force. had he continued his investigations and made a wider sweep he would have discovered the proximity of the british battle-cruiser squadron which routed the german force, the latter having acted on incomplete information. while the low-lying sea-fog is the navigator's worst enemy, it is the airman's greatest friend and protection. it not only preserves him against visual discovery from below, but is an excellent insulator of sound, so that his whereabouts is not betrayed by the noise of his motor. it is of in calculable value in another way. when a fog prevails the sea is generally as smooth as the pro verbial mirror, enabling the waterplanes to be brought up under cover to a suitable point from which they may be dispatched. upon their release by climbing to a height of a few hundred feet the airmen are able to reach a clear atmosphere, where by means of the compass it is possible to advance in approximately the desired direction, safe from discovery from below owing to the fog. if they are "spotted" they can dive into its friendly depths, complete their work, and make for the parent ship. low-lying sea-fogs are favourable to aerial raids provided the scout is able to catch sight of the upper parts of landmarks to enable him to be sure of the correctness of his line of flight-in cases where the distance is very short compass direction is sufficiently reliable-because the bank of vapour not only constitutes a perfect screen, but serves as a blanket to the motor exhaust, if not completely, at least sufficiently to mislead those below. fogs, as every mariner will testify, play strange tricks with the transmission of sound. hence, although those on the vessels below might detect a slight hum, it might possibly be so faint as to convey the impression that the aviator was miles away, when, as a matter of fact, he was directly overhead. this confusion arising from sound aberration is a useful protection in itself, as it tends to lure a naval force lying in or moving through the fog into a false sense of security. the development of the submarine revealed the incontrovertible fact that this arm would play a prominent part in future operations upon the water: a presage which has been adequately fulfilled during the present conflict. the instinct of self-preservation at once provoked a discussion of the most effective ways and means of disguising its whereabouts when it travels submerged. to this end the german naval authorities conducted a series of elaborate and interesting experiments off the island of heligoland. as is well known, when one is directly above a stretch of shallow water, the bottom of the latter can be seen quite distinctly. consequently, it was decided to employ aerial craft as detectives. both the aeroplane and the dirigible took part in these experiments, being flown at varying heights, while the submarine was maneouvred at different depths immediately below. the sum of these investigations proved conclusively that a submarine may be detected from aloft when moving at a depth of from to feet. the outline of the submerged craft is certainly somewhat blurred, but nevertheless it is sufficiently distinct to enable its identity to be determined really against the background or bottom of the sea. to combat this detection from an aerial position it will be necessary inter alia to evolve a more harmonious or protective colour-scheme for the submarine. their investigations were responsible for the inauguration of the elaborate german aerial patrol of harbours, the base for such aerial operations being established upon the island of heligoland. so far the stern test of war as applied to the science of aeronautics has emphasised the fact that as a naval unit the dirigible is a complete failure. whether experience will bring about a modification of these views time alone will show, but it is certain that existing principles of design will have to undergo a radical revision to achieve any notable results. the aeroplane alone has proved successful in this domain, and it is upon this type of aerial craft that dependence will have to be placed. chapter xix. the navies of the air less than three years ago the momentous and spectacular race among the powers of europe for the supremacy of the air began. at first the struggle was confined to two rivals--france and germany--but as time progressed and the importance of aerial fleets was recognised, other nations, notably great britain, entered the field. germany obtained an advantage. experiment and research were taken up at a point which had been reached by french effort; further experiments and researches were carried out in german circles with secret and feverish haste, with the result that within a short time a pronounced degree of efficiency according to german ideals had been attained. the degree of perfection achieved was not regarded with mere academic interest; it marked the parting of the ways: the point where scientific endeavour commanded practical appreciation by turning the success of the laboratory and aerodrome into the channel of commercial manufacture. in other words, systematic and wholesale production was undertaken upon an extensive scale. the component parts were standardised and arrangements were completed with various establishments possessed of the most suitable machinery to perfect a programme for turning out aeronautical requirements in a steady, continuous stream from the moment the crisis developed. the wisdom of completing these arrangements in anticipation is now apparent. upon the outbreak of hostilities many german establishments devoted to the production of articles required in the infinite ramifications of commerce found themselves deprived of their markets, but there was no risk that their large plants would be brought to a standstill: the government ordered the manufacture of aeroplane parts and motors upon an extensive scale. in this manner not only were the industrial establishments kept going, but their production of aeronautical requirements relieved those organisations devoted to the manufacture of armaments, so that the whole resources and facilities of these could be concentrated upon the supply of munitions of war. in france the air-fleet, although extensive upon the outbreak of war, was somewhat heterogeneous. experiment was still being pursued: no type had met with definite official recognition, the result being that no arrangements had been completed for the production of one or more standard types upon an elaborate scale comparable with that maintained by germany. in fact some six months after the outbreak of war there was an appreciable lack of precision on this point in french military. many of the types which had established their success were forbidden by military decree as mentioned in a previous chapter, while manufacturing arrangements were still somewhat chaotic. great britain was still more backward in the new movement. but this state of affairs was in a measure due to the division of the fourth arm among the two services. a well-organised government manufactory for the production of aeroplanes and other aircraft necessities had been established, while the private manufacturers had completed preparations for wholesale production. but it was not until the admiralty accepted responsibility for the aerial service that work was essayed in grim earnest. the allocation of the aerial responsibilities of great britain to the admiralty was a wise move. experience has revealed the advantages accruing from the perfection of homogeneous squadrons upon the water, that is to say groups of ships which are virtually sister-craft of identical speed, armament, and so on, thus enabling the whole to act together as a complete effective unit. as this plan had proved so successful upon the water, the admiralty decided to apply it to the fleet designed for service in the air above. at the time this plan of campaign was definitely settled great britain as an aerial power was a long way behind her most formidable rival, but strenuous efforts were made to reduce the handicap, and within a short while the greater part of this leeway had been made up. upon the outbreak of war great britain undoubtedly was inferior to germany in point of numbers of aircraft, but the latter power was completely outclassed in efficiency, and from the point of view of personnel. the british had developed the waterplane as an essential auxiliary to naval operations, and here was in advance of her rival, who had practically neglected this line of experiment and evolution, resting secure in the assurance of her advisers that the huge dirigibles would be adequate for all exigencies on the water. indeed, when war was declared, all the powers were found more or less wanting so far as their aerial fleets were concerned. if germany's huge aerial navy had been in readiness for instant service when she invaded belgium, she would have overcome that little country's resistance in a far shorter time and with much less waste of life. it was the belgians who first brought home to the belligerents the prominent part that aircraft were destined to play in war, and the military possibilities of the aeroplane. true, the belgians had a very small aerial navy, but it was put to work without delay and accomplished magnificent results, ascertaining the german positions and dispositions with unerring accuracy and incredible ease, and thus enabling the commander of the belgian army to dispose his relatively tiny force to the best advantage, and to offer the most effective resistance. great britain's aerial navy, while likewise some what small, was also ready for instant service. the british expeditionary force was supported by a very efficient aerial fleet, the majority of the vessels forming which flew across the channel at high speed to the british headquarters in france so as to be available directly military preparations were begun, and the value of this support proved to be inestimable, since it speedily demoralised the numerically superior enemy. france, like germany, was somewhat dilatory, but this was attributable rather to the time occupied in the mobilisation of the fourth arm than to lack of energy. there were a round , aeroplanes ostensibly ready for service, in addition to some dirigibles. but the fleet was somewhat scattered, while many of the craft were not immediately available, being in the shops or in dock for repairs and overhaul. during the period of mobilisation the so-called standing military force was augmented by about machines which were acquired from private owners. the aeroplane factories were also, overhauled and re-organised so as to be in a position to remedy the inevitable wastage, but these organisation efforts were somewhat handicapped by the shortage of labour arising from the call to arms. france, moreover, imperilled her aerial strength by forbidding the use of machines which were ready for service. germany's aerial fleet was of similar proportions to that of her gallic neighbour, but curiously enough, and in strange contrast, there appeared to be a lack of readiness in this ramification of the teuton war machine. the military establishment possessed about , machines--active and reserve--of which it is estimated were available for instant service. during the period of mobilisation a further machines were added to the fleet, drawn for the most part from private owners. so far as the dirigibles were concerned zeppelins were ready for duty, while others were under construction or undergoing overhaul and repair. a few other types were also in commission or acquired during mobilisation, bringing the dirigible force to machines all told. but the greatest surprise was probably offered by russia. very little was known concerning russian activities in this particular field, although it was stated that large orders for machines had been placed with various foreign manufactories. certain factories also had been established within the empire, although the character of their work and its results and achievements were concealed from prying eyes. in russia, however, an appreciable number of private aeroplanes were in operation, and these, of course, were placed at the disposal of the authorities the moment the crisis developed. the british and french aeroplane manufacturers had been busy upon russian orders for many months previous to the outbreak of hostilities, while heavy shipments of component parts had been made, the assembling and completion of the machines being carried out in the country. it is generally believed that upon the outbreak of war russia had a fleet of aeroplanes in hand, of which total were contributed from private sources. even the dirigible had not been overlooked, there being nearly of these craft attached to the russian army, although for the most part they are small vessels. in comparison with the foregoing large aerial navies, that of great britain appeared to be puny. at the moment great britain possesses about machines, of which about are waterplanes. in addition, according to the secretary of the admiralty, dirigibles should be in service. private enterprise is supported by the government, which maintains a factory for the manufacture of these craft. during the two years preceding the outbreak of war the various powers grew remarkably reticent concerning the composition and enlargement of their respective aerial fleets. no official figures were published. but at the same time it is a well-known fact that during the year france augmented her flying force by no fewer than aeroplanes. germany was no less energetic, the military acquisition in this branch, and during the self-same year, approaching machines according to the semi-official reports published in that country. the arrangements concluded for the manufacture of additional craft during the war are equally remarkable. the principal factory in germany, (now devoting its energies to the production of these craft, although in happier days its normal complement of , men were responsible for the production of another commercial article) possesses facilities for turning out complete aeroplanes per week, according to the statement of its managing director. but it is averred that this statement is purposely misleading, inasmuch as during the first fortnight of the campaign it was producing over aeroplanes per week. it must be remembered that germany is responsible for the supply of the majority of such craft for the austrian armies, that country purchasing these vessels in large numbers, because in the early days of the conflict it was notoriously weak in this arm. since the declaration of war strenuous efforts have been made to remedy this state of affairs, particularly upon the unexpected revelation of russia's aerial strength. it is computed that upon the outbreak of war the various powers were in the position to show an aggregate of , aircraft of all descriptions, both for active service and reserve. this is a colossal fleet, but it serves to convey in a graphic manner the importance attached to the adrial vessel by the respective belligerents. so far as germany is concerned she is sorely in need of additional machines. her fleet of the air has lost its formidable character, owing to the fact that it has to be divided between two frontiers, while she has been further weakened by the enormous lengths of the two battle-fronts. russia has been able to concentrate her aerial force, which has proved of incalculable value to the grand duke nicholas, who has expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by his fliers. the french likewise have been favoured by fortune in this respect. their aerial navy is likewise concentrated upon a single frontier, although a pronounced proportion has been reserved for service upon the mediterranean sea-board for co-operation with the fleet. france suffers, however, to a certain degree from the length of her battle-line, which is over miles in length. the french aerial fleet has been particularly active in the vosges and the argonne, where the difficult, mountainous, and densely wooded country has rendered other systems of observation of the enemy's movements a matter of extreme difficulty. the germans have laboured under a similar handicap in this territory, and have likewise been compelled to centre a considerable proportion of their aerial fleet upon this corner of the extended battlefield. it is in this region that the greatest wastage has been manifest. i have been informed by one correspondent who is fighting in this sternly contested area, that at one time a daily loss of ten german machines was a fair average, while highwater mark was reached, so far as his own observations and ability to glean information were concerned by the loss of machines during a single day. the french wastage, while not so heavy upon the average, has been considerable at times. the term wastage is somewhat misleading, if not erroneous. it does not necessarily imply the total loss of a machine, such as its descent upon hostile territory, but includes damage to machines, no matter how slight, landing within their own lines. in the difficult country of the vosges many aeroplanes have come to earth somewhat heavily, and have suffered such damage as to render them inoperative, compelling their removal from the effective list until they have undergone complete overhaul or reconstruction. upon occasions this wastage has been so pronounced that the french aviators, including some of the foremost fliers serving with the forces, have been without a machine and have been compelled to wait their turn. i am informed that one day four machines, returning from a reconnaissance in force, crashed successively to the ground, and each had to be hauled away to the repair sheds, necessitating withdrawal from service for several days. unfortunately the french, owing to their decision to rule out certain machines as unsuited to military service, have not yet perfected their organisation for making good this wastage, although latterly it has been appreciably reduced by greater care among the aviators in handling their vessels. the fast vessels of the french aerial fleet have proved exceptionally valuable. with these craft speeds of and miles or more per hour have been attained under favourable conditions, and pace has proved distinctly advantageous, inasmuch as it gives the french aviators a superiority of about per cent over the average german machine. it was the activity and daring of the french fliers upon these high speed machines which induced the german airmen to change their tactics. individual effort and isolated raiding operations were abandoned in favour of what might be described as combined or squadron attack. six or eight machines advancing together towards the french lines somewhat nonplussed these fleet french mosquito craft, and to a certain degree nullified their superiority in pace. speed was discounted, for the simple reason that the enemy when so massed evinced a disposition to fight and to follow harassing tactics when one of the slowest french machines ventured into the air. it is interesting to observe that aerial operations, now that they are being conducted upon what may be termed methodical lines as distinct from corsair movements, are following the broad fundamental principles of naval tactics. homogeneous squadrons, that is, squadrons composed of vessels of similar type and armament, put out and follow roughly the "single line ahead" formation. upon sighting the enemy there is the manoeuvring for position advantage which must accrue to the speedier protagonist. one then, witnesses what might almost be described as an application of the process of capping the line or "crossing the 't.'" this tends to throw the slower squadron into confusion by bending it back upon itself, meanwhile exposing it to a demoralizing fire. the analogy is not precisely correct but sufficiently so to indicate that aerial battles will be fought much upon the same lines, as engagements between vessels upon the water. if the manoeuvres accomplish nothing beyond breaking up and scattering the foe, the result is satisfactory in as much as in this event it is possible to exert a driving tendency and to force him back upon the lines of the superior force, when the scattered vessels may be brought within the zone of spirited fire from the ground. attacks in force are more likely to prove successful than individual raiding tactics, as recent events upon the battlefield of europe have demonstrated more or less convincingly. an attack in force is likely to cause the defenders upon the ground beneath to lose their heads and to fire wildly and at random, with the result that the airmen may achieve their object with but little damage to themselves. this method of attacking in force was essayed for the first time by the british aerial fleet, which perhaps is not surprising, seeing that the machines are manned and the operations supervised by officers who have excelled in naval training, and who are skilled in such movements. no doubt this practice, combined with the daring of the british aviators, contributed very materially to the utter demoralisation of the german aerial forces, and was responsible for that hesitancy to attack a position in the vicinity of the british craft which became so manifest in the course of a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. one of the foremost military experts of the united states, who passed some time in the fighting zone, expressed his opinion that the british aerial force is the most efficient among the belligerents when considered as a unit, the french flier being described by the same authority as most effective when acting individually, owing to personal intrepidity. as a scout the french aviator is probably unequalled, because he is quick to perceive and to collect the data required, and when provided with a fast machine is remarkably nimble and venturesome in the air. the british aviators, however, work as a whole, and in the particular phases where such tactics are profitable have established incontestable superiority. at first the german aerial force appeared to possess no settled system of operation. individual effort was pronounced, but it lacked method. the germans have, however, profited from the lessons taught by their antagonists, and now are emulating their tactics, but owing to their imperfect training and knowledge the results they achieve appear to be negligible. the dirigible still remains an unknown quantity in these activities, although strange to relate, in the early days of the war, the work accomplished by the british craft, despite their comparatively low speed and small dimensions, excelled in value that achieved by the warplanes. this was particularly noticeable in matters pertaining to reconnaissance, more especially at night, when the british vessels often remained for hours together in the air, manoeuvring over the hostile lines, and gathering invaluable information as to the disposition and movements of the opposing forces. but it is probably in connection with naval operations that the british aerial fleet excels. the waterplanes have established their supremacy over the naval dirigible in a striking manner. british endeavour fostered the waterplane movement and has carried it to a high degree of perfection. the waterplane is not primarily designed to perform long flights, although such may be carried out if the exigencies demand. the practice of deputing certain vessels to art as "parent ships" to a covey of waterplanes has proved as successful in practice, as in theory. again, the arrangements for conveying these machines by such means to a rendezvous, and there putting them into the water to complete a certain duty, have been triumphantly vindicated. at the time this idea was embraced it met with a certain degree of hostile criticism: it was argued that the association of the two fighting, machines would tend towards confusion, and impair the efficiency of both. practice has refuted this theory. the british aerial raids upon cuxhaven and other places would have been impossible, and probably valueless as an effective move, but for the fact that it was possible to release the machines from a certain point upon the open sea, within easy reach of the cooperating naval squadron. true, the latter was exposed to hostile attack from submarines, but as results proved this was easy to repel. the aircraft were enabled to return to their base, as represented by the rendezvous, to be picked up, and to communicate the intelligence gained from their flight to the authorities in a shorter period of time than would have been possible under any other circumstances, while the risk to the airmen was proportionately reduced. the fact that the belligerents have built up such huge aerial navies conclusively proves that the military value of the fourth arm has been fully appreciated. from the results so far achieved there is every indication that activity in this direction will be increased rather than diminished.